PLD 2017 Judgments

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 1

Before Riaz Ahmad Khan, C.J., Allama Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan, Sheikh Najam ul Hasan, Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani and Ashraf Jahan, JJ

Dr. MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAKI---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through President of Pakistan and another---Respondents

Shariat Petition No. 4/I of 2005, decided on 12th May, 2016.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss.302(b), 304 & 311---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.345---Constitution of Pakistan, Art, 203-D---Shariat petition---Qatl-i-amd---Punishment of death sentence as Ta'zir---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Plea of petitioner was that for awarding sentence of death as Ta'zir under S.302(b), P.P.C. the required standard of evidence was less than what was required for punishment with death as 'Qisas' under S.302(a), P.P.C; that despite the higher degree of evidence required, the offence under S.302(a), P.P.C was made compoundable, but the offence under S.302(b), P.P.C. requiring lesser standard of evidence was not compoundable; that in such circumstances in cases of Ta'zir, punishment other than death should be awarded---Validity---Where the (higher) standard required for Qatl-i-amd provided under S.304, P.P.C. was not met, but the guilt of the accused was established beyond any reasonable doubt through other reliable evidence, the offender could not be let escort free and must be punished according to the nature of the gravity of offence committed---Relief sought by petitioner in the form lesser punishment (other than death sentence) as Ta'zir for Qatl-i-amd was already provided under Ss.311, P.P.C. and 345, Cr.P.C.

Plea of petitioner that as per Islamic principles, the punishment in Tazir in the same offence should not reach or exceed the punishment of 'Qisas' or 'Hadd'; that as per section 302(a), P.P.C. the Qisas was proved either by confession or by the credible testimony of at least two male Muslim witnesses having the test of Tazkia-tul-Shahood, while in section 302(b) for punishment of death as 'Ta'zir' no such proof was required; that the offence in section 302(a), P.P.C. where there was definiteness of the involvement of the accused was made compoundable, but the offence in section 302(b), P.P.C. where the testimony was doubtful, the offence was not compoundable; that this was against the logic, justice, fairness and against the principles of Shariah as laid down by Holy Quran and Sunnah, and that accordingly as far as Ta'zir was concerned, punishment other than death should be awarded.

When the standard required for qatl-i-amd as provided under section 304, P.P.C. was not forthcoming but despite that, guilt of the accused was established beyond any reasonable doubt through other reliable evidence, to the entire satisfaction of the Court, the offender could not be let escort free to spread "Fasaad-Fil-Arz" and remain a permanent source of threat to the life, honour and property of other citizens. At times modern technologies like DNA tests, medical test, chemical examiner's reports, security cameras and various other bits and pieces of circumstantial evidence etc. proved the offence of murder to the hilt, without leaving any slightest room for reasonable doubt, but, as was the situation, the standard of proof as required by section 304, P.P.C. was not usually available for various reasons. In such situations, justice demanded that such culprits must be punished according to the nature of the gravity of offence committed by them.

When any offence was proved by some credible confidence-inspiring piece of evidence, beyond any reasonable doubt, Islamic law provided to strike hard and long to take the offender to the logical end, according to law. No leniency in such regard had been allowed in any "Nass".

Moreover relief sought by petitioner in the form lesser punishment (other than death sentence) as Ta'zir for qatl-i-amd was already provided under sections 311, P.P.C. and 345, Cr.P.C. Shariat petition being misconceived was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Islamic jurisprudence---

----Islamic State---Legislative powers for maintaining law and order---Scope---Islamic State was empowered to legislate appropriate laws for offences committed within its jurisdiction---State was bound to exercise its power and authority within the limits prescribed by the Injunctions of Islam, through the chosen representatives of the people---State in performance of its obligation had to legislate for maintaining law and order situation in all circumstances and had to resort to various measures including promulgation of laws for protection of life, honour and property of the citizens.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 203-D---Federal Shariat Court---Original jurisdiction---Scope---Federal Shariat Court while exercising its original jurisdiction was constitutionally bound to base its judgment on specific "Nass" of the Holy Quran and Sunnah and not on any other ground or consideration.

Petitioner in person.

M. Pervez Khan Tanoli, Standing Counsel for Federal Government.

Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. Advocate-General for Balochistan Government.

Ahsan Hameed Dogar for Sindh Government.

Rashid Hafeez, Addl. Advocate General for Punjab Government.

Arshad Ahmad Asstt. Advocate General for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 8

Before Riaz Ahmad Khan, C.J., Allama Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan, Sheikh Najam ul Hasan, Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani and Ashraf Jahan, JJ

SYEDA VIQUAR UN NISA HASHMI---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Ministry of Law Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad---Respondent

Shariat Petition No. 2/I of 2011, decided on 12th May, 2016.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---

----Ss 306 (b) & (c), 307(1) (b) & (c), 309(1), 310(1), 311, 313 & 338---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 345(1) & (2A)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.203-D---Shariat petition---Honour killing---Waiver to or compounding of offence---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Plea of petitioner that honour killing was "Fasad-Fil-Arz" and therefore there should be no compoundability in granting waiver to or compounding the offence of Qisas with an accused who took law in his hands and committed a heinous offence of murder without adopting recourse to the judicial process---Validity---Section 311, P.P.C. already provided for the relief sought by the petitioner---Said section started with the word "notwithstanding anything contained in S.309 or 310" pertaining to waiver of Qisas in Qatl-i-amd and compounding of Qisas in qat1-i-amd and by authorizing the court to award, inter alia, even death sentence to such a culprit despite the waiver of or compounding the right of Qisas by the adult sane 'Wali'---Shariat petition being misconceived was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Preamble---Islamic State was bound to exercise its power and authority within the limits prescribed by the Injunctions of Islam, through the chosen representatives of the people.

Petitioner in person.

M. Pervez Khan Tanoli, Standing Counsel for Federal Government.

Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Additional Advocate-General for Balochistan Government.

Ahsan Hameed Dogar for Sindh Government.

Rashid Hafeez, Additional Advocate-General for Punjab Government.

Arshad Ahmad, Assistant Advocate-General for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 12

Before Riaz Ahmad Khan, C.J., Allama Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan, Sheikh Najam ul Hasan, Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani and Ashraf Jahan, JJ

DIRECTOR AND MEMBERS AL-QURAN RESEARCH ACADEMY, KHYBER BAZAR, PESHAWAR---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Law Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad---Respondent

Shariat Petition No. 01/P of 1997, decided on 12th May, 2016.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 54, 55, 55A, 309, 310, 312 & 313---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 345---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 203-D---Shariat petition---Qatl-i-amd, punishment for---Death sentence---Compounding of punishment for qatl-i-amd---Waiver of right of qisas---Repugnancy to injunctions of Islam---Holy Quran gave the victim the right to forgive, and to waive or compound his right of Qisas---Where the heirs of the victim (deceased) willingly agreed to bury the hatchet, it would not only add to the public peace and tranquility but would save their present and successive generations from bloodshed; thus it was in the larger public interest to grant legal sanctity to compoundability only in the cases of Qisas.

Plea by petitioner was that according to the Holy Quran, the punishment of qatl-i-amd was only death and it was not at all compoundable, therefore Ss.54, 55, 55A, 309, 310, 312 & 313, P.P.C. as well as section 345 Cr.P.C. were repugnant to the Injunctions of the Holy Qur'an, and that the harmful effects of compoundability/leniency provided in the said section had resulted in enormous increase in commission of heinous crimes.

Holy Quran (Surah 17, Verse 33) referred to the right of the victim to claim Qisas (equal retribution) or Diyat (blood money) from the murderer. He was also vested with the "authority" (right to forgive, to waive or compound his right of Qisas). Thereafter, the State was bound to honour his right, in any form he wanted.

Muhammad Riaz v. Federal Government PLD 1980 FSC 1; PLD 1989 SC 633; Al-Qur'an Surah Bani Israeel Verse 33 and Surah Al-Baqra Verses Nos. 178 and 179 ref.

Where the heir/heirs of the victim (deceased) willingly agreed to bury the hatchet, genuinely patch up the dispute with the accused, and put an end to the animosity and restart an amicable life, it would not only add to the public peace and tranquility but would definitely save their present and successive generations from consistent tensions, persistent apprehensions, continuous unending chain-reactions of bloodshed by one or the other side. Thus it was in the larger public interest to grant legal sanctity to ccmpoundability only in the cases of Qisas, which primarily pertained to the right of citizens as compared to the cases of "Ta'zir" which pertained to the right of State which, in order to stop crimes altogether, reserved the right and usually did not allow its compoundability. Both types of Injunctions aimed at maintaining and ensuring peace and law and order in the society at large, by one way or the other. Shariat petition, being misconceived, was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Islamic jurisprudence---

----Interpretation---Islamic law is divine in its original sources, as such it necessitates great caution and meticulous care in dealing with the issue of interpretation of verses or in changing its universally accepted meanings to suit varying times, places and needs---Interpretation or meaning of a Quranic Verse, therefore, must have full support by the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.).

(c) Islamic jurisprudence---

----Sources of Islamic law---Quran and Sunnah---Scope---Quran is the first source of Islamic law and jurisprudence; it is the fundamental source wherein there is absolutely no doubt; it has been sent down for administration of justice between mankind---Legislation in the Holy Quran was revealed gradually and intermittently to meet the requirements of events in Islamic State and society---Sunnah (i.e. sayings, deeds or tacit approvals) of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) is the second most important source after the Quran and is unanimously considered supplementary to, and explanatory of Quran.

Verses 2:2; 32:2; 4:105; 5:92; 4:80 and 59:7 ref.

(d) Islamic jurisprudence---

----Sunnah---Adherence to Sunnah is obligatory, subject to verification of its authenticity.

Verses 2:129; 3:164; 16:44 and 33:21 ref.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan --

----Art. 203-D---Injunctions of Islam---Scope---Injunctions of Islam refer to the Injunctions as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.).

Nemo for Petitioner.

M. Pervez Khan Tanoli, Standing Counsel for Federal Government.

Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Additional Advocate-General for Balochistan Government.

Ahsan Hameed Dogar for Sindh Government.

Rashid Hafeez, Additional Advocate-General for Punjab Government.

Arshad Ahmad, Assistant Advocate-General for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 19

Before Riaz Ahmad Khan, C.J., Dr. Allama Fida Muhammad Khan, Sheikh Najam ul Hasan, Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani and Mrs. Ashraf Jahan, JJ

Col (Retd.) MUHAMMAD AKRAM---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary M/o Defence, Rawalpindi Cantt.---Respondent

Shariat Petition No.4/I of 2008, decided on 31st October, 2016.

Pakistan Army Regulations--

----Vol. 1, Rr. 133(q), 133(r) & 133(u)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.203-D---Shariat petition---Vacation of appointment---Suspension from duty---Loss of temporary rank and its emoluments during suspension---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Plea that an officer of armed forces who was taken into custody or was suspended from duty or was attached on disciplinary grounds, remained innocent till he was proved 'guilty', however under Rr.133(q), 133(r) & 133(u) of Volume 1 of Pakistan Army Regulations, such officer on vacation of his appointment lost his temporary rank and its emoluments which was against the Injunctions of Islam; that in contrast a government servant remained entitled to service emoluments and all other benefits and facilities provided to him for the period he remained suspended from duty---Validity---Rule 133 of Volume 1 of Pakistan Army Regulations ('impugned Rule') mentioned only the conditions for vacation of appointment---Said Rule did not affect the rules in Pay and Allowances Regulations under which command charge, staff or additional pay may, in certain cases, continue to be admissible to an officer and his successor notwithstanding the fact that he had ceased to actually perform, the duties connected with that appointment---According to the impugned Rule, an officer lost only the temporary rank and not the substantive rank nor its emoluments to which he remained duly entitled---In case of acquittal, such an officer may be reappointed to the post he had vacated from the first day of vacation of his original appointment, and in case of his conviction, if he received a sentence of less than dismissal, he may be reappointed from the date he returned to duty---As far pay and allowances of such an officer were concerned, the impugned Rule specifically provided, that these would remain unaffected under the Pay and Allowances Regulations---¬Petitioner could not refer to any specific Regulations in the Pay and Allowances Regulations which debarred such an officer from receiving his pay and allowances for the substantive ranks he held---Shariat petition being misconceived, was dismissed accordingly.

Petitioner in person.

M. Parvez Khan Tanoli, Standing Counsel for Federal Government.

Major Shah Jehan Khan, JAG, GHQ, Rawalpindi for Pakistan Army.

Capt. M. Nawaz Mirza and Commander Sami Waheed for Pakistan Navy.

Group Captain Rana Nazir JAG, Headquarter Peshawar for Pakistan Air Force.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 24

Before Riaz Ahmad Khan, C.J., Dr. Allama Fida Muhammad Khan, Sheikh Najam ul Hasan, Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani and Mrs. Ashraf Jahan, JJ

Col (Retd.) MUHAMMAD AKRAM---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary M/o Defence, Rawalpindi Cantt.---Respondent

Shariat Petition No.3/I of 2008, decided on 31st October, 2016.

(a) Islamic jurisprudence--

----"Equality before law" and "equal protection of law" was one of the fundamental principles of Islam which could not be ignored.

(b) Words and phrases--

----"Expedient"---Meaning.

Legal Terms and Phrases Judicially defined from 1947-2006 ref.

(c) Pakistan Army Regulations---

----R. 269-A(c)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 203-D---Shariat petition-- Dismissal, removal, premature or voluntary retirement/resignation of officer for misconduct etc.---Summary punishment---Cases in which it was not practicable or desirable to convene a Court Martial for the trial of an officer against whom misconduct or inefficiency etc. was imputed---Power of Chief of Army Staff to submit a report giving all the circumstances of the case and evidence, and send the case along with his recommendations for the decision of the Government---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Plea that R.269-A(c) was against the principles of 'Adl' and thus repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam---Validity---Rule 269-A of Pakistan Army Regulations provided, firstly for a court of inquiry to investigate and submit its findings [subsection (a)] or, secondly, call upon an officer to show cause and explain his position regarding the reasons necessitating his dismissal, removal and premature retirement from service [subsection (b)] or, lastly, in case it was not expedient either to hold a court of inquiry or call for the officer's explanation, the Chief of Army Staff may submit a report giving all the circumstances of the case and evidence, if any available, and send the case along with his recommendations for the decision of the Government [subsection (c)]---Maintenance of high order and discipline in the Armed Forces had utmost importance---In certain cases in the military recourse to the normal legal system may create irreparable loss to their unity, morale, discipline and performance, especially in war or emergency---Senior officers, in the chain of command, irrespective of the rank they held, urgently needed to be vested with the requisite authority to curb violation and disobedience of command---In certain cases such objective could be achieved by summary punishment of simple nature, which had to be administered without any unreasonable delay---Chief of Army Staff and other Chiefs of the Armed Forces had to decide various cases then and there on the spur of the moment, as they were the best judges to take cognizance, decide and take any appropriate action based on the attending circumstances and available evidence---Petitioner could not specifically point out any Verse of the Hoy Qur'an or Hadith of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) to support his contention that R.269-A(c) of Pakistan Army Regulations was repugnant to Injunctions of Islam---Shariat petition was dismissed accordingly.

Rule 269-A of Pakistan Army Regulations provided, firstly for a court of inquiry to investigate and submit its findings [subsection (a)] or, secondly, call upon an officer to show cause and explain his position regarding the reasons necessitating his dismissal, removal and premature retirement from service [subsection (b)] or, lastly, in case it was not expedient either to hold a court of inquiry or call for the officer's explanation, the Chief of Army Staff may submit a report giving all the circumstances of the case and evidence, if any available, and send the case along with his recommendations for the decision of the Government [subsection (c)]. Chiefs of Armed Forces were competent enough to properly decide whether the matter brought to their notice was expedient or not keeping in view all the existing circumstances and nature of offence as well as its repercussions.

Maintenance of high order and discipline in the Armed Forces had utmost importance. Without enforcing proper order and discipline, the troops may turn into an unruly mob and become a mere irresponsible mobilization of a crowd. Many occasions arose in the Armed Forces, from time to time, when recourse to the normal legal system may create irreparable loss to their unity, cohesion, morale, good order, military discipline and professional performance, especially in war or emergency.

The Chiefs of Armed Forces held very high responsible positions and had to keep a vigilant eye on anything that might disturb the morale, good order and discipline of the personnel under their command and had to immediately use their discretion in deciding various issues/cases. They were duty bound to take notice, repress any negligence or impropriety of conduct on part of all ranks under their command and sternly curb any infringement of orders by adopting appropriate remedial measures as soon as possible. Since the Chief of Army Staff and other Chiefs of the Armed Forces had to decide various cases then and there on the spur of the moment, they were the best judges to take cognizance, decide and take any appropriate action based on the attending circumstances and available evidence.

Armed Forces could function only if strict discipline was maintained in their organizations and it was ensured that orders of the superior Officers were obeyed, in letter and spirit, without any question or hesitation. Any inclination to violate the orders given by the competent command or disobedience of that, whatsoever, must, therefore, be curbed with strict disciplinary action by subjecting the offender to punishment according to the gravity of the offence. To meet this end the senior officers, in the chain of command, irrespective of the rank they held, urgently needed to be vested with the requisite authority. In some cases such objective could be achieved by summary punishment of simple nature, which had to be administered without any unreasonable delay. The Chiefs of Armed Forces were entrusted with very authoritative and important positions and required to pass fair, appropriate and prompt orders in all situations, especially those of sensitive nature. Sometimes, apparently minor loopholes could cause huge damage if not taken care of immediately.

Petitioner could not specifically point out any Verse of the Holy Qur'an or Hadith of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) to support his contention that Rule 269-A(c) of Pakistan Army Regulations was repugnant to Injunctions of Islam. Shariat petition was dismissed accordingly.

Petitioner in person.

M. Parvez Khan Tanoli, Standing Counsel for Federal Government.

Major Shah Jehan Khan, JAG, GHQ, Rawalpindi for Pakistan Army.

Capt. M. Nawaz Mirza and Commander Sami Waheed for Pakistan Navy.

Group Captain Rana Nazir JAG, Headquarter Peshawar for Pakistan Air Force.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 33

Present: Dr. Allama Fida Muhammad Khan, Sheikh Najam ul Hasan and Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani, JJ

SHAHID ORAKZAI---Petitioner

Versus

PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Religious Affairs, Hajj and Auqaf, Islamabad---Respondent

Shariat Miscellaneous Application No.1/I of 2016, decided on 18th November, 2016.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 5, 9 & 203-D---Shariat petition---Manasik-e-Hajj---Act of condemning Shaitan by stoning ("Rammi")---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Plea of petitioner that the act of "Rammi" had no religious link with Hajj and was not mentioned in the Holy Quran or in any previous Book of Allah; that such act had not been performed by any Prophet of Allah particularly Prophet Ibrahim who was the architect of Ka'ba; that such act had been causing lot of casualities and, in view of Art.5 and Art.9 of the Constitution, it was responsibility of the State to ensure security of its citizens anywhere in the world---Validity---Casting pebbles at the pillar/monument (Jamrah), symbolically considered as Shaitan, was unanimously held as a mandatory part of Hajj by Muslim jurists of all schools of thought---Any person who failed to do so, personally or in case of women or disabled persons, by representation, had to offer an additional sacrifice as compensation according to all the prominent Muslim jurists---Act of "Rammi" and other important details of Hajj, which were not mentioned in the Holy Qur'an, were mentioned in the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet---Sunnah [i.e. sayings, actions and tacit approval of the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.)], in fact, represented the Holy Quran in practice-Ritual of "Rammi" was practiced by the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.), his companions and millions from succeeding generations, ever since the 9th Hijra when Hajj was made mandatory for all who could afford---Continuous, constant and incessant practice of "Rammi" during the past 1429 years, provided an irrefutable proof that it was an integral part of Hajj---Casualties during the act of "Rammi" were caused by the negligence, haste or violation of rules by the pilgrims and had nothing to do with the pebbles being cast at pillar/monument (Jamrah)---Rituals necessary for performing Hajj could not be left out for such reason---Shariat petition was dismissed accordingly.

Al-Fiqhal Islami wa Addilatuhu Vol.III,p.236 and 245 and Hadith No.2991, Chap. CDXCIX Sahih Muslim ref.

(b) Islamic jurisprudence---

----Sources---Sunah---Scope---Sunnah was an elaboration/explanation of the Injunctions of Islam as revealed to the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) who was entrusted with the obligation of reciting the Holy Qur'an as well as teaching the injunctions of the Holy Qur'an---Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) was not only the recipient of the Divine Revelation, contained in the Holy Qur'an, but he was also its utmost authentic teacher, interpreter and expounder---Holy Quran had given complete injunctions, principles and precepts for guidance---For the sake of practical implementation of the injunctions and manifestation of the principles, however, Almighty Allah commissioned the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) and assigned him the duty to explain as well as demonstrate by his personal example all that which was actually required---Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) thus set a perfect model which was shown to the people to be followed in letter and spirit---One would never be able to act upon any Islamic Injunction, in accordance with the Holy Qur'an, without following Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.).

2:129; 2:151; 62:2;16; 44;53:3, 4; 7:203; 46:9; 3:31 and 33:21 ref.

Petitioner in person.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 39

Present: Riaz Ahmad Khan, C.J., Allama Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan, Sheikh Najam ul Hassan, Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani and Mrs. Ashraf Jahan, JJ

ABID ALI BANGSH---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Justice and Law Division, Islamabad and 6 others---Respondents

Shariat Petitions Nos. 4/I, 1/I and 11/I of 2013, decided on 18th November, 2016.

(a) Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Exclusion of Jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court) Order (P.O. 5 of 1984)---

----Art. 2---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 203-D & 270A---Federally Administered Tribal Areas ("FATA")---Ouster of jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court---Scope---Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Exclusion of Jurisdiction of Federal Shariat Court) Order, 1984 ("the Order") was issued in view of the various circumstances and international phenomena at the relevant time, particularly in the neighbouring country, to render ineffective some decisions, relating to the Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901, which were passed by the Courts---Ouster of jurisdiction laid down by the Order even in criminal/ revisional jurisdiction, could not be effective in all situations---Order in question had neither been specifically incorporated in the body of the Constitution nor been provided a cover by Art.270A of the Constitution---Order in question could not rank at par with the substantive provisions of the Constitution and, therefore, could not take away the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court, conferred by the Constitution itself, and exclude FATA from its jurisdiction.

PLD 1989 FSC.50 ref.

(b) Interpretation of Constitution---

----Conflict between a sub-Constitutional provision and the Constitution---Sub-Constitutional provisions could never over-ride a provision of the Constitution.

(c) Frontier Crimes Regulations (III of 1901)---

----Reglns. 8 & 11---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 203-D---Shariat petition---Civil and criminal references to the Council of Elders---Procedure adopted by Council based on customs, usages and traditions of the area---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Most provisions of the Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901 ("the Regulation") had deep relevancy with the customs, usages, conventions and traditions prevailing in that area---Prior to Islam, custom and usage was one of the major sources of law in many countries and especially in Roman law and it is still considered as one of the secondary source of Islamic law---Seeking guidance, assistance and judgment of Council of Elders in resolving certain criminal and civil issues was a frequently used custom---Jirga and Punchait played a vital role in deciding matters and maintaining peace in the society and resolving hostilities between members of the society, as expeditiously as possible---Procedure adopted in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ensured speedy trial to forestall blood-shed in the area---Main purpose of the Regulation was to crush insurgency, connivance and conspiracy well in time, in order to maintain law and order---Procedure adopted by the Council of Elders provided in the Regulation was a particularly urgent requirement of the area and was not repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam but in consonance with the requirement of administration of justice which had to be dispensed with care, caution and speed---Formation of Council of Elders for consultation to decide certain issues/matters in the area was very much in line with the Quranic Injunctions---Shariat petition was dismissed accordingly.

Falsafat Al-Tashr Al-Islam, pp.130-132 and Majallah al Ahkamul Adlia; Surah Al Imran, Ayat 159 and Surah Al-Shura, Ayat 38 ref.

(d) Frontier Crimes Regulations (III of 1901)---

----Reglns. 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 32, 34, 36, 40 & 52---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 203-D---Shariat petition---Crime committed by member of a tribe/community---Punishments awarded by Council of Elders to all members of the tribe or community---Collective responsibility of community/tribe---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Under the Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901 ("the Regulation") where a crime was committed by any member of the tribe, the entire tribe/community or the members thereof in general were made collectively liable, with the result that they may face blockage, fine and forfeiture of properties if they failed to do the needful as required---General rule or principle of Islamic justice system was that nobody could be made liable for the wrong committed by others, however, in exceptional circumstances the concept of joint liability had been introduced in Islamic criminal justice system as a special provision in cases of blind murder where the entire community was held collective liable to pay Diyat---Government, keeping in view the gravity of offences, their frequency and other attending circumstances, was fully authorized to make legislation as 'Taazir', as warranted by the situation---Shariat petition was dismissed accordingly.

Surah Al Baqra-Ayat 286 and Surah Al-Najam-Ayat 38 ref.

(e) Frontier Crimes Regulations (III of 1901)--

----Regln. 30---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 203-D---Shariat petition-- Adultery by woman, punishment for---Regulation 30 of Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901 ("the Regulation") provided that a married woman who, knowingly and by her own consent, had sexual intercourse with any man who was not her husband, was guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both---Repugnancy to Injunctions of Islam---Punishment provided for adultery under Regln. 30 was repugnant to Injunctions of Islam as contained in the Holy Quran and Ahadith of the Holy Prophet (pbuh)---Federal Shariat Court directed that the Federal Government, Provincial Government as well as Federally Administered Tribal Areas and all other concerned authorities should take necessary steps to amend the Regln. 30 so as to bring the same in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam; that such necessary steps shall be taken by 31st May 2017, where-after Regln. 30 would become void and shall be of no effect---Shariat petition was allowed accordingly.

Suras Al-Isra 32; Al-Nisa, 15; Al-Noor 2; Sahi Bukhari Hadith No.2542, Jild 1st; Hadith No.1726, Jild 3rd; Hadith No.1938, Jild 2nd and Sunan Ibn. Maja Hadith No.707 Jild 2nd ref.

(f) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 203-D---Federal Shariat Court, jurisdiction of---Scope---Relief in personam---Prayer of petitioner for relief in personam could not be granted as that was beyond the scope of jurisdiction conferred upon the Federal Shariat Court under the provisions of Art. 203-D of the Constitution.

Mir Adam Khan and Fazal Shah Mohmand for Petitioners.

M. Parvez Tanoli Standing Counsel for Federal Government.

Iqbal Ahmed Durrani, Standing Counsel for FATA.

Arshad Ahmed, Asstt. Advocate-General for Government of KPK.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 63

Present: Allama Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan, Sheikh Najamul Hasan, Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani and Mrs. Ashraf Jahan, JJ

SHAHID ORAKZAI---Petitioner

Versus

PAKISTAN through Secretary Law, Ministry of Law, Islamabad and 4 others---Respondents

Shariat Petition No.9/I of 2004, decided on 15th December, 2016.

(a) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)---

----S. 8(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 203-D---Shariat petition---Proof of zina liable to Hadd---Provision of S.8(b) of the Ordinance that evidence of the act of penetration necessary to the offence of zina liable to hadd was to be given by at least four Muslim adult male eye-witnesses, about whom the Court was satisfied, having regard to the requirements of tazkiyah al-shuhood, that they were truthful persons and abstained from major sins---Repungnancy to Injunctins of Islam---Plea of petitioner was that shahid ( ) did not mean an eye-witness at all but any prudent person, whose testimony about the unseen facts removed a doubt regarding two conflicting claims or statements, was called shahid ( )---Root of the word 'shahid' ( ) was 'shahida' ( ) and its different derivatives had been mentioned 180 times in the Holy Quran, each signifying various meanings according to the context used in the verse---Word 'shahid' in its original root, sometimes referred to mere presence while on some other occasions it meant bear testimony to a fact, bear witness, produce evidence, bring proof, offer demonstration, attest, cite example/ instance/illustration etc.---Meaning of the word 'shahid' ( ) could not be confined to only one interpretation---No one could be accepted as a witness of zina unless he actually saw with his own eyes commission of zina---Witnesses must also be competent---Conditions for a competent witness, inter alia, included possession of sound reasoning faculty, puberty, probity, absence of enmity/bias/interest, eyesight in case of facts which required to have been seen, capacity to speak or communicate with rectitude, and to be male and not convicted of perjury or giving false evidence as well as being a Muslim in cases of Hudood---For the sake of abundant extraordinary caution in the administration of justice, the Court, before awarding punishment, in a case of Hadd, was required to make further inquiry (Tazkiyah al-shuhood) about the witnesses as prescribed in S.8(b) of the Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979---Shariat petition was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art, 203-D---Shariat petition---Scope---By virtue of Art. 203-D of the Constitution, the Federal Shariat Court was bound to base its judgments not only on the Holy Quran but also on the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) as well.

(c) Islamic jurisprudence ---

----Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.)---Significance and scope---Sunnah was in fact the interpretation, explanation, elaboration, implementation and specific demonstration of Quranic Injunctions by the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) himself, thus, its binding authenticity could not be questioned on any ground---Without Sunnah no one could ever be able to properly understand or act in accordance with the Islamic Injunctions, as required by the Holy Quran.

(d) Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VII of 1979)---

----S. 4---"Zina"---Meaning---Word 'zina' meant both fornication and adultery-- Zina meant commission of sexual intercourse by a man with a woman, without having being married to each other.

(e) Islamic jurisprudence -

----Evidence---Principles with regard to witnesses stated.

Following are the principles of Islamic jurisprudence with regard to witnesses

(i) If the Court felt it necessary it could call for other or additional witnesses to testify before the Court which may decide the case on their testimony;

(ii) Court was bound to investigate a report/verify a statement given by a person whose veracity was doubtful and to confirm whether or not he was involved in any major sin;

(iii) Evidence of a person convicted of 'Qazaf ( ) was not admissible. So the Court had to confirm his eligibility as a witness, especially in cases of Hudood. Those who were convicted of perjury and giving false evidence were not credible as witnesses. Therefore, it was incumbent on the Court to conduct inquiry and verify the antecedents of witnesses, in Hadd cases;

(iv) Although one should always hold good opinion about all believers, but there were many habitual or compulsive or "stock" witnesses available all around in the society. Courts were duty-bound to vigilantly examine the status of witnesses, particularly in cases which involved capital punishments;

(v) Evidence of a 'Fasiq" ( ) a person who committed major sins) was to be subjected to strict scrutiny. For such purpose his conduct as a witness had to be minutely checked and carefully verified; and

(vi) Those whom people regarded as trustworthy and straightforward may not always be so. One should regard everybody as trustworthy until contradictory evidence emerged and proved him liar.

Al-Qur'an Verses 5 : 106-108; 49: 6; and 24: 4 ref.

(f) Islamic jurisprudence --

----Evidence---'Tazkiyah al-shuhood' (Purgation of witnesses)---Scope---Tazkiyah was a technical term of Islamic system of evidence which required clearing a witness from accusation or suspicion cast upon him by the opposite party, by holding an enquiry by a Qadi, openly or secretly, himself or through an official purgatory---Under Islamic system of law, like other legal systems, the opposite party had every right to test, weaken, or destroy the credit of a witness by cross-examination---Purgation did not bar such right of the opposite party but at the same time, it should not be used to the disadvantage of the party producing the witness---While cross examination was the right of defence, 'Tazkiyah al-Shuhood' ( )" was a duty of the Court to ascertain the veracity of witnesses in cases of Hudood that each one of them was just and righteous, worthy of credence, reliable, truthful and not a previous convict of perjury or other major offence---Tazkiyah al-Shuhood ( ) was the mode which was adopted for excluding all possibilities of innocence of an accused and ensuring absolute justice in each and every case.

(g) Islamic jurisprudence---

----Crime and punishment---Zina---Conviction---Scope---In an Islamic State, no one could be subjected to any punishment for committing unlawful sexual intercourse unless that charge was fully established by due evidence---Unless there was definite evidence against someone that he/she was guilty of unlawful sexual intercourse, he/she may not be subjected to the Hadd punishment regardless of all other external sources wherefrom information about the commission of that offence was gathered but was not duly proved in the court of competent jurisdiction, as was required by the Injunctions of Islam laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.

(h) Islamic jurisprudence---

----Crime and punishment---Benefit of doubt---Scope---Basic guiding principle of Islamic law was that the accused shall be granted the benefit of doubt.

(i) Islamic jurisprudence---

----Crime and punishment---Conviction---Standard of proof---Scope---No one could be punished on the basis of conjectures, surmises and suspicions---Presumption of innocence existed till the contrary was established by reasonable cogent evidence, as was required by the law---Where the required evidence failed to satisfy the Court affirmatively and bring home guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the accused stood entitled to acquittal.

Petitioner in person.

Pervez Khan Tanoli, Standing Counsel for Federation.

Saleem Murtaza Mughal for Government of Punjab.

Arshad Ahmad, Asstt. Advocate General for KPK Government.

Ahsan Hameed Dogar for Sindh Government.

Muhammad Fareed Dogar for Balochistan Government.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 78

Present: Riaz Ahmad Khan, C.J., Allama Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan and Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani, JJ

FAROOQ SIDDIQUI---Petitioner

Versus

Mst. FARZANA NAHEED---Respondent

Shariat Petition No.2/I of 2015, decided on 16th February, 2017.

Per Justice Riaz Ahmad Khan, C.J.; Allama Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan and Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani, JJ agreeing.

(a) Medical jurisprudence--

----"Surrogacy"---Meaning---Surrogacy meant 'appointed to act in place of'---Surrogacy was a technique of assisted reproduction wherein woman bore and delivered child for other couples---Where a man was incapable of producing a child and the sperm was obtained from a third person that could not be called a case of surrogacy for the simple reasons that the child did not belong to the father---Issue of surrogacy arose when the woman was hired for carrying a child for a couple for some monetary or other consideration---Surrogate mother was paid certain amounts for carrying out the child for nine months and then producing child for another woman---For all practical purposes the surrogate mother gave her womb on rent.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 203-D---Shariat petition---Medical jurisprudence---Surrogacy---Repugnancy to Injunction of Islam---Child produced through In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) procedure by using sperm of a third person---Where the husband was not in a position to produce a child or there was some problem in the sperm of the husband and the sperm was obtained from a third person, in that case the child would belong to the person, from whom the sperm had been obtained---Child would not belong to the husband who had arranged the sperm from a third person---Even if the egg belonged to the wife of the person who had arranged the sperm from a third person, for all practical purposes the child would belong to the person from whom the sperm had been obtained---Such an arrangement would be illegal and against the injunction of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah---Shariat petition was disposed of accordingly.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 203-D---Shariat petition---Medical jurisprudence---Surrogacy---Repugnancy to Injunction of Islam---Child produced through In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) procedure by using sperm of the husband, eggs of the wife, and placing the embryo in the womb of the wife---Where the sperm had been obtained from husband and the egg from the wife and the same had been fertilized in the test tube through medical process and the embryo was then placed in the womb of the wife, in that case the child would belong to the actual husband and wife---Such process could not be considered as illegal or against the injunctions of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah---Child in such a case by all means would be legal and legitimate---Shariat petition was disposed of accordingly.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 203-D---Shariat petition---Medical jurisprudence---Surrogacy---Repugnancy to Injunction of Islam---Producing a child through a surrogate mother [Per Riaz Ahmad Khan, C.J.]: Where a woman was arranged as a surrogate mother against a monetary consideration or some other reasons, the whole procedure as well as the resulting birth of the child would be illegal and against the Injunctions of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah---Children born through surrogacy were not produced by a couple through the bond of Nikah---Object of producing children through surrogacy was to satisfy the desire of a woman who may not wish to marry a man or go through the pains of delivery or was infertile---Homosexual couples could also have such desires---Paternity and maternity of child would become irrelevant in case of surrogacy---Only if a baby was born through mechanical/medical process where the sperm belonged to the husband and the egg to the wife and the child was born through the wife, in that case the procedure would be legal and lawful---In all other cases surrogacy procedure would be unlawful and against the Injunctions of Holy Qur'an and Sunnah---His Lordship observed that surrogacy procedure was not only based on exploitation rather the whole concept was illogical, cruel and absurd; that if a woman was asked to carry a child for an unknown couple and then go through the pains of delivery and deliver a child for another couple, it would be beyond human understanding that the woman, who carried the child for nine months, would not develop emotional feelings for the child to whom she gave birth; that in such a case the woman became only a machine not having any feelings, emotions or love, and that surrogacy also disturbed the settled principles of inheritance given by the Holy Qur'an---[Per Allama Dr. Fida Muhammad Khan, J]---Use of a third party in the process of pregnancy was prohibited, whether the subject was liquid sperm or egg or embryo or a third party, and whether it was involved by way of lease or donation---Shariat petition was disposed of accordingly.

Holy Qur'an Surah Nisa Ayat 24; Surah Al-Baqarah Ayat No.223 and Islamic Fiqah Academy Jeddah established by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) i.e. ( ) in its meeting held in Mekka Mukarrma in 1985 and another meeting held in Amman in 1986 ref.

(e) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---

----S. 2---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.203-D---Shariat petition---Medical jurisprudence---Surrogacy---Repugnancy to Injunction of Islam---Contract for producing a child through a surrogate mother---Federal Shariat Court held that whole procedure of surrogacy as well as the resulting birth of the child was illegal and against the Injunctions of Holy Qur'an, and directed that suitable amendment should be made in S.2 of the Contract Act, 1872 and it may be specifically provided that any agreement regarding surrogacy would not be enforceable by law as the same would contain unlawful proposals and unlawful considerations; that the Penal Code, 1860 should also be amended and suitable section of law be added regarding definition of surrogacy; that surrogacy should be declared as an offence punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, that further amendment be made in the Penal Code, 1860 that the couple who arranged a surrogate mother would be liable to punishment along with surrogate and the doctor who carried on the surrogacy procedure; that the Penal Code, 1860 should provide punishable for the doctor who maintain a sperm bank or egg bank for future use, which should include imprisonment and fine, and that it must also be provided that any doctor involved in the procedure of surrogacy should lose his license---Shariat petition was disposed of accordingly.

Petitioner in person.

Respondent in person.

M. Parvez Khan Tanoli Standing Counsel for Federal Government.

Syed Raza Abbas Naqvi, Asstt. Advocate General, Punjab for Government of Punjab.

Ahsan Hameed Dogar, on behalf of A.G. Sindh for Government of Sindh.

Arshad Ahmad Khan Asstt. Advocate General KPK for Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Muhammad Ayaz Khan Swati, Addl. Advocate General Balochistan for Government of Balochistan.

Dr. Muhammad Yousaf Farooqui and Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki: Juris Consults.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 93

Before Zahoor Ahmed Shahwani, J

DIN MUHAMMAD---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.17/Q of 2014, decided on 16th June, 2017.

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 392---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S.17(3)---Robbery, haraabah---Appreciation of evidence---Accused was not nominated in the FIR and case was registered against "unknown" persons---Record of the case was silent as to how and by whom accused was implicated and arrested in the case---Prosecution's version was that complainant, during identification parade had identified accused thrice in the presence of Assistant Commissioner, but the Assistant Commissioner was not produced in the court by prosecution in support of its case---Possibility could not be ruled out that complainant had seen the accused at the Levies Station prior to identification parade as complainant had visited Levies Station nine days regularly---Alleged confessional statement of accused was recorded with delay of ten days after his arrest and such delay remained un-explained; which had created doubt about the voluntariness of the same and rendered that inadmissible---Alleged confessional statement of accused was not corroborated by any other independent evidence---Robbed vehicle had not been recovered from the possession and pointation of accused---Investigating Officer, had deposed that during the course of investigation, accused had made disclosure with regard to commission of offence and disclosure memo was prepared, but neither said disclosure memo was exhibited nor any marginal witness of the same was examined---Non-production of disclosure memo had further made the case of prosecution doubtful---Except alleged confessional statement of accused, no other incriminating evidence was available to connect accused with the commission of offence and said confessional statement had already been disbelieved and discarded---Prosecution had been unable to establish its case against accused beyond reasonable doubt---Trial Court, without proper appreciation of evidence had convicted and sentenced the accused---Judgment of the Trial Court being not tenable in the eye of law, was set aside by Federal Shariat Court and accused was acquitted of the charge, in circumstances.

Muhammad Nadeem (alias Deeni) and another v. The State 2007 PCr.LJ 1211; State v. Muhammad Naseer 1993 SCMR 1822 and Bahadur Khan v. The State PLD 1996 SC 336 ref.

Naseebullah Khan Kasi and Rehmatullah Sadozai for the Appellant.

Ameer Hamza Mengal, DPG Balochistan for the State.

P L D 2017 Federal Shariat Court 98

Before Mrs. Ashraf Jahan, J

KHAMISO---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.17-K of 2016, decided on 9th June, 2017.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 392 & 342---Robbery, wrongful confinement---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of more than three months in lodging FIR was not plausibly explained---Prosecution case was that four persons (accused) were present at the time of incident, but challan was produced against six persons---Complainant in his evidence before the court had nominated appellant with the commission of crime, but other eye-witness who was with the complainant at the time of incident did not identify the appellant as accused---Said piece of evidence was a major blow to the case of prosecution---Evidence of complainant revealed that in the FIR he had alleged that the accused had also snatched two Mobile Phones from the complainant party besides ten empty cauldrons, but in his evidence before the court his statement was totally silent about the snatching---Prosecution witness also did not adduce a single word about alleged robbed mobile phones---No recovery was made from the accused and no corroboratory piece of evidence was on the record in support of the statement of complainant against accused connecting him with the commission of crime---Complainant had attributed only the accused for commission of offence and exonerated the rest of the persons facing trial---Said self-contradictory statement of complainant further created doubts about the prosecution case---Prosecution had failed to discharge its burden satisfactorily and there appeared major lacunae and contradictions in the evidence brought on record---No satisfactory basis for upholding the conviction being present, sentence of accused, and judgment passed by the court below was set aside---Appeal was allowed.

(b) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating doubts, if a simple circumstance would create reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of accused, he would be entitled to such benefit, not as a matter of grace, but as a matter of right.

Tariq Pervez v. State 1995 SCMR 1345 rel.

Nadir Hussain M. Abro for Appellant.

Zahoor Shah, Assistant Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State.

P L D 2017 High Court (AJ&K) 1

Before M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, Ch. Jahandad Khan, Azhar Saleem Babar and Muhammad Sheraz Kiani, JJ

Chaudhary TARIQ FAROOQ and 2 others---Petitioners

Versus

AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR GOVERNMENT through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 6 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2740 of 2015, decided on 12th January, 2016.

(a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act (II of 1992) [as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance (XIX of 2015)]----

----Ss. 6-A, 5, 4 & Preamble---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), Ss. 44, 42-B & 50---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act (VI of 1976), Preamble---Writ petition---Chief Election Commissioner and acting Chief Election Commissioner, appointment of---Constitutionality---Vires of S.6-A of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditins) Act, 1992---Questions before the High Court were as to whether S. 6-A of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act, 1992 (as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 was violative of the provisions/scheme of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974; whether a Constitutional office could be created through subordinate legislation; whether creation of office of Acting Chief Election Commissioner fell within the ambit of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act, 1992 [as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015)] and whether the advice of Chairman of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council was binding on the President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir---Held, S.6-A of the Act would have been a good piece of legislation, had the same been provided through the mechanism of amending the Constitution Act---Office of Acting Chief Election Commissioner could be created through constitutional amendment and by no other means---Office of Acting Chief Election Commissioner, having the similar functions and status of permanent Chief Election Commissioner, could not be created through subordinate legislation, by adding a provision in Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Condition) Act (II of 1992)---Lacuna in the Constitution could not be made up by an Act of subordinate legislation---Advice tendered by the Chairman Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council for appointment of Chief Election Commissioner on regular basis could have a binding effect on the President, had the advice been tendered on the summary moved by the President---Said advice of the Chairman therefore, was violative of S.50(1) of the Constitution Act---Principles.

Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 did not contain a provision of Acting Chief Election Commissioner. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act, 1992 (as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions), Act, 1992 had been passed by the Legislative Assembly in furtherance of Section 50 of the Constitution Act. In terms of Section 50(1) of the Constitution Act, terms and conditions of the office of Chief Election Commissioner could be prescribed through an Act of the Assembly or rules.

Sections 4 and 5 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act, 1992 (as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015) related to salary, allowances, privileges and terms of office of Chief Election Commissioner; therefore, the Act was limited to the terms and conditions of the office of Chief Election Commissioner. Words 'terms and conditions' had been defined only in Section 3 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act, 1976, which provided that the terms and conditions of the service of a civil servant would be as provided in that Act and rules. Preamble of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act, 1992 (as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015)) provided that the Act was for provision of law relating to the terms and conditions of Chief Election Commissioner. Office of Acting Chief Election Commissioner, having the similar functions and status of permanent Chief Election Commissioner, could not be created through subordinate legislation, by adding a provision in Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act (II of 1992). Lacuna in the Constitution could not be made up by an Act of subordinate legislation.

Petitioners had contended that if the amending Section 6-A of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act, 1992 (as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Condition) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015)) was presumed to be in accordance with the Constitution Act, then appointment of Acting Chief Election Commissioner would be made on the advice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council, as where the Constitution Act had provided a criterion for doing a thing in one provision, then said criterion could be utilized for doing another thing of similar nature. Requirement as to appointment of a regular Chief Election Commissioner and that of Acting Chief Election Commissioner was different. Acting Chief Commissioner was appointed as a stop-gap-arrangement. Office of Chief Election Commissioner, in present case, had been lying vacant for last nine months, and the correspondence between the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Secretariat could not result in regular appointment of Chief Election Commissioner. Mode of appointment of Chief Election Commissioner under Article 218 of Constitution of Pakistan and Section 6-A of the Act was synonymous, which provided that Acting Chief Election Commissioner of Azad Jammu and Kashmir would be appointed by the President in consultation with Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir; process of appointment of Acting Chief Election Commissioner had been shortened and such stop-gap-arrangement could be managed on a short notice. Said principle of law, as suggested by the petitioners, therefore, could not be applied to the appointment of Acting Chief Election Commissioner. Section 6-A of the Act would have been a good piece of legislation, had the same been provided through the mechanism of amending the Constitution Act.

PLD 1996 SC 324 and 1992 MLD 2083 ref.

Powers conferred on the President for appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court, High Court and Chief Election Commissioner were subject to advice by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir had moved names of three retired Judges for appointment of Chief Election Commissioner, which was not assented to by the Chairman of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council; the Council, rather, had added another name in the panel, whereupon the Chairman had advised the President to appoint him as Chief Election Commissioner. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Secretariat had stated that advice of the Chairman was not limited by any panel suggested by the President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Secretariat, which was only to facilitate him in the decision making process, and that advice of the Chairman given under express provisions of the Constitution Act, was binding on the President. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Secretariat, was of the view that the Chairman of the Council was vested with the unfettered powers of tendering advice to the President under Section 50(1) of the Constitution Act and enabling sections thereof for appointment of a particular person as Chief Election Commissioner. Advice could not be given in vacuum, and rather the advice was to be tendered when same was sought by the President. Advice tendered by the Chairman for appointment of Chief Election Commissioner on regular basis could have a binding effect on the President, had the advice been tendered on the summary moved by the President. Said advice of the Chairman was, violative of Section 50(1) of the Constitution Act.

Office of Acting Chief Election Commissioner could be created through Constitutional amendment and by no other means, and the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir might introduce a bill for amendment in the Constitution Act in that regard. High Court observed that the eligibility for appointment of regular Chief Election Commissioner, although, included a serving Judge of the High Court, but the High Court was already short of two Judges and the Judges had been entrusted with the additional responsibilities of Shariat Court as well; said aspect of the matter would be kept into consideration while preparing summary for appointment of new Chief Election Commissioner. Panel of suitable candidates, in view of the prevailing urgency in the matter, would be sent for seeking advice of the Chairman of the Council within a week. High Court setting aside Section 6-A of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act (II of 1992) (as amended under Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance (XIX of 2015)) and the notification being violative of the Constitution Act. Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Case law referred.

(b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act (II of 1992) [as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance (XIX of 2015)]---

----S. 6-A---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S. 44---Appointment of Chief Election Commissioner---Vires of S.6-A of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act, 1992---Writ petition---Maintainability---'Aggrieved person'---Determination---Contention that one of the petitioners, in the present case, was a candidate for the slot of Chief Election Commissioner, therefore, the petitioners did not fall within the ambit of an 'aggrieved person'---Such objection, however, was not worth consideration for the reason that the petitioners had challenged the vires of S.6-A of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditons) Act (II of 1992) [as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance (XIX of 2015)] and the notification dated 29.12.2015 being against the provisions of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974---Petitioners, being the members of the Legislative Assembly and advocate of the Supreme Court, had claimed to believe in the supremacy of the Constitution---Every qualified State subject had fundamental right to vote for a candidate for membership of the Legislative Assembly, and if an election to the Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir was held in pursuance of the impugned notification, and the election, later on, was held to be void because of illegal appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner, the fundamental rights of the petitioners would be infringed---Petitioners, therefore, fell within the definition of 'aggrieved person' and had the right to challenge the impugned Ordinance and the notification.

(c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure Rules, 1984---

----R. 32(2)---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S.44---Writ petition---Maintainability---Attachment of certified copies of document/annexures, requirement of---Scope---Petitioners had challenged the vires of S. 6-A of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) Act (II of 1992) [as amended by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Chief Election Commissioner (Terms and Conditions) (Amendment) Ordinance (XIX of 2015)] and the notification dated 29.12.2015, copy of which had been placed as annexures with the memorandum of the petition---Said documents had been issued by the Law, Justice, Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights Department and the same had been attested by Additional Secretary of the same department---Rule 32(2) of Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure Rules, 1984 made that mandatory to attach attested copies of the impugned Ordinance and notification only---Necessary ingredients of R.32(2) of the Rules, therefore, had been complied with---Non-attested copies of the rest of the documents (attached with present petition) did not infringe R.32(2) of the Rules.

(d) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)----

----S. 44----Writ petition---Annexures---Copy of advice of Chairman of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council was obtained without following the process of law and annexed with the petition---Effect---Objection was raised by non-petitioners that the advice of Chairman Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council was not a "public document" and that the petitioners had obtained a copy of such advice without following the process of law and, therefore, writ petition was not maintainable---Validity---No provision of law existed which might entail imposition of penalty on the petitioners for obtaining the copy---Objection, therefore, would not result in dismissal of writ petition.

(e) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)----

----S. 50----Chief Election Commissioner---Appointment---Prime function of Chief Election Commissioner is to conduct free and fair election to the Legislative Assembly---All the political parties are the stake holder in the process of election, and parliamentary parties are represented in the Assembly by the leader of the House and Leader of the Opposition---Appointment of Chief Election Commissioner, in such a scenario, after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition gains more importance.

Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan for Petitioners Nos. 1 and 2.

Petitioner No.3 in person.

Barrister Humayun Nawaz Khan for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Ch. Shoukat Aziz, Additional Advocate General for Respondents Nos.3 and 5 to 7.

P L D 2017 High Court (AJ&K) 23

Before Azhar Saleem Babar and Muhammad Sheraz Kiani, JJ

Syed TASAWAR HUSSAIN SHAH---Petitioner

Versus

AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Chief Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 9 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2250 of 2015, decided on 15th March, 2016.

Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952)----

----Ss.2(d)(ii), 59 & 131---Official Secrets Act (XIX of 1923), S.13---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S.44---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Person subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952---Remedy against finding and sentence of Court Martial---Questions before the High Court were that "whether the petitioner, being civilian, was subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952", "whether the petitioner had been condemned unheard" and "whether a civilian could be tried only by Magistrate or Sessions Court under Official Secrets Act, 1923"---Under Pakistan Army Act, 1952, if a person who had committed any offence in relation to any work of defence arsenal, naval or military etc. under Official Secrets Act, 1923, was also subject of Pakistan Army Act, 1952---Word "any person not otherwise subject" as used in Pakistan Army Act, 1952, connoted "other than military men"---Under S. 59 of Pakistan Army Act, 1952, any person, who, being subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952 committed any civil offence, would be deemed to be guilty of the offence under Pakistan Army Act, 1952---All official document carried presumption of correctness and the warrant of commitment was an official document and contents of the same could not be disbelieved in absence of any contradictory evidence in that regard---According to the warrant of commitment, the petitioner was attached with the Mujahid Battalion; thus, he was subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952, and the punishment awarded to him by the Field General Court Martial could not be termed as without lawful authority---Petitioner's contention that he was not involved in the affairs of army was question of fact which could not be agreed upon in absence of any supportive documentary evidence, particularly from the concerned Battalion; therefore, on the face of the record, the Court had to believe the petitioner was attached with said Battalion---Under S. 59(4) of Pakistan Army Act, 1952, the words 'notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law' had an overriding effect upon the other laws; thus, normally, under Official Secrets Act, 1923, accused was tried by Magistrate or Court of Session, but when a civilian became subject to Pakistan Army Act, 1952, then his case would be triable under Pakistan Army Act, 1952---Field General Court Martial, having convicted the petitioner, had awarded him punishment for five years imprisonment under S. 59 of Pakistan Army Act, 1952---Petitioner had an alternative remedy of appeal under S. 131 of Pakistan Army Act, 1952 against the sentence, which the petitioner had already filed before the Chief of Army Staff; hence, present petition had become infructuous---Question as to any irregularity or illegality regarding trial of the petitioner committed by the Military Trial Court could be considered by the concerned appellate authority---High Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, could not sit as an appellate court---Writ petition was dismissed in circumstances.

1993 SCR 88; 2008 SCR 184; 2008 SCR 60; 2000 YLR 1891; PLD 1987 SC (AJ&K) 109; PLD 1984 SC (AJ&K) 13; PLD 1990 SC (AJ&K) 13; PLD 1978 SC (AJ&K) 142; PLD 1978 SC (AJ&K) 140 and PLD 1995 SC(AJ&K) 1 ref.

PLD 1975 SC 506; PLD 1999 SC 504 and 2004 SCMR 1761 rel.

Mujahid Hussain Naqvi for Petitioner.

Sardar M.R. Khan, A.A.-G. for Respondents.

P L D 2017 High Court (AJ&K) 32

Before Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, C.J., M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, Azhar Saleem Baber, Muhammad Sheraz Kiani and Sadaqat Hussain Raja, JJ

Writ Petition No.2694 of 2016

Ch. LATIF AKBAR, FORMER FINANCE MINISTER, AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR, MUZAFFARABAD and 8 others---Petitioners

Versus

AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Chief Secretary and 10 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No. 2805 of 2016

KHALIL AHMED KHAN and 175 others---Petitioners

Versus

AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Chief Secretary and 11 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2867 of 2016

MUHAMMAD FAROOQ AWAN and 92 others---Petitioners

Versus

AZAD GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Chief Secretary and 11 others---Respondents

Writ Petitions Nos. 2694, 2805 and 2867 of 2016, decided on 16th December, 2016.

(a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--

----S. 44---Writ petition---'Aggrieved person'---Scope---'Right' in strict juristic sense was not required to be established by a petitioner before the High Court for success of his writ petition---If the petitioner had made up a case of his personal interest in the performance of lawful duty by the respondents, which if not performed or performed in a manner not permitted by law would result in the loss of some personal benefit or advantage etc. he could safely be termed as "aggrieved person".

Mian Fazal Din's case PLD 1969 SC 223 ref.

(b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)---

----S. 44---Writ petition---'Aggrieved person'---Scope---Education Policy---'Education Package' introduced by former government postponed for reconsideration by the incumbent government---Writ petition filed by Ministers and political workers of former government seeking enforcement of the Education package introduced by them during their tenure---Maintainability---Ex-Ministers and political workers would not suffer any loss if the current government revisited the Education Package, hence they were not 'aggrieved persons', especially so, when it has been categorically stated by the current government that it had no intention to cancel the Education Package rather it wanted to make up the deficiencies and to fulfil the requirements of the (educational) institutions already established and judge the necessity of the institutions which had been established in pursuance of the decision taken by the earlier government---Writ petition was held as not maintainable accordingly.

(c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)-

----S. 44---Writ petition---'Aggrieved person'---Scope---Education Policy-'Education Package' introduced by former government postponed for reconsideration by the incumbent government---Writ petition filed by students and their parents seeking enforcement of the Education Package---Maintainability---Students and their parents were aggrieved persons within the meaning of S. 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, hence their writ petitions were maintainable.

(d) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)-

----S. 4(4)(1)---'Right to education'---Scope---Right to education though not expressly mentioned in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, but it had nexus with right to life.

(e) Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court Procedure Rules, 1984---

----R. 32(2)---Writ petition, filing of---Procedure---Attested copies of impugned documents not filed---Effect---Petitioners had not filed the attested copies of the impugned documents but their applications were on the record which disclosed that they did apply for the same but copies had not been supplied to them by the concerned authorities---Attested copies of some of the necessary documents however, had been filed later on and the requirement had been complied with---Impugned documents consisted of Cabinet decision and notifications, which were admitted documents, therefore, legality of the same could be judged notwithstanding the fact that their attested copies had not been appended with the writ petitions---Writ petitions were held to be maintainable accordingly.

Ahmed Nawaz Tanoli, Advocate v. Chairman Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and others 2016 SCR 960 ref.

(f) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)---

----Ss. 38 & 41---Budget passed by Legislative Assembly---Nature and scope---Budget passed by Legislative Assembly had to be authenticated by the signature of the President---Approval of the budget did not have the force of an Ordinance issued under S.41 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, or an Act passed by the Legislative Assembly rather it was a mere approval of estimated receipts and expenditure for coming financial year.

(g) Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Rules of Business, 1985---

----R. 23---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 21---Decisions and policies adopted by the outgoing/former Government---Such policies could be reviewed or undone by the successor Government for ensuring good governance---Government/Cabinet could not be restricted from taking steps for good governance---Incumbent Government was empowered to frame any policy or take decisions and was also entitled to revisit the same in public interest---Convenience/public good welfare of the people were the main objects of a democratic set up and if any scheme was launched or program was approved then the cancellation of the same must be for genuine reasons and should be in the public interest by eliminating every impression of change of person or Government.

Rule 23 of the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir Rules of Business, 1985 mentioned the cases to be brought before the Cabinet. Under clause "E" of the said Rule the Cabinet was empowered to consider the cases involving vital political, economic and administrative policies. Cases which a Minister considered important enough for reference to the Cabinet could be considered by the Cabinet, therefore, a decision made by a (former) Cabinet could be revisited by the incumbent Cabinet. Government/Cabinet could not be restricted from taking steps for good governance. Government was empowered to frame any policy or take decisions and was also entitled to revisit the same in public interest. Even otherwise, section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provided that where by any (Federal) Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws was conferred, then that power included a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any) to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye- laws so issued.

For achieving the target of good governance there must be continuity in the policies of the Governments which had been framed for the betterment of the people. Mere change of the regime may not affect the policies made for betterment of the people which would result in anarchy and bad governance and would also cause serious damage to democracy and welfare of the people. Convenience/public good welfare of the people were the main objects of democratic set up and if any scheme was launched or program was approved then the cancellation of the same must be for genuine reasons and should be in the public interest by eliminating every impression of change of person or Government. It must be ensured that entire system of development and governance should have credibility in the eyes of the people especially those who were poor, marginalized or living in backward areas.

(h) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)---

----S. 44---Government policy---Judicial review by High Court---Scope---Court while deciding a lis/controversy regarding the project/policies of the Government should not sit over the wisdom of the Government---Government was the best judge in the matter of policy/decision and it must be left to the Government itself to decide on the same---Court had no jurisdiction to take the role of policy maker in the garb of interpretation---Any policy of the Government could, however, be judicially reviewed only if it was found in conflict with any provision of law; in violation of any Fundamental Right; arbitrary or was made/employed to give benefit to a person or group of persons with mala fide intent---Moreover, a policy could be held to be invalid if it was not approved by the authority under any law or if it lacked legal sanction.

Wattan Party and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2013 SC 167; Farzand Ali and others v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 98; Dossani Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Messrs Travels Shop (Pvt) Ltd. and others PLD 2014 SC 1; Messrs Al-Raham Travels and Tours (Pvt) Ltd. and others v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Haj, Zakat and Ushr through Secretary and others 2011 SCMR 1621 and Muhammad Nadeem Arif and others v. Inspector General of Police Punjab, Lahore and others 2010 PLC(CS) 924 ref.

(i) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)---

----S. 44---Writ jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Questions of fact which required detailed probe and investigation could not be resolved in exercise of writ jurisdiction of the High Court.

Barrister Humayun Nawaz Khan for Petitioners.

Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan for Respondents.

P L D 2017 High Court (AJ&K) 55

Before Muhammad Sheraz Kiani, J

The STATE through Advocate General of the State of J&K, Muzaffarabad---Petitioner

Versus

MUHAMMAD IDREES JARRAL and another---Respondents

Criminal Revision No.114 of 2016, decided on 15th March, 2017.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.324, 337-F(i)(iv), 337-G, 353, 279 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.6(2)---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing Damiah, Mudihah, hurt by rash or negligent driving, rash driving, assault or criminal force, common intention---Bail, grant of---During investigation offences under S.324, P.P.C., and S.6(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were added, but later on after investigation same had been deleted by the Police as no evidence could be recorded in relation to those offences---After completion of evidence challan had been submitted for the offences under Ss.337-F(i)(iv), 337-G, 353, 279 & 34, P.P.C. and in view of punishment provided for said offences, case of accused persons did not come within the ambit of prohibited clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Investigation in the case had been completed and challan had been submitted before the Trial Court---Accused persons were no more required for investigation---Bail in such like cases, was rule and its refusal was an exception---If the court of competent jurisdiction had released accused on bail, very strong and exceptional grounds were required to cancel the same---No allegation was on record to the effect that accused persons after the occurrence had committed any other offence; or they had misused the concession of bail; or they were tampering or interfering with the prosecution evidence---In absence of exceptional grounds or circumstances, order granting bail by the Trial Court, did not require any interference by High Court.

PLD 1996 SC 241; 2014 PCr.LJ 1512 and 2014 SCR 234 rel.

Hafiz Fazal ur Rehman Dar, Assistant Advocate-General for the State/Petitioner.

Raja Waseem Younis Khan, Advocate for Accused-Respondents.

P L D 2017 High Court (AJ&K) 59

Before M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, C.J., Muhammad Sheraz Kiani and Sadaqat Hussain Raja, JJ

MUJAHID HUSSAIN NAQVI---Petitioner

Versus

AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR BAR COUNCIL through Chairman/Vice Chairman/Members/Secretary Bar Council Secretariat and 6 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.813 of 2017, decided on 12th June, 2017.

Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)-

----S. 44---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legal Practitioners Bar Council Act (XXX of 1995), Ss. 38 & 51---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, Rr. 27 & 26---Writ petition---Maintainability---Petitioner, who was a member of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Bar Association, impugned notification issued by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Bar Council whereby license to practice of the petitioner had been cancelled on account of stricture against the petitioner passed by the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir---Validity---Stricture on basis of which the impugned notification was issued, could not be expunged by the High Court---Petitioner, however, could prefer a review before the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir for expunging of the said remarks within the prescribed limitation period under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978-Writ petition before High Court was therefore not maintainable and was dismissed, in circumstances.

P L D 2017 High Court (AJ&K) 66

Before M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, C.J.

Mst. AMINA BIBI and 2 others---Applicants

Versus

THE STATE through Additional Advocate General and 3 others---Respondents

Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.128 of 2017, decided on 28th July, 2017.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 561-A, 249-A & 265-K---Inherent powers of High Court---Scope---High Court has inherent powers to make such orders necessary to give effect to any order under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 or to prevent abuse of process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice---Such powers are very wide and can be exercised by High Court at any time---High Court, in exceptional cases, can exercise its powers under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., without waiting for Trial Court to pass orders under S.249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C., if the facts of the case so warranted to secure the ends of justice---High Court observed that if free hand to the Police to play havoc with the life, honour and liberty of citizens and to use it as a lever to commit atrocities on innocent citizens under the garb of investigation, is allowed to apply; then jurisdiction of the High Court would become redundant and citizens would be left at the mercy of Police---Ordinarily, High Court would not interfere in the investigation of a criminal case, but, if the court would come to a conclusion that accused was innocent and his/her conviction was impossible, then High Court was duty bound to quash the criminal proceedings.

Mst. Kaneez Fatima and others v. The State and others 1995 PCr.LJ 1672 and Allah Ditta and 3 othes v. The State and 3 others 1995 PCr.LJ 1668 ref

(b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Act, 1985---

----Ss. 10, 11, 16 & 19---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.561-A---Zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir, kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a woman---Application for quashing of FIR---Female accused personally appeared in the court and deposed that she being sui juris, had contracted marriage as per her free-will with the male accused and that nobody had abducted her---Female accused had affirmed the ingredients of 'Nikahnama' and categorically admitted her 'Nikah' with male accused---When the accused had admitted her 'Nikah' with male accused, it had become clear that allegation of her abduction by male accused was baseless---High Court observed that statement of a female, in suchlike cases, was of vital importance to decide the controversy between the parties---Consent of adult sane couple, was sufficient for 'Nikah'as per injunctions of Islam---Accused persons, being sui juris, had lawfully married each other, the alleged offences in the FIR having not been made out continuance of proceedings against the couple and others, would amount to unnecessary harassment---Nikah between the spouses, was declared to be valid by the High Court and proceedings initiated against them through impugned FIR, were quashed, in circumstances.

Syed Azad Hussain Shah v. Syeda Saba Asghar and others Civil PLA No.86 of 2012) ref.

(c) Administration of justice---

----Each and every case, had its own peculiar facts and circumstances, and it should be judged in the light of the peculiar facts.

Muhammad Saeed Awan for Applicants.

Khursheed Anwar Mughal, Asstt. A.G. for Respondents Nos.1, 3 and 4.

P L D 2017 High Court (AJ&K) 71

Before Muhammad Sheraz Kayani, J

ZULFIQAR ALI and another---Petitioners

Versus

MUHAMMAD SODAGAR---Respondent

Civil Revision No.80 of 2015, decided on 19th June, 2017.

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 12(2) & O.V, R.17---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts. 164 & 181---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Limitation---Contention of applicant (defendant) was that process server had never visited him nor he had refused to acknowledge the summons---Validity---Article 164 of Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable where defendant was served and he absented himself after service---Service of defending, in the present case, had been denied and it had been alleged that service was not effected under the law---Where service of defendant was denied Art.181, Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable---Neither copy of summons was affixed nor report was submitted in accordance with law---When service was not effected according to law then no order could have been passed and if it was rendered, same should have been vacated on the application of defendant after recording evidence---Limitation for filing of application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was three years as per Art.181, Limitation Act, 1908---Findings of Trial Court with regard to limitation were not in accordance with law---Requisite procedure had not been adopted while serving the defendant---Impugned judgments and decree passed by the Courts below were set aside and case was remanded to the Trial Court with the direction to obtain written statement and then decide the controversy after providing opportunity of evidence---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. was accepted---Revision was allowed in circumstances.

2011 SCR 214 and 1987 CLC 1994 rel.

Kamran Tariq for Petitioners.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 29

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

Messrs MIA CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD.---Petitioner

Versus

PAKISTAN PWD and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2671 of 2016, decided on 30th September, 2016.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Scope---Disputed question of facts---Recording of evidence---Principle---Respondent in a Constitutional petition cannot expect to have petition dismissed by making vague and general assertion to the effect that petitioner involves disputed questions of fact--- For a respondent to succeed on such score, he must identify disputed questions which cannot be resolved without recording of evidence.

Saad Muhammad Shaheen Ali-Soofi v. Principal and Chairman Academic Council, Sindh Medical College 1982 CLC 805 and Shamim Khan v. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority 1999 YLR 410 rel.

(b) Public Procurement Rules, 2004---

----R. 3---Public procurement---Scope and object---Public Procurement Rules, 2004, are not exhaustive and do not cater for each and every eventuality that can be thought of in the realm of tender bidding---Public Procurement Rules, 2004, are codified norms and requirements of a fair, open, competitive and transparent tender bidding required to be conducted by government or public sector organizations.

(c) Public Procurement Rules, 2004---

----Rr. 4, 12, 14 & 20---Re-procurement---Selective bidding---Petitioner participated in tender for installation of Heating, Ventilation and Air-conditioning equipment and was awarded the contract being the lowest bidder but due to certain differences the contract was cancelled---Authorities instead of re-advertising the project, adopted selective bidding among contractors pre-qualified in earlier tender and the contract was awarded to respondent---Validity---Method of selective bidding adopted by authorities for award of re-procurement contract did not satisfy requirements of Rr. 4 & 20 of Public Procurement Rules, 2004---Procedure adopted by authorities for award of re-procurement contract for supply of equipment without issuing an advertisement inviting bids for public was unlawful---Mere fact that an advertisement was published at a stage when bids were initially invited prior to the award of contract by authorities to petitioner did not absolve the authorities from initiating a bidding process de novo by issuing a fresh advertisement for re-procurement contract---Selective bidding process for award of re-procurement contract adopted by authorities by inviting quotations from five parties which had been pre-qualified in earlier round of bidding was also unlawful and was violative of Rr.4, 12, 14 & 20 of Public Procurement Rules, 2004---High Court directed the authorities to initiate bidding process in transparent manner by issuing advertisement inviting bids from general public and set aside re-procurement contract in question---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Messrs Malik Mushtaq Goods Transport Co. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 Lah. 289=2010 CLD 726; Habibullah Energy Limited v. WAPDA through Chairman PLD 2014 SC 47; Pakcom Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 44; Indus Trading and Contracting Company v. Collector of Customs 2016 SCMR 842; Quality Weaving Mills Limited v. Government of Punjab 2005 CLC 964; GETZ Pharma (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2016 Sindh 420; Syed Bhais (Pvt.) Limited v. Government of Punjab PLD 2012 Lah. 52; Muhammad Maqsood Sabir Ansari v. District Returning Officer PLD 2009 SC 28; Jan Muhammad Mughal v. Tariq Saleem Dogar 2011 MLD 769; Noman Razzaq v. Faryad Hussain Chaudhry PLD 2015 SC AJK 7; Haider Khan v. Additional Chief Secretary, FATA 2012 MLD 1830; Tipu Salman Makhdoom v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2014 Lah. 468 and Muhammad Atif Hanif v. Government of Punjab 2013 CLC 1612 ref.

Habibullah Energy Limited v.WAPDA through Chairman PLD 2014 SC 47; Ramna Pipe and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines 2004 SCMR 1274; Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-i-Azam Internaitonal Airport, Karachi 1998 SCMR 2268; Ittehad Cargo Service v. Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi PLD 2001 SC 116; Kay Bee International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Secretary to the Government of Punjab PLD 2002 SC 1074; Iqtedar Ali Khan v. Department of Mines and Minerals PLD 2004 SC 773 and Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2014 SC 206 rel.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Judicial review---Test---In matter of judicial review, basic test is to see whether there is any infirmity in the decision making process and not in decision itself---Decision maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision making power and he must give effect to it otherwise it may result in illegality---Basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether disputed action satisfies the test of reasonableness---Question whether disputed question is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case.

Captain-PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. A. W. Brothers 2004 SCMR 1956 and Pacific Multinational (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Inspector-General of Police, Sindh Police Headquarters and 2 others PLD 1992 Kar. 283 rel.

Bilal Akbar Tarar and Shahid Naseer for Petitioner.

Arshad Khan Jadoon, Dy. Attorney-General with Muhammad Mushtaq, Chief Engineer, Pak. P.W.D. and Ch. Nadeem Ahmad Bhutta for Respondent No.2.

Sardar Masroof Abid, Hasnain Muzaffar and Shakir Javaid for Respondent No.3.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 48

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

NEO TV/MESSRS FUN INFORMATION NETWORK (PVT) LTD.---Appellant

Versus

PEMRA through Chairman and others---Respondents

F.A.Os. Nos.125 and 126 of 2016, decided on 30th November, 2016.

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)---

----Ss.20(c), 29(6) & 30---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009, R.15(1)---Electronic Media (Programmes and Advertisements) Code of Conduct, 2015, Cls. 3(1)(i)(j), 4(10), 22 & 24(2)---Constitution of Pakistan. Arts. 19 & 204---Appeal---Aspersions against Judges of Supreme Court---Contemptuous material---Petitioner company was running a television channel and its licence was suspended for seven days and fine was also imposed upon it by authorities on account of casting aspersions against Judges of the Supreme Court during a talk show---Authorities also directed the anchor person to tender apology if he would appear on some other channel during those seven days---Plea raised by appellant was that information in question was already aired by another channel as news item---Validity---Appellant did not deny content of the show which led to issuance of show cause notice---Appellant could not point out towards any credible information justifying allegation against superior judiciary---Simply because another television channel had aired a news item was not a valid excuse to airing the same without ensuring that the information was credible and based on facts---Appellant must have realized that Judges or their representatives or Court officials could not come to talk-shows to defend themselves and it must not be taken undue advantage of by broadcast media or television anchors---For anchor person, to question on air, the appropriateness from a moral and political perspective, the alleged meeting between a sitting Judge of superior judiciary and a leader of political party, was tantamount to casting an aspersion on a member of superior judiciary of Pakistan---Such act was a violation of cl.3(1)(j) of Electronic Media (Programmes and Advertisements) Code of Conduct, 2015---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority was empowered under S. 29(6) of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, to impose fine up to Rupees One million on a licensee who would contravene any of the provisions of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, or the Rules or Regulations made thereunder, after reasonable opportunity to show cause was given to the licensee---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority was empowered under S.30(1)(b) of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, to suspend the licence of a broadcast media or distribution service where the licensee had contravened any provision of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, or the Rules and Regulations made thereunder---High Court declined to interfere in the penalty imposed by authorities as the same was within the parameters of statutory provisions---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Dr. Shahid Masood v. Federation of Pakistan 2010 SCMR 1849; Pakistan Broadcasters Association v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority PLD 2016 SC 692 and ARY Media Communications Private Limited v. Pakistan Media Regulatory Authority and another (F.A.O. No.81 of 2016) ref.

Fawad Hussain Chaudhry and Faisal Fareed Hussain, ASCs for the appellants.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 64

Before Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, J

ALI RAZA and another---Petitioners

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and another---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2875-Q of 2016, decided on 5th January, 2017.

(a) Administration of justice---

----Where the law required doing things in a particular manner, such things had to be done in that manner and all other modes stood excluded.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 19---Fundamental Right to freedom of speech---Nature and scope---Article 19 of the Constitution provided the concept of freedom of speech but at the same time, State could regulate the right to speech when the same came in conflict with rights of other individuals---Equilibrium had to be maintained by placing the reasonable restrictions on freedom of expression in maintenance of public order.

Pakistan Broadcaster Associations v. PEMRA and others PLD 2016 SC 692 and Flt.-Lt. (Dr) Shariq Saeed v. Mansoob Ali Khan and 5 others 2010 YLR 1647 rel.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 120-B, 124-A & 505---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.196 & 196-A, 249-A & 265-K---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Quashment of FIR---Prosecution for offences against the State---Sedition---Criminal conspiracy---Statements conducing to public mischief---Scope and nature of Ss.196 & 196-A, Cr.P.C.---Petitioner sought quashment of FIR registered against him on the ground, inter alia, that cognizance for offences under Ss.120-B, 124-A & 505 of the P.P.C. could only be taken upon a complaint made by or under the authority of a Federal or Provincial Government or some other officer empowered in such behalf, which was not done in the present case---Effect---Legislature had used negative language in Ss.196 & 196-A of the Cr.P.C., hence no court could initiate the process against the accused and in the present case, FIR was registered by the Station House Officer, on his own and competent authority under law had not initiated said process---No sanction was obtained in the present FIR for offences under Ss.124-A, 120-B & 505 P.P.C. and the FIR was registered without approval of competent authority as referred in S.196-A of the Cr.P.C.---High Court observed that while under the law, FIR could not be quashed when alternate course of action was available under S.249-A or 265-K of the Cr.P.C., however it was also the fundamental duty of the court to protect a citizen from abuse of process of law, and from plain reading of FIR in the present case, no offence had been made out nor any legal process was adopted---FIR against the petitioner / accused was declared to be illegal and quashed---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Rana Shahid Ahmad Khan v. Tanveer Ahmad and others 2011 SCMR 1937 rel.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss.120-B, 124-A & 505---Offences against the State---Sedition---Criminal conspiracy---Statements conducing to public mischief---Cognizance of offences under Ss.120-B, 124-A & 505 P.P.C.---Essential principles governing cognizance of offences under Ss.120-B, 124-A & 505, P.P.C., explained.

Following are the principles necessary for the cognizance of offences like sedition, criminal conspiracy and statement conducing public mischief:

(a) Offence must contain promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes.

(b) Words, deeds or writing used to disturb the tranquility of the State or to subvert the government.

(c) Incite the people to incursion and rebellion.

(d) Complaint must be initiated by the Federal or Provincial Government and by authorized person under the law after considering the relevant factors of the alleged incident with reasons..

(e) Private persons cannot agitate the matter regarding seditions of charge rather it should be initiated, inquired and investigated by the Government or at least on their direction.

(f) Criminal conspiracy can only be considered if the other principle offence comes on record on the basis of allegations referred in the complaint in each case.

(g) Authorized officer shall state reason before issuing any sanction in terms of Sections 196 and 196-A, Cr.P.C. with speaking order.

Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. 1997 SCC 431; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955; Makhdoom Javed Hashmi v. The State 2010 PCr.LJ 1809; Sabz Ali Khan and others v. Inspector General of Police KPK and others 2016 YLR 1279; Abdul Razzaq v. The State PLD 2005 Lah. 631; Muhammad Ishaq and others v. The State 1988 PCr.LJ 992; Salman Taseer v. Judge, Special Court 1993 SCMR 71; Naveed Ahmad Khan, Advocate and others v. S.H.O. Renala Khurd 1994 PCr.LJ 2381; Mst. Tehmina Doltana and others v. The State 2001 PCr.LJ 1199 and Abdul Fatah and others v. The State 1990 MLD 1087 ref.

Taimoor Aslam Khan for Petitioners.

Mian Abdul Rauf, Advocate-General, Muhammad Haseeb Ch., for Respondent No.2.

Ms. Hadia Aziz, State Counsel, Muhammad Yasin Bhutta, Inspector P.S. Secretariat, Islamabad for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 81

Before Athar Minallah, J

BNP PVT. LTD. and others---Petitioners

Versus

CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY---Respondent

Writ Petition No.3043 of 2016, decided on 3rd March, 2017.

(a) Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960)---

----Ss. 5(2), 11, 12 & 13 --- Islamabad Capital Territory (Zoning) Regulations, 1992, Reglns. 8, 13, 14, 19 & 27---Islamabad Building Regulations, 1963, Reglns. 12 & 13---Islamabad Residential Sectors Zoning (Building Control) Regulations, 2005, Reglns.2.2, 3.9, 3.10 & 3.12.9---Islamabad Land Disposal Regulations, 2005. Regln.6---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), S.9---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Allotment of plot on basis of lease, cancellation of---Legality---Illegalities in the bidding process---Violation of terms of the lease---Effect---Subject plot was allotted on the basis of a lease to petitioner-company ("company") to construct a hotel---Company started construction of residential apartments on the plot and offered it to the public for sale---Subsequently Board of the Capital Development Authority ("Authority") cancelled allotment of the plot on basis of violation of terms of the lease---Company and purchasers, who had paid sale consideration for the purchase of respective apartments in the building, impugned the decision of the Authority by filing Constitutional petitions before the High Court---Held, that Cabinet had not given its approval at any stage for amending the Master Plan and the sanctioned Scheme made and prepared under the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 ("Ordinance") for the creation of a plot for a hotel, let alone a plot meant for the construction of 'residential apartments'---At no stage was any approval given by the Board of the Authority for the creation of a plot at the site for construction of a multi-storeyed building meant for residential apartments---All the advertisements published in the newspapers, inviting response from interested parties, had explicitly described the plot as being offered for the construction of a hotel---Nothing has been placed on record to show that the plot was part of a sanctioned Scheme or that it was included in the manner as prescribed under the mandatory provisions of the Ordinance---Record did not reflect that the Authority, at any stage, had prepared a Scheme in discharge of its functions on the basis of sound principles of development and town planning, as expressly mandated under S.5(2) of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960---Furthermore neither the bank guarantee nor the performance guarantee given by the company were kept alive---Moreover the company was a juridical person and was, admittedly, not one of the partners of the consortium that successfully bid for the lease---Nothing on record even remotely indicated as to how a juridical person which had not participated in the bidding process was permitted to execute the lease deed and, thereafter, construct a building on the plot---From execution of the lease deed till the cancellation of the plot, both the company as well as the Authority had blatantly violated the provisions of the Ordinance, and the rules and regulations made thereunder---Officials of the Authority extended undue benefits to the company in complete disregard of the mandatory regulations, thus causing loss to the exchequer on the one hand and on the other enabling the company to defraud and deceive members of the general public---Authority had breached its fiduciary duties and obligations in holding, disposing and managing the property vested in it for the benefit of the people---Representations made by the company to the members of the general public, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, could possibly be construed as dishonestly inducing members of the public at large with the intent to deliver money and valuables, as defined in S.9 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Purchasers had been robbed of their hard earned savings solely due to regulatory failure and negligence of the Authority and the Federal Government as well, therefore, it was their duty to ensure that the rights of the purchasers to the extent of being compensated was protected and enforced---Both the construction of the residential apartments on the plot and the purported sale thereof was illegal, void and in flagrant abuse and violation of the Ordinance read with the Islamabad Capital Territory (Zoning) Regulations, 1992, the Islamabad Building Regulations, 1963, and the Islamabad Residential Sectors Zoning (Building Control) Regulations, 2005---Constitutional petitions were dismissed accordingly.

Capital Development Authority through Chairman and others v. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and others 1999 SCMR 2636; Saad Mazhar and others v. CDA and others 2005 SCMR 1973; Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. CDA and others PLD 2006 SC 394; Human Rights Cases Nos.4668 of 2006, 1111 of 2007 and 15283-G of 2010 (PLD 2010 SC 759) ref

(b) Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960)---

----S. 4---Capital Development Authority ("Authority")---Fiduciary duty---Scope---Authority had been entrusted with the statutory status of a trustee; it held the land in trust on behalf of every citizen, thus giving rise to a relationship which was fiduciary in nature---Power of disposal of land would, thus, attract the duties and obligations of a fiduciary.

Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon v. Capital Development Authority through Chairman 2015 SCMR 294 and Suo Motu Case No.13 of 2009 (PLD 2011 SC 619 ref.

(c) Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960)---

----Ss. 50 & 51 & Preamble---Provisions of the Capital Development Authority Ordinance, 1960 and the Rules and Regulations made there-under---Nature and interpretation---Said provisions, rules and regulations were mandatory in nature and binding, thus, a liberal construction thereof was not permissible.

Human Rights Cases Nos. 4668 of 2006, 1111 of 2007 and 15283-G of 2010 (PLD 2010 SC 759) ref.

(d) Words and phrases

----"Transparency"---Definition.

Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd Edn.) ref.

(e) Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960)---

----S. 14D---Islamabad Land Disposal Regulations, 2005, Regln. 6---Disposal of commercial and business plots---Public auction---Transparency---Principles---Commercial or business plot could not be disposed of otherwise than through public auction---Openness and transparency in the disposal of land falling under the category of commercial and business plot was mandatory otherwise the entire proceedings would be void and thus vitiated---Transparency was mandatory at every stage i.e. planning disposal, inviting interested persons, bidding process, evaluation of bids, declaring a successful bidder and the execution of the lease or contract pursuant thereto---At the first stage the plot and its category must be clearly described in the sanctioned Scheme; second, the terms and conditions for pre-qualification or eligibility must be intelligible and free from any ambiguity and provided to the interested persons in writing; third, advertisements published in daily newspapers ought to unambiguously mention the category and description of the plot being offered and the terms and conditions; fourth, the timings, dates and venue for the bidding must be open and transparent; lastly, the terms and conditions of the proposed lease or contract must not only be strictly in conformity with the description mentioned in the published advertisements but should also have been in the knowledge of the participants prior to the submission of bids---Any deviation, at any stage, from the terms and conditions published in the advertisements would vitiate the process and render the disposal as opaque---Any doubt about whether the person who was ultimately allotted a plot had participated in the bidding process would render the disposal non-transparent unless such a person could give a plausible explanation to the satisfaction of the Capital Development Authority ("Authority") that it had actually participated in the bidding process and was declared as the successful bidder---Principles of transparency were not restricted to the description given in the advertisements---Transparency would extend to the pre-bidding process i.e. the preparation of the specifications, the approval mechanism, methods of advertisements and the entire process till the contract had been concluded with the successful bidder---Opening and evaluation of bids and formulating evaluation of the criteria were an integral part of the disposal of land under the Islamabad Land Disposal Regulations, 2005---Test of transparency was to allow the widest possible competition, which was not favourable to a selected class of bidders nor put any person, who may have been interested, at a disadvantage---Transparency was the key to ensuring that the widest possible competition was made possible so that the maximum price for the land being disposed of could be fetched---Non-transparent process in the disposal of land was not sustainable in law.

Ali Sarwar and others v. Syed Shujat Ali Naqvi and others PLD 2011 SC 519 ref.

(f) Capital Development Authority Ordinance (XXIII of 1960)---

----S. 6---Capital Development Authority ("Authority")---Loss caused to the public on account of regulatory failure or negligence by the Authority---Liability---Scope---Besides the Authority as a statutory organization, the concerned Chairman and every Member of the Board of the Authority were jointly and severally accountable for such loss.

(g) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Powers vested in the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution were in the nature of exercising judicial review, intended to prevent arbitrariness, enforcement of Fundamental Rights, and to exercise the powers in the larger public interest---Said power was designed to effectuate the law, to enforce rule of law and to ensure that all the authorities and organs of the State acted in accordance with the law, therefore it could not be exercised to condone a material breach of the principles of transparency and violation of the mandatory provisions of law; it could not be exercised in a manner that would lead to perpetuating illegality---High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction could not direct statutory authorities to act contrary to the law.

Suo Motu Caes No.13 of 2009 (PLD 2011 SC 619) ref.

(h) Illegality---

----Scope---Rights could not be claimed on the basis of an illegality --- Illegal and void foundation could not create a right and any superstructure built thereon would equally remain illegal and void.

(i) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Part II, Chap. 1 [Arts. 8 to 28]---Illegality---Scope---No person could justify an illegality by contending that similar other illegal activities were going on---Rule of law could be upheld by effectuating and enforcing the law, rather than condoning and giving legitimacy to violations of law---Legitimizing illegality lead to chaos and thus results in violation of the Fundamental Rights of the citizens.

Khalid Saeed v. Shamim Rizvan and others 2003 SCMR 1505 and Mst. Mukhtar Begum and others v. Ala-ud-Din and others 1999 SCMR 914 ref.

Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan, Barrister Gohar Ali Khan, Advocates Supreme Court for Petitioner (in W.P.No.3043 of 2016).

Khawaja Haris Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in W.P. No.3160 of 2016).

Asma Jahangir, Khurram M. Hashmi and Barrister Salman Afridi, Advocates Supreme Court for Petitioner (in W.P. No.3259 of 2016).

Babar Sattar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in W.P. No.4023 of 2016).

Muhammad Ali Raza, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms.Maryam Ali Abbasi for Petitioner (in W.P. No.3750 of 2016).

Khalil ur Rehman Abbasi for Petitioner (in W.P.No.3488 of 2016).

Syed Iftikhar Gillani, Advocate Supreme Court, Kashif Ali Malik and Aamir Latif Gill, for Respondent/CDA.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 115

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

7C'S CORPORATE SERVICES---Petitioner

Versus

OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.1784 of 2016, decided on 13th March, 2017.

(a) Partnership Act ( IX of 1932) ---

----Ss. 59, 69(1) & 69(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition filed before the High Court by an 'unregistered firm/business'---Maintainability---Petitioner was unable to show that it was "a registered firm" or even an unregistered partnership firm---Petitioner brought on record certain documents which showed that it had entered into contracts in the past for the supply of goods and services, and in these contracts, the petitioner had been described as "a company incorporated and registered" with the relevant 'Chamber of Commerce and Industry' or a "firm/company registered under the laws of Pakistan"---Mere fact that the petitioner was issued a Membership Certificate by the relevant Chamber of Commerce and Industry or a Taxpayer Registration Certificate by the Federal Board of Revenue would not infuse it with legal personality having the capacity to sue---No document showing the petitioner's incorporation, establishment or registration had been brought on record-Only a natural or a juristic person could sue or be sued in its own name---Since the petitioner had not been able to show that it was a partnership firm, it was clearly not a juristic or juridical person---Constitutional petition filed by the petitioner was not maintainable.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 184(3) & 199---Public interest litigation---Meaning and scope---Public interest litigation had been termed as a strategic arm of the legal aid movement which was intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor masses who constituted the low visibility area of humanity---Public Interest Litigation discarded the traditional concept of locus standi, which provided that only the person whose legal rights were being violated could approach the Court for redress---High Court observed that public interest litigation in the Supreme Court and in the High Courts by public-spirited citizens had helped to ameliorate the miseries of thousands of persons, arising from repression, governmental omissions or excesses, administrative lethargy or arbitrariness.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Public interest litigation---Scope---Personal gain, business interest or economic benefit sought by petitioner under the garb of public interest litigation---Where the petitioner acted for his own economic benefit or business interest by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, the petition could not be held to be in the public interest---Personal interest could not be enforced through the process of the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution in the garb of public interest litigation---High Court had the duty to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice was not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court for personal gain under the garb of public interest litigation.

Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 SCMR 455; Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal AIR 2004 SC 280; Muhammad Shafique Khan Swati v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 851; Ms. Imrana Tiwana v. Province of Punjab PLD 2015 Lah. 522; Muntizama Committee, Al-Mustafa Colony (Regd.) Karachi v. Director Katchi Abadis Sindh PLD 1992 Kar. 54 and S.P. Gupta and others v. President of India and others AIR 1982 SC 149 ref.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 9---'Access to justice'---'Right to life'---Scope---Right of access to justice was a Fundamental Right in terms of Art.9 of the Constitution, and an integral part of the rule of law---Every right when breached must be provided with a right to a remedy.

Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 870; Malik Asad Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 161; Al-Jahad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 324; Ghulam Abbas v. The State 2004 PCr.LJ 1321; Abdul Qayyum v. Chairman, Capital Development Authority 2015 PLC (C.S.) 617; Bremen Vulkan Schiffban and Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corp. (1981 AC 909 = 1981 (1) All ER 289; R. v. Secretary of State for Home Dept., ex parte Leech 1993 (4) All ER 539 (CA) ref.

(e) Procurement Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XXII of 2002) ---

----S. 2(j)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 9---Procurement by a State owned company/entity---Bidders challenging bidding process in courts disqualified from participating in future projects of the State owned company---Barrier to access to justice---Any private party was at liberty not to enter into a contract with a party against whom he had been litigating, however, such a luxury was not available to the State or a Procuring Agency, as defined in Public Procurement Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---In dispensing its largesse or entering into contracts, the State was expected not to act as a private individual but should act in conformity with certain healthy standards and not in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner---Bidder could not be disqualified from participating in a tender bidding process simply because he had instituted legal proceedings against the State's procuring agency---Disqualification on said ground would pose as a barrier to access to justice and thereby transgress a person's fundamental right of access to justice---Party would be reluctant to agitate its rights by invoking the jurisdiction of a Court of law against an authority for the fear of being ousted from a tender bidding process initiated by such an authority---Mere fact that a procuring agency could not disqualify a party on the ground that such party had litigated against the procuring agency did not mean that the procuring agency could not require bidders to furnish information in the form of an affidavit or otherwise as to its litigation history with the procuring agency.

Messrs Maxim Advertisisng Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh 2007 MLD 2019; Premier Mercantile Services (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trustees of Port of Karachi 2003 MLD 1063 and Pak Shaheen Containers Services (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trustees of the Port of Karachi PLD 2001 Kar. 30 ref.

(f) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VI, R.1 & O.XIX, R.1---Constitutional petition---Denial of relief to a litigant---Grounds---Although all pleadings delivered or affidavits sworn in the course of judicial proceedings before a Court of competent jurisdiction, were privileged, but it was equally important that such a privilege must not be abused by casting unsubstantiated aspersions and insinuations against parties to the lis---Such a privilege did not give a party a carte blanche to make any statement it liked, however defamatory---Such allegations may at times not form the foundation of a claim for damages for libel or defamation by the person against whom such allegations were levelled, but they could most definitely, be a ground for the High Court, exercising equitable jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, to penalize and deny relief to a litigant making such allegations.

King v. Skinner (1876) 98 E.R.529 ref.

(g) Procurement Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XXII of 2002)---

----S. 2(j)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---'Aggrieved persons'---Scope---Procurement by a State owned company/entity---'Potential/prospective bidders'---Mere possibility of bidding at the auction without actual participation conferred no locus standi to file a constitutional petition---Prospective/potential bidder, who had not joined the auction proceedings, could not be treated as an "aggrieved person" to maintain a constitutional petition under Art. 199 of the Constitution.

Muhammad Arshad v. Secretary, Government and Rural Development Department, Lahore 2005 CLC 939 ref.

Hafiz Arfat Ahmed Chaudhry and Ms. Kashifa Niaz Awan for Petitioner.

Muhammad Ali Saif for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Malik Muhammad Qayyum for Respondent No.3.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 135

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

PAKISTAN TOBACCO COMPANY LIMITED---Petitioner

Versus

ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL ZAKAT, MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2891 of 2015, decided on 13th March, 2017.

Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (XVIII of 1980)---

----Ss. 3, 2(xxiii), 2(xx) & First Sched.---Zakat Collection and Refund Rules, 1981, R.21---Charge and collection of Zakat---Compulsory deduction of Zakat---Sahib-e-Nisab---Definition---"Recognized provident fund"---Exemption from compulsory deduction of Zakat---Scope---Petitioner, impugned compulsory deduction of Zakat from their investments in the National Saving Schemes, on the ground that being a recognized provident fund, they were exempt from compulsory deduction of Zakat---Contention of department inter alia was that National Saving Schemes was a separate class of asset upon which the petitioner was liable to pay Zakat, and no certificate claiming exemption from the same was provided by the petitioner for National Saving Schemes---Validity---Provisions of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 did not limit or restrict or identify assets of a person, who was excluded from definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab" which would subjected to compulsory deduction of Zakat and S.2(xxiii) of the same provided that a "recognized provident fund" was excluded from the definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab" and its assets could not be subjected to compulsory deduction of Zakat---Section 3 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 started with a non obstante clause, therefore, other provisions of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 including Ss.2(xx) and 2(xxiii) of the same would exclude a "recognized provident fund" from definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab" and per R.21 of the Zakat Collection and Refund Rules, 1981, Zakat shall not be deducted in respect of assets of a person claiming an exclusion from the definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab"---Investment made by a "Sahib-e-Nisab" in National Saving Schemes was included within meaning of assets per the first Sched. to the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 but Zakat could not be deducted from the same if such assets belonged to a person excluded from meaning of "Sahib-e-Nisab"---High Court observed that on account of being a recognized provident fund, petitioners did not come within the definition of "Sahib-e-Nisab", and their assets, whether or not mentioned in the First Sched. to the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980; were not liable to compulsory deduction of Zakat and directed the Administrator General Zakat, Ministry of Religious Affairs etc., to process petitioners' case for refund of the Zakat deducted---Constitutional petitions were allowed, accordingly.

Market Committee, Chichawatni District Sahiwal v. Federation of Pakistan 1991 CLC 118 rel.

Nadeem Ahmad Sheikh for Petitioner.

Raja Khalid Mehmood Khan, Deputy Attorney-General for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 143

Before Athar Minallah and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

SAIF ULLAH---Petitioner

Versus

THE STATE and others---Respondents

Writ Petitions Nos.2605, 3049, 3198, 2855, 3030 of 2016, decided on 27th February, 2017.

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(b) & 16(a)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Bail, refusal of---Delay in conclusion of trial---Conditional order---Petitioner was arrested by National Accountability Bureau and remained in custody for almost 18 months without conclusion of trial---Validity---Person arrested was justified in having a legitimate expectation that he would not be deprived of his right to freedom and liberty for an unreasonable period particularly if the Court had taken cognizance---Legitimate expectation stemmed from express language and scheme of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---When such legitimate expectation was frustrated it would give the affected person a valid ground to seek judicial review despite ouster of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Unreasonable delay in conclusion of proceedings was tantamount to defeating object and purposes of National Accountability Ordinance,1999 particularly when it could not be attributed to the person deprived of liberty---During trial, 108 witnesses had been examined while more than 50 were yet to enter witness box---No time frame could be given for expected conclusion of trial---Petitioner could not be kept behind bars for an indefinite period particularly when National Accountability Ordinance,1999 expressly provided that proceedings would be held day-to-day and were to be concluded within 30 days---High Court observed that Trial Court would complete trial within 30 days holding hearings on day-to-day basis without granting an adjournment---In case trial was not concluded within stipulated period, i.e., 30 days, petitioner would be released on bail by Trial Court---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Muhammad Jahangir Badar v. The State and others PLD 2003 SC 525 fol.

Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust and others v. Muhammad Arif and others 2015 SCMR 1472 Secretary, Govt. of Punjab, Finance Department and others v. M. Ismail Jayer and others 2014 SCMR 1336; Syed Mubashir Raza Jaffri and others v. EOBI and others 2014 SCMR 949; Nadeem Ahmed, Advocate v. FOP 2013 SCMR 1062; Application by Abdul Rehman Farooq Pirzada PLD 2013 SC 829; Goverment of Sindh through Secretary, Home Department and others v. Abdul Jabbar and others 2004 SCMR 639; Shafique Ahmad and others v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2004 SC 168; Government of Sindh through Secretary, Home Department and others v. Abdul Jabbar and others 2004 PLC (CS) 99; Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and another v. Facto Belarus Tractors Ltd. 2000 SCMR 112; Khan Asfandyar Wali and others v. FOP through Cabinet Division, Islamabd and others PLD 2001 SC 607; Mrs. Shahida Faisal and others v. FOP and others 2001 SCMR 294; Anwar Saifullah Khan v. The State and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1040; Muhammad Saeed Mehdi v. The State and 2 others 2002 SCMR 282; Haji Ghulam Ali v. The State through A.G. NWFP, Peshawar and another 2003 SCMR 597; Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad and another v. Asif Baig Muhammad and others 2004 SCMR 91; Rafiq Haji Usman v. Chairman, NAB and another 2015 SCMR 1575; The State v. Haji Kabeer Khan PLD 2005 SC 364; NAB v. Khalid Masood and another 2005 SCMR 1291; Shahbazuddin Chaudhry and another v. The State PLD 2004 SC 785 and Mir Shah Jehan Khan Ketran v. The National Accountability Bureau and others C.P.No.3341 of 2016 and C.M.A. No.6948 of 2016 rel.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 16(a)---Trial---Delay in conclusion---Effect---Scheme of National Accountability Ordinance,1999 reaffirms that delay in proceedings particularly the trial would lead to defeating legislative intent---Deprivation of liberty of a citizen for an indefinite period encourages the National Accountability Bureau authorities to concentrate more on ending matter on basis of plea bargain rather than carrying out fair, efficient and professional investigation aimed at achieving conviction---Delay is an unambiguous intent of legislature in enacting National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.

Khan Asfandyar Wali and others v. FOP, through Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others PLD 2001 SC 607 ref.

(c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(b) & 16(a)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Bail, refusal of---Delay in conclusion of trial---Second petition---Petitioner was arrested by National Accountability Bureau and was in custody for more than 2 years without conclusion of trial---Validity---In earlier petition, petitioner had raised ground of delay but it did not find favour either with High Court or the Supreme Court---After dismissal of earlier petition by High Court and refusal of leave by Supreme Court, trial could not be concluded as envisaged in S. 16 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Further delay could have been treated as a fresh ground but High Court declined to entertain constitutional petition in view of observations of Supreme Court which were binding on High Court---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

(d) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(b) & 16(a)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition-Bail, refusal of---Delay in conclusion of trial---Delay attributed to accused---Petitioner before arrest remained fugitive from law for about 5 years---Petitioner sought his release on bail in view of delay in conclusion of trial---Validity---Trial had been delayed due to conduct of petitioner firstly, by remaining fugitive from law and secondly, demanding that fee of MRI be arranged for him---Conduct of petitioner did not entitle him to concession of bail even on ground of delay---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Laiq Khan Swati and Ehtesham Turk for Petitioner (in W.P.No.2605 of 2016), Barrister Sajjad Ahmad Satti for Petitioner (in W.P.No.3039 of 2016), Muhammad Amjad Iqbal Qureshi Mohammad Nouman Qureshi, Mohammad Ejaz and Hafiz Muhammad Nawaz for Petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos.3198, 2855 and 3030 of 2016) for Petitioners.

Sardar Muzaffar Ahmad Khan, ADPG, NAB, Adnan Tahir, Prosecutor, NAB, Umair Naeem Bajwa, A.D. I.O. NAB, M. Raza, Deputy A.D. NAB, Raza Bashir, Special Prosecutor NAB, Mubasshar Kareem, A.D. /I.O.. NAB. For Respondents.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 162

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

MUHAMMAD SOHAIL KIYANI and others---Appellants

Versus

Raja MUHAMMAD ANWAR and others---Respondents

R.S.A. No.15 of 2016, decided on 27th March, 2017.

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 42---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 123 & 124---Suit for declaration---Missing person, not heard of for seven years-Presumption of death---Onus to prove-Inheritance, opening of---Scope---Plaintiff (brother of missing person) filed suit that his brother was dead having gone missing since 1973 and suit property was liable to be transferred to his legal heirs---Trial Court decreed the suit by declaring that plaintiff and other legal heirs of deceased were entitled to inherit all his estate and inheritance would be considered to have opened in the year 1980 i.e. seven years after the year of disappearance---Appellate Court modified the judgment of Trial Court to the extent that missing person would be considered as dead with effect from the date of institution of suit and his inheritance was declared to have opened from the date of institution of suit---Validity---If a person had not been heard of for seven years then presumption would be that he was dead---Burden of proving that missing person was alive would shift to the other side---None of the defendants had asserted that missing person was heard of after 1973 so question of shifting of burden did not arise in the present case---Appropriate inquiry should have been made before a presumption of death that missing person had not been heard of for seven years---Presumption would be that missing person was alive unless it was established that the whereabouts of said person were not known and he had not been heard of for seven years before the date of suit---Owner of suit property was unheard of for seven years since 1973 and he could be deemed to have met with a civil death and not a death occasioned on his last breath---Presumption of death did not extend to the date of death---No presumption could be drawn as to the date or time of the death of a person who had not been heard of for seven years but it could be inferred on the basis of evidence factual or circumstantial---Onus of proving that a person was dead on a particular date would lie on the party who asserted the same---Plaintiff was bound to prove that owner of suit property died after the death of private defendants to exclude them from inheriting their share in the missing person's estate---Said onus, in the present case had not been discharged by the plaintiff---Nothing was on record that missing person died on a date after all his legal heirs (except the plaintiff) had died---Plaintiff had not pleaded in the suit that his brother died after the death of private defendants---Plaintiff could not seek to deprive the other legal heirs of missing person from their inheritance by claiming to be his sole heir on account of being alive on the date of institution of suit in absence of any specific pleadings to date and time of his death---Plaintiff had not even prayed for missing person's inheritance to open with effect from the date of institution of present suit---Plaintiff had not produced any evidence to show that his brother was heard of after 1980 or after his legal heir had died---Statutory period of seven years had expired in 1980 i.e. before any of missing person's legal heirs died---Missing person would be presumed to have died before any of his legal heirs died and not on the day of the institution of the suit by the plaintiff---Inheritance of owner of suit property would be considered to have opened in 1980 i.e. upon the lapse of seven years from the date when he went missing and was unheard of when all his legal heirs were living---Successors of all the legal heirs of missing person including plaintiff would have a share in his estate/suit property---Legal heirs of deceased could gift or transfer their respective share in the suit property to the plaintiff if they so desired---Impugned judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court were set aside and those of Trial Court were restored---Second appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Lal Hussain v. Mst. Sadiq and another 2001 SCMR 1036 ref.

State Life Insurance Company v. Faisal Tahir 2011 CLD 1594; Mst. Sardar Bibi v. Maula Dad and others PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lah. 137; Muhammad Sarwar and another v. Fazal Ahmed and another PLD 1987 SC 1; Khudadad v. Mst. Resham Jan and others PLD 1968 Pesh. 172; Ramabai and others v. Saraswathi and others AIR 1953 Travancore Cochin 114; Sarojini v. Sivanandan AIR 1956 Travancore Cochin 129, Bhagat v. Life Insurance Company of India Madras AIR 1965 Madras 440; Smt. Narbada and another v. Ram Dayal AIR 1968 Rajasthan 48; Har Nand v. The Commissioner Ambala Division, Ambala Cantt and others AIR 1972 Punjab and Haryana 14; Chandi Charan v. Bhagyadhar AIR 1976 Calcutta 356, Lal Hussain v. Mst. Sadiq and another 2001 SCMR 1036 and Muhammad Afsar and others v. Mst. Khatun and others PLD 1957 Pesh. 1 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 189---Decision of Supreme Court---Binding effect---Decision of Supreme Court enunciating principle of law was binding on all other courts in Pakistan---Judgment passed by any Court including High Court contrary to the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court would be a judgment per incuriam.

Province of the Punjab through Secretary, Health Department v. Dr. S. Muhammad Zafar Bukhari PLD 1997 SC 351 and Ashiq Hussain alias Muhammad Ashraf v. the State PLD 1994 SC 879 rel.

Wasim Ahmed Abbasi for Appellants.

Sharafat Ali Ch. and Umar Sajjad Chaven for Respondent No.1.

Hassan Mehmood for Respondent Nos. 2(iii), 5(i), ii), 6(i), iii, iv, vi, vii, viii) and 7(v).

P L D 2017 Islamabad 177

Before Aamer Farooq, J

DV COM DATA---Appellant

Versus

PAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION AUTHORITY through Chairman and another---Respondents

F.A.O. No.22 of 2015, decided on 7th April, 2017.

(a) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act (XVII of 1996)--

----Ss. 21, 5(2), 23 & 7---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (Functions and Powers) Regulations 2006, Reglns. 23(7) & 6 --- Exclusive power of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority ("PTA") to grant licenses --- Issuance of license, cancellation of license, levy of fee and late payment of additional fee for license by the PTA----General conditions concerning fee(s)---Nature of Late Payment Additional Fee---Scope---Appellant impugned order of the PTA where it was held to be liable to pay additional fee for late payment of the Initial Spectrum Fee under the license agreement---Question before the High Court was whether the demand by the PTA on the appellant to pay additional fee for late payment of the Initial Spectrum Fee was justified---Validity---License agreement and Regln. 23(7) of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (Functions and Powers) Regulations 2006, envisaged a levy of 2 percent late payment additional fee per month and in addition to the said fee, a licensee had to pay all fees required under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 and the Rules and Regulations framed under the same---Contention of the appellant that the default on payment of the Initial Spectrum Fee was not wilful, therefore the penalty of the late payment fee could not be imposed on it, was not tenable as the late payment additional fee was not a penalty but additional fee by way of compensation and Regln. 23(7) of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (Functions and Powers) Regulations 2006 did not provide that levy of late payment fee shall only be in the case of wilful default---License agreement between the parties revealed that PTA did not have any discretion not to impose or waive the said late payment fee---High Court observed that the Late Payment Additional Fee was part of the agreement between the parties and admittedly the appellant did not make the payment of the Initial Spectrum Fee as required, and hence it was liable to pay the same---No illegality therefore existed in the impugned order---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Messrs D.S. Textile Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2016 Lah. 355; (2015 SCC Bombay 336); 2016 SCMR 626; Assistant Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Division-III, Sukkur v. M/s Mari Gas Company Limited 2003 PTD 818; `Mahmood Rafique v. Muhammad Ismail and 3 others PLD 2008 Kar. 260; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan through Chairman and others v. Mst. Begum Rashida Jamil 2014 CLD 1216; Rehmat Ullah Khan and others v. GOP through Secretary, Petroleum and Natural Resources Division, Islamabad and others 2003 SCMR 50; M/s Lahore Textile and General Mills Limited, Lahore's case 1986 CLC 2728; Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. M/s Han Dossa Limited and 6 others PLD 1985 Kar. 71; M/s Aslam Saeed and Company v. M/s Trading Corporation of Pakistan PLD 1985 SC 69 and 2016 SCMR 16; PakCom Limited and others v.. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 44; Great Bear International Services Pvt. Ltd. V. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (FAO No.33-2012); Telecard Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority FAO No.32-2012 & FAO No.51-2012; The Adoni Ginning Factory and others v. The Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board, Hyderabad and others and Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd. v. State Electricity Board Andhra Pradesh and others AIR 1979 SC 1511; Pakistan Telecom Mobile Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Islamabad PLD 2014 SC 478; Abdul Razzak v. The Collector of Customs and another 1995 CLC 1453; Member Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab Lahore v. Abdul Majeed and another PLD 2015 SC 166 and Sindh High Court Bar Association through Secretary and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabd and others PLD 2009 SC 879 ref.

Messrs. D.S. Textile Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2016 Lah. 355; Mercantile Traders Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State Bank of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 250; The Adone Ginning Factory and others v. The Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board, Hyderabad and others and Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd. v. State Electricity Board Andhra Pradesha and others AIR 1979 SC 1511; Assistant Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Division III, Sukkur v. M/s. Mari Gas Company Limited 2003 PTD 818; Pak Telecom Mobile Limited v. PTA PLD 2014 SC 478; Great Bear International Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority FAO No.33 of 2012; Telecard Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority FAO No.32 of 2012 and FAO No.51 of 2012 and Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority FAO No.17 of 2015 rel.

(b) Ejusdem generis, doctrine of ---

----Scope--- Doctrine of ejusdem generis was a rule of construction and not substantive law and it was confined to a statute and not a contractual document.

Mercantile Traders Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State Bank of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 250 rel.

(c) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--

----S. 74---Compensation for breach of contract where penalty was stipulated---Nature of additional fee for late payment under a contract---Distinction between "penalty" and "compensation"---Scope---Late payment additional fee was not a penalty but additional fee by way of compensation.

The Adoni Ginning Factory and others v. The Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board, Hyderabad and others and Bajrang Jute Mills Ltd. v. State Electricity Board Andhra Pradesh and others AIR 1979 SC 1511 rel.

(d) Words and phrases--

----Phrases "shall pay" and "shall be liable to pay"---Distinction---Distinction existed between the phrases "shall pay" and "shall be liable to pay" as the former made it mandatory on the person to pay an amount while the latter gave discretion to the concerned functionary to impose the amount in question or waive the same.

Assistant Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Division III, Sukhur v. M/s Mari Gas Company Limited 2003 PTD 818 rel.

Muhammad Shahzad Shoukat and Asim Hafeez for Appellant.

Barrister Munawwar Iqbal Duggal for PTA with Muhammad Khurram Siddiqui,Director (Law), PTA for Respondents.

Nasir Ayyaz for MoIT.

Ch. Abdul Khaliq Thind, Standing Counsel.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 194

Before Aamer Farooq, J

MASOOD AHMED ORAKZAI---Appellant

Versus

PARVEEN SHOUKAT and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No.273 of 2009, decided on 6th April, 2017.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-

----S. 417(1) & (2-A)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 420---Cheating---Appeal against acquittal---Maintainability---Special and general provisions---Applicability---Appellant was son of complainant who filed private complaint in which accused was acquitted of the charge by Trial Court---Appellant sought special leave to appeal under S.417(2), Cr.P.C.---Validity---Complainant in caption of appeal had mentioned that the same was under S.417(2-A), Cr.P.C., which provision of law was not applicable---Judgment was passed upon the case filed through criminal complaint and in case of acquittal, S.417(2), Cr.P.C. covered the situation---Provision of S.417(2-A), Cr.P.C. was of general applicability i.e. in cases where accused was acquitted, any person aggrieved of the order of acquittal could prefer appeal---Where there was a special provision and a general provision, the special provision would prevail over the general one---Appellant was one of the legal heirs of complainant and was not a complainant, therefore, he could not have filed the appeal---State could file appeal against acquittal under S.417(1), Cr.P.C. and the same had not been done---Appellant was not competent to file appeal under S.417(2-A), Cr.P.C. therefore, the same was not maintainable---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Asghar and others PLD 2004 SC 875; Mst. Parveen v. Bakhsheesh and others 2014 PCr.LJ 1207 and Khalid Hussain v. Naveed alias Qalb Ali and 2 others PLD 2007 Kar. 442 rel.

2010 MLD 1638; 2005 YLR 2258; 2004 MLD 157; PLD 2011 SC 241; 1987 PCr.LJ 2096; 1989 MLD 2631; 1971 PCr.LJ 943 and 2002 SCMR 1089 ref.

Syed Muhammad Tayyab for Appellant.

Ahsan Hameed Lilla, along with Respondent No.1, and Yasir Barkat Chaudhry, State Counsel.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 198

Before Athar Minallah, J

AL-KHAIR UNIVERSITY through Muhammad Niaz, Additional Registrar Bhimber, AJK---Petitioner

Versus

HIGHER EDUCATION COMMISSION and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2523 of 2016, decided on 22nd June, 2017.

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9(a)(ix)---Cheating the public at large---Educational institution which does not meet prescribed criteria laid down by Higher Education Commission and opts to continue offering unapproved programs, or opens campuses and grants affiliations to other institutions, such institution exposes itself to be tried for committing offence of cheating public at large as defined under S.9(a)(ix) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.

(b) Higher Education Commission Ordinance (LIII of 2002)---

----Preamble---Higher Education Commission---object of establishing the Commission as an exclusive regulatory authority is to protect and safeguard members of general public, particularly the youth and their parents from being cheated and defrauded.

(c) Higher Education Commission Ordinance (LIII of 2002)---

----S. 10---Directions of Higher Education Commission, non-compliance of---Effect---Petitioner University was aggrieved of letter issued by Higher Education Commission to carry out its inspection---Validity---Educational institution which refused to surrender to or demonstrated defiance and contumacious conduct towards authority vested in the Higher Education Commission by refusing to comply with its directions could not expect equitable relief under Art.199 of the Constitution, from High Court---No institution affiliated by the University could operate or offer programs without express written approval granted by the Commission---Students enrolled in such programs could not claim a right that their degrees or certificates be recognized---University was bound to strictly comply with directions given by the Commission---Letter issued by Higher Education Commission did not suffer from any legal infirmity or jurisdictional error---Commission was justified in informing general public regarding status of the University so as to ensure that the youth would not suffer---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Haji Nasir Mehmood v. Mian Imran Masood and others PLD 2010 SC 1089; Government College University, Lahore through Vice-Chancellor and others v. Syeda Fiza Abbas and another 2015 SCMR 445; University of Health Science, Lahore through Vice-Chancellor and others v. Arslan Ali and another 2016 SCMR 134; The University of Dacca through Vice-Chancellor v. Zakir Ahmed PLD 1965 SC 90 and Ahmed and 3 others v. Vice-Chancellor, University of Engineering and Technology and another PLD 1981 SC 464 ref.

Sh. Ahsan ud Din for Petitioner.

Qaisar Sarwar for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 207

Before Athar Minallah, J

MUHAMMAD NAWAZ---Petitioner

Versus

PRINCIPLE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN and 11 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.4802 of 2016, decided on 20th June, 2017.

Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 154 & 153---Rules of Business, 1973, R.3(3), Sched. II, Cl.2, Entry 53---Notification SRO No.226(I)/2010, dated 3-4-2010---Council of Common Interest---Statutory Regulatory Authorities---Petitioner was aggrieved of the Memorandum whereby Prime Minister transferred administrative control and had placed five Statutory Regulatory Authorities i.e. National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, Frequency Allocation Board, Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority and Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, under the control of Cabinet Division of Federal Government---Validity---Council of Common Interest held a pivotal status in scheme of Federalism---Obstructing or impeding its functions and bypassing or ignoring the forum which was established to strengthen bonds between Federating units would inevitably lead to defeating intent of framers of the Constitution, besides giving rise to unfounded suspicions and doubts---Placement of five Regulatory Authorities was not a matter relating to day-to-day functioning but it fell within the fold of general principles by which Federal Government was to be guided by Council of Common Interests in its management of public affairs; as such the same fell within the expression used in Art.154 of the Constitution and therefore, subject to the exclusive power and jurisdiction vested in the Council of Common interests---Any alternation made in administrative arrangement relating to regulatory authorities was subject to approval of Council of Common Interests---Policy decisions and guidelines of Council of Common Interests were binding on Federal Government, and the Government was not empowered to interfere with the affairs of regulatory authorities other than as provided under Art.154 of the Constitution and relevant legislative enactments---Provision of R.3(3) of Rules of Business, 1973 was subject to Arts.153 & 154 of the Constitution---Memorandum dated 19-12-2016, could not have been issued nor the Prime Minister was empowered to grant approval pursuance to powers vested under R.3(3) of Rules of Business, 1973---High Court declared the Memorandum in question to have been issued in violation of the constitutional mandate and as such was illegal, void and was issued without lawful authority and jurisdiction---Status which existed before issuance of Memorandum in question was restored---Any alteration or amendment of entry 53 of Cl.2 of Rules of Business, 1973 was required approval of Council of Common Interests---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others PLD 2012 SC 132; Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills and 814 others v. WAPDA and others 1997 SCMR 641; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 SC 473; Reference No.01/2012; (1973) (PLD 2013 SC 279); Constitutional Petition No.127/2012 (PLD 2013 SC 829) and M.A. Rahman v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1988 SCMR 691 ref.

Saliheen Mughal for Petitioner.

Khawaja Muhammad Imitaz, Assistant Attorney General, Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Khursheed Butt, Barrister Munawar Iqbal Duggal and Ch. Hassan Murtaza Mann for Respondents.

حکم

جسٹس شوکت عزیز صدیقی : واقعات مقدمہ اس طرح ہیں کہ سائل سلمان شاہد نے اس آئینی درخواست میں یہ مؤقف اختیار کیا ہے کہ سلمان حیدر ، احمد وقاص گورایہ، عاصم سعید ، احمد رضانصیر اور ثمر عباس نامی اشخاص اور اُن کے دیگر ساتھی فیس بک پر بھینسا، موچی اور روشنی کے نام سے پیجز چلا رہے ہیں جن میں نبی کریم ﷺ، اہل بیت، صحابہ کرام، امہات المومنین ( رضوان اللہ علیھم اجمعین) ، قرآن مجید اور حتیٰ کہ اللہ رب العزت کی شان میں انتہائی گستاخانہ مواد بصورت خاکے ، تصاویر، تحریر، اور ویڈیوز نشر کیا جا رہا ہے ۔ سائل نے اپنی آئینی درخواست میں ویڈیوزمیں نشر کیے جانے والے گستاخانہ مواد کا اقتباس بطور حوالہ نقل کیا ہے، علاوہ ازیں آئینی درخواست کے ساتھ بھی گستاخانہ مواد منسلک کیا ہے ۔سائل نے اپنی ایک درخواست مورخہ 2017-01-21 کا حوالہ دیتے ہوئے یہ مؤقف اختیار کیا ہے کہ اُس نے مسؤل علیہ نمبر 3 ڈائریکٹر جنرل ایف آئی اے اسلام آباد کو مرتکبین گستاخی رسالت ، توہین دین ، توہین اصحاب رسول، توہین امہات المومنین (رضوان اللہ علیھم اجمعین) اور توہین شعائر اسلام کے خلاف انسدادِ دہشت گردی ایکٹ،C/295 تعزیراتِ پاکستان اور دیگر دفعات کے تحت فوری مقدمہ درج کرنے کی درخواست کی ہے ۔ سائلان نے یہ مؤقف اختیار کیا کہ ایف آئی اے نے شروع میں معاملے میں کچھ مستعدی دکھائی لیکن پھر اچانک اس معاملے پر عمل درآمد روک دیا گیا ۔ سائل نے اس امرپر تشویش کا اظہار کیا کہ سوشل میڈیا پر ان پیجز کو بلاک نہیں کیا گیا اور اس طرح ریاستی ادارے بالخصوص انتظامیہ اپنی ذمہ داری ادا کرنے میں ناکام ہیں لہذا عدالت سے استدعاکی گئی کہ-:

"i۔ مسؤل علیہ نمبر 2 تا 4 (وزارت اطلاعات ، ایف آئی اے اور پی ٹی اے )کو ہدایت کی جائے کہ وہ سوشل میڈیا پر بھینسا، مچھر ، موچی اور اسی طرح کے دیگر صفحات اور آئی ڈیز جو کہ گستاخانہ الفاظ ، خاکے اور ویڈیوز کے ذریعے توہین رسالتﷺ ، توہین صحابہ، توہین امہات المؤمنین(رضوان اللہ علیہم اجمعین) ، توہین کتاب اللہ قرآن پاک اور حتیٰ کہ اللہ کی ذات کی توہین کے مرتکب ہیں، کو فی الفور بند کریں ۔

ii۔ مسؤل علیہ نمبر 1 (حکومت پاکستان) کو ہدایت کی جائے کہ وہ مسؤل علیہ نمبر 3 (یعنی ایف آئی اے ) پر اس معاملے کی تفتیش اور تحقیق اور اصلی مجرموں تک رسائی اور اُن کے خلاف فوجداری کارروائی کے معا ملہ میں بے جا دخل اندازی اوراس معاملے میں غیر قانونی اثر و رسوخ ڈالنے سے بازو ممنوع رہے ۔

iii۔ دیگر جو داد رسی بمطابق قانون ممکن ہو، وہ بھی کی جائے ۔"

2۔ حقیقت یہ ہے کہ عدالت ہذا کے روبرو ایک ایسا مقدمہ پیش کیا گیا ہے کہ جس کی تفصیلات نے میرےرونگٹے کھڑے کر دیئے۔ آنکھوں کی اشک باری تو ایک فطری تقاضا تھا ، میری روح بھی تڑپ کر رہ گئی ۔ اس مقدمے کی سماعت کے دوران اپنے دل و دماغ پر گزرنے والی کیفیت الفاظ میں بیان کرنےسے قاصر ہو ں ۔ قانون کے طلباء کی نظر میں ایک جج کی ایسی کیفیت کچھ نرالی تصور کی جاتی ہے اور یہ خدشہ رہتا ہے کہ جذبات میں شاید انصاف کا دامن ہاتھ سے چھوٹ جائے لیکن یہ مقدمہ اپنی نوعیت کے اعتبار سے ذرا مختلف ہے کیونکہ اس مقدمہ میں عدالت کو کسی فریق کے ذاتی جھگڑے یا حق کا تصفیہ نہیں کرنا بلکہ اپنے نظرثانی کے اختیار کو استعمال کرتے ہوئے ریاستِ اسلامی جمہوریہ پاکستان کی بقاء، سلامتی اور تحفظ کے ضمن میں اپنی آئینی و قانونی ذمہ داری کو پوراکرنا ہے ۔اس مقدمے کی سماعت کے دوران یہ احساس بھی دامن گیر رہا کہ خود آقائے دو جہاں رسول پاک ﷺ کی ذاتِ گرامی مجھ سمیت ہر کلمہ گو سے یہ سوال کر رہی ہے کہ جب اللہ رحیم و کریم ، میرے اور میرے اہل بیت، برگزیدہ صحابہ کرام اور امہات المومنین رضوان اللہ علیھم اجمعین کے متعلق غلیظ ترین الفاظ ،بے ہودہ ترین ویڈیوز،واہیات ترین خاکے اور بد ترین پوسٹس انتہائی ڈھٹائی، دیدہ دلیری اور تواتر کے ساتھ سوشل میڈیا کے توسط سے پھیلائی جا رہی ہیں تو تمہیں نیند کیسےآرہی ہے ؟تمہاری سانسوں کی آمدورفت کا تسلسل کیسے برقرار ہے ؟ تمہاری زندگی میں روانی تمہارےشب و روز میں چین وسکون اور تمہارے معاملات میں توازن کیسے قائم ہے ؟ اس مقدمے کی سماعت کے دوران یہ خوف بھی رہا کہ کیا سوشل میڈیا پر ایسے گھٹیا ، شرم وحیاسے عاری اورتما م اخلاقی حدود سے ماوراء پھیلا ئے گئےتحریری ، تصویری اور بصری مواد کی موجودگی میں ہم شافع محشر ﷺ،ساقی کوثر ﷺ ، سرور انسانیت ﷺ کو قیامت کے روز کوئی عذر پیش کرنے کے قابل ہوں گے؟ جو مواد عدالت کے سامنے پیش کیا گیا اُس کو دیکھ کر غلیظ ، بے ہودہ اور بے شرم جیسے الفاظ بہت ہی حقیرمحسوس ہو تے ہیں،بالعموم جج صاحباں عدالتی فیصلے تحریر کرتے وقت ایسے الفاظ سے گریز کرتے ہیں لیکن اس فیصلے کے حالات و واقعات کی نوعیت ہی ایسی ہے کہ میں اپنے آپ کو صورت حال کی وضاحت کے لیے بادل ناخواستہ ایسے نامطلوب الفاظ کے استعمال پر مجبور پاتا ہوں۔میرا ضمیر اورقلم اس بات کی اجازت نہیں دیتا کہ میں وہ مواد اس فیصلے میں نقل کروں چونکہ ایساکرنے سے گستاخانہ مواد کو تحفظ ملنے کا خدشہ اور تاریخ کا حصہ بن جانے کا احتمال ہے۔ لہذااس مقدمے میں بطور استشہادیا بطور حوالہ اُس مواد کو نقل کرنے سے اجتناب میں ہی حکمت پنہاں ہے ۔

| | | --- | | |

3۔ بد قسمتی سے سوشل میڈیا پر اس مواد کو ایک شرم ناک مہم کے ذریعے تواتر کے ساتھ پھیلایا گیا ہے اورسوشل میڈیا سے منسلک افراد جو کہ بلاشبہ کروڑوں کی تعداد میں ہیں ، اس مکروہ فعل سے آگاہ ہیں۔اس گستاخانہ مواد نے کروڑوں مسلمانوں کے دلوں میں بجا طورپر اضطراب اورغم وغصہ کی آگ سلگا دی ہے اور ان کی قوت برداشت اورصبر کا پیمانہ چھلکنے کو ہے، اُن کے ایمان وعشق کے جذبات پر ایسی کاری ضرب لگائی گئی ہے کہ ان کا جگرچھلنی اور روح گھائل ہے۔ اُن کے احساسات کو اس بری طرح سے مجروح کیا گیا ہے کہ وہ خود کو بے بسی کے عالم میں ایک مجرم سمجھنے لگے ہیں ۔ ایسے نازک حالات میں یہ عدالت ایک خاموش تماشائی کا کردار ادا کرنے سے قاصر ہے۔یہ عدالت اپنی نوجوان نسل کو جو لاکھوں کروڑوں کی تعداد میں سوشل میڈیا سے وابستہ ہے ، بے بسی ، مایوسی، پریشانی ، اضطراب اور احساس ندامت کی ایسی بھیانک دلدل میں نہیں دھکیل سکتی جہاں وہ خود کوایسے نامراد اور بدبخت گستاخان کے خلاف کوئی قانونی اقدام اور کارروائی کرنےسے مایوس پاتے ہوں ۔ عدالت خلاء میں سفر کرنے والے کسی سیارے کا نام نہیں ، بلکہ ایک ایسے حکیم کی مانند ہے جو معاشرے کی نبض شناس ہو۔یہ عدالت پاکستانی عوام کی توقعات اور عزم جو دستور پاکستان میں ایک عمرانی معاہدہ کی حیثیت سے عیاں ہے ، سے پوری طرح واقف ہے۔دوران سماعت مقدمہ ، اسلامی جمہوریہ پاکستان کی عدالت عالیہ کا ایک جج ہونے کی حیثیت سے یہ فکر بھی میرےدامن گیر رہی کہ اس مقدمے کی سماعت میں کسی قسم کی کوتاہی میرے اُس حلف کو بھی داغ دار نہ کر دے جو میں نے دستور ِ پاکستان کے تحت اللہ اور اس کےرسول کو گواہ بنا کے لیا ہے ۔ لہذا اس مقدمے میں پوری کوشش کی گئی ہے کہ حتی المقدور اُن تمام عوامل کا تدارک اور سد باب کیا جا سکے اور ایسے تما م راستے مسدودکیے جا سکیں جن کے ذریعے چند عاقبت نا اندیش ،نبیؐ مہربان حضرت محمد مصطفیٰ ﷺ کی ذات اقدس پر حملہ آور ہو رہے ہیں ۔ سیرت النبی ﷺ پرشہرہ آفاق کتاب محسن انسانیتؐ کے مصنف مولانا نعیم صدیقی ؒ مرحوم نے ایسے ہی حالات کی بابت اپنی قلبی کیفیت کااظہار اس انداز میں کیاتھا۔

پرانے ہو گئے بُو جہل و بُولہب کے طریق

نئے نئے ہیں یہاں فتنہ گر ، بس ایک نظر

عدو ہیں چار طرف ، لڑ رہا ہوں مَیں تنہا

بسوئے معرکہ ء خیر و شر ، بس ایک نظر

بس اک اشارہ ء ابرو کہ ہو جنوں انگیز

جہان عقل ہو زیر و زبر ، بس ایک نظر

جو سو ز و ساز ملا ، اس میں تازہ لہر اُٹھے

ترے نثار ، فقط اک نظر ، بس ایک نظر

4۔ مورخہ 2017-02-27 کو اس عدالت نے آئینی درخواست کو سماعت کے لیے منظور کیااور عبوری حکم امتناعی جاری کرتے ہوئے مسؤل علیہان کو طلب کیا ۔ مورخہ 2017-03-07 کو مقدمہ کی دوبارہ سماعت ہوئی عدالتی حکم کے تحت سید اسماعیل شاہ چئیر مین پی ٹی اے، طارق مسعود یٰسین آئی جی پولیس اسلام آباد ، رضوان بشیر خان سیکرٹری آئی ٹی، ڈاکٹر شفیق الرحمٰن پروجیکٹ ڈائریکٹر این آر 3 سی اور دیگر حاضر عدالت ہوئے ، عدالت نے اس امر پر دُ کھ کا اظہار کیا کہ سیکرٹری وزارت داخلہ حاضر نہیں ہوئے۔ عدالت کے حکم مورخہ 2017-03 -07 کا عکس درج ذیل ہے :

i”۔ یہ عدالت پہلے یہ عندیہ دے چکی ہے کہ اگر مجرمان کے خلاف قانونی کاروائی نہ کی گئی جو اپنی مجرمانہ ذہنیت اور شرمناک حرکات کے سبب نبی کریم ﷺ، صحابہ اکرام ، اہل بیت ، ازواج مطہرات ( رضوان اللہ علیہم اجمعین)، قرآن مجید اور حتیٰ کہ اللہ تعالیٰ کی ذات کی بے حرمتی کے مسلسل مرتکب ہو رہے ہیں ، جس سے ملک میں امن و امان کا شدید مسئلہ جنم لے سکتا ہے جو کہ ملکی معاملات کو خراب کر سکتا ہے ۔

ii۔ آئی جی اسلام آباد جو حاضر عدالت ہیں، نے یہ کہا ہے کہ عدالت اس مسئلے پر جو بھی حکم دے گی وہ بمطابق قانون کاروائی کے لیے تیار ہیں۔

iii۔ یہ مسئلہ انتہائی توجہ کا حامل ہے ، بصورتِ دیگر پیروان مصطفیٰ ﷺ کے صبر کا پیمانہ لبریزہو سکتا ہے ۔

معاملے کی نزاکت ، اہمیت اور سنجیدگی اس بات کی متقاضی ہے کہ چوہدری نثار علی خاں وزیر داخلہ پاکستان کل یعنی مورخہ 2017-03-08بذاتِ خود عدالت میں پیش ہوں جن سے یہ توقع کی جاتی ہے کہ وہ اپنی نگرانی میں اس شر کے جڑ سے خاتمے کے لیے اقدامات کریں گے ، چاہے اس کے لیے سارے سوشل میڈیا کو بندہی کیوں نہ کرنا پڑے۔"

مورخہ 2017-03-08 کو مقدمہ کی دوبارہ سماعت ہوئی عدالت کویہ بتایا گیا کہ وزیر داخلہ اپنی جراحت ( آپریشن) کی وجہ سے حاضر عدالت ہونے سے قاصر ہیں تاہم سیکرٹری داخلہ موجو د ہیں۔بعد از سماعت حسب ذیل حکم جاری کیا گیا :

" 2۔ عدالت نے درخواست سے منسلک تمام مواد عدالت میں موجود سرکاری افسران کو ملاحظہ کے لیے چیمبرمیں فراہم کیا ، مواد کا جا ئیزہ لینے پر افسران نہ صرف محوِحیرت ، بلکہ کرب و اضطراب کی کیفیت میں پائے گئے۔ سیکرٹری داخلہ نے دو ٹوک الفاظ میں بیان کیا کہ ذات باری تعالیٰ ، قرآن مجید اور دنیا کی معزز ترین ہستی حضرت محمد ﷺ ، آپ ؐ کے صحابہؓ، اہل بیت اور ازواج مطہرات ( رضوان اللہ علیہم اجمعین) کے خلاف گھٹیااور شرم ناک مہم چلانے والے مجرموں کے خلاف سخت قانونی کاروائی کی جائے گی۔ انہوں نے عدالت کو یقین دہانی کرائی کہ پور ی سرکاری مشینری کو اس شر انگیزی کو روکنے اور اس کے خاتمے کے لیے حرکت میں لایا جائے گا اور ذمہ دار افراد کے خلاف متعلقہ دفعات کے تحت فوجداری مقدمات دائر کیے جائیں گے ۔ "

عدالت نے مزید یہ حکم دیا کہ مجرموں کے نام ای سی ایل میں ڈالے جائیں اور انسداد دہشت گردی ایکٹ 1997 کی روشنی میں ایک جوائینٹ انویسٹی گیشن ٹیم تشکیل دی جائے اور چیئرمین پی ٹی اے کو یہ ہدایت کی گئی کہ وہ بھی اپنی جانب سے کیے گئے اقدامات کی رپورٹ پیش عدالت کرے ۔

مورخہ 2017-03-09 کو مقدمے کی سماعت کے دوران سیکرٹری داخلہ نے عدالت کو بتایاکہ وہ اس پوری کاروائی کی بذات خود نگرانی کر رہے ہیں ،وہ اس امر کو بھی یقینی بنا رہے ہیں کہ مجرموں کی گرفتاری ، گستاخانہ پیجز کی بندش اور اس بُری مہم کے مکمل خاتمے کے عمل کی سرپرستی کریں گے ۔ اس موقع پر عدالت نے معاملے کی نزاکت کے پیش نظر یہ حکم دیا کہ ہونا تو یہ چاہیے تھا کہ ملک کے وزیر اعظم کو بطور سربراہ حکومت اس مواد سے مکمل اگاہ کیا جاتا لیکن ایسا محسوس ہوتا ہے کہ تاحال یہ مواد وزیر اعظم کو نہیں پہنچا حالانکہ اس سنگین مواد کی وجہ سے پوری قوم کی نیندیں حرام ہو چکی ہیں اور قوم انتظامیہ کے عملی جمود کے باعث خود کو بے یار و مد دگار پاتی ہے ۔

مورخہ 2017-03-13کو عدالتی کارروائی اور اس بابت احکامات کو اُس روز کےحسب ذیل عدالتی حکم میں درج کیا گیا ہے :۔

سیکرٹری وزارتِ داخلہ نے بیان دیاہے کہ تمام حکومتی مشینری حرکت میں آ چکی ہے اور مسئلے کی سنگینی کو اعلیٰ سطح پر محسوس کیا گیا ہے اور ضروری ہدایات جاری کر دی گئی ہیں ۔ وہ مزید کہتے ہیں کہ تما م انٹیلی جنس اور قانون نافذ کرنے والے ادارےمجرموں ، اُن کے سہولت کاروں اور پشتی بانوں کی تلاش کے لیے تفتیش اور تحقیق شروع کر چکے ہیں ۔ ایڈیشنل ڈی جی ایف آئی اے نے بھی اپنی رپورٹ پیش کی جس میں انکوائری کی پیش رفت بیان کی گئی ہے ۔ایک سرکاری خط جو کہ سیکرٹری وزارت اطلاعات و نشریات اور قومی ورثہ کی جانب سے پرنسپل انفارمیشن آفیسر ، چیئرمین پیمرا، ڈی جی پاکستان براڈ کاسٹنگ کارپوریشن ، ایم ڈی پی ٹی وی اور عدالتِ ہذا کے رجسٹرار کو ارسال کیا گیا ہے ،کی کاپی ریکارڈ پر لائی گئی ہے جس کی رو سے یہ ہدایات جاری کی گئیں :

موضوع : اخلاقیات ، شائستگی اور اخلاقی ضابطہ کار

میں آج ہنگامی طلبی پر اسلام آباد ہائی کورٹ میں پیش ہوا۔معزز جج صاحب نے اشتہارات، اشاعت اور نشریات کی بابت درج ذیل اقدامات کو یقینی بنانے کی ہدایت کی ہے :

i۔اشتہارات ، اشاعت اور نشریات کو معاشرتی اخلاقیات ،شائستگی اور اخلاقی ضابطہ کا پابند رکھا جائے ۔

ii۔متعلقہ اداروں کے سربراہان ایسے حساس مسائل پر ذاتی دلچسپی لیں تاکہ معاشرے کی اخلاقی اور معاشرتی اقدار کا تحفظ ہو سکے ۔

iii۔کسی قسم کے تضاد کو قانون کے مطابق موئثر انداز میں حل کیا جائے ۔

ہائی کورٹ کی ہدایات، مسئلے کی اہمیت اور قومی مفادات کے تناظر میں میرے دستخطوں کے ساتھ یہ ہدایات جاری کی جا رہی ہیں ۔ آپ کو ہدایات کی جا رہی ہیں کہ ان پر عمل درآمد کو یقینی بنائیں

(شعیب احمد صدیقی )

سیکرٹری

سیکرٹری وزارت اطلاعات و انفارمیشن ٹیکنالوجی نے اعلیٰ حکام اور ماہرین کی میٹنگ کی رپورٹ پیش کی ۔ چیئر مین پی ٹی اے نے بتایا کہ بڑی تعداد میں توہین آمیز صفحات کو بند کیا جا چُکا ہے اور ہر ممکن کوشش، بشمول اس کے کہ سوشل میڈیا کے مختلف حصوں کو منظم کیا جائے، کی تجویز روبہ عمل میں لائی جا رہی ہے ۔ انہوں نے مزید بتایا کہ معاملے کی نزاکت کا اندازہ ہے لہذا مزید مثبت نتائج مختصر وقت میں حاصل کر لیے جائیں گے ۔

آئی جی اسلام آباد سے جب استفسار کیا گیا کہ جنوری 2017 سے دائر شدہ درخواست برائے اندراج مقدمہ پر تا حال کاروائی کیوں نہیں ہوئی تو انہوں نے درخواست کی وصولی کی تصدیق کرتے ہوئے عمل نہ کر سکنے کی وجوہات بیان کرنے کیلئے مہلت کی استدعا کی ۔

میری دانست میں یہ مناسب وقت ہے کہ پاکستان کے عوام کو آگاہ کیا جائے اور پرنٹ والیکٹرانک میڈیا کے متعلقین کی توجہ اسلامی جمہوریہ پاکستان کے دستور کی دفعہ 19 کی جانب مبذول کرائی جائے جس کی رو سے تقریر وغیرہ کی آزادی کے حق کی ضمانت دی گئ ہے تاہم اس حق پر چند حدود اور قیود بھی عائد کی گئی ہیں۔ آسانی کے لیے دفعہ 19 درج ذیل ہے ۔

" دفعہ 19

تقریر وغیرہ کی آزادی: اسلام کی عظمت یا پاکستان یااس کے کسی حصے کی سالمیت ، سلامتی دفاع ، غیر ممالک کے ساتھ دوستانہ تعلقات ، امن عامہ ، تہذیب یا اخلاق کے مفاد کے پیش نظر یا توہین عدالت ، کسی جرم (کے ارتکاب )یا اس کی ترغیب سے متعلق قانون کے ذریعے عائد کردہ مناسب پابندیوں کے تابع، ہر شہر ی کو تقریر اور اظہار خیال کی آزادی کا حق ہوگا اور پریس کی آزادی ہو گی "

جو کوئی بھی ان پابندیوں کو پامال کرتا ہے وہ دستور کی بے حرمتی کا مرتکب ہوتاہے اور قانون کے مطابق تادیبی کارروائی کا مستحق ہے ۔اس معاملے کے تناظر میں سیکرٹری اطلاعات ، نشریات کو ہدایت کی جاتی ہے کہ وہ الیکٹرانک ،پرنٹ اور سوشل میڈیا کے مختلف ذرائع کو استعمال کرتے ہوئے دستور کی دفعہ 19، اس کی عائد کردہ حدود اور اس کی خلاف ورزی کے قانونی اثرات و نتائج سے آگاہی کی ایک مہم چلائیں ۔اس بابت اشتہار میں یہ بات باور کرائی جائے کہ دستور اور قانون کی تشریح کا حق ملک کی اعلیٰ عدلیہ کو اور دستور میں ترمیم کا حق صرف مجلس شوریٰ کو حاصل ہے ۔

عدالت کو یہ اطلاع دی گئی ہے کہ ڈی جی ایف آئی اے واپس آ چکے ہیں اور انہوں نے اپنی ذمہ داریاںسنبھال لی ہیں ۔ ڈی جی ایف آئی اے کو ہدایت کی جاتی ہے کہ وہ ایف آئی اے کے زیر التواء انکوائری کی بذات خود نگرانی کریں اور قانون کے مطابق مقاصد کے حصول کے لیے اقدامات کریں ۔ڈی جی ایف آئی اے یہ رپورٹ بھی پیش کریں کہ مبینہ بلاگرز، جو کہ پہلے لا پتہ ہوئے پھر چند دن بعد منظر عام پر آئے ، کہ وہ کس سر گرمی میں ملوث تھے اور وہ کیسے پاکستان چھوڑنے میں کامیاب ہوئے؟

مقدمہ کی سماعت 2017-03-17 تک ملتوی کی جاتی ہے اُس روز سیکرٹری اطلاعات عمل درآمد کی رپورٹ اور مہم سے متعلقہ مواد سے عدالت کو آگاہ کریں۔

حکم کی تعمیل میں درج ذیل اشتہارات شائع ہوئے۔

مورخہ 2017-03-17 کو عدالت نے ایف آئی اے کی رپورٹ پرعدم اطمینان کااظہار کیا اور ڈی جی ایف آئی اے کو بہتر کارکردگی کے ساتھ مسئلے پر سرعت کے ساتھ کارروائی کا حکم دیا ۔ عدالت نے یہ ہدایت بھی کی کہ ایف آئی اے اُن این جی اوز کے بارے میں بھی تحقیقات کرے جو پاکستان میں گستاخانہ مواد کو پھیلانے ، فحش نگاری کو ترویج دینے ، اور نظریہ پاکستان اور سالمیت پاکستان کےخلاف کام کرنے میں مصروف ہیں۔عدالت نے یہ بھی نوٹس لیا کہ برقی جرائم کے انسداد کے قانون 2016 میں توہین رسالت اور فحش نگاری جیسے اہم امور کا ذکر نہیں کیاگیا۔عدالت نے توہین رسالت کے قانون کے غلط استعمال کی روک تھام پر مناسب جائزہ کے لئے اٹارنی جنرل آف پاکستان کو طلب کیا۔

مورخہ 2017-03-22کو سیکرٹری داخلہ نے عدالت کو پیش رفت سے آگاہ کیا اس موقع پر تمام افسران اور حکومتی وکلاء نے متفقہ طور پر اس امر کا اعادہ کیاکہ نبی آخر الزماں ﷺ ، اہل بیت ، صحابہ کرام اور ازواج مطہرات رضوان اللہ علیھم اجمعین پاکستان کی نظریاتی حدود کی بنیا د ہیں اور اس بابت خلاف ورزی کی کوئی جسارت بھی پاکستان کی جغرافیائی سرحدوں کے لیے خطرہ ہے۔ انہوں نے مزید کہا کہ آئینی درخواستوں میں اُٹھایا گیا مسئلہ پاکستان کی یکجہتی ، سالمیت اور دفاع سے براہ راست متعلق ہے لہذا اسلامی جمہوریہ پاکستان کے تمام اداروں کا یہ فرض ہے کہ وہ وقت کی پکار پر اُٹھیں تاکہ پاکستان کی نظریاتی اور جغرافیائی سرحدوں کی حفاظت ہو۔ ملک کے اعلیٰ سرکاری عہد یداران کی جانب سے اس عزم کا اظہار خوش آئند ہے ۔ عدالت کو بتایا گیا کہ ملزمان کے خلاف مقدمہ علت نمبر7/2017مورخہ 2017-03-19کا اندارج کر دیا گیاہے اور جے آئی ٹی تشکیل کے مراحل میں ہے ۔ حساس ادارے کے افسر نےعدالت کو بتایا کہ اُنکے ادارے کو یہ استعدا دکار حاصل ہے کہ وہ ایسے پیجز کو بند کر سکیں اور مجرموں تک رسائی کے لیے مدد فراہم کر سکیں ۔چونکہ اٹارنی جنرل عمرہ کی ادائیگی کے لیے گئے ہیں لہذا مقدمہ کی کاروائی 2017-03-27 تک ملتوی کی جائے۔

مورخہ 2017-03-27کو عدالت نے جب اس مقدمہ کی سماعت شروع کی تو سیکرٹری داخلہ نے عدالت کو سابقہ تاریخ پیشی کے بعد سے ہونے والی پیش رفت سے آگاہ کیا ۔ اس روز کی عدالتی کاروائی /حکم درج ذیل ہے :

"i۔ کاروائی کے آغاز پر ہی ، سیکرٹری داخلہ عارف احمد خان نے عدالت کو سابقہ پیشی مورخہ2017-03-22 سے اب تک ہونے والی پیش رفت سے آگاہ کرتے ہوئے عدالت کو بتایا کہ مختلف اسلامی ممالک کےسفیروں کے ساتھ ایک اجلاس، جس کی صدارت وزیر داخلہ چوہدری نثار علی خان نے کی ، جس میں اس مسئلہ کو بین الاقوامی اداروں میں اجاگر کرنے کے لیے ایک حکمت عملی وضع کی گئی ہے۔انہوں نے یہ بھی بتایا کہ گورنمنٹ کی تمام مشینری حرکت میں لائی گئی ہے اور تمام متعلقین کو اس مقصد اور نصب العین کے ساتھ اعتماد میں لیا گیا ہے کہ توہین /گستاخی کےسوشل میڈیا پر پھیلاؤ کے مسئلہ کو مستقل بنیادوں پر حل کیا جائے ۔انہوں نے ایک جوابی خط کی کاپی بھی عدالت میں پیش کی جو نائب صدر ، گلوبل پبلک پالیسی ، فیس بک نے وزیر داخلہ چوہدری نثار علی خان کو ارسال کیا ہے ۔

ii۔ ڈائریکٹر جنرل (آئی پی اینڈ ڈبلیواے) ،پی ٹی اے نے بھی عدالت میں ایک رپورٹ پیش کی ہے جس میں پی ٹی اے کی کوششوں کو بیان کیا گیا ہے ۔ ڈائریکٹر ایف آئی اے نے بیان کیاکہ مقدمہ علت نمبر 7/2007کی تفتیش کے دوران کچھ افراد کو حراست میں لیا گیا ہے جن کے خلاف مضبوط شہادت موجود ہے ۔ یہ اس عدالت کا کام نہیں ہے کہ وہ تفتیش کی نگرانی کرے ۔ یہ تحقیقاتی ادارے کا کام ہے کہ وہ قانون کے مطابق سلوک کے اصول کو مدنظر رکھتے ہوئے شفافیت اور میرٹ پر حتمی رائے قائم کریں ۔ ادارے کو یہ بات ذہن میں رکھنی چاہیے کہ یہ اس کی ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ ثبوت اکٹھے کرے اورتفتیش کو قانون کے مطابق مکمل کرے ۔ عدالت کو اس تفتیش کی بابت رپورٹ سے کوئی دلچسپی ہے نہ ہی عدالت میں ان ملزموں کے خلاف تحقیقات کی رپورٹ جمع کروائی جائے ۔

iii۔ البتہ ، تاحال حکم مورخہ 2017-03-13 اور 2017-03-17 کی تعمیل میں مبینہ بلاگرز کے حوالے سے ، جو پہلے لاپتہ ہوئے ، بعد میں نمودار ہوئے اور پھر ملک سے چلے گئے ، کوئی رپورٹ نہیں دی گئی اور نہ ہی اس حکم کے پیرا نمبر 4 کے مطابق NGO’sکے حوالے سے کوئی رپورٹ پیش کی گئی ہے ۔ رپورٹ اگلی تاریخ یا اس سے پہلے داخل کی جائے ۔

مزید براں عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ وزارت انفارمیشن اینڈٹیکنالوجی محض ایک خاموش تماشائی کا کردار اداکرنے کے بجائےموثر کارکردگی کا مظاہرہ کرےاورمقدمہ کو مورخہ 2017-03-31 کے لیے ملتوی کر دیا گیا ۔

5۔ مورخہ 2017-03-31 کو اس مقدمہ کی آخری سماعت ہوئی اور عدالت نے ایک مختصر فیصلہ سنایا ۔ جو کہ حسب ذیل ہے:

I۔ "فاضل اٹارنی جنرل نے جناب وزیر اعظم پاکستان کو بھجوائی گئی سمری مع ڈائریکٹر لیگل ، وزارت انفارمیشن ٹیکنالوجی (آئی ٹی اینڈ ٹیلی کام ڈویژن) کی جانب سے سیکرٹری ، وزارت داخلہ اسلام آباد کو ارسال کیئےگئے خط مورخہ 2017-03-30 کی کاپی عدالت میں پیش کی جس کی رو سے یہ استدعاکی گئی کہ مجموعہ تعزیرات پاکستان کے باب 15 میں درج جرائم کو ایف آئی اے ایکٹ 1974ء کے شیڈول میں شامل کیا جائے ۔ ڈائریکٹر ایف آئی اے اسلام آبادنے بھی اپنی رپورٹ پیش کی"۔

I۔ تفصیلی وجوہ کو مؤخر رکھتے ہوئے عدالت اس آئینی درخواست کا فیصلہ درج ذیل احکامات کے ساتھ کررہی ہے ۔

i. فیڈرل انویسٹی گیشن ایجنسی اس مقدمہ کی تفتیش بمطابق قانون بالکل میرٹ پر کرے ۔ معاملہ کی حساسیت اس امر کی متقاضی ہے کہ کسی نئی شکایت / درخواست کی صورت میں اس کا ابتدائی انکوائری کے لیے اندراج کیا جائے اور قانون کے مطابق کارروائی کو آگے بڑھایا جائے ۔

ii.

| | | --- | | |

پاکستان ٹیلی کمیونیکیشن اتھارٹی (پی ٹی اے ) ایک جامع اور مربوط تفصیلی ضابطہ کار وضع کرے جس کے تحت گستاخانہ صفحات / ویب سائٹس کی نشاندہی ہو سکے ، اور بلاتاخیر ضروری اقدامات کئے جا سکیں ۔ چیئر مین پی ٹی اے کو ہدایت کی جاتی ہے کہ وہ ایک سائنسی طریقہ کار وضع کریں جس کے تحت عامتہ الناس کو گستاخی رسول ؐ اور فحش مواد کے سنگین فوجداری نتائج سے آگاہ کیا جا سکے ۔

iii. سیکرٹری وزارت داخلہ متعلقہ محکموں اور افراد کے تعاون سے ایک پینل / کمیٹی تشکیل دیں جو سوشل میڈیا سے گستاخانہ مواد کے خاتمے کے لیے ایک جامع مہم چلائے او ر ایسے افراد کی نشاندہی کرے جو ایسے قبیح جرائم میں ملوث ہیں اور ایسے افراد کے خلاف قانونی کاروائی عمل میں لائی جا سکے ۔

iv. چونکہ اٹارنی جنرل نے گستاخی رسول ﷺ وغیرہ اور فحش مواد کی تشہیر جیسے جرائم کو انسدادِ برقی جرائم ایکٹ 2016ء اوردوسروںپر گستاخی کے جھوٹے الزام عائدکرنےکے مرتکب افراد کے حوالے سے قانون سازی کی بابت اقدامات شروع کر دیئے ہیں لہذا یہ توقع کی جاتی ہے کہ متعلقہ عہدیدار معاملے کی نزاکت کو سمجھتے ہوئے اس حکم یعنی2017- 03-31 سے ایک ماہ کے اندر ضروری اقدامات کریں گے ۔

v.

| | | --- | | B |

جہاں تک ان پانچ بلاگرز کا تعلق ہے ، جو پاکستان سے جاچکے ہیں ، تو اس معاملے میں ایف ائی اے کو ہدایت کی جاتی ہے کہ قانون کے مطابق پیش رفت کرے اور اگر کوئی قابل گرفت شہادت میسر ہے تو ان بلاگرز کو واپس لایا جائے تاکہ ان کے خلاف قانون کے مطابق کارروائی ہو سکے لیکن اس معاملے میں قانون کے مطابق سلوک کے اصول کو مد نظر رکھا جائے ۔

vi. وزارت داخلہ کو ہدایت کی جاتی ہے کہ وہ ملک میں کام کرنے والی ایسیNGO’sکی بھی نشاندہی کریں ، جو ملک میں گستاخانہ مواد اور فحش مواد کی اشاعت و تشہیر کے ایجنڈا پر گامزن ہیں ، بلاشبہ ایسی این جی اوز بیرون اور اندرون ملک سے مالی امداد کے ذریعے کام کر رہی ہیں ، تاکہ ایسی این جی اوز کے خلاف قانونی کارروائی کی جا سکے۔"

درج بالا مختصر فیصلہ کی تفصیلی وجوہات زیرِ نظر پیش ہیں ۔

6۔ یہ امر انتہائی لائق تشویش ہے کہ ُملک ِ خداداد میں بیرونی امداد سے چلنے والی NGO’sاور نام نہاد دانشور انتہائی مکرو ہ فعل کو ایک منظم سازش کے تحت اسلام دشمن ایجنڈا پر عمل پیرا ہوتے ہوے ٔ نبی محترم حضرت محمدﷺ کی پاکیزہ و مننّرہ شخصیت پر بے ہودہ ، شرمناک اور گھٹیا الزامات لگا کر اُن کے مقام کو کم کرنے کی سعی لا حاصل کر رہے ہیں اور دوسری جانب Saint Valentine جیسے بدنام اور فحاشی کی علامت کو نوجوان نسل کا ہیرو بنا کر پیش کیا جاتا ہے افسوس کہ ریاستی ادارے اور میڈیا بھی اس بھیانک عمل کا حصہ بن چکے ہیں، گستاخی رسولﷺ میں تمام حدیں پھلانگ جانے والوں اور انکی عظمت و توقیر کو تار تار کرنیکی کوشش کرنے والوں کے خلاف قانون کے مطابق کارروا ئی کا مطالبہ نحیف جبکہ کسی ردعمل کا شکار ہو جانےوالے کیلئے موم بتیوں کو روشن اور پھولوں کو بکھیر کر میڈیا پر ظلم کا عنوان بنا کر پیش کر دیا جاتا ہے۔ عدالت کسی بھی غیر قانونی فعل اور قانون کو اپنے ہاتھ میں لینے کی حوصلہ افز ا ئی نہیں کر سکتی۔ لیکن ایسے واقعات اُسی صورت رُک سکتے ہیں جب گستاخی رسولﷺ کے مرتکب عناصر کے خلاف بروقت اور دیانتدارانہ کارروائی ہو۔ ایسے مکروہ فعل کے خلاف پوری پاکستانی قوم مدعی ہوتی ہے اور اپنی جانوں کے نذرانے پیش کرنے کیلئے ہمہ وقت تیار۔ پاکستانی قوم کا نبی محترم ﷺ کی محبّت، اُن سے عشق اور تمام رشتوں سے اعلٰی اور بلند مُقام دینا ایمان کی بنیاد ہے جس پر نہ کو ئی مصلحت کام آتی ہے اور نہ ہی کوئی دلیل کارگر ثابت ہوتی ہے۔ یہ وہ پُر کیف لذت ہے جس پر کو ئی کلمہ گو سمجھوتہ نہیں کر سکتا۔

سوشل میڈیا پر مقدس ہستیوں کی تضحیک و ہرزہ سرائی کے مسئلہ کو پاکستان کے پرنٹ و الیکٹرانک میڈیا بالخصوص اخبارات اور ملک کے ممتاز کالم نگاروں ، صحافیوں نے بھر پور انداز میں اجاگر کرتے ہوئے نہ صرف اپنی آواز بلند کی بلکہ قوم کے جذبات کی عکاسی کی ۔ اس عدالت میں مقدمہ کی کارروائی کے دوران بھی اہل علم اور دانشور حضرات نے اپنے اپنے طور پر مسئلہ کی سنگینی سے ارباب اختیار و اقتدار کو متنبہ کرنے کی کوشش کی ۔الیکڑانک میڈیا میں بھی اس مسئلہ کو شدت کے ساتھ موضوع بحث بنایا گیا اور تقریباًہر نشریاتی ادارے نے اس موضوع پر علماء ، دانشوروں ، مفکرین ، سیاستدانوں اور مختلف طبقوں کے معززین اور بااثر شخصیات کے احساسات ، آرا اور افکار کو مختلف پروگراموں کے ذریعے نشر کیا ۔یہ تمام عمل بذات خود اس بات کی دلیل ہے کہ یہ مسئلہ نہ صرف مفاد عامہ سے متعلق ہے بلکہ ملک کا ہر مسلمان شہری سوشل میڈیا پر مذموم گستاخانہ مہم پر دل گرفتہ ہے ۔

اس دوران صرف چند دنوں میں مختلف اخبارات ، رسائل اور جرائد میں تخریب اور شر انگیزی کے خلاف بہت کچھ لکھا گیا جس کا یہاں ذکر کرنا ممکن نہیں ۔ تاہم بطور حوالہ چند اقتباسات نقل کرنے ضروری ہیں تاکہ معروضی حالات و واقعات سے بھی مفاد عامہ کا پہلو اجاگر ہو سکے ۔ روزنامہ جنگ نے اپنے " اداریے "میں سوشل میڈیا پر ہرزہ سرائی پر متنبہ کرتے ہوئے لکھا :

" اظہار رائے کی آزادی کے نا م پر مغرب کے جو حلقے مسلمانوں کی مقدس مذہبی شخصیات کی شان میں گستاخیوں کے ارتکاب کو جائز قرار دیتے ہیں ان کے مؤقف کے بودے پن کو ظاہر کرنے کے لیے پوپ فرانسس کے یہ الفاظ کافی ہیں کہ اگر تم کسی کی ماں کو گالی دو تو جواباًاپنے منہ پر تھپڑ کھانے کو تیار ہو جاؤ۔ تاہم مسلمانوں کو دل آزاری اور شر پسندی کے مذموم کھیل کے پیچھے چھپے اصل مقصد کو پیش نظر رکھتے ہوئے اپنے رد عمل کے اظہار کے طریقوں کا تعین کرنا چاہیے ۔اس اشتعال انگیزی کا مقصد مسلمان عوام کو پُر تشدداحتجاج پر اکسانا ہوتا ہے تاکہ اسلام کو دہشت گردی کاعلم بردار قرار دے کر بد نام کیا جائے ۔ " (جنگ ، 26 مارچ ، 2017)

'نوائے وقت ' نے اپنے "اداریے "بعنوان " سوشل میڈیا پر گستاخانہ مواد پھیلانے والوں کو نشان عبرت بنایا جائے " میں حکومت اور اپوزیشن دونوں کو متوجہ کرتے ہوئے نہ صرف سخت تادیبی کاروائی کا مطالبہ کیا ہے بلکہ سوشل میڈیا کی مانیٹرنگ کے نظام کو وضع کرنے کی ضرورت پر زور دیتے ہوئے لکھا :

" پاکستا ن کلمہ طیبہ کی بنیاد پر قائم ہوا ، انبیاء کرام بالخصوص رسول اکرم ﷺ ، صحابہ کرام اور اولیا ء کرام اور اہل بیت(رضوان اللہ علیہم اجمعین) کا احترام ہمارے ایمان کا حصہ ہے اور اس کی پاسداری حکومت اور اپوزیشن دونوں کی ذمہ داری ہے ۔ بد قسمتی ہے کہ نام نہاد ترقی پسند اور لبرل ہونے کے دعویداروں نے اظہار رائے کی آزادی کی آڑ میں اسلام اور قابل احترام مذہبی ہستیوں اور سیاسی جماعتوں کے اکابرین کے تمسخر کو اپنا مشن بنا لیا ہے اور سوشل میڈیا پران کے خلاف توہین آمیز کلمات اور مواد سے مسلمانوں کے جذبات بھڑکا کر معاشرے میں نفرت کا زہر پھیلا رہے ہیں ۔ یہ اسلام اور پاکستان کے خلاف سازش کے مترادف ہے ۔آزادی اظہار کے نام پر مقدس ہستیوں کی تضحیک کرنے والوں کی سرگرمیاں ناقابل برداشت ہیں ۔ حکومت کو اس کے خلاف سخت تادیبی اقدام اٹھانا چاہیے ۔ اب تک اس سلسلے میں کوئی کارروائی نہ ہونا افسوس ناک ہے ۔ وزارت داخلہ کو سوشل میڈیا کی مانیٹرنگ کے نظام کو مؤثر و فعال بنا کر آپریشن ردالفساد کے ذریعے گستاخی کے مرتکب افراد اور ان کے سہولت کاروں کو نکیل ڈالنا چاہیے تاکہ سوشل میڈیا پر جاری اس شرمناک مہم کو لگام دی جائے ۔" (نوائے وقت : 29اپریل ، 2017)

سوشل میڈیا پر گستاخانہ مہم کو فتنہ انگیزی ، شرنگیزی اور اشتعا ل انگیزی کی شرمناک کارروائی قرار دیتے ہوئےجناب انصار عباسی (معروف صحافی / کالم نگار/ تجزیہ نگار ) لکھتے ہیں :

’’یہ قانون تو ریاست کو گستاخی کے الزام پر کارروائی کی ہدایت دیتا ہے ۔ جو کچھ حال ہی میں عدلیہ ،پارلیمنٹ اور حکومت نے سوشل میڈیا پر سے گستاخانہ مواد کو ہٹانے کے لیے کیا وہ انتہائی قابل تعریف اقدام ہے اور اس کا مقصد ایک ایسے فتنہ پر قابو پانا ہے جو کسی بھی اسلامی معاشرے میں اشتعال انگیزی ، نفرت اور غم و غصہ کا باعث بنتا ہے ۔ کسی ایک واقعہ کا بہانہ بنا کر کوئی اگر یہ چاہے کہ blasphemy-law کو ہی ختم کر دیا جائے یا کوئی آزاد ئ رائے کے مغربی معیارات کو یہاں لاگو کیا جائے تو ایسا ممکن نہیں ہو سکتا کیوں کہ اس سے فتنہ بڑھے گا ۔"[1]

حکومت اور ارباب اقتدار کو گستاخانہ مواد کی تشہیر سے روکنے اور مرتکبین کو قرار واقعی سزا دلوانے کے لیے مزید لکھتے ہیں :

"اسی طرح سوشل میڈیا پر گستاخانہ مواد کی تشہیر کو روکا جائے اور ایسا کرنے والوں کو سزائیں دی جائیں ۔ اس کے ساتھ ساتھ میڈیا اور سوشل میڈیا کے ذریعے دوسروں پر توہین مذہب کے جھوٹے الزامات لگا نے والوں سے بھی سختی سے نپٹا جائے ، انہیں سزائیں دی جائیں ۔ اس کے ساتھ ساتھ ایسے مواد (جھوٹے الزامات ) کو بھی سوشل میڈیا پر بلاک کیا جائے اور میڈیا پر اس کی تشہیر کوسختی سے روکا جائے ۔ ہمیں نوجوانوں اور بچوں کو یہ تعلیم بھی دینی چاہیے کہ وہ نہ صرف ہر صورت میں اپنے دین اور مقدس ہستیوں کا احترام کریں بلکہ اسلامی تعلیمات کے مطابق دوسروں کے مذاہب کو بھی بُرا مت کہیں ۔"[2]

اپنے ایک اور کالم میں جناب انصار عباسی میڈیا پر شرانگیزی کی روک تھا م کے لیے میڈیا کو ریگولیٹ کرنے اور اسے ایک ضابطہ کار کا پابند بنانے کی ضرورت کا اعادہ کرتے ہوئے تجاویز اور مطالبات پیش کرتے ہوئے کہتے ہیں :۔

"اگر میڈیا اور سوشل میڈیا کو فتنہ بازی ، شر انگیزی سے روکنا ہے تو پھر اس کے لیے ان ذرائع ابلاغ کو ریگولیٹ کرنے کے لیے ریاست کو ضروری اقدامات کرنے ہوں گے جس کا ساتھ ہم سب کو دینا ہو گا ۔ ایک مربوط لائحہ عمل کے تحت سختی سے توہین مذہب سے متعلقہ ہر قسم کے مواد کو روکنا ہو گا کیوں کہ گستاخانہ مواد فتنہ اور شر کی سب سے بڑی وجہ ہے ۔ اسی طرح توہین مذہب کے جھوٹے الزامات کے لیے بھی میڈیا اور سوشل میڈیا کو استعمال سے سختی سے روکا جائے ۔ اس کے ساتھ ساتھ ایسا مواد جو ہمارے بچوں کو دہشتگردوں کی طرف راغب کرے یا اُن کے اخلاق ، کردار کو تباہ کرے اور انہیں فحاشی و عریانیت کے راستے پر چلانے کا ذریعہ بنے تو اُسے بھی میڈیا اور سوشل میڈیا پر روکا جانا چاہیے۔"[3]

سوشل میڈیا کے مثبت پہلوؤں پر روشنی ڈالنے کے بعدگستاخانہ مواد پر اپنی پریشانی کا اظہار کرتے ہوئے معرو ف کالم نگار محترم جاوید چوہدری لکھتے ہیں :

’’دنیا میں ہر چیز کے اچھے پہلو بھی ہوتے ہیں اور بُرے بھی ، سوشل میڈیا میں بھی درجن بھر خرابیاں موجود ہیں ان سب خرابیوں میں بڑی خرابی سنسر شپ کی کمی ہے۔آپ سوشل میڈیا کے کسی بھی پیج پر کوئی بھی مواد چڑھاسکتے ہیں، دنیا کا کوئی شخص آپ کو روک نہیں سکتا۔ یہ خرابی خوفناک ہے اور اسلامی دنیا اس وقت اس خرابی کا بڑا ہدف ہے ، دنیا کے چند منافق مسلمان ، چند عاقبت نا اندیش پاکستانی ، چند شر پسند غیر مسلم اور چند ننگ افلاس قادیانی اس خرابی کا فائدہ اُٹھا رہے ہیں ، یہ سوشل میڈیا پر روزانہ گستاخانہ مواد چڑھا دیتے ہیں جو ہم مسلمانوں کے لیے ناقابل برداشت ہے ۔پاکستان میں ایسے 70گستاخ ہیں ، ایف آئی اے نے گیارہ لوگوں کا اایک ایسا گروپ بھی پکڑا جو مسلسل یہ مکروہ حرکت کر رہا تھا ، یہ لوگ پاکستان سمیت پوری دنیا میں انتشار پھیلا رہے ہیں ۔‘‘[4]

پاکستان کے کروڑو ں لوگوں کی بے بسی کی کیفیت کے بارے میںجناب اوریامقبول جان رقمطراز ہوئے کہ :۔

"پاکستان کی عدلیہ میں اس فقرے کی گونج ( آبروئے مازنام مصطفی است ) اس مملکت خداداد میں بسنے والے ان کروڑوں لوگوں کے جذبات کی عکاسی کرتی ہے جو گزشتہ ایک دہائی سے بھی زیادہ عرصے سے روز اپنی بے بسی پر ماتم کرتے ہیں ، خون کے آنسو روتے تھے ، ایسا تو دنیا ئے اسلام کی تاریخ میں کبھی نہیں ہوا تھا کہ ہر روز ایک گروہ جو خود کو سیکولر اور لبرل کہتا ہو وہ فیس بک ، ٹوئٹر اور ویب سائٹس پر روزانہ اللہ تبارک و تعالیٰ کی توہین کرے ، سید الانبیا ء ﷺ کی توہین کرے ، سید الانبیاءﷺ کی شان میں گستاخانہ جملے لکھے ، کارٹون بنائے ، اہل بیت ِاطہارؓ کے بارے میں ہرزہ سرائی کرے اور کوئی ان کا گریبان نہ تھامے ، انہیں روکنے کی کوشش نہ کرے ، ان پر نفرت انگیزی جیسے نرم قانون کے تحت بھی مقدمہ درج نہ ہو ۔ سب سے زیادہ پریشان وہ لوگ تھے جو دن رات سوشل میڈیا اور انٹرنیٹ کی دنیا میں ان بد بختوں کا مقابلہ کرتے تھے ۔"1

سینئر صحافی محترم ہارون الرشید سوشل میڈیا پر گستاخانہ عوامل کے تناظر میں اپنے جذبات کا اظہار قوتِ عشق محمدﷺ کی نسبت سےکرتے ہوئے رقم طراز ہوئے کہ :

"ایمان ایک قلبی واردات بھی ہے جس نے اس کا ذائقہ نہیں چکھا ، وہ کبھی نہیں جان سکتا کہ کن کیفیات سے وہ دوچار کرتا ہے ۔ انبیاء کرام اور اولیائے عظام کی تو بات دوسری ہے ، زندوں کی حکایات سنئے تو حیرت ہوتی ہے کہ حب رسول ﷺ نے ادراک کے کیسے کیسے چراغ ان میں روشن کئے ۔اسد اللہ خان غالبنے نعت کا قصدکیا تو عالم حیرت میں رہا ۔ کہا تو کہا :

غالب ثنائے خواجہ بہ یزدان گزاشتیمآں ذات پاک مرتبہ دانِ محمد ؐ است

آپ ﷺ کی مدح میں نے پروردگار کے سامنے کی ۔ وہی ایک ذات ہے جو رحمۃ اللعالمین کے مقام و مرتبے پر سے آشناء ہے ۔

چودہ سو سال بیت چکے مدحت کا سلسلہ جاری ہے ۔ علامہ اقبالؒ نے تواپنا اعزازہی نبیؐ محترم کی مدح سرائی کوقرار دیا:

خیمہ افلاک کاایستادہ اسی نام سے ہے نبض ہستی تپش آمادہ اسی نام سے ہے"2

محترم خورشید ندیم سوشل بلاگرز کے فتنہ سےخبردار کرتے ہوئے یہ تو جہ دلانے کی کوشش کرتے ہیں کہ :

"یہ (سوشل میڈیا ) تہذیبی کشمکش کا نیا میدان ہے ۔ فکر و نظر کی وہ بحث جو اس سے پہلے ابلاغ کے دوسرے ذرائع تک محدود تھی ، اب یہاں منتقل ہو رہی ہے ۔ اس فورم کا ایک پہلو یہ بھی ہے کہ اپنی شناخت کو مستور رکھتے ہوئے وہ کچھ کہا جا سکتا ہے جو شناخت کے ساتھ کہنا مشکل ہے ۔ ہر ایجاد دودھاری تلوار ہے ۔ یہ اگر اناڑیوں کے ہاتھ لگ جائے تو خیر پر شر غالب آجاتا ہے ۔ سوشل میڈیا کا معاملہ بھی کچھ ایسا ہی ہو گیاہے۔اگر یہ انسانوں کے ہاتھوں میں رہتا تو فکر و نظر کا اختلاف شاید فساد میں تبدیل نہ ہوتا ۔ بد قسمتی سے کچھ بھینسے بھی اس طرف آنکلے ہیں ۔ انہوں نے یہاں وہی کچھ کیا ہے جو ایک بے مہاربھینسا کسی کھیت میں گھس کر ، کرسکتا ہے ۔کوئی جتنا غیر جانب دار ہو ، انسانیت کے شرف سے تو دست بردار نہیں ہو سکتا ۔ اختلاف رائے کا دفاع تو کیا جا سکتا ہے ، بد تہذیبی کے دفاع کا مطلب شرف انسانیت سے دست برداری ہے۔"[5]

جناب مشتاق احمد قریشیسوشل میڈیا پر ناموس رسالت ﷺ کے باب میں انتظامیہ کی خاموشی اور غفلت پر آواز بلند کرتے ہوئے لکھتے ہیں :

"سوشل میڈیا ہو ، برقی ذرائع ابلاغ ہوں یا اخبارات سب جگہ ناموس رسالت ﷺ کے بارے میں طرح طرح کے بیانات و اعلانات ہو رہے ہیں لیکن متعلقہ افراد کی کہیں کوئی گرفتاری نہیں ہو رہی اور نہ ہی سوشل میڈیا پر کسی قسم کی قدغن لگائی جارہی ہے بلکہ طرح طرح کے بیانات سے اہل ایمان کے جذبات کو مجروح کیا جار ہا ہے ۔اللہ اور رسولﷺ سے بڑھ کر کوئی چیز اہم نہیں ہے ۔اللہ کے رسول ﷺ پر تو ہماری جان بھی قربان ۔ ناموس رسالتﷺ کا مسئلہ خالص دینی معاملہ ہے ، دیگر تمام معاملات چاہے سیاسی ہو ں ، معاشرتی ہوں ، ثانوی حیثیت رکھتے ہیں ۔"[6]

پاکستان کے ممتاز عالم دین ، چیئرمین رویت ہلال کمیٹی پاکستان محترم مفتی منیب الرحمٰن نے ناموس رسالت ﷺ کے حوالے سے انتہائی مدلل انداز میں اپنے احساسا ت کا اظہار کیا ہے اور یہ باور کروانے کی کوشش کی ہے کہ یہ ایسا مسئلہ ہے کہ جہاں مسلمانوں کو اپنے جذبات پر قابو پانا مشکل ہے

"مغربی دنیا میں وقفے وقفے سے توہین رسالت مآب ﷺ کے واقعات رونما ہوتے رہتے ہیں۔ ان واقعات سے امت مسلمہ کو روحانی اذیت پہنچتی ہے اور اُن کے جذبات مجروح ہوتے ہیں ۔یہ محض اتفاق نہیں ہے ، بلکہ دیدہ و دانستہ طور پر اسلام اور مسلمانوں کے خلاف اُن کے خبث باطن اور نفرت کا اظہار ہے ۔ وہ یہ بھی جانتے ہیں کہ مسلمانوں کے لیے اس مسئلے میں اپنے جذبات پر قابو پانا مشکل ہے ۔" [7]

اس حوالے سے مزید لکھتے ہیں:

"ہر شخص جانتا ہے کہ اللہ تعالیٰ ، رسول ﷺ ، قرآن کریم کی ناموس اور شعائرِ دین کی حرمت مسلمانوں کے لیے انتہائی حساس مسئلہ ہے ۔ پہلے ایسی فضا پیدا کی جاتی ہے کہ مسلمان مشتعل ہوں اور پھر اُن پر انتہا پسندی ، نفرت انگیزی اور جذباتیت کی چھاپ لگا دی جائے اور جی بھر کر ملامت کی جائے ۔ کئی دنوں سے ان بد نصیب بلاگرز کا مسئلہ چل رہا ہے ،لیکن ان لبرل حضرات نے اس پر کوئی آواز نہیں اُٹھا ئی او ر نہ ہی مسلمانوں کے جذبات کی ترجمانی کی ۔ اگر کسی حساس ادارے کے بارے میں کوئی اس طرح کی حرکت کر بیٹھے تو اسے غائب کر دیا جاتا ہے ، لیکن ناموسِ رسالت ﷺ جن پر ہمارے ماں باپ اور ہم سب کی جانیں قربان ہوں ، کے حوالے سے اداروں کو بھی کسی کارروائی کی توفیق نہیں ہوتی ۔ مذہبی انتہا پسندی کا رونا رویا جاتا ہے ، لیکن لبرل اور سیکولر انتہا پسندوں کے بارے میں کوئی آواز نہیں اُٹھا تا ، انہیں فتنہ انگیزی ، عصبیت اور انتہا پسندی کی کھلی اجازت ہے ۔ پس ہماری گزارش ہے کہ قبل اس کے کہ مسلمان سڑکوں پر آ جائیں اور اُن کے جذبات بے قابو ہو جائیں ، آئی ٹی کی وزارت کے حکام ، انٹیلی جنس ادارے اوردیگر حساس مراکز فوری اقدام کر کے عوام کے جذبات مشتعل ہونے سے بچائیں۔"[8]

یہی وجہ ہے کہ پاکستان کی مجلس شوریٰ جو کہ دستور کی رو سے باشندگان پاکستان کی نمائندہ اور ان کے احساسات ، منشاء اور خواہشات کی حقیقی ترجمان ہے ، اس اہم مسئلے سے قطعاًغافل نہ رہی ۔ اس عدالت میں مقدمہ کی سماعت کے دوران جس طرح پاکستان کے باقی طبقات کے نمائندہ حضرات نے ہر فورم پر اس مسئلے کی نزاکت کو اجاگر کیا ، بعینہ مجلس شوریٰ نے بھی اپنے فرائض کو مد نظر رکھتے ہوئے غیر معمولی نوعیت کی قرار دادیں منظور کیں جن میں انتہائی شدید الفاظ میں مجرموں کےخلاف 295-C تعزیرات پاکستان کے تحت کاروائی کے ساتھ ساتھ اُن کو نشان عبرت بنانے کا مطالبہ کیا اور سوشل میڈیا سمیت تمام ذرائع ابلاغ پر ایک سخت مانیٹرنگ سسٹم قائم کرنے کا مطالبہ بھی کیا ۔ پاکستان کی مجلس شوریٰ کے ایوان بالا یعنی سینٹ نے مورخہ 10 مارچ 2017 کو قرارداد نمبر 317 متفقہ طور پر منظور کی جس کا متن حسب ذیل ہے :

" پاکستان دنیا کا واحد ملک ہے جو لا الہ الااللہ محمد ؐرسو ل اللہ کی بنیاد پر قائم ہوا ۔ پاکستان کا قانون تمام انبیاء کرامؑ، بالخصوص امام الانبیاءو خاتم الانبیاء والمرسلین حضرت محمد ﷺ ، صحابہ کرامؓ ، اہل بیت عزامؓ ، تمام مقدس شخصیات اور شعائر ِ اسلام کے تحفظ کی ذمہ داری لیتا ہے ، تعزیراتِ پاکستان کی دفعہC-295 انہی مقدس شخصیات اور شعائر اسلام کے تحفظ کے لیے قائم کی گئی ہے۔ جبکہ حالیہ دنوں میں کچھ ناعاقبت اندیش اس قانون کی دھجیاں بکھیرتے ہوئے شعائر اسلام کی عموماً اور امام الانبیاء ، خاتم الانبیاء والمرسلین جناب محمد مصطفیٰ ﷺ ، صحابہ کرام ؓ، اہل بیت عزامؓ ، کی خصوصی توہین کر کے اپنے ناپاک عزائم کو فروغ دیتے ہوئے فسادات کی آگ کو بھڑ کانے کی پوری کوشش میں مصروف ہیں ۔ اور امت مسلمہ کے ایمان پر سنگین حملے کر کے پاکستان میں نئے فسادات کو جنم دینے کے لیے کوشاں ہیں ۔ ہماراآئین اور قانون جہاں ہر قسم کی آزادی ِ اظہار رائے کا حق دیتا ہے وہاں تمام انبیاء کرامؑ، صحابہ کرامؓ ، اہل بیت عزامؓ ، سمیت کسی بھی مقدس شخصیت کی توہین کی قطعاًاجازت نہیں دیتا ۔ اللہ ذوالجلال اور خاتم الانبیا ء و المرسلین حضرت محمد ﷺ کو راضی کرنے کے لیے ضروری ہے کہ ایسے گستاخانہ افعال کو روکنے کے لیے متعلقہ محکمہ دفعہC295 کے تحت ایسے افراد اور ان کے سہولت کاروں کو نشان عبرت بنائیں اور سوشل میڈیا دیگر تمام ایسے ذرائع کے حوالے سے انفارمیشن ٹیکنالوجی پر ایک سخت مانیٹرنگ سسٹم قائم کریں۔"

اسی طرح پاکستان کی مجلس شوریٰ کے ایوان زیریں یعنی قومی اسمبلی نے اتفاق رائے سے مورخہ 14 مارچ 2017 کو ایک قرارداد منظور کرتے ہوئے حکومت سے یہ مطالبہ کیا ہے کہ :

"یہ ایوان سوشل میڈیا اور دوسرے تمام ذرائع ابلاغ پر مسلسل توہین رسالت کی اشاعت کی بھرپور مذمت کرتا ہے اور حکومت سے پُر زور مطالبہ کرتا ہے کہ مملکت اسلامی میں مسلمانوں کے جذبات و احساسات اور ان کے دین اورپیغمبر خاتم النبیین نبی برحق ﷺ کے خلاف توہین آمیز مواد کی اشاعت کو روکنے کے لیے فوری اقدامات کئے جائیں ۔ "

| | | --- | | |

پاکستان کی مجلس شوریٰ کی قراردادیں ، اہل علم و دانش کی تحریریں ، اخبارات کے اداریے اور ملک میں عوامی اضطراب اور بے چینی اس امر کی غماز ہے کہ یہ مسئلہ پاکستان کے تحفظ، سلامتی ، دفاع اور نظریاتی اساس سے تعلق رکھتا ہے ۔ آئین پاکستان عوام کو جو بنیادی حقوق کی ضمانت دیتا ہے اس میں حق زندگی اورزندگی کو احسن انداز میں گزارنے کاحق بھی شامل ہے ۔ یہ عدالت سمجھتی ہے کہ پاکستان کی عوام اس حالت میں اپنے حق زندگی سے ہر گز استفادہ نہیں کر سکتے جب تک اُن کی سب سے محبوب ہستی ﷺ کے نامو س کی حفاظت نہ ہو ۔اسی طرح آئین میں بنیادی حقوق کے بابمیں دفعہ 19 میں آزادئ ِ تقریر کے ضمن میں اسلام کی عظمت کی حفاظت کی جو ضمانت دی گئی ہے اس پر کما حقہُ عمل درآمد میں کوتاہی اور غفلت عوام کے بنیادی حقوق پر براہ راست حملہ ہے جس پر وہ اس عدالت کا دروازہ کھٹکھٹانے پر کلی طور پر حق بجانب ہیں ۔ آرٹیکل 199 کے تحت یہ عدالت اتنی اہمیت کے حامل عوامی مفاد کے مسئلے پر اپنے دائرہ کار کو سکیڑنہیں سکتی ۔ یہ اختیار پاکستان کے عوام کی امانت ہے اور اسے عوامی منشاء جو کہ دستور میں واضح کی گئی ہے ، کے مطابق ہی استعمال کرنا عدالت کی ذمہ داری ہے ۔ یہی وجہ ہے کہ تمام فریق جو اس مقدمہ میں عدالت میں پیش ہوئے کسی نے بھی عدالت کے اختیار سماعت پر اعتراض نہیں کیا ۔ علاوہ ازیں عدالت عظمیٰ کے بے شمار نظائر کی روشنی میں یہ ایک مسلمہ قانونی حقیقت ہے کہ پاکستان کے عوام کے بنیادی حقوق کی فراہمی ، حفاظت اور ادائیگی کی غرض سے عدالت ِ عالیہ اپنے دستوری اختیارات کو برو ئے کار لاتے ہوئے مناسب احکامات بمطابق قانون صادر کر سکتی ہے ۔

| | | --- | | |

7۔ نبی مہربان ﷺکی ذات گرامی ہر قسم کے عیب سے مبرا ہے ، ہر قسم کی تنقیص سے بالا تر ہے ، ہر قسم کی تنقید سے ماورا ہے ، ہر قسم کی خطا ء سے معصوم ہے ، لہذا اسلام کسی شخص یا گروہ کو یہ اجازت نہیں دیتا کہ وہ نبی کریم ﷺ کی ذات ، صفات اور منصب کو ہدفِ تنقید و ملامت بنائے ۔

جو لوگ برگزیدہ ، معصوم اور منزہ عن الخطاء اور محبوب کبریا ہستی ﷺ کو ذہنی یا جسمانی کسی قسم کی اذیت پہنچائیں ان کے بارے میں قرآن حکیم کا صریح حکم اور اعلان ہے کہ

إِنَّ الَّذِينَ يُؤْذُونَ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ لَعَنَهُمُ اللَّهُ فِي الدُّنْيَا وَالْآخِرَةِ وَأَعَدَّ لَهُمْ عَذَابًا مُهِينًا ۔[9]

بلاشبہ جو لوگ اللہ اور اس کے رسولﷺ کو اذیت دیتے ہیں اُن پر دنیا اور آخرت میں اللہ کی طرف سے پھٹکار ہے اور ان کے لیے رسواء کن عذاب مہیا کر دیا گیا ہے ۔اسی طرح رسول اللہﷺ کو اذیت دینے والوں کے بارے میں اللہ کا فرمان ہے کہ وَالَّذِيْنَ يُؤْذُوْنَ رَسُوْلَ اللّٰهِ لَهُمْ عَذَابٌ اَلِيْمٌO‘‘[10] "اور جو لوگ رسول اللہ ﷺ کو ایذا دیتے ہیں ان کے لئے درد ناک عذاب ہے" اور رسول خدا ﷺ کو اذیت دینے والوں کو یہ بتلا دیا گیا کہ وہ مَلْعُونِينَ ۖ أَيْنَمَا ثُقِفُوا أُخِذُوا وَقُتِّلُوا تَقْتِيلًاO'[11] ۔" ان پر پھٹکار برسائی گئی، جہاں کہیں ملیں پکڑے جائیں اور گن گن کر قتل کئے جائیں" یعنی دنیا میں انکی سزا قتل اور آخرت میں درد ناک اور رُسوا کن عذاب ہے۔ یہ آیات اس پر دلالت کرتی ہیں کہ رسول ؐ کو ایذا دینا ، رنج پہنچانا اور معمولی تکلیف اور اذیت پہنچانا نہ صرف کفر ہے بلکہ موجب قتل ہے ۔ امام خطابیؒ نے 'واھب اللدنیۃ ' میں لکھا ہے کہ آیات میں مذکور لفظ 'الأذی ' کے معنی 'الشرالخفیف ' کے ہیں ۔ اور شر خفیف اگر بڑھ جائے تو ضر ر کہلاتا ہے ۔ امام تقی الدین السبکی ؒ نے اپنی شہرہ آفاق تصنیف "السیف المسلول علیٰ من سبَّ الرسول ؐ "میں لکھا ہے کہ خدا کے رسولؐ کی عظمت کا تقاضا ہے کہ انہیں تھوڑی سی تکلیف پہنچانا بھی کفر ہے ۔ اس کے علاوہ دیگر آیات جن سے علماء و محققین نے ناموس رسالت پر حرف گیری کی سزا قتل اور گستاخ رسول کے یقینی کفر کے حکم کا استنباط کیا ہے وہ درج ذیل ہیں:

اول : سورۃالتوبہ آیات 61 تا 69

اس سلسلے میں سورہ توبہ کی آیات 61 تا 69 اس معاملے میں واضح نصوص ہیں ۔ " سورۃ التوبہ کی آیات 61 تا 69 مدینہ کے منافقین کے جوڑ توڑ کے بارے میں اُتریں ۔ ان کی حرکات آنحضرت ﷺ کو اذیت پہنچاتی تھیں ۔ ان کی طعنہ زنی اور بیہودہ گفتگو جو وہ لوگ آنحضور ﷺ کے خلاف کرتے تھے انہیں کفر و الحاد کی گہرائیوں میں گرادیتی تھی جس پر وہ سزا کے مستوجب تھے ۔ انہیں آگاہ کیا گیا ہے کہ ان کے اعمال و افعال اس دنیا میں بھی اور آخرت میں بھی بے ثمر قرار دیے گئے کہ وہ آنحضرت ﷺ کی تضحیک کرتے تھے ۔مسلم قانون دان اس فیصلے پر پہنچے ہیں کہ اچھے اعمال و افعال اس دنیا میں او ر آخرت میں بے ثمر بنا دیا جانا بے معنیٰ ہو کر رہ جاتا ہے اگر فعل فوجداری جرم تصور ہوکر سزائے موت کا مستوجب قرارنہ دیا جاتا ۔ گو یا ان مسلم قانون دانوں کے نزدیک آنحضور ﷺ پر طعنہ زنی کرنے کے فعل کی سزا، سزا ئے موت سے کم نہیں ہو نی چاہیے"۔[12]

( قانون توہین رسالت ایک سماجی ،سیاسی ،تاریخی تناظر ،ص: 25از ڈاکٹر محمود احمدغازی )۔

وَمِنْهُمُ الَّذِيْنَ يُؤْذُوْنَ النَّبِيَّ وَيَقُوْلُوْنَ هُوَ اُذُنٌ ۭقُلْ اُذُنُ خَيْرٍ لَّكُمْ يُؤْمِنُ بِاللّٰهِ وَيُؤْمِنُ لِلْمُؤْمِنِيْنَ وَرَحْمَةٌ لِّلَّذِيْنَ اٰمَنُوْا مِنْكُمْ ۭوَالَّذِيْنَ يُؤْذُوْنَ رَسُوْلَ اللّٰهِ لَهُمْ عَذَابٌ اَلِيْمٌO61؀

ان میں سے وہ بھی ہیں جو پیغمبر کو ایذا دیتے ہیں اور کہتے ہیں کان کا کچا ہے، آپ کہہ دیجئے کہ وہ کان تمہارے بھلے کے لئے ہیں (1) وہ اللہ پر ایمان رکھتا ہے اور مسلمانوں کی بات کا یقین کرتا ہے اور تم میں سے جو اہل ایمان ہیں یہ ان کے لئے رحمت ہے، رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کو جو لوگ ایذا دیتے ہیں ان کے لئے دکھ کی مار ہے۔(سورۃ التوبہ آیت 61)

اس آیت سے استنباط کرتے ہوئے شیخ الاسلام امام ابن تیمیہ ؒ فرماتے ہیں کہ " اس سے یہ بھی معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ ایذا رسانی اوررسول ﷺ کی مخالفت کفر کی موجب ہے ، اس لیے کہ اللہ نے یہ خبر دی کہ اس کے لیے آتش جہنم تیار ہے جس میں وہ ہمیشہ رہے گا، یوں نہیں فرمایا کہ " اس کی سزا یہ ہے۔" ظاہر ہے کہ ان دونوں جملوں میں فرق ہے بلکہ " المحادۃ " ( مخالفت ) ہی کو عداوت اور علیحدگی سے تعبیر کیا جاتا ہے اور اس کا نام کفر اور محاربہ ہے ، بدیں وجہ یہ لفظ تنہاکفر سے بھی سنگین تر ہے ۔ بنا بریں رسول ﷺ کو ایذا دینے والا کافر ، اللہ اور اس کے رسول کا دشمن اور ان کے خلاف جنگ لڑنے والا ہو گا ، اس لیے "المحادۃ " کے معنی ہیں جدا ہونا ، بایں طور کہ ایک کی حد جد ا ہو ، جس طرح کہا گیا کہ " المشاقۃ " یہ ہے کہ ہر شخص ایک شِق ، یعنی ایک جانب ہو جائے اور " المعاداۃ " یہ ہے کہ دونوں ایک دوسرے کے دشمن بن جائیں ۔ حدیث نبویﷺ میں ہے کہ ایک شخص رسول ﷺ کو گالیاں دیا کرتا تھا ، یہ سن کر آپ ﷺ نے فرمایا : (من یکفینی عدوی؟)"کون میرے دشمن کے لیے کافی ہو گا ؟ " یہ ایک واضح امر ہے جس کا تذکرہ پہلے کیا جا چکا ہے ۔ بدیں وجہ ایسا شخص کافر اور مباح الدم ہے۔ " [13]

يَحْذَرُ الْمُنٰفِقُوْنَ اَنْ تُنَزَّلَ عَلَيْهِمْ سُوْرَةٌ تُنَبِّئُهُمْ بِمَا فِيْ قُلُوْبِهِمْ ۭقُلِ اسْتَهْزِءُوْا ۚ اِنَّ اللّٰهَ مُخْرِجٌ مَّا تَحْذَرُوْنَO64؀ وَلَىِٕنْ سَاَلْتَهُمْ لَيَقُوْلُنَّ اِنَّمَا كُنَّا نَخُوْضُ وَنَلْعَبُ ۭ قُلْ اَبِاللّٰهِ وَاٰيٰتِهٖ وَرَسُوْلِهٖ كُنْتُمْ تَسْتَهْزِءُ وْنَO65؀ لَا تَعْتَذِرُوْا قَدْ كَفَرْتُمْ بَعْدَ اِيْمَانِكُمْ ۭاِنْ نَّعْفُ عَنْ طَاۗىِٕفَةٍ مِّنْكُمْ نُعَذِّبْ طَاۗىِٕفَةًۢ بِاَنَّهُمْ كَانُوْا مُجْرِمِيْنَO66؀ۧ

منافقوں کو ہر وقت اس بات کا کھٹکا لگا رہتا ہے کہ کہیں مسلمانوں پر کوئی ایسی سورۃ نہ اترے جو ان کے دلوں کی باتیں انہیں بتلا دے۔ کہہ دیجئے کہ مذاق اڑاتے رہو، یقیناً اللہ تعالیٰ اسے ظاہر کرنے والا ہے جس سے تم ڈر دبک رہے ہو ۔اگر آپ ان سے پوچھیں تو صاف کہہ دیں گے کہ ہم تو یونہی آپس میں ہنس بول رہے تھے۔ کہہ دیجئے کہ اللہ اس کی آیتیں اور اس کا رسول ہی تمہارے ہنسی مذاق کے لئے رہ گئے ہیں ۔تم بہانے نہ بناؤ یقیناً تم اپنے ایمان کے بعد بےایمان ہوگئے ۔ اگر ہم تم میں سے کچھ لوگوں سے درگزر بھی کرلیں ۔ تو کچھ لوگوں کو ان کے جرم کی سنگین سزا بھی دیں گے۔

(سورۃ التوبہ آیت 64- 66)

اس آیت سے استدلال کرتے ہوئے امام ابن تیمیہ فرماتے ہیں" یہ آیت اس ضمن میں نص ہے کہ اللہ تعالی، اس کی آیت ،اور اس کے رسول کا مذاق اُڑانا کفر ہے ، پس گالی دینا بطریق اولیٰ مقصو د ہے ۔ یہ آیت اس امر پر دلالت کرتی ہے جو شخص رسول ﷺ کی توہین کرے ، خواہ سنجیدگی سے ہو یا ازراہ مذاق ، وہ کافر ہو جاتا ہے ۔ " اسی آیت کے مدعا کی وضاحت کرتے ہوئے ڈاکٹر محمود احمد غازی نے لکھا ہے کہ "منافقین اپنی نجی محفلوں میں آپؐ کی توہین کاکوئی بھی موقع ہاتھ سے نہ جانے دیتے اور اس سے مسلمانوں کے جذبات کو برانگیختہ کرنا بھی مقصود ہو تا ۔ اس لیے یہ فیصلہ کیا گیاکہ آنحضرت ﷺ کی توہین کرنے کے جرم یا آپ ؐ کے مقدّس نام کی بے حرمتی کرنے کے جرم میں ، یہ بھی ضروری نہیں رہ جاتا کہ مجرم نے اس گناہ کا ارتکاب مسلمانوں کے جذبات کو مشتعل کرنے اور انہیں اکسانے کی نیت سے کیا ہو توہین کا جرم ثابت ہونے پر سزا ہو گی قطع نظر اس کے کہ نیت اور مقصد کیا تھا ،ارادہ اور نیت کا تعین صرف مبھم الفاظ کی صور ت میں کیا جائے گا "۔

( قانون توہین رسالت ایک سماجی ،سیاسی ،تاریخی تناظر ،ص: 27)[14]

دوم : البقرہ آیت 104

يٰٓاَيُّهَا الَّذِيْنَ اٰمَنُوْا لَا تَقُوْلُوْا رَاعِنَا وَقُوْلُوا انْظُرْنَا وَاسْمَعُوْا ۭ وَلِلْكٰفِرِيْنَ عَذَابٌ اَلِــيْمٌ ١٠٤

ترجمہ :اے لوگو جو ایمان لائے ہو مت کہو ”راعنا“ اور کہو ”انظرنا“ (ہماری طرف متوجہ ہوں) اور (یہ بات توجہ سے) سنو اور کافروں کے لیے دردناک عذاب ہے۔

حضرت مولانا مفتی محمد شفیع ؒ مقبول عام تفسیر معارف القرآن میں اس آیت کے پس منظر کی وضاحت میں بیان کرتے ہیں کہ "بعض یہودیوں نے ایک شرارت ایجاد کی کہ جناب رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کے حضور میں آکر لفظ راعنا سے آپ کو خطاب کرتے جس کے معنی ان کی عبرانی زبان میں ایک بددعا کے ہیں اور وہ اسی نیت سے کہتے تھے مگر عربی زبان میں اسکے معنی ہماری مصلحت کی رعایت فرمائیے کے ہیں اس لئے عربی داں اس شرارت کو نہ سمجھ سکتے تھے اور اس اچھے معنی کے قصد سے بعض مسلمان بھی حضور کو اس کلمہ سے خطاب کرنے لگے اس سے ان شریروں کو گنجائش ملی آپس میں بیٹھ کر ہنستے تھے کہ اب تک تو ہم ان کو خفیہ ہی برا کہتے تھے اب اعلانیہ کہنے کی تدبیر ایسی ہاتھ آگئی کہ مسلمان بھی اس میں شریک ہوگئے حق تعالیٰ نے اس گنجائش کے قطع کرنے کو مسلمانوں کو حکم دیاکہ) اے ایمان والو تم (لفظ) راعنا مت کہا کرو اور (اس کی جگہ لفظ) انظرنا کہہ دیا کرو (کیونکہ اس لفظ کے معنی اور راعنا کے معنی عربی زبان میں ایک ہی ہیں راعنا کہنے میں یہودیوں کی شرارت چلتی ہے اس لئے اس کو ترک کرکے دوسرا لفظ استعمال کرو) اور (اس حکم کو اچھی طرح) سن لیجئو (اور یاد رکھیو) اور (ان کافروں کو تو سزائے دردناک ہو (ہی) گی جو پیغمبر (صلی للہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کی شان میں ایسی گستاخی اور وہ بھی چالاکی کے ساتھ کرتے ہیں۔[15]

جو شخص نبی کریم ﷺ کی شان میں کسی بھی قسم کی گستاخی اور توہین کا ارتکاب کرے شرعاً وہ مباح الدم اور واجب القتل ہے "۔ حضرات صحابہ کرام رضی اللہ عنھم اس آیت سے یہی حکم سمجھے تھے چناچہ علامہ سید محمود آلوسی ؒ "تفسیر روح المعانی " میں اسی آیت کی تفسیر کرتے ہوئے حضرت سعد بن عبادہ رضی اللہ عنہ کا قول نقل کیا ہے کہ :

وروی ان سعد بن عبادۃ رضی اللہ عنہ سمعھا منھم فقال :

یا اعداء اللہ ! علیکم لعنۃ اللہ والذی نفسی بیدہ لئن سمعنا من رجل منکم یقولہا لرسولﷺلاضربن عنقہ ۔[16]

ترجمہ : مروی ہے کہ حضرت سعد بن عبادۃ رضی اللہ عنہ نے یہ لفظ ان یہودیوں سے سنا اور فرمایا کہ : اے اللہ کے دشمنو ! تم پر اللہ کی لعنت ہو ، اس ذات کی قسم جس کے قبضہ قدرت میں میری جان ہے ، اگر میں نے تمہارے کسی شخص کو یہ لفظ کہتے سنا کہ وہحضور ﷺ کو کہہ رہا ہے تو میں لازماًاس کی گردن اُڑا دوں گا ۔

اسی طرح حضرت اما م رازی ؒ نے" تفسیر کبیر " میں یہی قول حضرت سعد بن معاذ رضی اللہ عنہ سے بھی نقل کیا چناچہ وہ فرماتے ہیں کہ :

وروی ان سعد بن معاذ رضی اللہ عنہ سمعھا منھم فقال :

یا اعداء اللہ ! علیکم لعنۃ اللہ والذی نفسی بیدہ لئن سمعنا من رجل منکم یقولہا لرسولﷺلاضربن عنقہ۔[17]

ترجمہ : مروی ہے کہ حضرت سعد بن معاذ رضی اللہ عنہ نے یہ لفظ ان یہودیوں سے سنا اور فرمایا کہ :

اے اللہ کے دشمنو ! تم پر اللہ کی لعنت ہو ، اس ذات کی قسم جس کے قبضہ قدرت میں میری جان ہے ، اگر میں نے تمہارے کسی شخص کو یہ لفظ کہتے سنا کہ وہ حضور ﷺ کو کہہ رہا ہے تو میں لازماًاس کی گردن اُڑا دوں گا ۔

یہاں پر یہ بات یاد رہے کہ یہ الفاظ صرف سعد بن معاذ اور سعد بن عبادۃ رضی اللہ عنھما کے نہیں تھے بلکہ جمہور صحابہ کا یہی مسلک اور نظریہ تھا کہ نبی ﷺ کی توہین کرنے والا واجب القتل ہے ۔چناچہ فتح القدیر میں علامہ شوکانی ؒ امام نعیم ؒکے حوالے سے لکھتے ہیں :

واخرج ابو نعیم فی الدلائل عنہ (ای عن ابن عباس رضی اللہ عنھما ) انہ قال المومنون بعد ھذہ آیۃ من سمعتموہ یقولھافاضربوا عنقہ ، فانتھت الیہود بعد ذالک[18]

ترجمہ : امام نعیم ؒ نے "دلائل البنوۃ " میں لکھا ہے کہ حضرت ابن عباس رضی اللہ عنہ فرماتے ہیں کہ مومنوں نےاس آیات کے نزول کے بعد کہا : جسے تم حضور ﷺ کے لیے یہ الفاظ کہتے ہوئے سنو ، تو اس کی گردن اڑا دو ، تو اس کے بعد یہودی رک گئے ۔

شیخ التفسیر حضرت مولانا ادریس کاندہلویاپنی تفسیر" تفسیر معارف القرآن " میں تحریر فرماتے ہیں: "نبی کی اشارۃً اور کنایۃً تحقیر بھی کفر ہے اس لیے کہ یہود صراحۃً آپ کی تحقیر نہیں کرتے تھے۔ راعنا کہہ کر اشارۃً اور کنایۃً آپ کی تحقیر کرتے تھے اللہ تعالیٰ نے ان کو کافر فرمایا"۔[19]

سوم : سورۃ التوبہ آیت 11،12

فَاِنْ تَابُوْا وَاَقَامُوا الصَّلٰوۃَ وَاٰتَوُا الزَّكٰوۃَ فَاِخْوَانُكُمْ فِي الدِّيْنِ۝۰ۭ وَنُفَصِّلُ الْاٰيٰتِ لِقَوْمٍ يَّعْلَمُوْنَ۝۱۱وَاِنْ نَّكَثُوْٓا اَيْمَانَهُمْ مِّنْۢ بَعْدِ عَهْدِهِمْ وَطَعَنُوْا فِيْ دِيْنِكُمْ فَقَاتِلُوْٓا اَىِٕمَّةَ الْكُفْرِ ۙ اِنَّهُمْ لَآ اَيْمَانَ لَهُمْ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَنْتَهُوْنَ12؀

ترجمہ : اب بھی اگر یہ توبہ کرلیں اور نماز کے پابند ہوجائیں اور زکوٰۃ دیتے رہیں تو تمہارے دینی بھائی ہیں ۔ (11) ہم تو جاننے والوں کے لئے اپنی آیتیں کھول کھول کر بیان کر رہے ہیں۔اور اگر وہ توڑ دیں اپنی قسمیں عہد کرنے کے بعد اور عیب لگائیں تمہارے دین میں تو لڑو کفر کے سرداروں سے بیشک ان کی قسمیں کچھ نہیں تاکہ وہ باز آئیں (12)۔

امام ابن کثیر ؒ مذکورہ آیت کی تفسیر میں لکتے ہیں:

ومن ھاھنا اخذ قتل من سب الرسول صلوٰت اللہ و سلامہ علیہ او من طعن فی دین الاسلام او ذکرہ بتنقص "

اس آیت میں علما ء نے یہ بات اخذ کی ہے کہ جو حضور (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کو گالیاں دے، دین میں عیب جوئی کرے، اس کا ذکر اہانت کے ساتھ کرے اسے قتل کردیا جائے ۔

تفسیر قرطبی میں علامہ قرطبی فرماتے ہیں :

استدل بعض العلماء بھذہ الآیۃ بو جوب قتل من طعن فی الدین اذھو کافروالطعن ان ینسب الیہ مالایلیق بہ او یعترض بالا ستخفاف علیٰ ما ھو فی الدین لما ثبت من الدلیل القطعی علی صحۃ اصولۃ و استقامۃ فروعہ ۔ و قال ابن المنذر اجمع عامۃ اہل العلم علی ان من سب النبیﷺالقتل ۔[20]

اس آیات سے بعض علماء نے استدلال کیا ہے کہ دین میں طعن کرنے والے ہر آدمی کو قتل کرنا واجب ہے ، کیونکہ وہ کافرہے ۔ اور طعن کا معنی یہ ہے کہ اس طرف ایسی شے کی نسبت کرنا جو اس کے لائق اور مناسب نہ ہو یا کسی امر دینی کو حقیر سمجھتے ہوئے اس پر اعترا ض کرنا ، جب کہ اس کے اصول کا صحیح ہونا اور اس کے فروع کا درست ہونا دلیل قطعی سے ثابت ہو ۔ ابن منذر نے کہا ہے : عام اہل علم نے اس پر اجماع کیا ہے کہ جس نے حضور نبی مکرم (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کو سب و شتم کی اس کی سزا قتل ہے ۔

امام تیمیہ ؒ " الصارم المسلول " میں مذکورہ آیت پر بحث کرتے ہوئے کہتے ہیں کہ حضور ﷺ کی عادت مبارکہ یہ تھی کہ عام لوگوں سے تو در گزر فرمایا کرتے تھے لیکن جو بد بخت دین میں طعنہ زنی کرتا تھا یا اللہ تعالیٰ اور اس کے رسول ﷺ کو ایذاء دیتاتھا تو اس کے خون کو آپ ﷺ ہدر فرمایا کرتے تھے ۔[21] چنا چہ اما م موصوف فرماتے ہیں :

"واما من طعن فی الدین فانہ یتعین قتا لہ و ھذہ کانت سنۃ رسول اللہﷺفانہ کان یھدردماء من آذی اللہ و رسولہ و طعن فی الدین و ان امسک عن غیر ہ "

(الصارم المسلول علیٰ شاتم الرسول : ص 20)

اور جو دین میں طعن کرتا ہےتو اس کے ساتھ قتال کرنا متعین ہے ، اور یہی طریقہ نبی کریم ﷺ کا تھا ، کیونکہ آپ ﷺ ان لوگوں کا خون ہدر فرماتے تھے جو اللہ تعالیٰ اوراس کے رسول ﷺ کو ایذاء دیتے ، اور دین میں طعنہ زنی کرتے ، اگر چہ ان کے علاوہ اوروں سے آپ ﷺ درگزر فرماتے ۔

اسی آیت سے استدلال کرتے ہوئے امام ابوبکر حصاص ؒ نے " احکام القرآن " میں امام لیث ؒ کا قول نقل کیا ہے کہ (العیاذ باللہ ) اگر کوئی مسلمان توہین رسالت کا ارتکاب کرے تو اسے فوراً ہی قتل کیا جائے گا، نہ اُسے مہلت دی جائے گی اور نہ ہی اس سے تو بہ کا مطالبہ کیا جائے گا، چناچہ امام موصوف فرماتے ہیں کہ :

" وقال اللیث فی المسلم یسب النبیﷺلا یناظر ولا یستتاب و یقتل مکانہ و کذالک الیہودو النصاریٰ "۔[22]

ترجمہ : امام لیث ؒ اس مسلمان کے لیے فرماتے ہیں جو نبی ﷺ کی توہین کرتا ہے کہ اسے نہ مہلت دی جائے گی اور نہ ہی توبہ کا کہا جائے گا ، بلکہ اسی جگہ قتل کر دیا جائے گا ، اگر یہود و نصاریٰ ایسا کریں تو ان کا بھی یہی حکم ہے ۔

ڈاکٹر محمود احمد غازی اپنی کتاب "قانون توہینِ رسالت ایک سماجی ،سیاسی ،تاریخی تناظر " میں لکھتے ہیں کہ " یہ آیات ان دو جرائم کے بارے میں ہیں ، جن میں ان لوگوں کے خلاف جنگ کرنے کو حق بجانب قرار دیا گیا ہے ، جو ان جرائم کے مرتکب ہوتے ہیں ۔ سب سے پہلے تو ان کے خلاف جہاں اہل ایمان کے ساتھ کیے گئے عہد ، نماز قائم کرنے اور زکوۃ کی ادائیگی کی خلاف ورزی کی گئی ہو ۔ دوسرے نمبر پر وہ لوگ آتے ہیں جو مسلمانوں کے دین پر حملہ کرتے ہیں ۔ مسلم سکالر اس نتیجے پر پہنچے ہیں کہ جوکوئی پیغمبر اسلام کے خلاف یا آپ کی تعلیمات میں سے کسی ایک کے بارے میں توہین آمیز اور رسوا کن را ئے کا اظہار کرتا ہے و ہ ان عام ہدایات اور فرمان کے تحت سزا کا مستوجب ہے ۔"[23]

چہارم : سورۃ الاحزاب 57

اِنَّ الَّذِيْنَ يُؤْذُوْنَ اللّٰهَ وَرَسُوْلَهٗ لَعَنَهُمُ اللّٰهُ فِي الدُّنْيَا وَالْاٰخِرَةِ وَاَعَدَّ لَهُمْ عَذَابًا مُّهِيْنًا (57 )

ترجمہ :جو لوگ اللہ اور اس کے رسول کو ایذاء دیتے ہیں ان پر دنیا اور آخرت میں اللہ کی پھٹکار ہے اور ان کے لئے نہایت رسواکن عذاب ہے۔

اس آیت مبارکہ سے درج ذیل امور ثابت ہوتے ہیں ۔مفسرین نے استدلال کرتے

ہوئے فرمایا ہے کہ جو شخص بھی کسی بھی طریقے سے حضور ﷺ کو ایذاء اور تکلیف پہنچائے یا

آپ ﷺ کی توہین و تنقیص اور استخفاف کرے خواہ صراحتاً ہو یا کنایۃ ً ، اشارۃًہویا تعریضاً ہر صورت میں وہ کافرو ملعون ہو جائے گا۔اس آیت کے ضمن میں امام ابن تیمیہ ؒ کہتے ہیں ۔

| | | --- | | |

" اللہ تعالیٰ نے اپنی ایذا کو رسول کی ایذا اور اپنی اطاعت کو رسول کی اطاعت کے ساتھ مقرون و متصل کر کے بیان کیا ہے ، یہ بطریق منصوص بھی آپ سے منقول ہے ۔اور جو شخص اللہ کو ایذا دے وہ کافر اورمباح الدم ہے ۔ اس سے مستفاد ہوتا ہے کہ اللہ تعالیٰ نے اپنی اور رسول ﷺ کی محبت ، اپنی اور رسول کی رضا مندی ، اپنی اور رسول کی اطاعت کو ایک ہی چیز قرار دیا ہے ۔ " مزید فرمایا کہ " اللہ اور اس کے رسول ﷺ کا حق باہم لازم و ملزوم ہے ، نیز یہ کہ اللہ اور اس کے رسول کی حرمت کی جہت ایک ہی ہے ، لہذا جس نے رسول ﷺ کو ایذا دی اس نے اللہ کو ایذا دی اور جس نے رسولﷺ کی اطاعت کی اس نے اللہ کی اطاعت کی، اس لیے کہ امت کے تعلق باللہ کا رشتہ صرف رسول کے واسطہ سے استوار ہو سکتا ہے ۔ کسی کے پاس بھی اس کے سوا دوسرا کوئی طریقہ یا سبب نہیں ہے ، اوامر و نواہی اور اخبار و بیان میں اللہ نےرسول ﷺ کو اپنا قائم مقام مقرر کیا ہے ، اس لیے مذکورہ بالا امور میں اللہ اور رسول کے مابین تفریق جائز نہیں ۔[24]

چناچہ امام تقی الدین السبکی ؒ مذکورہ آیت کے حوالے سے فرماتے ہیں کہ :

والاذی فی حقہ و حق رسولہ کفر ، لان العذاب المھین انما یکون للکفار و کذالک القطع بالعذاب فی الدنیا و الاخرۃ انما یکون للکفار و کذاالعذاب الالیم "[25]

تر جمہ : اللہ تعالیٰ اور اس کے رسول کو ایذا دینا کفر ہے کیونکہ رسوائی کا عذاب صرف کفار ہی کے لیے ہوتا ہے ۔ اور اسی طرح آخرت میں عذاب کاقطعی فیصلہ صرف کفار ہی کے لیےہے اور اسی طرح دردناک عذاب کابھی ۔

اس آیت سے امام تیمیہؒنے گستاخ رسول کے کافر ہونے کا استدلال کیا ہے ۔کہتے ہیں :

"ولم یجئ اعداد العذاب المھین فی القرآن الا فی حق الکفار "۔۔۔۔ (الصارم المسلول : 46 )

ترجمہ : قرآن کریم میں صرف کفار کے لیے رسوائی کے عذاب کے تیار ہونے کی وعید آئی ہے۔[26]

حضرت قاضی ثناء اللہ پانی پتیؒ " تفسیر مظہری " میں مذکورہ آیت کی تشریح میں لکھتے ہیں "رسول اﷲ کی شخصیت ‘ دین ‘ نسب یا حضور (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کی کسی صفت پر طعن کرنا اور صراحۃً یا کنایۃً یا اشارۃً یا بطور تعریض آپ پر نکتہ چینی کرنا اور عیب نکالنا کفر ہے۔ ایسے شخص پر دونوں جہان کی لعنت ‘ دنیوی سزا سے اس کو توبہ بھی نہیں بچا سکتی"۔[27]

مولانا شبیر احمد عثمانی ؒ تفسیر عثمانی میں فرماتے ہیں ۔"اب بتلایا کہ اللہ و رسول کو ایذا دینے والے دنیا و آخرت میں ملعون و مطرود اور سخت رسواکن عذاب میں مبتلا ہوں گے۔ اللہ کو ستانا یہ ہی ہے کہ اس کے پیغمبروں کو ستائیں یا اس کی جناب میں نالائق باتیں کہیں" ۔[28]

ڈاکٹر محمود احمد غازی اپنی کتاب " قانون توہین رسالت " میں اس آیت کے تناظر میں کہتے ہیں کہ مفسرین اس آیت کے حوالے سے عذاب الٰہی سے مراد جہنم کا عذاب لیتے ہیں ،لیکن اس دنیا میں عذاب الٰہی سے مراد دنیاوی سزا ہے ۔مزید آیت کی وضاحت کرتے ہوئے لکھتے ہیں:

" 4 ہجری میں ایک یہودی قبیلے بنو نضیر نے مسلمانوں کے ساتھ شہریت کا معاہدہ کیا اور میثاق مدینہ پر دستخط کیے ۔ بعد ازاں انہوں نے اس میثاق کی خلاف ورزی کی اور مسلمانوں کے خلاف سازشوں کے جال بچھا دیے ۔چناچہ آنحضرت ﷺ نے انہیں سزا دی ، اور بالآخر انہیں جلا وطن کر دیا گیا ۔قرآن حکیم کی سورۃ الحشر ا س موقع پر نازل ہوئی فرمایا: وَلَوْلَآ اَنْ كَتَبَ اللّٰهُ عَلَيْهِمُ الْجَلَا ءَ ۗ لَعَذَّبَهُمْ فِي الدُّنْيَاۭ وَلَهُمْ فِي الْاٰخِرَةِ عَذَابُ النَّار۝ ذٰلِكَ بِاَنَّهُمْ شَاقُّوا اللّٰهَ وَرَسُوْلَهٗ ۚ وَمَنْ يُّشَاقِّ اللّٰهَ فَاِنَّ اللّٰهَ شَدِيْدُ الْعِقَاب۝ ترجمہ : اور اگر اللہ تعالیٰ نے ان پر جلا وطنی کو مقدر نہ کردیا ہوتا تو یقیناً دنیا میں ہی عذاب دیتااور آخرت میں (تو) ان کے لئے آگ کا عذاب ہے ہی۔ یہ اس لئے کہ انہوں نے اللہ تعالیٰ کی اور اس کے رسول کی مخالفت کی اور جو بھی اللہ کی مخالفت کرے گا تو اللہ تعالیٰ بھی سخت عذاب کرنے والا ہے"۔[29]

پنجم : سورۃالحجرات آیت 2

يٰٓاَيُّهَا الَّذِيْنَ اٰمَنُوْا لَا تَرْفَعُوْٓا اَصْوَاتَكُمْ فَوْقَ صَوْتِ النَّبِيِّ وَلَا تَجْـهَرُوْا لَهٗ بِالْقَوْلِ كَجَــهْرِ بَعْضِكُمْ لِبَعْضٍ اَنْ تَحْبَــطَ اَعْمَالُكُمْ وَاَنْتُمْ لَا تَشْعُرُوْنَĄ۝

ترجمہ : اے ایمان والو! اپنی آوازیں نبی کی آواز سےبلند نہ کرو اور نہ ان سے اونچی آواز سے بات کرو جیسے آپس میں ایک دوسرے سے کرتے ہو، کہیں (ایسا نہ ہو) کہ تمہارے اعمال اکارت جائیں اور تمہیں خبر نہ ہو ۔ (سورۃ الحجرات آیت 2)

اس آیت سے استدلال کرتے ہوئے امام ابن تیمیہ فرماتے ہیں :

"وجہ استدلال یہ ہے کہ اللہ نےان کو اس بات سے منع کیا کہ اپنی آوازوں کو نبی ﷺ کی آواز سے زیادہ بلند کریں یا اس طرح بآواز بلند ان سے مخاطب ہوں جیسے آپس میں ہوتے ہیں ۔ اس لیے کہ یہ رفع و جہر حبوطِ اعمال کا موجب بن سکتا ہے جبکہ آواز بلند کرنے والے کو پتہ بھی نہیں چلتا ۔اس آیت میں ترک جہر علّت یہ بیان کی گئی ہےحبط ِ اعمال سے سلامت رہے ۔ اس آیت میں جس خرابی کی نشاندہی کی گئی ہے وہ حبوطِ اعمال کا ہے اور جو چیز حبوطِ اعمال تک لے جا سکتی ہو اس کا ترک کرنا واجب ہے ۔ اور اعما ل کا حبط کفر کی وجہ سے ہوتا ہے ۔ " اس بات کو مزید وضاحت سے بیان کرتے ہوئے کہتے ہیں "جب یہ بات ثابت ہو گئی کہ نبی کی آوازسے آواز بلند کرنے سے اس بات کا اندیشہ ہے کہ وہ کافر ہو جائے اور اسے پتہ بھی نہ ہو اور اس وجہ سے اس کے اعمال بھی ضائع ہو جائیں اور یہ کہ رفع صوت حبوطِ اعمال کا سبب اور مظنّہ ہے تو اس سے معلوم ہوا کہ اس کی وجہ نبی اکرم ﷺ کی تعزیز و توقیر اور اکرام و اجلال ہے ،نیز اس لیے کہ نبی کی آواز پر آواز بلند کرنے سے انہیں ایذا پہنچتی ہے اور ساتھ ہی ان کی تحقیر بھی ہوتی ہے اگر چہ آواز بلند کرنے والے کا یہ ارادہ نہ ہو ۔ جب ایسی یذا اور تحقیر ، جو غیر شعوری طور پر گستاخی کی موجب ہوتی ہے ، کفر تک پہنچا دیتی ہے تو ایسی ایذا اورتحقیر جوارادی طور پر کی جائے اور وہ فاعل کا مقصود بھی ہو تو بطریق ِ اولیٰ کفرکی موجب ہو گی ۔"[30]

ششم : سورۃالنور آیت 63

لَا تَجْعَلُوْا دُعَاۗءَ الرَّسُوْلِ بَيْنَكُمْ كَدُعَاۗءِ بَعْضِكُمْ بَعْضًا ۭ قَدْ يَعْلَمُ اللّٰهُ الَّذِيْنَ يَتَسَلَّـلُوْنَ مِنْكُمْ لِوَاذًا ۚ فَلْيَحْذَرِ الَّذِيْنَ يُخَالِفُوْنَ عَنْ اَمْرِهٖٓ اَنْ تُصِيْبَهُمْ فِتْنَةٌ اَوْ يُصِيْبَهُمْ عَذَابٌ اَلِيْمٌ 63؀

ترجمہ : تم اللہ تعالیٰ کے نبی کے بلانے کو ایسا بلاوا نہ کرلو جیسا کہ آپس میں ایک دوسرے سے ہوتا ہے تم میں سے انھیں اللہ خوب جانتا ہے جو نظر بچا کر چپکے سے سرک جاتے ہیں (1) سنو جو لوگ حکم رسول کی مخالفت کرتے ہیں انھیں ڈرتے رہنا چاہیے کہ کہیں ان پر کوئی زبردست آفت نہ آپڑے یا انھیں دردناک عذاب نہ پہنچے۔(سورۃ النور آیت 63)

شیخ الاسلام امام ابن تیمیہ ؒاس آیت کی تشریح میں بیان کرتے ہیں کہ

"اس سے یہ بات معلوم ہوتی ہے کہ آپ کے حکم کی خلاف ورزی کفر یا عذابِ الیم تک پہنچانے والی ہے ، ظاہر ہے کہ عذاب تک پہنچانا محض فعلِ معصیت کی وجہ سے ہے اور کفر تک پہنچا نے کی وجہ یہ ہے کہ معصیت کے ساتھ ساتھ اس میں حکم دینے والے رسول (ﷺ ) کی تحقیر و استخفاف بھی شامل ہو جاتا ہے ، پھر اس فعل کی سزا کیا ہو گی جو اس سے شدیدتر ہے مثلاً : آپ ﷺ کو(نعوذباللہ) گالی دینا اور تحقیر کرنا وغیرہ" ۔[31]

ہفتم:سورۃ الاحزاب 53

وَمَا كَانَ لَكُمْ اَنْ تُــؤْذُوْا رَسُوْلَ اللّٰهِ وَلَآ اَنْ تَنْكِحُوْٓا اَزْوَاجَهٗ مِنْۢ بَعْدِهٖٓ اَبَدًا ۭ اِنَّ ذٰلِكُمْ كَانَ عِنْدَ اللّٰهِ عَظِيْمًا 53؀

رجمہ : اور نہ تمہیں جائز ہے کہ تم رسول اللہﷺ کو تکلیف دو اور نہ تمہیں یہ حلال ہے کہ آپ کے بعد کسی وقت بھی آپ کی بیویوں سے نکاح کرو ۔یاد رکھو اللہ کے نزدیک یہ بہت بڑا گناہ ہے۔(سورۃ الاحزاب 53)

امام ابن تیمیہ ؒ اس آیات کی تفہیم میں کہتے ہیں :

"اس آیت میں امت پر ہمیشہ کے لیے نبی کی بیویوں کو حرام قرار دیا گیا کیونکہ اس سے آپ ﷺ کو ایذا پہنچتی ہے ، پھر اس کی حرمت کی عظمت کی وجہ سے اس کو اللہ کے نزدیک عظیم جرم قرار دیا گیا ۔ جو شخص آپ ﷺ کی بیویوں یا لونڈیوں کے ساتھ نکاح کرے تو اس کی سزا قتل ہے ۔ یہ حرمت نبویؐ کو توڑنے کی سزا ہے تو قیاس بریں نبیؐ کو (نعوذباللہ)گالیاں دینے والا بالاولیٰ اس سزا کا مستحق ہے ۔ "[32]

ہشتم : سورۃ النساء آیت 65

فَلَا وَرَبِّكَ لَا يُؤْمِنُوْنَ حَتّٰي يُحَكِّمُوْكَ فِيْمَا شَجَــرَ بَيْنَھُمْ ثُمَّ لَا يَجِدُوْا فِيْٓ اَنْفُسِہِمْ حَرَجًا مِّمَّا قَضَيْتَ وَيُسَلِّمُوْا تَسْلِــيْمًا۝۶۵

ترجمہ : سو قسم ہے تیرے پروردگار کی! یہ مومن نہیں ہو سکتے جب تک کہ تمام آپس کے اختلاف میں آپ کو حاکم نہ مان لیں، پھر جو فیصلے آپ ان میں کر دیں ان سے اپنے دل میں کسی طرح کی تنگی اور ناخوشی نہ پائیں اور فرمانبرداری کے ساتھ قبول کرلیں ۔ (النساء -65)

نہم :سورۃ الحشر آیت 3،4

وَلَوْلَآ اَنْ كَتَبَ اللہُ عَلَيْہِمُ الْجَلَاۗءَ لَعَذَّبَہُمْ فِي الدُّنْيَا۝۰ۭ وَلَہُمْ فِي الْاٰخِرَۃِ عَذَابُ النَّارِ۝۳ذٰلِكَ بِاَنَّہُمْ شَاۗقُّوا اللہَ وَرَسُوْلَہٗ۝۰ۚ وَمَنْ يُّشَاۗقِّ اللہَ فَاِنَّ اللہَ شَدِيْدُ الْعِقَابِ۝۴

ترجمہ : اور اگر اللہ تعالیٰ نے ان پر جلا وطنی کو مقدر نہ کر دیا ہوتا تو یقیناً دنیا میں ہی عذاب دیتا اور آخرت میں (تو) ان کے لئے آگ کا عذاب ہے ہی۔یہ اس لئے کہ انہوں نے اللہ تعالیٰ کی اور اس کے رسول (ﷺ)کی مخالفت کی اور جو بھی اللہ کی مخالفت کرے گا تو اللہ تعالیٰ بھی سخت عذاب کرنے والا ہے۔

دہم :سورۃ المجادلہ آیت 5

اِنَّ الَّذِيْنَ يُحَاۗدُّوْنَ اللہَ وَرَسُوْلَہٗ كُبِتُوْا كَـمَا كُبِتَ الَّذِيْنَ مِنْ قَبْلِہِمْ وَقَدْ اَنْزَلْنَآ اٰيٰتٍؚبَيِّنٰتٍ۝۰ۭ وَلِلْكٰفِرِيْنَ عَذَابٌ مُّہِيْنٌ۝۵ۚ

ترجمہ : بیشک جو لوگ اللہ اور اس کے رسول کی مخالفت کرتے ہیں وہ ذلیل کئے جائیں گے جیسے ان سے پہلے کے لوگ ذلیل کئے گئے تھے اور بیشک ہم واضح آیتیں اتار چکے ہیں اور کافروں کے لئے تو ذلت والا عذاب ہے۔

| | | --- | | |

8۔ شریعت کے دوسرے ماخذ یعنی احادیثِ رسول ﷺ او ر سنت مطہرہ سے متعدد واقعات اور اقوال رسول ﷺ اور صریح احکامات و ہدایات سے یہ بات اظہر من الشمس ہے کہ

رسالت مآب ﷺ نے خود ایسے لوگوں کے قتل کا حکم صادر کیا جنکی اہانت کے رویے سے آپ ﷺ کو تکلیف و اذیت پہنچی اور ذخیرہ حدیث سے ایسے واقعات بھی ملتے ہیں کہ اگر کسی صحابی نے شاتم رسول کو قتل کیا تو آپ ﷺ نے اُس کے خون کو ہدر(رائگاں) قرار دیا ۔ ذخیرہ احادیث سے ایسے ناقابل تردید شواہد اس امر کی غمازی کرتے ہیں کہ دین اسلام کی حفاظت ،مقصد الٰہی کی تکمیل ، شریعت الٰہی کے دائمی و ابدی اظہار اور پیغمبر ِخدا کی ناموس کی پاسداری کی غرض سے

رحمۃ اللعالمینﷺ کو خود بھی ایسے شوریدہ سر ، فسادی اور شیطانی عناصر کا قلع قمع کرنا پڑا ، تو اس سے دریغ نہیں کیا گیا تاکہ نبی مہربان ﷺ کی ذات جو انسانیت کے لیے معلم و مربی ہے ، ایسی شر انگیزیوں سے ہر دور ، ہر زمانہ میں محفوظ رہ سکے ۔ اس سلسلے میں وارد ہونے والی احادیث اور واقعات سیرت میں سے چند درج ذیل ہیں:۔

i۔حَدَّثَنَا عَبَّادُ بْنُ مُوسَى الْخُتَّلِيُّ أَخْبَرَنَا إِسْمَعِيلُ بْنُ جَعْفَرٍ الْمَدَنِيُّ عَنْ إِسْرَائِيلَ عَنْ عثْمَانَ الشَّحَّامِ عَنْ عِكْرِمَةَ قَالَ حَدَّثَنَا ابْنُ عَباسٍ أَنَّ أَعْمَى كَانَتْ لَهُ أُمُّ وَلَدٍ تَشْتُمُ النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَتَقَعُ فِيهِ فَيَنْهَاهَا فَلَا تَنْتَهِي وَيَزْجُرُهَا فَلَا تَنْزَجِرُ قَالَ فَلَمَّا كَانَتْ ذَاتَ لَيْلَةٍ جَعَلَتْ تَقَعُ فِي النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَتَشْتُمُهُ فَأَخَذَ الْمِغْوَلَ فَوَضَعَهُ فِي بَطْنِهَا وَاتَّكَأَ عَلَيْهَا فَقَتَلَهَا فَوَقَعَ بَيْنَ رِجْلَيْهَا طِفْلٌ فَلَطَّخَتْ مَا هُنَاكَ بِالدَّمِ فَلَمَّا أَصْبَحَ ذُكِرَ ذَلِكَ لِرَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَجَمَعَ النَّاسَ فَقَالَ أَنْشُدُ اللَّهَ رَجُلًا فَعَلَ مَا فَعَلَ لِي عَلَيْهِ حَقٌّ إِلَّا قَامَ فَقَامَ الْأَعْمَى يَتَخَطَّى النَّاسَ وَهُوَ يَتَزَلْزَلُ حَتَّى قَعَدَ بَيْنَ يَدَيْ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَقَالَ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ أَنَا صَاحِبُهَا كَانَتْ تَشْتُمُكَ وَتَقَعُ فِيكَ فَأَنْهَاهَا فَلَا تَنْتَهِي وَأَزْجُرُهَا فَلَا تَنْزَجِرُ وَلِي مِنْهَا ابْنَانِ مِثْلُ اللُّؤْلُؤَتَيْنِ وَكَانَتْ بِي رَفِيقَةً فَلَمَّا كَانَ الْبَارِحَةَ جَعَلَتْ تَشْتُمُكَ وَتَقَعُ فِيكَ فَأَخَذْتُ الْمِغْوَلَ فَوَضَعْتُهُ فِي بَطْنِهَا وَاتَّكَأْتُ عَلَيْهَا حَتَّى قَتَلْتُهَا فَقَالَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَلَا اشْهَدُوا أَنَّ دَمَهَا هَدَرٌ

عباد بن موسیٰ ختلی، اسماعیل بن جعفر مدنی، اسرائیل، عثمان اشحام، عکرمہ، حضرت عبداللہ بن عباس (رضی اللہ عنہما) سے مروی ہے کہ ایک اندھے کی ام ولد (وہ باندی جس نے مالک کا بچہ جنا ہو) رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کو برا بھلا کہا کرتی تھی اور آپ کی برائی میں (نَعُوذُ بِاللہ) مشغول رہتی تھی۔ وہ اندھا اسے اس سے منع کرتا تھا تو وہ باز نہ آتی تھی اور وہ اسے ڈانٹتا تھا لیکن وہ اس کی ڈانٹ نہیں سنتی تھی۔ راوی کہتے ہیں کہ ایک رات جب وہ رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کی ہجو میں پڑی تھی اور آپ کو برا بھلا کہہ رہی تھی تو اس کے اندھے مالک نے خنجر لیا اور اس کے پیٹ پر رکھ دیا اور اس پر تکیہ لگا لیا۔ اور اسے قتل کردیا۔ اس عورت کی ٹانگوں کے درمیان بچہ پڑا ہوا تھا تو وہ وہاں پر خون سے لتھڑ گیا صبح کو جب رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کے سامنے اس کا تذکرہ ہوا تو آپ نے لوگوں کو جمع کیا اور کہا کہ میں اس شخص کو جس نے اپنے اوپر میرا حق رکھتے ہوئے یہ فعل کیا ہے اللہ کی قسم دیتا ہوں کہ وہ کھڑا ہوجائے تو وہ اندھا کھڑا ہوگیا اور لوگوں کی گردنیں پھلانگتا لرزتا کانپتا ہوا آیا اور رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کے سامنے بیٹھ گیا اور کہا کہ یا رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) میں اس عورت کا ساتھی ہوں وہ آپ کو برا بھلا کہتی تھی اور آپ کی برائی میں پڑی رہا کرتی تھی میں اسے منع بھی کرتا تھا تو وہ باز نہ آئی تھی اور اسے ڈانٹا ڈپٹا تو اس پر اس کا کوئی اثر نہ ہوا اور اس سے میرے دو موتیوں جیسے بیٹے ہیں اور وہ میری بڑی اچھی ساتھی تھی گذشتہ

رات وہ آپ کو برا بھلا کہنے لگی اور آپ کے بارے میں ایسی ویسی بات کہنے لگی تو میں نے خنجر

لے کر اس کے پیٹ پر رکھا اور اس پر تکیہ لگا دیا۔ (زور لگایا) یہاں تک کہ میں نے اسے قتل کردیا رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے فرمایا کہ خبردار گواہ رہو اس کا خون ہدر (بیکار اور لغو ہے اس کا قصاص نہیں لیا جائے گا۔ [33]

ii۔حَدَّثَنَا مُوسَى بْنُ إِسْمَعِيلَ حَدَّثَنَا حَمَّادٌ عَنْ يُونُسَ عَنْ حُمَيْدِ بْنِ هِلَالٍ عَنْ النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ ح و حَدَّثَنَا هَارُونُ بْنُ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ وَنُصَيْرُ بْنُ الْفَرَجِ قَالَا حَدَّثَنَا أَبُو أُسَامَةَ عَنْ يَزِيدَ بْنِ زُرَيْعٍ عَنْ يُونُسَ بْنِ عُبَيْدٍ عَنْ حُمَيْدِ بْنِ هِلَالٍ عَنْ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ مُطَرِّفٍ عَنْ أَبِي بَرْزَةَ قَالَ كُنْتُ عِنْدَ أَبِي بَكْرٍ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ فَتَغَيَّظَ عَلَى رَجُلٍ فَاشْتَدَّ عَلَيْهِ فَقُلْتُ تَأْذَنُ لِي يَا خَلِيفَةَ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَضْرِبُ عُنُقَهُ قَالَ فَأَذْهَبَتْ كَلِمَتِي غَضَبَهُ فَقَامَ فَدَخَلَ فَأَرْسَلَ إِلَيَّ فَقَالَ مَا الَّذِي قُلْتَ آنِفًا قُلْتُ ائْذَنْ لِي أَضْرِبُ عُنُقَهُ قَالَ أَكُنْتَ فَاعِلًا لَوْ أَمَرْتُكَ قُلْتُ نَعَمْ قَالَ لَا وَاللَّهِ مَا كَانَتْ لِبَشَرٍ بَعْدَ مُحَمَّدٍ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ أَبُو دَاوُد هَذَا لَفْظُ يَزِيدَ قَالَ أَحْمَدُ بْنُ حَنْبَلٍ أَيْ لَمْ يَكُنْ لِأَبِي بَكْرٍ أَنْ يَقْتُلَ رَجُلًا إِلَّا بِإِحْدَى الثَّلَاثِ الَّتِي قَالَهَا رَسُولُ اللَّه صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ كُفْرٌ بَعْدَ إِيمَانٍ أَوْ زِنًا بَعْدَ إِحْصَانٍ أَوْ قَتْلُ نَفْسٍ بِغَيْرَ نَفْسٍ وَكَانَ لِلنَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَنْ يَقْتُلَ

موسٰی بن اسماعیل، حماد، یونس، حمید بن ہل، ہارون بن عبداللہ ، نصیر بن فرج، ابواسامہ، یزید بن زریح، یونس بن عبید، حمید بن ہلال، عبداللہ بن مطرف، حضرت ابوبرزہ ؓ ،الاسلمی ؓ فرماتے ہیں کہ میں ایک مرتبہ حضرت ابوبکر صدیق ؓ کے پاس ان کے زمانہ خلافت میں بیٹھا ہوا تھا پس وہ کسی آدمی پر غضبناک ہو گئے اور اسے سخت سست کہا میں نے عرض کیا اے رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کے خلیفہ آپ مجھے اجازت دیتے ہیں کہ میں اس کی گردن ماردوں؟ ابوبرزہ کہتے ہیں کہ میرے اس جملہ سے ان کا غصہ جاتا رہا اور وہ کھڑے ہو کر گھر کے اندر داخل ہوگئے اور مجھے بلابھیجا اور فرمایا کہ تم نے ابھی کیا کہا تھا میں نے کہا کہ مجھے اجازت دیں تو اس کی گردن ماردوں؟ فرمایا کہ اگر میں تمہیں اس کا حکم دیتا تو کیا تم ایسا کر دیتے؟ میں نے کہا جی ہاں۔ فرمایا کہ اللہ کی قسم محمد (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کے بعد کسی فرد بشر کے لئے کسی کو قتل نہیں کیا جاسکتا (برابھلا کہنے پر) امام ابوداؤد فرماتے ہیں کہ یہ الفاظ یزید بن زریع کے ہیں۔

iii۔ حَدَّثَنَا عُثْمَانُ بْنُ أَبِي شَيْبَةَ وَعَبْدُ اللَّهِ بْنُ الْجَرَّاحِ عَنْ جَرِيرٍ عَنْ مُغِيرَةَ عَنْ الشَّعْبِيِّ عَنْ عَلِيٍّ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ أَنَّ يَهُودِيَّةً كَانَتْ تَشْتُمُ النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَتَقَعُ فِيهِ فَخَنَقَهَا رَجُلٌ حَتَّى مَاتَتْ فَأَبْطَلَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ دَمَهَا۔ [34]

عثمان بن ابوشیبہ، عبداللہ بن جراح، جریر، مغیرہ، شعبی، حضرت علی ؓ فرماتے ہیں کہ ایک یہود عورت رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کو برا بھلا کہتی تھی اور آپ کی برائی میں پڑی رہتی تھی ایک آدمی نے اس کا گلا گھونٹ دیا حتی کہ وہ مر گئی اور رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے اس (عورت) کا خون ہدر (ضائع) قرار دے دیا۔

iv۔ حَدَّثَنَا عُثْمَانُ بْنُ أَبِي شَيْبَةَ قَالَ حَدَّثَنَا أَحْمَدُ بْنُ الْمُفَضَّلِ قَالَ حَدَّثَنَا أَسْبَاطُ بْنُ نَصْرٍ قَالَ زَعَمَ السُّدِّيُّ عَنْ مُصْعَبِ بْنِ سَعْدٍ عَنْ سَعْدٍ قَالَ لَمَّا كَانَ يَوْمُ فَتْحِ مَكَّةَ أَمَّنَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ النَّاسَ إِلَّا أَرْبَعَةَ نَفَرٍ وَامْرَأَتَيْنِ وَسَمَّاهُمْ وَابْنُ أَبِي سَرْحٍ فَذَكَرَ الْحَدِيثَ قَالَ وَأَمَّا ابْنُ أَبِي سَرْحٍ فَإِنَّهُ اخْتَبَأَ عِنْدَ عُثْمَانَ بْنِ عَفَّانَ فَلَمَّا دَعَا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ النَّاسَ إِلَى الْبَيْعَةِ جَاءَ بِهِ حَتَّى أَوْقَفَهُ عَلَى رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَقَالَ يَا نَبِيَّ اللَّهِ بَايِعْ عَبْدَ اللَّهِ فَرَفَعَ رَأْسَهُ فَنَظَرَ إِلَيْهِ ثَلَاثًا كُلُّ ذَلِكَ يَأْبَى فَبَايَعَهُ بَعْدَ ثَلَاثٍ ثُمَّ أَقْبَلَ عَلَى أَصْحَابِهِ فَقَالَ أَمَا كَانَ فِيكُمْ رَجُلٌ رَشِيدٌ يَقُومُ إِلَى هَذَا حَيْثُ رَآنِي كَفَفْتُ يَدِي عَنْ بَيْعَتِهِ فَيَقْتُلُهُ فَقَالُوا مَا نَدْرِي يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ مَا فِي نَفْسِكَ أَلَا أَوْمَأْتَ إِلَيْنَا بِعَيْنِكَ قَالَ إِنَّهُ لَا يَنْبَغِي لِنَبِيٍّ أَنْ تَكُونَ لَهُ خَائِنَةُ الْأَعْيُنِ قَالَ أَبُو دَاوُد كَانَ عَبْدُ اللَّهِ أَخَا عُثْمَانَ مِنْ الرِّضَاعَةِ وَكَانَ الْوَلِيدُ بْنُ عُقْبَةَ أَخَا عُثْمَانَ لِأُمِّهِ وَضَرَبَهُ عُثْمَانُ الْحَدَّ إِذْ شَرِبَ الْخَمْرَ۔

عثمان بن ابی شیبہ، احمد بن مفضل، اسباط بن نصر، سدی، مصعب بن سعد، حضرت سعد سے روایت ہے کہ جب فتح مکہ کا دن آیا تو رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے تمام لوگوں کو امن دیا مگر چار مردوں اور عورتوں کو اس سے مستثنی رکھا۔ راوی نے ان کے نام ذکر کئے جن میں ابن سرح کا نام بھی تھا پس ابن سرح تو عثمانؓ بن عفان کے پاس چھپ رہے (یہ حضرت عثمانؓ کے رضاعی بھائی تھے) جب رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے لوگوں کو بیعت کے لئے بلایا تو حضرت عثمان ؓ نے بن سرح کو آپﷺ کے سامنے لا کھڑا کیا اور بولے اے اللہ کے نبی ﷺعبداللہ سے بیعت لے لیجئے آپ ﷺنے سر اٹھا کر اس کی طرف دیکھا اور بیعت نہ کی اور تین مرتبہ آپ ﷺنے ایسا ہی کیا تین مرتبہ انکار کرنے کے بعد آپ ﷺنے بیعت لی اور اپنے اصحاب ؓسے فرمایا کیا تم میں کوئی بھی اتنا سمجھدار نہ تھا کہ جب میں نے اس کی بیعت لینے سے ہاتھ کھینچ لیا اور بیعت نہ کی تو اس کو قتل کر ڈالتا صحابہؓ نے عرض کیا یا رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) ہم نہیں سمجھ پائے کہ آپﷺ کے دل میں کیا ہے اگر آپﷺ آنکھ سے بھی اشارہ کر دیتے تو ہم اس کو قتل کر ڈالتے رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے فرمایا نبی کے لئے آنکھوں کی خیانت جائز نہیں (یعنی نبی کیلئے یہ مناسب نہیں ہے کہ وہ چپکے چپکے آنکھوں سے اشارے کنائے کرے) ابوداد ؒ کہتے ہیں کہ ابن سرح حضرت عثمان ؓکارضاعی بھائی تھا اور ولید بن عقبہ ان کا اخیافی بھائی تھا اس نے شراب پی تو حضرت عثمانؓ نے اس پر حد جاری فرمائی۔ [35]

v۔ حَدَّثَنَا عَلِيُّ بْنُ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ حَدَّثَنَا سُفْيَانُ قَالَ عَمْرٌو سَمِعْتُ جَابِرَ بْنَ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُمَا يَقُولُ قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ مَنْ لِكَعْبِ بْنِ الْأَشْرَفِ فَإِنَّهُ قَدْ آذَى اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ فَقَامَ مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ مَسْلَمَةَ فَقَالَ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ أَتُحِبُّ أَنْ أَقْتُلَهُ قَالَ نَعَمْ قَالَ فَأْذَنْ لِي أَنْ أَقُولَ شَيْئًا قَالَ قُلْ فَأَتَاهُ مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ مَسْلَمَةَ فَقَالَ إِنَّ هَذَا الرَّجُلَ قَدْ سَأَلَنَا صَدَقَةً وَإِنَّهُ قَدْ عَنَّانَا وَإِنِّي قَدْ أَتَيْتُكَ أَسْتَسْلِفُكَ قَالَ وَأَيْضًا وَاللَّهِ لَتَمَلُّنَّهُ قَالَ إِنَّا قَدْ اتَّبَعْنَاهُ فَلَا نُحِبُّ أَنْ نَدَعَهُ حَتَّى نَنْظُرَ إِلَى أَيِّ شَيْءٍ يَصِيرُ شَأْنُهُ وَقَدْ أَرَدْنَا أَنْ تُسْلِفَنَا وَسْقًا أَوْ وَسْقَيْنِ وَحَدَّثَنَا عَمْرٌو غَيْرَ مَرَّةٍ فَلَمْ يَذْكُرْ وَسْقًا أَوْ وَسْقَيْنِ أَوْ فَقُلْتُ لَهُ فِيهِ وَسْقًا أَوْ وَسْقَيْنِ فَقَالَ أُرَى فِيهِ وَسْقًا أَوْ وَسْقَيْنِ فَقَالَ نَعَمِ ارْهَنُونِي قَالُوا أَيَّ شَيْءٍ تُرِيدُ قَالَ ارْهَنُونِي نِسَاءَكُمْ قَالُوا كَيْفَ نَرْهَنُكَ نِسَاءَنَا وَأَنْتَ أَجْمَلُ الْعَرَبِ قَالَ فَارْهَنُونِي أَبْنَاءَكُمْ قَالُوا كَيْفَ نَرْهَنُكَ أَبْنَاءَنَا فَيُسَبُّ أَحَدُهُمْ فَيُقَالُ رُهِنَ بِوَسْقٍ أَوْ وَسْقَيْنِ هَذَا عَارٌ عَلَيْنَا وَلَكِنَّا نَرْهَنُكَ اللَّأْمَةَ قَالَ سُفْيَانُ يَعْنِي السِّلَاحَ فَوَاعَدَهُ أَنْ يَأْتِيَهُ فَجَاءَهُ لَيْلًا وَمَعَهُ أَبُو نَائِلَةَ وَهُوَ أَخُو كَعْبٍ مِنْ الرَّضَاعَةِ فَدَعَاهُمْ إِلَى الْحِصْنِ فَنَزَلَ إِلَيْهِمْ فَقَالَتْ لَهُ امْرَأَتُهُ أَيْنَ تَخْرُجُ هَذِهِ السَّاعَةَ فَقَالَ إِنَّمَا هُوَ مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ مَسْلَمَةَ وَأَخِي أَبُو نَائِلَةَ وَقَالَ غَيْرُ عَمْرٍو قَالَتْ أَسْمَعُ صَوْتًا كَأَنَّهُ يَقْطُرُ مِنْهُ الدَّمُ قَالَ إِنَّمَا هُوَ أَخِي مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ مَسْلَمَةَ وَرَضِيعِي أَبُو نَائِلَةَ إِنَّ الْكَرِيمَ لَوْ دُعِيَ إِلَى طَعْنَةٍ بِلَيْلٍ لَأَجَابَ قَالَ وَيُدْخِلُ مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ مَسْلَمَةَ مَعَهُ رَجُلَيْنِ قِيلَ لِسُفْيَانَ سَمَّاهُمْ عَمْرٌو قَالَ سَمَّى بَعْضَهُمْ قَالَ عَمْرٌو جَاءَ مَعَهُ بِرَجُلَيْنِ وَقَالَ غَيْرُ عَمْرٍو أَبُو عَبْسِ بْنُ جَبْرٍ وَالْحَارِثُ بْنُ أَوْسٍ وَعَبَّادُ بْنُ بِشْرٍ قَالَ عَمْرٌو جَاءَ مَعَهُ بِرَجُلَيْنِ فَقَالَ إِذَا مَا جَاءَ فَإِنِّي قَائِلٌ بِشَعَرِهِ فَأَشَمُّهُ فَإِذَا رَأَيْتُمُونِي اسْتَمْكَنْتُ مِنْ رَأْسِهِ فَدُونَكُمْ فَاضْرِبُوهُ وَقَالَ مَرَّةً ثُمَّ أُشِمُّكُمْ فَنَزَلَ إِلَيْهِمْ مُتَوَشِّحًا وَهُوَ يَنْفَحُ مِنْهُ رِيحُ الطِّيبِ فَقَالَ مَا رَأَيْتُ كَالْيَوْمِ رِيحًا أَيْ أَطْيَبَ وَقَالَ غَيْرُ عَمْرٍو قَالَ عِنْدِي أَعْطَرُ نِسَاءِ الْعَرَبِ وَأَكْمَلُ الْعَرَبِ قَالَ عَمْرٌو فَقَالَ أَتَأْذَنُ لِي أَنْ أَشُمَّ رَأْسَكَ قَالَ نَعَمْ فَشَمَّهُ ثُمَّ أَشَمَّ أَصْحَابَهُ ثُمَّ قَالَ أَتَأْذَنُ لِي قَالَ نَعَمْ فَلَمَّا اسْتَمْكَنَ مِنْهُ قَالَ دُونَكُمْ فَقَتَلُوهُ ثُمَّ أَتَوْا النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَأَخْبَرُوهُ

علی بن عبداللہ، سفیان، عمرو بن دینار سے روایت کرتے ہیں کہ میں نے جابرؓ بن عبداللہ سے سنا کہ آنحضرت (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے صحابہ کرام ؓسے فرمایا کعب بن اشرف یہودی کا کام کون تمام کرتا ہے اس نے اللہ اور رسول(ﷺ) کو بہت ستا رکھا ہے محمد بن مسلمہ انصاری نے کھڑے ہو کر کہا یا رسول اللہ! اگر آپ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) مجھے اجازت دیں تو میں اس کام کو انجام دوں آپ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے فرمایا اجازت ہے محمد بن مسلمہ نے کہا مجھے یہ بھی اجازت دے دیجئے کہ جو مناسب سمجھوں وہ باتیں اس سے کہوں آپ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے اجازت دی غرض محمد بن مسلمہ، کعب بن اشرف کے پاس آئے تو کہا کہ یہ شخص محمد بن عبداللہ ہم سے زکوٰۃ مانگتا ہے ہمارے پاس خود نہیں اور یہ ہم کو ستاتا ہے کعب نے کہا ابھی کیا دیکھا ہے واللہ یہ آگے چل کر تم کو بہت ستائے گا محمد بن مسلمہ نے کہا خیر ابھی تو ہم نے اس کی پیروی کرلی ہے فورا چھوڑنا بھی ٹھیک نہیں دیکھتے ہیں کہ آگے کیا ہوتا ہے اس وقت میں تمہارے پاس اس لئے آیا ہوں کہ ایک یا دو وسق کھجوریں ہم کو قرض دے دو سفیان کہتے ہیں کہ عمرو بن دینار نے ہم کو کئی مرتبہ حدیث سنائی تو اس میں ایک وسق یا دو وسق کا ذکر نہیں کیا جب میں نے یاد دلایا تو کہنے لگے کہ ہاں میرا خیال ہے کہ ہوگا غرض کعب نے کہا قرض مل جائے گا کچھ رہن رکھ دو میں نے کہا کیا رہن رکھ دوں کعب نے کہا کہ اپنی عورتوں کو رہن رکھ دو، محمد بن مسلمہ نے کہا یہ کیسے ہوسکتا ہے ہم عورتوں کو کس طرح رہن کردیں سارے عرب میں تم خوبصورت ہو! اس نے کہا اپنے بیٹے رہن رکھ دو میں نے کہا تمہارے پاس بیٹوں کو کیسے رہن رکھ دیں آئندہ جو ان سے لڑے گا وہ طعنہ دے گا کہ تو ایک یا دو وسق میں رہن رکھا گیا ہے اور اس کو ہم برا سمجھتے ہیں البتہ ہم اپنے ہتھیار رکھ سکتے ہیں سفیان نے لفظ لامہ کی تفسیر سلاح یعنی ہتھیار سے کی ہے محمد بن مسلمہ نے کعب سے دوبارہ ملنے کا وعدہ کیا اور چلے گئے رات کو دوبارہ آئے اور ابونائلہ کو ساتھ لائے جو کعب کا دودھ شریک بھائی تھا کعب نے ان کو قلعہ میں بلا لیا اور پھر ان کے پاس نیچے آنے لگا اس کی بیوی نے کہا اس وقت کہاں جاتے ہو؟ کعب نے کہا یہ محمد بن مسلمہ اور ابونائلہ میرا بھائی ہے جو بلاتے ہیں سفیان کہتے ہیں کہ عمرو بن دینار کے سوا اور لوگوں نے اس حدیث میں اتنا اور زیادہ کیا ہے کہ کعب کی بیوی نے یہ بھی کہا کہ اس کی آواز سے تو خون کی بو آرہی ہے یا خون ٹپک رہا ہے کعب نے کہا کچھ نہیں میرا بھائی ابونائلہ اور محمد بن مسلمہ ہیں

اور شریف آدمی کو تو رات کے وقت بھی اگر نیزہ مارنے کے لیے بلائیں تو جانا چاہئے اور محمد بن مسلمہ اپنے ساتھ دو آدمیوں کو اور لائے تھے سفیان سے پوچھا گیا کہ عمرو نے ان کا نام لیا تھا؟ انہوں نے کہا بعض کا لیا تھا مگر دوسروں نے ابوعبس بن جبر اور حارث بن اوس اور عبادہ بن بشر لیا تھا عمرو نے اتنا ہی کہا محمد بن مسلمہ اپنے ساتھیوں کو کہنے لگے کہ کعب جب آئے گا تو میں اس کے سر کے بال تھام کر سونگھوں گا، جب تم دیکھو کہ میں نے مضبوط تھام لیا ہے تو تم اپنا کام کر ڈالنا غرض کعب چادر اوڑھے ہوئے اترا اس کے جسم سے خوشبو مہک رہی تھی محمد بن مسلمہ نے کہا میں نے آج تک ایسی خوشبو نہیں دیکھی جو ہوا میں بسی ہوئی ہے عمرو کے علاوہ دوسرے راوی کہتے ہیں کہ کعب نے جواب میں کہا کہ اس وقت میرے پاس ایسی عورت ہے جو سب عورتوں سے زیادہ معطر رہتی ہے اور حسن و جمال میں بھی بےنظیر ہے عمرو کہتے ہیں کہ محمد بن مسلمہ نے پوچھا کیا سر سونگھنے کی اجازت ہے؟ اس نے کہا ہاں محمد بن مسلمہ نے خود بھی سونگھا اور ساتھیوں کو بھی سونگھایا پھر دوبارہ اجازت لے کر سونگھا اور زور سے تھام لیا اور ساتھیوں سے کہا ہاں اس کو لو! انہوں نے فورا کام تمام کردیا اور پھر آپ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کی خدمت میں حاضر ہو کر قتل کعب کی خوشخبری سنائی۔ [36]

vi۔ حَدَّثَنَا يُوسُفُ بْنُ مُوسَى حَدَّثَنَا عُبَيْدُ اللَّهِ بْنُ مُوسَى عَنْ إِسْرَائِيلَ عَنْ أَبِي إِسْحَاقَ عَنْ الْبَرَاءِ بْنِ عَازِبٍ قَالَ بَعَثَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ إِلَى أَبِي رَافِعٍ الْيَهُودِيِّ رِجَالًا مِنْ الْأَنْصَارِ فَأَمَّرَ عَلَيْهِمْ عَبْدَ اللَّهِ بْنَ عَتِيكٍ وَكَانَ أَبُو رَافِعٍ يُؤْذِي رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ وَيُعِينُ عَلَيْهِ وَكَانَ فِي حِصْنٍ لَهُ بِأَرْضِ الْحِجَازِ فَلَمَّا دَنَوْا مِنْهُ وَقَدْ غَرَبَتْ الشَّمْسُ وَرَاحَ النَّاسُ بِسَرْحِهِمْ فَقَالَ عَبْدُ اللَّهِ لِأَصْحَابِهِ اجْلِسُوا مَكَانَكُمْ فَإِنِّي مُنْطَلِقٌ وَمُتَلَطِّفٌ لِلْبَوَّابِ لَعَلِّي أَنْ أَدْخُلَ فَأَقْبَلَ حَتَّى دَنَا مِنْ الْبَابِ ثُمَّ تَقَنَّعَ بِثَوْبِهِ كَأَنَّهُ يَقْضِي حَاجَةً وَقَدْ دَخَلَ النَّاسُ فَهَتَفَ بِهِ الْبَوَّابُ يَا عَبْدَ اللَّهِ إِنْ كُنْتَ تُرِيدُ أَنْ تَدْخُلَ فَادْخُلْ فَإِنِّي أُرِيدُ أَنْ أُغْلِقَ الْبَابَ فَدَخَلْتُ فَكَمَنْتُ فَلَمَّا دَخَلَ النَّاسُ أَغْلَقَ الْبَابَ ثُمَّ عَلَّقَ الْأَغَالِيقَ عَلَى وَتَدٍ قَالَ فَقُمْتُ إِلَى الْأَقَالِيدِ فَأَخَذْتُهَا فَفَتَحْتُ الْبَابَ وَكَانَ أَبُو رَافِعٍ يُسْمَرُ عِنْدَهُ وَكَانَ فِي عَلَالِيَّ لَهُ فَلَمَّا ذَهَبَ عَنْهُ أَهْلُ سَمَرِهِ صَعِدْتُ إِلَيْهِ فَجَعَلْتُ كُلَّمَا فَتَحْتُ بَابًا أَغْلَقْتُ عَلَيَّ مِنْ دَاخِلٍ قُلْتُ إِنْ الْقَوْمُ نَذِرُوا بِي لَمْ يَخْلُصُوا إِلَيَّ حَتَّى أَقْتُلَهُ فَانْتَهَيْتُ إِلَيْهِ فَإِذَا هُوَ فِي بَيْتٍ مُظْلِمٍ وَسْطَ عِيَالِهِ لَا أَدْرِي أَيْنَ هُوَ مِنْ الْبَيْتِ فَقُلْتُ يَا أَبَا رَافِعٍ قَالَ مَنْ هَذَا فَأَهْوَيْتُ نَحْوَ الصَّوْتِ فَأَضْرِبُهُ ضَرْبَةً بِالسَّيْفِ وَأَنَا دَهِشٌ فَمَا أَغْنَيْتُ شَيْئًا وَصَاحَ فَخَرَجْتُ مِنْ الْبَيْتِ فَأَمْكُثُ غَيْرَ بَعِيدٍ ثُمَّ دَخَلْتُ إِلَيْهِ فَقُلْتُ مَا هَذَا الصَّوْتُ يَا أَبَا رَافِعٍ فَقَالَ لِأُمِّكَ الْوَيْلُ إِنَّ رَجُلًا فِي الْبَيْتِ ضَرَبَنِي قَبْلُ بِالسَّيْفِ قَالَ فَأَضْرِبُهُ ضَرْبَةً أَثْخَنَتْهُ وَلَمْ أَقْتُلْهُ ثُمَّ وَضَعْتُ ظِبَةَ السَّيْفِ فِي بَطْنِهِ حَتَّى أَخَذَ فِي ظَهْرِهِ فَعَرَفْتُ أَنِّي قَتَلْتُهُ فَجَعَلْتُ أَفْتَحُ الْأَبْوَابَ بَابًا بَابًا حَتَّى انْتَهَيْتُ إِلَى دَرَجَةٍ لَهُ فَوَضَعْتُ رِجْلِي وَأَنَا أُرَى أَنِّي قَدْ انْتَهَيْتُ إِلَى الْأَرْضِ فَوَقَعْتُ فِي لَيْلَةٍ مُقْمِرَةٍ فَانْكَسَرَتْ سَاقِي فَعَصَبْتُهَا بِعِمَامَةٍ ثُمَّ انْطَلَقْتُ حَتَّى جَلَسْتُ عَلَى الْبَابِ فَقُلْتُ لَا أَخْرُجُ اللَّيْلَةَ حَتَّى أَعْلَمَ أَقَتَلْتُهُ فَلَمَّا صَاحَ الدِّيكُ قَامَ النَّاعِي عَلَى السُّورِ فَقَالَ أَنْعَى أَبَا رَافِعٍ تَاجِرَ أَهْلِ الْحِجَازِ فَانْطَلَقْتُ إِلَى أَصْحَابِي فَقُلْتُ النَّجَاءَ فَقَدْ قَتَلَ اللَّهُ أَبَا رَافِعٍ فَانْتَهَيْتُ إِلَى النَّبِيِّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَحَدَّثْتُهُ فَقَالَ ابْسُطْ رِجْلَكَ فَبَسَطْتُ رِجْلِي فَمَسَحَهَا فَكَأَنَّهَا لَمْ أَشْتَكِهَا قَطُّ

یوسف بن موسٰی، عبیداللہ بن موسٰی، اسرائیل، ابواسحاق، براء بن عازب ؓ سے روایت کرتے ہیں کہ رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے ابورافع کے پاس کئی انصاریوں کو بھیجا اور عبداللہ بن عتیق ؓ کو سردار مقرر کیا ابورافع دشمن رسول تھا اور مخالفین رسول کی مدد کرتا تھا اس کا قلعہ حجاز میں تھا اور وہ اسی میں رہا کرتا تھا جب یہ لوگ اس کے قلعہ کے قریب پہنچے تو سورج ڈوب گیا تھا اور لوگ اپنے جانوروں کو شام ہونے کی وجہ سے واپس لا رہے تھے عبداللہ بن عتیق ؓ نے ساتھیوں سے کہا تم یہیں ٹھہرو میں جاتا ہوں اور دربان سے کوئی بہانہ کرکے اندر جانے کی کوشش کروں گا چنانچہ عبداللہ گئے اور دروازہ کے قریب پہنچ گئے پھر خود کو اپنے کپڑوں میں اس طرح چھپایا جیسے کوئی رفع حاجت کے لئے بیٹھتا ہے قلعہ والے اندر جا چکے تھے دربان نے عبداللہ ؓ کو یہ خیال کرکے کہ ہمارا ہی آدمی ہے آواز دی اور کہا! اے اللہ کے بندے اگر تو اندر آنا چاہتا ہے تو آ جا کیونکہ میں دروازہ بند کرنا چاہتا ہوں

عبداللہ بن عتیقؓ کہتے ہیں کہ میں یہ سن کر اندر گیا اور چھپ رہا اور دربان نے دروازہ بند کرکے چابیاں کیل میں لٹکا دیں جب دربان سو گیا تو میں نے اٹھ کر چابیاں اتارلیں اور قلعہ کا دروازہ کھول دیا تاکہ بھاگنے میں آسانی ہو ادھر ابورافع کے پاس رات کو داستان ہوتی تھی وہ اپنے بالا خانے پر بیٹھا داستان سن رہا تھا جب داستان کہنے والے تمام چلے گئے اور ابورافع سو گیا تو میں بالا خانہ پر چڑھا اور جس دروازہ میں داخل ہوتا تھا اس کو اندر سے بند کرلیتا تھا اور اس سے میری یہ غرض تھی کہ اگر لوگوں کو میری خبر ہوجائے تو ان کے پہنچنے تک میں ابورافع کا کام تمام کردوں غرض میں ابورافع تک پہنچا وہ ایک اندھیرے کمرے میں اپنے بچوں کے ساتھ سو رہا تھا میں اس کی جگہ کو اچھی طرح معلوم نہ کرسکا اور ابورافع کہہ کر پکارا اس نے کہا کون ہے؟ میں نے آواز پر بڑھ کر تلوار کا ہاتھ مارا میرا دل دھڑک رہا تھا مگر یہ وار خالی گیا اور وہ چلایا میں کوٹھڑی سے باہر آ گیا اور پھر فورا ہی اندر جا کر پوچھا کہ اے ابورافع تم کیوں چلائے؟ اس نے مجھے اپنا آدمی سمجھا اور کہا تیری ماں تجھے روئے ابھی کسی نے مجھ پر تلوار سے وار کیا ہے یہ سنتے ہی میں نے ایک ضرب اور لگائی اور زخم اگرچہ گہرا لگا لیکن مرا نہیں آخر میں نے تلوار کی دھار اس کے پیٹ پر رکھ دی اور زور سے دبائی وہ چیرتی ہوئی پیٹھ تک پہنچ گئی اب مجھے یقین ہوگیا کہ وہ ہلاک ہوگیا پھر میں واپس لوٹا اور ایک ایک دروازہ کھولتا جاتا تھا اور سیڑھیوں سے اترتا جاتا تھا میں سمجھا کہ زمین آگئی ہے چاندنی رات تھی میں گر پڑا اور پنڈلی ٹوٹ گئی میں نے اپنے عمامہ سے پنڈلی کو باندھ لیا اور قلعہ سے باہر آکر دروازہ پر بیٹھ گیا اور دل میں طے کرلیا کہ میں اس وقت تک یہاں سے نہیں جاؤں گا جب تک اس کے مرنے کا یقین نہ ہوجائے آخر صبح ہوئی مرغ نے اذان دی اور قلعہ کے اوپر دیوار پر کھڑے ہو کر ایک شخص نے کہا کہ لوگو! ابورافع حجاز کا سوداگر مر گیا میں یہ سنتے ہی اپنے ساتھیوں کی طرف چل دیا اور ان سے آکر کہا اب جلدی چلو یہاں سے اللہ نے ابورافع کو ہلاک کرا دیا اس کے بعد ہم نے رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) کو آکر خوشخبری سنائی آپ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے میرے پیر کو دیکھا اور فرمایا کہ اپنا پاؤں پھیلاؤ میں نے پھیلایا آپ (صلی اللہ علیہ وآلہ وسلم) نے دست مبارک پھیر دیا بس ایسا معلوم ہوا کہ اس پیر کو کوئی صدمہ نہیں پہنچا۔[37]

ii۔ حدثنا عبد الله بن يوسف أخبرنا مالك عن ابن شهاب عن أنس بن مالك رضي الله عنه أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم دخل عام الفتح وعلى رأسه المغفر فلما نزعه جاء رجل فقال إن ابن خطل متعلق بأستار الكعبة فقال اقتلوه

عبداللہ بن یوسف، مالک، ابن شہاب، انس بن مالک ؓ سے روایت کرتے ہیں کہ رسول اللہ (ﷺ) فتح مکہ کے سال اس حال میں داخل ہوئے کہ آپ(ﷺ) خود پہنے ہوئے تھے جب آپ(ﷺ) نے اس کو اتارا تو ایک شخص آیا اور عرض کیا کہ ابن خطل کعبہ کے پردہ سے لٹکا ہوا ہے آپﷺ نے فرمایا کہ اسے قتل کر دو۔ [38]

9۔ نبی کریم ﷺ کی ادنیٰ سی بھی بے ادبی ، توہین و تنقیص ، تحقیر و استخفاف خواہ باالواسطہ ہو یا بلا واسطہ ، با الفاظ صریح ہو یا باانداز اشارہ و کنایہ ، تحقیر کی نیت ہو یا بغیر نیت تحقیر کے یہ تمام صورتیں گستاخی میں شامل ہیں ۔ اسی طرح آپ ﷺ کی ذات گرامی ، آپ ﷺ کی صفات و عادات ، اخلاق و اطوار ، آپ ﷺکے اسماء گرامی اور ارشادات اور آپﷺ سے متعلقہ کسی بھی چیز کی ادنیٰ اور معمولی سی تحقیر یا اس میں کوئی عیب نکالنا بھی گستاخی اور موجب کفر ہے ۔ ہر شخص جو حضور ﷺ کی ذات اقدس میں عیب اور نقص کا متلاشی ہو آپ ﷺ کے اخلاق و کردار ، خصائل و اوصاف حمیدہ ، نسب پاک کی طہارت و پاکیزگی اور آپ ﷺ کی عظمت و حرمت کی طرف عیب منسوب کرتا ہو تو نہ صرف یہ کہ ضلالت و گمراہی اس کا مقدر بن جاتی ہے بلکہ ایسے بد بخت و جود سے اس زمین کو پاک ہونا بھی ضروری ہے یہی وجہ ہے فقہاء امت ایسے بد بخت کے واجب القتل ہونے پر متفق ہیں ۔

بلاشبہ اس موضوع پر وافر علمی ذخیرہ موجود ہے اور یقیناً ہر دور اور ہر زمانے کے اہل علم نے ناموس رسول ﷺ کو اپنے ایمان کا لازمی جز و تصور کرتے ہوئے اس موضوع پر قرآن و سنت کے موقف کی بسط و وضاحت کی ہے ۔ تاہم مالکیہ میں ابوالفضل قاضی عیاض اندلسی کی کتاب الشفاء بتعریف حقوق المصطفیٰ ﷺ حنابلہ میں شیخ الاسلام مجتہدِ اُمت حضرت امام ابن تیمیہ ؒ کی ضخیم کتاب "الصارم المسلول علی شاتم الرسول "شافعیہ میں مجتہدعصؔر امام تقی الدین ابو الحسن علی السبکی کی معرکۃ الاراء تصنیف السیف المسلول من سب الرسول اور احناف میں علامہ ابن عابدین شامی ؒ کی کتاب "تنبیۃ الولاۃ و الحکام علی احکام شاتم خیر الانام او احد اصحابہ الکرام"اپنے موضوع پر کمال ہیں اور سند کا درجہ رکھتی ہیں ۔ناموس ِ رسالتﷺ کے حوالے سے گستاخ رسولﷺ کی قانونی و شرعی حیثیت اور اس کی سزا کے حوالے سے امت ِ مسلمہ کا اجماع جو کہ قرون اولیٰ سے چلا آ رہا ہے ان تصانیف میں انتہائی شرح و بسط سے بیان کیا گیا ہے ۔ چونکہ مندرجہ بالا تصانیف اس موضوع پرمصادر و مراجع اور ماخذ و امہاتِ کا درجہ رکھتی ہیں اور چاروں بڑے فقہی مسالک سمیت امت کے متفقہ اجماعی مؤقف کی ترجمانی کرتی ہیں لہذا ان میں سےبعض کتب کے چند اقتباس اسلامی فقہ کےتیسرےمصدر اجماع امت کو اس مسئلہ میں واضح کرتے ہیں :

"جس قدر آپ ﷺ کی توقیر و عزت ہے اسی کے موافق اللہ نے آپ ﷺ کی ایذا رسانی کو اپنی کتاب میں حرام قرار دیا ہے اور ساری امت کا اس امر پر اجماع ہے کہ جو شخص آپ ﷺ کی شان میں گستاخی کرے یا آپ ﷺ کو بُرا کہے وہ واجب القتل ہے ۔

ابو بکر بن منذر نے کہا ہے کہ عامہ اہل علم کا اس امر پر اجماع ہے کہ جو شخص نبی اکرم ﷺ کو گالی دے اسے قتل کر دینا چاہیے ۔ یہ بات حضرت مالک بن انس 'لیث ' احمد اور اسحاق وغیرہم نے بھی کہی ہے ' یہی امام شافعی کا بھی مسلک ہے ۔

البتہ اس معاملے میں کوئی اختلاف نہیں کہ ایسا شخص مباح الدم ہے ۔ سلف ؒ امت اور تمام دیاروامصار کے علماء اس بات پر متفقہ ہیں ،بہت سے علماء نے لکھا ہے کہ ایسے شخص کے قتل و تکفیر پر اجماع ہے ۔تمام علمائے امت کا اس امر پر اجماع ہے کہ شاتم النبی یاوہ شخص جو آپ ﷺ میں نقص نکالے کافر اور مستوجب و عید عذاب ہے اور پوری امت کے نزدیک واجب القتل ہے جو شخص ایسے کافر اور مستحق عذاب ہونے میں شک کرے وہ خود کافر ہے ۔

ابن القاسم نے عتبیہ میں لکھا ہے کہ " جو نبی اکرم ﷺ کو گالی دے یا آپ ﷺ پر عیب لگائے یا آپ ﷺ میں نقص نکالے اسے قتل کیا جائے اور ساری امت کے نزدیک اس کو قتل کرنے کا حکم اسی طرح ہے جس طرح زندیق کو قتل کرنے کا اس لیے کہ اللہ تعالیٰ نے نبی کریم ﷺ کی تعظیم و توقیر کو فرض قرار دیا ہے ۔

عقل اور قیاس کا بھی تقاضا یہی ہے کہ جو شخص نبی کریم ﷺ کو گالی دے یا آپ ﷺ میں نقص نکالے تو اس کا مطلب یہ ہے کہ اس کا قلب بیمار ہے اور اس کے باطن میں کفر چھپا ہوا ہے 'اسی لیے اکثر علماء نے ایسے شخص کو مرتد قرار دیا ہے ۔ امام مالک اور اوزاعی سے شامی علماء نے یہی روایت کی ہے ، یہی سفیان ثوری ، امام ابوحنیفہ اور علمائے کوفہ کی رائے ہے اور ایک دوسراقول یہ ہے کہ نبی ﷺ کی شان میں گستاخی کفر کی دلیل ہے ،لہذا حد شرعی کے تحت اسے قتل کیا جائے گا گو کہ اس پر کفر کا حکم نہیں لگایا جائے گا ۔ البتہ اگر وہ اپنی اس گستاخی اور دریدہ ذہنی پر اصرار کرے اور اپنے فعل کو برا نہ جانے نہ اس سے باز رہے تو وہ کافر ہے اس کاقول صریح ہے اور یہ بالکل ایسا ہی ہے گویا کہ اس نے نبی کریم ﷺ کی تکذیب کی ۔ یا اگر وہ آپ ﷺ کی مذمت کے کلمات کہے یا آپ ﷺ کا مذاق اڑائے اور یہ جانتے ہوئے کہ وہ مذمت کر رہا ہے تو بہ کرنے سے انکار کرے تو اس کا مطلب یہ ہے کہ وہ آپ ﷺ کی مذمت اور آپ ﷺ پر دُشنام طرازی کو حلال سمجھتا ہے ، جو صریحا ً کفر ہے۔لہذا ایسا شخص بلا اختلاف کافر ہے" ۔[39]

امام ابن تیمیہ اجماع کی تفصیلات بیان کرتے ہوئے لکھتے ہیں:

اکثر علماء کا موقف یہی ہے۔ ابن المنذرکہتے ہیں کہ عام علماءکو اس امر پر اجماع ہے کی نبی ﷺ کی توہین کرنے والے کی حد قتل ہے ۔ اما م لیث، احمد، اسحاق اورامام شافعی کا قول یہی ہے مگر نعمان ( ابو حنیفہ )سے منقول ہے کہ اسے ( ذمی) قتل نہ کیا جائے ، اس لیے کہ جس شرک پر وہ قائم ہے وہ توہین رسالت سے عظیم تر جرم ہے ۔ اصحاب شافعی میں ابو بکر فارسی نے اس امر پر مسلمانوںکا اجماع نقل کیا ہے کہ جو شخص رسول ﷺ کو گالی دے اس کی حدِ شرعی قتل ہے جس طرح کسی اور کو گالی دینے کی سزا کوڑے مار نا ہے ۔ جو اجماع انہوں نے نقل کیا اس سے صدر اول ، یعنی صحابہ و تابعین ، مراد ہے یااس کا مطلب یہ ہے کہ نبی کریم ﷺ کو گالی دینےوالا اگر مسلم ہو تو واجب القتل ہے ، قاضی عیاض نے بھی اسی طرح کہا ہے ، فرماتے ہیں کہ اس بات پر امت کا اجماع منعقدہے کہ اگر مسلمانوں میں سے کوئی شخص رسول ﷺ کی توہین کرے یا آپ ﷺ کو گالی نکالے تو اسے قتل کیا جائے ۔ اسی طرح دیگر علماء سے بھی رسول ﷺ کی توہین کرنے والے کے واجب القتل اور کافر ہونے کے بارے میں اجماع نقل کیا گیا ہے۔ امام اسحاق بن راہویہ فرماتے ہیں کہ اس بات پر مسلمانوں کا اجماع منعقد ہے کہ جو شخص اللہ یااس کے رسول کو گالی دے یا خدا کے نازل کردہ کسی حکم کو رد کر دے یا کسی نبی کو قتل کرے تو وہ اس کی بنا پر کافر ہو جاتا ہے اگر چہ وہ خدا کے نازل کردہ تما م احکام کو مانتا ہو ۔ امام خطابی فرماتے ہیں کہ میرے علم کی حد تک کسی مسلمان نے بھی اس کے واجب القتل ہونے میں اختلاف نہیں کیا ،۔محمد بن سحنونکہتے ہیں کہ اس بات پرعلماء کا اجماع ہے کہ نبی ﷺکو گالی دینےوالا اورآپ ﷺ کی توہین کرنے والا کافر ہے ، اس کے بارے میں عذاب خدا وندی کی وعید آئی ہے ۔ امت کے نزدیک اس کا حکم یہ ہے کہ اُسے قتل کیا جائے ، جو شخص اس کے کفر اور سزا میں شک کرے وہ بھی کافر ہے ۔[40]

جہاں تک فقہ جعفریہ کا تعلق ہے تو اس مسئلہ میں امام خمینیؒ کا واضح اور دو ٹوک موقف اپنی مثال آپ ہے ۔نہ صرف فقہ جعفریہ بلکہ ملت اسلامیہ کے موقف کی ترجمانی کرتے ہوے امام خمینی نے سلمان رشدی (ملعون ) کے واجب القتل ہونے کا فتویٰ صادر فرمایا ۔ بعد ازاں امام خمینیؒ کے اسی فتویٰ کی توثیق کرتے ہوے امام آیت اللہ خامنہ ایؒ نے یہ قرار دیا کہ امام خمینی کا فتویٰ نافذ العمل رہے گا تا کہ کسی گستاخ کو نبی مکرم ﷺ کی شان اقدس میں گستاخی کی دوبارہ جسارت نہ ہو۔[41]

ابتدائے اسلام میں اس مسئلے پر صرف نظر کی وجوہات پر روشنی ڈالتے ہوے امام ابن تیمیہ بیان کرتے ہیں کہ:

ابتدائے اسلام میں تالیف قلب اور لوگوں کو ایک کلمے پر جمع کرنے کی ضرورت تھی لیکن جب اسلام مستحکم ہو گیا اور اسے اللہ نے دیگر ادیان پر غالب کر دیا تو پھر (حکم تبدیل ہو گیا ) جس شخص پر قدرت ہوئی اور جس کی شرارت و فتنہ انگیزی مشہور ہو گئی اسے قتل کرنے کا حکم دیا گیا جیسے آپ ﷺ نے ابن خطل کے قتل اور لوگوں کے قتل کا فتح مکہ کے دن حکم دیا ( جو بہت فتنہ پرور تھے ) یا یہودی سرداروں کوترکیب سے قتل کرنے کی اجازت دی یا جو لوگ آپ ﷺ کی ایذا رسانی میں لگے رہتے تھے تو جب آپﷺ کو ان پر غلبہ حاصل ہوا تو ان کی فطرت اور طبعئ شرارت کے باعث آپ ﷺ نے ان کے قتل کی اجازت دی۔

نیز یہ بات بھی پیش نظر رہنی چاہیے کہ وہ لوگ ابھی نئے نئے مسلمان ہوئے تھے ۔واضح نہیں تھا کہ ان میں کتنے لوگ کفر کی آلودگیوں سے بالکل پاک ہو چکے ہیں اور کتنے ہنوز ملوث ہیں پھر بھی سارے عرب میں یہ بات مشہور ہو چکی تھی کہ وہ مسلمان ہو گئے ہیں اور بظاہر وہ (منافق ) نبی کریم ﷺ کے صحابی اور دین اسلام کے اعوان و انصار سمجھے جاتے تھے ایسی صورت میں اگر نبی کریم ﷺ ان کے نفاق اور ان باتوں کی وجہ سے جو کبھی کبھا ر ان پر ظاہر ہوتیں یا اس علم کی بناء پر جو نبی کریمﷺ کو دلی خیالات پر واقفیت حاصل ہونے سے ہوتا تو انہیں قتل کر دیتے تو لازماًاس سے اسلام سے نفرت پیدا کرنے والے کو موقع مل جاتا اور ان کے منہ میں جو آتا کہتے ۔ اس سے جاہل لوگ شک میں پڑ جاتے ، دشمن جھوٹی باتیں بناتا اور بہت لوگ اسلام قبول کرنے اور آپ ﷺ کی صحبت اختیار کرنے سے گھبرا تے ، یا بد گمانی کرنے والا بد گمانی کرتا یا ظالم دشمن یہ خیال کرتا کہ شاید آپ ﷺ نے انہیں کسی عداوت کی بنا پر یا بدلہ لینے کے لیے قتل کرایا ہے ۔

یا اسی طرح کی وہ تکالیف جو کافروں نے آپ ﷺ کو پہنچائیں مگر اس امید پر کہ آیندہ یہ اسلام قبول کر لیں گے آپ ﷺ نے انہیں معاف فرما دیا یا آپﷺ نےاس یہودی کو معاف فرما دیا جس نے آپ ﷺ پر جادو کیا تھا یااس اعرابی کو جس نے آپﷺ کو قتل کرنے کا ارادہ کیا یااس یہودی عورت کو جس نے آپ ﷺ کو زہر دے دیا تھا بعض کہتے ہیں کہ آپ ﷺ نےاسے قتل کرایا اور اسی قسم کی وہ تکلیفیں تھیں جو آپ ﷺ کو اہل کتاب اور منافقین سے پہنچی تھیں، مگر آپ ﷺ نے انہیں اس لیے درگزر فرما دیا کہ انہیں اور دوسروں کو اسلام سے محبت پیدا ہو ۔[42]

10۔ اکثر اہل مغرب کو اپنے مذہبی پس منظر اور اپنی مخصوص مذہبی تاریخ کے باعث اس امر کو سمجھنے میں شدید مغالطہ ہے کہ اسلام میں شاتم رسول کی عقوبت قتل کیوں مقرر کی گئی ہے ، لیکن باعث حیرت ہے کہ بعض مسلمان بھی مغرب کی اندھی تقلید میں ان وجوہات کو قطعاً نظر انداز کر دیتے ہیں جن کی بنیاد پر اسلام میں شاتم رسول کی عبرت ناک سزا مقرر کی گئی ہے ۔ اسلام اور اسلام کے مزاج و تعلیمات سے ناآشنائی کے سبب ایک غیر مسلم کی قانون توہین رسالت پر تنقید تو سمجھ میں آتی ہے لیکن اس مسئلہ میں ان مسلمانو ں کی اہل مغرب کی بے چون و چرا اطاعت سمجھ سے بالا تر ہے ۔انٹر نیٹ پر غلاظت سے بھر پور مواد میں ایک وافر حصہ ایسے مواد کا بھی ملتا ہے جس میں قانون توہین رسالت کی آڑ میں بنی مہربان ﷺ کی ذات پاک کو ہدف تنقید بنایا گیا ہے ۔ اور بد قسمتی سے چند نام نہاد مسلمان بھی اسی دوڑ میں اہل مغرب سے پیچھے نہیں رہے ۔ اس موقع پر یہ وضاحت انتہائی ضروری ہے کہ قرآن و سنت ' آثار صحابہ ، تعامل امت اور محققین کے دلائل کی روشنی میں اس امر کا جائزہ لیا جائے کہ وہ کیا وجوہات اور اسباب ہیں جن کی بناء پر شاتم رسول اسلامی شریعت کی روشنی میں مباح الدم اور واجب القتل ٹھہرایا گیا ہے ، یقیناً اس حوالے سے تمام دلائل کا احاطہ ممکن نہیں بہر حال بنیادی عوامل درج ذیل ہیں :

i. اسلام میں محبت رسول ﷺ کی شرعی و قانونی حیثیت :

ہر مسلمان نبی کریم ﷺ سے والہانہ محبت کرتا ہے ۔ ایسی محبت کہ وہ خود اپنی ذات سے بھی اتنی محبت نہیں کر سکتا ۔ کسی بھی مذہب یا نظریے کے پیروکاروں کا اپنی مقدس ہستیوں یا لیڈروں سے شدید ذہنی وابستگی اور محبت و عقیدت کا اظہار اور ان کے حوالے سے جذباتی تعلق ایک فطری امر ہے۔جو کہ انسان کی سرشت میں شامل ہے لیکن اسلام نے محبت ِ رسول ﷺ کو ایمان کا معیار مقرر کیا ہے ۔ بلکہ محبوب کی فہرست میں نبی ﷺ کا مقام سر فہرست ہونا ایمان کا لازمی تقاضا ہے ۔ اللہ رب العزت نے خود ہی قرآن مجید میں محبت رسول ﷺ کو ایمان کا لوازمہ قرار دیتے ہوئے فرمایا کہ

قُلْ اِنْ كَانَ اٰبَاۗؤُكُمْ وَاَبْنَاۗؤُكُمْ وَاِخْوَانُكُمْ وَاَزْوَاجُكُمْ وَعَشِيْرَتُكُمْ وَاَمْوَالُۨ اقْتَرَفْتُمُوْہَا وَتِجَارَۃٌ تَخْشَوْنَ كَسَادَہَا وَمَسٰكِنُ تَرْضَوْنَہَآ اَحَبَّ اِلَيْكُمْ مِّنَ اللہِ وَرَسُوْلِہٖ وَجِہَادٍ فِيْ سَبِيْلِہٖ فَتَرَبَّصُوْا حَتّٰي يَاْتِيَ اللہُ بِاَمْرِہٖ۝۰ۭ وَاللہُ لَا يَہْدِي الْقَوْمَ الْفٰسِقِيْنَ۝۲۴

آپ کہہ دیجئے کہ اگر تمہارے باپ اور تمہارے لڑکے اور تمہارے بھائی اور تمہاری بیویاں اور تمہارے کنبے قبیلے اور تمہارے کمائے ہوئے مال اور وہ تجارت جس کی کمی سے تم ڈرتے ہو اور وہ حویلیاں جنہیں تم پسند کرتے ہو اگر یہ تمہیں اللہ سے اور اس کے رسول(ﷺ) سے اور اس کی راہ کے جہاد سے بھی زیادہ عزیز ہیں، تو تم انتظار کرو کہ اللہ تعالیٰ اپنا عذاب لے آئے اللہ تعالیٰ فاسقوں کو ہدایت نہیں دیتا۔[43]

قاضی عیاض اپنی مشہور کتاب "الشفاء بتعریف حقوق المصطفیٰ " میں اس آیت کریمہ کے ذیل میں لکھتے ہیں :

" اس آیت کریمہ سے یہ ثابت ہو تا ہے کہ حضور ﷺ کی محبت واجب ہے اور اللہ تعالیٰ نے اس آیت میں آپ سے محبت کرنے پر اُبھارا اور تنبیہ فرمائی ہے ۔ یہ آیت اس بات پر حجت اور دلیل ہے اور معلوم ہوا کہ آپ کی محبت فرض اور لازم ہے کیونکہ اللہ تعالیٰ نے ان لوگوں کو جھڑکا ہے جنہیں ان کا مال اور اولاد اور آباء و اجداد اللہ اور اس کے رسول ﷺ سے زیادہ پیارے ہوں اورا نہیں اپنے اس قول کے ذریعے ڈرایا ہے اور ان کو جتلایا ہے کہ بے شک ایسے لوگ گم کردہ راہ ہیں اور اللہ نے انہیں ہدایت نہیں دی ہے "۔[44]

اور اللہ تعالیٰ کا فرمان ہے کہ

" اَلنَّبِیُّ أَوۡلَیٰ بِاُلۡمُؤۡمِنِیۡنَ مِنۡ أَنۡفُسِھِمۡ وَأَزۡوَٰجُہُ أُمَّھَٰتُہُمۡ "[45]

بلاشبہ نبی (ﷺ )مومنوں پر خود ان سے بھی زیادہ حق رکھنے والے ہیں اور نبی (ﷺ)کی بیویاں مومنوں کی ما ئیں ہیں ۔

حضرت انس ؓسے روایت ہے :

عَنْ أَنَسِ بْنِ مَالِکٍ قَالَ قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّی اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ لَا يُؤْمِنُ أَحَدُکُمْ حَتَّی أَکُونَ أَحَبَّ إِلَيْهِ مِنْ وَلَدِهِ وَوَالِدِهِ وَالنَّاسِ أَجْمَعِينَ

حضرت انسؓ بن مالک سے مروی ہے کہ جناب رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم) نے فرمایا تم میں سے کوئی اس وقت تک کامل ایمان والا نہیں ہو سکتاجب تک کہ میں اس کے نزدیک اس کے بچوں والدین اور تمام لوگوں سے زیادہ محبوب نہ ہو جاؤں۔[46]

اور حضرت انس ؓ ہی سے روایت ہے :

قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّی اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ ثَلَاثٌ مَنْ کُنَّ فِيهِ وَجَدَ طَعْمَ الْإِيمَانِ مَنْ کانَ يُحِبُّ الْمَرْئَ لَا يُحِبُّهُ إِلَّا لِلَّهِ وَمَنْ کَانَ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ أَحَبَّ إِلَيْهِ مِمَّا سِوَاهُمَا وَمَنْ کَانَ أَنْ يُلْقَی فِي النَّارِ أَحَبَّ إِلَيْهِ مِنْ أَنْ يَرْجِعَ فِي الْکُفْرِ بَعْدَ أَنْ أَنْقَذَهُ اللَّهُ مِنْهُ

رسول اللہ (صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم) نے فرمایا جس شخص میں تین خصلتیں ہوں گی اس کو ایمان کا مزہ آجائے گا جس شخص سے محبت کرے صرف اللہ کے لئے کرے اللہ تعالیٰ اور اس کے رسول اس کو تمام عالم سے زیادہ محبوب ہوں جب اللہ تعالیٰ نے کفر سے نجات دے دی تو پھر کفر کی طرف لوٹنے سے زیادہ آگ میں ڈالے جانے کو اچھا سمجھے۔[47]

حضرت عمر رضی اللہ عنہ نے ایک بارنبی کریم ﷺ کو عرض کیا کہ اے نبی ﷺ ! میں آپ کو دنیا کی ہر چیز سے زیادہ محبوب رکھتا ہوں سوائے میری جان کے ۔ اس پر آپ ﷺ نے فرمایا تم میں کوئی اس وقت تک مومن نہیں ہو سکتا جب تک میں اُ س کو اس کی جان سے زیادہ محبوب نہ ہو جاؤں ۔ اس پر حضرت عمرؓ نے عرض کیا کہ اے اللہ کے رسول ﷺ قسم ہے اُ س ذات کی جس نے آپ پر قرآن نازل کیا کہ آپ مجھے میری جان سے بھی زیادہ محبوب ہیں اس پر نبی ﷺ نے فرمایا الآن یا عمر ۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔اب ٹھیک ہے عمر !

اس ضمن میں اور بھی بہت سی احادیث موجود ہیں ۔صلح حدیبیہ کے موقع پر اپنے قبیلہ کی جانب سے حضور ﷺ کے پاس بطور نمائندہ حاضر ہونے والے عروہ بن مسعودکا صحابہ کرام رضوان اللہ علیھم اجمعین کاحضور اکرم کے ساتھ والہانہ عشق اوروارفتگی کا بیان انتہائی اہمیت کا حامل ہے۔جسے محدثین نے تفصیلاً نقل کیا ہے ۔ عروہ بن مسعود نے اپنی قوم میں واپس جا کر اصحاب رسولﷺ کی رسول خدا ﷺ سے محبت کا جو نقشہ پیش کیا وہ کچھ یوں ہے :

"اے لوگو اللہ کی قسم، میں بادشاہوں کے دربار میں گیا، قیصر وقصریٰ اور نجاشی کے دربار میں گیا، مگر اللہ کی قسم میں نے کسی بادشاہ کو ایسا نہیں دیکھا کہ اس کے مصاحب اس کی اتنی تعظیم کرتے ہوں جتنی محمد کی یہ تعظیم کرتے ہیں، اللہ کی قسم، جب تھوکتے ہیں، تو وہ جس کسی کے ہاتھ پڑتا ہے، وہ اس کو اپنے چہرے اور بدن پر مل لیتا ہے اور جب وہ کسی بات کے کرنے کا حکم دیتے ہیں تو ان کے اصحاب بہت جلد اس حکم کی تعمیل کرتے ہیں، جب وضو کرتے ہیں، تو ان کے غسالہ وضو کیلئے لڑتے مرتے ہیں اپنی آوازیں ان کے سامنے پست رکھتے ہیں، نیز بغرض تعظیم ان کی طرف دیکھتے تک نہیں، بےشک انہوں نے تمہارے سامنے ایک عمدہ مسئلہ پیش کیا ہے، لہٰذا تم اس کو مان لو"[48]

درج بالا آیات و احادیث میں محبت رسول ﷺ کو ایمان کے ساتھ مکمل پیوست کر دیا گیا ہے جس کے بعد ایسے کسی ایمان کا تصور بھی ناممکن ہے جو حُب رسول ﷺ سے عاری ہو ۔ ایک ایسی امت جس کے دل میں نبی ﷺ کی محبت اپنی جان سے ، اپنے مال ومتاع سے ، اہل وعیال سے بڑھ کر ہو کیسے توہین رسالت برداشت کر سکتی ہے ؟ کیسے اپنے عزیز از جان نبی ﷺ کی شان اقدس میں گستاخی پر سکون اور ہوش کا دامن تھام سکتی ہے ؟یہ خود اللہ کی شان کریمی کے خلاف تھا کہ خود اپنے نبی سے محبت کا حکم بھی دیتا اور دوسری طرف گستاخان ِ رسول کو شتر بے مہار جیسی آزادی بھی عطا کر دیتا کہ وہ نبی ﷺ اور اس کے عاشقان کی دل آزاری کریں۔ نبی ﷺ سے والہانہ محبت کا جو پہلو امت محمدیہ میں ہے اس کی کو ئی نظیر ملنا محال ہے ۔ اس لیے شاتم رسول کی سنگین سزا کا مقرر کیا جانا حُب رسول ﷺ کا لازمی نتیجہ ہے ۔ محبت کے تقاضوں میں ایک تقاضا یہ بھی ہے کہ محبوب کے بارے میں ہرزہ سرائی کرنے والی زبانوں کو لگا م دیا جائے ۔ اس لیے اسلامی قانون نے یہ راستہ ہموار کیا ہے ۔

ii. اسلام میں نبی ﷺ کی تعظیم اور احترام کے بارے میں واضح احکامات:

توہین رسالت کے اسلامی قانون کی دوسری بنیا د نبی کریم ﷺ کے حکم کی تعظیم اور آپ ؐ کی ذات کی تکریم ہے ۔ اسلام رسول ﷺ کی اطاعت وفاداری ہی فرض نہیں کرتا بلکہ ان کا ہر لحاظ سے مکمل ادب و احترام بھی لازم قرار دیتا ہے ۔ نبی ﷺ کی شان اقدس میں ذرہ برابر بے ادبی اور آپ ﷺ کی ذات کے بارے میں خفیف سی بدگمانی بھی ایک مسلمان کے لیے دنیا و آخرت دونوں میں ناکامی و نامرادی کا سبب بن سکتی ہے اور اس کے زندگی بھر کے تمام نیک اعمال غارت ہو سکتے ہیں ۔ اسلام نبی کریم ﷺ کے ادب و احترام کے بارے میں اس قدر محتاط رہنے کی تلقین کرتا ہے کہ اپنی آواز بھی رسول ﷺ کی آواز سے پست رکھی جائے ۔ آپ ﷺ کی آواز سے بلند آواز نیکی کے تمام اعمال ضائع کرنے کے مترادف ہے ۔

اِنَّآ اَرْسَلْنٰكَ شَاہِدًا وَّمُبَشِّرًا وَّنَذِيْرًا۝۸ۙلِّتُؤْمِنُوْا بِاللہِ وَرَسُوْلِہٖ وَتُعَزِّرُوْہُ وَتُوَقِّرُوْہُ۝۰ۭ وَتُسَـبِّحُوْہُ بُكْرَۃً وَّاَصِيْلًا۝۹

(ترجمہ) یقیناً ہم نے تجھے گواہی دینے والا اور خوشخبری سنانے والا اور ڈرانے والا بنا کر بھیجا۔تاکہ (اے مسلمانو)، تم اللہ اور اس کے رسول پر ایمان لاؤ اور اس کی مدد کرو اور اس کا ادب کرو اور اللہ کی پاکی بیان کرو صبح و شام۔ (سورۃ الفتح،آیت 8-9)

يٰٓاَيُّہَا الَّذِيْنَ اٰمَنُوْا لَا تُـقَدِّمُوْا بَيْنَ يَدَيِ اللہِ وَرَسُوْلِہٖ وَاتَّقُوا اللہَ۝۰ۭ اِنَّ اللہَ سَمِيْعٌ عَلِيْمٌ۝۱يٰٓاَيُّہَا الَّذِيْنَ اٰمَنُوْا لَا تَرْفَعُوْٓا اَصْوَاتَكُمْ فَوْقَ صَوْتِ النَّبِيِّ وَلَا تَجْـہَرُوْا لَہٗ بِالْقَوْلِ كَجَــہْرِ بَعْضِكُمْ لِبَعْضٍ اَنْ تَحْبَطَ اَعْمَالُكُمْ وَاَنْتُمْ لَا تَشْعُرُوْنَ۝۲

(ترجمہ) اے ایمان والے لوگو! اللہ اور اس کے رسول (ﷺ)کے آگے نہ بڑھواور اللہ سے ڈرتے رہا کرو یقیناً اللہ تعالیٰ سننے والا، جاننے والا ہے۔اے ایمان والو! اپنی آوازیں نبی(ﷺ) کی آواز سے اوپر نہ کرو اور نہ ان سے اونچی آواز سے بات کرو جیسے آپس میں ایک دوسرے سے کرتے ہو، کہیں (ایسا نہ ہو) کہ تمہارے اعمال اکارت جائیں اور تمہیں خبر نہ ہو ۔ (الحجرات 1،2 )

لَا تَجْعَلُوْا دُعَاۗءَ الرَّسُوْلِ بَيْنَكُمْ كَدُعَاۗءِ بَعْضِكُمْ بَعْضًا۝۰ۭ قَدْ يَعْلَمُ اللہُ الَّذِيْنَ يَتَسَلَّـلُوْنَ مِنْكُمْ لِوَاذًا۝۰ۚ فَلْيَحْذَرِ الَّذِيْنَ يُخَالِفُوْنَ عَنْ اَمْرِہٖٓ اَنْ تُصِيْبَہُمْ فِتْنَۃٌ اَوْ يُصِيْبَہُمْ عَذَابٌ اَلِيْمٌ۝۶۳

(ترجمہ) تم اللہ تعالیٰ کے نبی کے بلانے کو ایسا بلاوا نہ کر لو جیسا کہ آپس میں ایک دوسرے سے ہوتا ہے تم میں سے انھیں اللہ خوب جانتا ہے جو نظر بچا کر چپکے سے سرک جاتے ہیں ۔سنو جو لوگ حکم رسول ﷺکی مخالفت کرتے ہیں انھیں ڈرتے رہنا چاہیے کہ کہیں ان پر کوئی زبردست آفت نہ آپڑے یا انھیں دردناک عذاب نہ پہنچے۔

مولاناصفی الرحمٰن مبارکپوری اپنی کتاب " الرحیق المختوم " میں لکھتے ہیں ؛

"نبی کریم ﷺ ایسے جمالِ خلق اور کمالِ خلق سے متصف تھے جو حیطہء بیان سے باہر ہے ۔ اس جمال و کمال کا اثر یہ تھا کہ دل آپ ؐ کی تعظیم اور قدرومنزلت کے جذبات سے خود بخود لبریز ہو جاتے تھے ۔ چناچہ آپ ؐ کی حفاظت اور اجلال و تکریم میں لوگوں نے ایسی ایسی فداکاری و جاں نثاری کاثبوت دیا جس کی نظیر دنیا کی کسی اور شخصیت کے سلسلے میں پیش نہیں کی جا سکتی ۔ آپؐ کے رفقاء اور ہم نشین وارفتگی کی حد تک آپ ؐ سے محبت کرتے تھے ۔ انہیں گوارا نہ تھا کہ آپ ؐ کو خراش تک آ جائے خواہ اس کے لیے ان کی گردنیں ہی کیوں نہ کاٹ دی جائیں ۔ اس طرح کی محبت کی وجہ یہی تھی کہ عادۃً جن کمالات پر جان چھڑکی جاتی ہے ان کمالات سے جس قدر حصہ وافر آپ ؐ کو عطاہوا تھاکسی اور انسان کو نہ ملا۔ "[49]

اس امر میں کوئی شک و شبہ نہیں کہ جس طرح حضور ﷺ کی توقیر و تعظیم آپ(ﷺ) کی حیات میں لازم تھی اسی طرح آپ (ﷺ)کی وفات کے بعد بھی آپ (ﷺ)کا احترام لازم ہے ۔ (قاضی عیاض / الشفاء)[50]

یہ تمام آیات اور حادیث و آثار اس بات کا واضح ثبوت ہیں کہ ایمان اور ادب بارگاہ مصطفیٰﷺ لازم و ملزوم ہیں کہ جو مذہب اپنے ماننے والوں کو رسول ﷺ کا اس درجہ مطیع اورفرماں بردار بناتا ہے کہ رسول ﷺکی محفل میں اونچی آواز سے بات کرنے ، رسول ﷺ کے دروازے پر کھڑے ہو کر آوازے دینے ،رسول ؐ سے آگے بڑھنے اور رسول ؐ کو عام انسانوں کی طرح مخاطب کرنے کو " تمام اعمال کے ضیاع " کے مترادف قرار دے تو پھر پیروان ِ محمد ؐ سے یہ کیسے تو قع کی جاسکتی ہے کہ کوئی بد بخت آپﷺ کی ذات کو (نعوذ باللہ) ہدف طعن و ملامت بنائے اور اسے آزادی اظہار کے نام پر اپنے مکروہ اور شنیع دھندے کو دہرانے کا موقع دیا جائے تاکہ دوسرے بھی اس سے حوصلہ پکڑیں اور پھر توہین کے بازار کو گرم ہونے کا موقع دیا جائے ۔ ایسا ممکن نہیں ہے لہذا ایسی ناپاک جسارت کی بیخ کنی کے لیے اسلامی قانون فوراً حرکت میں آتا ہے اور شاتم رسول ﷺ کو کیفر کردار تک پہنچاکر احترام رسول ﷺ کے قرآنی تقاضے کی تکمیل کرتا ہے ۔

iii. اسلام میں نبی ﷺ کے اسو ہ حسنہ کا واجب الاتباع ہونے کا تصور:

اسلام میں سرور عالم ﷺ کا جو مقام ہے اس کا احاطہ نہ کسی عدالتی فیصلے میں کیا جاسکتا ہے اور نہ ہی کسی بشر کے لیے ممکن ہے کہ آپ ﷺ کے مرتبہ ومقام کو ضبط تحریر میں لا سکے۔ خود اللہ رب العالمین ہی کی ذات آپ ﷺ کے مقام و مرتبہ کو بہتر جانتی ہے ۔

آپ ﷺکی ذات بابرکات جہاں ایک طرف وحی الٰہی کی شارح ہے 'وہیں دوسری طرف شارع بھی ۔ آپ ؐ کاہر قول ' ہر فعل اور ہر عمل اللہ رب العزت کی مرضی و منشاءکا ترجمان ہے ۔ اسلام نے اپنے پیغمبر ﷺ کی زندگی کو انسانیت کے لیے ایک بہترین نمونہ بنایا اور مسلمانوں کے لیے آپ (ﷺ) کی پیروی کو خدا کی محبت کا ذریعہ بتایا۔ قرآن مجیدکی واضح تصریحات کی روشنی میں صحابہ کرام رضی اللہ عنہم کے دور سے آج تک تمام مسلمانوں نے بالاتفاق یہ تسلیم کیا ہے کہ قرآن کے بعد قانون کا دوسرا ماخذ نبی کریم ﷺ کی سنت ہے ۔ سنت کے ماخذ ِقانون ہونے اور واجب الاتباع ہونے پر امت کا اجماع ہے ۔ امت محمد یہ کا یہ واضح مؤقف ہے کہ آپ ﷺ کی ذات بحیثیت معلم و مربی ، بحیثیت پیشوا و نمونہ تقلید ، بحیثیت شارح قرآن مجید ، بحیثیت قاضی ، بحیثیت حاکم و فرمانروا اور بحیثیت شارع، اتباع اور پیروی کی لازم حیثیت رکھتی ہے۔[51]

بیاں کے روپ میں قرآن تجھ پہ اترا تھا

عمل کے روپ میں قرآں عطاکیاتونے

(نعیم صدیقی)

جیسا کہ پہلے بیان کیا ہے کہ رسول ﷺ شارح قرآن بھی تھے اور خدا کے مقرر کردہ شارع بھی ۔ان کا منصب یہ بھی تھا کہ " لوگوں کے لیے خدا کے نازل کردہ احکام کی تشریح کریں " اور یہ بھی کہ " پاک چیزیں لوگوں کے لیے حلال کریں اور ناپاک چیزوں کو اُن پر حرام کردیں " ۔ قرآن مجیدبار بار اس امر کی صراحت کرتا ہے کہ رسول ہونے کی حیثیت سے جو فرائض رسول اللہ ﷺ پر عائد کیے گئے تھے اور جو خدمات آپ ﷺ کے سپر دکی گئی تھیں اُن کی انجام دہی میں آپ ﷺ اپنے ذاتی خیالات و خواہشات کے مطابق کام کرنے کے لیے آزاد نہ تھے بلکہ وحی الٰہی کے پابند تھے جیسا کہ قرآن مجید میں آیا ہے کہ " اِنْ اَتَّبِـــعُ اِلَّا مَا يُوْحٰٓى اِلَيَّ۝۰ۭ میں تو صرف جو کچھ میرے پاس وحی آتی ہے اس کا اتباع کرتا ہوں [52]

" قُلْ اِنَّمَآ اَتَّبِــعُ مَا يُوْحٰٓى اِلَيَّ مِنْ رَّبِّيْ۝۰ۚآپ کہہ دیجئے! کہ میں اس کی پیروی کرتا ہو جو مجھ پر میرے رب کی طرف سے حکم بھیجا گیا ہے۔[53]مَا ضَلَّ صَاحِبُكُمْ وَمَا غَوٰى۝۲ۚ وَمَا يَنْطِقُ عَنِ الْہَوٰى۝۳ۭ اِنْ ہُوَاِلَّا وَحْيٌ يُّوْحٰى۝۴ۙ

کہ تمہارے ساتھی نے نہ راہ گم کی ہے اور نہ ٹیڑھی راہ پر ہے ۔اور نہ وہ اپنی خواہش سے کوئی بات کہتے ہیں ۔وہ تو صرف وحی ہے جو اتاری جاتی ہے۔[54] اور عقل بھی اس بات کو تسلیم کرتی ہے کہ اگر کسی شخص کو خدا کی طرف سے رسول مقرر کیا جائے تو پھر اُسے رسالت کا کام اپنی خواہشات و رجحانات اور ذاتی آرا کے مطابق انجام دینے کی اجازت نہیں دی جا سکتی بلکہ وہ وحی الٰہی اور امر الٰہی کا پابند ہے ۔ ابتدائی دور سے لے کر آج تک مسلمان اس امر پر یکسو ہیں کہ حضور ﷺ نے اپنے قول و عمل سے اسلامی انداز فکر اور دین کے اصول و احکام کی جو تشریح فرمائی ہے ، اس میں آپ ﷺ کی پیروی ہم پرواجب بھی ہے اور ہمارے ایمان کی بنیاد بھی ۔ جو کچھ رسول ﷺ دیں و ہ لے لو اور جس سے وہ منع کر دیں اُس سے رُک جاؤ،جس قول و عمل کی سند آپ ﷺ دیں صرف اُسی کو اپنے لیے نمونہ سمجھو، جس کو و ہ حق بتائیں اُسی کو معیار حق تصور کرو ، جو فیصلہ وہ دیں اُسی فیصلے کی طرف رجوع کرو ، ان کے فیصلے کی بظاہر ہی نہیں دل سے تائید کرو ، اور پھر اگر اللہ کی محبت مطلوب ہے تو اللہ کے رسول کی اتباع کرو ۔[55] یہ وہ اختیارات ہیں جو احکم الحاکمین اللہ رب العزت نے آپ ﷺ کو تفویض کیے ہیں اور یہ ہے دین اسلام میں رسول ﷺ کی اصل حیثیت جسے قرآن اتنی وضاحت کے ساتھ پیش کرتا ہے ۔

1۔لَقَدْ مَنَّ اللہُ عَلَي الْمُؤْمِنِيْنَ اِذْ بَعَثَ فِيْھِمْ رَسُوْلًا مِّنْ اَنْفُسِھِمْ يَتْلُوْا عَلَيْھِمْ اٰيٰتِہٖ وَيُزَكِّيْھِمْ وَيُعَلِّمُھُمُ الْكِتٰبَ وَالْحِكْمَۃَ۝۰ۚ وَاِنْ كَانُوْا مِنْ قَبْلُ لَفِيْ ضَلٰلٍ مُّبِيْنٍ۝۱۶۴

بیشک مسلمانوں پر اللہ تعالیٰ کا بڑا احسان ہے کہ انہیں میں سے ایک رسول ان میں بھیجا (۱) جو انہیں اس کی آیتیں پڑھ کر سناتا ہے اور انہیں پاک کرتا ہے اور انہیں کتاب اور حکمت (۲) سکھاتا ہے یقیناً یہ سب اس سے پہلے کھلی گمراہی میں تھے۔ (آل عمران3- 164)

2۔ وَاَنْزَلْنَآ اِلَيْكَ الذِّكْرَ لِتُبَيِّنَ لِلنَّاسِ مَا نُزِّلَ اِلَيْہِمْ وَلَعَلَّہُمْ يَتَفَكَّرُوْنَ۝۴۴

یہ ذکر (کتاب) ہم نے آپ کی طرف اتارا ہے کہ لوگوں کی جانب جو نازل فرمایا گیا ہے آپ اسے کھول کھول کر بیان کر دیں، شاید کہ وہ غور و فکر کریں ۔ (النحل -44)

3۔ يَاْمُرُہُمْ بِالْمَعْرُوْفِ وَيَنْہٰىہُمْ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَيُحِلُّ لَہُمُ الطَّيِّبٰتِ وَيُحَرِّمُ عَلَيْہِمُ الْخَـبٰۗىِٕثَO

وہ ان کو نیک باتوں کا حکم فرماتے ہیں اور بری باتوں سے منع کرتے ہیں (٢) اور پاکیزہ چیزوں کو حلال بناتے ہیں اور گندی چیزوں کو ان پر حرام فرماتے ہیں (الاعراف ۔ 157 )

4۔وَمَآ اٰتٰىكُمُ الرَّسُوْلُ فَخُذُوْہُ۝۰ۤ وَمَا نَہٰىكُمْ عَنْہُ فَانْتَہُوْا۝۰ۚ

وَاتَّقُوا اللہَ۝۰ۭ اِنَّ اللہَ شَدِيْدُ الْعِقَابِ۝۷ۘ

اور تمہیں جو کچھ رسول دے لے لو، اور جس سے روکے رک جاؤ اللہ تعالیٰ سے ڈرتے رہا کرو، یقیناً اللہ تعالیٰ سخت عذاب والا ہے۔(الحشر -7)

5۔وَمَآ اَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ رَّسُوْلٍ اِلَّا لِيُطَاعَ بِـاِذْنِ اللہِ۝۰ۭ

ہم نے ہر رسول (صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم) کو صرف اس لئے بھیجا کہ اللہ تعالیٰ کے حکم سے اس کی فرمانبرداری کی جائے۔( النساء -64)

6۔مَنْ يُّطِعِ الرَّسُوْلَ فَقَدْ اَطَاعَ اللہَ۝۰ۚ

اس رسو ل( ﷺ )کی جو اطاعت کرے اسی نےاللہ کی اطاعت کی (النساء -80)

7۔وَاِنْ تُطِيْعُوْہُ تَہْتَدُوْا۝۰ۭ

ہدایت تو تمہیں اس وقت ملے گی جب رسول (ﷺ)کی ماتحتی کرو (النور -54 )

8۔لَقَدْ كَانَ لَكُمْ فِيْ رَسُوْلِ اللہِ اُسْوَۃٌ حَسَنَۃٌO

یقیناً تمہارے لئے رسول اللہ میں عمدہ نمونہ (موجود) ہے (الاحزاب -21 )

9۔فَلَا وَرَبِّكَ لَا يُؤْمِنُوْنَ حَتّٰي يُحَكِّمُوْكَ فِيْمَا شَجَــرَ بَيْنَھُمْ ثُمَّ لَا يَجِدُوْا فِيْٓ اَنْفُسِہِمْ حَرَجًا مِّمَّا قَضَيْتَ وَيُسَلِّمُوْا تَسْلِــيْمًا۝۶۵

سو قسم ہے تیرے پروردگار کی! یہ مومن نہیں ہو سکتے جب تک کہ تمام آپس کے اختلاف میں آپ(ﷺ) کو حاکم نہ مان لیں، پھر جو فیصلے آپ(ﷺ) ان میں کر دیں ان سے اپنے دل میں کسی طرح کی تنگی اور ناخوشی نہ پائیں اور فرمانبرداری کے ساتھ قبول کرلیں ۔ (النساء -65)

10۔يٰٓاَيُّھَا الَّذِيْنَ اٰمَنُوْٓا اَطِيْعُوا اللہَ وَاَطِيْعُوا الرَّسُوْلَ وَاُولِي الْاَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ۝۰ۚ فَاِنْ تَنَازَعْتُمْ فِيْ شَيْءٍ فَرُدُّوْہُ اِلَى اللہِ وَالرَّسُوْلِ اِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُؤْمِنُوْنَ بِاللہِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْاٰخِرِ۝۰ۭ

اے ایمان والو!فرمانبرداری کرو اللہ تعالیٰ کی اور فرمانبرداری کرو (رسولﷺ) کی اور تم میں سے اختیار والوں کی۔ (۱) پھر اگر کسی چیز پر اختلاف کرو تو اسے لوٹاؤ، اللہ تعالیٰ کی طرف اور رسول (صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم) کی طرف اگر تمہیں اللہ پر اور قیامت کے دن پر ایمان ہے ۔ (النسا ء -59)

11۔قُلْ اِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُحِبُّوْنَ اللّٰهَ فَاتَّبِعُوْنِيْ يُحْبِبْكُمُ اللّٰهُO

کہہ دیجئے! اگر تم اللہ سے محبت رکھتے ہو تو میری تابعداری کرو (آل عمران 3/31)

اسی آیت کے ضمن میں علامہ سید سلیمان ندویؒ نےاپنی معرکۃ الاراء تصنیف ' خطبات مدراس ' میں اتباع رسول ﷺ کی اسی حیثیت کو بیان کرتے ہوئے لکھا کہ "آپ ﷺ کی اتباع یعنی آپ کی زندگی کی نقل و عکس کو خداکی محبت کا معیار بتایا ۔ ایک لمحہ کے لیے نشئہ دینی سے سر مست ہو کر اپنی جان دینا آسان ہے مگر پوری عمر ہر چیز میں ' ہر حالت میں ' ہر کیفیت میں آپکی اتباع کے پل صراط کو اس طرح طے کرنا کہ کسی بات میں سنت محمدی ؐ سے قدم اِ دھر اُدھر نہ ہو ' سب سے مشکل امتحان ہے ۔ اس اتباع کے امتحان میں صحابہ کرام رضی اللہ عنھم پورے اُترے اور اسی جذبہ سے صحابہ ، تابعین ، تبع تابعین ، محدثین، مورخین اور ارباب سیر کا یہ اہم فرض قرار دیا کہ آپ ؐ کی ایک ایک بات ، ایک ایک چیز ، ایک ایک جنبش کو معلوم کریں ' پچھلوں کو بتائیں تاکہ اپنے اپنے امکان بھر ہر مسلمان اس پر چلنے کی کوشش کرے ۔ اس نکتہ سے ظاہر ہو گا کہ آنحضرت ؐ کی زندگی ان کے جاننے والوں کی نگاہ میں پوری کامل تھی ، تب ہی تو اسکی نقل کو انہوں نے کمال کا معیار ِیقین کیا "۔ مولانا ابوالکلام آزاد نے آپ ؐ کی سیرت کے اسی پہلو کو اجاگر کرتے ہوئے لکھا ہے کہ "چونکہ نوع انسانی کی سعادت و تنویر کا مبداء وجود انبیاء ہے اور حقیقت محمد ان پر سب سے مافوق اور شمس و کواکب اور صباح و مصباح کے معاملے کا حکم رکھتی ہے ، اسی لیے حیات قائمہ و دائمہ کا نور الانوار اور مصباح المصباح وہی دائرہ ٹھہرا " اور مزید فرمایا کہ " قرآن کے بعد اگر کوئی اور ہستی لوح محفوظ ہو سکتی ہے تو وہ صرف وہی روح اعظم و خالد ہے جس کے ذکر کو خود قرآن نے اپنی آغوش حفظ و صیانت میں ہمیشہ کے لیے لیا ہے " ۔

اس ضمن میں خود نبی کریم ﷺ کا یہ ارشاد ہی کافی و شافی ہے کہ

لاَ يُؤْمِنُ أَحَدُكُمْ حَتَّى يَكُونَ هَواهُ تَبَعًا لِمَا جِئْتُ بِهِ

(تم میں سے کوئی شخص اس وقت تک مومن نہیں ہو سکتا جب تک اُس کی خواہشات اس شریعت کے تابع نہ ہو جائیں جو میں لے کر آیا ہوں ۔)

لہذا اس دین کی بنیاد نبی مہربان ﷺ کی ذات کی اتباع پر ہے ،یہ کیسے ممکن ہے کہ جو ذات شریعت کا منبع و مصدر اور ماخذ قانون ہو اور جو ذات امت محمدیہ کے ہر فرد کے لیے مشعل راہ ہو اس کی تضحیک وہرزہ سرائی کو برداشت کیا جائے ؟ نبی کریم ﷺ کو بطور کامل نمونہ تسلیم کرتے ساتھ ہی یہ امر خود بخود لازم ٹھہرتا ہے کہ آپ ﷺ کی ذات پر الزام تو درکنار کو ئی ادنٰی سا شائبہ بھی اسلام کی عمارت کو منہدم کرنے کے لیے کافی ہے اس لیے شریعت کی حفاظت کے لیے ضروری تھا کہ آپ ﷺ کی ذات گرامی اور ناموس کی حفاظت فرمائی جاتی اسی لیے شریعت نے گستاخی رسول (ﷺ)کے معاملے میں عدم استثناء کا رویہ اپنایا ۔ یہ بات سمجھنا قطعاً مشکل نہیں ہے کہ اگر موجودہ دور میں ایک ریاست اپنے بانیوں اور آزادی کے لیڈروں کے احترام کی حفاظت کرتی ہے اور جس طرح ریاست کے دستور کو پامال کرنے والا باغی ٹھہرتا ہے اور جس طرح ریاست کے خلاف کام کرنے والا ریاست کا دشمن اور غدار تصور ہوتا ہے ، افواج کو بدنام کرنے والا اور عدلیہ کی تضحیک کرنے والاسخت سزا کا مستحق تو آخر کیا وجہ ہے کہ وہ دین جس کی بنیاد ہی نبی کریم ﷺ کی ذات ہے اس کی حرمت و تقدس کی حفاظت کے لیے مناسب اقدام نہ کیا جا تا ؟

iv. اسلام میں رسول پاک ﷺ کی ابدی اور عالم گیر راہنمائی کا تصور :

مسلمانوں کا یہ مسلمہ عقیدہ ہے کہ جس طرح قرآن مجید پوری انسانیت اور تا قیامت ہر زمانے کے لیے خدا کی آخری الہامی کتاب اور راہ نمائی اور ہدایت کا ذریعہ ہے اسی طرح آپ ﷺ کی رسالت بھی تمام انسانوں کے لیے تا ابد ہدایت و راہنمائی کا ذریعہ ہے ۔ عہد نبوی ؐ سے چودہ صدیوں کے فاصلے پر ہونے کے باوجود درحقیقت یہ اُسی عہد کا حصہ اور تسلسل ہے ۔ کیونکہ نبی کریم ﷺ کسی قوم کی طرف نہیں بلکہ ساری انسانیت کی طرف مبعوث فرمائے گئے ہیں اور آپ ﷺ کے بعد کوئی نبی آنے والا نہیں ہے اس لیے آپ ﷺ ہماری اکیسویں صدی کے لیے بھی اسی طرح رسول ہیں جس طرح چھٹی صدی کے تھے ۔ مولانا سید ابو الاعلیٰ مودودی ؒ نے اس حقیقت کو بیان کرتے ہوئے لکھا کہ

"قرآن مجید اس بات پر شاہد ہے کہ جس طرح وہ خود ایک خاص زمانے میں ، ایک خاص قوم کو خطاب کرنے کے باوجود ایک عالم گیر اور دائمی ہدایت ہے ، اسی طرح اس کا لانے والا رسول ﷺ بھی ایک معاشرے کے اندر چند سال تک فرائضِ رسالت انجام دینے کے باوجود تمام انسانوں کے لیے ابد تک ہادی اور راہ نما ہے ۔ جس طرح قرآن کے متعلق یہ فرمایا

وَاُوْحِيَ اِلَيَّ ہٰذَا الْقُرْاٰنُ لِاُنْذِرَكُمْ بِہٖ وَمَنْۢ بَلَغَ۝۰ۭ

اور میرے پاس یہ قرآن بطور وحی کے بھیجا گیا ہے تاکہ میں اس قرآن کے ذریعہ سے تم کو اور جس جس کو یہ قرآن پہنچے ان سب کو ڈراؤں (الانعام -19)

ٹھیک اسی طرح قرآن کے لانے والے رسول ﷺ کے متعلق بھی یہ فرمایا گیا ہے کہ:

قُلْ يٰٓاَيُّھَا النَّاسُ اِنِّىْ رَسُوْلُ اللہِ اِلَيْكُمْ جَمِيْعَۨا الَّذِيْ لَہٗ مُلْكُ السَّمٰوٰتِ وَالْاَرْضِ۝۰ۚ

آپ کہہ دیجئے کہ اے لوگو! میں تم سب کی طرف اس اللہ کا بھیجا ہوا ہوں، جس کی بادشاہی تمام آسمانوں پر اور زمین میں ہے۔ (الاعراف -158)

وَمَآ اَرْسَلْنٰكَ اِلَّا كَاۗفَّۃً لِّلنَّاسِ بَشِيْرًا وَّنَذِيْرًا

ہم نے آپ کو تمام لوگوں کے لئے خوشخبریاں سنانے والا اور ڈرانے والا بنا کر بھیجا ہے (سباء -28 )

مَا كَانَ مُحَمَّدٌ اَبَآ اَحَدٍ مِّنْ رِّجَالِكُمْ وَلٰكِنْ رَّسُوْلَ اللہِ وَخَاتَمَ النَّـبِيّٖنَ۝۰ۭ

(لوگو) تمہارے مردوں میں کسی کے باپ محمد (صلی اللہ علیہ وسلم) نہیں (۱) لیکن اللہ تعالیٰ کے رسول ہیں اورخاتم النبین ہیں (الاحزاب -40 )

اس لحاظ سے قرآن مجید اور محمد ﷺ کی راہ نمائی میں کوئی فرق نہیں ۔اگر وقتی اور محدود ہیں تو دونوں ہیں ، اگر دائمی اور عالمگیر ہیں تو دونوں ہیں ۔"[56]

اس امر میں کو ئی شک و شبہ نہیں کہ دونوں دائمی اور عالم گیر ہیں یہی وجہ ہے کہ جو ہستی دائمی ، عالم گیر اور اکملیت و جامعیت کے بے مثال اوصاف سے متصف ہو ،اس شخصیت کے وقار ، تقدس ، حرمت اور شان میں کوئی تنقیص برداشت نہیں کی جاسکتی ۔اس لیے شریعتِ اسلامیہ کا مزاج یہی ہے کہ سلسلہ انبیاء کے آخری فرد ، شاہد و مبشر ، داعی و نذیر اور سراج منیر ﷺ کی ذات کے تقدس کی حفاظت کی جائے ۔آپ ﷺ کی ذات کی عالم گیر یت کی بابت مولانا سید سلمان ندوی ؒ لکھتے ہیں کہ "ایک ایسی شخصی زندگی جو ہر انسانی گروہ اور ہر انسانی حالت کے مختلف مواقع پر ہر قسم کے صحیح جذبات اور مکمل اخلاق کا مجموعہ ہو صرف محمد رسو ل اللہ ﷺ کی سیرت ہے ۔[57] " مزید کہتے ہیں " اسلام ان تمام انسانوں کو سنت ِ نبوی ﷺ کی دعوت دیتا ہے ۔اس کے صاف معنی یہ ہیں کہ اسلام مختلف طبقاتِ انسانی کے لیے اپنے پیغمبر کی عملی سیرت میں نمونے اور مثالیں رکھتا ہے ، جو ان میں سےہر ایک کے لیے الگ الگ ہدایت کا ذریعہ بن سکتا ہے ۔ اسلام کے صرف اسی نظریے سے ثابت ہو جاتاہے کہ پیغمبر اسلام ﷺ کی سیرت میں جامعیت ۔ یعنی انسانوں کے ہر طبقے اور گروہ کے لیے اس سیرت میں نصیحت حاصل کرنے کے مواقع اور عمل کے لیے درس اور سبق موجود ہے ۔ " اس پر مزید کہتے ہیں " پیدائش ، دودھ پینے کی عمر ، بچپن ، ہوش و تمیز ، جوانی ، تجارت ، آمد و رفت ، شادی ، دوست احباب ، نبوت سے پہلے قریش کی لڑائی اور قریش کے معاہدے میں شرکت ،امین بننا ، خانہ کعبہ میں پتھر نصب کرنا ، رفتہ رفتہ تنہائی پسندی ، غارِ حرا کی گوشہ نشینی ، وحی ، اسلام کا ظہور ،دعوت ، تبلیغ ، مخالفت ، طائف کا سفر ، معراج کا واقعہ ، ہجرت ، غزوات ، حدیبیہ کی صلح ، دعوت اسلام کے حوالہ سے خط و کتابت ،اسلام کی اشاعت ، تکمیل ِ دین ، حجۃ الوداع ،وصال ، ان میں سے کون سازمانہ ہے جو انسانوں کی نگاہوں کے سامنے نہیں اور آپ ﷺ کی کون سی حالت ہے جس سے اہل تاریخ ناواقف ہیں۔ اُٹھنا بیٹھنا ، سونا جاگنا ، شادی بیاہ ، بال بچے ، دوست احباب ،نماز روزہ،دن رات کی عبادت ،صلح وجنگ ،سفر و حضر ، نہانا دھونا ، کھانا پینا ، ہنسنا رونا ، پہننا اوڑھنا ،چلنا پھرنا، ہنسی مذاق ،بول چال، خلوت وجلوت ،ملنا جلنا ،طور طریق ،رنگ و بو ، خدوخال ،قدو قامت، یہاںتک کہ بیوی سے خانگی تعلقات اور نجی معاملات بھی پوری روشنی میں بیان کیے گئے ہیں اور معلو م و محفوظ ہیں۔[58] " آگے فرماتے ہیں " حضور ﷺ محفل میں ہوں یا اکیلے ہوں ، مسجد میں ہوں یا میدانِ جہاد میں ، رات کے آخری اوقات میں نماز میں مصروف ہوں یا عین میدان ِ جنگ میں فوجوں کی درستگی میں ، منبر پر ہوں یا گو شہ تنہائی میں ، ہر قوم اور ہر شخص کو حکم تھا کہ جو کچھ آپ ﷺ کی حالت اور کیفیت ہو وہ سب منظر عام پر لائی جائے ۔ ایک طرف ازواج مطہرات رضوان اللہ علیھم اجمعین آپ ﷺ کے ذاتی اور گھریلو حالات سنانے اور بتانے میں مصروف رہیں اور دوسری طرف اصحاب ِ صفہ رضی اللہ عنھم عقیدت مند شاگردوں کی طرح شب و روز ذوق و شوق کے ساتھ آپ ﷺ کے حالات دیکھنے اور دوسروں سے ان کو بیان کرنے میں مصروف رہتے رھے ۔ مدینے میں رہنے والی آبادی دس برس تک مستقل آپﷺ کی ایک ایک حرکت و سکون اور ایک ایک جنبش کو دیکھتی رہی ۔ غزوات اورلڑائیوں کے موقع پر ہزار ہا صحابہ کو شب و روز آپﷺ کی زندگی کا کون سا پہلو ہو گا جو پردے میں رہا ہو گا اور اس پر بھی ایک شخص تک کو بلکہ بڑے سے بڑے دشمن اور مخالف کو پوری چھان بین ، تلاش اور کوشش کے بعد بھی آپ ﷺ پر انگلی اُٹھانے کو کوئی موقع نہ مل سکا ۔ "[59]

ایسی ہستی جو چہار دانگ عالم کے لیے رشد و ہدایت کا ذریعہ ہو ، جو قیامت تک کامل ترین اور موزوں ترین ہدایت نامہ زندگی کی حامل ہو ۔ جو اپنی ذات میں اکملیت و جامعیت کے اُس منبر پر فائز ہو جہاں بشریت کی رسائی محال ہو ، جہاں کسی ترمیم اور اضافے کی ضرورت ختم ہو جائے اور انسانوں پر اتمام حجت ہو جائے ۔ جو سارے زمانوں ،سارے جہانوں ، سارے گروہوں ، طبقوں ، قوموں ، نسلوں اور علاقوں کے لیے رحمت ِ کامل بن جائے ۔ جس کی ایک ایک ادا کی نقل انسانیت کی فلاح اور معراج کی دلیل بن جائے تو پھر یہ کیسے ممکن ہے کہ آزادئ فکر و خیال و اظہار کے لبادے میں سرکار دوعالم ﷺ کی تضحیک کے مکروہ دھندے کی اجازت دی جائے؟

منصبِ رسالت ﷺ کی اسی جامعیت و اکملیت کی وضاحت کرتے ہوئے مولانا پیر محمد کرم شاہ الزہریؒ،سابق جج شریعت اپیلیٹ بینچ، عدالتِ عظمیٰ پاکستان نے فرمایا :

" جو انسا ن اسلام کی تعلیما ت کو بگاڑ کر پیش کرنے کی کوشش کرتا ہے یا حضور اکرم ﷺ کے دامن ِ حیات کو رزائل سے آلودہ کرنے کی کوشش کرتا ہے جن سے نسلِ آدم ؑ کو پاک کرنے کے لیے آپ ﷺ نے اپنی ساری زندگی وقف کر دی ، وہ صرف مسلمانوں پر ظلم نہیں کرتا بلکہ وہ ساری انسانیت پر ظلم کرتا ہے ۔ وہ حق کی جستجو کرنے والوں کے لیے منزلِ حق تک پہنچنے والے تمام راستوں کو مسدود کرنے کی مذموم کوشش میں مصروف ہے ۔ وہ نہ اپنی ذات کا خیر خوا ہ ہےاور نہ ہی اپنے مذہب اور ملت کا ہمدرد۔ وہ ساری انسانیت کا قاتل ہے اور اس کے دستِ جفا کو روکنا ہمارا حق ہی نہیں فرض بھی ہے"۔[60]

نبی کریمؐ سے مسلمانوں کی والہانہ محبت ووابستگی کااعتراف نیپولین بوناپارٹ کی اپنی انتظامیہ کو جاری کردہ اس ہدایت سےبھی ہوتا ہے جس میں اس نے اپنی انتظامیہ کو خبردار کیا کہ وہ مسلمانوں کو اس بات کا یقین دلائیں کہ وہ قرآن مجیدسے محبت اورنبی کریمؐ سے عقیدت رکھتے ہیں، وگرنہ اس ضمن میں بلاسوچے سمجھے ایک چھوٹاسا ادا کیاگیا لفظ یااقدام سالہا سال کی محنت کو رائیگاں کرسکتا ہے۔[61] نیپولین بوناپارٹ جب ۱۷۹۹ میں مصرسے واپس جانے لگا تو اس نے جاتے ہوئے مصر پرقابض اپنی فرانسیسی انتظامیہ کوہدایت کی:

ترجمہ: "ہمیں مسلمانوں کو نہایت احتیاط سے یہ باور کروانا ہے کہ ہم قرآن مجید سے محبت کرتے ہیں اور رسولﷺ کا بےحد احترام کرتے ہیں ۔اس سلسلے میں بلا سوچے سمجھے کہا گیا ایک لفظ یا معمولی سا عمل ہماری سالہا سال کی جدوجہد پر پانی پھیر سکتا ہے ۔"

“One must take great care to persuade the Muslims that we love the Quran and that we venerate the Prophet. One thoughtless word or action can destroy the work of many years.”

(Articale John V. Tolan European Account of Muhammad’s Life.

Muhammad Edited by: Andreas Gorke. Volum-IV, Page 287.

v. وَرَفَعنَا لَکَ ذِکرَکَ :[62]

یہ بات اظہرمن شمس ہے کہ محمد دنیا کا مقبول ترین نام ہے ۔ اک سروے کے مطابق دنیا میں پندرہ کروڑ سے زائد افراد کا نام محمد ہے۔ بہر حال دنیا کے بہت سے ممالک میں مردوں کے ناموں کے شروع ، درمیان یا آخر میں محمد کا نام نامی ضرور ملتا ہے ۔ہر مسلمان یہ عقیدہ رکھتا ہے کہ مقام محمود ، حوض کوثر ، مرتبہ شفاعت ، تمام انبیا ء و اصفیاء پر بر تری اور بے انتہاعزتیں اور کرامتیں رسول خدا ﷺ کو عطا ہو ں گی ۔ اسی حقیقت کی طرف رب العالمین نے ارشاد فرمایا :

'' وَلَسَوْفَ يُعْطِيْكَ رَبُّكَ فَتَرْضٰى۝۵ۭ

تجھے تیرا رب بہت جلد (انعام) دے گا اور تو راضی و خوش ہو جائے گااور

" اِنَّآ اَعْطَيْنٰكَ الْكَوْثَرَ۝۱ۭ فَصَلِّ لِرَبِّكَ وَانْحَرْ۝۲ۭ اِنَّ شَانِئَكَ ہُوَالْاَبْتَرُ۝۳ۧ

یقیناً ہم نے تجھے (حوض) کوثر (اور بہت کچھ) دیا ہے ۔ پس تو اپنے رب کے لئے نماز پڑھ اور قربانی کر۔ یقیناً تیرا دشمن ہی لا وارث اور بےنام و نشان ہےؔ۔[63]

ورفعنالک ذکرک کے وعدے کی تکمیل کی ہی ایک صورت یہ ہے کہ ہروقت ،ہر لمحہ اورہر گھڑی دنیا کے ہرکونے میں بسنے والے کروڑوں مسلمان نبی کریمؐ اورآپ ؐ کی آل پر درود وسلام بھیجنے کاشرف حاصل کرتے ہیں۔آپؐ کانام نامی کانوں سے ٹکراتے ہی لبوں پر درود وسلام کے پروانے جاری ہوجاتے ہیں، نگاہیں جھک جاتی ہیں اور قلب وذہن پر عقیدت ومحبت کی ایک دلنشین کفیت طاری ہوجاتی ہے۔یہ فضیلت صرف آپؐ کی ذات کے ساتھ ہی مخصوص ہے۔آپؐ وہ واحدہستی ہیں جن کویہ مقام حاصل ہے۔ بقول مولا ناظفر علی خان ؒ

فرش پر تیرے ہمہمے،عرش پر تیرے زمزمے

بھیج رہی ہے کائنات تجھ پہ سلام اور صلوٰۃ

امام احمد رضا بریلوی ؒ نے اپنے انتہائی رو ح پرور کلام کے ذریعے حضورِ اقدس ﷺ کی شان میں اپنے شیریں و لا جواب انداز میں درود و سلام بھیج کر کروڑوں مسلمانوں کو سالہا سال سے تسکین و سرور کی کیفیت میں دلشاد کر رکھا ہے ، جو کہ یقیناٍٍٍٍٍ ً ان کے لیے صدقہ جاریہ ہے:

| | | | --- | --- | | مصطفی جانِ رحمت پہ لاکھوں سلام | شمعِ بزمِ ہدایت پہ لاکھوں سلام | | مِہرِ چرخِ نبوت پہ روشن دُرود | گلِ باغِ رسالت پہ لاکھوں سلام | | شبِ اسرا کے دولہا پہ دائم دُرود | نوشۂ بزمِ جنّت پہ لاکھوں سلام | | عرش کی زیب و زینت پہ عرشی دُرود | فرش کی طیب و نُزہت پہ لاکھوں سلام | | نورِ عینِ لطافت پہ اَلطف دُرود | زیب و زینِ نظافت پہ لاکھوں سلام | | نقطۂ سِرِّ وحدت پہ یکتا دُرود | مرکزِ دورِ کثرت پہ لاکھوں سلام | | فتحِ بابِ نبوت پہ بے حد دُرود | ختمِ دورِ رسالت پہ لاکھوں سلام | | کاش محشر میں جب اُن کی آمد ہو اور | بھیجیں سب اُن کی شوکت پہ لاکھوں سلام | | مجھ سے خدمت کے قُدسی کہیں ہاں ! رضاؔ | مصطفی جانِ رحمت پہ لاکھوں سلام |

ورفعنالک ذکرک کے باب میں آپﷺ کی عظمت وکردار کااعتراف عرب تک ہی محدود نہیں رہا بلکہ ساری دنیا کے عظیم دانشور اورمفکر جوپیروان دین اسلام نہیں وہ بھی محمد سرورعالمﷺ کی عظمت ورفعت کے برملا اعتراف اورآپﷺ کی حمد وستائش پرمجبور ہیں۔ تھامس کارلائن،نپولین، والٹیر، ژاں ژاک روسو، برناڈشا، ایچ جی ویلز، گوئٹے، مسزاینی بیسنٹ، ایس مارگولیتھ، ڈاکٹر لین پول، مائیکل ایچ ہارٹ، ہزہائی نس، مہاراجہ نرسنگھ گڈھ، مانگ تونگ، شری متی کملادیوی، پروفیسر لگھویتی فراق، پنڈت امرناتھ زتشی دیال، بھگت راؤایڈووکیٹ، راج پال، گاندھی جی اوران گنت مفکرین نے اپنے اپنے اندازمیں نبی کریمؐ سے اپنی عقیدت کااظہار کیا ہے۔ جو اس امر کی دلیل ہے کہ اللہ رب العزت نے اپنے محبوب نبیؐ کاذکر ہمیشہ کے لئے بلند کردیاہے اورآپ ؐ کی ذات گرامی کی تاثیر سے ہردور کے ، زندگی کے ہرشعبہ سے تعلق رکھنے والے افراد متاثرہوتے رہے ہیں اوریہ سلسلہ رواں دواں رہے گا۔

ورفعنالک ذکرک کے باب میں امت مسلمہ کا ایک بڑا کارنامہ نعت نگار ی اور نعت گوئی ہے۔ یہ اللہ رب العزت کے اُسی وعدے کی تکمیل ہے کہ اللہ رب العزت اپنے محبوب سرور کائنات ﷺ کا ذکر ہر انداز ، ہر طور اور ہر صنف میں بلند کرے گا ۔ نعت نگاری امت محمدیہ کا ایک ایسا خاصہ ہے جس کی دنیا میں کوئی مثال نہیں ملتی ۔ امت ِ مسلمہ کے ہر اہل قلم ، اہل ادب اور اہل زبان کی یہ کوشش، تمنا اور آرزو رہی ہے کہ وہ نبی کریم ﷺ کی شان میں اعلیٰ سے اعلیٰ شعری کاوش بصور تِ نعت پیش کرے ۔ بقول عاشقِ رسولﷺ[64] ،نعت حضور ﷺ کے نہایت پاکیزہ و سنجیدہ تذکار اور آُپ ﷺ کے لیے والہانہ فدائیت کی آئینہ دار ہوئی ۔ حضور ﷺ کے معجزوں کا بیان ،حضور ﷺ سے تعلق ، ایات قرآنی کی تلمہات ، سیرت کے نمایاں واقعات کا تذکرہ ، نبی کریم ﷺ کے ارشادات ، میدان جنگ میں آپ ﷺ کی بہادری ، آپ ﷺ کے گونا گو ں اعلیٰ اوصاف نیز نعت گو کا اعتراف گناہ اور طلب بخشش و شفاعت ، ہجرو فراق کے درد اور قرب و وصال کی آرزو کا اظہار نعت کا لازمی حصہ بن گئے ہیں ۔خود نبی کریم ﷺ نے صحابہ رضوان اللہ اجمعین کو نعت گوئی کی ترغیب دی ، اچھے نعت خواں صحابہ کی تعریف و تحسین کی ،اور اس طرح شاعر رسول حسان بن ثابت رضی اللہ عنہ سے شروع ہونے والا یہ سلسلہ لاکھوں کروڑوں نعت نگار وں تک محیط ہے اور قیامت تک چلتا رہے گا ۔ برصغیر میں ذکر رسول کو بلند کرنے کاسہر ا تقریباًہر بڑے شاعر کو جاتا ہے ۔ رومی و سنائی ، بیدل اورنظیری ، حافظ اور سعدی ، غالب اور امیر خسرو سے لے کر مولانا محمد علی جوہر اور مولانا ظفر علی خان تک ہر پیرائے میں درخشاں نعتوں کے انبار لگائے گئے ۔علامہ محمد اقبال ؒ کی تو پہچان ہی عشق رسول ﷺ میں ڈوبے نعت کے میدان میں بے نظیر اشعار بن گئے ۔ یہ سلسلہ آج تک جاری ہے ۔ شاعروں کے نظریات اور افکار اورادبی مکتبہ فکرکا تنوع اور اختلاف ، طبعیتوں کا رجحان اور میلان میں دوری ،انداز اور بیان میں تفاوت اپنی جگہ لیکن جب بات نعت کی ہو تو ہر کسی نے ایک جذبہ بے تاب کےساتھ وادی سخن میں طبع آزمائی کی ہے ۔ غرض نعت ایک ایسا نکتہء اتحاد ہے جس نے مشرق و مغرب کے بعد اور دوری کو عشق و محبت کی ایک ہی کشتی میں سوار کردیا ۔ نعت کے میدان میں بڑے بڑے شعراء نے بھی اپنی بے بسی اور کم مائیگی کا اعتراف کرتے ہوئے یہ کہا ہے کہ آپ ﷺ کی تعریف سے ہم اپنے آپ کو تہی دامن پاتے ہیں ، الفاظ کا سمندر خشک پڑ جاتا ہے لیکن تعریف کا بیان پیاسا ہی رہتا ہے ۔ ہمارے شعراء کے کلام میں ورفعنالک ذکر ک کے باب میں ایسے اشعار بکثرت ملتے ہیں جن میں عشاق مصطفیٰ نے اس صداقت عظمیٰ کی گواہی دی ہے کہ مقام رسولﷺ خدا ہی کے علم میں ہے اور انسان کا قلم و زباں اُس کا ادراک و احاطہ کرنے سے قاصر ہے ۔ امت محمدیہ جس ہستی کی تعریف اور توصیف کو اپنی زندگی کا ماحاصل سمجھتی ہو وہ اُمت کیسے گوارہ کر سکتی ہے کہ اُس مقدس ہستی اور اس سے منسوب ازواج مطہرات اور اس کے ساتھی اصحاب کرام پر حرف گیری کی کوئی جراء ت کرے ۔ان کے ادبی ذخائر اور اشعار سے بہتی محبت ، رواں جذب دروں اور پُر کیف ، پُر لطف الفاظ کا سیل رواں کسی ذی ہوش کے لیے امت کے مؤقف بر ناموس رسالت کی گہرائی اور گیرائی کو سمجھنے کے لیے کافی ہو نا چاہیے ۔

وَاَبۡیَضَ یَیتَسۡقَیٰ الۡغَمَا مُ بِوَ جۡھِہ

وُہ گورے مُکھڑے والاجِس کے روئے زیبا کے

واسطے سے اَبرِ رحمت کی دُعائیں مانگی جاتی ہیں،

ثِمَالَ الۡیَتٰمٰی ! عِصۡمَۃً لۡلَا رَامِلۡ

وُہ یتیموں کا سہارا وُہ بیواؤں اور مسکینوں کا سرپرست

(حضرت ابُو طالب)

وَاَحسَنُ مِنکَ لَمۡ تر قَطُّ عَینِی

یا رسول اللہ ﷺ میری آنکھ نے آپ جیسا خوبصورت ترین پیکر نہیں دیکھا

وَ اَجۡمَلَ مِنۡکَ لَمۡ تَلِدِ النِسَاءُ

اور آپ سے بڑھ کر حسین و جمیل کسی ماں نے جنم نہیں دیا

خُلِقۡتَ مُبَرّ َاءً مِنۡ کُلِّ عَیۡبٍ

آپ ہر عیب سےپاک پیدافرمائے گئے

کَاَنّکَ قَدۡ خُلِقۡتَ کَمَا تَشَا ءُ

گویا کہ آپ حسب مرضی پیدا ہوئے

(حضرت حسان بن ثابت ؓ)

یَا صَاحِبَ الجَمالُ وَ یَا سَید البشَر

اے صاحب الجما لﷺ اور اے انسانوں کے سردار ﷺ

مِن وَجہ کَل مُنِیر لَقَد نُورَا لقَمَر

آپ ﷺ کے رخِ انور سے چاند چمک اٹھا

لَا یمیکنُ الثّنا ءُ کَما کَانَ حَقُہ

آپ ﷺ کی ثنا کا حق ادا کرنا ممکن ہی نہیں

بَعداز خُدابزرگ توئی قصہ مختصر

قصہ مختصر یہ کہ خدا کے بعد آپ ﷺ ہی بزرگ ہیں

عبدالرحمٰن جامیؒ))

بَلَغ العُلےٰ بِكَمَالِه

پہنچے بلندیوں پہ ، وہ ﷺ اپنے کمال سے

كَشفَ الدجیٰ بَجَمالِه

آپ ﷺ کے حسن و جمال سے تمام اندھیرے دور ہو گئے حَسُنت جمِيعُ خِصالِه

آپﷺ کی سبھی عادات مبارکہ اور سنتیں بہت پیاری ہیں صَلّوا عليهِ وآلِه

آپ ﷺ پر اور آپ ﷺ کی آل پر سلام ہو​

شیخ سعدیؒ))

غَر یبَم یَا رسُول اللہ غَریبَم

یا رسو ل اللہﷺ میں انتہائی غریب ہوں

نَدارَم دَر جَہاَں جُز تو حَبیبَم

اس دنیا میں آپ ﷺ کےسِوا میرا کوئی حبیب نہیں ہے

مَرضَ دَارم زعصیَاں لادَوَائے

میں گناہوں کے ایسے مرض میں مبتلا ہوں جس کا کوئی علاج نہیں ہے

مگر اَلطافِ تَو بَاشد طَبیبَم

مگر یہ کہ آپ ﷺ کی مہربانیاں ہی میری طبیب ہیں

برَیں نَازم کہ ھَستم اُمّت تَو

بس مجھے اسی پر ناز ہے کہ میں آپ ﷺ کا امتی ہوں

گُہنگارم وَ لیکن خُوش نصیبَم

بےشک میں گنہگار ہوں لیکن خوش نصیب ہوں

(عبدالرحمٰن جامی ؒ)

نسیما جانب بطحا گزر کنز احوالم محمد را خبر کناے بادِ نسیم جب ترا شہرِ بطحا سے گزر ہو، میرے احوال (حالات ) سرکار کی خدمت میں بیان کرنا ببر ایں جان مشتاقم بہ آں جا فدائے روضہ خیر البشر کنمیری جان یہ اشتیاق رکھتی ہے (مشتاق ہے ) کہ جاکر روضہ ِ خیر البشر فدا ہوجائے

توئی سلطان عالم یا محمد!ز روئے لطف سوئے من نظر کنیا محمد (صل اللہ علیہ وسلم ) آپ جہان کے بادشاہ ہیں ، میری جانب بھی اک لطف و کرم کی نظر ہو مشرف گرچہ شد جامی ز لطفتخدایا ایں کرم بار دگر کن جامی کو گرچہ یہ شرف حاصل ہے کہ اس پر لطف ہوا، اے خدا یہ کرم بارِ دگر(بار بار یادوبارہ ) بھی ہو

(عبدالرحمٰن جامی ؒ)

شاعرمشرق علامہ اقبالؒ کی ساری شاعری حب رسولؐ کی خوشبوسے مہک رہی ہے۔ ان کی یہ شہرہ آفاق رباعی، حضورؐ سے گہری عقیدت ومحبت کا بے مثل نمونہ ہے۔

توغنی ازہر دو عالم من فقیر

روزِ محشر عذر ہائے من پذیر

ورحسابمرا تو بینی ناگزیر

ازنگاہ ِ مصطفےٰ ﷺ پنہا ں بگیر

"اے باری تعالیٰ! تو دونوں جہانوں سے غنی ہے۔ میں توایک فقیر ہوں۔ میری التجا ہے کہ قیامت کے روز میرے عذر، میرے جواز،میری کوتاہیاں قبول فرما لے۔ اوراگر تومیرا نامۂ اعمال دیکھنا ضروری ہی خیال کرتا ہے تومیرے نبی پاکؐ حضرت محمدؐ کی نگاہوں سے بچاکردیکھ۔"

وہ دانا ئےسُبل ختم الرَسل مولا ئے کل جس نے

غبار راہ کو بخشا فروغ وادی سینا

نگاہ عشق و مستی میں وہی اول وہی آخر

وہی قرآں وہی فرقاں وہی یٰسیں وہی طٰہٰ

(علامہ اقبالؒ)

الٰہی بحقِ رسو ل تہامی ہر اِک فرد انساں کا تھا جو کہ حامی

جسے دور نزدیک تھے سب گرامی برابر تھے مکی و زنگی و شامی

شریروں کو ساتھ اپنے جس نے نبایا

بُروں کا ہمیشہ بھلا جس نے چاہا

(مولانا الطاف حسین حالی)

حبیب داور ، غریب پرور، رسول اکرمﷺ کرم کے پیکر

کسی کو درپے بلا رہے ہیں، کسی کے خوابوں میں آ رہے ہیں

میں اپنے خیر الوریٰ کے صدقے، انہی کی شان عطا کے صدقے

بھرا ہے عیبوں سے میرا دامن، حضور ﷺ پھر بھی نبھا رہے ہیں

بنے گا جانے کا پھر بہانہ، کہے گا آکر کوئی دیوانہ

چلو نیازی چلو مدینے، مدینے والے بلا رہے ہیں

(عبدالستار نیازی)

عمل کی میرے اساس کیا ہے بجز ندامت کے پاس کیا ہے

رہے سلامت تمہاری نسبت میرا تو اک آسرا یہی ہے

یہی ہے خالد اساس رحمت یہی ہے خالد بنائے عظمت

نبیﷺ کا عرفان زندگی ہے نبیﷺ کا عرفان بندگی ہے

(خالد محمود خالد)

11۔ اسلامی معاشرہ اپنے مزاج کے اعتبار سے رواداری اورتکثیریت کا حامل رہا ہے ۔ یہ ایک ناقابل تردید تاریخی حقیقت ہے کہ جہاں کہیں بھی مسلمانوں نے حکومت کی وہاں کے دیگر مذاہب ، ثقافت اور وہاں کے اقلیتی گروپوں کے حقوق کی مکمل حفاظت کی ۔ عباسی دور میں بغداد اور اموی دور میں اسپین میں یہودیوں کو جو آزادی حاصل رہی وہ زبان زد عام ہے ۔ یہ کہنابالکل غلط نہ ہو گاکہ ، تاریخی اعتبار سے مسلمان معاشرہ تکثیرت اور رواداری اور مذہبی برداشت کا آئینہ رہا ہے ۔

مسلمانوں کا توہین رسالت کا قانون ایک الگ شناخت اور حیثیت رکھتا ہے ۔ اور اسے مغرب کے توہین مذہب کے قانون سے تقابل کرنا درست نہیں ہے۔ مسلمانوں کے قانونتوہین رسالت کا بنیادی مقصد رہنمائی اور ہدایت کے اس سر چشمہ کی حفاظت ہے جو دراصل اسلام کے قانونی ، دستوری ، معاشرتی ، معاشی اور ثقافتی و تہذیبی عمارت کی اساس ہے ۔ اور اس رہنمائی اور ہدایت کی حفاظت کے مقصد کے پیش نظر منشاء خداوندی سے نبی کریم ﷺ کی محبت جاگزیں ہے جیسے دل کے ساتھ دھڑکن اور سانس کے ساتھ زندگی وابستہ و پیوستہ ہے۔

اب تک کم ازکم یہ حقیقت مترشح ہو چکی ہے کہ قانون توہین رسالت ، جیسا کہ اب پاکستان میں نافذ ہے ، نہ تو کسی مذہبی جنون کا شاخسانہ ہے اورنہ ہی کسی مخصوص طبقہ فکر یا گروہ کے مفادات کا حامل ، بلکہ یہ قانون اسلام کی منشاء اور روح کا عکاس ہے ۔

آگے بڑھنے سے پہلے مفید ہو گا کہ ہم پاکستان کے قانون توہین رسالت کے ارتقاء پر ایک نظر ڈالیں۔

1860 میں جب مجموعہ تعزیرات ہند ، انگریز نے پہلی بار نافذ کیا تو اس وقت بھی اس میں ایک مستقل باب نافذ العمل کیا گیا جومذہب سے متعلق جرائمپر مشتمل تھا ۔اس سے کم ازکم یہ بات تو عیاں ہو تی ہے کہ مذہب سے متعلق جرائم اس وقت بھی مجموعہ تعزیرات کا حصہ تھے اور اس قانون کے تحریر کرنے اور نافذ کرنے والوں نے بھی مذہب سے متعلقہ جرائم کو 1860ء میں اس قانون کا لازمی حصہ رکھا ۔ ابتدائی طور پر باب 15 میں چار دفعات 295،296، 297 اور 298 وضع کی گئیں جوکہ کسی کے مذہبی مقدس مقامات کی توہین اور نقصان پہنچانے ،کسی مذہبی تقریب کو مداخلت کرنے ، قبرستان پر قبضہ کرنے اور کسی کےمذہبی جذبات کو ٹھیس پہنچانے کے جرائم کی تنفیذتھی ۔ اس وقت سے لے کر آج تک تقریباًڈیڑھ صدی سے زائد عرصہ گزرنے کے باوجودوہ قوانین آج بھی موجود ہیں او ر برصغیر کی عدالتوں سے لے کر برطانوی پریوی کونسل تک سینکڑوں مقدمات میں ان قوانین /دفعات کی تشریح اور عمل درآمد ہو چکا ہے اور قانون کی ہر کسو ٹی پر یہ دفعات پوری اُتری ہیں۔ مجموعہ تعزیرات پاکستان کے باب پندرہ (xv)کے اصلی حصے جو اُس مذہبی جرائم سے متعلق قانون کے لیے بنیادی ڈھانچہ فراہم کرتے ہیں ۔درج ذیل ہیں :

دفعہ 295 : عبادت گاہ کو کسی فرقے کے مذہب کی توہین کے ارادے سےبے حرمت کرنا یا اس فرقے کے ماننے والوں کے جذبات مجروح کرنا

جو کوئی بھی کسی بھی عبادت گاہ کو تباہ کرتا ہے اسے نقصان پہنچاتا ہے یا اس کی بے حرمتی کرتا ہےیا وہ کسی بھی جماعت کے لوگوں کی کسی متبرک شے کی بے حرمتی اس خیال سے کرتا ہے کہ اس سے ان لوگوں کی توہین ہو گی ، یا وہ ایسا اس نیت سے کرتا ہے کہ اس کے اس فعل سے وہ لوگ اس قسم کی تباہی ، نقصان یا بے حرمتی کو اپنے مذہب کی توہین تصور کریں گے ، ایسا شخص دو قسم کی سزا کا مستوجب ہو گا ، یا تو اسے قید کی سزا دی جائے گی جو دو سال تک کی ہو سکتی ہے یا اسے جرمانہ ہو گا یا پھر اسے قید اور جرمانہ دونوں ہوں گے ۔

دفعہ 296 : مذہبی اجتماع میں مداخلت کرنا

جو کوئی بھی مذہبی عبادت کے دوران از خود کسی مذہبی اجتماع میں مخل ہوتا ہے یا مذہبی رسومات کی ادائیگی میں مداخلت کرتا ہے تو اس کے لیے جن دو سزاؤں کی صراحت کی گئی ہے ان میں سے کوئی ایک سز ا ، جو ایک سال تک کی قید بھی ہو سکتی ہے دی جائے گی یا اسے جرمانہ کیا جائے گا یا قید اور جرمانہ دونوں ہوں گے ۔

دفعہ 297 : قبرستانوں وغیرہ میں مداخلت بے جا

جو کوئی بھی کسی فرد کے جذبات مجروح کرنے کی نیت رکھتا ہے یا کسی شخص کے مذہب کی توہین کرنے کا ارادہ رکھتا ہے یا وہ کوئی کام اس لیے کرتا ہے کہ اس کے اس فعل سے کسی شخص کے جذبات مجروح ہو سکتے ہیں یاا س سے کسی شخص کے مذہب کی توہین ہو گئی ، یا کسی کی عبادت گاہ میں مداخلت بے جا کا مرتکب ہوتا ہے ، کسی بت خانے میں مداخلت کرتا ہے ، یا کسی جنازہ گاہ کی مخصوص زمین میں مداخلت کرتا ہے یا جو جگہ قبرستان کے لیے مختص کی گئی ہو اس میں دخل بے جا کا مرتکب ہوتا ہے ، کسی انسانی لاش کی بے حرمتی کرتا ہے ، یا جنازہ کی رسومات میں شریک کسی شخص کے کام میں دخل دیتا ہے تو ایسا شخص کسی ایک سزا کا مستوجب ہو گا یا تو اسے ایک سال تک قید کی سزا دی جائے گی یا جرمانہ کیا جائے گا یا قید اور جرمانہ دونوں سزائیں دی جا سکیں گی ۔

دفعہ 298 :مذہبی جذبات مجروح کرنے کے لیے جان بوجھ کر ایسی زبان وغیرہ کا استعمال

جو کوئی بھی کسی شخص کے مذہبی جذبات کو مجروح کرنے کی نیت سے ایسی زبان استعمال کرتا ہے یا کسی کو سنانے کے لیے ایسی آواز نکالتا ہے یا کسی کو دکھاکر کوئی ایسا اشارہ کرتا ہے ، یا کوئی ایسی شے اس جگہ رکھ دیتا ہے جہاں سے وہ اس شخص کو نظر آرہی ہو ، تو ایسے شخص کوایک سال تک کی قید یا جرمانہ کی شکل میں کوئی ایک سزا دی جاسکتی ہے یا قید اور جرمانہ دونوں ۔

برطانوی سامراج نے بعد کے حالات میں اس بات کی مزید ضرورت محسوس کی کہ اُس باب میں قانون سازی کو مزید وسعت دی جائے اور 1927ء میں ترمیم کے ذریعے دفعہ 295 –اے ایزاد کیا گیا ۔ جس کی رو سے دانستہ طور پر بدنیتی کے ساتھ کسی کے مذہب اور مذہبی عقائد پر گستاخانہ حملہ چاہے الفاظ، تحریر ی یا زبانی کی صورت میں ہو یا مظاہر کے ذریعے سے ہو ، جرم قرار دیا گیا ۔

دفعہA295 کا اضافہ:کسی بھی جماعت کے مذہب یا مذہبی اعتقادات کی توہین کے لیے دانستہ معاندانہ فعل کا مرتکب ہونا

جو کوئی بھی جان بوجھ کر بد نیتی کے ساتھ کسی جماعت کے لو گوں کے مذہبی جذبات کو الفاظ سے مشتعل کرے ، خواہ الفاظ زبان سے ادا کیے جائیں یا تحریر میں لائے جائیں ، یا نظر آنے والے کسی مجسمے یا تصویر کے ذریعے ایسا کرنے کا مرتکب ہو ، اس جماعت کے مذہب یا مذہبی اعتقادات کی توہین کرے وہ کسی ایک سزا کا مستوجب ہو گا جو دوسال تک قید بھی ہو سکتی ہے یا اسے جرمانہ کیا جاسکتا ہے یا قید اور جرمانہ دونوں سزائیں دی جا سکتی ہیں ۔

پاکستان کے قیام کے بعد1982ء میں ایک ترمیم کے ذریعے 295 بی کا اضافہ کیا گیا جس کی رو سے قرآن مجید کی بے حرمتی کو جرم قرار دیا گیا ۔

دفعہB295 :قرآن حکیم کی بے حرمتی وغیرہ

جو کوئی بھی عمداً قرآن حکیم کے کسی نسخے کی بے حرمتی کرتا ہے ، اسے نقصان پہنچاتا ہے ، اس کی توہین کرتا ہے یا اس کے کسی حصے کی توہین کرتا ہے یا اسے تحقیر آمیز طریقے سے استعمال کرتا ہے یا اسے کسی غیر قانونی مقصد کے لیے استعمال کرتا ہے ایسے شخص کو عمر قید سزا دی جائے گی۔

بعد ازاں 1986ء میں اسی باب میں مزید توضیح اور اضافہ کرتے ہوئے توہین رسالت کے جرم کا اضافہ کرتے ہوئے دفعہ 295 سی کا اضافہ کیا گیا، جو کہ نبی ﷺ کے دور سے لے کر پاکستان میں از سر نو نفاذ بشکل قانون 295 سی تک ہمیشہ رائج و نافذ رہا ہے ۔

دفعہC295 : آں حضرت ﷺ کی شان میں گستاخی یا توہین آمیز را ئے کا اظہار

جو کوئی بھی آں حضرت ﷺ کے مقدس نام کی توہین زبانی یا تحریری الفاظ میں کرتا ہے، یا نظر آنے والی تصاویر یا باتوں کے ذریعے یا بہتان تراشی ، طعن و تعریض کے ذریعے ، بالواسطہ یا بلاواسطہ حضور ﷺ کی شان میں گستاخی کرتا ہے وہ سزائے موت کا مستوجب ہو گا یا اسے عمر قید کی سزا ہو گی اور اسے جرمانہ ہو جائے گا ۔

اس قانون میں دو سزائیں تجویز کی گئیں ، سزائے موت یا عمر قید سزا ، چو نکہ توہین رسالت کے مرتکب کی سزا "عمر قید "اسلامی قانون کے خلاف تھی ، لہذا سپریم کورٹ کے سینئرایڈووکیٹ جناب محمد اسماعیل قریشی نے اس قانون کو وفاقی شرعی عدالت میں چیلنج کر دیا کہ توہین رسالت کی سزا بطور حد سزائے موت ہے اور حد کی سزا میں کسی کو کمی یا بیشی کا اختیار نہیں اور یہ ناقابل معافی جرم ہے ۔ اس مقدمہ کی تفصیلی سماعت کے بعد مورخہ 30 اکتوبر 1990ء کو وفاقی شرعی عدالت کے فل بینچ مشتمل جناب جسٹس گل محمد خان ، چیف جسٹس جناب جسٹس عبد الکریم خان کنڈی ، جناب جسٹس عبادت یار خان ، جناب جسٹس عبد الرزاق اے تھیم اور جناب جسٹس فدا محمد خان نے درخواست کو منظور کرتے ہوئے حکم دیا کہ متبادل سزا عمر قید اسلام کی واضح نصوص کے منافی ہے ۔اور دفعہ C295میں لفظ "یا عمر قید "شریعت اسلا می کے خلاف ہے اور صدر پاکستان کو ہدایت کی گئی کہ اس قانون کی اصلاح 30 اپریل 1990 ء تک کریں ، بصورت دیگر یہ الفاظ مدت معینہ /مقررہ کے اختتام پر کالعدم تصور ہو ں گے ۔ چناچہ مقررہ مدت تک یہ کام مکمل نہ ہو سکنے کی وجہ سے یہ قانون فیڈرل شریعت کورٹ کے فیصلے(PLD1991FSC10)کی رو سے سزا سزائے موت ہے وفاقی حکومت نے اپیل کر کے واپس لے لی ۔ یہاں یہ امر قابل ذکر ہے کہ 02جون 1992ءکو قومی اسمبلی میں 8 جنوری 1992ء کو سینٹ میں یہ قانون متفقہ طور پر منظور کر کے نافذ العمل بنایا گیا ۔[65]

قانون کے اس تاریخی پس منظر سے درج ذیل نکات اخذ ہوتے ہیں ۔

1. توہین مذاہب ، مذہبی عقائد کی توہین ، مذہبی عبادات اور مذہبی رسوم میں دراندازی اور رکاوٹ ، مقد س مقامات کی توہین پر جرم کا قانون ۔برصغیر میں گذشتہ 157 سال سے رائج ہے ۔

2. کسی گروہ کے مذہبی جذبات کو زک پہنچانے کے اقدام کو بھی انگریز کے سامراجی دور سے ہی جرم گردانا گیا ہے اور قابل سزا تصور کیا گیا ہے ۔

3. یہ قوانین گذشتہ ڈیڑھ صدی سے سینکڑوںمقدمات میں قانون اور عدالت کی کسوٹی پر پورے اُترے ہیں ۔ نہ صرف پاکستانی عدالتوں بلکہ پریوی کونسل تک عدم مذہبی منافرت اور توہین مذہب کے قانون کو توثیق حاصل رہی ہے ۔

4. C295 اور 295 ، A295 کے ضمن میں 'insult’ injury’اور defile کے الفاظ استعمال ہوئے ہیں وہ کسی طور بھی مبہم نہ ہیں بلکہ قانون کی منشاء بالکل واضح ہے ۔

5. C295میں شاتم رسول ﷺ کی سزا موت پاکستان کی پارلیمنٹ نے منظور کی جو کہ پاکستان کے عوام کی خواہشات کی ترجمان ہے ۔

12۔ پاکستان کی سپریم کورٹ نے اٹھارویں ترمیم کے فیصلے (بعنوان ڈسٹرکٹ بار ایسوسی ایشن راولپنڈی بنام وفاق ِ پاکستان ( PLD 2015 SC 401) نے یہ قرار دیا ہے کہ پاکستان کے دستور پر ایک طائرانہ نظر ڈالنے سے یہ بات عیاں ہوتی ہے کہ پاکستان ایک جمہوریت ہے جہاں حتمی اقتدار اعلیٰ اللہ رب العزت کا ہے اور یہ اختیار پاکستان کے عوام کو تفویض کیا گیا ہے ۔اسی فیصلے کے پیرا نمبر 54 میں اکثریتی فیصلے کے متن میں ، جسے جسٹس شیخ عظمت سعید نے تحریر کرتےہوئے یہ قرار دیا ہے کہ

"یہ بات بالکل واضح اور روشن ہے کہ ہمارے اصول ِ قانون جو کہ عدالتوں کے نظائر کی روشنی میں ارتقاءپذیر ہوئے ، یہ بات مسلمہ طور پر ثابت اور تسلیم کردہ ہے کہ دستور کوئی متفرق دفعات کا جتھا نہیں جنہیں باہمی گانٹھ دیا گیا ہو بلکہ دستور کی دفعات میں ایک یکسانیت اور مربوط اسکیم ہے جو دستو ر کی بنیادی دفعات سے واضح ہے ، جو کہ دستور کی نمایاں اور واضح خصوصیات ہیں"۔[66]

اسی بات کوفاضل جسٹس جواد ایس خواجہ صاحب نے اپنے اقلیتی نوٹ میں بیان کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ" آئین کے کسی بھی آرٹیکل کو باقی آئین سے علیحدہ کر کےانفرادی طور پر نہیں سمجھا جا سکتا " مزید فرمایا کہ

"ہمارے اصول قانون میں اب تک یہ بات طے ہو چکی ہے کہ آئین کا مطالعہ تاریخٰی تناظر میں اور ایک نامیاتی کل ((Organic Whole کے طور پر کیا جائے گا ۔ اگر آئین کی جزوی شقوں اور احکامات کو باقی آئین سے الگ کر کے دیکھا جائے تو یہ قاری کو گمراہ کر سکتا ہے ۔ لہذا آئین کا مفہوم اور مدعا معلوم کرنے کے لیے اُس کے اجزا کی میکانکی انداز میں عقلی توجیہ کرنے کی بجائے اُسے ایک مربوط کل کی طرح دیکھنا پڑے گا۔ یہ بات ہماری قدیم اور سادہ دانش کا عطر رہی ہے جو منطق کی رو سے بھی کشید ہو تی ہے اور نظائر سے استدلال کے طریقے میں بھی پوری طرح راسخ ہے ۔اس کے نتیجے میں آئین کی تعبیر و تشریح کا یہ اصول طے پاتا ہے کہ آئین کو ایک زندہ حقیقت یا نامیاتی کل کے طور پر دیکھا اور سمجھا جائے ۔"[67]

13۔ 1973کے آئین کا سر چشمہ پاکستان کے عوام ہیں ۔ پاکستان کی پہلی دستور ساز اسمبلی جس نے1949ء میں قرار داد مقاصد کو منظور کیا ، ایسے ارکان پر مشتمل تھی جو جدوجہد آزادی کے سرخیل اور بلاشبہ پاکستان کے بانیان تھے ۔ جن کی قیادت میں مملکت خداد اد پاکستان معرض وجود میں آئی ۔ پہلی دستور ساز اسمبلی نے جب سے قرارداد مقاصد منظور کی تو یہ ایک تاریخی حقیقت ہے کہ قرار داد مقاصد اس وقت سے پاکستان کے ہر آئین کادیباچہ رہی ۔اور 1973 کے آئین کا بھی دیباچہ اور آئینی تمہید قرارداد مقاصد ہی ہے جو کہ دستورکے ساتھ بطور ضمیمہ بھی شامل ہے ۔یہ بات بھی واضح ہے کہ 1949 میں اور 1973 میں بھی قانون ساز اسمبلی کے ارکان آئینی اصولوں کے نازک اور باریک معاملات کو خوب اچھی طرح سمجھتے تھے ۔ پاکستان کی عدالتی تاریخ میں قرارداد مقاصد اس حوالے سے بھی ایک اہم موضوع کے طور پر زیر بحث رہی ہے کہ آیا باقی دستور پرقرارداد مقاصد کو بالاتر حیثیت حاصل ہے یا نہیں ؟ بہر حال قرارداد مقاصد کی باقی آئین پر بالاتر حیثیت پر اختلاف کے باوجود یہ امر متفقہ طے شدہ ہے کہ قرارداد مقاصد کو دستور کی دیگر دفعات کی طرح ایک اہم مقام حاصل ہے ۔اور عدالت عظمیٰ کے اٹھارویں ترمیم کے فیصلے کے مطابق دستور کی تشریح کا ایک بنیادی اصول یہ ہے کہ اُسے ایک ہم آہنگ اور نامیاتی کل کے طور پر لیا جائے ۔اگر پاکستان کے دستور کو ایک ہم آہنگ ، مربوط ، منظم اور نامیاتی کل کے طور پر دیکھا جائے تو دستور کی دینی ساخت اور اسلامی حیثیت کا تعین کرنا چنداں مشکل نہیں ۔دستور کی متعدد دفعات اور دستور کے تحت قائم کیے گئے ادارے قیام پاکستان کے مقاصد اور مملکت کی نظریاتی اساس کی عکاسی کرتے نظر آتے ہیں ۔ دستور چونکہ عوام کی خواہشات کا ترجمان ، ماضی کا بیان اور مستقبل کا نشان ہو تاہے جس سے نہ صرف تمام ادارے وجود میں آتے ہیں بلکہ یہی وہ میزان اورمقیاس ہے جس سے عوامی امنگوں ، قومی مقاصد اور نصب العین کو پرکھا اور جانچا جا سکتا ہے ۔ دراصل دستور ہی وہ آئینہ ہے جس سے ایک طرف ملک کی تاریخ کا عکس جھلکتا ہے ، حال کا ادراک ہو تاہے اور مستقبل کا نقشہ نظر آتا ہے ۔ اس تناظر میں 1973 ء کا آئین سب سے پہلے اپنی تمہید (Preamble) میں واشگاف الفاظ میں پاکستان کے جمہور کی طرف سے یہ اعلان کرتا ہےکہ " جمہوریت،آزادی ،مساوات،رواداری اور عدل ِعمرانی کے اصولوں پر جس طرح اسلام نے ان کی تشریح کی ہے ، پوری طرح عمل کیا جائے گا۔جس میں مسلمانوں کوانفرادی اور اجتماعی حلقہ ہائے عمل میں اس قابل بنایا جائے گا کہ وہ اپنی زندگی کو اسلامی تعلیمات و مقتضیات کے مطابق، جس طرح قرآن ِ پاک و سنت میں ان کا تعین کیا گیا ہے ، ترتیب دے سکیں" اور اس امر کا بھی اظہار کیا گیا ہے کہ "بنیادی حقوق کی ضمانت دی جائے گی اور ان حقوق میں قانون اور اخلاق عامہ کے تابع حیثیت اورمواقع میں مساوات ، قانون کی نظر میں برابری ،معاشرتی، معاشی اور سیاسی انصاف ، اظہار خیال ، عقیدہ ،دین ، عبادت اور اجتماع کی آزادی شامل ہو گی۔ " اور پھر مزید یہ اقرارکہ " لہذا ، اب ، ہم جمہوریہ پاکستان ؛قادرمطلق اللہ تبارک و تعالیٰ اور اس کے بندوں کے سامنے اپنی ذمہ داری کے احساس کے ساتھ ، پاکستان کی خاطر عوام کی دی ہوئی قربانیوں کے اعتراف کے ساتھ ؛بانی پاکستان قائد اعظم محمد علی جناح کے اس اعلان سے وفاداری کے ساتھ کہ پاکستان عدل عمرانی کے اسلامی اصولوں پر مبنی ایک جمہوری مملکت ہو گی ؛اس جمہوریت کے تحفظ کے لیے وقف ہونے کے جذبے کے ساتھ جو ظلم و ستم کے خلاف عوام کی انتھک جدوجہد کے نتیجے میں حاصل ہوئی ہے ۔۔۔۔۔اسے اپنا دستور تسلیم کرتے ہیں ۔" دستور کی دفعہ 2 میں اسلام کو پاکستان کا ریاستی مذہب قرار دیا گیا ۔ دستور کی دفعہ 2 الف میں یہ قرار دیا گیا کہ " ضمیمہ میں نقل کردہ قرارداد مقاصد میں بیان کردہ اصول اور احکام کو بذریعہ ہذا دستور کا مستقل حصہ قرار دیا جاتا ہے اور وہ بحسبہ مؤثر ہوں گے ۔ضمیمہ میں شامل قرارداد مقاصد کا متن درج ذیل ہے :

" اللہ تعالیٰ ہی کل کا ئنات کا بلا شرکت ِ غیرے حاکم ِمطلق ہے۔اس نے جمہور کے ذریعے مملکتِ پاکستان کو جو اختیار سونپا ہے، وہ اس کی مقررہ حدود کے اندر مقدس امانت کے طور پر استعمال کیاجائے گا۔مجلس دستور ساز نے جو جمہور پاکستان کی نمائندہ ہے ،آزاد و خود مختار پاکستان کے لیے ایک دستور مرتب کر نے کا فیصلہ کیا ہے۔جس کی رو سے مملکت اپنے اختیارات و اقتدار کو جمہور کے منتخب نمائندوں کے ذریعے استعمال کرے گی۔جس کی رو سے اسلام کے جمہوریت، حریت، مساوات، رواداری اور عدل ِعمرانی کے اصولوں کا پورا اتباع کیا جائے گا۔جس کی رو سے مسلمانوں کو اس قابل بنا دیا جائے گا کہ وہ انفرادی اور اجتماعی طور پر اپنی زندگی کو قرآن و سنت میں درج اسلامی تعلیمات و مقتضیات کے مطابق ترتیب دے سکیں۔جس کی رو سے اس امر کا قرارواقعی اہتمام کیا جائے گا کہ اقلیتیں، اپنے مذاہب پر عقیدہ رکھنے،عمل کر نے اور اپنی ثقافتوں کو ترقی دینے کے لیےآزاد ہوں۔جس کی رو سے وہ علاقے جو اب تک پا کستان میں داخل یا شامل ہو جا ئیں،ایک وفاق بنا ئیں گےجس کے صوبوں کو مقررہ اختیارات واقتدار کی حدتک خود مختاری حاصل ہو گی۔جس کی رو سے بنیادی حقوق کی ضمانت دی جا ئے گی اور ان حقوق میں جہاں تک قانون واخلاق اجازت دیں، مساوات،حیثیت ومواقع کی نظر میں برابری، عمرانی، اقتصادی اور سیاسی انصاف، اظہارخیال، عقیدہ، دین، عبادت اور جماعت کی آزادی شامل ہو گی۔جس کی رو سے اقلیتوں اور پسماندہ و پست طبقات

کے جا ئز حقوق کے تحفظ کا قرار واقعی انتظام کیا جائے گا۔جس کی رو سے نظام ِعدل گستری کی آزادی پو ری طرح محفوظ ہو گی۔جس کی رو سے وفاق کے علاقوں کی صیانت،آزادی اور جملہ حقوق ،بشمول خشکی و تری اور فضا پر صیانت کے حقوق کا تحفظ کیا جا ئے گا۔تاکہ اہل ِپاکستان فلاح وبہبود کی منزل پا سکیں اور اقوام عالم کی صف میں اپنا جائز و ممتاز مقام حاصل کریں اور امن عالم اور بنی نوع انسان کی تر قی و خوش حالی کے لیے اپنا بھر پور کر دار ادا کر سکیں۔"

14۔ دستور کا ایک اہم عنصر دفعہ (3) 260 میں دی گئی مسلمان اور غیر مسلم کی تعریف ہے ۔ دستور میں دی گئی تعریف کی رُوسے مسلمان وہ شخص ہے جواللہ تعالیٰ کی وحدانیت و توحید اورمحمد رسول ﷺ کے مطلقاً خاتم النبین ہونے پر ایمان رکھے اور کسی ایسے شخص کو نہیں مانتا نہ ایمان رکھتا ہے جو محمد رسول ﷺ کے بعد نبی ہونے کا دعویٰ کرے خواہ کسی بھی مفہوم میں ہو ۔غیر مسلم کی تعریف کرتے ہوئے واشگاف الفاظ میں قادیانی گروپ اور لاہوری گروپ کو ( جو اپنے آپ کو احمدی کہتے ہیں )اور بہائیوں کو ، غیر مسلموں میں شمار کیا گیا ہے۔جس کی بنیادی وجہ مسلمانوں کا علیحدہ تشخص اور مستقل وجود کا اظہار و اقرار ہے۔ دستور کی یہ دفعات جو مسلمان کی تعریف میں نبی مہربان حضرت محمد ﷺ کے خاتم النبیین ہونے کے اعلان سےمتعلق ہے وہ انتہائی اہمیت کی حامل ہے اور نبی کریم ﷺ کی ذات کے بارے میں امت کے مؤقف کی ترجمان ہیں۔یہاں یہ امر قابل ذکر ہے کہ دستور نے ایسے شخص کو غیر مسلم قرار دیا ہے جو نبی کریم ﷺ کو بطور خاتم النبیین تسلیم نہ کرتا ہو تو پھر کیا ایسے شخص کے بارے میں جو نبی کریم ﷺ کی شان اقدس میں نازیباالفاظ استعمال کرے اُس کے انجام کے تعین میں کوئی ابہام باقی رہتا ہے ؟ جس طرح نبی کریم ﷺ کی ذات کو آخری نبی تسلیم کرنےسے انکارکرنا یا پس و پیش سے کام لینا دستور و شریعت کے مطابق دائرہ اسلام سے اخراج کا سبب ہے تو نبی کریم ﷺ کی ذات پر سب و شتم بدرجہ اولیٰ انکار اور کفر ہے ۔ اسی طرح دستور پاکستان میں جمہور کی منشاء کی ترجمانی کرتے ہوئے ایک مستقل باب10 بعنوان اسلامی دفعات کی دفعہ 227 میں قرار دیا ہے کہ پاکستان میں کوئی قانون قرآن و سنت کے منافی نہیں بنایا جائے گا بلکہ مملکت پر یہ بھی لازم کیا ہے کہ پہلے سے موجود تمام قوانین کو اسلام کی تعلیمات جو کہ قرآن اور سنت میں بیان کی گئی ہیں ، کے مطابق ڈھالاجائے گا ۔اس مقصد کے حصول کے لیے دستور پاکستان نے اسلامی نظریاتی کونسل کا ادارہ تشکیل دیا ، دستور کی دفعات، 228،229،230،231 اس سلسلے میں مستقل ہدایات سموئے ہوئے ہیں۔ دفعہ(a)(1)230 میں اسلامی نظریاتی کونسل کے اغراض و مقاصد اور فرائض میں یہ صراحت کی گئی ہے کہ وہ قومی اور صوبائی اسمبلیوں کو اپنی تجاویز دے کہ جن کے ذریعے پاکستان کے مسلمانوں کو اپنی انفرادی اور اجتماعی زندگیوں کو تمام معاملات میں اسلام کے اصول و مقتضیات جو قرآن و سنت میں بیان ہوئے ہیں ، کے مطابق زندگی گزارنے کے قابل بنائے اور اس کی حوصلہ افزائی کرے ۔ یہاں یہ عمل قابل ذکر ہے کہ دستور نے مذکورہ دفعہ میں اس ضمن میں حوصلہ افزائی کرنے ((Encouragingکا لفظ استعمال کیا ہے تاکہ اس امر کی وضاحت ہو سکے کہ ریاست کی ذمہ داری صرف قرآن و سنت کے مطابق زندگی گزارنے کے قابل بنانا ہی نہیں بلکہ اُس کی حوصلہ افزائی بھی کرنا ہے ۔ دستور مسلمانوں کو نہ صرف قرآن و سنت کے مطابق زندگی گزارنے کی ضمانت دیتا ہے بلکہ ریاست کی یہ ذمہ داری قرار دیتا ہے کہ وہ اس حوالے سے تمام ضروری اقدامات کرے اور اس عمل کی حوصلہ افزائی کرے ۔ اس مقدمے کی سماعت کے دوران یہ دستور ی تقاضا عدالت کے سامنے رہا ہے کہ جہاں اسلامی نظریاتی کونسل کو یہ فریضہ سونپا گیا ہے کہ وہ ایسی سفارشات پیش کرے جس کے ذریعے مسلمانان پاکستان قرآن و سنت کے مطابق اپنی زندگی کو انفرادی اور اجتماعی سطح پر تشکیل دے سکیں تو یقیناًدستور پاکستان میں ایک ایسا ماحول پیداکرنا چاہتا ہے جہاں اطاعت خداوندی کی حوصلہ افزائی ہو ، سنت رسول کے اتباع کی افزائش ہو ، نیکیوں کی ترویج ہو ۔ عصمت انبیاء ، ناموس صحابہ ، حرمت ِ امہات المؤمنین کی حفاظت ہو اورفحاشی ، بے راہ روی اوراسلام دشمنی کے تمام راستے مسدود کیے جاسکیں ۔"آرٹیکل (3)228کی رو سے قومی اسمبلی ، صوبائی اسمبلی ، صدر یا کوئی گورنر اسلامی نظریے کی مشاورتی کونسل کو مشورے کے لیے سوال بھیج سکتے ہیں کہ آیا کوئی مجوزہ قانون قرآن و سنت میں بیان اسلامی تعلیمات کی مقتضیات کے منافی تو نہیں ۔ "آرٹیکل722 میں کہا گیا ہے کہ کوئی قانون قرآن و سنت میں بیان اسلامی تعلیمات و مقتضیات کے منافی نہیں بنایا جا ئے گا اور موجودہ تمام قوانین کو قرآن و سنت کے مطابق ڈھالا جائے گا۔"آرٹیکل 230 کے مطابق کونسل کے فرائض مندرجہ ذیل ہیں :

1۔ پارلیمنٹ اور صوبائی اسمبلیوں کے لیے سفارشات تیار کرنا تاکہ پاکستان کے مسلمان اپنی انفرادی اور اجتماعی زندگیوں کو ہر لحاظ سے اسلام کے اصولوںاور تصورات کے مطابق بنا سکیں۔

2۔کسی ایوان ، اسمبلی ، صدر یا گورنر کی اس بارے میں راہ نمائی کرنا کہ آیا مجوزہ قانون اسلام کے مطابق ہے یا نہیں ۔

3۔موجودہ قوانین کا جائزہ لے کر ایسی سفارشات تیار کرنا تاکہ یہ قوانین احکام اسلام کے مطابق ہو جائیں ۔

4۔ احکام اسلام کو ایک مناسب شکل میں ترتیب دینا تاکہ پارلیمنٹ اور صوبائی اسمبلیاں ان پر قانون سازی کر سکیں ۔"

آرٹیکل 30 میں ریاست کے بنیادی اصول بیان کرتے ہوئے یہ قرار دیا گیا ہے "پاکستان کے مسلمانوں کو انفرادی اور اجتماعی طور پر اس قابل بنایا جائے کہ وہ اپنی زندگی اسلام کے بنیادی اصولوں اور اساسی تصورات کے مطابق ڈھالیں اور انہیں ایسی سہولتیں بہم پہنچائی جائیں جن کی مدد سے وہ ان اصولوں اور تصورات کے مطابق زندگی کا مفہوم سمجھنے کے قابل ہو جائیں ۔ پاکستان کے مسلمانوں کے لیے قرآن مجید اور اسلامیات کی تعلیم لازمی قرار دی جانا چاہیے ۔ باہمی اتحاد اور اسلامی اخلاقی معیار کو فروغ دیا جانا چاہیے ۔ زکوٰۃ ، اوقاف اور مساجد کی باقاعدہ تنظیم کا اہتمام کیا جانا چاہیے۔"دستور پاکستان قانون کو قرآن و سنت کی بنیاد پر وضع کرنے کا کس درجہ اہتمام کرتا ہے وہ اسی حقیقت سے عیاں ہے کہ جہاں ایک طرف دستورملک کی مقننہ پر یہ پابندی عائد کرتا ہے کہ وہ قرآن و سنت کے منافی کوئی قانون سازی نہیں کرے گی تو دوسری طرف اس سلسلے میں مکمل راہنمائی اور جائزے کے لیے اسلامی نظریاتی کونسل کا ادارہ قائم کرتا ہے ۔لیکن اگر اس کے باوجود بھی کوئی قانون قرآن و سنت کی تعلیمات کے خلاف منشاء ظہور پر آجائے یا پہلے سے وقوع پذیر ایسا قانون باقی رہ جائے تو وفاقی شرعی عدالتاس کا جائزہ لے سکے اور اگر اس قانون کو قرآن و سنت کے منافی پائے تو اسےکالعدم قرار دے کر ختم کر دے۔دستور کا باب A3اس حوالےسے ایک مستقل ضابطہ ہے ۔دفعہ A203 سے لے کر دفعہ J203تک 16 تفصیلی دفعات فیڈرل شریعت کورٹ کے اختیارات اور طریقہ کار سے متعلق ہیں۔اس باب کی بنیادی دفعہ D 203 جو کہ عدالت کے اختیار سماعت سے متعلق ہے ، عدالت کو یہ اختیار دیا گیا ہے کہ "عدالت اپنی کسی تحریک پر ، یا پاکستان کے کسی شہری ، وفاقی حکومت یا کسی صوبائی حکومت کی درخواست پر کسی قانون یا اس کی کسی شق کا جائزہ لے سکتی ہے اور فیصلہ کر سکتی ہے کہ آیا یہ قانون یااس کی کوئی شق احکام اسلام ، جیسا کہ قرآن و سنت میں مذکور ہیں ، کے منافی تو نہیں ہے ۔"

اسلامی نظریہ ملک کی اساس ہے اور غیر مسلم عہد یدار بھی اس کے تحفظ کا حلف اٹھائے گا ، دستور کے جدول دوم میں سولہ دستوری عہدوں کے حلف کی عبارتیں ملتی ہیں ۔ا ن میں سے پہلے بارہ عہدوں ۔۔۔۔صدر ، نائب صدر ، وزراء و وزرائے مملکت ،اسپیکر اسمبلی ، ڈپٹی اسپیکر قومی اسمبلی ، رکن قومی اسمبلی ، صدر قومی اسمبلی ، گورنر صوبہ جات ، صوبائی وزراء، صوبائی اسمبلیوں کے اسپیکر ، صوبائی اسمبلیوں کے ڈپٹی اسپیکر اور رکن صوبائی اسمبلی ۔۔۔کے حلف کی تمام عبارتوں میں یہ جملہ موجود ہے " کہ میں اسلامی نظریہ کو برقرار رکھنے کے لیے کوشاں رہوں گا جو قیام پاکستان کی بنیاد ہے " حالانکہ ان دستوری عہدوں میں سے صدر اور نائب صدر کے سواء کسی کے لیے مسلمان ہو نا شرط نہیں ہے۔ان پر غیر مسلم بھی فائز ہو سکتے ہیں ۔ لیکن حلف کی عبار ت میں سیاسی اعتبار سے یہ اہتمام موجود ہے کہ اگر کوئی غیر مسلم کسی وقت ان عہدوں پر فائز ہو تو اپنے مذہب اور عقیدے پر قائم رہتے ہوئے بھی وہ پاکستان کی نظریاتی بنیاد ۔۔۔ اسلامی نظریہ ۔۔۔کا تحفظ کرے گا ۔"[68]

15۔ یہ تو دستور کا ایک سرسری جائز ہ ہے جو صرف اس امر کے اظہار کے لیے بیان کیا گیا ہے کہ پاکستان کا دستور جس کی حفاظت ہم سب پر فرض ہے ۔دفعہ 5 کے مطابق پاکستان کے ہر شہری کا فرض ہے کہ وہ دستور کی پاسداری کرے اور ریاست اسلامی جمہوریہ پاکستان کا وفادار رہے ۔اعلیٰ عدلیہ کے جج کی حیثیت سے یہ عدالت عوام کی ہدایات کی امین ہے اوراس حیثیت میں آئین کے تحفظ پر مامور ہےاور آئین کے تحت حلف کی روشنی میں اس کے فرائضِ منصبی میں آئین کی حفاظت اور دفاع شامل ہے ۔ آئین کا جو جائزہ عدالت نے پیش کیا ہے اس کی روشنی میں اس عدالت کو کوئی ابہام نہیں ہے کہ مملکت خداداد پاکستان میں مقدس ہستیوں کی توہین کی ناپاک جسارت دراصل پاکستان کے دستور اور نظریے کے ساتھ غداری ہے ۔ ہم عدالت عظمیٰ پاکستان کے فیصلہ جات کی روشنی میں یہ قرار دے چکے ہیں کہ آئین کو ایک مربوط ، یکجاء اور کل کی حیثیت سے تشریح کی جانی چاہیے اور آئین پاکستان کے مختلف دفعات ایک لڑی کی طرح اس انداز میں پروئے گئے ہیں کہ اسلامی جمہوریہ پاکستان میں قرآن و سنت کی تعلیمات اور مقتضیات کو کلیدی، بنیادی اوراولین اہمیت حاصل ہے ۔ آئین پاکستان دراصل پاکستان کے بانیان کے تصور کی ایک جھلک ہے جس کا وعدہ اور عہد انہوں نے تحریک پاکستان کےدوران کیا تھا۔یہاں مناسب معلوم ہوتاہے کہ بانیان پاکستان کے تصور پاکستان کی ایک تصویر اُن کے اپنے خطابات اور تحریروں کی روشنی میں پیش کی جائے تاکہ پاکستان کے اولین مسلمانوں کی تمنائیں اور ان کی جدو جہد کا مقصد واضح ہو سکے ۔ علامہ اقبال کا مشہور خطبہ الہ آباد (1930) جو کہ تصور پاکستان کی بنیاد ہے ، اُس عظیم خطبے میں علامہ اقبال امت مسلمہ کے مقصد وجود اور اس تناظر میں مسلمانوں کے لیے جداگانہ سیاسی ڈھانچے کی وضاحت کرتے ہوئے کہتے ہیں کہ:

"ظاہر ہے کہ اگر مذہب کا تصور یہی ہے کہ اس کا تعلق صرف آخرت سے ہے اور انسان کی دنیوی زندگی سے اسے کوئی سروکار نہیں تو جو انقلاب مسیحی دنیا میں رونما ہو چکا ہے ،وہ ایک طبعی امر تھا ۔ مسیح ؑ کا عالم گیر نظام ِاخلاق نیست و نابود ہو چکا ہے اور اس کی جگہ اخلاقیات و سیاسیات کے قومی نظم نے لے لی ہے ۔ اس سے اہل مغرب بجا طور پر اس نتیجے پر پہنچے ہیں کہ مذہب کا معاملہ ہر فرد کی اپنی ذات تک محدد د ہے ۔ اسے دنیاوی زندگی سے کوئی تعلق نہیں ۔ لیکن اسلام کے نزدیک ذات ِ انسانی بجائے خود ایک وحدت ہے ،وہ مادہ اور روح کی کسی ناقابل اتحاد ثنویت کا قائل نہیں ۔" [69]

قائداعظم کا اگست 1944ءکا گاندھی جی کے نام خط قیام پاکستان کے مقاصد کی وضاحت میں ایک بنیادی دستاویز ہے جس میں بانی پاکستان نے گاندھی جی کو آگاہ کیا :

" قرآن مسلمانوں کا ضابطہ حیات ہے ۔ اس میں مذہبی اور مجلسی ، دیوانی اور فوجداری ، عسکری اور تعزیری ، معاشی اور معاشرتی غرض کہ سب شعبوں کے احکام موجود ہیں ۔ مذہبی رسوم سے لے کر امور حیات تک ، روح کی نجات سے لے کر جسم کی صحت تک ، جماعت کے حقوق سے لے کر فرد کے حقوق و فرائض تک دنیوی زندگی میں جزاو سزا سے لے کر عقبیٰ کی جزا و سزا تک ، ہر فعل ،قول اور حرکت پر مکمل احکام کا مجموعہ ہے ۔ لہذا جب میں یہ کہتا ہوں کہ مسلمان ایک قوم ہے تو حیات و مابعد حیات کے ہر معیار اور ہر مقدار کے مطابق کہتا ہوں ۔ہر مسلمان جانتا ہے کہ قرآنی تعلیمات محض عبادات و اخلاقیات تک محدود نہیں بلکہ قرآن کریم مسلمانوں کا دین و ایمان اور قانون حیات ہے۔ یعنی مذہبی ، معاشرتی ، تجارتی ، تمدنی ، عسکری ، عدالتی اور تعزیری احکام کا مجموعہ ہے ۔"[70]

پنجاب اسٹوڈنٹس فیڈریشن کی سالانہ کانفرنس کے اختتامی اجلاس میں ، تقریر ، لاہور 19 مارچ 1944ء، میں قائداعظم نے فرمایا:

ہمیں ہلالی پر چم کے علادہ کوئی پرچم درکار نہیں ۔ اسلا م ہمارا رہنما ہے جوہماری زندگی کا ایک مکمل ضابطہ حیات ہے ۔ ہمیں اور کوئی سرخ یا زرد پرچم نہیں چاہیے ۔ہمیں کوئی اور فکر (ازم ) مطلوب و مقصود نہیں نہ اشتمالیت نہ اشتراکیت ۔ [71]

پنجاب مسلم سٹوڈنٹس فیڈریشن ، منعقدہ 19 مارچ 1944ء میں صدارتی خطبہ ، لاہور ، کے اسی اجلاس میں مزید وضاحت کی:

ہماری بنیاد اور ہماری کشتی کا لنگر اسلام اور صرف اسلام ہے ۔ ذات پات کیا ، شیعہ سنی کا بھی کوئی مسئلہ نہیں ہے ۔ ہم ایک ہیں اور ہمیں بحیثیت ایک متحد قوم ہی کے آگے بڑھنا ہے ۔ صرف ایک رہ کر ہی ہم پاکستان کو قائم کر سکتے ہیں ہمارے لیے اسلام ہی کافی و شافی ہے ۔[72]

میلاد النبی ﷺ کی تقریب پیغام بمبئ، 5 فروری 1945ء:

میں آج آپ کو اس کے سوا کیا پیام دے سکتا ہوں کہ ساری دنیا میں مسلمانوں کو اسلام کی بہترین روایات کے مطابق زندگی گزارنا چاہیے ، جو دین ہمیں رسو ل اللہ ﷺ کی وساطت سے ملا ہے ۔ [73]

سبی دربار بلوچستان سے خطاب کرتے ہوئے 14 فروری 1948 ء کو فرمایا :

" میرا ایمان ہے کہ ہماری نجات اسوۃ حسنہ پر چلنے میں ہے ۔ جو قانون عطاکرنے والے پیغمبر اسلامﷺ نے ہمارے لیے بنایا ہے ، ہمیں چاہیے کہ اپنی جمہوریت کی بنیادیں صحیح معنوں میں اسلامی تصورات اور اصولوں پر رکھیں۔"[74]

(ملت کا پاسبان قائد اعظم محمد علی جناح از علی سفیان آفاقی ، سارنگ پبلی کیشنز ،لاہور )

میلاد النبی ﷺ کی تقریب سے خطاب ، کراچی 25 جنوری 1948 ء، کرتے ہوئے واشگاف انداز میں کہا کہ:

میں سمجھنے سے قاصر ہوں کہ لوگوں کا ایک طبقہ جو دانستہ طور شرارت کرنا چاہتا ہے ، یہ پروپیگنڈہ کر رہا ہے کہ پاکستان کے دستور کی اساس شریعت پر استوار نہیں کی جائے گی ۔ آج بھی اسلامی اصولوں کازندگی پر اسی طرح اطلاق ہوتا ہے جس طرح تیرہ سو برس بیشتر ہوتا تھا ۔ [75]

شاہی دربار سبی ، بلوچستان میں تقریر ۔ 14 فروری 1948ء :

"میرا ایمان ہے کہ ہماری نجات اس اسوہ حسنہ پر چلنے میں جو ہمیں قانون عطاء کرنے والے پیغمبر ؐ نے ہمارے لیے دیا ہے ۔ہمیں چاہیے کہ ہم اپنی جمہوریت کی بنیاد یں صحیح معنوں میں اسلامی تصورات اور اصولوں پر رکھیں ۔"[76]

نواب بہادر یار جنگ پاکستان کے بانیان کی فہرست میں ایک معتبر نام اور قائد اعظم ؒ کے معتمد علیہ ساتھی ہونے کی کی حیثیت سے قائد اعظم کی موجودگی میں آل انڈیا مسلم لیگ اجلاس منعقدہ کراچی ، دسمبر 1943ء میں پاکستان کے مقصد وجود کو بیان کرتے ہوئے کہتے ہیں کہ :

"اس امر سے انکار نہیں کیا جا سکتا کہ پاکستان اس لیے چاہتے ہیں کہ وہاں قرآنی نظام حکومت قائم ہو ۔ یہ ایک انقلاب ہو گا، یہ ایک نشاۃ ثانیہ ہو گی ، یہ ایک حیات نو ہو گی جس میں خوابیدہ تصورات اسلام ایک مرتبہ پھر جاگیں گے اور حیات اسلامی ایک مرتبہ پھر کروٹ لے گی ۔ پلاننک کمیٹی آپ کے لیے جو دستوری اور سیاسی نظام مرتب کرے گی ، اس کی بنیاد یں اگر کتاب اللہ اور سنت رسول ﷺ پر نہیں ہیں تو وہ شیطانی سیاست ہے اور ہم ایسی سیاست سے خداکی پناہ مانگتے ہیں ۔" [77]

پاکستان کے پہلے وزیر اعظم قائد ملت جناب لیاقت علی خان مارچ 1949ء کو پاکستان کی پہلی دستور ساز اسمبلی میں قرارداد مقاصد کے حوالے سے خطاب کرتے ہوئے قائد اعظم کے تصور کو درج ذیل الفاظ میں اجا گر کرتے ہیں :

" میں ایوان کو یاد دلانا چاہتا ہوں کہ بابائے ملت قائد اعظم ؒ نے اس مسئلہ کے متعلق اپنے جذبات کا متعدد موقعوں پر اظہار کیا تھا اور قوم نے ان کے خیالات کی تائید غیر مبہم الفاظ میں کی تھی۔ پاکستان اس لیے قائم کیا گیا کہ اس برصغیر کے مسلمان اپنی زندگی کی تعمیر اسلامی تعلیمات و روایات کے مطابق کرنا چاہتے تھے ۔ اس لیے کہ وہ دنیا پر عملاًواضح کر دینا چاہتے تھے کہ آج حیات ِ انسانی کو جو طرح طرح کی بیماریاں لگ گئی ہیں ان سب کے لیے اسلام اکسیر اعظم کا حکم رکھتا ہے ۔"[78]

جو لوگ پاکستان کو مغربی تھیوکریسی سے تشبیہ دینے کی کوششیں کر رہے تھے اُن کو مغربی تھیوکریسی اور نظریہ پاکستان کے واضح فرق سے آ گاہ کرتے ہوئے کہا کہ :

"جناب والا ! میں نےابھی یہ عرض کیا تھا کہ اختیارات کےحقیقی حامل جمہور ہیں ۔ چناں چہ قدرتی طور پر "تھیوکریسی " کے لغوی معنی " خدا کی حکومت " ہیں اوراس اعتبار سے تو کل کائنات "تھیوکریسی " ہوئی کیوں کہ کا ئنات کا کون سا گوشہ ایسا ہے جہاں اسے قدرت حاصل نہیں ۔ مگر اصطلاح میں تھیو کریسی کلیسا کی حکومت کو کہتے ہیں ، یعنی بر گزیدہ پادریوں کی حکومت جو محض اس بناء پر اختیار رکھتے ہوں کہ وہ ایسے اہل تقدس کی طرف سے خاص طور پر مقرر کیے گئے ہیں جو اپنے مقام مقدس کے اعتبار سے ان حقوق کے دعویدار ہیں اور میں اس امر پر جتنا بھی زور دوں کم ہوگا کہ یہ تصور اسلام سے قطعاًبعید ہے ۔ اسلام ملائیت یا کسی حکومت مشائخ کو تسلیم نہیں کرتا ۔ اس لیے اسلام میں تھیوکریسی کا سوال ہی پیدا نہیں ہوتا ۔اگر کوئی اب بھی پاکستان کے نظام حکومت کے ضمن میں "تھیوکریسی " کا ذکر کرتا ہے تو وہ یا تو شدید غلط فہمی کا شکار ہے یا شرارت سے ہمیں بدنام کرنا چاہتا ہے ۔" [79]

اسی خطاب میں آگے چل کر قراردار مقاصد کی ایک اور شق کی وضاحت کرتے ہوئے یوں مخاطب ہوتے ہیں کہ :

“قراداد مقاصد میں یہ دفعہ بھی درج ہے کہ مسلمانوں کو اس قابل بنایا جائے کہ انفرادی اور اجتماعی طور پر اپنی زندگی کو اسلامی تعلیمات و مقتضیات کے مطابق ، جو قرآن مجید اور سنت رسول ﷺ میں متعین ہیں ، ترتیب دے سکیں۔ یہ امر بالکل ظاہر ہے کہ اگر مسلمانوں کو اس قابل بنایا جائے کہ وہ اپنی زندگی اپنے مذہب کی تعلیمات کے مطابق بنالیں تو اس پر کسی غیر مسلم کو اعتراض نہیں ہونا چاہیے ۔

جناب والا!حکومت ایک غیر جانبدار تماشائی کی حیثیت سے اس امر پر اکتفانہیں کرے گی کہ مسلمانوں کواس مملکت میں صرف اپنے مذہب کو ماننے اور اس پر عمل کرنے کی اجازت ہو ، کیوں کہ حکومت کے اس طریق عمل کا مطلب ہو گا کہ جو مقاصد پاکستان کے مطالبہ کے محرک تھے ، ان ہی کی خلاف ورزی ہو حالانکہ یہ مقاصد اس مملکت کا سنگ بنیاد ہونے چاہییں جسے ہم تعمیر کرنا چاہتے ہیں ۔ یہ مملکت ایک ایساماحول پیدا کرے گی جو ایک حقیقی اسلامی معاشرہ کی تعمیرمیں ممد و معاون ہو ۔ اس کامطلب یہ ہے کہ مملکت کو اپنی مساعی میں مثبت پہلو اختیار کرنا ہو گا ۔

"جناب والا! آپ کو یاد ہوگا کہ قائداعظم اور مسلم لیگ کے دوسرے رہنماؤں نےہمیشہ یہ واضح اور غیر مبہم اعلانات کیے کہ پاکستان کے قیام کے لیے مسلمانوں کے ہاں اپنا طریق زندگی اور ضابطہ اخلاق موجود ہے ۔ انہوں نے بار بار اس امر پر بھی زور دیا کہ اسلام کا مطلب صرف یہ نہیں ہے کہ خدا اور بندہ کے درمیان ایک ایسا تعلق قائم ہو جسے مملکت کے کاربار میں کسی قسم کا دخل نہ ہو بلکہ حقیقت یہ ہے کہ اسلام میں عمرانی اخلاق کے متعلق مخصوص ہدایات ہیں اور اسلا م روز مرہ پیش آنے والے مسائل کے متعلق معاشرہ کے طرز عمل کی راہنمائی کرتا ہے ۔ اسلام صرف ذاتی عقائد اور اخلاق کا نام نہیں ہے بلکہ اپنے پیروؤں سے توقع کرتا ہے کہ وہ ایک ایسے معاشرے کی تعمیر کریں جس کا مقصد حیات صالح ہو ۔یونانیوں کے برخلاف اسلام نے جو صالح زندگی کا تصور پیش کیا ہے اس کی اساس لازماًروحانی اقدار پر قائم ہے ۔ ان اقدار کو اہمیت دینے انہیں نافذ کرنے کے لیے مملکت پر لازم ہو جاتاہے کہ و ہ مسلمانوں کی سرگرمیوں کی اس طریقہ پر ہم نوائی کریں کہ ایک ایسا نیا عمرانی نظام قائم ہو جائے جو اسلام کے بنیادی اصولوں پر مبنی ہو ، جن میں جمہوریت ، حریت ،رواداری اور عمرانی عدل شامل ہیں ۔ ان کا ذکر تو میں نے تمثیلاًکیا ہے کیوں کہ وہ اسلامی تعلیمات جو قرآن ا ور سنت نبوی ﷺ پر مشتمل ہیں محض اس پر ختم نہیں ہو جاتیں ۔ کوئی مسلمان ایسا نہیں ہو سکتا جس کا اس پر ایمان نہ ہو کہ کلام اللہ اور اسوہ رسول ﷺ ہی اس کے روحانی فیضان کے بنیادی سر چشمے ہیں ۔"

16۔ ابلاغ انسان کی وہ وجہ خصوصیت ہے جس کے باعث وہ ساری مخلوق سے ممتاز اور جداگانہ حیثیت کامالک ہے کیونکہ ابلاغ کے جووسائل انسان کومیسرہیں وہ کسی اورمخلوق کومیسرنہیں۔ ابلاغ دراصل اپنے مافی الضمیر کوآگے پہنچانے کانام ہے انسان کوزبان ،تکلم، علم اورعقل کی بہترین صفات ودیعت کی گئی ہیں۔ انسانی معاشروں کے فروغ اورتنوع میں انسان نے مختلف زبانیں ایجاد کیں،اظہارکے مختلف پیرائے اختیار کئے اورایک دوسرے سے خطاب کے متنوع اسالیب وضع کئے، جودراصل ابلاغ ہی کاوسیلہ ہیں۔ سورۃ رحمان میں "علمہالبیان[80]" اور سورۃ علق میں "اِقۡرَأ وَرَبُّکَ الۡاَکۡرَمO الَّذِیۡ عَلَّمَ بِالۡقَلَمِO[81]" میں اللہ تعالی نے ابلاغ ہی کے دوموثرترین ذرائع بیان اورقلم کا ذکرفرمایاہے۔جب اپنی جانب سے لکھی ہوئی ہدایت کا تذکرہ فرمایا تو

"وَکَتَبۡنَا لَہُ فِیۡ اَلۡاَ لۡوَاحِ مِنۡ کُلِّ شَیۡءٍ مَّوۡعِظَۃً وَّتَفۡصِیۡلاً لِّکُلِّ شَیۡ ءٍ"

[82](اور ہم نے تختوں میں ان کےلیے ہرقسم کی نصحیت اورتفصیل لکھ دی)۔قرآن مجید میں 77 مقامات پرابلاغ کالفظ مختلف صیغوں اور اندازمیں مستعمل ہواہے۔ حتی کہ ہردورمیں ہرنبی کو جوبنیادی ذمہ داری سونپی گئی وہ "ابلاغ" ہی کی ہے۔ حضرت نوح ؑ، حضرت ہود ؑ، حضرت صالح ؑ حضرت ابراہیم ؑ، حضرت شعیب ؑ اوردیگر متعدد انبیا علیم الصلوۃ والسلام نے اپنی بعثت کامقصد "ابلاغ" (وماعلی الرسول الاالبلاغ) ہی بتایا، قرآن مجید نے نبی کریمﷺ کومخاطب کرکے فرمایا "فانا علیک البلاغ وعلینا الحساب" خود قرآن مجید کے متعلق بھی فرمان الٰہی ہے کہ " ہذا بلاغ للناس" (یہ ایک پیغام ہے سب انسانوں کے لئے)۔

انسانی حقوق کاپہلا بنیادی چارٹر ،خطبہ حجتہ الوداع جسے تاریخ میں اپنی اہمیت کے پیش نظر حجتہ البلاغ،حجتہ التمام، حجتہ الاسلام کے نام سے بھی موسوم کیاجاتاہے۔ جسے تاریخ میں نہ صرف ایک ممتازمقام حاصل ہے بلکہ انسانیت کے لئے ایک مینارہ نور،امن وسلامتی اورعدل ومساوات کے ابدی اصولوں پر مبنی ایک عظیم دستورحیات کی حیثیت حاصل ہے، اللہ کے رسول نے اپنی امت کو اپنے بعداس کام پرمامور فرمایا "فلیبلغ الشاہد الغائب" جوحاضر ہیں وہ میرا پیغام ان لوگوں تک پہنچا دیں جوحاضر نہیں ہیں۔ عرب عہد جاہلیت میں ذرائع ابلاغ صرف شعروشاعری، تجارتی میلوں اور بازاروں ،خطبوں اور وصیتوں تک محدود تھے۔ لیکن اسلام نے ذرائع ابلاغ کوشاعری، خطابت اور قصہ گوئی کے محدود دائرے سے نکال کر ایک نئی جلا بخشی۔ قرآن حکیم نے قصہ نویسی ،قانون سازی، منطقی استدلال ،نئی اصلاحات، نئے الفاظ، جدید تراکیب اورمضامین کے اضافے سے جن کواہل عرب نہیں جانتے تھے دنیاکو ایک نئے طرز ابلاغ سے متعارف کروایا۔کھجور کی شاخوں، سفید پتلے کاغذ،اونٹ کے شانے کی چوڑی ہڈی، مصری کاغذ اور یمنی کاغذ پرقرآن مجید تحریر کرکے اسے ابلاغ کاذریعہ بنایا۔ مسجد اور حج کو "ابلاغ" کے ایک جدید اورموثر ذریعہ کے طورپرمتعارف کروایا۔ آپ نے خود اپنے دور مبارک میں عالمی فرمارواؤں اورسلاطین کے نام جو خطوط اورمکتوب ارسال کئے، مورخین نے انکی تعداد250 کے قریب بیان فرمائی ہے۔ یہ ذرائع ابلاغ کاموثرہتھیار ہی تھا جسکے ذریعے جناب رسالت ماب نے اپنی زندگی میں اپنے پیغام کوجزیرہ العرب کی جغرافیائی حدودسے نکال کر افریقہ، یورپ اورجنوب وسطی ایشیا تک پہنچادیا۔ یہ ایک حقیقت ہے کہ ابلاغ اورمواصلات کے جدید دور کے متحرک وسائل کی عدم دستیابی کے باوجود بہت محدود نوعیت کے ذرائع کوایسی مہارت، ہنرمندی اور بصیرت سے استعمال کیاگیا ہے کہ جس کی مثال نہیں ملتی۔ صفاکی چوٹی، منبررسولﷺ، چبوترہ اذان، مکبرین کاتقرر، اورتحریر کے مختلف انداز، ایسے ذرائع ہیں جو ابلاغ کی جدت اورنت نئے طریقوں کے استعمال کی اہمیت واضح کرتے ہیں۔ نبی کریم ﷺکے انداز اور سیرت میں ابلاغ اورصحافت کے متعلق بہترین ہدایات اورمسلمہ ابلاغیاتی اصول موجود ہیں۔اوراس سلسلے میں بہترین راہنمائی موجود ہے۔ آپ نے زبانی پیغام رسانی، سفارتی پیغام رسانی کے علاوہ عبادت، اذان، نماز، خطبہ جمعہ، خطبہ حج اور عیدین تک کوابلاغ کاایک

موثر ذریعہ بنایا۔[83] خلافت راشدہ میں"برید" یعنی ڈاک اور اطلاعات کے نظام پرزبردست توجہ دی گئی، عہداموی میں سرکاری خط وکتابت کی ترسیل اورخبروں ومعلومات سے آگاہی کےلئے دمشق سے صوبائی صدرمقامات تک جانے والی تمام شاہراہوں پرچندمیل کے فاصلے پربرید کے گھوڑے موجود ہوتے تھے جوایک چوکی سے دوسری چوکی اورپھرآگے تیسری چوکی تک ڈاک پہنچاتے۔عباسی دورمیں "صاحب البرید " کاعہدہ بے پناہ اہمیت کاحامل تھا۔ جس کے ذریعے دربارسے مملکت کے عام وخاص تک اور اس طرح دربارتک ہرقسم کی خبریں پہنچائی جاتی تھیں۔یہی سلسلہ خلافت عثمانیہ اوردیگر ادوارتک چلتارہا۔قرآنی آیات پر غورکرنے سے معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ تخلیق آدم کے وقت رب کائنات اور فرشتوں کے درمیان ہونے والامکالمہ بھی دراصل ابلاغ کی وہ پہلی صورت تھی جس میں حضرت آدم ؑ نے ان ساری چیزوں کے نام بتائےجواللہ رب العزت نے سکھائے تھے۔ لہذا ایک مسلمان ریاست میں ابلاغ کی اہمیت سے انکار نہیں کیا جا سکتا۔[84] ابلاغ کے تمام میسر وسائل کو بروئے کار لانا اور انہیں ریاست کے انتظام اور عوامی فلاح و سعادت کے لئے استعمال کرنا ایک لازمی امر ہے۔

دستور پاکستان میں اسی ضرورت کے تحت ابلاغ کے حق کو بنیادی انسانی حق کے طور پر تسلیم کیا گیا ہے۔دستور پاکستان کی دفعہ 19میں دیئے گئے نظریہ ابلاغ کا ایک سرسری مطالعہ یہ واضح کرنے کے لئے کافی ہے کہ پاکستان کادستور ایک معتدل اورمتوازن نظریہ ابلاغ کاتصورپیش کرتا ہے۔ جو ایک طرف آزادی اظہارکاحق بھی دیتاہے اوردوسری جانب اس کے استعمال پرذمہ داری بھی عائد کرتاہے۔حقیقت یہ ہے کہ دستور پاکستان میں واضح کردہ نظریہ ابلاغ اپنے اصول وضوابط کے حوالےسے ہمہ گیر اورلاجواب ہے۔ اس مطالعہ سے یہ بھی عیاں ہوتا ہے کہ آئین پاکستان کا وضع کردہ نظریہ ابلاغ پاکستانی معاشرے کی ضروریات اور امنگوں سے ہم آہنگ ہے۔ ہمارے آئین کے واضح کردہ نظریہ ابلاغ میں حقوق وفرائض ایک ہی تصویر کے دو رخ ہیں ۔ جس میں فرد کی آزادی کی ضمانت کے ساتھ ساتھ معاشرے کی اصلاح اور تربیت ، ریاست کے مثبت اقدامات پرتحسین اور خلاف قانون اوراخلاقی امورپرگرفت اور احتساب کی ضمانت دی گئی ہے۔دستور کی دفعہ19 ودیگر دفعات میں جو ابلاغی نظریہ پیش کیاگیاہے وہ دراصل قرآنی تعلیمات، احادیث مبارکہ اورسیر ت طیبہ کی تعلیمات واساسات سے قریب تر ہے۔ جس میں "اسلام کی عظمت کے تحفظ " کویقینی بنایاگیاہے۔اسلامی ریاست میں آزادی ذرائع ابلاغ کی حدودبیان کرتےہوئے ڈاکٹرمحمدوسیم اکبرشیخ[85] نے یہ لکھا ہے کہ "اسلام نے فرد اورریاست،اداروں اورذرائع ابلاغ کو جوذمہ داریاں اورفرائض سونپے ہیں، انہیں ایک مخصوص دائرہ کار میں رہتے ہوئے پورا کرنا ذرائع ابلاغ کافرض ہے،اسلامی تعلیمات سے یہ بات بھی واضح ہوتی ہے کہ اسلامی ریاست میں آزادی ذرائع ابلاغ نیکی وپاکیزگی کے فروغ کے لئے ہے، شر انگیزی اورفتنہ وفساد پھیلانے کے لئے نہیں۔"

| | | --- | | M |

سلام کی عظمت میں بُنیادی اور دا ئمی کردار مُحسنِ انسانیت حضرت محمد ﷺ کی شخصیت اور اسوۂ حسنہ کا ہے۔ یہ کہنا بے جا نہ ہوگا کہ آپ ﷺ کی زندگی قرآن کریم کی عملی تصویر، مینارۂ نور، معراجِ انسانیت اور تا ابد پیروی کے لیے نمونہ ہے۔ اسلام کی عظمت کی ابتداء اور انتہاء آپﷺ ہی ہیں۔

قرطاس کے چہرے پر

اک لفظ لکھا میں نے

اُس لفظ کی خوشبو سے

قرطاس معطّر ہے

اُس نام کی کرنوں سے

ہر چیز منوّر ہے!!!

وہ لفظ مکمل ہے

وہ لفظ محمدﷺ ہے

جدیدمحققین[86] نے اسلامی معاشرے میں ابلاغ کے جواہم مقاصد ، حدود اور آداب بیان کئے ہیں ان کے مطابق میڈیا کی جو تصویر ابھرتی ہے وہ ایک ایسا ذمہ دار ادارہ ہے جو احترام انسانیت کی تلقین،

آزادی وذمہ داری کے اشتراک کے واضح تصور، معاشرے میں مثبت باتوں کے فروغ ، عریانی اورفحاشی کے انسداد اورسدباب، حق اور انصاف کی ادائیگی، ترویج اور رسائی میں معاونت ، معاشرتی اتحاد و تنظیم کے قیام، صحت اورصفائی کی ترغیب، عوامی تعلیم اور تربیت کے اقدامات، اظہارخیال میں شائستگی اوربرداشت کی ترویج، تحریف، غلط بیانی اور پراپیگنڈہ کی ممانعت اورحوصلہ شکنی ، نفرت انگیزی و دل آزاری سے گریز کی تربیت، لوگوں کے نجی معمولات میں تجسس اور دخل اندازی سے گریز کے رویے، خواتین اور اقلیتوں کے حقوق کی نگہداشت اوررائے عامہ کی ہمواری، صالح اورپرامن معاشرے کے قیام میں ریاست اورحکومت کی معاونت ، امت مسلمہ میں اخوت اوریکجہتی کےقیام، بین الاقوامی معمولات میں مثبت،تعمیری اورصلح جوئیانہ مؤقف کےاظہاراورترویج اور عوام کو مثبت اور تعمیری تفریح کی فراہمی جیسے انتہائی اہم فرا ئض سے عبارت ہے۔

17۔ یہ ایک ناقابل انکار حقیقت ہے کہ ذرائع ابلاغ جدید معاشرے اورتہذیب کا ایک جزولاینفک ہیں۔ یہ بھی ایک بدیہی حقیقت کہ ذرائع ابلاغ کسی بھی معاشرے کے اجتماعی مزاج کوبنانے اور بگاڑنے میں اہم کردارادا کرتے ہیں۔ موجودہ دورمیں ذرائع ابلاغ نے انسانی زندگی کے ہرشعبے کو متاثرکیا ہے اور اب ان کی حیثیت معاشرے کے ایک لازمی جزواور اہم ترجمان کی ہے۔ پرنٹ، الیکٹرانک اورسوشل میڈیا نہ صرف قومی اوربین الاقوامی پالیسیوں کے اظہار اورتعارف کا ایک اہم ذریعہ ہے بلکہ اب تو ان کی قبولیت اورعدم قبولیت کے حوالے سے ایک اہم عنصر تصورکیاجاتاہے۔ اس لئے کوئی ملک اورقوم ذرائع ابلاغ کے درست اور ذمہ دارانہ استعمال کے عصر حاضر کے اہم چیلنج سے صرف نظر نہیں کرسکتی۔ بدقسمتی سے پاکستان میں میڈیا کے مثبت ، ذمہ دارانہ اور قومی خواہشات کے ہم آہنگ استعمال کے حوالےسے کوئی واضح اورمناسب قانون سازی موجود نہ ہے۔ میڈیا کو دستور پاکستان میں دی گئی ہدایات اور ایک اسلامی معاشرے کی ضروریات ،جوکہ دستورمیں واضح طورپربیان کی گئی ہیں۔ سے ہم آہنگ کرنے میں شدید غفلت ،لاپرواہی اور غیرذمہ داری کامظاہرہ کیاگیاہے۔یہاں یہ امر واضح کرنا ضروری ہے کہ عدالت عظمیٰ کی بھرپور کاوش اور احکامات کی روشنی میں 2005 میں الیکٹرانک میڈیا کے لیے ایک ضابطہ اخلاق جاری کیا گیا، لیکن بد قسمتی سے چینلز کے مالکان مالی منفعت اور درجہ بندی کی دوڑ میں نہ آ ئینی حدود کی پابندی کرتے ہیں اور نہ ضابطہ اخلاق کو ہی خاطر میں لاتے ہیں پیمرا عملی طور پر بے بس نظر آتا ہے چونکہ اُس کی جانب سے تمام سنجیدہ اور پر عزم کاوشیں غیر موثر کر دی جاتی ہیں لیکن سوشل میڈیا پر بے حیائی کا ایک سیلاب ہے جس کے آگے آئین میں دی گئی حدود کے مطابق بندباندھنے کے لئے حکومتی سطح پر مناسب اقدامات نہ کئے گئے ہیں۔یہی وجہ ہے کہ مقدس شخصیات کی توہین کاسلسلہ اپنے عروج پر ہے اور دشمنانِ پاکستان واسلام اس ذریعہ ابلاغ کو اپنے مذموم مقاصد کےلئے استعمال کررہےہیں۔ یہ عدالت سمجھتی ہے کہ ذرائع ابلاغ کی بنیادی ذمہ داری قوم کے اخلاق وکردار کی اصلاح ہے، ملک کے تعمیروترقی اور دستورپاکستان میں متعین کی گئی منزل کی طرف پیش قدمی اس کااہم فریضہ ہے۔ ملک کے ذرائع ابلاغ دستورپاکستان میں دی گئی عوامی خواہشات اور امنگوں کے نہ صرف ترجمان ہونے چاہیئں بلکہ اس مملکت کے نظریہ اورمقصد کے تابع ہونے چاہئیں۔ ذرائع ابلاغ ملک و قوم کے لئے ایک امین کا درجہ رکھتے ہیں ۔ اورامانت کی ذمہ داریوں کو ملحوظ رکھنا ذرائع ابلاغ کا اہم قومی و دستوری فریضہ ہے۔ دستورپاکستان کے مطابق پاکستانی معاشرے میں فرد، ریاست اور اداروں کاسرچشمہ ہدایت قرآن وسنت ہیں اوروہی ان کے حقوق وفرائض،مقاصد ونصب العین اورلائحہ عمل کاتعین کرتے ہیں۔ ذرائع ابلاغ کا کردار ان رہنماء اخلاقی اقدار اور اصولوں کاپابندہوناچاہیےجوفرد، ریاست اور ہردوسرے ادارے پرعائدکی گئی ہیں جس طرح ایک فرد قومی سلامتی کی حفاظت کا ذمہ دار ہے بالکل اسی طرح ذرائع ابلاغ بھی قومی سلامتی کی حفاظت کے ذمہ دار ہیں۔ جس طرح فحاشی کوفروغ دینا ایک فرد کے لئے ممنوع ہے اسی طرح ذرائع ابلاغ کے لئے بھی ممنوع ہے۔ جس طرح مقدس ہستیوں کے ناموس کی حفاظت ہرشہری کافرض ہے اسی طرح ذرائع ابلاغ اوران کے ذمہ داران بھی ان مقدس ہستیوں کی ناموس کی حفاظت کے پابند ہیں۔ اوراگر ریاست کاکوئی ذمہ دار فرد یاکوئی ادارہ ایسے کسی غیرقانونی فعل کے ارتکاب یا اس کے فروغ پر چشم پوشی کے جرم کامرتکب ہوگا تویقیناً قانون اور پاکستان کے عوام کے سامنے جوابدہ ہوگا۔ دستورپاکستان نے تحفظ جان ،مال، آبرو، نجی اورشخصی آزادی کے تحفظ اور اسی نوعیت کے دوسرے امور میں جوحقوق فرائض کادائرہ متعین کردیاہے اس کااحترام فرد ،ریاست اور ذرائع ابلاغ پرلازم ہے۔ اس لئے ہم یہ سمجھتے ہیں کہ اظہار رائے کی آزادی کامحتاط اور ذمہ دارانہ استعمال دستور کا لازمی تقاضا ہے۔ اوراس ضمن میں ذرائع ابلاغ کی ذمہ داری ہے کہ بلاتحقیق وآگاہی خبر کی نشرواشاعت سے اجتناب کریں، درست اورصحیح معلومات کا ابلاغ کریں۔ معلومات میں اگرصداقت اورثقاہت کے عناصرموجود نہیں ہیں تووہ فریب کاری ہے۔ احترام انسانیت وتکریم آدمیت کا مکمل پاس اورلحاظ رکھاجائے۔ ضرورت اس بات کی ہے کہ آج ملک سے منافرت ، انتہاپسندی، بدامنی اورلاقانونیت کے خاتمے کےلئے ذرائع ابلاغ اپنا ذمہ دارانہ کردارادا کریں اور پیغام امن اور احترام انسانیت کے تصورات کو عام کریں۔ ذرائع ابلاغ کواجازت نہیں دی جاسکتی ہے کہ وہ انسانوں کی آزادئ ضمیراور عزت نفس کومجروح کرنے کا انتظام کریں۔ معاشرے کے تمام افراد کی نجی زندگی کاتحفظ معاشرے اورریاست کی بنیادی ذمہ داری ہے۔ تفتیشی صحافت کے نام پر شہریوں کے معمولات کی جاسوسی یا بلیک میلنگ تحفظ زندگی کے دستوری تقاضے کی کھلی خلاف ورزی ہے۔ آج ضرورت اس امر کی ہے کہ ابلاغ کے لئے حکمت ودانش ،سلیقہ مندومہذب اورباوقار اسلوب اختیار کیاجائے جس میں اظہار خیال میں شائستگی اوراخلاقی اقدار کے تحفظ کی جھلک نظرآئے۔آئین کی دفعہ 19 میں شہریوں ا تقریر اور اظہارِ رائے کا حق تسلیم کیا گیا ہے ۔ یہ بھی کہا گیا ہے کہ پریس آزاد ہو گا۔ لیکن اس بنیادی حق کو اسلام کی عظمت ( Glory of Islam) کی خاطر عائد کردہ معقول قانونی بندشوں کے ساتھ مشروط کر دیا گیا ہے ۔سپریم اپلیٹ کورٹ (گلگت بلتستان) کے فل بنچ فیصلہ بابت سوموٹو کیس نمبری 2010/5 میں فاضل چیف جسٹس جناب محمدنوازعباسی نے آزادی اظہار کی حدود کی وضاحت کرتے ہوئے یہ قرار دیا ہے کہ:

ترجمہ: "لیکن خلاف اسلام افکارکا اس نکتہ نظر سے پراپیگنڈا کے اس کے ذریعے مسلمانوں کے جذبات کو ٹھیس پہنچےیا نبی کریم ﷺکے بارے میں توہین آمیز تحریری یا زبانی گفتگو یا توہین کے حق میں بیان بازی یا نبی کریم ﷺ کے تقدس کی حفاظت کی غرض سے بناۓ گئےقانون توہین رسالت کے بارے میں نازیبا گفتگو قانونی طور پر ممنوع ہے اور اخلاقی تعلیمات کے منافی بھی ہے لہٰذا ان معاملات پر قابل اعتراض مواد کی اشاعت یقینی طور پر آزادی اظہار کے حق میں ہرگز شامل نہیں ہے اور ایسے موا د کی اشاعت میں بالواسطہ یا بلا واسطہ ملوث شخص یا کسی بھی طور پر اس کی مدد کرنے والا توہین رسالت کے جرم کا مرتکب ٹھہر سکتا ہے۔ اور ایسا شخص ہتک عزت کی کارروائی کے ساتھ تو ہین رسالت کے جرم میں سزاوارہو گا ۔

۳۸۔ پاکستان ایک اسلامی ریاست ہے اور دستور پاکستان کی رو سے اسلام کی تعلیمات کے خلاف کوئی قانون سازی نہ ہو سکتی ہے لہٰذا توہین رسالت کے قانون پر انگشت نمائی سختی سے قابل مذمت ہے ۔"

"…….but propaganda of anti Islamic thoughts with a view to cause injury to the feelings of a Muslim sect or any slander made in writing of in spoken words insultive to the Holy Prophets or to be critical with use of derogatory language in respect of the religious thoughts or to speak in favor of blasphemy or against the law of blasphemy in insultive manner to the honour of last Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is prohibited by law and also by code of moral conduct. Therefore, publication of objectionable material on the above matters is certainly beyond the right of free expressin and the person responsible for such publication directly or indirectly and also a person who in any manner acts in aid of such activity may be guilty of offence of Blasphemy and is equally liable for prosecution under the law of Blasphemy in addition to the prosecution for libel and defamation.

1. Pakistan is a Muslim State and under the Constitution of Pakistan no law against the spirit of injunction of Islam can be made therefore any action criticizing Blasphemy law is rigidly condemnable.

پریس کی آزادی کو اسلام کی خاطر معقول قانونی پابندیوں کے ساتھ مشروط کر دیا گیا ہے۔انسانی حقوق کا عالمی منشور جسے اقوام متحدہ کی جنرل اسمبلی نے ۱۰دسمبر ۱۹۴۸ کو منظور کیا، میں بھی آزادیوں اورحقوق کے ضمن میں ایسی حدود کاتعین کیاگیا ہے جودوسروں کی آزادی اورحقوق کو تسلیم کرنے، ان کے احترام کرنےیا جمہوری نظام میں اخلاق، امن عامہ اورعام فلاح وبہبود کے مناسب لوازمات سے مقید ہے۔انسانی حقوق کے عالمی منشور کی منظور ی کے تاریخی کارنامے کے بعد جنرل اسمبلی نے تمام ممبر ممالک پر یہ زوردیا کہ وہ بھی اپنے اپنے ہاں اس کااعلان عام کریں، اشاعت کریں، نمایاں مقامات پر آویزاں کریں، اور سکولوں وتعلیمی اداروں میں اس منشورکو پڑھائیں اورسمجھائیں۔اس منشور کی دفعات ۲۹ و۳۰ انتہائی اہمیت کی حامل ہیں۔

دفعہ ۲۹: (۱) ہرشخص پرمعاشرے کے حقوق ہیں کیونکہ معاشرے میں رہ کر ہی اسکی شخصیت کی آزادانہ اورپوری نشوونماممکن ہے۔

(۲) اپنی آزادیوں اورحقوق سے فائدہ اٹھانے میں ہرشخص ایسی حدود کا پابندہوگا جو دوسروں کی آزادیوں اورحقوق کوتسلیم کرانے اوران کااحترام کرانے کی غرض سے یا جمہوری نظام میں اخلاق، امن عامہ اور عام فلاح وبہبودکے مناسب لوازمات کو پورا کرنے کے لئے قانون کی طرف سے عائد کئے گئے ہیں۔

(۳) یہ حقوق اورآزادیاں کسی حالت میں بھی اقوام متحدہ کے مقاصد اوراصول کے خلاف عمل میں نہیں لائی جاسکتیں۔

دفعہ ۳۰: اس اعلان کی کسی چیز سے کوئی ایسی بات مرادنہیں لی جاسکتی جس سے ملک ،گروہ، یاشخص کوکسی ایسی سرگرمی میں مصروف ہے یا کسی ایسے کام کوانجام دینے کاحق پیدا ہو جس کامنشا ان حقوق اورآزادیوں کی تخریب ہو، جویہاں پیش کی گئی ہیں۔

اسی طرح اقوام متحدہ کے ‘‘بین الاقوامی معاہدہ برائے شہری وسیاسی حقوق’’ (International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights) کی دفعات ۱۹،۱۸ اور ۲۰ میں سوچ وفکرکی آزادی ، اظہاررائے وبیان کی آزادی ، مہذب وعقیدے کی آزادی کے بیان میں مستقل دفعات کے ذریعے اس بات کی وضاحت کی گئی ہے کہ یہ تمام آزادیاں اورحقوق قانون میں عائد پابندیوں ،امن عامہ، صحت، اخلاقیات اوردوسروں کے بنیادی حقوق اورآزادیوں کے احترام کے لحاظ سے مشروط ہیں۔دفعات درج ذیل ہیں:

دفعہ۱۸:

۱۔ ہر شخص کو فکر، اخلاقی شعور اور مذہب کی آزادی کا حق حاصل ہوگا۔ اس حق میں اپنی پسند کے کسی مذہب یا عقیدے کو رکھنے یااختیار کرنے کی آزادی بھی شامل ہوگی۔اور یہ آزادی بھی کہ وہ انفرادی یا اجتماعی طور پرعوامی یا نجی سطح پر اپنے مذہب یا عقیدے کا اظہار عبادت ، بندگی ، عمل اور تعلیم کے ذریعے کر سکے۔

۲۔ کسی شخص پر ایسا جبر نہیں کیا جاسکے گاجس کے تحت اُس کی مرضی ومنشاء کے مذہب وعقیدے کو رکھنے یا اختیار کرنے کی آزادی کو مجروح کیا جاسکے۔

۳۔ کسی کو اپنے مذہب یا عقیدے کے اظہار کی آزادی پر صرف وہی قیود عائد کی جاسکتی ہیں۔ جو کہ قانون میں عائد کی ہوںاور تحفظ عامہ کی حفاظت ، نظم، صحت یااخلاقیات یا بنیادی حقوق یا دوسروں کی آزادیوں سے متعلق ہوں۔

۴۔ معاہدہ ہذا میں شامل ریاستیں یہ ضمانت دیتی ہیں کہ والدین کی آزادی کا احترام کیا جائے گااور جہاں لاگو ہو، قانونی ولی کی، کہ وہ اپنے بچوں کی مذہبی اور اخلاقی تعلیم اپنے رجحانات کے مطابق کر سکیں۔

Article 18

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.

2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

دفعہ۱۹:

۱۔ ہر کسی کو رائے رکھنے کی بلامداخلت آزادی حاصل ہو گی۔

۲۔ ہر کسی کو اظہار کی آزادی حاصل ہوگی اور اظہار کی آزادی میں معلومات اور ہر قسم کے خیالات کی تلاش ، حصول اور فراہمی کی آزادی، جغرافیائی حدود سے ماورأ، زبانی یا تحریری یا مطبوعہ آرٹ کی صورت میں یا کسی دیگر ذریعہ سے جو کہ اُس کی پسند ہو، شامل ہے۔

۳۔ فقرہ نمبر ۲مذکورہ بالا میں واضح کردہ حقوق کے استعمال کے ساتھ خاص ذمہ داریاں اور فرائض منسلک ہیں، یہ حقوق مخصوص قدغن کے ساتھ مشروط ہو سکتے ہیں لیکن قدغن وہی ہو گی جو قانون میں واضح کی گئی ہو اور ضروری ہو، جو کہ

(الف ) دوسروں کے حقوق کے احترام اور اُن کی معاشرتی ساکھ سے متعلق ہوں۔

(ب) قومی سلامتی کے تحفظ یا امن عامہ یا صحت عامہ یا اخلاقیات سے متعلق ہوں۔

Article 19

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre (sic.) public), or of public health or morals.

دفعہ۲۰:

۱۔ جنگ کے لیے پروپیگنڈہ پر قانونی پابندی عائد کی جائے گی۔

۲۔ قومی ، نسلی یا مذہبی نفرت کی حمایت، جو کہ امتیاز، دشمنی اور تشدد کی جانب ابھارے، پر قانونی پابندی عائد کی جائے۔

Article 20

1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.

2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

یہاں یہ واضح کرناضروری ہے کہ آزادی اظہار اورتقریرپرمناسب اورجائزقدغن صرف پاکستان کے دستورکاخاصہ نہیں بلکہ دنیا کے سیکولرممالک میں بھی آزادی اظہار وتقریرکو مناسب قانونی حدود وقیودکے ساتھ مشروط کیاگیا ہے۔ یورپ کے اکثرممالک میں حق اظہاروتقریر کومتعددپابندیوں کے ساتھ قبول کیاگیا ہے۔ حتیٰ کہ ‘‘یورپی کنونشن برائے تحفظ انسانی حقوق اور بنیادی آزادیاں’’ جوکہ تقریباً پورے یورپ پر نافذ ہے، کی دفعہ ۱۰ میں یہ قراردیاگیا ہے کہ :

دفعہ۱۰

۱۔ ہر کسی کو آزادی اظہار کا حق حاصل ہے۔ اس حق میں رائے کی آزادی کا حق اور معلومات اور خیالات کی بلاروک ٹوک حصول اور فراہمی قطع ٔ نظر جغرافیائی حدود شامل ہو گی۔یہ دفعہ ریاستوں پر یہ قدغن عائد نہیں کرتی کہ وہ براڈکاسٹنگ، ٹی وی یا سینماجیسے تجارتی اداروں سے لائسنس کے حصول کی شرائط عائد کریں۔

۲۔ اِن آزادیوں کا استعمال چونکہ فرائض اور ذمہ داریوں سے منسلک ہے۔لہٰذا اِن آزادیوں کے استعمال پر قانون کے مطابق ایسی شرائط ، ضوابط، قدغن یا سزائیں عائد کی جاسکتی ہیں جو جمہوری معاشرے، قومی سلامتی کے مفاد، یکجہتی اور حفاظت عوام کی ضرورت ہوں تاکہ نقص امن، جرم کی روک تھام، صحت کی حفاظت، اخلاق کی حفاظت، دوسروں کی شہرت کی حفاظت اور دوسروں کے حقوق کی حفاظت اور خفیہ معلومات اور عدلیہ کے قانونی اختیار کے قیام اور غیرجانبداری سے متعلقہ ہوں۔

ARTICLE 10

Freedom of expression:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

ڈنمارک جہاں سے حالیہ عرصہ میں گستاخانہ خاکوں کا آغاز ہوا، بھی اس کنونشن کاحصہ ہے، ڈنمارک نے ۱۹۵۳ میں اس کنونشن کی تصدیق کی اور اب وہ ڈنمارک کے دستور وقانون کا لازمی جزو ہے۔ڈنمارک کے کریمنل کوڈ کی دفعہ ۱۴۰ میں دوسروں کے مذہبی جذبات کی توہین وتضحیک کو جرم تصور کرتے ہوئے یہ قرار دیاگیا ہے کہ :

“Those who publicly mock or insult the doctrines of worship of any religious community that is legal in this county, will be punished by a fine or incarceration for upto four months”

اسی طرح کریمنل کوڈ کے آرٹیکل ۲۶۶بی میں یہ قرار دیاگیاہے کہ :

“Any person who publicly or with intention of dissemination to wide circle of people makes a statement or imparts other information threatening, insulting or degrading a group of persons on account of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin, belief or sexual orientation, shall be liable to a fine, simple detention or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”

فرانسیسی انقلاب کا مشہورزمانہ ‘‘حقوق کا اعلامیہ’’ جوکہ بعد ازاں بہت سے ممالک کے دساتیر کے لئے رہنمائی کاذریعہ بنا، میں بھی یہ واضح طورپرقراردیاگیا ہے:

“The free communication of ideas and opinion is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law.”

ناروے کے دستور کی دفعہ ۱۰۰ میں یہ واضح طورپراعلان کیاگیا ہے کہ :

“There shall be liberty of the Press. No person may be punished for any writing, whatever its contents, which he has caused to be printed or published, unless he will fully and manifestly has either himself shown or incited others to disobedience to the laws, contempt of religion, morality or the constitutional powers or resistance to their orders of has made false and defamatory accusations against anyone.”

اس حوالے سے جرمنی کاقانون بھی بہت واضح ہے، ضابطہ تعزیرات جرمنی کے گیارویں باب بعنوان ‘‘جرائم جو مذہب اورفلسفہ زندگی سے متعلق ہیں ’’ کی فعہ ۱۶۶ میں یہ جرم قرار دیاگیا ہے کہ:

“(1) Whoever publicly or through dissemination of writings (Section 11 subsection (3) insults the content of others, religious faith or faith related to a philosophy of life in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public peace, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or fine.

(2) Whoever publicly or through dissemination of writings (Section 11 subsection (3) insults a church, other religious society, or organization dedicated to a philosophy of life located in Germany, or their institutions or customs in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public peace, shall be similarly punished.”

اسی طرح اسی قانون کی دفعہ۱۶۷ جوکہ مذہب کے عمل میں مداخلت کے عنوان سے ہے، یہ قرار دیتی ہے کہ :

“(I) Whoever:

1. Intentionally and in a gross manner disturbs a religious service or an act of a religious service of a church or other religious society located in Germany: or

2. Commits insulting mischief at a place dedicated to the religious service or such a religious society, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine.

(II) Corresponding celebrations of an organization dedicated to a philosophy of life located in Germany shall be the equivalent of religious services.”

فن لینڈ کے قانون بعنوان مذہب کے تقدس کی خلاف ورزی کی دفعہ ۱۰اس ضمن میں توہین مذہب کی تعریف کرتے ہوئے یہ قرار دیتی ہے کہ:

“A person who (I) publicly blasphemes against God or, for the purpose of offending, publicly defames or desecrates what is otherwise held to be sacred by a church or religious community, as referred to in the Act on the Freedom of Religion (267/1998) ”

اسی طرح آسٹریا کے ضابطہ تعزیرات فوجداری کی دفعہ۱۸۸ میں مذہبی جذبات کو مجروح کرنا جرم قرار دیاگیا ہے۔اسی طرح نیدرلینڈکے تعزیرات فوجداری کی دفعہ۱۴۷ میں بھی بلاسفیمی کو جرم قراردیاگیاہے۔ڈاکٹر شیریں مزاری نے اپنے ایک مضمون بعنوان “Multiculturalism and Islam in Europe”میں نیدر لینڈ کے ضابطہ فوجدار ی کی وضاحت کرتے ہوئے لکھا ہے کہ :

“The Netherlands: Blasphemy is a criminal offence under the Penal Code Article 147 (introduction and subsection (1) Wetboek van Strefrecht), though this provision only covers expressions concerning God, and not saints and other revered religious figures (“godalaatering”). Further, the criminal offence of blasphemy has been interpreted to require that the person who makes the expression must have had the intention to be “scornful” (“Smalend”).”

اسی طرح اسپین کے قانون بابت توہین کے ضمن میں لکھتی ہیں کہ :

“Spain:The crime of blasphemy was abolished in 1988. The Constitutional Court has ruled that the right to freedom of expression, broadly protected by Article 20 of the Constitution, can be subject to restrictions aimed both at the protection of the rights of others or at the protection of other constitutionally protected interests. ”

آئرلینڈ کے دستور کی دفعہ۴۰ میں بھی اظہاررائے کی آزادی کی حدود وقیود درج ذیل طورپر متعین کی گئی ہیں:

“6.1: The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to public order and morality:

(1) The right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions. The education of public opinion being, however, a matter of such grave import to the common good, the State shall endeavour to ensure that organs of public opinion, such as the radio, the press, the cinema, while preserving their rightful liberty of expression, including criticism of Government policy, shall not be used to undermine public order or morality or the authority of the State.”

18۔ بین الاقوامی انجمنوں واداروں ، بین الاقوامی معاہدات ، بین الاقوامی اعلامیےاور یورپ کے مختلف ممالک کے قانون سے یہ واضح ہے کہ توہین مذہب، توہین مقدس شخصیات اور افراد واجتماع کے مذہبی جذبات واحساسات کا لحاظ اوراس ضمن میں اظہار رائے وتقریر وبیان پر مناسب قانونی قدغن دنیاکے تمام مہذب ممالک کاخاصہ ہے۔ اس کے علاوہ بین الاقوامی عدالتوں کے فیصلہ جات بھی اس ضمن میں اہمیت کے حامل ہیں۔ اقوام متحدہ کی ہیومن رائٹس کمیٹی (HRC) جسے بین الاقوامی معاہدہ برائے شہری وسیاسی حقوق کے تحت قائم کیاگیاہے ، نے اپنے فیصلہ نمبری۵۵۰1993/مورخہ ۸ نومبر۱۹۹۶ میں ‘‘رابرٹ فوریسن بنام فرانس’’ میں دفعہ (۳) ۱۹ کی تشریح کرتے ہوئے یہ قرار دیاکہ فرانس کی جانب سے ہولوکاسٹ پراظہار خیال سے یہودیوں کے مذہبی جذبات اور حقوق کی پامالی ہوئی ہے۔

ترجمہ: چونکہ مصنف کی طرف سے بیان اس نوعیت کا ہے جس سے یہودیوں کے خلاف جذبات بڑھتے یا مضبوط ہوتے لہٰذاقانونی قدغن یہودیوں کے خوف سے آزاد فضاء میں زندگی گزارنے کے لیے عائد کی گئی ہے۔ان وجوہات کی بنا پرکمیٹی اس نتیجے پر پہنچی ہے کہ مصنف کے آزادی ٔ اظہار پر عائد کردہ قیود معاہدہ کی دفعہ(۳) ۱۹ کے فقرہ نمبر ۳ (الف) کی رو سے بالکل درست ہیں۔

“Since the statements made by the author…. Were of a nature as to raise or strengthen anti-Semitic feelings, the restriction served the respect of the Jewish community to live free from fear of an atmosphere of anti-Semitism. The Committee therefore concludes that the restriction of the author’s freedom of expression was permissible under Article 19, paragraph 3 (a), of the Covenant.”

یورپی عدالت برائے انسانی حقوق (ECHR)نےایک مقدمہ میں جس میں سکول کے بچوں کےلئے ایک کتاب “The little Red Schoolbook” کی اشاعت، جس میں فحش اورگھٹیا جنسی مواد کی تفصیلات دی گئی تھیں کے پبلشر پر برطانوی حکومت کی جانب سے Obscene Publication Act, 1964 کے تحت مقدمہ کے حوالے سے مشہور ہینڈی سائیڈ کیس میں حق اظہاررائے کی وضاحت کرتے ہوئے قرار دیا کہ:

ترجمہ : اس عدالت کا نگرانی کا منصب اس بات کامتقاضی ہے کہ یہ عدالت اُن اصولوں کی جانب بھرپور توجہ دے جو جمہوری معاشرے کی تشکیل کرتے ہیں۔آزادی ٔاظہار ایسے معاشرے کے قیام کے لیے ایک اساس ہے، ایک ایسی بنیادی شرط جو معاشرے اور ہر فرد کی ترقی وتعمیر کے لیے ناگزیر ہے۔دفعہ ۱۰کے پیراگراف ۲ کے تحت، یہ آزادی نہ صرف معلومات یا خیالات جو کہ مثبت طور پر حاصل ہوتے ہیں یا جو غیرمجرمانہ تصور ہوتے ہیں تک ہی محدود نہ ہے بلکہ ہر اُس عمل پر محیط ہے جو ریاست یا ریاست کے کسی گروہ کو متاثر ، پریشان یا خوفزدہ کرتا ہے۔تکثیریت، برداشت اورکشادذہنی کی یہ بنیادی ضروریات ہیں۔جن کے بغیرکسی جمہوری معاشرہ کا تصورنہ ہے۔اس کا واضح مطلب یہ ہے کہ بشمول دیگرے ہر قانونی ضابطہ، شرط، پابندی اور سزا جو اِس باب میں تجویز کی جائے وہ اُن قانونی مقاصد سے ہم آہنگ ہونی چاہیے۔

ایک اور زاویۂ نظر سے دیکھا جائے تو یہ عیاں ہوتا ہے کہ جوکوئی بھی آزادیٔ اظہار کا حق استعمال کرتا ہے وہ اپنے اوپر چند فرائض اور ذمہ داریاں بھی قبول کرتا ہے۔جس کا دائرہ کار اُن حالات اور ذرائع جن کو وہ اختیارکرتا ہے پر موقوف ہے۔عدالت اُن ذمہ داریوں اور فرائض سے صرفِ نظر نہیں کرسکتی جواُس شخص پرعائد ہوتی ہیں جیسا کہ اس کیس میں ہے کہ آیاقانونی پابندیاں اور سزائیں معاشرتی اخلاقیات کی حفاظت جوکہ جمہوری معاشرے کے قیام کے لیے ضروری ہیں کا مناسب اطلاق کیا گیا۔

“The Court's supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost attention to the principles characterizing a "democratic society". Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 (Art. 10-2), it is applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society". This means, amongst other things, that every "formality", "condition", "restriction" or "penalty" imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

From another standpoint, whoever exercises his freedom of expression undertakes "duties and responsibilities" the scope of which depends on his situation and the technical means he uses. The Court cannot overlook such a person's "duties" and "responsibilities" when it enquires, as in this case, whether "restrictions" or "penalties" were conducive to the "protection of morals" which made them "necessary" in a "democratic society". ” (HANDYSIDE v. THE UNITED KINGDOM)

اسی طرح اوٹومری سنگر انسٹی ٹیوٹ ،ایک وڈیوساز ادارہ، نے عیسائیت کے خلاف ایک متنازعہ فلم بنائی تورومن کتھیولک چرچ نے اس کے خلاف فوجداری کارروائی کاآغاز کردیا۔ فلم کوقبضہ میں لے لیاگیا اوربعدازاں عدالتی حکم کے تحت فلم کو ضبط (Forfeit)کردیاگیا۔مقدمہ جب یورپی عدالت برائے انسانی حقوق میں پہنچا توعدالت نے یہ قرار دیاکہ:

ترجمہ : کوکی ناکی کے فیصلے میں عدالت نے قرار دیا کہ آرٹیکل ۹ کے تناظر میں ریاست ایسے رویوں بشمول ایسی معلومات اور خیالات کی ترویج جو آزادی خیال، شعور اور کسی مذہبی آزادی سے متصادم ہوں، کی روک تھام کے لیے قانونی طور پراقدامات کرے۔

قانونی طور پر ایسا سمجھا جا سکتا ہے کہ مقدس مذہبی شخصیات کی اشتعال انگیز تصاویر سے، مذہبی احساسات کا احترام ، جس کی ضمانت آرٹیکل ۹ میں دی گئی ہے، بری طرح مجروح ہوا ہے اور ایسی تصاویر سے جذبۂ برداشت کی روح کی خلاف ورزی /بے حرمتی ہوئی ہے،جوکہ ایک جمہوری معاشرے کا خاصہ ہونی چاہیے۔اس کنونشن کو بحیثیت مجموعی پڑھا جانا چاہیے اور اسی لیے آرٹیکل ۱۰کی تشریح اور اس کیس پر اس کا اطلاق، اس کنونشن کی منطق کے موافق ہونا چاہیے۔(دیکھیں میوٹیٹس میوٹینڈس، کلاس ودیگر بنام جرمنی، فیصلہ مورخہ۶ستمبر۱۹۷۸ء سیریز اے نمبر۸۲،پیرا۶۸۱)

جن اقدامات کی شکایت کی گئی وہ آسٹریا کے مجموعہ تعزیرات کی دفعہ ۱۸۸کی بنیاد پرجس میں ایسے رویوں کی روک تھام کی گئی ہے جو مذہبی تقدس کے خلاف اور جن سے اشتعال انگیزی پیداہونے کااحتمال ہو۔اس کا مقصد شہریوں کے حقوق کا تحٖفظ تھا کہ دوسرے لوگوں کے عوامی سطح پر اظہارِ رائے سے کسی بھی شخص کے مذہبی احساسات و جذبات مجروح نہ ہوں۔آسٹریائی عدالتوں کے فیصلے جن دلائل کے تحت کیے گئے اِن کی روشنی میں یہ عدالت تسلیم کرتی ہے کہ ایسے اقدامات کا مقصد قانونی طور پر دفعہ ۱۰پیرا۲پرعمل درآمد ہے۔جس کا عنوان ہے ’’دوسروں کے حقوق کی حفاظت‘‘۔

“In the Kokkinakis judgment the Court held, in the context of Article 9 (Art. 9), that a State may legitimately consider it necessary to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct, including the imparting of information and ideas, judged incompatible with the respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of others (ibid., p. 21, para. 48). The respect for the religious feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 9 (Art. 9) can legitimately be thought to have been violated by provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration; and such portrayals can be regarded as malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance, which must also be a feature of democratic society. The Convention is to be read as a whole and therefore the interpretation and application of Article 10 (Art. 10) in the present case must be in harmony with the logic of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the Klass and Others v. Germany judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 31, para. 68).

1. The measures complained of were based on section 188 of the Austrian Penal Code, which is intended to suppress behaviour directed against objects of religious veneration that is likely to cause "justified indignation". It follows that their purpose was to protect the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of views of other persons. Considering also the terms in which the decisions of the Austrian courts were phrased, the Court accepts that the impugned measures pursued a legitimate aim under Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2), namely "the protection of the rights of others".”

اسی طرح یورپی عدالت نے ایک دیگرمقدمہ(Dubowska and Skup Vs. Poland میں اسی اصول کو مزید واضح کرتے ہوئے لکھا:

ترجمہ : البتہ جس طریقہ سے مذہبی عقائد یا تعلیمات کی مخالفت یا نفی کی جاتی ہے ایک توجہ طلب امر ہے جو کہ ریاست کی ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ ان عقائد و تعلیمات کے حامل افرادکے پرامن طوردفعہ ۹ میں دیئے گئے حق کے استعمال کو یقینی بنائے۔لہٰذا مذہبی پیروکاروں کے جذبات کا احترام جو کہ دفعہ ۹ میں وضع کیا گیا ہے کی بعض صورتوں میں اشتعال انگیز اقدامات کے ذریعے مذہبی طور پر مقدس چیزوں کی خلاف ورزی بھی ہو سکتی ہے۔نتیجۃ ً، دفعہ ۹ میں دیئے گئے حقوق کی حفاظت کی غرض سے ریاستوں پر یہ بدیہی ذمہ داری عائد ہوتی ہے کہ وہ ایسے اقدامات کریں کہ جن کے ذریعے مذہبی آزادی کے حق کو افراد کے مابین تعلقات کے ضمن میں بھی موثر انداز میں محفوظ کیا جا سکے۔ایسے اقدامات، بعض حالات میں، ایک قانونی راستہ وضع کرتے ہیں کہ فرد اپنی عبادت کے معاملات میں کسی دوسرے کی وجہ سے تنگ نہ ہو۔

“However, the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage the responsibility of the State to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaranteed

under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines. Thus, the respect for the religious feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 9 (Art. 9) may in some cases be violated by provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration

(see Eur. Court HR, Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria judgment of 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295-A, p. 18, para. 47).

As a consequence, there may be certain positive obligations on

the part of a State inherent in an effective respect for rights guaranteed under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention, which may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for freedom of religion even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, X and Y v. the Netherlands judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, p. 11, para. 23). Such measures may, in certain circumstances, constitute a legal means of ensuring that an individual will not be disturbed in his worship by the activities of others.”

(Dubowska and Skup Vs Poland: (Appl. Nos 33490/96 and 34055/96.)

19۔ مغرب میں پائے جانے والے توہین رسالت کاتصور اسلام کے قانون توہین رسالت سے یکسر مختلف ہے۔مغرب کی اپنی ایک تاریخ ہے جس میں خُدا یا مقدس ہستیوں کی تضحیک و توہین (Blasphemy)کے قانون کا کلیسا نے اپنے مقاصد کے تحت استعمال کیا اور حتیٰ کہ اہل کلیسا کی رائے کی مخالفت کوبھی توہین کے ہم پلہ (Blasphemy) شمار کرتے ہوئے معصوم لوگوں کو سخت سے سخت سزائیں دی گئیں۔ اس موضوع پرمغرب میں متعددکتب تصنیف کی گئیں۔مغرب اورکلیسا کی اس حوالے سے ظلم بھری تاریخ کےلئے ڈیوڈناش کی کتاب Blasphemy in the Christian World (A History) اور لیونارڈ لیوی کی کتاب Blasphemyچشم کشائی کے لئے کافی ہیں۔ اس موضوع پر ڈاکٹر محمود احمد غازی کی کتاب " قانون توہین رسالت " کا ایک اہم اقتباس نقل کرنا ضروری ہے جس میں وہ لکھتے ہیں :

" توہین رسالت کی تاریخ کو ذہن نشین رکھنا ضرور ی ہے ، خصوصاً اس وقت جب دفعہ 295 سی کے متعلق ذہنی تحفظات کا اظہار کیا جا رہا ہو ۔ مسلمان جو مختلف سیاسی آرا ، مذہبی تقسیم ، جغرافیائی ، علاقائی تفریق اور گروہی و نسلی پس منظر کے حامل ہوں ۔ اس موضوع پر گہری جذباتیت رکھتے ہیں اور آنحضرت ﷺ کی شخصیت کی حرمت اور آپ کے مقدس مشن کی توقیر پر بھی مصالحت نہیں کرتے ، حالانکہ توہین رسالت کے قانون کے اصول اور نظریات کی بنیاد مغربی ممالک میں توہین رسالت کے نظریہ کے تصور سے مختلف ہے اور اس لیے مختلف ادوار میں قوانین توہین رسالت کی تاریخ کے ساتھ کسی طرح کا موازنہ کرنے کا جواز پیش نہیں کرتے ۔

پھر بھی یہ مناسب معلوم ہوتا ہے کہ مغرب میں توہین رسالت کا تصور کی مختصر تاریخ کو تلاش کیا جائے ۔ یہ تجزیہ ضروری ہے کیو نکہ پاکستان میں اس قانون کے بہت سے نقاد اسےلوگوں کی اکثریت کے جذبات اور اُمنگوں کی روشنی میں سمجھنا چاہیے اور اسی حوالے سے اس کی تشریح بھی ہونی چاہیے ۔

کچھ لوگ قانون توہین رسالت کے بارے میں بڑے عدم اطمینان کا اظہار کرتے ہیں کیونکہ ان کے خیال میں آئین کی رو سے جن انسانی حقوق کی ضمانت فراہم کی جاتی ہے یہ اس سے ہم آہنگ نہیں ۔ اس بنیاد پر اس احساس کی بمشکل توثیق ہوتی ہے اس لیے کہ آئین نے خود کچھ حدود و قیود مقرر کر رکھی ہیں ۔ سیاسی طور پر بھی پاکستان میں بسنے والی اقلیتوں کو ہم یہ مشورہ دیں گے کہ وہ اس قانون پر معترض نہ ہو ں ۔ وہ یہ بات اچھی طرح جانتے ہیں اور اگر نہ جانتے ہوں تو انہیں یہ جان لینا چاہیے کہ پاکستان کے مسلمان کسی کا بھی، جن میں اقلیتیں شامل ہیں ، یہ حقوق نہیں تسلیم کرتے کہ وہ کسی بھی بنیادپر یہ دعویٰ کریں کہ انہیں اپنے ہمساے کے مذہب کی توہین کرنے یا آنحضرت ﷺ کی شان میں گستاخی کرنے کا کوئی حق حاصل ہے ۔ پاکستانی مسلمان تو درحقیقت اس منطق کو سمجھنے سے قاصر ہیں کہ کوئی پوری تاریخ بنی نوع انسان کی سب سے زیادہ قابل احترام اور محبوب شخصیت کی توہین کرنے کی آزادی کا حق کس طرح مانگ رہا ہے ۔"

اسے مغرب کی تاریخ توہین رسالت کی روشنی میں سمجھنے کی کوشش کرتے ہیں ۔ اس قانون کا سہارا لے کر کلیسا اور ریاست نے بے اعتدالیاں کیں جس کا نتیجہ یہ نکلا کہ رفتہ رفتہ اس کے خلاف ردِ عمل بڑھتا گیا اور بالآخر کچھ ممالک میں اسے کالعدم کر دیا گیا اور کچھ ممالک میں اس کا وجود برائے نام رہ گیا تھا ، کلیسا نے اپنے آپ کو نہ صرف یسوع مسیح کا جانشین ثابت کرنے کی کو شش کی بلکہ اس کا ترجمان بن کر خود خدا کی نمائندگی کی ۔

کلیسا نے غور کیا کہ اس کے اپنے نظریات میں جو تضاد تھا وہ توہین رسالت کے مترادف تھا اور سخت سزا کا مستوجب تھا ۔ ایک مشہور محاورہ ہے " جو میں چاہتا ہوں تم وہ مت کرو" اس سے معاملے میں کلیسا کے رویے کی عکاسی ہوتی ہے ۔ اس طرح کا رویہ آزاد علم اور بامعنی چھان بین یا تحقیق کے تما م دروازے بند کر دیتا ہے ۔ پادریوں نے اپنے علم و فضل کی گرتی ہوئی سطح اور اپنی سیاسی طاقت کی بڑھتی ہوئی دھاک کی وجہ سے ہر اس رائے یا نقطہ نظر کو جو ان کی پالیسیوں اور دعوؤں سے ہم آہنگ نہیں تھے توہین رسالت اور کفر و الحاد کہا ۔ ریاست نے کلیسا کے اثر و رسوخ کو ترقی دینے اور یکجا کرنے کے لیے اپنی ہدایات کے نفاذ کے ذریعے معاونت کی ۔

1553ء میں برطانیہ کی ملکہ الزبتھ نے کچھ لوگوں کو محض اس لیے زندہ جلا دیا کیونکہ ان کا عقیدہ یہ تھا کہ یسوع مسیح خدا نہیں تھے اور یہ کہ معصوم بچوں کوبپتسمہ نہیں دینا چاہیے۔

20۔ عدالت عالیہ لاہور نے اپنے فیصلہ اسلامک لا یٔرز موومنٹ بنام فیڈریشن آف پاکستان(۲۰۱۲ سی ایل سی صفحہ۱۳۰۰)میں اسی نوعیت کے معاملہ میں درج ذیل ہدایات جاری کیں، لیکن بد قسمتی سے اِن پر عملدر آمد نہ ہوا۔ نتیجتاََ پراگندہ سوچ کے حامل افراد کو مزید شہ ملی اور انہوں نے اپنے مکروہ عزا یٔم کی تکمیل کی خاطر کا ئنات کی سب سے مقدس اور معتبر ہستی نبیٔ آخر الزمانﷺ کی شان میں ناقابل تحریر و بیان گستاخی کے انداز اپنائے اور ایسا مواد پھیلایا جس کو دیکھنے کی کسی میں سکت ہے اور نہ سننے کا یارا۔ عدالت عالیہ لاہور نے مذکورہ بالا مقدمہ میں حکومت اور متعلقہ اداروں کو درج ذیل ہدایات جاری کیں:

(ترجمہ )گزشتہ فقرات میں کی گئی بحث سے اخذ کردہ نتائج کی رو سے درج ذیل ہدایات فوری اورسختی سے عملدرآمد کے لیے مسئول علیہ کو جاری کی جاتی ہیں:۔

۱۔ یہ کہ بین الوزارت کمیٹی جوکہ سال۲۰۱۰ء میں اس وقت کےوزیراعظم نے تشکیل دی تھی، ویب سائٹس پر چوکس نظررکھے گی اور کسی بھی گروہ کے مذہبی عقائد کے حوالے سے متنازعہ/قابل اعتراض مواد کے فتنہ شہود پر آنے کی صورت میں فوری ایکشن لے گی۔قبل اس کے کہ ایسا مواد عامۃ الناس تک پہنچ سکے اور کسی کوتاہی کی صورت میں متعلقہ افراد/افسران کے خلاف تادیبی کارروائی عمل میں لائی جائے گی اور حکومت ایسی کمیٹی میں نجی طبقہ سے بھی افراد کو نمائندگی دے گی۔

۲۔ یہ کہ سروسز ڈویژن، اسلام آباد کے تحت کام کرنے والے کرائسز سیل کو ایسے میٹریل/مواد کے سوراغ اور متعلقہ ویب سائٹ/ URL کی بلاتاخیر بندش کی جانے اور کسی کوتاہی کی صورت میں غفلت کے مرتکب افراد کے خلاف سخت قانونی اقدام کیا جائے۔

۳۔ حکومت اپنے مستقل مندوب کے توسط سے اس مسئلہ کو اقوام متحدہ میں اُجاگر کرے گی۔تاکہ بین الاقوامی سطح پرایسے افعال کے اداروں کے لیے قانون سازی ہوسکےاور عالمی برادری کوامت مسلمہ کے تحفظات سے بالعموم جبکہ پاکستان کے تحفظات سے بالخصوص آگاہ کریں جوکہ ایسے قابل اعتراض مواد کی اشاعت سے متعلق ہیں۔

۴۔ حکومت دیگررکن ممالک سے مشاورت سے اس مسئلے کواسلامی ممالک کی تنظیم او۔آی۔سی میں اُجاگر کرے گی اور آئندہ ایسے اقدامات کے تدارک کے لیے واضح لائحہ عمل اختیار کرے گی۔

۵۔ حکومت ایسے اقدامات پر بھی غور کرے گی کہ جن کے ذریعے غیراخلاقی اور غیرقانونی سرگرمیوں میں ملوث ویب سائٹس کومستقل طور پربند کیا جاسکے۔

۶۔ حکومت اس مسئلے پر دیگر اسلامی ممالک اور چین کی طرز پرقانون سازی کے لیے تحرک کرے گی۔

۷۔ حکومت پرنٹ والیکٹرانک میڈیا کے توسط سے ایسی ویب سائٹس کے استعمالات و مضمرات سے عوامی آگاہی کا انتظام کرے گی اور

۸۔ آئندہ ایسےجرائم کے اقدام کی صورت میں حکومت متعلقہ ذمہ دارمحکموں کے خلاف متعلقہ فورمز پر قانونی کارروائی کرےگی۔

1. As a necessary corollary to the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs the following guidelines are formulated for immediate and strict action by the respondents:

(i) That Inter ministerial committee constituted by the then Prime Minister in the year; 2000 would keep a vigilant eye on the websites and in the eventuality of any objectionable material concerning the religious faith of any group would take prompt action before it reaches to the public-at-large and in case of failure the concerned persons would be taken to task while initiating disciplinary action against them and the government would also include some members from amongst the private persons in the said committee;

(ii) That the Crisis Cell working in the Services Division ICT Directorate and Enforcement Division shall be used as a tool to unearth such material and to block the relevant website/URL forthwith and in case of failure stern action be taken against the delinquents;

(iii) That the government shall agitate the matter before the United Nations through its permanent delegate for legislation at international level against such acts and convey the reservations of the Muslims of the world in general and that of Pakistan in particular regarding the publication of such objectionable material;

(iv) That the government shall bring matter before the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) in consultation with the other member countries and would adopt a clear-cut via media to halt repetition of such incidents;

(v) That the government shall also see the viability of permanent blocking of the websites involved in unethical and illegal activities in the event that such material is again presented on internal;

(vi) That the government shall strive for legislation in this regard on the lines already adopted by other Islamic countries in additional to China;

(vii) That the government shall impart awareness amongst the public through different modes e.g. print and electronic media regarding use and misuse of such like websites; and

(i) That in case of repetition the government shall sue concerned authorities before the appropriate forums.

21۔ یہاں اس امر کی وضاحت انتہائی ضروری ہے کہ یہ عدالت ممتاز قادری کیس ‘پی ایل ڈی۲۰۱۵ اسلام آباد صفحہ۸۵ میں یہ قرار دے چکی ہے کہ کسی بھی شخص کوتوہین رسالت کے ملزم کے خلاف ازخود کوئی کارروائی کرنے کا کوئی اختیار حاصل نہ ہے۔اورقانون کوہاتھ میں لینے والا قرار واقعی سزا کامستحق ہے۔ اس بابت تمام قانونی دلائل کی تفصیل مقدمہ متذکرہ میں دیکھی جاسکتی ہے۔تاہم فیصلے کا فقرہ نمبر۳۵ اہمیت کاحامل ہے۔ جوکہ درج ذیل ہے:

(ترجمہ )فرض کریں کہ مقتول نے واقعی جرم زیر دفعہ ۲۹۵سی تعزیراتِ پاکستان کا ارتکاب کیا تھا۔تو ایسی صورت میں اپیل کنندہ کے پاس مقتول کو منطقی انجام تک پہنچانے کاکیا راستہ تھا؟کیا اُسے یہ اختیار حاصل تھاکہ وہ جائے وقوعہ پر خود ہی عدالت لگائے، مقتول سے منسوب بیان کے متعلق استفسار کرے،محض ایک جملے میں بیان کردہ وضاحت کو جانچے، اور بغیر کسی فردِ جرم عائد کیے ،بغیر شہادت قلمبند کیے، اُسی موقع پر اپنے تیئں یہ فیصلہ بھی کر لےکہ مقتول واجب القتل ہے اور پھر اُسی لمحے اُسی مقام پر فی الواقعہ اپنے ہاتھوں سے سزا کا نفاذ بھی کر ڈالے؟کوئی معقول انسان مجرم /سائل کے اِس اقدام کا دفاع نہیں کرسکتا۔ کیونکہ ہم ایک ایسی ریاست کے باشندے ہیں جوکہ ایک دستور، ایک قانون ، ایک ضابطہ اور ایک طریقہ کار کے ماتحت ہے اور ہر باشندہ اس امر کا پابند ہے کہ ریاست کی وضع کردہ حدود کے اندر رہے۔

یہ عدالت اس نتیجے پر پہنچی ہے کہ اپنے دفاعی جواب کے ذریعے ملزم/سائل عدالت سے یہ فیصلہ حاصل کرنے کا خواہشمند ہے کہ عدالت اِسلامی قانون کے(سائل کے خود ساختہ) اصولوں کے تحت ملزم کے اقدام کو درست قرار دیتے ہوئے اُس کے حق میں فیصلہ صادر کرے لیکن تکرار کی زحمت کے ساتھ یہ دہرایا جاتا ہے کہ ہم پہلے یہ قرار دے چکے ہیں کہ سائل کا مجرمانہ اقدام توہینِ رسالت کے باب میں اسلامی قانون کے اصولوں کے تحت درست نہ ہے بلکہ ایسا محسوس ہوتا ہے کہ سائل خود بھی تذبذب کا شکار ہےکہ آیا اُس کو مقتول کو قتل کرنے کا فعل درست تھا یا نہیں۔

"35. Assuming that, deceased had actually committed the offence punishable under section 295-C PPC then what course was left for appellant to take the deceased to the task. Was he authorized to hold a court at the place of occurrence i.e. Kohsar Market, ask a question to seek explanation from the deceased about the remarks a question to seek explanation from the decased about the remarks allegedly attributed to him, hear the explanation of the deceased in a single sentence, without framing any charge or recording any evidence then and there declare in his heart that deceased was liable to be murdered and to execute that sentence then and there. No body on earth would dare to execute that sentence then and there. No body on earth would dare to justify this conduct of the appellant as we are living in a State governed by the Constitution, law, rules and regulation and everyone is required to proceed within the limits prescribed by the State. It is observed that through his reply appellant has left it for the determination of the court to seek verdict in his favour that his act be justified under the principles of Islamic law but at the cost of repetition it is observed that we have already held that criminal act of the subject of blasphemy. This reveals that the appellant is himself not certain that his act of committing murder of the deceased was justified."

عدالت عظمیٰ پاکستان نے اسی کیس میں پی ایل ڈی۲۰۱۶ سپریم کورٹ صفحہ ۱۴۶ میں قانون ہاتھ میں لینے والے کو انسداد دہشت گردی کی عدالت کی جانب سے دفعہ ۷ انسداد دہشت گردی ایکٹ 1997 کے تحت دی گئی سزاۓ موت کو بحال کیا اور عدالت عالیہ کے دفعہ ۷ کے جرم سے بریت کو کالعدم قرار دیا۔

22۔ اس موقع پر اس امرکی وضاحت بھی انتہائی ضروری ہے کہ اس بابت کوئی غلط الزام مسئلے کی سنگینی کے پیش نظر نہ صرف بذات خود توہین رسالتؐ کاارتکاب ہے بلکہ کسی معصوم انسانی جان کی حرمت اورتقدس کی صریحاً پامالی ہے۔ ممتاز قادری کیس میں ہم اس مسئلے پر تفصیلی روشنی ڈال چکے ہیں کہ پاکستان کے آئین اوردستور کے مطابق انسانی جان کی حرمت، تقدس اورحفاظت کس درجہ اہمیت کی حامل ہے۔ اور کسی شخص کو آئین وقانون کی روح سے یہ اختیار حاصل نہ ہے کہ وہ قانون کو ازخود ہاتھ میں لے اور ازخود ریاست بن کر دوسروں کو سزادیتا پھرے۔جس طرح کسی معصوم جان پر حملہ ایک جرم ہے بالکل اسی طرح ایک جھوٹے اورغلط الزام کے ذریعےکسی معصوم کی جان کو خطرے میں ڈالنا بھی ایک جرم ہے۔ ہم نےممتاز قادری کیس پی ایل ڈی ۲۰۱۵ اسلام آباد ۸۵ کے فیصلے میں یہ قرار دیا ہے کہ:

(ترجمہ )"قراردادِ مقاصد کےذریعےپاکستان کےعوام نےاپنےحقوق ریاست کےسپردکیےہیں اور اس امر پررضامندی ظاہرکی ہے کہ وہ دستورکی عائد کردہ حدودوقیودکی پابندی کریں گے۔اِسلامی جمہوریہ پاکستان کی ریاست کے باشندوں نے دستورِ پاکستان کے نفاذکےذریعےریاست کےساتھ ایک عمرانی معاہدہ تشکیل دیا ہے۔جس کے رو سے وہ اپنے ذاتی اختیارات سےریاست کے حق میں دستبردار ہوں۔تاکہ ریاست اُن کے تفویض کردہ اس اختیار کو عوام کے نمائندوں کے ذریعے استعمال کرے۔دستورِ پاکستان مجریہ۱۹۷۳ءکے مطابق ریاست کےکسی باشندےکویہ حق نہ پہنچتا ہے کہ وہ خود قانون کو اپنے ہاتھوں میں لے اور دوسروں کے حقوق کے بارے میں ازخودفیصلے صادر کرے، یہ صرف اور صرف ریاست اور ریاستی اداروں کا کام ہے کہ وہ افراد اور شہریوں کے مابین اختلافات وتنازعات کا فیصلہ کریں اوریہ یقینی بنائیں کہ اسلامی قانون کےاصولوں کا زندگی کے ہر شعبہ میں نفاذ ہوسکے،چاہے وہ فرد،معاشرہ یا عالمی نوعیت سے متعلق ہوں۔مزید یہ کہ قراردادِ مقاصد میں یہ بھی قرار دیا گیا ہے کہ ریاست کی عدلیہ مکمل خودمختارہوگی تاکہ عوام کو انصاف کی فراہمی شفاف اور اُن کی تسلی کے مطابق ہو، جنہوں نے اپنے اختیارات عوامی نمائندوں کو تفویض کیے ہیں۔

دستورِ پاکستان، بطور ریاست کے اساسی قانون ، شہریوں کواور ہر ایسے شخص کو جوکہ فی الوقت پاکستان میں ہو، بنیادی تحفظ اور ضمانتیں مہیا کرتا ہے۔اِس ضمن میں دستور کی دفعہ ۴،۵،۹،۱۰الف، ۱۴اور ۲۵انتہائی اہمیت کی حامل ہیں جوکہ درج ذیل ہیں۔

دفعہ۴:افراد کا حق کہ اُن سے قانون وغیرہ کے مطابق سلوک کیا جائے:

۱۔ ہرشہری کا خواہ کہیں بھی ہواورکسی دوسرےشخص کا جو فی الوقت پاکستان میں ہو،یہ ناقابلِ انتقال حق ہے کہ اسے قانون کا تحفظ حاصل ہواوراس کے ساتھ قانون کےمطابق سلوک کیا جائے۔

۲۔ خصوصا۔۔۔۔۔۔۔(الف) کوئی ایسی کارروائی نہ کی جائے جو کسی شخص کی جان، آزادی جسم، شہرت یا املاک کے لیے مضرہو، سوائے جبکہ قانون اس کی اجازت دے:

(ب) کسی شخص کوکوئی ایسا کام کرنے میں ممانعت یا مزاحمت نہ ہو گی جو قانوناً ممنوع نہ ہواور

(ج) کسی شخص کو کوئی ایسا کام کرنے پر مجبور نہیں کیا جائے گا جس کا کرنا اس کے لیے قانوناً ضروری نہ ہو۔

دفعہ۵:

مملکت سےوفاداری اوردستوراورقانون کی اطاعت:

۱۔ مملکت سے وفاداری ہر شہری کا بنیادی فرض ہے۔

۲۔ دستوراورقانون کی اطاعت ہر شہری خواہ وہ کہیں بھی ہو اور ہر اس شخص کی جو فی الوقت پاکستان میں ہو اور واجب التعمیل ذمہ داری ہے۔

دفعہ۹: فردکی سلامتی،گرفتاری اورنظرثانی سےتحفظ:

کسی شخص کو زندگی یا آزادی سے محروم نہیں کیا جائے گاسوائے جبکہ قانون اس کی اجازت دے۔

دفعہ ۱۰ الف: منصفانہ سماعت کاحق:

اس کے شہری حقوق اور ذمہ داریوں کے تعین یا اس کے خلاف کسی بھی الزام جرم میں ایک شخص منصفانہ سماعت اور جائزعمل کامستحق ہوگا۔

دفعہ۱۴: شرفِ انسانی وغیرہ قابل حرمت ہوگا:

۱۔ شرف انسانی اور قانون کے تابع، گھر کی خلوت قابل حرمت ہوگی۔

۲۔ کسی شخص کو شہادت حاصل کرنے کی غرض سے اذیت نہیں دی جائے گی۔

دفعہ۲۵: شہریوں سے مساوات:

۱۔ تمام شہری قانون کی نظر میں برابر ہیں اورقانونی تحفظ کے مساوی طور پر حقدار ہیں۔

۲۔ جنس کی بناء پر کوئی امتیاز نہیں کیا جائے گا۔

۳۔ اس آرٹیکل میں مذکور کوئی امر عورتوں اور بچوں کے تحفظ کے لیے مملکت کی طرف سے کوئی خاص اہتمام کرنے میں مانع نہ ہوگا۔

متذکرہ بالا دفعات حقوق کا اصدار،فرائض کااطلاق اور دستوری ضمانتوں کااظہارکرتی ہیں۔دستور میں جس ترتیب کے ساتھ یہ دفعات منضبط کی گئی ہیں وہ ترتیب بھی انتہائی اہمیت کی حامل ہیں۔دفعہ ۴اور ۵دستور کے حصہ اول میں مذکور ہیں۔ جبکہ دفعہ نمبر۸ تا۲۸ دستور کے حصہ دوم کے باب اول جوکہ بنیادی حقوق سے متعلق ہے،میں درج کی گئی ہیں۔ دفعہ۴قانون کی حکمرانی، قانونی تحفظ اور قانون کے مطابق سلوک سے متعلق ہے اور یہ دفعہ اس اعتبار سے انفرادیت کی حامل ہےکہ اس دفعہ کی رو سے قانون کے مطابق سلوک کی ضمانت ایسے وقت میں بھی دی گئی ہے جب حصہ دوم کے باب اول میں مذکور بنیادی حقوق دستورکے مطابق معطل ہوں۔ریاست سے وفاداری اور قانون کی اطاعت ہر شہری کا بنیادی فرض اور واجب التعمیل ذمہ داری ہے۔خواہ وہ کہیں بھی ہواور یہ ذمہ داری ہر اُس شخص پر بھی عائد ہوتی ہےجو فی الوقت پاکستان میں رہائش پذیر ہوکہ وہ دستور اور قانون کی پابندی کرے۔دستور کی دفعات پر ایک سرسری نگاہ ڈالنے سےہی یہ عیاں ہوتا ہےکہ قانونی تحفظ کی ضمانت اِک ایسا حق ہے جو بایں طور پرمہیاکیا گیا ہےجوکہ کسی صورت واپس نہیں لیا جاسکتا۔ دستور شہریوں سے یہ تقاضا کرتا ہے کہ وہ اُس کے وفاداررہیں ،اطاعت کریں اور پابندی کریں۔جس کے بعدہی بنیادی حقوق جوکہ دفعہ ۸ تا ۲۸ میں درج کیے گئے ہیں،کے حقدار ٹھہرتے ہیں۔

ہرشہری کے لیے اُس کی سب سے قیمتی متاع اُس کی’’زندگی‘‘اور’’آزادی‘‘ہے۔دفعہ۹اِس بات کی ضمانت دیتی ہےکہ کوئی بھی شخص زندگی اور آزادی جیسی قیمتی نعمتوں سےمحروم نہیں کیا جائے گا۔سوائے قانونی طریقہ کار کے۔ہر شخص زندگی کی نعمتوں اور آزادی کے ثمرات سے لطف اندوز ہوسکتا ہے لیکن اُس کے لیے قانون میں عائد کردہ پابندیوں کی اطاعت کرنا ہوگی اور اگر کوئی اُن حدود کو پامال کرے جو آئین میں دی گئی ہیں اور قانون شکنی کا مرتکب ہوتو قانون کے مطابق یہ ضمانتیں منقطع ہو جائیں گی۔دستور میں دی گئی ضمانتیں کیسی شانداراورعظیم ہیں کہ جیسے ہی کوئی شخص اپنے کسی غیرقانونی فعل کے سبب دفعہ ۹میں دی گئی ضمانت سے محروم ہوتا ہےتو فی الفور دفعہ ۱۰ اور ۱۰الف میں مہیاکردہ دستوری ضمانتیں اُس کے تحفظ کے لیے میدان عمل میں اُتر آتی ہیں۔زندگی اور آزادی چھیننے کا حق کسی فرد یا افراد کے گروہ کو قطعاً حاصل نہ ہے۔"

| | | --- | | S |

ریاست کی بنیا دی ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ اپنے شہریوں کی جان، مال، آبرو، عزت، کاروبار، اور اس کی خاندانی زندگی کا تحفظ کرے ۔ کسی ایک فرد کے خلاف ارتکاب جرم سے قانون فوری طور پر حرکت میں آجاتا ہے لیکن جب یہ جرم کسی ایسی ہستی کے خلاف ہو جو ایمان و یقین، عشق و محبت،دنیاوی زندگی میں منبع رُشد و ہدایت ہواور روزِ محشر شفاعت کرنے والی ہو تو ایسا جرم پوری ملت کے خلاف بالعموم اور پاکستانی قوم کے خلاف بالخصوص ایک گھناؤنا فعل اور ناقابل برداشت عمل ہے۔ پاکستانی قوم کی یہ خوبی ہے کہ اس کے اندر جذبہ خیر اور قربانی کا حوصلہ دیگر اقوام سے زیادہ ہے لیکن ایک پہلو ایسا ہے جس پر کسی قیمت، کسی مصلحت ،کسی خوف و لالچ میں آۓ بغیر مسلمان کے دل میں آقا حضرت محمد ﷺ کی محبت کی لو روشن رہتی ہے جسے وقت کی آندھیاں کبھی بجھا سکی ہیں نہ بجھا سکیں گی۔ اس لیےریاست کو ایسے جرا ئم جو محسن انسانیت حضرت محمد ﷺ کی عزت ، توقیر، مقام،مرتبہ، گھریلو زندگی، نبوی ذمہ داریوں، اور قرآن کریم کے نزول کے حوالے سے ہوں جس سے آپ ﷺ کی تضحیک، توہین، بے عزتی اور مرتبہ کم کرنے کی کوشش ہو، ریاست کو بہت زیادہ ذمہ داری کے ساتھ اپنا کردار ادا کرنا پڑے گا۔ اور ملک کی غالب اکثریت کے جذبات، ایمان، عقیدت، عشق و لگاؤ کو اہمیت دینا پڑے گی اور چند عناصر کی خوشنودی کے لیٔے یا بیرونی ممالک کے دباؤ کے تحت کاروائی سے اجتناب یا گریز سنگین صورتحال پیدا کرنے کا موجب بن سکتا ہے۔ یہ امر ذمہ داران حکومت کے سامنے تابندہ بن کر رہنا چاہیے کہ اگر اختیارات کے باوجود وہ نبی محترم ﷺ کی شان میں گستاخی اور تضحیک کو برداشت کرتے رہے تو نہ صرف وہ اپنے آپ کو نبی محترم ﷺ کی شفاعت سے محروم پائیں گے بلکہ توہین و تضحیک کرنے والوں کے سہولت کار تصور ہوں گے جو اَز خود ایک جرم ہے۔

| | | --- | | |

23۔ معاملہ کی حساسیت فوری کاروائی کی متقاضی ہوتی ہے نہ کہ کبوترکی مانند آنکھیں بندکرنے سے یامعاملہ کوتکنیکی وپیچیدہ قرار دیکر راہِ فرار اختیار کرنے سے ۔بدقسمتی سے کچھ لوگ اپنے مذموم مقاصد کے حصول کےلئے عمل سے زیادہ ردِعمل پرشوروغوغہ بلندکرتے ہیں۔ حالانکہ کسی عمل جوکہ قانون کی نظرمیں جرم ہے پربروقت قانونی کارروائی غیر قانونی ردِعمل کوروک سکتی ہے۔

یہ امرباعث افسوس ہے کہ FIA اوراسلام آباد پولیس نے معاملہ کی حساسیت کی آڑلیکراپنی ذمہ داریوں سے راہِ فرار اختیار کی اوراس طرز عمل سے محسن انسانیتؐ کی شان اقدس میں گستاخی کرنے والے عناصر کی حوصلہ افزائی ہوئی جس بناپرپوری اُمت مسلمہ اورپاکستانی قوم ،کرب واضطراب کی کیفیت سے دوچارہوگئی۔ قریب تھاکہ وطن عزیز کے اندر شدیداحتجاج کی فضابنتی، اور ملک ایک سنگین بحران سے دو چار ہوتا عدالت ہذا نے معاملہ کی اہمیت کااحساس کرتے ہوئے اورقوم کے ذہنی تناؤ کوبھانپتے ہوئے فوری اقدامات کے احکامات جاری کئے۔ الحمداللہ قوم کااعلیٰ عدلیہ پراعتماد بڑھاجسکی وجہ سے پاکستان ایک بہت بڑی آزمائش سے دوچار ہونے سے محفوظ رہا۔

یہ پہلو انتہائی تکلیف دہ ہے کہ ریاستی ادارے اس پہلو کا ادراک کرنے سے قاصر رہے کہ پاکستان ایک نظریاتی ملک ہے، اسکی جغرافیا ئی سرحدوں کی طرح نظریاتی سرحدیں بھی ہیں جغرافیا ئی سرحدوں کی پاما لی ذمہ دار اداروں کو بے چین اور مضطرب کر دیتی ہے جس سے قوم ایک ہیجا نی کیفیت میں مبتلاء ہو جاتی ہےلیکن ناموسِ رسالت ﷺ جو کہ بجا طور پر وطن عزیز کی نظریاتی سرحد ہے پرتابڑتوڑ حملے نبی مہربان ﷺ کی شان میں گستاخی کی صورت کیے جا تے ہیں تو ریاستی اداروں کی طرف سے عمومی طور بے حسی اور سرد مہری کا مظاہرہ کیا جاتا ہے۔ جبکہ ملک کا سوادِ اعظم غم و غصہ بے بسی اور ذہنی تنا ؤ کا شکار ہوتا ہے ایسی ہی کیفیت حضور اکرمﷺ کے عشق میں سرشار کسی غلام کو قانون ہاتھ میں لینے پر مجبور کر دیتی ہےضرورت اس امر کی ہے کہ حساس معاملہ پر سرعت سے قانون کو حرکت میں لایا جا ئے اور ذمہ دار عناصر کے خلاف فی الفور کارروا ئی عمل میں لائی جائے تا کہ مسلمانان پاکستان جن کیلے حضوراقدسﷺ کی ذات تمام رشتوں سے محترم ہے کو یقین کامل حاصل ہو سکےکہ گستاخان رسول ﷺملکی قانون کے مطابق عمل سے گزارے جا ئیں گے اور قانون وانصاف کے تقاضے پورے کرتے ہو ئے عدالتی فیصلہ کے مطابق برتاؤ کے مستحق قرار پا ئیں گے۔انسداد ِ دہشت گردی ایکٹ مجریہ ۱۹۹۷ کی دفعہ ۶ ذیلی دفعہ ۲ کی شق (ایف) اور (پی) کے مطابق توہینِ رسالتﷺ کے جرم کو دہشت گردی ہی قرار دیا جا سکتا ہے۔ اس لیئے قانون نافذ کرنے والے ادارے مقدمہ کے اندراج کے وقت اس اہم قانونی تقاضے کو مدِ نظر رکھیں ۔

24۔ چند نامور دانشور یہ سمجھنے سے قاصر ہیں کہ مسلمان اپنے نبی حضرت محمد ﷺ کے لیٔے کٹ مرنے اور تختہ دار پر چڑھنے کے لیٔے کیوں تیار رہتے ہیں۔ مسلمان کو اللہ سُبحانہ و تعٰالیٰ کا تعارف اور اس کی ہستی کے ہونے کی دلیل آپ ﷺ نے دی تو اللہ سُبحانہ و تعٰالیٰ کی ذات کے حوالے سے ایمان و یقین پیدا ہوا اسی طرح قرآن کریم جو مختلف اوقات میں نبی مہربان ﷺ کے قلب اطہر پر وحی کی صورت میں نازل ہوتا تھا۔ اور آپ ﷺ اس کی تلاوت فرما کر صحابہ کرام اجمعینؓ کو سناتے تھے پر اللہ کا کلام ہونے کا یقین اور ایمان اس لئے پیدا ہوا کہ آپ ﷺ نے گواہی دی کہ یہ کلام اللہ کی طرف سے نازل کیا گیا۔ آج ہم قرآن کریم کو جس کتابی صورت میں دیکھتے ہیں یہ ہر گز اس شکل میں نازل نہیں ہوا تھا۔ اس پہلو پہ غور کرنے سے نا عا قبت اندیشں ملحدوں اور کم ظرف دانشوروں کو جواب مل جانا چاہیے کہ اللہ سبحانہ وتعالیٰ کی ہستی اور قرآن مجید کا الہامی کتاب ہونا نبی آخر الزماں ﷺ کی گواہی کا ثمر ہے۔

ایسے ہی افراد پر مشتمل ایک مخصوص طبقہ کئی دہائیوں سے توہین رسالتؐ کے قانون پربرانگیختہ ہے اورقانون پراعتراضات اٹھاتے ہوئے ایک دلیل پیش کرتاہے کہ اس قانون کاغلط استعمال ہوتاہے۔ لہٰذا اس قانون کوختم کردینا چاہیے۔ یہاں قابل غور امریہ کہ کیاکسی قانون کے غلط استعمال کی وجہ سے اس کا صحیح استعمال بھی روک دیناچاہیے یاغلط استعمال کے اسباب کودورکرناچاہیے ؟ یقیناً ایک عام فہم آدمی بھی یہ رائے ہی قائم کرے گا کہ غلط استعمال کے اسباب دورہونے چاہئیں نہ کہ قانون ۔ یہ ایک مسلمہ حقیقت ہے کہ پاکستان میں آج تک کسی بھی مسلم یاغیرمسلم کو توہین رسالتؐ کے جرم کے ارتکاب پر سزائے موت پرعمل درآمد نہیں ہوا۔

| | | --- | | |

پاکستانی معاشرہ کی ساخت اس نوعیت کی ہے کہ یہاں خاندانی دشمنیاں کئی نسلوں تک چلتی ہیں اورقتل اوربدلہ ایک عمومی کارروائی تصور ہوتی ہے اوراگر معاملہ قانونی کارروائی کی طرف جائے تو بے گناہ افرادکوبھی مقدمہ میں ملوث کرنالازمی شرط ہے۔ یہ عمل صدیوں سے جاری ہے لیکن قانون کے اس غلط استعمال پرکبھی کوئی نوحہ کناں نہ ہوا اورنہ ہی معترض ،محض قانونِ توہین رسالتؐ پر تنقید اور ہرزہ سرائی نیک نیتی کوظاہرنہیں کرتا۔ عدالت اس حقیقت سے بخوبی آگاہ ہےکہ بعض عناصر اپنے ذاتی مذموم مقاصد کے حصول کےلئے اوراپنے مخالف کوعامتہ الناس کے غصے اورغضب کانشانہ بنوانے اورقانون کے شکنجے میں پھانسنے کےلئے توہین رسالتؐ کاجھوٹا الزام بھی عائد کردیتے ہیں۔ اس سے ملزم اور اس کاخاندان نفرت کی علامت، لائقِ معاشرتی قطع تعلق اورقانونی کاروائی کے تحت واجب سزاتصور ہوتاہےگو ایسے واقعات بہت ہی محدود تعداد میں ہیں لیکن توہین رسالتؐ کاجھوٹا الزام لگانا کسی جرم کی غلط اطلاع دینے اوردفعہ182 مجموعہ تعزیرات پاکستان کے تحت سزاوارعمل نہیں ہے بلکہ یہ ازخودایک سنگین جرم ہے جوکہ الزام لگانے والا کسی بے گناہ فردسے توہین رسالتؐ کے الفاظ، حرکات یاعمل منسوب کرکے، کم ازکم خوداس جرم کاارتکاب کرتاہے۔ اس لئے غلط استعمال روکنے کےلئے یہ ضروری ہے کہ توہین رسالتؐ کالگایاگیا الزام غلط ثابت ہونے پرالزام لگانے والے کو وہ سزادی جائے جوکہ توہین رسالتؐ کے قانون کی صورت میں موجود ہے۔ اس لئے یہ معاملہ مقننہ کے پاس لیکر جاناضروری ہے تاکہ ضروری قانون سازی کی جاسکے۔

25۔ عدالت پوری یکسو ئی سے اس نتیجہ پر پہنچی ہے کہ ریاستی اداروں کے ذمہ داروں کو حضور نبی کریم ﷺ کی ذات اطہر کیساتھ پاکستانی قوم کی وابستگی اور عشق و محبت کی گہرا ئی کا صحیح اندازہ نہیں ہے۔ حضور شفیع المسلمین و المرسلین ہیں اُنکی ذات پر حملے یا انکی شان میں گستاخی متقی و پر ہیز گارو دُنیادار و گناہ گار کوئی مسلمان بھی برداشت نہیں کر سکتا ۔بے علم و بے عمل مسلمان بھی اتنا شعوربہر حال ضرور رکھتا ہے کہ روزِ محشِر جب خونی رشتے اجنبی بن جائیں گے دوست احباب کنارہ کش ہو جا ئیں گےاور مال و اسباب حیثیت کھو بیٹھیں گے تو اس کیفیّت میں اللہ کریم سے گناہوں کی مُعافی کیلئے آپﷺ ہی شفاعت فرمائیں گے۔ اس لیے یہ مذہبی جنوں کا معاملہ نہیں بلکہ ایمان کی پونجی جو اُخروی زندگی کیلے کامیابی کا واحد حوالہ ہے، جسے کو ئی مسلمان چاہے اس کےروز و شب، مطلوب مسلمان جیسے نہ بھی ہوں تب بھی آپ ﷺ کیساتھ عشق کی حرارت میں صاحبانِ عمل سے پیچھے نہیں رہتا اور اس کو سرمایہ حیات سمجھتا ہے۔ ریاستی اداروں کو ایسے مقدمات میں اس امر کا بھی ادراک کرنا چاہیے کہ اطلاع کردہ وقوعہ دو متحارب گروپوں یا افراد کے درمیان نہیں ہوتا بلکہ گستاخی رسولﷺ کا جرم خیبر سے کراچی تک پوری قوم کے جذبات کو مجروح کرنے اور اضطراب پیدا کرنے کا سبب بنتا ہے۔ قانونی کاروائی میں تا خیرلازمی طور پر قانون شکنی اور امن ِعامہ کا مسٔلہ پیدا کرتی ہے۔ قانون نافذ کرنے والے اداروں کو قطعاً یہ اختیار حاصل نہیں کہ وہ اس بابت فیصلہ کریں کہ کون سا قانون ٹھیک ہے اور کونسا نہیں۔ قانون کی کتب میں درج ہرقانون زندہ اور لا ئق نفاذ ہوتا ہے جب تک کہ پارلیمان اس بابت کو ئی تحرک نہ کرے یا اعلٰی عدالتیں ا سے بنیادی حقوق اور اسلامی تعلیمات کے منافی قرار دیکر کالعدم قرار نہ دے دیں۔ سیاسی یا مذہبی مباحث سے قطع نظر قانون کا نفاذ اُسکی صحیح روح کیساتھ متعلقہ اداروں کی ذمہ داری ہے۔

ایک عامی مسلمان محسن انسانیت ﷺ کے بارے میں کیا جذبات رکھتا ہے اور اپنی امیدوں کا مرکز و محور کیسے سمجھتا ہے کی عکاسی جناب مظفروارثی(مرحوم) نے اپنی زیرِ نظر نعت میں پیش کی ہے جو بجا طور پر ہرمسلمان کی قلبی کیفیت کی عکاس ہے۔

میرا تو سب کچھ میرا نبؐی ہے

| | | | --- | --- | | سیاہیاں مجھ میں داغ مجھ میں | جلیں اُسی کے چراغ مجھ میں | | اثاثۂ قلب و جاں وہی ہے | میرا تو سب کچھ میرا نبؐی ہے | | میرے گناہوں پے اس کا پردہ | وہ میرا اِمروز میرا فردا | | ضمیر پر حاشیے اُسی کے | شعور بھی اُس کا وضع کردہ | | وہ میرا ایماں میرا تیقن | وہ میرا پیمانۂ تمدّن | | وہ میرا معیا ر زندگی ہے | میرا تو سب کچھ میرا نبؐی ہے | | وہ میری منزل بھی ہمسفر بھی | وہ سامنے بھی پسِ نظر بھی | | وہ ہی مجھے دور سے پُکارے | اُسی کی پر چھا ئی روح پر بھی | | وہ رنگ میرا میں اُس کی خوشبو | میں اُسی کی مُٹھی کا ایک جگنو | | وہ میرے اندر کی روشنی ہے | میرا تو سب کچھ میرا نبؐی ہے | | اسی کا غم مجھ کو ساتھ رکھے | وہ ہی میرے دل پہ ہاتھ رکھے | | وہ درد بھی ہے سکون بھی ہے | میرا تو سب کچھ میرا نبؐی ہے | | ازل کے چہرے پہ نور اُس کا | ظہور عالم ظہور اُس کا | | اُسی کے قد موں میں راہ میری | اُسی کی پیاسی ہے چاہ میری | | اُسی کی مجرم میری خطائیں | اُسی کی رحمت گواہ میری | | خُود اس کی آواز گُفتہ ٔ حق | خُود اس کی تنہا ئی طور اس کا | | بہت سے عالی جناب آ ئے | خدا کے بعد اس کا نام آ ئے | | وہ اولی ٰ ہے وہ آخری ہے | میرا تو سب کچھ میرا نبؐی ہے | | نہ مجھ سے بارِ عمل اُٹھے گا | نہ عذب ہی کو ئی ساتھ دے | | اگر کہے گا تو روز محشر | خُدا سے میرا نبی ؐ کہے گا | | سیاہیاں داغ صاف کر دے | اسے بھی مولا مُعاف کر دے | | یہ میرا عاشق ہے وارثی ہے | میرا تو سب کچھ میرا نبؐی ہے |

میرا تو سب کچھ میرا نبؐی ہے

یہ امر باعث اطمینان ہے کہ عدالت کی طرف سے بیدار کرنے اور توجہ دلانے پر حکومتی اداروں بالخصوص وزارتِ داخلہ نے مسٔلہ کی نزاکت کا ادراک کرتے ہوۓ مختلف اقدامات اٹھاۓ جن میں سے ایک فیس بک انتظامیہ سے رابطہ کرنا بھی شامل ہے۔ چونکہ یہ گھناؤنا فعل ایک سازش کے تحت مسلسل جاری ہے اس لیے وزارتِ داخلہ اور دیگر متعلقہ اداروں کو یہ ہدایت کی جاتی ہے کہ فیس بک انتظامیہ کے ساتھ مذاکرات کرکے اس شر انگیزی کا مکمل خاتمہ کرائے اور یہ مطالبہ کرے کہ توہینِ اللہ رب العزت ،توہینِ رسالتﷺ، توہینِ امہات المومنینؓ، توہینِ اہل بیت اطہارؓ، توہینِ صحابہ کرام ؓ، اور توہینِ قرآن پاک کی ناپاک جسارت کرنے والے صفحات کو نہ صرف بند کیا جاۓ بلکہ فیس بک انتظامیہ ایسے مواد کو اپنی منفی فہرست میں شامل کرے۔ پاکستان سے فیس بک انتظامیہ کو کثیر آمدن حاصل ہوتی ہے اس لیے یہ پہلو بھی اجاگر کیا جانا ضروری ہے کہ اگر یہ مکروہ فعل اور ناپاک دھندہ نہ رُکا تو پاکستان میں عوام سوشل میڈیا بشمول فیس بک کا بائیکاٹ کرنے پر مجبور ہو سکتے ہیں اور مستقل پابندی بھی لگائی جا سکتی ہے۔اس فتنہ گیری اور شر انگیزیکے خلاف ریاست کو مستقل بنیادوںپر ایک آتشی دیوار (Fire Wall)کھڑی کرنے کی ضرورت ہے اور ایک ایسا ادارہ تشکیل پانا چاہیے جس میں ملک کی نظریاتی ، جغرافیائی ، اور انتظامی امور سے متعلق افراد شامل ہوں جو ہمہ وقت اس طرح کی تخریبی کاروائیوں کی بیخ کنی کریں اور تخریبی عمل میں شریک عناصر کو قانون کے مطابق برتا ؤ کے لیٔے متعلقہ عدالتوں کے حوالے کریں تاکہ قانون کی منشاء کے مطابق ان کی سزا و جزا کا فیصلہ آ سکے۔

اللہ سبحانہ تعالی ٰ کی توفیق اور نبی کریم ﷺ کی ناموس کی برکت سے تمام فاضل وکلاء نے اس مقدمہ کے دوران بھرپور معاونت کی ۔ یہ عدالت اُنکی کاوشوں کا اعتراف کرتی ہے اور دعا گو ہے کہ روزِ محشر نبی محترمﷺ کی شفاعت کے حقدار ٹھہریں۔ اسی طرح تمام سرکاری افسران جو مختلف اداروں سے تعلق رکھتے ہیں ، کے جذبات اور تعاون کو سراہتے ہوۓ ان کے لیےدنیا و اخرت کی ابدی کامیابی کے لیے بھی عدالت نیک خواہشات کا اظہار کرتی ہے۔ گو کہ تمام وکلاء جو اس مقدمے میں پیش ہوئے کا تعاون اور رہنمائی مثالی رہی لیکن چند نام ایسے ہیں جن کا تذکرہ خصوصیت کے ساتھ نہ کرنا غیر مناسب ہو گاان میں جناب ارشد محمود کیانی ڈپٹی اٹانی جنرل، جناب افتخار احمد بشیر ایڈووکیٹ اور جناب عمران شفیق ایڈوو کیٹ شامل ہیں جنہوں نے ہمہ وقت کاوش اور انتھک محنت سے عدالت کی طرف سے لگائی جانے والی ذمہ داریوں کو بطریق احسن ادا کیا جس سے فیصلہ ہذٰا کی تحریر میں بے حد سہولت اور مدد حاصل ہوئی۔ اللہ ان فاضل دوستوں کو جزاۓ خیر سے نوازے۔ آمین

26۔ اس فیصلے کے اختتام پریہ ذکرکرنا ضروری ہے کہ موجودہ دور میں گستاخی کی جوناپاک جسارت سوشل میڈیا پرکی جارہی ہے وہ تمام اہل اسلام کے لئے انتہائی تکلیف دہ ہے اور اسی مقصد کے تحت ملک کو فتنہ فساد اورخانہ جنگی سے بچانے کے لئے عدالت نے توہین رسالت کے مسئلے پر فیڈرل شریعت کورٹ کے فیصلہ مصدرہ پی ایل ڈی۱۹۹۰فیڈرل شریعت کورٹ صفحہ نمبر۱۰میں واضح کردہ قانون توہین رسالت پر عملددرآمدکویقینی بنانے کے لئے اپنے اختیار کو استعمال کیا ہے۔جہاں تک دلی کیفیت کاتعلق ہے تواس کااظہاراس سے بہتر ممکن نہیں جوکہ تقریباً اسی طرح کے حالات میں امام ابن تیمیہ نے اپنی شہرہ آفاق تصنیف الصارم المسلول کےدیباچہ میں ذکر کئے ہیں:

"ایک حادثہ و سانحہ (جوہمارے عصر و عہد میں ) رونما ہوا اس کا تقاضا تھا کہ رسول ﷺ کا جو حق ہم پر واجب ہے (استطاعت بشری کی حد تک ) اُس میں سے جس قدر ممکن ہو اداکیا جائے ۔ اس سے بڑھ کر یہ کہ رسول ﷺ کی تعظیم و توقیر ، نصرت و حمایت ، ہر موقع و مقام پر آپ ﷺ کو اپنے نفس و مال پر ترجیح دینا اور ہر موذی سے آپ ﷺ کی رعایت و نگہداشت اللہ تعالیٰ نے ہم پر واجب ٹھہرائی ہے ، اگرچہ ذات ربانی نے اپنے رسول کو مخلوقات کی امداد سے بے نیاز کر دیا ہے ، تاہم ایک دوسرے کو آزمانے اور رسولوں کی مدد کرنے والوں کو نہ مدد کرنے والوں سے ممتاز کرنے کے لیے ہم پراسے واجب کیا ہے تاکہ بندوں کو اُن کے اعمال کا صلہ اسی طرح دیا جائے جس طرح اُس نے پہلے سے لوح محفوظ میں رقم کر دیا ہے ۔ ہمارے درد کا یہ المناک سانحہ اس امر کا موجب ومحرک ہوا کہ میں نبی ﷺ کی توہین و تحقیر کرنے والے کے لیے جو سزا مقرر ہے اُس کو ضبط ِ تحریر میں لاؤں ، خواہ اس کا ارتکاب کرنے والا مسلم کہلاتاہے یا کافر، نیز اس کے تمام متعلقات و توابع کو شرعی احکام و دلائل کی روشنی میں بیان کروں ۔ اوروہ ذکر و بیان اس قابل ہو کہ اس پر بھروسہ کیا جاسکے ۔ اس کے ساتھ ساتھ علماء کے اقوال کا تذکرہ کروں جو میرے ذہن میں محفوظ ہیں اور ان کے اسباب و علل بھی ذکر کروں ۔ باقی رہی وہ سزا جو عالم ِ آخرت میں اللہ نے اس کی مقرر کی ہے تو میں اس کی تفصیل میں نہ جاؤں گا ، اس لیے کہ یہاں اُس حکم شرعی کا اظہار و بیان مقصود ہے جس کے مطابق مفتی فتویٰ دے سکے اور قاضی فیصلہ صادر کر سکے ۔ اور اُمت اور اس کے حکمرانوں دونوں پر اس کی تعمیل بقدرِ استظاعت ِ واجب ہے۔ اللہ ہی سیدھی راہ دکھانے والا ہے "

میں نہ زاہد ، نہ مجاہد ، نہ مفسر، نہ حکیم

میری دولت دلِ شرمند ہ ء عصیاں ہی سہی

کوئی نسبت تو ہوئی ر حمت عالم ؐ سے مجھے

آخری صَف کا میں اَدنیٰ سا مسلماں ہی سہی

یورش کُفر سے زخمی سہی جذبے میرے

ایک کمزو رسا ، مظلوم سا ایماں ہی سہی

یہ بہت ہے کہ جلے اس میں تِری شمع خیال

زندگی اپنی بس اِ ک خانہء ویراں ہی سہی

اُسے کیا غم ، جسے ہو درد محبت حاصل

چشمِ دُنیا میں و ہ اِک سوختہ ساماں ہی سہی

فیصلہ ہذٰ ا کی نقول تمام متعلقہ اداروں کو روانہ کی جائیں اور دی گئی ہدایات پر عمل درآمد کی رپور ٹ اندر تیس یوم طلب کی جائے ۔

MWA/94/Isl Order accordingly.

[1] انصار عباسی (معروف صحافی / کالم نگار/ تجزیہ نگار )، مورخہ۱۷اپریل۲۰۱۷،روزنامہ جنگ

[2] انصار عباسی ، مورخہ۱۷اپریل۲۰۱۷،روزنامہ جنگ

[3] انصار عباسی ، مورخہ۲۰ اپریل ۲۰۱۷ روزنامہ جنگ،کیامیڈیاکچھ چھپارہا ہے؟؟

[4] جاوید چوہدری،محمدیؐ طریقہ،مورخہ۲۹ اپریل۲۰۱۷، روزنامہ اپکسپریس

1 اوریامقبول جان،آبروئے مازنام مصطفی است، مورخہ ۱۰مارچ۲۰۱۷،روزنامہ دنیا

2 ہارون الرشید ،جج صاحب جشن منائیں،مورخہ ۲۹ اپریل ۲۰۱۷،روزنامہ جنگ

[5] خورشید ندیم،آنے والا سونامی،مورخہ۱۳مارچ۲۰۱۷،روزنامہ دنیا

[6] مشتاق احمدقریشی، ناموس رسالت ﷺ،مورخہ۲۸مارچ۲۰۱۷،روزنامہ جنگ

[7] مفتی منیب الرحمن، تحفظ ناموس رسالت کے لئے حکمت عملی،مورخہ۲۹اپریل ۲۰۱۷،روزنامہ دنیا

[8] مفتی منیب الرحمن، تحفظ ناموس رسالت کے لئے حکمت عملی،مورخہ۲۹اپریل ۲۰۱۷،روزنامہ دنیا

[9] سورۃ الاحزاب، آیت ۵۷

[10] سورۃ التوبہ ، آیت نمبر ۶۱

[11] سورۃ الاحزاب، آیت ۶۱

[12] ڈاکٹر محمود احمدغازی : قانون توہین رسالت ایک سماجی ،سیاسی ،تاریخی تناظر:ص: 25

[13] امام ابن تیمیہ،الصارم المسلول

[14] ڈاکٹر محمود احمد غازی، قانون توہین رسالت ایک سماجی ،سیاسی ،تاریخی تناظر ،ص: 27

[15] تفسیر معارف القرآن جلد :1 صفحہ 280 ۔

[16] (تفسیر روح المعانی ج : 1، ص : 348) ۔

[17] (تفسیر کبیر ؛ج : 3 ، ص: 224)

[18] فتح القدیر ؛ج: 1 ،ص: 146

[19] تفسیر معارف القرآن ؛ج :1، ص: 255

[20] احکام القرآن للقرطبی ، ج : 8 ص : 82

[21] امام ابن تیمیہ، الصارم المسلول

[22] احکام القرآن؛ ج : 3 ص : 128

[23] ڈاکٹر محموداحمد غازی،کتاب قانون توہین رسالت ایک سماجی،سیاسی،تاریخی تناظر

[24] امام ابن تیمیہ، الصارم المسلول

[25] امام تقی الدین السبکی،السیف المسلول ، ص : 105

[26] امام ابن تیمیہ، الصارم المسلول

[27] تفسیر مظہری اردو مترجم ، ج :9 ، ص 428

[28] تفسیر عثمانی ، ج : 7 ، ص : 229

[29] ڈاکٹر محمود احمدغازی، قانون توہین رسالت ایک سماجی ،سیاسی ،تاریخی تناظر ،ص: 26

[30] امام ابن تیمیہ، الصارم المسلول

[31] امام ابن تیمیہ، الصارم المسلول

[32] امام ابن تیمیہ، الصارم المسلول

[33]سنن ابی داؤد، کتاب الحدود(۴۳۶۱) ، سنن النسائی، کتاب المحاربہ

[34] سنن ابی داؤد، کتاب الحدود(۴۳۶۳) ، سنن النسائی، کتاب المحاربہ

[35] سنن النسائي - تحريم الدم (4067)، سنن أبي داود - الجهاد (2683)

[36] صحيح البخاري - المغازي (3811)، صحيح مسلم - الجهاد والسير (1801)، سنن أبي داود - الجهاد (2768)

[37] صحيح البخاري - المغازي (3813)

[38] صحيح البخاري - الحج (1749)، صحيح مسلم - الحج (1357)، سنن الترمذي - الجهاد (1693)، سنن النسائي - مناسك الحج (2867)، سنن أبي داود - الجھاد (2685)، سنن ابن ماجہ - الجھاد (2805)، مسند أحمد - باقي مسند المکژرین (3/110)، موطأ مالك - الحج (964)، سنن الدارمي - المناسك (1938)

[39] قاضی عیا ض، الشفاء بتعریف حقوق المصطفی

[40] امام ابن تیمیہ، الصارم المسلول

[41] Muhammad; The Messanger of God and The Law of Blasphemy in Islam and The West: Muhammad Ismael Qureshi

[42] امام ابن تیمیہ، الصارم المسلول

[43] سورۃ التوبہ ،آیت 24

[44] قاضی عیاض الشفاء بتعریف حقوق المصطفیٰ

[45] سورۃ الاحزاب،آیت ۶

[46] سنن ابن ماجہ:جلد اول:حدیث نمبر 67

[47] صحیح مسلم:جلد اول:حدیث نمبر 168

[48] صحيح البخاري - الشروط (2583)، سنن أبي داود - الجهاد (2765، سنن أبي داود - السنة (4655، سنن ابن ماجه - الجهاد (2875

[49] مولاناصفی الرحمٰن مبارکپوری ، الرحیق المختوم

[50] قاضی عیاض ،الشفاء بتعریف حقوق المصطفی

[51] مولانا سید ابوالاعلی مودودی، سنت کی آئینی حیثیت

[52] سورہ الانعام ،آیت50

[53] الاعراف، آیت 203

[54] النجم ،آیت2 تا 4

[55] مولانا سید ابوالاعلی مودودی، سنت کی آئینی حیثیت

مولانا سید ابو الا علیٰ مودودی، سنت کی آئینی حیثیت [56]

[57] مولانا سید سلمان ندویؒ،خطبات مدراس

[58] مولانا سید سلمان ندویؒ،خطبات مدراس

[59] مولانا سید سلمان ندویؒ،خطبات مدراس

بحوالہ ضیا النبیﷺ صفہ نمبر ۱۸ جلد نمبر ششم پیر محمد کرم شاہ الزہریؒ[60]

[61] John V. Tolan: European Account of Muhammad’s Life : Muhammad Edited by: Andreas Gorke: Volum-IV: Page 287

[62] سوۃ الضحی

[63] سورہ الکوثر

[64] نعیم صدیقی،نعتیہ مجموعہ

[65] محمداسماعیل قریشی ایڈووکیٹ،تحفظ ناموس رسالت کاقانون

[66] پی ایل ڈی۲۰۱۵سپریم کورٹ،صفحہ۴۰۱

[67] پی ایل ڈی۲۰۱۵سپریم کورٹ،صفحہ۴۰۱

[68] ڈاکٹرشہزاد شہرام،دستور پاکستان

[69] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۴۳

[70] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۱۷

[71] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۲۲

[72] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۲۲

[73] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۲۸

[74] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۲۸

[75] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۳۰

[76] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۸۲

[77] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۸۷

[78] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۱۴۸

[79] ڈاکٹراکرام الحق یاسین،تصور پاکستان بانیان پاکستان کی نظرمیں،صفحہ نمبر۱۵۳

سورۃ الرحمان آیت ۴ [80]

سورۃ علق آیت ۳ اور ۴ [81]

سورۃ الاعراف آیت ۱۴۵[82]

[83] پروفیسر ڈاکٹر حافظ محمد ثانی،ذرائع ابلاغ کاکردار اورذمہ داریاں،صفحہ ۲۳۷

[84] پروفیسر مہدی حسن ،جدید ابلاغ عامہ،اسلام آباد،مقتدرہ قومی زبان،صفحہ۲۲۴

[85] ڈاکٹرمحمدوسیم اکبرشیخ،اسلامی ریاست میں آزادی ذرائع کی حدود،لاہور،مکتبہ تعمیرانسانیت

[86] تفصیل کے لئے دیکھیئے: ڈاکٹرمحمدوسیم اکبرشیخ،اسلامی ریاست میں آزادی ذرائع کی حدود،لاہور،مکتبہ تعمیرانسانیت،: پروفیسر مہدی حسن ،جدید ابلاغ عامہ،اسلام آباد،مقتدرہ قومی زبان: کنورمحمددلشاد،ذرائع ابلاغ اورتحقیقی طریقے،اسلام آباد،مقتدرہ قومی زبان،عرفان علی یوسف،مطالعہ ابلاغیات

P L D 2017 Islamabad 356

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

ISLAH-UD-DIN CHAUDHRY and another---Appellants

Versus

Sardar MUHAMMAD NASEER ABBASI---Respondent

F.A.O. No.45 of 2016, decided on 12th July, 2017.

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XXXVII, Rr. 2, 3, 4 & O.V, Rr. 17, 20---Summary suit on the basis of cheque---Ex parte decree, setting aside of---Substituted service---Requirements---Applicants were not in Pakistan when alleged service had been shown---Process server could only affix a copy of summons on the outer door or some conspicuous part of the house in which defendant resided or carried on business when he refused to accept service or where he could not be found despite all due and reasonable diligence---Order of Court for service of summons through affixation was not necessary---Personal service was a rule and substituted service was an exception which might be resorted to in unusual circumstances---Law primarily required personal service to be the best mode of bringing notice to the knowledge of defendant---Nothing was on record that defendants were keeping away in order to avoid service in the ordinary way before substituted service was resorted to---Substituted service was made without satisfying the essential prerequisites for the same---Trial Court did not pass an order to proceed ex parte against the applicants but nonetheless decided the suit ex parte---Impugned order of Trial Court dismissing application for setting aside of ex parte decree was not sustainable which was set aside---Applicants might file an application for leave to appear and defend the suit---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Bangul v. Noor Muhammad 1998 CLC 657; Abdullah Jan v. Bibi Almas Bano 2016 CLC 1465 and Khan Khel v. Haji Nasir 2007 YLR 1827 rel.

Gul Hussain Jadoon for Appellants.

Muhammad Iqbal Ramay for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 364

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

FAWAD AHSAN and another---Petitioners

Versus

CHAIRMAN, ARBITRATION COUNCIL, ISLAMABAD and another---Respondents

Writ Petition No.161 of 2017, decided on 16th August, 2017.

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)-

----S. 7---Divorce---Certificate of effeteness of divorce---Chairman Arbitration Council issued such certificate after ninety days---Parties reconciled before expiry of stipulated period but could not inform the Chairman---Recalling of Certificate of effectiveness of divorce once issued---Scope---Petitioner/husband contended that as spouses reconciled before ninety days so the Chairman was not justified in issuing the certificate for effectiveness of divorce---Chairman contended that husband did not inform about reconciliation so he was justified issuing the certificate in the light of statement of husband to that effect---Validity---Marriage could be dissolved by husband at his will without intervention of the Court and husband who wanted to divorce his wife should, as soon as might be, after the pronouncement of talaq, give the Chairman, Arbitration Council a notice in writing of his having done so and should supply a copy thereof to the wife---Talaq did not become effective until the expiry of ninety days from the date of delivery of such a notice, unless same was revoked earlier expressly or otherwise---Word "Talaq" in S. 7 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance,1961 referred to any form of talaq, whether irrevocable or not and by whatever name called, be talaq-e-ahsan, talaq-hasan or talaq-e-biddat---No provision of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance,1961 required the Chairman, Arbitration Council to issue a certificate of effectivness of talaq---Chairman was just to record in writing whether or not reconciliation between the spouses had failed within the period of ninety days of the delivery of the notice of talaq---After the expiry of the period as prescribed by S.7 the divorce became effective automatically---Chairman, though was not vested with the authority to annul a divorce after it became effective upon the expiry of ninety days but in the event the couple, prior to the expiry of the said ninety days, reconciled their differences and get back together which would imply the revocation of the talaq, Chairman could take into consideration such fact and recall the certificate of effectiveness of divorce and would note that the talaq had been revoked prior to the expiry of ninety days of the delivery of receipt of notice of talaq by the Chairman, Arbitration Council---Husband and wife had executed a razinama prior to the expiry of ninety days of the issuance of the notice of talaq by husband but could not inform the Chairman as father of husband had passed away during such period---Spouses had reconciled the differences which would imply that divorce had been revoked and there would be no impediment for the Chairman to note that the talaq pronounced by husband had become ineffective---High Court set aside the impugned certificate issued by the Chairman and the matter was remanded to the Chairman who would determine afresh as to whether husband had revoked the talaq prior to the expiry of ninety days of the delivery of the notice---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Mst. Fahmida Bibi v. Mukhtar Ahmad PLD 1972 Lah. 694 and Almas Mubashar v. Mubashar Hanif PLD 2014 Lah. 494 ref.

Ms. Fahmida Naz Shaikh for Petitioners.

Shakil-ur-Rehman for Respondent No.1.

Raja Muhammad Aleem Khan Abbasi, and Ms. Hadia Aziz : Amici Curiae.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 370

Before Aamer Farooq, J

Rana IMRAN LATIF---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.13 of 2012, decided on 30th June, 2017.

(a) Maxim-

----"Actus non facit, nisi mens sit rea"---Applicability---Maxim means that an act is not guilty unless mind is guilty---Prosecuting, in order to prove guilt of an accused, not only has to prove guilty act/actus reus and mens rea---Guilty mind/mens rea for each offence is to be discerned from definition of the offence---Legislature, in its wisdom, can dispense with the requirement of mens rea and the referred offences are called crimes of strict liability only in exception cases.

PLD 2001 Kar. 1151 and 2013 PCr.LJ 1737 ref.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 499 & 501---Defamation---Appreciation of evidence---Imputation---Proof---Allegation against accused levelled by complainant was that he published defamatory material alleging that complainant and his family had sent people abroad by procuring their visas for monetary benefits---Trial Court convicted accused and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for two years with fine---Validity---No imputation could harm a person's reputation under Exception 4 to S.499, P.P.C. unless the same directly or indirectly had lowered moral or intellectual character of that person with respect to his caste or of his calling---Prosecution, in the present case, did not produce any evidence to show that imputation printed in newspapers had lowered reputation of complainant in the estimation of other persons, especially with respect to his job/profession---Testimonies of prosecution witnesses did not contain anything to the effect which showed that reputation of complainant and his family was actually harmed and that resulted in lowering of the same in the estimation of others---Prosecution failed to prove that material was defamatory and accused had committed actus reus of the offence---High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused by Trial Court and acquitted him of the charge---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

PLD 2001 Kar. 1151; 2013 PCr.LJ 1737 and PLD 1996 Lah. 410 ref.

Qaiser Imam for Appellant.

Sajjad Haider Malik for Respondent.

Yasir Barkat, State Counsel.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 375

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

MUHAMMAD NAWAZ---Petitioner

Versus

SHAHIDA PERVEEN and others---Respondents

Civil Revision No.112 of 2016, decided on 16th August, 2017.

(a) Benami transaction---

----"Benami"---Meaning---Word 'Benami' means without a name, nameless or fictitious---Benami transaction is used to denote a transaction which is really done by a person without using his own name but in the name of another.

(b) Trusts Act (II of 1882)---

----S. 82---Transfer of property---Benami transaction---Proof---Preconditions---Burden can be discharged by adducing evidence of a definite character which can either directly prove fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly raising an inference of such fact---Guiding factors for the court to determine whether a transaction is benami or not stated.

Following are the guiding factors for the Court to determine as to whether transaction in question was benami or not:

(i) source from which purchase money came;

(ii) nature and possession of property, after purchase;

(iii) motive, if any, for giving transaction a benami complexion;

(iv) position of parties and relationship, if any, between claimant and alleged benamidar;

(v) custody of title deeds after transaction; and

(vi) conduct of parties concerned in dealing with property after sale.

Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh AIR 1942 FC 38 rel.

(c) Benami Transactions Prohibition Act (V of 2017)---

----S. 56---Benami transaction, prohibition of---Scope---Provisions of benami Transactions Prohibition Act, 2017 are prospective in nature.

(d) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Concurrent findings of facts by two courts below---Petitioner was paternal uncle of respondent and both had filed two suits against each other with regard to suit property---Petitioner claimed that he was exclusive owner of suit property and his brother (father of respondent) was just a benamidar---Claim of respondent was that suit property was jointly owned by two brothers and she was entitled to her legal share in suit property after demise of her father---Two courts below concurrently decreed the suit filed by respondent in her favour whereas that of petitioner's was dismissed---Validity---Petitioner in his evidence did not come up with any convincing evidence that he had paid all the allotment charges etc. for suit plot and could not prove that one-third share in suit plot was actually owned by him and not of the father of respondent in whose favour allotment of that share stood at all material times---Contention of petitioner that suit plot was allotted as rehabilitation benefit and only allotment charges were paid and no sale consideration was paid which made it doubtful when petitioner in his cross-examination deposed that suit plot was not allotted as compensation by Capital Development Authority and he had paid for suit plot---Both courts below concurrently came to the right conclusion that petitioner had failed to prove purchase of one-third share in suit plot in name of father of respondent as benami transaction---High Court declined to interfere in findings arrived at by two courts below as same were neither perverse nor in disregard of material evidence on record---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Mazim-ud-Din v. Sheikh Zia-ul-Qamar 2016 SCMR 24; Mandi Hassan v. Muhammad Arif PLD 2015 SC 137; Muhammad Baksh v. Gul Muhammad 2012 YLR 1045; Muhammad Sajjad Hussain v. Muhammad Anwar Hussain 1991 SCMR 703; Major (Retd.) Mazhar Mahmood Khan v. Khushal Khan Jadoon 1995 MLD 316; Guru Narayan v. Sheolal Singh AIR 1918 PC 140; Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh AIR 1942 FC 38; Farzand Ali v. Khuda Bakhsh PLD 2015 SC 187; Bashir Ahmad v. Abdul Latif 2005 YLR 2655; Bakhan v. Ahmad Yar 2006 YLR 831; Allah Rakha v. Nisar Khan 2007 CLC 154; Riffat Sultana v. Nadir Khan 2016 YLR 110; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Javaid Iqbal 2011 SCMR 1013; BABAP Entrprises v. United Bank Limited 2011 CLC 1534; Muhammad Ashraf v. Shah Noor Khan 1996 MLD 1819; Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Tahir Ismail 2011 MLD 1848 and Jamshed Ahmed Khan Dasti v. The State 2013 CLC 1501 ref.

(e) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Arts. 17 & 79---Power of attorney---Document, proof of---When defendant denies execution of power of attorney, burden shifts on plaintiff to prove the same in accordance with provisions of Arts. 17 & 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Presumption of correctness is attached to a registered document but when its execution is denied, sanctity of such document is dependent upon quantum and quality of evidence.

Mir Shah Nawaz Marri v. Sub-registrar, Quetta 2017 MLD 158; Mst. Salma Bibi v. Muhammad Aslam 2014 YLR 2481; Riaz-ul-Haq Sheikh v. Zulfiqar Hussain 2010 CLC 770; Sardar Muhammad v. Mst. Naheed Mehboob Alam 2005 YLR 2108 and Jan Muhammad Vs. Collector, District Jhang 2004 CLC 1847 rel.

Muhammad Ishtiaq Ahmad Raja for Petitioner.

Akseer Abbasi and Rakhshanda Azhar for Respondent No.1.

Bilal Anwar Sadat for Respondent No.4.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 1

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY---Appellant

Versus

Messrs CHINA PETROLEUM ENGINEERING CORPORATION---Respondent

F.A.O. No.88 of 2015, decided on 22nd April, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 104 & O.XLIII, R.1---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss. 39, 33 & 30---Appeal from order---Limitation---Appeal filed before High Court within prescribed time but, after removing office objections, re-filed after expiry of limitation period---Maintainability---Office objections raised and case file returned without fixing time for re-filing---Effect---Limitation period for filing an appeal under S. 39 of Arbitration Act, 1940 was ninety days, computed from the date of the order appealed from---Originally, the appeal had been filed within the time---Excluding the time period between when the office objections had been raised and the appeal returned, and when the appeal was re-filed, the appeal would have been barred by time---Objections raised by the office of the High Court after filing of the appeal were not such as would have rendered the appeal incompetent, and the office objections did not suffer from any fatal defect, as the same were at the best of ministerial in nature---Period, within which the office objections were required to be removed, had been left blank, and the office had not indicated a time within which the deficiencies/objections had to be cleared; therefore, the appeal could not have been held to be time barred---Court would refuse to entertain an appeal, in cases where the delay in re-filing of the appeal after an office objection was far in excess of the period fixed by the officer for the re-filing after removal of objection---Defendant could not be penalized for the inaction of the officer by not fixing a period for removal of the objections---Officer had also not issued any notice to the defendant for the removal of the office objections---Objection as to maintainability of the appeal on ground of limitation was repelled in circumstances.

National Highway Authority v. Zarghoon Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd 2015 MLD 746; Mian Corporation through Managing Partner v. Messrs Lever Brothers of Pakistan Ltd through General Sales Manager, Karachi PLD 2006 SC 169; Muhammad Farooq Shah v. Shakirullah 2006 SCMR 1657; Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation, Karachi v. Messrs Mustafa Sons (Pvt.) Ltd, Karachi PLD 2003 SC 301 and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Food, Islamabad and others v. Messrs Joint Venture Kocks K.G./Rlst PLD 2011 SC 506 rel.

(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----

----Ss. 30 & 33----Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 15---Arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application---Effect of legal proceedings on arbitration---Sine die adjournment of appeal against arbitration award during pendency of application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.---Scope---Rule as to exclusion of time during which proceedings were suspended---Applicability---Mere filing of an application under S.12(2), C.P.C. against the impugned judgment and decree would not render appeal incompetent---Appeal against the judgment and decree could not be kept pending or adjourned sine die until the decision on the application under S.12(2), C.P.C. by the Trial Court---Appeal, being a continuation of the proceedings before the lower court, should have been decided as expeditiously as possible---Arbitration award in question revealed that in the arbitration proceedings, the plaintiff had raised the objection of limitation to the claim made for recovery of money, on basis of which the arbitrator had framed an issue as to maintainability and limitation of the defendant's claim---Defendant had taken the plea of exclusion of the time spent during the subsistence of the injunctive order passed by the High Court from the limitation period (for recovery of the claimed amount) in terms of S.15 of Limitation Act, 1908---Grounds taken in the constitutional petition in conjunction with the order passed therein, the plaintiff's case before the High Court was that the dispute regarding the recovery amount was referable to an arbitrator and the defendant could not have arbitrarily ordered for the recovery---Injunctive order in question passed by the High Court had not placed any impediment on the defendant to institute arbitration proceedings in accordance with the contract between the parties for the recovery of the claimed amount---Said injunctive order had only restrained the process for the recovery of the amount initiated by the defendant through its letter, which had been impugned in the constitutional petition---Defendant had not instituted arbitration proceedings even after the injunctive order had been vacated by the High Court, and it was the plaintiff who had filed an application before the court below for reference of the dispute to arbitration---Defendant was, therefore, not entitled to the benefit of S. 15 of Limitation Act, 1908---Issues framed (by the arbitrator) were said to have been accepted by the parties, as no objection had been raised thereto---No infirmity or invalidity was found in the arbitration award, and there was not misconduct on part of the arbitrator---Arbitrator, in the present case was, therefore, correct to hold that the defendant's claim for recovery against the plaintiff was barred by time---Impugned judgment of the court below was, therefore, upheld---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

A. Qutubuddin Khan v. Chec Millwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Ltd Steel House, Karachi 2014 SCMR 1268 = 2014 CLD 824; North-West Frontier Province Government, Peshawar through Collector, Abbotabad and another v. Abdul Ghafoor Khan through Legal Heirs and 2 others PLD 1993 SC 418; Mrs. Rukhsana Parveen v. Syed Shabahat Hussain Naqvi 2007 CLC 1247; Tanveer Siddiqui and another v. Muhammad Rashid 2010 YLR 1851; Syed Jammat Ali Shah and others v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan Ltd, Karachi 1989 MLD 3931; Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Rashid 1997 SCMR 1224; Collector Land Acquisition Abbotabad and others v. Fazal-ur-Rehman and others 2009 SCMR 767 and Province of Punjab through Secretary, Local Government and Community Development, Lahore and 3 others 2014 CLC 417 ref.

Messrs Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division and another 1992 SCMR 65; Kashmir Corporation Ltd. v. Pakistan International Airlines PLD 1995 Kar. 301; Happy Family Associate through Chief Executive v. Messrs Pakistan International Trading Company PLD 2006 SC 226; Muhammad,Yasin v. Sh. Hanif-Ahmed and 14 others 1993 SCMR 437 and Raja Wali v. Mansha Ahmed PLD 1996 Lah. 354 rel.

(c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----

----Ss. 30, 33 & 39----Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 104 & O.XLIII, R.1---Arbitration award---Validity of---Powers of court---Scope---Court, while examining the validity of an award, does not sit as a court of appeal and cannot undertake reappraisal of evidence---For the Court to interfere in an arbitration award, there has to be an error on the face of it and discoverable by reading the award itself.

Messrs Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division and another 1992 SCMR 65 and Kashmir Corporation Ltd. v. Pakistan International Airlines PLD 1995 Kar. 301 rel

(d) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----

----Ss. 30 & 33----Arbitration award without determining question of limitation---Validity---Arbitrator has to determine whether the claim of a party before it is barred by time, and an arbitration award, which does not take into account the fact that the claim is barred by limitation, cannot be made a rule of court.

Messrs Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division and another 1992 SCMR 65 and Kashmir Corporation Ltd. v. Pakistan International Airlines PLD 1995 Kar. 301 rel

(e) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)----

----Ss. 30, 33, 39 & First Sched., para 3----Arbitration proceedings---Scope---Arbitration is essentially a time and expense saving device---Paragraph 3 of the First Schedule of Arbitration Act, 1940 requires an arbitrator to make award within a period of four months after entering on the reference---Very purpose of resolution of disputes through a domestic tribunal would be defeated if the objections to an arbitration award or appeals from judgments and decrees in terms of the arbitration award are kept pending indefinitely---Courts to make an earnest effort to decide the objections and appeals in a time frame lesser than the one given to the arbitrators to decide a dispute.

Zahid Idrees Mufti for Appellant.

Syed Ishtiaq Haider for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Islamabad 19

Before Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, J

MUHAMMAD MAJID---Petitioner

Versus

SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF MANPOWER AND OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT, ISLAMABAD and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.460 of 2016, decided on 26th April, 2016.

(a) Emigration Ordinance (XVIII of 1979)---

----S. 12(3)---Cancellation of Overseas Employers Promoters Licence and forfeiture of security deposit---Order of cancellation of licence lacking reasons---Effect---Director General, Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment cancelled the petitioner's Overseas Employment Promoter's licence and forfeited the security deposit; the appellate authority upheld the said decision---Validity---Impugned order, being devoid of reasons, was not sustainable---Order in question did not show as to whether the replies of the petitioner had been taken into consideration---Authorities were under obligation to justify as to why the position taken by the licence had not been accepted---Revocation of the petitioner's licence entailed serious consequences and attached stigma against him, apart from causing him to suffer financial loss and the loss of business goodwill---Appellate order was also cryptic and devoid of reasons, and the same was therefore invalid and unsustainable---High Court, setting aside impugned orders, directed the appellate authority to decide the complaint against the petitioner within two weeks by making reasoned and speaking order---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam International Airport Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268; Secretary, Ministry of Health, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another v. Dr. Rehana Hameed and others 2010 SCMR 511; Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana and others v. Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1159, Messrs. United Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan others 2014 SCMR 856; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Central Secretariat, Islamabad and others 2015 SCMR 630; Tristar Shipping Lines Limited v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock and 2 others 1997 CLC 1475; Dr. Zafar Ahmad v. Mst. Shamsa and others PLD 2002 Kar. 524 and Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Woolcombers Workerw Union AIR 1973 SC 2658 rel.

(b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---

----S. 24-A---Exercise of powers under an enactment---Quasi-judicial order to be supported by reasons---Where an Authority makes an order in exercise of quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order---Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons.

(c) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---

----S. 24-A---Exercise of powers under an enactment---Expression "give reasons' in S.24-A, General Clauses Act, 1897---Requirement of---Scope---Exception in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with by the statute, expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative Authority, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function, is required to record reasons for its decision.

(d) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---

----S. 24-A---Exercise of powers under an enactment---Expression "give reasons", in S.24-A, General Clauses Act, 1897---Requirement of---Object---Reasons for decisions make it possible to test the validity of decision---Giving reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.

(e) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---

----S. 24-A---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLI, R.31---Exercise of powers under an enactment---Expression "give reason", in S.24-A, General Clauses Act, 1897---Requirement of---Duty of appellate Authority---Statutory Appellate Authority acting as a quasi-judicial authority, was also to apply its mind and give reasons---Appellate forum was although not required to state the points arising for determination and then to give decision thereon, as required by O.XLI, R.31, C.P.C. but reason were nevertheless, required to be given for the appellate order---Requirement of giving reasons was equally applicable to appellate orders---Order disposing the appeal must indicate that there had been proper application of mind by the Authority to all the pleas raised and the reasons for the decision were also to be explicit in the order itself.

(f) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---

----S. 24-A---Exercise of powers under an enactment---Expression "give reasons" in S.24-A, General Clauses Act, 1897---Requirement of---Duty of public functionaries---Public functionaries dealing with the rights and obligations of persons are required to give valid reasons in their orders which are likely to operate adversely against such person.

(g) General Clauses Act (X of 1897)---

----S. 24-A---Exercise of powers under an enactment---Expression "give reasons" in S.24-A General Clauses Act, 1897---Requirement of---Principles/parameters enumerated.

The principles on the requirement to give reasons for decisions, are as follows:-

(i) Recording of reasons in support of a decision by a quasi-judicial authority ensures that the decision is reached in accordance with the law and is not the result of caprice, whim or fancy or reached on grounds of policy or expediency.

(ii) A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the authority has rejected his claim. If the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reasons is greater, for without recorded reasons the appellate authority has no material on which it may determine whether the facts were properly ascertained, the relevant law was correctly applied and the decision was just.

(iii) If the executive can make orders without giving reasons, the said power in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are to be given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations, will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction.

(iv) The condition to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness. It gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made. It also enables an appellate or supervisory court to keep the executive or a tribunal within bounds.

Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam International Airport Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268; Secretary, Ministry of Health, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another v. Dr. Rehana Hameed and others 2010 SCMR 511; Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana and others v. Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 1159, Messrs. United Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2014 SCMR 856; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Central Secretariat, Islamabad and others 2015 SCMR 630; Tristar Shipping Lines Limited v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock and 2 others 1997 CLC 1475; Dr. Zafar Ahmad v. Mst. Shamsa and others PLD 2002 Kar. 524 and Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Woolcombers Workers Union AIR 1973 SC 2658 rel.

Sardar Waqas Naseer for Petitioner.

Raja Ahsan Mahmood Satti, Standing Counsel for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 1

Before Sajjad Ali Shah, C.J., and Mahmood Ahmed Khan, J

ASHIR AZEEM---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Federal Secretary, Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage and 8 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-2449 of 2016, decided on 6th September, 2016.

(a) Motion Pictures Ordinance (XLIII of 1979)---

----S. 9(2)(a)---Sindh Motion Pictures Act (IV of 2012) S. 21(1)---Punjab Motion Pictures (Amendment) Act, 2012 (X of 2013) S.3---Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act (X of 2010), Preamble & Ss.96, 101(3) & 75---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts 270AA(6), 142 & Fourth Sched. Concurrent List [since omitted]---Scope, nature and effect of Art.270AA(6) of the Constitution on Federal Laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, after omission of the said list by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 and subsequent legislation on the subject-matter by the Provincial Legislatures being the "competent authority" under Art.142 of the Constitution---Production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph films---Scope and application of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 in the Provinces after the omission of the Concurrent List---Petitioner had impugned the notification issued by Federal Government in exercise of powers under S. 9(2)(a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 whereby a film was declared uncertified in the whole of Pakistan and its exhibition was banned---Contention of petitioner, inter alia, was that after the promulgation of Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 legislative competence in respect of "production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph films" came within the sole domain of the Provinces---Validity---Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 was a federal statute and was legislated consequent to the Constitutional mandate that was available vide Entry No. 41 of the Concurrent List provided in the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution, empowering the Federal Legislature to legislate law in respect of "production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph film" and vide the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010 all such entries from the Concurrent Legislative List were omitted and effect of such omission was taken care of by Art.270AA of the Constitution---Sustainability of laws made by the Federal Legislature on the strength of the now-omitted Concurrent Legislative List, depended on the "competent authority" and were to remain in force until such "competent authority" altered, repealed or amended such law---Article 142 of the Constitution, after Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, restricted the power of the Parliament to make any laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in Federal Legislative List and subject of "production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph films" was not available in the Federal Legislative List, therefore the "competent authority" to legislate, referred to in Art.270AA of the Constitution, in the matters of "production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph films" were the Provincial Legislatures---After legislation on the subject of "production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph films" by the Provinces, namely Sindh and Punjab, argument that notwithstanding the repeal of the Concurrent Legislative List and the subsequent legislation by the Provinces, the Federal Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 would still apply or extend to the Provinces went against the concept, object and purpose of the Eighteenth Constitutional (Amendment) and was contrary to Art.270AA(6), read with Art. 142 of the Constitution---Provinces had also retained powers in their own respective legislations, similar to those available under proviso to S.9(2)(a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 therefore contention that notwithstanding the omission of the Concurrent List, Entry No.58 of the Federal Legislative List would sustain application of the proviso to S.9(2)(a) of Federal Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 was also not valid and the matter of "production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph films" was not a matter that "related to the Federation"---High Court held that since the Provinces of Punjab and Sindh had legislated on a subject not available in the Federal Legislative List therefore, the Federal Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 stood repealed in its application to the extent of the Provinces, and had to be read down accordingly---Impugned notification was quashed, and constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances.

KESC v. NIRC PLD 2014 Sindh 553 distinguished.

M/s. Baho Film Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1981 Lah. 295; M/s. Everday Pictures Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1979 Kar. 155 and Shahid Afzal v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1977 Lah. 117 rel.

Air League of PIAC Emplyees v. Federation of Pakistan 2011 SCMR 1254; Pakistan Tabacoo Co. Ltd. v. Karachi Municipal Corporation PLD 1967 SC 241; Union of India v. K.M. Shankarappa AIR 2000 SC 3678; The Central Board of Film Certification v. Yadavalaya Films 2007 (1) CTC 1; Parkash Jha Productions v. Union of India 2012 (3) UIC 2029 and Lakshmi Ganesh Films v. Government of A.P. and others 2006 (4) ALD 374 ref.

(b) Motion Pictures Ordinance (XLIII of 1979)---

----S. 9(2)(a) & proviso---Revisional powers of the Federal Government---Power to uncertify a film and ban the same from exhibition---Exercise of power under S.9(2)(a) & proviso of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979---Providing an opportunity of hearing/issuing of a show-cause notice before uncertification and banning of a film from exhibition---Scope---Where an action was envisaged under S.9(2)(a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979, besides the "satisfaction" of the Federal Government that such action was necessary to take in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or to prevent the commission of, or incitement to an offence; an opportunity of hearing had to be provided after supplying all such material on basis whereof an action was proposed for the reason that under S.9(2)(a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979, issuance of show-cause notice or provision for providing of hearing had not been expressly excluded---Where a statute did not expressly exclude the provision for providing of an opportunity of hearing before a proposed action, then such right of hearing had to be read into such a statute and an action taken in violation of such right (against the principle of audi alteram partem); was liable to be declared as taken without lawful authority.

(c) Interpretation of statutes---

----Natural justice---"Audi alteram partem", principle of---Where a statute did not expressly exclude the provision for providing of an opportunity of hearing before taking of a proposed action, then such right of hearing had to be read into such a statute and an action taken in violation of such right (against the principle of audi alteram partem); was liable to be declared as taken without lawful authority.

Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem for Petitioner.

Salman Talibuddin, Addl. Attorney General for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 23

Before Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Abdul Maalik Gaddi, JJ

KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION---Appellant

Versus

MUHAMMAD SHAHNAWAZ and others---Respondents

High Court Appeals Nos.178, 179 and 180 of 2016, decided on 20th September, 2016.

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. VI, R. 17---Pleadings---Amendment---Exercise of discretion by the Court under O. VI, R. 17, C.P.C.---Principles and scope---Period of limitation since the accrual of cause of action in a suit having expired---Effect---Court enjoyed jurisdiction under O.VI, R.17 of the C.P.C. to allow amendments in a plaint at any stage in the proceedings where, in the opinion of the court, the same was just and necessary for the final disposal of a case between the parties in accordance with law---Mere delay in making an application for amendment in pleadings was not a valid ground for refusing a proposed amendment in plaint, however, a court was also bound to exercise such discretion in accordance with settled judicial principles---Amendments were to be allowed if the same were necessary for accurate determination of a dispute between the parties and at any stage if the same did not change the complexion of the suit altogether or introduced a new cause of action and it did not cause prejudice to the other party---Amendments could also be allowed to seek consequential relief arising from a cause of action originally incorporated in the plaint or to add additional relief available to the plaintiff before the courts of higher jurisdiction, including the High Courts and the Supreme Court and could be allowed in order to base a plaint on a different title---Amendment to a plaint, however, cannot be allowed when mala fide on part of the plaintiff was explicitly visible in the pleadings or to raise a plea of fact which was derogatory to the plea already taken up in the plaint, particularly when such fact amounted to admission in favour of the other side---Amendment to a plaint could not be allowed on ground of findings made by another tribunal in respect of the same subject matter---Rights accrued in favour of one party could not be allowed to be snatched away by allowing amendment in a causal manner unless it qualified the test based on the established principles and the same cannot be done

Mst. Ghulam Bibi and others v. Sarsa Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 345 ref.

Mst. Ghulam Bibi and others v. Sarsa Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 345;Mst. Khudeja v. Jehangir Khan and 37 others 1971 SCMR 395; Mst. Maryam Begum and 5 others v. Riaz Muhammad 2005 SCMR 1945; Muhammad Iqbal v. Muhammad Ramzan and 2 others PLD 1987 Azad J&K 170 and Mst. Imam Hussain v. Sher Ali Shah and others 1994 SCMR 2293 rel.

Amel Khan Kasi along with Ms. Nahl Chamdia for Appellants.

Salahuddin Ahmed for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 31

Before Irfan Saadat Khan and Zafar Ahmad Rajput, JJ

NAEEM SAJID and 4 others---Petitioners

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and 6 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-7759 of 2015, decided on 24th May, 2016.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 4 & 8---Fundamental rights---Scope---Fundamental rights can neither be treated lightly nor interpreted in a casual or cursory manner---While interpreting fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, a cardinal principle has always to be borne in mind that such guarantees to individuals are subject to overriding necessity or interest of community---Fundamental rights have no real meaning if State itself is in danger and disorganized---If State is in danger, liberties of subjects are themselves in danger---Equilibrium has to be maintained between two contending interests at stake; one, individual liberties and positive rights of citizen which were declared by the Constitution to be Fundamental; and the other, need to impose social control and reasonable limitation on enjoyment of those rights in the interest of collective good of society.

(b) Mala fides---

----Connotation---Action or decision is said to be suffering from mala fide on facts if it is taken due to some personal grudge, animosity, or for some personal benefit---State of mind of person taking action is of great importance.

(c) Malice---

----Scope---Any action suffers from malice in law if authority taking action is not competent to do so or has acted beyond its powers or in violation of law applicable even though it may have acted bona fide and without ill-will---Malice in law is found when order has been passed without contrary to objects and purpose of relevant statute and in abuse of powers conferred upon such authority.

(d) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 7 & 11-EEE(1)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302, 324, 427, 109 & 34---Pakistan Army Act (XXXIX of 1952), Ss.2(1)(d)(iii)(iv)(4)(5), 8(11) & 112---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.199 & 175 [as amended by Constitution (Twenty-First Amendment) Act, (I of 2015)]---Constitutional petition---Military Court---Transfer of case to Military Court---Petitioners were accused in cases of terrorism resulting into killing of innocent persons---Authorities authorized the case to be tried by Military Courts constituted under Pakistan Army Act, 1952---Validity---Safoora Goth incident was also one of the cases sanctioned for the trial under Pakistan Army Act, 1952, vide impugned letter and petitioners were alleged to be the abettors and facilitators of the crime---Legal and procedural formalities for sanctioning of their cases were duly complied with---No mala fide or malice in law existed so far as sanction of trial of petitioners along with co-accused persons was concerned---All rights of criminal trial were available to accused before military trial and even those persons who were convicted by Military Courts could approach superior Courts if they could establish that either the trial was mala fide or without jurisdiction or coram non judice---High Court declined to interfere in the matter as apprehensions of petitioners were misplaced---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Mian Manzoor Ahmed Watto v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others PLD 1997 Lah. 38; Federation of Pakistan and another v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar PLD 1989 SC 26; Arbab Akhtar Adil v. Government of Sindh through Home Secretary, Government of Sindh Karachi PLD 2005 Kar. 538; Syed Mubbashar Raza v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Home Department and 2 others PLD 2015 Lah. 20; Shahazad Abid v. The State 2003 PCr.LJ 661; Jahanghir Akhter Awan and 2 others v. The State and 8 others PLD 2000 Kar. 89; Khizar Hayat v. The State 2012 SCMR 1066; Muhammad Shoaib and others v. The State 2013 MLD 1469; Nizamuddin v. The State PLD 2014 Sindh 248; Federal Government M/o Defence, Rawalpindi v. Lt. Col. Munir Ahmed Gill 2014 SCMR 1530; Rang Mirani v. The State 2003 YLR 2007; Iftikhar Ahmed v. The State 1990 SCMR 607; Sheikh Muhammad Aslam and another v. The State and 2 others 1991 MLD 1973; The State v. Mirza Azam Beg, P.C.S. and another PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lah. 339; Ramesh M. Udeshi v. The State 2002 PCr.LJ 1712; Iftekhar Ali v. The State PLD 2013 Sindh 532 and Noor Ahmed v. The State PLD 1964 SC 120 distinguished.

District Bar Association Rawalpindi and others. v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2015 SC 401 and Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali's case PLD 1975 SC 506 rel.

Saghir Ahmed v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2004 SC 261; The Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan Rawalpindi v. Saeed. Ahmad Khan and others PLD 1974 SC 151; Lt.-General (Retd) Jamshaid Gulzar, Chairman, FPSC and 4 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Islamabad and 2 others 2006 YLR 425; Mrs. Shahida Zahir Abbasi and 4 others v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 632; Khan Asfandyar Wali and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others PLD 2001 SC 607; Sardar Ahmed Siyal and others v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman and 4 others 2004 SCMR 265; Akhtar Ali v. Judge Special Court (Offences in Banks), Punjab Lahore and 3 others PLD 2004 Lah. 182; Muhammad Nazim-ud-Din v. Chairman, National Accountability Bureau through Director General, National Accountability Bureau, Karachi and 6 others PLD 2007 Kar. 586 and Shahid Orakzai v. Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group) 2000 SCMR 1969 ref.

Khawaja Shamsul Islam, Khawaja Saiful Islam, Shehzad Mehmood and Imran Taj for Petitioners (in C.P.No.D-7759 of 2015).

Khawaja Muhammad Azeem for Petitioner (in C.P.No.D-134 of 2016).

Salman Talibuddin, Addl. Attorney General for Pakistan and Muhamamd Aslam Butt, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan for Respondents No. 1 and 5 (in both cases).

Shahadat Awan, Prosecutor General Sindh, Muhammad Sarwar Khan, Addl. A.-G; Sindh, Saifullah, Assistant A.G. Sindh, and Jan Muhammad Khohro, Assistant A.G. Sindh along with DSP Mazhar Hussain Alvi for Respondents Nos.2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 (in both cases).

P L D 2017 Sindh 53

Before Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh and Mohammed Karim Khan Agha, JJ

NAJIB RAHIM---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and 3 others---Respondents

C.P. No.D-2908 of 2013, decided on 11th February, 2016.

Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (VIII of 1975)---

----S. 5---Freezing of bank account---Principle---Federal Investigation Agency issued notice to Bank to freeze account of petitioner---Plea raised by petitioner was that he or his account had no nexus with investigation of any criminal case---Validity---Copy of charge sheet submitted by investigating officer did not reflect account in question having any nexus or relevance with investigation of F.I.R. in question---Notice issued by Federal Investigation Agency regarding account of petitioner was void ab initio and without lawful authority---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Salahuddin Ahmed and Nadeem Ahmed for Petitioner.

P L D 2017 Sindh 56

Before Nadeem Akhtar and Aziz-ur-Rehman, JJ

ABDUL WAHAB through Legal Heirs---Petitioners

Versus

ABDUL RASHEED and others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-4149 of 2014, decided on 23rd May, 2016.

Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)---

----S. 278---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Letters of administration---Limitation---Expenses, on improvements in property in question and upon marriages of children of deceased, recovery of---Letters of administration under S.278 of Succession Act, 1925, was issued by Trial Court in favour of legal heirs of deceased owner of suit property---Petitioners assailed the letters of administration on the plea of its being barred by limitation and for recovery of expenses made by their predecessor-in-interest on improvements in property in question and upon marriages of the children of deceased---Validity---Under law/Sharia no co-owner could expel or otherwise deprive to inherit properties to other co-owners much-less, on the point of limitation and/or the principle of res judicata---Legal heirs of deceased inherited property left behind with all those rights which deceased had in it---In case of any defect in title, legal heirs would also inherit the properties with such defect---If any mutation was made in the names of legal heirs of deceased, then too the defect, if any would remain intact as it was---Each and every legal heir till distribution of properties also remain co-owner in each and every inch of the properties left behind by a deceased---Petitioners did not bring on record any proof vis-a-vis spending of any huge amount on construction, marriages of three sisters and or on maintaining respondent---Court, in the matter pertaining to letter of administration, was only required to determine question about assets/properties, left behind by deceased and inherited by legal heirs only---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in order passed by Trial Court---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Sindh Industrial Trading Estates Ltd. through Secretary v. Muhammad Ilyas and another 2005 SCMR 309; Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan through Secretary and others PLD 2010 SC 61; Shahab Mazhar Bhalli v. Pakistan Railways through Divisional Superintendent and another 2014 PLC (C.S.) 356 and Syed Qasim Hussain v. Syed Mehdi Hussain and 2 others PLD 2015 Sindh 441 ref.

Anayat Hussain Shah Bukhari for Petitioner.

Mehar Khan for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Sindh 67

Before Salahuddin Panhwar, J

AIJAZ-UL-HAQ---Applicant

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Bail Application No.1449 of 2008, decided on 14th March, 2016.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 498, 499, 500 & 502---Release of accused on bail---Return of surety documents---Scope---Security offered by the surety was under process but he filed application for return of surety documents---Validity---Release of accused was subject to execution of bond by the accused himself or by one or more sureties to the satisfaction of court or police officer---Written declaration even on oath that one was ready/prepared to stand surety for an accused would not dress him up as 'surety' nor it would be sufficient for release of accused on bail---Release of accused on bail would be handing over the accused in the custody of surety under certain terms and conditions---Mere offer would create no liability upon its maker unless accepted and parties thereto proceeded further---Offer to stand surety should not only be accepted by the court but such agreement had to be followed by execution of bond---Such offer could not be taken as 'bond'---Satisfaction of court would include identification of surety and verification of his/her documents offered as security---Surety furnishing affidavit his role would commence from the acceptance of surety and execution of bond (offer) which, in the present case, had not been accepted by the court---Accused had not been handed over into the hands of surety in circumstances---Application for return of offered document could not be declined nor it could be withheld---Application for return of document was allowed in circumstances.

Ghulam Rasool v. Nusrat Rasool PLD 2008 SC 146 and Hakim Ali Zardari v. State PLD 1998 SC 1 rel.

(b) Words and phrases---

----'Bond'---Meaning

Black's Law Dictionary rel.

(c) Words and phrases---

---'Affidavit'---Meaning.

Black's Law Dictionary rel.

Shamshad Ali Qureshi for Applicant.

Abdullah Rajput, APG and Usman Tufail Shaikh for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Sindh 73

Before Sajjad Ali Shah, C.J. and Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J

OLYMPIA POWER GENERATION (PVT) LTD. through Chief Executive Officer and another---Appellants

Versus

SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LTD.---Respondent

High Court Appeals Nos.214 to 221, 230 and 293 of 2015, decided on 18th August, 2016.

Regulations of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act (XL of 1997)---

----Ss. 15, 16 & 20---Intra court appeal---Tariff---Independent Power Project (IPP)--- Plaintiffs were industrial units producing their own electricity for their in-house consumption---Plea raised by plaintiffs was that as they were IPPs therefore, tariff for Captive Power Unit (CPU) did not apply to them---Validity---Detailed and cumbersome procedure was laid down for setting up an IPP and plaintiffs had not gone through any of the stringent requirements to attain the status of IPP---By merely getting an industrial gas connection in their factory and hooking gas pipeline to a gas-generator intended to produce electricity under S.15 of Regulations of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, and that too upon giving undertaking that the electricity would be for 'self-use' only, therefore, plaintiffs could not be classified as IPP---IPPs and CPU (or industrial units) were different breed of industrial undertakings and separate laws and procedures regulate them---Plaintiffs could not be provided any benefit accorded to IPPs in any form including special rates or manners (interruptability) at which gas or other supplies were provided to IPPs--- Division Bench of High Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Single Judge of High Court---Intra court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Muneer A. Malik along with Anas Makhdoom and Ameen Bundukada for Appellants.

Asim Iqbal and Farmanullah for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Sindh 79

Before Sajjad Ali Shah and Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, JJ

SINDH RURAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATION (SRSO) through Authorised Attorney---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Cabinet Division and 3 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-4136 of 2012, decided on 24th November, 2015.

Auditor General's (Functions, Powers and Terms and Conditions of Service) Ordinance (XXIII of 2001)---

----S. 8---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.169 & 170---Auditor General, powers of--- Audit of company--- Provincial Government funds--- Petitioner company was engaged in managing public sector Healthcare Infrastructure programmes funded by Provincial Government--- Plea raised by petitioner was that under agreement with Provincial Government audit was to be conducted by independent auditors and not by Auditor General---Validity---Provisions of Auditor General's (Functions, Powers and Terms and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2001, were in line with the provision of Art.169 of the Constitution, as it defined functions and powers of Auditor General in respect of both, the accounts of Federation and of Provinces as well as accounts of any authority or body established by Federation or a Province--- Such were two distinct provisions, one of which related to accounts of Federation and the Provinces and the other for the account of any Authority or body established by Federation or a Province--- Funds utilized by petitioner were provided from the account of Province and Federation, therefore, provision of Auditor General's (Functions, Powers and Terms and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2001, were neither beyond the scope and mandate of Art.169 of the Constitution nor were ultra vires to the Constitution---Auditor General of Pakistan had authority to audit accounts of petitioner by virtue of Arts. 169 & 170 of the Constitution read with S.8 of Auditor General's (Functions, Powers and Terms and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2001---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Hamid Mir and others v. Federation of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 1880 and Suo Motu Case No.12 of 2015 ref.

Ali Almani for Petitioner.

Salman Talibuddin Addl. Attorney General of Pakistan along with Ainuddin Khan, D.A.G. for Respondents

P L D 2017 Sindh 88

Before Nadeem Akhtar and Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro, JJ

Messrs TEE JAYS EXCLUSIVE (PVT.) LTD. through Managing Director and another---Appellants

Versus

MUHAMMAD NAVEED---Respondent

H.C.A. No.147 of 2009, decided on 4th August, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XLI, R. 22 (4)---Appeal---Maintainability---Cross objections---Withdrawal of main appeal---Cross objections were filed by respondent within time and he had also paid requisite Court fee thereon---Effect---Respondent's cross-objections were maintainable in circumstances.

Suba and others v. Abdul Aziz and others 2008 SCMR 332 rel.

(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S.12---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.55---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VIII, Rr. 3, 5 & O.XLI, R.22 (4)---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Time not essence of contract---Evasive denial---Cross objection---Plaintiff entered into agreement with defendants to purchase suit property but defendants failed to provide commercialization certificate and clearance of dues therefore, sale could not be completed within the time stipulated in agreement to sell---Suit filed by plaintiff for specific performance of agreement to sell was dismissed by Trial Court with direction to defendants to retain Rs.500,000/- from earnest money and return remaining Rs.95,00,000/- to plaintiff---Defendants partially assailed judgment and decree passed by Trial Court wherein plaintiff also filed memorandum of objection and deposited requisite court fee but later on defendants withdrew their appeal---Validity---Defendants did not deny specific averments and allegation made by plaintiff, the same were deemed to have been admitted by them---Defendants were obliged to convey suit property to plaintiff as a commercial property and to complete all requisite statutory obligations in such behalf before finalization of sale---Respective promises of both the parties under the agreement were reciprocal in nature and were dependent on performance of each other---Plaintiff was not obliged to pay balance sale consideration to defendants unless entire process of commercialization of suit property was completed and it was ready to be conveyed to him as a commercial property---Plaintiff had not committed any breach and defendants committed breach by not conveying suit property to plaintiff as a commercial property, as it had never become impossible for them to perform their reciprocal promise---Time stipulated in agreement was of no consequence in view of reciprocal promises of parties---Time was not deemed to be essence of contract in cases of immovable properties---High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Trial Court and decreed the suit filed by plaintiff---Cross objection was allowed in circumstances.

Umar Bakhsh and 2 others v. Azim Khan and 12 others 1993 SCMR 374; Mst. Baswar Sultan v. Mst. Adeeba Alvi 2002 SCMR 326; Karam Din through L.Rs and others v. Muhammad Idrees 2010 CLC 246; Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Limited v. PEPSICO Inc. and others PLD 2004 SC 860; Mst. Safia v. Mst. Bibi and 14 others 2005 MLD 646; Anwar Sajid v. Abdul Rashid Khan and another 2011 SCMR 958, Sirbaland v. Allah Loke and others 1996 SCMR 575; Muzaffar Javed v. Haji Noor Bakhsh and others 2002 MLD 1474; Abdul Rehman and another v. Zia-ul-Haque Makhdoom and others 2012 SCMR 954; Asmatullah v. Allah Nawaz and others 2007 MLD 1329; Rab Nawaz and 13 others v. Mustaqeem Khan and 14 others 1999 SCMR 1362; Fazal-ur-Rehman v. Ahmed Saeed Mughal and others 2004 SCMR 436; and Abdul Aziz and another v. Abdul Rehman and others 1994 SCMR 111 distinguished.

Mushtaq Ahmed and others v. Muhammad Saeed and others 2004 SCMR 530; Muhammad Islam and 5 others v. Messrs Real Builders through Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq and others PLD 2011 Kar. 204. Muhammad Yaqoob and others v. Hakim Ali and others 2004 SCMR 584; Sajid Muhammad v. Abdur Rehman 1996 MLD 60; Muhammad Hussain and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law Justice and another 2003 YLR 2793; Sargodha Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and another v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., PLD 1982 Kar. 627 and Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others 2014 SCMR 1365; Muhammad Nawaz v. Mst. Ahmad Bibi and 3 others 1995 SCMR 266 and Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and 2 others PLD 1995 SC 423 ref.

Mirza Sarfaraz Ahmed for Appellants.

H.A. Rahmani for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Sindh 105

Before Nadeem Akhtar, J

KAMRAN ALI KHAN---Plaintiff

Versus

VANEEZA UMERAN and 9 others---Defendants

Suit No.1544 of 2013, decided on 19th September, 2016.

(a) Islamic law--

----Gift---Conditional gift---Scope---Donor gifted amount solely for using towards charitable purpose---Effect---Gift was a contract without consideration and were not enforceable in law---Only offer and acceptance would not complete a contract---If possession was transferred to the donee then gift would be deemed complete---Real test of delivery of possession was to see whether donor or the donee had reaped benefit from the property---Gift would not be complete without delivery of possession---Donor had unrestricted right to revoke gift before the delivery of possession and not thereafter---Court had to see whether gift was of the corpus or the usufruct---If gift was of the corpus then any condition which had derogated from absolute dominion over the subject of gift would be rejected as repugnant---Subject of gift might be either 'corporeal' or 'incorporeal'---Donor in case of 'corporeal' property must deliver possession of the 'corpus' of the property to the donee by any appropriate method of transferring all the control and he must divest himself of all the rights in the property in favour of donee---Where gift was made subject to a condition which would derogate it from completeness then gift would be valid but condition would be void and gift would take effect as if there was no condition attached to it---Conditions restraining or restricting the power of alienation of the donee would have no effect on the gift---Gift in favour of defendant was of the 'corpus' of the property with absolute and unlimited right of ownership over the said property---Donor after delivering possession and control thereof to the donee divested himself of all the rights in the gifted property---Whether condition alleged by the donor in the gift was valid or otherwise was to see if the alleged condition was repugnant to the gift or derogatory to its completeness and absolute dominion over its subject or absolute conveyance of the gifted property---Donee was not allowed to use the gifted amount for any purpose other than charitable and social welfare purposes---Said condition had restricted and restrained the absolute and unlimited right of ownership and dominion of donee over the 'corpus' of the gifted property---No such condition after delivering possession and control of the gifted property could be imposed by the donor as he had completely divested himself of all the rights therein---Alleged condition was null, void and ineffective and gift was to be treated as if no condition was attached to it---Gifted amount was transferred to the donee by the donor and the gift of 'corpus' of property was completed in all respects---Donor had divested himself of all the rights in the property and donee had become sole and lawful owner of the gifted amount having absolute right therein to alienate---Donor did not have any legal character or right with regard to gifted amount.

Said Akbar and others v. Mst. Kakai, PLD 1975 SC 377; Mir Zaman Khan through legal heirs v. Ajaib Sultan and 9 others 1994 CLC 991; Mst. Khan Bibi v. Mst. Safia Begum and others PLD 1969 Lah. 338; Bahadur v. Jan Muhammad PLD 1960 (W.P.) Kar. 745; St. John Ambulance Association Pakistan v. Pakistan Red Cross Society and another 1988 CLC 186; Muhammad Yasin and another v. Dost Muhammade through legal heirs and another PLD 2002 SC 71; Imam Din and 4 others v. Bashir Ahmed and 10 others PLD 2005 SC 418; Unair Ali Khan and others v. Faiz Rasool and others PLD 2013 SC 190; Muhammad Mehrban v. Sadruddin and another 1995 CLC 1541 and Zawar Hussain v. Abid Hussain Qureshi 1994 MLD 2251 ref.

Abdul Hameed and 23 others v. Muhammad Mohiyuddin Siddique Raja and 3 others, PLD 1997 SC 730; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Muhammad Khan and others 2005 SCMR 710; Ghulam Hussain Meherally v. Mst. Sirin Bai, PLD 1966 (W.P.) Kar. 608; Sh. Fateh Muhammad v. Muhammad Admit and others PLD 2007 SC 460; Zulfiqar and others v. Shahadat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582 and Malik Muhammad Faisal and another v. State Life Insurance Corporation through Chairman and 2 others 2008 SCMR 456 rel.

Thakur Raghunath Ji Maharaj and another v. Ramesh Chandra AIR 2001 SC 2340 distinguished.

(b) Islamic law---

---Gift---Revocation of---Scope.

Hedaya and Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mullah ref.

(c) Islamic law---

---Gift---Valid gift---Requisites.

(d) Islamic law---

----Gift---Essentials---Essentials of valid gift were declaration of gift by donor; acceptance by donee and delivery of possession by the donor.

The requisites of a valid gift are parties, subject, extent and formalities or mode of gift. The parties to a gift transaction are the donor who makes the gift and the donee who accepts and takes something as gift. The donor must have absolute title in the subject of the gift. The subject of a valid gift can be anything which can be legally owned or possessed, and over which dominion or right of property may be exercised, or anything which can be reduced to possession, or anything which exists either as a specific entity or as an enforceable right. The act of making a gift must fulfill three conditions which are commonly known as essentials of a valid gift ; namely, a declaration by the donor, delivery of possession by the donor, and acceptance by the donee. The real test of the delivery of possession is to see whether the donor or the donee reaps benefit from the property ; if the donor, the possession cannot be deemed to be a transfer, and if the donee, possession is transferred and the gift is complete. The reason why delivery of possession has been made the most essential requirement of a valid gift is that gift is a contract without consideration and contracts without consideration are not enforceable in law. As such, like other contracts, only offer and acceptance will not complete a contract of gift. It is because of this reason that the delivery of possession has been made essential. Under Islamic Law, gift is not complete without delivery of possession, hence the donor has unrestricted right to revoke it before the delivery of possession and not thereafter.

(e) Pleadings---

----Parties were bound by their pleadings.

(f) Islamic law---

----Gift---Meaning---

Hedaya by Charles Hamilton and Section 138 of the Principles of Muhammadan Law by D.F.Mulla ref.

(g) Words and phrases---

----'Corpus'---Meaning---'Corpus' was the absolute right of ownership over the property which was heritable, unrestricted and unlimited.

(h) Words and phrases---

----'Usufruct'---Meaning---'Usufruct' was the right of a person to use and enjoy the property which right would be limited and not heritable.

(i) Words and phrases---

----'Corporeal'---Meaning---'Corporeal' property was one which had physical existence and could be seen and touched.

(j) Words and phrases---

----'Incorporeal'---Meaning---'Incorporeal' property was one which had no physical existence.

Abdul Sattar Pirzada along with Umair Ali Qazi for Plaintiff.

Salahuddin Ahmed for Defendant No.1.

Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem (present on 18-12-2015) for Defendant No.2.

Muhammad Khalid Hayat (Present on 6-10-2015, 20-10-2015, 8-12-2015 and 27-6-2016) for Defendant No.3.

Defendant No.4 called absent.

Muhammad Muzaffar (Present on 18-12-2015) for Defendant No.5.

Defendant No.6 called absent.

Defendants Nos. 7 to 9 called absent.

Salahuddin Ahmed for Defendant No.10.

P L D 2017 Sindh 120

Before Irfan Saadat Khan and Mohammed Karim Khan Agha, JJ

ATTA ABBAS ZAIDI---Petitioner

Versus

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) and 2 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-1865 of 2016, decided on 3rd October, 2016.

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--

----Ss. 9 (b) & 16(a)---Corruption and corrupt practices---Bail, grant of---Bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial---Hardship---Scope---Statutory bail on account of delay was a right---Hardship case although involving delay was not a right and was in the discretion of the Court---Bail on the basis of hardship would depend on the particular facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether case qualified as a hardship case---Accused had completed 14 months in jail on account of trial not being completed due to no fault of his---Only one out of 10 prosecution witnesses had been examined and there were 38 accused---Trial of the case might take at least one year to complete---Accused had made out a case of bail on hardship grounds---Right to an expeditious trial should be meaningful and fully applied to protect the under-trial prisoner from prolonged period of detention during his trial due to no fault of his---Accused was admitted to bail on the ground of hardship subject to furnishing two sureties each of Rs.2,500,000/- to the satisfaction of Court---Accused should surrender his original passport to the Court and no fresh or duplicate passport be issued to him and his name should be placed on Exit Control List---Bail granting order would be subject to cancellation, if accused caused any delay in the trial.

Khan Asfand Yar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607; Muhammad Bashir v. The State 1987 PCr.LJ 230; Muhammad Saeed Mehdi v. The State 2002 SCMR 282; Mian Manzoor Ahmed Wato v. The State 2000 SCMR 107; Sanjay Chandra and others v. Central Bureau of Investigation 2012 SCMR 1732 SC India; Makhdoom Javed Hashmi v. The State 2003 PCr.LJ 266; Amir v. The State 1991 PCr.LJ 534; Razia Bibi v. The State 2011 YLR 1008; Ch. Zulfiqar Ali v. The State PLD 2002 SC 546; Munawar Hussain Mang v. The State 2000 SCMR 1585; Imran Amin v. The State 2002 MLD 1416; Nazir Hussain v. Ziaul Haq 1983 SCMR 72; Barkhurdar v. Liaqat Ali and others PLD 1977 SC 434; Muhammad Aslam v. The State 1999 SCMR 2147; Fazal Rehmat v. Naqshay and others 1997 SCMR 1579; Muhammad Afzal Butt v. The State 2015 SCMR 1696 and Muhammed Jahanghir Badar v. State PLD 2003 SC 525 ref.

Syed Mansoor Ali v. Chairman NAB PLD 2016 Sindh 41; Ali Anwar Ruk v. NAB 2015 YLR 216; Noor Muhammad v. NAB (C.P. 2876/2015 dated 24-8-2016; Bakht Zameen v. Chairman NAB W.P. 3447/2015 dated 3-3-2016; Haji Ghulam Ali v. State 2003 SCMR 597; Hamesh Khan v. NAB 2015 SCMR 1092; The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah 1992 SCMR 2192; Riasat Ali v. Ghulam Muhammad and The State PLD 1968 SC 353; Gul Hasan Penhyar v. The State 1997 SCMR 390; Muhammad Azim v. The State 2009 PCr.LJ 1314, Hashim v. The State 2009 YLR 1777; Shah Nawaz v. The State 2010 YLR 3182 and Anwar Ali v. The State 2002 PCr.LJ 186 rel.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--

----Ss. 9(b) & 16(a)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.10-A & 199---Bail---Statutory delay---Scope---Hardship case---Factors to be considered.

Although, no hard and fast rule can be set out as to what might amount to a hardship case in NAB cases, as opposed to other criminal cases where statutory bail on the ground of delay is applicable, as each case will depend upon its own particular facts and circumstances.

Following are the considerations/factors to be kept in mind for grant of bail in a hardship case;

(a) the time spent in custody without completion of the trial.

(b) that delay in the completion of the trial should not have been caused by any fault of the accused or someone acting on his behalf.

(c) the right to an expeditious trial without undue delay as guaranteed by Article 10(A) of the Constitution especially bearing in mind the Preamble to the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 requiring speedy trials and S.16(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 which requires trials to proceed on a day to day basis and be completed within 30 days.

(d) that as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Ziagham Ashraf v. State (2016 SCMR 18) that if an accused is acquitted at trial then no reparation or compensation can be awarded to him in respect of the time he has spent in jail. It is lost time which may have been spent with his family or in other useful pursuits.

(e) whether there was a reasonable chance of the trial being completed within 6 months of the date of this order which might justify giving appropriate directions to the Accountability Court rather than enlarging the accused on bail.

(f) whether the charge had been framed yet.

(g) whether a majority of the Prosecution witnesses had at the time of hearing the petition been examined.

(h) how many Prosecution witnesses were left to be examined.

(i) whether there were more than 7 accused left in the reference (some of the original accused may have entered into plea bargain or been declared proclaimed offenders).

(j) whether the loss to the exchequer had been made up or otherwise how substantial was the loss bearing in mind the time already spent in jail.

(k) whether the post arrest bail of the accused had been declined on merits.

(l) whether the accused was the main accused in the case.

(m) whether the accused was of an advanced age.

(n) whether the accused suffered from any serious medical conditions.

(o) the general principle that bail should not be withheld as a punishment.

(p) the chances of the accused absconding and/or interfering with witnesses if he is enlarged on bail.

(q) whether the accused has been convicted before under any Anti corruption legislation or entered into a plea bargain or voluntary return.

(r) Whether the circumstances leading to the delay could be said to amount to an abuse of the process of law.

(s) And finally in constitutional and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution the requirement that High Court does complete and substantial justice.

Shoukat Hayat for Petitioners.

Noor Muhammad Dayo, ADPGA (NAB) for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 135

Before Sajjad Ali Shah, C.J. and Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J

PAKISTAN CHEMISTS AND DRUGGISTS ASSOCIATION through Authorised Officer---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary and 3 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-4436 of 2014, decided on 23rd February, 2016.

Drugs (Import and Export) Rules, 1976---

----R. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 25---Drugs Import Policy---Discrimination---Petitioner was a representative body of drugs importers, wholesalers and retailers who assailed Drugs Import Policy on ground of discrimination---Validity---Discrimination was to be shown vis-à-vis same class and category, and not the whole world around---Class and category of finished drugs imports and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) were completely different and governed by different rules---Policy items assailed were perfectly in accordance with rules and grievance of petitioner was out of place as there was no discrimination---Policy in question was in line with legal framework established by laws---High Court declined to interfere in matter of policy of government---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

1996 MLD 1136 rel.

Omer Soomro for Petitioner.

Asim Mansoor Khan, A.A.G. along with Zaheer Uddin M. Baber, Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 140

Before Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh and Mohammed Karim Khan Agha, JJ

THE STATE/ANTI NARCOTICS FORCE, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR NARCOTICS CONTROL through Deputy Director (Law), Karachi---Appellant

Versus

PARVEZ HASSAN HARAVI and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No.7 of 2016, decided on 8th June, 2016.

(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 40----Anti-Narcotics Force Act (III of 1997), S. 6(5)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 12---Forfeiture of assets of person convicted abroad---Protection against retrospective punishment---Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 had no retrospective effect and was only prospective in nature---General principle was enshrined in Art. 12 of the Constitution, which provided that no law would authorize the punishment of a person for an act or omission that was not punishable by law at the time of the act or omission---Exception to such general rule might exist, but the same were rare and generally applied when the retrospective effect had been provided specifically in the statute, being a clear manifestation of the intention of the Legislature---Section 1 of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 specifically stated that the Act would come into force at once on the date of passing of the Act, which was 11th July, 1997, and as such, there was no intention on part of the Legislature for the Act to be retrospective---Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 was, therefore, applicable to offences committed under the Act after date of its passing---Property in question, having been purchased 11 years before the conviction of the respondent by the foreign court, had no nexus to offence related to offences committed after 1997; therefore, the property was not subject to forfeiture in favour of the Federal Government under S. 40 of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997.

Khan Asfanyar Wali Khan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607; Mst. Sarwar Jan v. Mukhtar Ahmed PLD 2012 SC 217; Lt.-Gen. (Rtd.) Jamshed Gulzar v. Federation of Pakistan 2014 SCMR 1504 and Haji Nawab Din v. The State PLD 1996 Lah. 304 rel.

(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----Ss. 40 & 39----Anti-Narcotics Force Act (III of 1997), S. 6 (5)---Forfeiture of assets of person convicted abroad---Laches, principle of---Applicability---Delay in initiation of forfeiture proceedings---Effect---Time period permissible for applying for forfeiture proceedings---No application for forfeiture was moved before the Special Court until approximately 2 years after dismissal of initial application by the High Court and later by the Special Court in 2005---Time limit for forfeiture under S.39 of the Act ought to have been a reasonable time which generally was regarded as 90 to 120 days---Department, having come to know of the respondent's conviction by the foreign court, should have perused its forfeiture application vigorously---Department did not show any reasonable explanation for the delay in moving the applications---Application under S. 40, of the Act, therefore, having been hit by the doctrine of laches was not entertainable.

The State v. Rana B.Nisar Ahmed 2012 SCMR 167 rel.

(c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----Ss. 40, 37, 39, 19, 12 & 68----Anti-Narcotics Force Act (III of 1997), S. 6 (5)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 23 & 24---Forfeiture of assets of person convicted abroad---Freezing of assets---Order for forfeiture of assets---Forfeiture of assets of respondents---Prohibition of acquisition and possession of assets derived from narcotic offences---Presumption of assets acquired through dealing in narcotics---Right of an individual to be dealt with in accordance with law---Protection of property rights---Respondents had been convicted in United Kingdom in 2000 for drug related offences and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment, for which the Anti-Narcotic Force filed application for forfeiture of the property owned/purchased by the respondent/wife of the convict on the ground that property had been acquired through proceeds arising out of the trade in illegal drugs by her husband and she was simply a benamidar, which was dismissed by the Special Judge Control of Narcotic Substances---Questions before the High Court were that whether the property was from the proceeds of drug related crimes under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 to be forfeited under S.40 of the Act; whether the Anti-Narcotics Force through evidence had shown reasonable grounds that the respondent/wife of the convict could not afford to purchase the property or the same belonged to her genuinely or as benamidar, and whether present case was of no evidence---Section 39 of the Act applied to convictions by the Special Court under the Act---No conviction, in the present case, however, had been made by the Special Court---Under S.39 of the Act, the Special Court could order forfeiture of assets derived, generated or obtained in contravention of S.12 of the Act or were liable to be forfeited under S.19 of the Act---Section 40 of the Act applied only to assets acquired through drug related offence in the foreign jurisdiction---Under S. 40 of the Act, there was a right for the affected party to be heard to enable to show that the assets had not been derived from a drug related offence---Presumption of S.68 of the Act would only kicked in if there were reasonable ground to believe that the assets of a person or any part thereof were acquired before or after the commission of an offence under the Act, and there was no other source of acquiring such assets or part thereof, and it would be presumed, unless contrary was proved, that such assets or part thereof were acquired, generated or obtained through narcotic related offences---Section 40 of the Act, therefore, would apply to the assets which had been acquired through drug related offences under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997---Assets in terms of a person's property could not be easily interfered with bearing in mind the protection given to property under Arts. 4, 23 & 24 of the Constitution---Department had to prove that the property had been acquired through a drug related offence under Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and that the same belonged to the accused and not his wife, or his wife was holding the same as a benamidar on his behalf or at the minimum there were reasonable grounds for so believing under S. 68 of the Act---Even if S. 68 of the Act could be relied upon, the petitioner would have to show through evidence that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the assets of a person or any part thereof had been acquired before or after the commission of an offence under the Act---Reasonable grounds must be more than suspicion---Department, in order to show existence of benamidari, had relied upon a Supplemental Lease deed which being an unregistered photocopy, paled into insignificance when the same was compared with the registered sale deed produced by the respondent, to which presumption of correctness applied, whereby his wife had purchased the property---Department, therefore, had no reasonable grounds under S.68 of the Act to believe that the property had been acquired before or after the commission of an offence under the Act, and as such, the burden of proof would not shift to the respondent/wife---High Court observed that as result of conviction of brother of the respondents, certain properties belong to said convict and the respondent's property had been forfeited for offence under the Act, but the property in question had not been included in the list of forfeiture (the Supreme Court, however, setting aside the conviction of the brother of the respondent, had released the property)---Investigating Officer had admitted that he had no evidence that the property had been purchased from drug money except the conviction of the respondent in United Kingdom and also that he had no reasonable suspicion or satisfaction or proof that the property had been purchased by the respondent/wife from drug money of her husband---No evidence was thus available to support the application under S. 40 of the Act---Impugned order was, therefore, upheld---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

The State v. Umer Hayat 2011 SCMR 1527 rel.

Muhammad Ishaque Memon, Special Public Prosecutor ANF for Appellant.

Muhammad Akram Shaikh for Respondent No.2 along with Behzad Haider for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 157

Before Sajjad Ali Shah, C.J. and Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J

Messrs GETZ PHARMA (PVT) LTD. through Authorised Person---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, through Secretary, Ministry of National Regulation and Services and another---Respondents

Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-1040, D-1042, D-1043, D-1269 and D-1355 of 2016, decided on 7th October, 2016.

(a) Drugs Regulatory Agency of Pakistan Ordinance (I of 2012)--

----S. 7(c)(vii)---Drugs Act (XXXI of 1976), S.12---Drug Pricing Mechanism, Cl.4(4)(i)---Patents Ordinance (LXI of 2000), S.58---SRO No.101(I)/2016, dated 9-2-2016---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9 & 14---Right to health---Scope---Dispute was with regard to fixation of price of 'life saving drug' meant to cure Hepatitits-C---Petitioner was aggrieved of fixation of too low retail price of medicine in question by authorities under notification SRO No. 101(I)/2016, dated 9-2-2016---Validity---Where drug was intended to heal a large part of population of Pakistan suffering from Hepatitis-C (4.5% of population), in public interest (even if patent was granted), Federal Government had ample power to invoke S.58 of Patents Ordinance, 2000, to grant compulsory licences to local pharmaceutical companies to produce drug in question at lot cheaper rates---High Court directed the authorities to recognize and take steps to show that they had recognized that "access to affordable medicine was a fundamental right granted and protected under Arts.9 & 14 of the Constitution"---Authorities were directed that "Maximum Retail Price" for essential drugs not to be set unless flexibilities provided under S. 58 of Patents Ordinance, 2001, had been fully exhausted in a transparent manner---High Court declared that Notification SRO No. 101(I)/2016, dated 9-2-2016, fixing "Maximum Retail Price" of medicine in question, as appropriate procedure of price determination of the compound in neighbouring countries was complied with and Federal Government had residual authority to issue the notification in partial modification of Cl.4(4)(i) of Drug Pricing Mechanism---High Court also directed the authorities to adopt due process provided under Drug Pricing Mechanism and after giving opportunity of hearing, re-fix Maximum Retail Price of drug in question strictly in accordance with law---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 9 & 14---Right to health---Scope---Unlike 115 countries of the world, the Constitution of Pakistan does not explicitly recognize the 'right to health'---Right to life is enshrined under Art. 9 of the Constitution and when it is read with Art.14 of the Constitution, which grants right to 'dignity of man' the same gives birth to the 'right to health' as a fundamental right---Such 'right to health' is also covered by several international human rights instruments, including International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) ratified by Pakistan on 17-4-2008, which recognizes the right of nationals to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.

Faisal Siddiqui and Abdul Sattar Pirzada for Petitioner.

Muhammad Aslam Butt, D.A.G. for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 169

Before Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Syed Saeeduddin Nasir, JJ

MUTTAHIDA QUAMI MOVEMENT (MQM) through the Leader of the Opposition and others---Petitioners

Versus

PROVINCE OF SINDH through Chief Secretary, Karachi and others---Respondents

Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-540 to D-543, D-419 and D-468 of 2016, decided on 24th February, 2016.

(a) Sindh Local Government Act (XLII of 2013)---

----S.18(3)(4)(6)(7)(8) & (9) [as amended by Sindh Local Government (Amendment) Act (XII of 2015)]---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 7, 25(3), 32, 34, 36, 37(i), 140-A, 219-D & 226---Election by show of hands---Vires---Petitioner assailed amendments introduced in Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, whereby elections to seats of Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Chairman and Vice Chairman and special seats were to be held by 'show of hands' instead of 'secret ballot'---Validity---Elections of Local Government were elections under the Constitution and the same should be held by 'secret ballot'---Amendments were enacted by Provincial Legislature in grave violation of the mandate contemplated by Art.226 of the Constitution, which stipulated that every election under the Constitution would be held by 'secret ballot' and not by 'show of hands'---Provisions of Art.226 of the Constitution were with regard to holding of election under the Constitution and were not confined to direct elections furthermore the provisions were relevant to indirect elections of reserved seats and that of elections of Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Chairman and Vice Chairman and the same could not be held by 'show of hands' instead of 'secret ballot'---Government had no constitutional or legal right to interfere in election process of special interest/reserved seats by amending Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, in the manner that elections of the reserved seats would be held by 'show of hands' instead of 'secret ballot'---High Court declared amendments in question as repugnant to Arts. 7, 25(3), 32, 34, 36, 37(i), 140-A, 219-B and 226 of the Constitution--- Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Attaullah and another v. Government of Balochistan, Local Government Rural Development and Agrovilles Department and another PLD 2014 Bal. 206; Election Commission of Pakistan v. Province of Punjab PLD 2014 SC 668; Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. MQM through Deputy Convener and others PLD 2014 SC 531; Arshad Mehmood v. Commissioner/Delimitation Authority Gujranwala and others PLD 2014 Lahore 221; Malik Nazar Hussain v. Governor of Punjab and 4 others PLD 1988 Lah. 171; Kuldip Nayyar v. Union of India and others AIR 2006 SC 3127; Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187; Ghulam Farid and 2 others v. Hamida Bibi and 2 others 2011 YLR 2188; M. Omkar v. Government of A.P. AIR 1983 And. Pra 379; In re: P. Raghava Redid AIR 1975 And. Pra. 123; Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahafuz-e-Dastoor v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 1263; G. Narayana Swamy v. Government of A.P. and others AIR 1985 And. Pra. 225; Niaz Ahmed v. Azizuddin and others PLD 1967 SC 466; Lahore Development Authority through D.G. and others v. Imrana Tiwana and others 2015 SCMR 1739; Muhammad Salahuddin v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1990 FSC 1; Abdul Majeed Khan v. District Returning Officer 2006 SCMR 1713 and Hari Khemu Gawali v. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay and another PLD 1957 SC (India) 90 ref.

(b) Judgment---

----Pronouncing of judgment---Two different laws---Effect---Not safe to pronounce judgment on the provision of one Act with reference to decision dealing with other Acts which are not pari materia.

Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi v. Additional District and Sessions Judge/Returning Officer, N.A.158 Naushero Feroze 1994 SCMR 1299 rel.

(c) Sindh Local Government Act (XLII of 2013)---

----Ss.18 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9), 19 & 20 [as amended by Sindh Local Government (Third Amendment) Act (XXXVIII of 2015)]--- Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 7, 25 (3), 32, 34, 36, 37(i), 140-A, 219-D & 226---Special seats for 'youth'---Vires---Petitioner assailed amendments introduced in Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, whereby special category of seats for 'youth' were reserved---Validity---No cogent reason was given for providing 'youth' a preferential treatment---Constitution did not recognize 'youth' as a category of society which was subject to bias, prejudice, discrimination or suffering from deprivation---Even if the 'youth' was brought into the category of the society which deserved preferential treatment, the same was not sustainable inasmuch as it was in contravention of the express provisions contemplated by the Constitution---Provincial Legislature did not take into consideration while enacting Sindh Local Government (Third Amendment) Act, 2015, as to whether or not the new category of 'youth' that it was creating was compatible with the Constitution---Special or reserved seats could only be maintained in respect of class of a person belonging to a down trodden and discriminate segment of society or minority community who had been specifically mentioned in the Constitution, like non-Muslims, women, peasants and workers---'Youth' could not be categorized as such inasmuch it was neither down trodden nor discriminated nor specifically stipulated in relevant Articles of the Constitution---By taking away reserved seats of workers and peasants and giving it to the category of 'youth' was discriminatory, illegal and in violation of Art.25 of the Constitution read with Art.32 of the Constitution, which guaranteed protection and special status to peasants and workers---High Court declared amendments in question as repugnant to Arts. 7, 25(3), 32, 34, 36, 37(i), 140-A, 219-B and 226 of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

(d) Interpretation of statutes---

----Retrospective effect---Principle---Legislation that touches inalienable vested rights of individuals of the State cannot at all be given retrospective effect.

Muhammad Farogh Naseem and Ahmed Zamir for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos. 540 to 543 of 2016).

Muhammad Mansoor Mir for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos.419 and 468 of 2016).

Farooq H. Naek and Owais Ahmed for Respondent No.1.

Khalid Javed Khan for Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians, Respondent No.6.

Abdus Samad Khattak for Jammat-e-Islami, Karachi, Respondent No.7.

Ghulam Shabbir Shah for Respondent No.5.

Mirza Nasim Baig for Respondent No.5.

Nisar Ahmed, Durrani, Advocate General Sindh along with Mukesh Kumar Karara, Addl. A.G. Sindh and Jaam Habibullah, State Counsel.

Dilawar Hussain, Standing Counsel.

Ghulam Shabbir Shah for Respondent No.5.

Niaz Ahmed Election Officer, Syed Rashid Hussain, District Election Commissioner, Korangi and Abdullah Hanjrah, Law Officer, Provincial Election Commission, Sindh.

P L D 2017 Sindh 198

Before Sajjad Ali Shah, C.J. and Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J

SHAHRUKH SHAKEEL KHAN and 2 others---Petitioners

Versus

PROVINCE OF SINDH through Chief Secretary and 4 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-5812, D-5651, D-6171, D-6219, D-6383, D-6943, D-5867, D-7390 and D-7901 of 2015 decided on 7th October, 2016.

(a) Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulations and Control) Rules, 2002---

----R. 7(3)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.25-A---Increase in fees by the private schools---Scope---State had the primary responsibility to establish educational institutions and operate the same effectively through appropriate regulatory mechanism---Rule 7(3) of Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulations and Control) Rules, 2002 was not violative of Art.25-A of the Constitution---Private schools were not following the mechanism provided in R.7(3) of Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulations and Control) Rules, 2002---Government was directed by the High Court to ensure compliance of Sindh Private Educational Institutions (Regulations and Control) Rules, 2002 and submit report to the Court---Schools should only increase tuition fees no more than 5% per annum from the date of their registration for three years and in case there had been no re-registration after said period of three years then tuition fees should not be increased unless school re-registered itself---Private schools who had increased their tuition fees over 5% per annum for the last three years from the date of their respective registration/ re-registration should not further increase fees until their re-registration---Constitutional petitions were disposed of accordingly.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Question of facts could not be resolved by the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction.

Petitioners by:

Abdur Rehman for Petitioners (in C.P. No.D-5867 of 2015).

Salahuddin Ahmed for Petitioners (in C.P. No.D-6219 of 2015).

Mehreen Ibrahim and Shajee Siddiqui for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos.D-5812, D-6171, D-6219, D-6983, D-6943 and D-7390 of 2015).

Haris Rasheed Khan along with Petitioner Sardar Azmat Hussain (in C.P. No.D-7901 of 2015).

Respondents by:

Jam Asif Mehmood, Saim Hashmi and Ms. Zahrah Sahar Viyani [Generation School (Pvt.) Ltd.] along with Shoaib Siddiq, Administrator.

Khawaja Shamsul Islam for Respondent No. 2 (in C.P. No.D-5867 of 2015).

Kazim Hasan, [Beacon House School System].

Mustafa Mahesar, A.A.G.

Dr. Mansoob Hassan Siddiqui, D.G. Private Institution Sindh.

P L D 2017 Sindh 209

Before Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan J

INDEPENDENT MEDIA CORPORATION (PVT) LTD. through Authorized Attorney---Appellant

Versus

PAKISTAN ELECTRONIC MEDIA REGULATORY AUTHORITY through Chairman---Respondent

M.A. No.45 of 2012, decided on 1st December, 2016.

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)--

----Ss. 26, 30A & 20(c)---Terms and conditions of licence---Council of Complaints---Determination as to whether content aired by a licensee contained "obscenity", "indecency", or "vulgarity"---Forum for such determination---Appeal under S.30A of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Scope---Contention of appellant, inter alia, was that no judicial determination could be made by the Council of Complaints under S.26 of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 as to whether content aired by appellant contained "obscenity", "indecency", or "vulgarity"---Validity---Contention that the High Court should determine whether contents aired by appellant, contained "obscenity", "indecency", or "vulgarity" was not valid as the same was not the job of the High Court under S.30A of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Questions as to whether content contained "obscenity", "indecency", or "vulgarity" were best suited to be answered by the appropriate forum which in the present case was the Council of Complaints under S.26 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Bahzad Haider and Umar Pirzada along with Abid Naseem for Appellant.

Kashif Hanif for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Sindh 214

Before Sajjad Ali Shah, C.J., and Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J

FAREED AHMED A. DAYO---Petitioner

Versus

CHIEF MINISTER SINDH through Principal Secretary and 5 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-3980 of 2016, decided on 22nd November, 2016.

(a) Interpretation of statutes ----

----"Casus omissus", doctrine of---Nature, scope meaning and application of the doctrine of "casus omissus"---"Casus omissus" literally meant "case omitted"---Application of the doctrine of "casus omissus" was that a matter which should have been, but had not been provided for in a statute, then the same could not be supplied by the courts, as to do so would be legislation and not interpretation, which was not a function of the courts---Doctrine of "casus omissus" applied to an eventuality or situation not provided for by the statute and was therefore governed by case-law, or (new) judge-made law---Classic rule was that the court would not fill the gap in the statute as their functions were "jus dicere" and not "jus dare"(that was to declare or decide the law)---Doctrine of "casus omissus" therefore, outlined the circumstances where a court could supply a clearly unintended omission by the Legislature in drafting a particular provision, thus the court's hands were not completely tied but it was only applicable when the Legislature had enlisted certain possibilities but missed a few ones.

Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmed Khan PLD 1974 SC 151; Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 SCMR 455; Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 697; Associated Provincial Picture Houses. Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 1947 (2) All ELR 680; Council of Civil Service Unions and others v. Minister for the Civil Service (1984 (3) All ELR 935; Nottinghamshire Country Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment 1986 (1) All ELR 199; The Chairman East Pakistan Railway Board v. Abdul Majid Sardar PLD 1966 SC 725; Abdul Majeed Pirzada v. Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1990 Kar. 9; Executive District Officer (Revenue) District Khushab at Jauharabad v. Ijaz Hussain 2012 PLC (C.S.) 917; Ghulam Rasool v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 6; Muhammad Ismail v. The State PLD 1969 SC 241; Dr. Zahid Javed v. Dr. Tahir Riaz Chaudhry PLD 2016 SC 637 and Zahid Iqbal v. Hafiz Muhammad Adnan 2016 SCMR 430 distinguished.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Arts. 130(11) & 93---Appointment of "advisers" by the Provincial Chief Minister---Basic and fundamental requisite for such appointment---Exercise of discretion by the Chief Minister---Constitutional criteria for appointment of adviser under Art.130(11) of the Constitution---"Adviser", meaning of---Scope---"Adviser" was a person who gave advice in a particular field---Word "advice" meant "guidance or recommendations offered with regard to prudent action" and the word "prudent" meant "acting with or showing care and thought of the future"---Said combined dictionary meanings therefore depict an "adviser" to be a person, who based on his prudence and thoughtfulness would be called upon for giving guidance and recommendations with regard to a futuristic action---Any person to be appointed as an Adviser under Art.130(11) of the Constitution should therefore be able to satisfy such fundamental and basic requisite as anticipated by the ordinary meaning of the word "adviser"---Constitution therefore, did prescribe the requisites for anticipated appointment of an Adviser under Art. 130(11) of the Constitution and did not leave it open to the Chief Minister to appoint any person as an Adviser who did not fulfil the intent or purpose as extruded out of the Constitution---For appointment of handpicked Advisers under Art.130(11) of the Constitution, the Provincial Chief Minister had apparent unhindered constitutional privilege of appointing them, but such power should never be seen to have been exercised by the Chief Minister in a manner as if he was a Monarch or a King, not answerable to anyone, as the Chief Minister carried the trust of those who elected him to make decisions solely on merit and not on account of favour or fear.

Oxford Dictionary of England and Abdul Haq and others v. Province of Sindh and others PLD 2000 Kar. 224 rel.

Ahmad Yousuf Ali Rizvi v. Munawar Ali Butt PLD 2000 Kar. 333; American International School System v. Mian Muhammad Ramzan 2015 SCMR 1499; Karachi Cooperative Housing Societies Union Ltd. v. Government of Sindh and others 1990 MLD 389; Shah Ahmad Khan v. Government of Punjab PLD 2007 Lah. 191; Hakim khan v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1992 SC 595; Bhai Khan and others v. the State PLD 1992 SC 14; Ghulam Hussain v. The State 1999 YLR 1596; Abdul Malik v. The State PLD 2006 SC 365; Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad Khan PLD 1974 SC 151; Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 SCMR 455; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation 1974 (2) AELR 680; Council of Civil Service Unions and others v. Minister for the Civil Service 1984 (3) AELR 935; Notingbamshir CC v. Secretary of State for Environment [1986 (1) AELR 199; Muhammad Ismail v. The State PLD 1969 SC 241; Dr. Zahid Javed v. Dr. Tahir Riaz Chaudhary PLD 2016 SC 637 and Zahid Iqbal v. Hafiz Muhammad Adnan and others 2016 SCMR 430 ref.

(c) Words and phrases--

----"Adviser"---Meaning of---"Adviser" was a person who gave advice in a particular field---Word "advice" meant "guidance or recommendations offered with regard to prudent action" and the word "prudent" meant "acting with or showing care and thought of the future"---Said combined dictionary meanings therefore depict an "adviser" to be a person, who based on his prudence and thoughtfulness would be called upon for giving guidance and recommendations with regard to a futuristic action.

Oxford Dictionary of England rel.

(d) Public functionary

----Duties of---Appointment of persons made by public functionaries---Exercise of discretion by public representatives/functionaries---Principles of probity, prudence, and good governance---Appointment on which no specific criteria was prescribed by law---Principles and scope---Whenever a person was appointed, who was not a public representative, and in particular when such person's remuneration and allied expenses were paid from the public exchequer, it was important that the authority which was handpicking such an individual had to ensure that such individual's selection fit every bit of the purpose and intent of such appointment being made, in order to ensure that the rule of "right person for the right job" became evident in every nook and corner of such an appointment---Said appointments were not a matter of public money only, but also of public perception as rule of law and respect for merit should not be seemed to have been slaughtered at the hands of the authority making such an appointment---In cases where the law did not provide any criteria or qualification for the appointment to a position and left such appointment on the absolute discretion of an authority, then there existed a taxing responsibility to justify the said appointment on the touchstone of prudence, good governance, fair play and such freedom could not be misused to accommodate people of one's choice---Such appointments should withstand the tests of fairness, fitness, judiciousness as well as impartiality; and arbitrary and capricious actions should be avoided.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Preamble & Arts. 93, 90, 91, 129, 130, 131, 132 & 138 --- Representative democracy---"State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people"---Exercise of executive authority of Federal and Provincial Governments---Constitutional mandate for the exercise of executive authority by elected representatives only---Constitutional restriction mandating the exercise of any and all executive authority by elected representatives only---Advisers appointed by Prime Minister and Chief Ministers under Arts.93 & 130(11) of the Constitution, respectively---Nature and role of such Advisers---Restrictions on exercise of executive authority by such Advisers---Rationale, scope and contours of such restrictions extensively discussed.

(f) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Arts. 130(11), 93, 91(9), 129(9) & Preamble---Representative democracy---Constitutional mandate for the exercise of executive authority by only elected representatives---Advisers appointed under Art.93 & 130(11) of the Constitution---Exercise of executive authority by such Advisers---Scope---Under the Constitution, neither in the Federal Government, nor in the Provincial Government(s), any executive authority was entrusted upon the respective Adviser, and rather being non-elected individuals, per Arts. 91(9) & 129(9) of the Constitution, no executive authority was to be exercised by such an individual beyond a period of six months from date of appointment---Constitution did not provide for taking an oath from a Federal or Provincial Adviser, meaning thereby, that such an Adviser, (as a non-elected individual) was neither answerable to the National Assembly, cabinet, any constituency, nor bound himself through an oath and for such reason, the Constitution did not encapsulate any possibility of an Adviser to exercise executive authority since such an exercise would be violative of the fundamental principles of democracy, and any act of giving any executive authority to an Adviser, would be an attempt to place non-elected persons at the helm of affairs to discharge executive authority which the Constitution solely reposed on the shoulders of the elected representatives which were additionally bound by the oath of their respective offices.

(g) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 130(11), 129, 199 & Preamble---Sindh Government Rules of Business, (1986), Rr. 6 & 7(ii)---Sindh Advisers (Appointments, Powers, Functions, Salaries, Allowances and Privileges) Act (I of 2003) S.4(2)---Vires of Sindh Government Rules of Business (1986), Rr.6(ii) & 7(ii) & S.4(2) of Sindh Advisors (Appointment, Powers, Functions, Salaries, Allowances and Privileges) Act, 2003---Constitutional mandate for the exercise of executive authority by the Provincial Government---Appointment of Advisers and Special Advisers---Delegation of executive authority of Ministers to Advisers appointed by the Chief Minister---Representative democracy---Constitutional restriction on unelected Advisers exercising executive authority---Scope---Provisions of Rr.6(ii) & 7(ii) of the Sindh Government Rules of Business, 1986 were in direct conflict with the scheme of democratic government as enshrined in the Constitution where right to exercise of executive authority was solely reposed on the elected representatives, however, pursuant to the Rr. 6 & 7 of the Sindh Government Rules of Business, 1986, the Chief Minister had been given the authority to delegate exercise of such executive authority unto his Advisers, of which neither any room was made in a democratic setup nor in the Constitution---High Court held that the R.6(ii) of the Sindh Government Rules of Business, 1986 in toto and R. 7(ii) of the Sindh Government Rules of Business, 1986 to the extent of the delegation of powers to Advisers was ultra vires the Constitution, thus void ab inito and of no legal effect---Similarly, S.4(2) of the Sindh Advisers (Appointments, Powers, Functions, Salaries, Allowances and Privileges) Act, 2003 enabled such unconstitutional and undemocratic act of use of executive authority by an Adviser and was also ultra vires the Constitution and was accordingly held to be void ab inito and of no legal effect.

Shah Ahmed Khan v. Government of Punjab PLD 2007 Lah. 191; Ahmad Yousuf Ali Rizvi v. Munawar Ali Butt PLD 2000 Kar. 333; Karachi Cooperative Housing Societies Union Ltd. v. Government of Sindh and others 1990 MLD 389 and Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edn.) Volume at para. 32 rel.

(h) Delegation of Powers--

----Maxim: "Delegatus non potest delegare"---Executive power conferred by a statute upon a particular functionary could not be delegated in absence of express words or necessary implication.

Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edn.) Volume at para. 32 rel.

(i) Maxim:--

----"Delegatus non potest delegare"---Delegated can not delegate.

Mustafa Lakhani for Petitioner.

Makhdoom Ali Khan for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Nemo for Respondent No.3.

Umer Lakhani for Respondent No.4.

Ghulam Mustafa Maheser, A.A.G. for Respondent No.5.

Nemo for Respondent No.6.

P L D 2017 Sindh 243

Before Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Sadiq Hussain Bhatti, JJ

SHOAIB WARSI and another---Petitioners

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Constitutional Petitions Nos. D-1199 and D-214 of 2016, decided on 1st July, 2016.

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. I8---Cognizance of offence---Principle---Great caution and care is required by NAB authorities while initiating proceedings or authorizing inquiry or investigation against any person under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Some concrete material and evidence were necessary in support of the allegations against any person connecting with commission of a cognizable offence under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--

----Ss. 18 & 24---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.54---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.10---Arrest---Stages---Liberty of citizen---Constitutional mandate --Arrest of accused required under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, can be made at three different stages in terms of proceedings: First stage is that if after receipt of any information as provided under S.18(b) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, Chairman NAB forms an opinion that reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received or reasonable suspicion exists that accused is involved in case cognizable under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, then he may arrest accused person, provided that there is some inquiry or investigation, duly authorized by competent authority is pending against accused under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, second stage of arrest is provided under S.18(e) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, where, Chairman NAB can make arrest of accused if conditions as mentioned in S.54, Cr.P.C. are fulfilled or if investigating officer conducting such inquiry or investigation requests for permission to arrest accused, then he can grant such permission of arrest of accused, however after examining grounds/reasons and incriminating material produced by investigating officer which may justify such permission of arrest and third stage is visualized under S.24(a) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, under which, if accused is neither arrested by Chairman NAB initially nor as provided under S.18(e) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, then Chairman NAB can direct that such accused person may be arrested, however before making arrest or issuing warrants of arrest or awarding permission to any investigating officer to arrest accused, Chairman NAB is required under law to first satisfy himself as to whether there is any tangible evidence or incriminating material available against accused connecting him with alleged offence cognizable under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and the conditions as detailed in S.54, Cr.P.C. are fulfilled---If Chairman NAB forms an opinion on the material placed before him, only then he can make arrest or permit investigating officer to make arrest of accused, otherwise an accused cannot be arrested on the basis of mere allegations or suspicion, in absence of sufficient incriminating material or evidence available with NAB authorities---Authority vested in Chairman NAB, to arrest accused at any stage of inquiry and investigation is neither absolute nor gives Chairman NAB unfettered powers to deprive a citizen of his inviolable right to liberty, which is to be safeguarded jealously, keeping in view the constitutional mandate under Art.10 of the Constitution.

(c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--

----Ss.18, 19 & 24---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.54---Fundamental Rights of citizens---Enforcement---Duty of Court---Proceedings by NAB---Procedure---Opportunity of hearing---Non- issuance of notice---Effect---NAB authorities did not follow legal course as provided under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and also violated principles of natural justice, while initiating proceedings under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, against accused person, even without proper authorization of inquiry and investigation--National Accountability Bureau in most of the cases, instead of providing opportunity to accused to explain allegations against him by issuing notice in terms of S.9 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, the arrest of accused is made against spirit of provisions of Ss.19 & 24 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and also in violation of express provision of S.54, Cr.P.C. and deprive a citizen of his fundamental right of liberty and fair trial as guaranteed under the Constitution---Court has to jealously safeguard Fundamental Rights as guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly right to life and liberty of a citizen by invoking its extra ordinary constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution---Any authority is required to act strictly in accordance with law and to perform its duty in the manner in which it has been authorized under the law---Violation of any statutory provision, rules or regulations makes such act of the Authority as illegal and unwarranted under law.

(d) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(b), 18 & 24---Bail, grant of---Unauthorized investigation--- Delay in conclusion of trial---Accused were arrested by NAB after they completed 90 days physical remand with Pakistan Rangers in an Anti-Terrorism case---Accused had been in the custody for more than one year and trial was not concluded---Effect---Prosecution failed to produce any lawful authorization of inquiry and investigation by competent authority in respect of allegations as contained in investigation report and reference filed before Accountability Court---No sufficient incriminating material specifying role of petitioners relating to allegations of misuse of authority and corruption or benefit derived by accused or extended to the beneficiary were produced by NAB---In spite of considerable lapse of time i.e. more than a year since arrest of accused persons, trial had not yet commenced before Accountability Court nor even charge was framed---Inordinate delay had taken place in trial which could not be attributed to accused persons and such delay was not explained by prosecution---Inordinate delay in trial while keeping accused persons behind bars as punishment was contrary to the spirit of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, which required expeditious decision in the matters relating to NAB---Accused person who were behind the bar for more than a year, whereas co-accused persons were granted ad-interim pre-arrest bail in the same reference---Bail was granted to accused in circumstances.

Wakeeluddin and others v. The State and others 2007 PCr.LJ 1515; Syed Mansoor Ali and others v. Chairman, NAB and others PLD 2016 Sindh 41; Anwarul Haq Qureshi v. NAB and another (2008 SCMR 1135; Khan Asfandyar Wali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2001 SC 607 and Raja Muhammad Zarat Khan and another v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 2007 Kar.597 ref.

Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2014 SC 206; Abdul Qadir v. Federation of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 1478; Muhammad Nadeem Anwar v. NAB PLD 2008 SC 645; Muhammad Jahangir Badar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 525 and Balochistan Public Service Commission v. NAB through Chairman and 2 others 2013 PCr.LJ 405 rel.

Khawaja Shams-ul-Islam along with Emran Taj and Farooq H. Naek along with Obaid-ur-Rehman for Petitioners.

Noor Muhammad Dayo, Spl. Prosecutor, NAB along with SIO, NAB Abdul Fatah for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Sindh 276

Before Arshad Hussain Khan, J

TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN (PVT) LTD.---Plaintiff

Versus

Messrs PUNJAB TRADING AGENCY---Defendant

Suit No.571 of 1997, decided on 28th September, 2016.

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S.42---Declaration of title---Maintainability of lis---Entitlement of relief---Principle---Question of 'maintainability of lis' and 'entitlement of relief' are two distinct things---'Maintainability of lis' is legal question related to legal character of person under the provisions of S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877, which requires any person entitled to any legal character or to any right as to any property may institute suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title to such character or right and Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration he is so entitled---Law authorizes a person to seek enforcement of his right to any property by instituting a suit against a person denying his right or title---'Entitlement to relief' is question of facts to be proved through evidence.

Parveen Begum and another v. Shah Jehan and another PLD 1996 Kar. 210 and Abdul Razzak Khamosh v. Abbas Ali and others PLD 2004 Kar. 269 rel.

(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---

----Ss. 148 & 150---Suit for recovery of money and damages---Bailor and bailee---Relationship---Contract of bailment---Plaintiff corporation handed over stocks of rice to defendant company and the same were accepted by defendant on the basis of 'Book Balance'---Plaintiff alleged that defendant company failed to exercise all care in respect of stocks and sought recovery of cost of deficient stocks and damages---Validity---To constitute effective bailment contract, it was obligatory on the part of bailor to put bailee in possession of the goods---Actual tender and delivery of goods and acceptance thereof by bailee must be there, and must be actual and physical transfer of possession---Merely putting into possession of documents of title did not constitute bailment of goods---Contact was awarded to defendant on 'Book Balance' basis without any physical verification of stock of rice which was lying in godown in dumped position---Such stock could not be assumed that a proper account could be made without physical verification of stock, which was not done, despite various requests and letters by defendant---In the grain handling contract there was inherent risk of diminishing quantity and quality of food grains and ratio of the losses was inversely proportionate to the nature of storage, which could vary from case to case basis---Longer the duration, greater the quantum of losses---Crops in question were related to year 1988-89, handling contract of which was earlier awarded to some other persons and on their failure the left over stocks were entrusted to the defendant through subject contract---Stock in question was lying in the godown of plaintiff in a dumped condition for a considerable period of time---Every possibility existed that stocks in question had diminished quantity and quality due to infestations and other factors---Defendant apprehending such facts informed plaintiff at the very outset of the contract but plaintiff did not pay any heed and took no step to safeguard the stocks to mitigate the losses---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.

Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Messrs Al-Noor (Pvt) Ltd. 2008 MLD 755; Trading Corporation of Pakistan Shahrah-e-Faisal Karachi v. Messrs Continential Cargo Services, Shahrah-e-Liatquat Karachi PLD 2004 Kar. 281; Parveen Begum and another v. Shah Jehan and another PLD 1996 Kar. 210 and Abdul Razzak Khamosh v. Abbas Ali and others PLD 2004 Kar. 269 ref.

Messrs Rice Export Corporation v. Messrs A.H. Corporation and 3 others 2002 CLC 607 rel.

Mohammad Safdar for Plaintiff.

Khalid Daudpota for Defendant.

P L D 2017 Sindh 309

Before Yousuf Ali Sayed, J

PETITION UNDER SECTIONS 276 OF THE SUCCESSION ACT, 1925, FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF MRS. FATIMA MANSURI WIDOW OF GHULAM NABI MANSURI, MUSLIM, ADULT: In the matter of

S.M.A. No.174 of 2016, decided on 22nd December, 2016.

(a) Islamic law---

----Inheritance---Bequeathing by making a "Will"---Validity of a bequest of more than one-third of the testator's estate---Scope---While the capacity of a Muslim to make a bequest was circumscribed by principles of Islamic Law, as per which bequest could only be to the extent of a third of the testator's property/estate; however, in case where heirs consented to the said Will, a bequest of more than one-third of the property, which by itself was not valid, would become valid.

1993 CLC 1552 rel.

(b) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)---

----Ss. 281, 278 & 372---Succession---Grant of Letter of Administration---Bequest by Will---Verification of petition for probate by one witness to Will---Non-contentious matter---Consent of all legal heirs of deceased to the Will of the deceased---Applicability of S.281 of the Succession Act, 1925 in a non-contentious matter---Scope---Section 281 of the Succession Act, 1925, which was a rule of procedure, was not of any particular importance in a non-contentious case, when the existence and content of a Will was uncontested and the entire matter was being proceeded consensually, with the concurrence of the executors and legatees/heirs.

Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali and others PLD 1963 SC 382 and Zafar Abbas v. Hassan Murtaza PLD 2005 SC 600 rel.

P L D 2017 Sindh 313

Before Sajjad Ali Shah and Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, JJ

Messrs BALOCH DISTILLERY AND SUGAR MILLS through Chief Executive---Petitioner

Versus

SECRETARY INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF SINDH and another---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.4778 of 2014, decided on 4th January, 2016.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Policy matters---Scope---Policy matters fall within the exclusive domain of Executive as they require consideration of various factual aspects---Such matters normally are not interfered by courts unless such policy is perverse, arbitrary, in violation of 'Constitutional mandate', 'law', or is patently mala fide.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Policy matters---Discretion, exercise of--- Principle--- Grievance of petitioner was that authorities did not issue "No Objection Certificate" (NOC) to it for establishing a sugar mill whereas five such other companies had been already granted NOC during period in question---Plea raised by authorities was that grant of NOC for establishment of sugar mill fell within exclusive jurisdiction of Chief Minister---Validity---Held, even if it was so, such discretion could not be exercised at whims of the Authority---Functionaries of any organization or establishment could not be allowed to exercise discretion at their whims, sweet will or in an arbitrary manner, rather they were bound to act fairly, evenly and justly---High Court set aside order of Chief Minister whereby summary of Provincial Government was rejected by refusing NOC to the petitioner---High Court directed Provincial Government to issue to petitioner, permission for establishing of a sugar mill as if summary had been responded in positive by following rest of the procedure---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Aman Ullah Khan v. Federal Government of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 1092; Chairman R.T.A. v. Pakistan Mutual Insurance Company PLD 1991 SC 14; Pacific Multinational (Pvt.) Ltd. v. I.G. of Police PLD 1992 Kar. 283; Presson Manufacturing Ltd. v. Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources 1995 MLD 15; Rantana v. I. A. Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628; Dwarka Nath Prasad Atal v. Ram Rati Devi AIR 1980 SC 1992; Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana AIR 1985 SC 1147; Nizamuddin v. Civil Aviation Authority 1999 SCMR 467 and Abid Hassan and others v. P.I.A.C. and others 2005 SCMR 25 rel.

Raja Akhtar Zaman for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondent No.1.

Chief Minister Sindh through Chief Secretary, Sindh.

Ghulam Mustafa Maheser A.A.G. along with Ms. Zhazia Rizvi, Secretary, S. Azizuddin, Deputy Secretary (Tech.) and Mushtaq Ahmed Memon, Research Officer for Respondent No.2.

P L D 2017 Sindh 318

Before Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Humayon Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD AMIN---Appellant

Versus

Mrs. FARIDA BANO---Respondent

High Court Appeal No.168 of 2016, decided on 18th November, 2016.

Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)---

----Ss. 273 & 372---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S. 3---Intra Court Appeal---Letter of Administration and succession certificate---Rent, distribution of---Appellant was aggrieved of order passed by Single Judge of High Court with regard to disposal of properties left by deceased predecessor-in-interest of parties---Validity---High Court directed its official to pay surprise visit upon property in question and to prepare inventory of all occupied tenements, unoccupied tenements, list of tenants and/or licensees, quantum of rent and/or licence fee---High Court further directed its official to issue notices to all tenants and/or licensees to attend his office with tenancy agreements and/or licence agreements and proof of monthly rent and/or licence fee---High Court also directed its official to direct all tenants and licensees to deposit monthly rent and/or licence fee in Court and thereafter to distribute the amount so deposited among all legal heirs of deceased as per their shares under Islamic Law---Original order having been merged in appellate order, intra court Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Glaxo Laboratories Limited v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and others 1992 PTD 932 and Gen. (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf through Attorney v. Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 2014 Sindh 389 rel.

Abdul Qayyum and another v. Niaz Muhammad and another 1992 SCMR 613 ref.

Ammar Ather for Appellant.

Ms. Farida Moten for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Sindh 324

Before Sajjad Ali Shah, C.J. and Syed Saeeduddin Nasir, J

SAIFULLAH KHAN and others---Appellants

Versus

Mst. AFSHAN and others---Respondents

H.C.As. Nos. 254 and 258 of 2014, decided on 3rd May, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

---O. XX, R. 13---Administration suit---Procedure---Preliminary decree---Scope---Court could for the purpose of achieving the object of such a suit besides determining the question of title to any property determine the existence or validity of any alienation of property not only by other persons after the death of deceased but also by deceased himself during his life time---Court could take over charge for determining property and entire process of realization, payment, settlement and distribution of assets of deceased had to be made under the supervision of court---Factual controversy could only be resolved upon leading comprehensive evidence by the parties to the suit---No preliminary decree was passed in the suit for appointment of an administrator to administer the properties of the deceased under the supervision of court---No administrator was appointed by the Trial Court to administer the properties left by the deceased and accounts of the properties were not ordered to be rendered by the Trial Court---Mandatory requirements had not been fulfilled by the Trial Court which had vitiated entire proceedings---Impugned judgments and decrees were set aside---Case was remanded to the Trial Court for adjudication afresh in terms of preliminary decree which should be passed in respect of only those properties which were in the name of deceased and in case properties were not in the name of deceased then commissioner/administrator be appointed to record evidence of the parties---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Mohammad Bibi and others v. Abdul Ghani and others PLD 1975 Kar. 979; Mst. Sherbanoo v. Sadruddin and another 1984 MLD 803 and Muhammad Zahid v. Mst. Ghazala Zakir and others PLD 2011 Kar. 83 rel.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XX, R. 13---Administration suit---Object---Purpose of a suit for administration was to have the estate of the deceased administrated by the court.

Haji Zafarul Haque for Appellants (in H.C.A. No.254 of 2014).

Mrs. Lali Tabassum for Respondents (in H.C.A. No.254 of 2014).

Mrs.Lali Tabassum for Appellants (in H.C.A. No.258 of 2014).

Haji Zafarul Haque for Respondents (in H.C.A. No.258 of 2014).

P L D 2017 Sindh 331

Before Irfan Saadat Khan and Mohammed Karim Khan Agha, JJ

ABDUL SATTAR DADABHOY and 2 others---Petitioners

Versus

DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU and 2 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-3251 of 2016, decided on 5th October, 2016.

(a) Criminal trial---

----Inquiry converted into investigation---Effect---Once an inquiry was converted into an investigation it could be said that at least some material was available, which suggested that offence had been committed.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9(c)---Recommendation of Chairman, National Accountability Bureau for closure of investigation against accused---Check and balance---Scope---Legislature had deliberately and consciously determined that the Chairman's power to close an investigation under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 should not be unbridled, thus amendments were made to S.9(c) in terms of the requirement of the approval of the Chairman NAB by the Accountability Court---Said amendment would prevent any potential abuse of office by the Chairman, NAB and increase public confidence when court had a second look albeit cursory at the decision of the Chairman NAB before granting its approval.

(c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9(c)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24-A---Recommendation of Chairman, National Accountability Bureau for closure of investigation against accused---Binding effect---Role of Accountability Court under S.9(c) of the Ordinance while acting as a check and balance on the Chairman's power to close an investigation was to review all the material placed before him albeit in a cursory manner---After applying judicial mind as envisaged under S.24-A General Clauses Act 1897, the court had to pass an order with reasons regarding approval of the closure or otherwise---Accountability Court could make recommendations of further avenues of inquiry---Recommendations of the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau had no binding effect on Accountability Court.

(d) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

---S. 9(c)---Recommendation of Chairman, National Accountability Bureau for closure of investigation against accused---Chairman, NAB could not sit on the decision of the Accountability Court if his application to close the investigation had not been approved---Chairman would either follow up immediately on the recommendations made in the order of the Court or move for judicial review.

(e) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9(c)---Recommendation of Chairman, National Accountability Bureau for closure of investigation against accused---If the Accountability Court, on the first application of the Chairman declined the approval to closure of investigation after giving reasons and Chairman NAB chose to address said reasons/recommendations, Chairman was again to apply for closure of investigation and the matter was to be decided by the Judge Accountability Court other than the one who decided first application.

(f) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9(c)---Recommendation of Chairman, National Accountability Bureau for closure of investigation against accused---Grounds for refusing recommendation for closure of investigation---Scope---Accountability Court was not to act as a post office or rubber stamp on the decision of Chairman, NAB to close the investigation---Intention of legislature was that Accountability Court was to play a meaningful role in determining as to whether the decision of the Chairman required reconsideration by the collection of additional evidence or rethinking of the evidence already collected or that legitimate lines of inquiry had been followed---Accountability Court could disagree with the recommendation and remand the matter for reconsideration.

(g) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S.31(b)---Withdrawal of case by Prosecutor General Accountability--Scope---Prosecutor General must set out reasons for seeking withdrawal---Court could reject, if the reasons were completely unjustified.

(h) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9(c)---Recommendation of Chairman, National Accountability Bureau for closure of investigation against accused---Accountability Court had passed a speaking order giving solid reasons for not approving the application for closure of the investigation carried out by the Chairman, NAB---Accountability Court, however, had failed to consider as to whether after investigation by the NAB, the matter was a case of "cheating the public at large" as per NAB's own SOP so as to come within the purview of National Accountability Ordinance; whether in fact, present case was a civil case so as to be hit by Supreme Court judgment in Rafi Haji Usman v. Chairman NAB 2015 SCMR 1575 and did not fall within the purview of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Impugned order was set aside and the application for closure of investigation was remanded by the High Court to the Accountability Court to rehear the same taking into consideration specified additional two issues.

Asim Iqbal for Petitioners.

Amjad Ali Shah, DPGA NAB, Muhammad Altaf, ADPGA NAB along with Sabih Rafay, Asstt. Director Investigation NAB for Respondents.

Syed Mahmood Alam Rizvi: Amicus Curiae

P L D 2017 Sindh 347

Before Ahmed Ali M. Sheikh, Munib Akhtar and Muhammad Ali Mazhar, JJ

Dr. NADEEM RIZVI and 7 others---Petitioners

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-1692 of 2011, decided on 4th July, 2016

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 270AA [as amended by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act (X of 2010)]---Term 'devolution'---Connotation---'Devolution' does not appear anywhere else in the Constitution, it has a specific meaning and it only meant that process (which was to be completed by 30-6-2011), whereby federal matters relating to omitted entries were to be transferred to the Provinces.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Fourth Sched., Part-I, Entry 16---Provincial authority---Institutions, establishment of---Principles---Existence of Entry 16 in Part-I, of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, does not prevent any Province from setting up a similar or even identical agency or institute---While agency or institute can be set up relating to any subject, discipline etc., its purpose must conform to the three specified aspects: research, professional or technical training, or promotion of special studies.

(c) Court---

----Historical wrongs---Scope---Court of law is concerned only with constitutional and legal aspects of issues raised before it---Such are the only wrongs that lie with the remit of court and 'historical' wrongs are for history to worry about.

(d) Interpretation of Constitution---

----Constitution provides for continuity and gives due recognition and force to existing laws.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 270AA(8)(9) [as amended by Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act (X of 2010)] & Fourth Schedule, Part-I, Entry 16---Devolution of power---Provincial autonomy---Medical and Research Institutions established by Federal Government were taken over by Provincial Government after amendment in Art.270AA of the Constitution under, Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010---Validity--- Devolution contemplated by Art.270AA (8) and (9) of the Constitution, had no relevance for any of said institutions--- Implementation Commission purported to recommend their transfer to Province and the Commission went well beyond its remit, authority and jurisdiction---Implementation Commission erred materially and on the constitutional plane, in making recommendation and Federal Cabinet and Government erred equally in accepting and acting upon the same---All actions taken in that regard were legally invalid and without lawful effect---Implementation Commission could only act in terms of Art.270AA (8) and (9) of the Constitution and devolution did not at all apply to any of the institutions in question---Purported transfer of institutions failed on constitutional plane and was unlawful---Medical Institutions were Federal Institutions within the scope of Entry No. 16 in Part-I, of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution---Institutions in question were in the exclusive Federal domain and remained so notwithstanding the effect of Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Anwar Mansoor Khan along with Ms. Umaimah Khan, Ms. Reem Tashfeen Niaz, Abrar Hasan, Yousuf Ali Sayeed and Dr. Tahir Rasheed for Petitioners.

Salman Talibuddin, Addl. Attorney General, Ch. Muhammad Rafiq Rajori, Addl. A.G., Raza Rabbani, Farooq H. Naek, M.Zeeshan Abdullah, Ali Almani along with Samiur Rehman, Haq Nawaz Talpur, Sohail H. K. Rana and Salim Salaam Ansari for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 381

Before Irfan Saadat Khan and Zafar Ahmed Rajput, JJ

TARIQ SALEEM and others---Applicants

Versus

SOHAIL SHAKIL FARUQI and others---Respondents

H.C.A. No.198 of 2007, C.M.As. Nos. 520 and 521 of 2013, decided on 29th April, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XXII, Rr.3 & 4 & O. VII, R.26---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Arts.176 & 177 & S. 5---Appeal---Death of a party---Impleadment of legal heirs---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Applicability of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 to the application under O.XXII, Rr.3 & 4, C.P.C.---Scope---Provisions of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 were applicable to the application under O.XXII, Rr.3 & 4, C.P.C---Application for impleadment of legal heirs of deceased was to be made within ninety days which period would be computed from the date of death of deceased---Court might implead legal representatives of the deceased suo motu according to the list given by the plaintiff accompanied with the plaint---Deceased was not co-plaintiff in the suit and no list was given under O.VII, R.26, C.P.C.---Legal representatives of deceased were not aware of pendency of present appeal---Unless legal heirs were aware that their deceased predecessor had brought action in a particular court they would not be able to make an application for making them party in the matter---Sufficient cause had been shown for not making the application for impleadment by the legal heirs of the deceased within prescribed period---Legal representatives of the deceased were directed to be impleaded as appellant in the appeal---Appellant was directed to file amended title within one week thereof---Application for impleadment as legal heirs was allowed in circumstances.

Shabbir Ahmed and another v. Nazir Ahmed and others 2000 MLD 702 ref.

(b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---

----Art. 176---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXII, R. 3(2)---Death of a party---Impleadment of legal heirs---Limitation, commencement of---Legal heirs of deceased could be impleaded within ninety days which period would be computed from the date of death of deceased.

(c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---

----Ss. 5 & 29(2)---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Scope---If statute governing the proceedings did not prescribe period of limitation then proceedings instituted thereunder should be controlled by the Limitation Act, 1908 as a whole---Where law under which proceedings had been launched prescribed itself a period of limitation then benefit of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 could not be availed unless it had been made applicable as per S.29(2) of Limitation Act, 1908.

Adnan I, Chaudhry for Applicants.

Badar Alam for Respondents Nos. 1 & 3 to 5.

P L D 2017 Sindh 387

Before Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh and Mohammed Karim Khan Agha, JJ

MUHAMMAD RASHID @ Master and another---Applicants

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Revision Application No.61 of 2015, decided on 16th May, 2016.

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 6, 7(a) & 23---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302---Murder---Act of terrorism---Ingredients---Accused were aggrieved of order passed by Anti-Terrorism Court, declining to transfer case to court of plenary jurisdiction---Plea raised by accused persons was that ingredients of terrorism were missing in the case---Validity---Case of murder did not automatically become an act of terrorism under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---In addition to murder, other ingredients which formed a part of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 also needed to be satisfied based on facts and circumstances of each case---Such additional ingredients included whether act was designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe government or public or a section of public or community or sect or foreign government or population or any international organization or created a sense of fear or insecurity in society along with necessary intent---Deceased was a senior activist of a major political party and her murder was intended to spread fear amongst other members/potential voters of that political party shortly before re-election in the constituency---Such offence of murder fell within ambit of S.6 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as other ingredients had also been met---High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Anti-Terrorism Court---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Bashir Ahmad v. Muhammad Siddique PLD 2009 SC 11; Shahbaz Khan v. Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court Lahore PLD 2016 SC 1 and Najam un Nisa v. Judge Special Court Constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 2003 SCMR 1323 rel.

Muhammad Lateefuddin Pasha for Appellants.

Zafar Ahmed Khan, A.P.G. for the State along with Complainant Muhammad Shoaib.

P L D 2017 Sindh 396

Before Munib Akhtar, J

SAJID PLASTIC FACTORY through Sole Proprietor---Plaintiff

Versus

MSC BAHAMAS through Master/Chief Officer and 9 others---Defendants

Admiralty Suit No.12 of 2012, decided on 11th June, 2014.

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----Ss. 20, 21, 22 & O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Bills of Lading Act (IX of 1856), Preamble---Interim injunction grant of---Jurisdiction of foreign Court---Contract of carriage---Procedure---Defendants sought stay of suit on the ground that they intended to invoke choice of foreign forum of jurisdiction as available in contract---Validity---plaintiff as consignee was not bound by Contract of Carriage as evidenced by bills of Lading---Such conclusion was contrary to what had been provided in Bills of Lading Act, 1856 and was most advantageous for consignees in Pakistan---Consignee was bound by totality of contract and jurisdiction clause was part thereof which was binding as well---Contract of Carriage was governed by English Law, it was obvious that High Court in England would be better placed to deal with e.g. questions of law and same was so notwithstanding similarity and connection between English law and Pakistan law especially in shipping matters and relative familiarity of Pakistan lawyers with English law---Dispute between parties should have been proceeded in England and not in Pakistan---Plaint could not be returned in cases involving foreign jurisdiction clause, proper course was to stay proceedings if court concluded that matter ought to proceed in foreign jurisdiction---Suit was stayed in circumstances.

M.A. Chowdhury v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. PLD 1970 SC 373 and The Eleftheria [1969] 2 All ER 641 fol.

CGM (Compagnie General Maritime) v. Hussain Akbar 2002 CLD 1528; Light Industries (Pvt) Ltd. v.Zsk Stickmaschinen GmbH and another 2007 CLD 1324 and Light Industries (Pvt) Ltd. v. Zsk Stickmaschinen GmbH and another 2009 CLD 1340 ref.

Omair Nisar for Plaintiff.

Abad ul Hasnain for Defendants.

P L D 2017 Sindh 402

Before Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh and Mohammed Karim Khan Agha, JJ

EHSAN ULLAH SHAH and another---Petitioners

Versus

NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) through Chairman and another---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-832 of 2016, decided on 4th May, 2016.

National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9(a)(ix) & (b)---Bail, refusal of--- Cheating members of public at large---Petitioners were arrested by National Accountability Bureau on allegation of defrauding members of public at large by offering attractive monthly profit in the garb of Rib'a-free business---Validity---Numerous banking documents showed that large amounts of money was paid into and withdrawn from accounts of petitioners which they had failed to adequately explain---In many cases, petitioners' banking transactions were interlinked with other accused which again they were unable to adequately explain bearing in mind that they claimed ignorance of scam and placed blame on other accused persons---If that was so, there should be no interrelated banking transactions between petitioners and other accused persons---Only reasonable inference was that such money belonged to investors and was fruits of scam which was shared between petitioners and other co-accused persons, in the reference who were all closely related---Present was more a case of joint criminal enterprise whereby every accused had played his role in order to achieve a criminal object and they all were aware of and could not have been achieved without active participation of all involved---All accused persons were to bear responsibility to a lesser or greater extent for commission of offence---Petitioners were linked to such heinous offence, i.e., accused persons posing as religious scholars and abusing trust of poor religiously minded people by duping them into investing huge amounts of their hard earned money in Islamic oriented products with allegedly high rates of return which they had no intention of honouring, an offence which was becoming more and more common---Bail was refused in circumstances.

Rafiq Haji Usman v. Chairman NAB 2015 SCMR 1575 distinguished.

Ch. Muhammad Ashfaq v. State 2015 SCMR 1716 rel.

Zaheer ul Hassan Minhas for Petitioners.

Noor Muhammad Dayo ADPG, NAB and Muhammd Aslam Bhutta, Special Prosecutor NAB along with I.O. Hassan Noor for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 409

Before Zulfiqar Ahmad Khan, J

Messrs BRIGHTLINK MOBILE PHONE AND ACCESSORIES through Proprietor---Petitioner

Versus

MUHAMMAD QAMAR GHANI and 2 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.S-581 of 2009, decided on 25th October, 2016.

(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----Ss. 15 & 2(g)---Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925), S. 305---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXII, R.4---Ejectment of tenant---Personal bona fide need of landlord---Death of landlord---Effect---Contention of tenant was that landlord had died and right to sue did not survive to the legal heirs of the landlord who were females only---Eviction petition was dismissed by the Rent Controller but same was allowed by the Appellant Court---Validly---Sections 2(g) & 15(2)(vii) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 had treated the landlord and his spouse or his son or daughter as 'one unit'---No requirement existed to breakdown the solidarity and integrity of the family unit and to consider the individual needs of the landlord's wife, sons or daughters---Tenant could be evicted for the requirement of landlord for bona fide use of himself and other members of his family---Right to sue did survive to the member of the family of deceased landlord---Members of landlord's family would take his/her place and they would be competent to continue the suit for eviction initiated by the landlord for his occupation and for occupation of surviving members of his family---Law did not discriminate a female family members from the male family members and vice versa---Right of enjoyment of tenanted property on the ground of bona fide use did not die with the death of landlord---Legal heirs could urge all the contentions which the deceased could have urged except only those which were personal to the deceased---Relief under Art. 199 of the Constitution was discretionary and unless impugned judgment had resulted in injustice or irreparable loss or injury there was no justification for interference---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

M. Siddique Butt v. ADJ, Lahore 2010 CLC 1095; Ahmed Saeed Rizvi v. Janat Bibi 2006 CLC 1848; Husna Begum v. Deen Mohammad 1999 CLC 1399 and Rajagopala v. P. Revanna 1974(1) KLJ 425.K. rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court could only be exercised if impugned order was based on misreading or non-reading of evidence; an erroneous assumption; misapplication of law; excess or abuse of jurisdiction and arbitrary exercise of powers.

2001 SCMR 338 rel.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Question of fact could not be entertained while exercising constitutional jurisdiction.

(d) Maxim--

----"Actio personalis moritur cum persona"---Meanging.

Haseeb-ur-Rehman for Petitioner.

Amir Aziz Khan, Represented by Asim Aziz Khan for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Sindh 415

Before Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh, Acting C.J. and Mohammed Karim Khan Agha, J

SOHAIL ADEEB BACHANI and others---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE though NAB and others--Respondents

C.P.D-Nos.7144, D-7930 and 5180 of 2015, decided on 10th March, 2016.

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9 & 25---Corrupt practices with regard to land scam---Payment of compensation without issuance of award---Bail, refusal of---Contention of accused was that he only implemented the awards which had already been made by his predecessor---Validity---Specific role had been attributed to the accused---Accused could have simply marked the omission on the file and sent the same back down the chain whereupon the omission could have been rectified---Accused had blindly made payment and was a part of the chain of criminality---Public functionary when dealing with a file had an obligation to briefly scan the same and point out any obvious irregularities/illegalities which had already taken place and return the file for necessary action otherwise he might expose himself to criminal liability---Accused had nexus with the offence---Bail was refused to the accused in circumstances.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9 & 25---Corrupt practices with regard to land scam---Payment of compensation without issuance of award---Ad interim pre-arrest bail, recalling of---Scope---Accused had signed general power of attorney as the Sub-Registrar when he was no more the Sub-Registrar---Accused was aware that he had neither power or authority to sign the power of attorney which enabled the beneficiaries to receive payment---Act of accused was an intricate part in the fulfilment of the scam---Accused had nexus with the offence---Ad interim pre arrest bail was recalled, in circumstances.

(c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 25(a)---Corrupt practices with regard to land scam---Payment of compensation without issuance of award---Bail, grant of---Voluntary return, option of---Scope---Option of voluntary return would lapse once the inquiry was converted into an investigation and only the option of plea bargain would remain intact---Under plea bargain an accused would be deemed convicted for the offence charged whilst he would not be convicted under a voluntary return---Inquiry, in the present case, had been converted into an investigation against the accused and a reference had been filed by the NAB---Option of voluntary return would no more open to the accused---Option of voluntary return had extinguished before the accused had even approached NAB for an extension in the time for him to make payment of the second installment---Accused had not been informed about the upgrading of his inquiry into investigation---Bureau had no right to cancel the voluntary return with regard to the accused when it converted the inquiry into investigation before the accused had defaulted on his obligation under voluntary return---Status of accused had to remain under voluntary return until he defaulted---NAB could not arbitrarily deprive the accused of his statutory right to voluntary return once he had offered to enter into voluntary return and NAB had accepted the same subject to that the terms and conditions had not been breached---Second installment of voluntary return had been paid by the accused in the Court---Final installment was directed to be paid by the accused within four weeks after release from custody on bail---If accused failed to pay final installment within specified period, voluntary return should stand cancelled and only option to him would be plea bargain or to face trial and his bail would stand automatically cancelled---Accused was granted bail subject to furnishing surety in the sum of Rs.500,000/- to the satisfaction of Nazir of the Court.

Assistant Commissioner, Mianwali v. Muhammad Amir 1987 CLC 2095 distinguished.

Chandi Ram v. Chairman NAB 2008 PCr.LJ 1172 ref.

(d) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 25 (a)---Offer to return the benefit acquired---Scope---Person who was subject to inquiry (prior to its conversion into an investigation) had a statutory right to voluntary come forward and offer to return the assets or gains acquired or made by him in the course or as the consequences of an offence under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 but his such offer might or might not be accepted by the Chairman National Accountability Bureau.

(e) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Preamble---Object of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 was recovery of ill-gotten gain.

Shahab Sarki for Petitiner in C.P. No.D-7144 of 2015, S.M. Iqbal for Petitioner in C.P.No.D-7930 of 2015 and C.P.No.D-5180 of 2015.

Noor Muhammad Dayo ADPG NAB for Respondents.

Saeed A. Memon, Standing Counsel for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 427

Before Ahmed Ali M. Shaikh and Mohammed Karim Khan Agha, JJ

NOOR QADIR---Appellant

Versus

NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU, SINDH REGIONAL DIRECTORATE, KARACHI---Respondent

Criminal Accountability Appeal No.10 of 2012, decided on 31st March, 2016.

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(iii) & (x), 15(a), 25(b) & 10----Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.405 & 109---Corruption and corrupt practices---Disqualification to contest election or to hold public office---Criminal breach of trust; abetment---Appreciation of evidence---Voluntary return (plea bargain)---Parameters---Accused, after the Accountability Court was informed that the defaulted amount had been repaid through a civil recovery suit, was simply deemed to have been convicted, presumably applying the consequences of S. 25(b) as per the proviso of S. 15(a) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Since no written offer of plea bargain by the accused, acceptance by the Chairman, NAB and no approval of the plea bargain agreement between the accused and Chairman by the Accountability Court was available on the record, present case, therefore, did not amount to a plea bargain under S.25(b) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and S.15(a) of the Ordinance, therefore, would not be applicable to the accused---Unless the offences in question had been proved by admissible, cogent and reliable evidence beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, the accused could not have been convicted---Prosecution had not led any evidence against the accused after framing of the charge---Neither the accused's statement under S.342, Cr.P.C. had been recorded, nor he had opportunity to call the defence witnesses---Accused could not have been convicted for any of the offences and the first part of S.15(a) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 would not be applicable to him, as he had not been formally convicted after recording of evidence---High Court, setting aside the impugned conviction order, remanded the case to the Accountability Court to proceed with the Reference against the accused on merits in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Syed Ali Nawaz Shah v. The State PLD 2003 SC 837 rel.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)----

----S. 25----Voluntary return (plea bargain)---Pre-requisites---Essence for a plea bargain under S. 15(b) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is that apart from the other conditions, there must be a clear written offer by the accused to return the assets or gains made by him; a clear written acceptance of that offer by the Chairman NAB and a speaking order by the Accountability Court approving the plea bargain (agreement) entered into by the accused and the Chairman NAB.

Syed Ali Nawaz Shah v. The State PLD 2003 SC 837 rel.

(c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--

----S. 25---Voluntary return (plea bargain)---Ingredients/essentials and effect elaborated.

Shahab Sarki for Appellant.

Noor Muhammad Dayo, ADPG, NAB for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Sindh 438

Before Salahuddin Panhwar and Syed Saeeduddin Nasir, JJ

Dr. ABDUL JABBAR KHATAK through Attorney and another---Petitioners

Versus

IIND SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, LARKANA and 3 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-79 of 2012, decided on 29th February, 2016.

(a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)---

----Ss. 3 & 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 11 & S.9---Defamation---Damages---Plaint, rejection of---Scope---Trial Court dismissed application for rejection of plaint on the ground that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter under S.9, C.P.C.---Validity---Plaint could not be dismissed in piecemeal even if out of several prayers one could not be granted---Trial Court was directed to frame issue with regard to the maintainability of suit pending before it, in view of S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002 and pronounce judgment on the same along with other issues---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

2004 MLD 1081 rel.

(b) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)---

----S. 13---Defamation---Suit for damages---Jurisdiction of civil court---Scope---Word "shall" contained in S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Scope---Jurisdiction of civil court with regard to suit for damages on the ground of loss of reputation and defamation was barred under S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002---District Court had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate such matters---When special tribunal or court had been established to hear and decide the dispute then jurisdiction of courts constituted under general law should be ousted from exercising power of the nature---Word "shall" used in Section 13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002 had mandatory nature of provision with regard to exclusive jurisdiction to try cases of defamation.

Raees Ghulam Sarwar v. Mansoor Sadiq Zaidi and 4 others PLD 2008 Kar. 458 ref.

Khadim Hussain and 12 others v. Gul Hassan Tiwano and 3 others 2014 MLD 574; Pakistan Herald Publications (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. Karachi Building Control Authority 2012 CLD 453; Capt. (Rtd.) Nayyar Islam v. Judge, Accountability Court No.III and others 2012 SCMR 669; Lahore Beverage Company (Pvt.) Limited v. Muhammad Javed Shafi and 2 others 2008 CLC 759; Muhammad Abul Olla v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another 1989 CLC 1146; Azhar Chaudhry v. Presidents Executive Committee and another 2007 YLR 2231; Khadim Hussain v. Gul Hassan Tiwano 2013 CLD 981; Ghulam Hussain and another v. Malik Shahbaz and another 1985 SCMR 1925; Manzoor Hussain Shah and 15 others v. Allah Bachaya Khan and 5 others 1986 CLC 1813 and Noor Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan and 2 others PLD 1985 SC 131 rel.

(c) Interpretation of statutes---

---Special law would exclude general law.

(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O.VII, R.11---Plaint rejection of---Scope---Plaint cannot be dismissed in piece meal, even if out of several prayers, one could not be granted.

Imdad Ali Mashori for Petitioner.

Habibullah Ghouri for Respondent No.3.

P L D 2017 Sindh 448

Before Salahuddin Panhwar and Syed Saeeduddin Nasir, JJ

NADIR ALI---Petitioner

Versus

MEDICAL SUPERINTENDNET, CIVIL HOSPITAL, LARKANA and 9 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-1137 of 2015, decided on 21st December, 2015.

(a) Sindh Healthcare Commission Act (VII of 2014)---

----Ss. 30 & 28(4)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.9---Health care services for the public---Fundamental right---Term 'life'---Scope---State was bound to ensure proper health care service to every citizen---Health care service would fall within the meaning of 'life'---Question of status of person should not be of significance in a petition qualifying the term 'probono publico' which would always be sustainable---Constitutional courts was guardian of 'fundamental rights'---State had failed to provide 'health care services' to its citizens---Constitutional petition was disposed of in the specified terms.

PLD 1994 SC 693; Corruption in Hajj Arrangement in 2010 (PLD 2011 SC 963); Iqbal Haider v. Capital Development Authority PLD 2006 SC 394 and Muhammad Shariq v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2015 Isl. 180 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 9---Term 'life'---Scope---Term 'life' would include all such amenities and facilities which a person born was entitled to enjoy.

Shamsuddin Abbasi for Petitioner.

Asif Hussain Chandio for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.

Mushtaque Ahmed Kourejo, Standing Counsel for D.A.G.

Abdul Hamid Bhurgri, Addl. A.G, along with Dr. Saeed Ahmed Mangnejo, Secretary, Health Department, Governmmet of Sindh, Ghulam Akbar Leghari, Commissioner, Larkana, Dr. Ghulam Asghar Channa, Vice-Chancellor and Dr. Amanullah Jokhio, Pro-Vice Chancellor, SMBBMU, Larkana, Prof. Dr. Sher Muhammad Shaikh, Principal, CMC, Larkana, Capt.(R.) M. Anwar-ul-Haque, Deputy Commissioner, Kamber-Shahdadkot, Muhammad Saleem, Chairman, Sindh Public Service Commission, Hyderabad, Nazar Mohammad Bozdar, Director, Anti-Corruption Establishment Sindh, Dr. Siraj Ahmed Abbasi, Director, LINAR Hospital, Larkana, Dr. Ghulam Murtaza Soomro, Director, Health Services, Sindh, Dr. Muzaffar Ali Chandio, Addl. M.S, Dr. Saeed Ahmed Memon, DMS, Shaikh Zaiyed Women Hospital, Larkana, Dr.Anil Kumar, Dr. Hazoor Bux Tunio, Medical Superintendent, G.M.M.C, Sukkur, Dr. Aijaz Ahmed, A.M.S, CMC, Larkana, Capt. Dr. Munir Ahmed, Medical Superintendent, CMCH, Larkana, Dr. Mehboob Ali Shah, D.H.O, Kamber-Shahdadkot, Zakir Hussain Samo, Deputy Director, Anti-Corruption, Larkana, Shahid Hussain Shahani, Circle Officer, Anti-Corruption, Shikarpur and Dr. Khalil Ahmed Katpar, A.M.S, CMCH, Larkana.

P L D 2017 Sindh 464

Before Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Yousuf Ali Sayeed, JJ

Moulvi IQBAL HAIDER, ADVOCATE and another---Petitioners

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 42 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-48 of 2017, decided on 21st February, 2017.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 63(1)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.6---Protection of Pakistan Act (X of 2014), Preamble---Disqualifications for membership of Provincial Assembly---Telephonic speech delivered by head of a political party against the State and its organs---Respondents, who were elected members of Provincial Assembly and belonged to the political party in question heard the telephonic speech during a sit in strike and were accused of not taking any steps to stop the speech and thereby allegedly facilitated the offence---Petitioner filed reference against the respondents before the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly seeking their disqualification in terms of the Art.63 of the Constitution---Held, that none of the situations envisaged under Art.63(1)(a) to (p) of the Constitution under which a Member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) could be disqualified, had been cited by the petitioner, on the contrary, on the basis of some vague allegations against the founder leader of a political party, and in the absence of any concrete material produced by the petitioner, reference was filed before the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly for seeking disqualification of respondents---No direct allegation was made against the respondents for having committed any offence, which may attract any of the provisions of the Constitution or the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014---Admittedly, nothing had been attributed to respondents, which may suggest that they had raised any Anti-State slogans or facilitated or participated in any activity which could possibly attract any cognizable offence under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or the Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014---Petitioner did not file the authenticated audio or written version of the purported telephonic speech, nor established any overt role of respondents toward knowledge, facilitation or even participation in respect of objectionable part of such telephonic audio speech---Respondent were the elected Members of Provincial Assembly and represented the will of the large number of voters in their respective constituencies, who had casted their votes in favour of respondents, therefore, in the absence of any valid reasons as provided under Art.63 of the Constitution they could not be de-seated on the basis of mere whims and baseless allegations by some individual, who did not prima facie have any locus standi or cause of action even to file such reference---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.

Ayatllah Dr. Imran Liaquat Hussain v. Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and another PLD 2005 SC 52 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 63(2) & (3)---Speaker of Provincial/National Assembly, powers of---Scope---Question of disqualification of a member of the Provincial/National Assembly---Office of the Speaker of the Assembly or the Chairman of the Senate, as the case may be, was not a post office to refer each and every question to the Election Commission, on the contrary it was the discretion of the Speaker/Chairman, either to refer the question to the Election Commission for appropriate orders or to decline to refer such question, if there was no material or reasonable cause to refer such reference to the Election Commission---Article 63(2) of the Constitution, however, provided that, if the Speaker/Chairman did not decide or refused to refer the question of disqualification of any Member of the Parliament, to the Election Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of its receipt by the Speaker/Chairman, such reference shall be deemed to have been referred to the Election Commission; thereafter, in terms of Art.63(3) the Election Commission had to decide the question regarding disqualification of any Member within ninety (90) days from its receipt or deemed to have been received, but, only in appropriate cases where, there was sufficient material and evidence available on record to substantiate the allegations against such Member which may be relatable to any of the instance as detailed in clauses (a) to (p) of Art.63(1) of the Constitution.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Arts. 63 & 199---Principles for examining the maintainability of a Constitutional petition filed under Art. 199 of the Constitution seeking disqualification of a Member of Parliament in terms of Art.63 of the Constitution stated.

Following are the legal principles which have to be kept in view while deciding a Constitutional petition before the High Court seeking disqualification of a Member of the Parliament in terms of the Article 63 of the Constitution:

(i) That pre-election alleged disqualification of a Member of the Parliament, could not form a basis for a reference of disqualification, to be sent by the Speaker of the Assembly to the Chief Election Commissioner;

(ii) That in case a reference was submitted to the Speaker of the National Assembly for forwarding the same to the Chief Election Commissioner, he had to take a decision as to whether a "question" as contemplated under Article 63(2) of the Constitution had arisen. He was not to act just as a post office and to forward the reference without judicious determination of the matter;

(iii) That it was only the Chief Election Commissioner who was competent to pass the order of disqualification of an elected Member of the Parliament under Article 63(2) of the Constitution;

(iv) That an individual, who sought a direction in a nature of mandamus, he had to show that he had an "interest" in the matter and that he was really an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution;

(v) That while levelling allegation of disqualification against an elected Member of the Parliament, the petitioner had to take care that the said allegations were not baseless and were not motivated inasmuch as the exercise amounted to interference with the choice of franchise who were presumably more wiser than one individual, in matter of election of their representatives;

(vi) That while exercising of power of judicial review the principle of 'judicial restraint" was to be followed as individual interest/was to give way to the collective good and public interest;

(vii) That High Court had the jurisdiction to issue an appropriate writ or order against the Speaker of the National Assembly provided a case for issuance of such a writ or order was made out; and, (viii) That in order to initiate proceedings of disqualification against a Member of Assembly, allegations of misconduct had to be based upon cogent material, which shall have to be proved by evidence.

Kanwar Intizar Muhammad Khan, Advocate v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1995 MLD 1903 ref.

Petitioner in person.

Nemo for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 483

Before Nadeem Akhtar and Fahim Ahmed Siddiqui, JJ

MAZHAR ALI MAGSI---Petitioner

Versus

PROVINCE OF SINDH through Chief Secretary and 6 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-6183 of 2015, decided on 16th February, 2017.

Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Public property---Illegal billboards/hoardings on public property---Petitioner, sought to restrain Municipal Corporation from allowing respondents from placing/erecting signage on green-belts, which per contention of petitioner, were illegally allotted to the respondents---Validity---Subject green belts were public property and in view of orders of the Supreme Court in such regard, no signboard, billboard or advertisements could be allowed on said green belts---Respondents were advertising and purported allotments to them were illegal in view of the orders of the Supreme Court---Public property meant for use and enjoyment of general public could not be leased to any private or third party nor could any type of third party interest could be created therein---Government, relevant municipal authority and all such functionaries were duty bound to keep public property free from all types of encroachments and claims---High Court declared impugned allotments of the green belts as illegal and directed that the possession of the same shall be resumed forthwith by the respondents and furthermore, the respondents and authorities were jointly and severally directed to ensure that all signboards, billboards and advertisements were removed forthwith from the green belts and in future no such signage should be allowed thereon---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

C.M.A. No.209-K of 2014 in C.P. No.152-K of 2014 and C.M.As. Nos. 657 to 660-K of 2015 and C.M.A. No.869-K of 2016 in C.M.A. No.209 of 2014 rel.

Ayaz Hussain holding brief for Raja Mir Muhammad for the Petitioner.

Chaudhry Arif for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.

Mirza Saleem Akhtar for Respondents Nos. 4 and 5.

Asadullah Lashari, State Counsel.

P L D 2017 Sindh 486

Before Salahuddin Panhwar, J

Mst. QAISRA BANO---Petitioner/Applicant

Versus

Shaikh SHAHID ABBAS and others---Deceased.

S.M.A. No. Nil of 2013, decided on 29th September, 2016.

Sucession Act (XXXIX of 1925)---

----S. 372---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 114 & 151---Administrative suit---Review of order-Inherent powers of High Court---Act of Court---High Court directed to convert Succession Miscellaneous Application (SMA) into administrative suit but later on said application was dismissed for not impleading proper legal heirs---Validity---Once the Court competently ordered conversion of proceedings from SMA to administrative suit, then direction in former proceedings would lose its value and weight and things were to proceed as per procedure, provided for later (converted) proceedings---Suit for administration could not be dismissed simply for the reason that there could also be some other legal heirs, not made party in suit---Inquiry in such regard could competently be done within the scope of administrative suit---Such was an inadvertent mistake of Court which should not result in prejudicing anybody---Order converting SMA into administrative suit held the field and at the time of subsequent order i.e. dismissal of SMA if it would have been pointed out so that such subsequent order could not have passed---Bona fide inadvertent mistake even of Court could always be corrected/ratified by exercising powers provided by S.114, C.P.C. coupled with inherent jurisdiction within the meaning of S.151, C.P.C., which was meant for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court---Administrative suit was restored in circumstances.

P L D 2017 Sindh 488

Before Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar, J

ALI MUHAMMAD and another---Plaintiffs

Versus

FAIZULLAH and another---Defendants

Suit No.1569 of 2000, decided on 16th December, 2016.

Partnership Act (IX of 1932)---

----S. 42---Suit for dissolution of partnership, rendition of accounts and injunction---Partnership---Proof---Predecessor-in-interest of parties were partners in business and plaintiffs claimed that after death of their father they had become partner in the business---Validity---Plaintiffs failed to bring on record income tax return filed by them showing business as partnership concern in which they were also taxpayers---Survey Form filed by plaintiffs reflected that it had same National Tax Number of the firm, as well as that of plaintiffs and defendants and the same was not conceivable---Survey Form ceased to have any evidentiary value being contradictory and ambiguous in nature--- In a partnership business, the firm was required to file its own return, whereas partners to file their independent returns as well---Plaintiff failed to bring on record any material to show that business continued with defendants in the form of partnership including any details of Bank accounts, balance sheet, profit and loss account or even settlement of accounts prior to date from which they claimed their share of profit---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.

Punjab and Sindh Bank, Ltd. v. Kishen Singh Ghulab Singh and others AIR 1935 Lah. 350; Tulsiram Sanganeria and another v. Smt. Anni Bai and others AIR 1963 ORISSA 11; Raghumull v. Lunchmondas AIR 1917 Cal. 52; Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs and others PLD 2007 SC 302; Fazle Ghaffor v. Chairman Tribunal Land Disputers, DIR, Swat at Chitral at Mardan and 6 others 1993 SCMR 1073 and Zakaullah Khan v. Muhammad Aslam and another 1991 SCMR 2126 distinguished.

Javed Rafat Khan v. Messrs Shabbir Tiles and Ceramics Limited through Representative PLD 2005 Kar. 1; Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur and Bhandara v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills AIR 1966 SC 24; Mt. Sughra v. Babu AIR 1952 All. 506 and Narayanan Chettiar v. M.S.M. Umayal Achi (MANU/TN/0189/1959) rel.

Shehanshah Hussain along with S.Arshad Ali for Plaintiffs.

H.A. Rehmani along with Ms. Naheed Akhtar for Defendants.

P L D 2017 Sindh 497

Before Syed Saeeduddin Nasir, J

NASIM AHMED VANA and others---Plaintiffs

Versus

SHAMIM AHMED VANA and others---Defendants

Suit Nos. 576, 577, 578, 579, 208, 580 of 2012 and 1439 of 2013, decided on 19th December, 2016.

(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---

----S. 34(4)---Arbitration agreement---Fixed by time---Extension of time---Principle---Arbitration agreement fixing time during which reference may be made to arbitration is impliedly considered valid by S.34(4) of Arbitration Act, 1940---Court is vested with discretion to extend such time only in case if Court is of the opinion that in particular circumstances of the case undue hardship would otherwise be caused to parties due to expiration of time.

Jam Khursheed Khan v. The Province of West Pakistan PLD 1973 Lah. 131 rel.

(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---

----Chap. II, Ss. 3 to 19 & Chap. III, S.20---Reference to arbitration---Principle---Bar exists on invoking provisions of S.20 (Chap.III) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, when parties to arbitration agreement have invoked provisions of Chap. II (Ss. 3 to 19) of Arbitration Act, 1940.

(c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---

----Ss. 3 to 20 & 37(4)---Arbitration---Agreement fixed by time---Plaintiffs contended that parties had arbitration agreement between them and the matter be sent to arbitrator for decision---Validity---Agreement fixing time during which reference could be made to arbitration was impliedly considered valid by S.37(4) of Arbitration Act, 1940, which vested Court power to extend such time when it was of the view that some undue hardship was likely to be caused to parties by not extending same---Where agreement itself could not be acted upon having become inoperative due to invalidity, the Court was not entitled to appoint arbitrator of its own choice and substitute original agreement of parties---High Court declined to extend validity of arbitration agreement under S.37(4) of Arbitration Act, 1940, as circumstances did not warrant to do so nor any undue hardship would be caused to parties to arbitration agreement, who were pursuing their remedies in parallel legal proceedings which were more effective and expeditious---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.

Safullah Khan v. Karachi Customs Agents Association 2011 YLR 202; Communication and Works Department v. Pavital/Pivato Joint Venture 2002 CLC 1798; Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Nidera Handelscompagnic B.V. 3001 UC 474; Qamaruddin Ahmed and Co. v. Din Muhammad 1970 SCMR 402; Abdul Salam v. Muhammad Yaqoob 1999 CLC 1005; Sharbat Khan v. Fazal Rahim 1998 SCMR 867; General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf through Attorney v. Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 2014 Sindh 389; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/O Interior v. General (R) Pervez Musharraf and others PLD 2016 SC 570; Pakistan International Bulk Terminal Limited through Chief Finance Officer and others v. Maqbool Associates (Pvt) Limited through M.D. and others 2014 CLD 773; West Pakistan Government v. Messrs Pindi-Jhelum Valley Transport Limited Rawalpindi and others PLD 1960 SC (Pak) 88; M/s. Commodities Trading International Corporation v. Trading Corporation of Pakistan Limited and another 1987 CLC 2063; Ganesh Chandra Dey and another v. Kamal Kumar Agarwalla AIR 1971 Calcutta 371; Nelofar Saqib v. Saiban Builders and Developers and others 2011 CLD 341; Mrs. Yasmeen v. M/s. Beach Developers through M.D. and another 2003 YLR 1109 and 1985 MLD 402 ref.

Mujtaba Hussain Siddiqui v. Sultan Ahmed 2005 YLR 2709; M/s. Hafiz Abdul Aziz Cotton Ginning Factory v. Ali Muhammad Abdullah and Co. and another PLD 1966 Kar. 197 and Jam Khursheed Khan v. The Province of West Pakistan PLD 1973 Lah. 131 rel.

Khawaja Shams-ul-Islam and Abdul Sattar Pirzada for Plaintiffs.

Muhammad Ali Lakhani for Defendants Nos. 1 and 2.

Ishrat Zahid Alvi for Defendant No.3.

P L D 2017 Sindh 515

Before Salahuddin Panhwar, J

NOOR AHMED and 5 others---Applicants

Versus

GHULAM HYDER and 2 others---Respondents

Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.S-206 of 2012, decided on 25th October, 2016.

(a) Establishment of Office of Ombudsman for Province of Sindh Act (I of 1992)---

----S. 9---Jurisdiction, functions and powers of ombudsman---Scope--- Ombudsman can entertain and investigate a complaint/application by an aggrieved person on allegation of mal-administration on the part of any agency or any of its officers or employees.

(b) Establishment of Office of Ombudsman for Province of Sindh Act (I of 1992)--

----S. 9--Jurisdiction, functions and powers of ombudsman---Scope--­Ombudsman could not exercise ultimate jurisdiction of civil court as well as investigate the matters which were pending in the court of competent jurisdiction.

(c) Establishment of Office of Ombudsman for Province of Sindh Act (I of 1992)-

9---Jurisdiction, functions and powers of ombudsman---Object--- Object of domain of ombudsman was supervisory in nature whereby he could pass appropriate order in event of any mal-administration.

(d) Words and phrases--

----"Mal-administration"---Meaning.

(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-

----Ss. 154 & 155---Information in cognizable case and non-cognizable case---Scope---Officer in-charge of police station was under mandatory duty to record statement of any informant but recording thereof in S.154 or 5.155 Cr.P.C. Register was subject to showing commission of cognizable offence or non-cognizable offence which would be decided officer in-charge of the Police Station

(f) Establishment of Office of Ombudsman for Province of Sindh Act (I of 1992)-

----S. 9---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 190-Jurisdiction, functions and powers of ombudsman---Cognizance of offence by Magistrate-Accused assailed the order passed by Magistrate in pursuance of which he disagreed with report under "C" class and took cognizance against the accused-Validity-Ombudsman could direct SILO to perform his duty and objection of counsel for accused with regard to jurisdiction of Ombudsman had no substance-Disclosure of names in FIR of those who were mentioned in application as "and others" was not of much significance-Witnesses in statements under 5.161, Cr.P.C. had not supported the FIR; version of injured was supported by medical evidence-Impugned order of the Magistrate was speaking and well-reasoned order---Criminal Miscellaneous Application was dismissed accordingly.

(g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 173---Report of police officer---Effect---Ipse dixit of police was not binding upon the court.

(h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---

----S. 190---Cognizance of offences by Magistrate---Scope---Magistrate could competently take cognizance on a negative report---Mere commendation of police for disposal of case under "C" class was of not much relevance if the Magistrate disagreed with reasons.

(i) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

---S. 190---Cognizance of offences by Magistrate---Scope---Mere taking cognizance did not decide the fate of allegation, rather brought the prosecution under obligation to prove the charge and the accused on his turn to disprove the same.

(j) Criminal trial---

----Agony of trial---Effect---Agony of trial alone could not be made an excuse to avoid the trial of a charge/allegation.

(k) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 190---Cognizance of Offence by Magistrate---Scope---Order of taking cognizance could only be set aside if it was shown that order was prima facie non-speaking and contrary to law.

Ishrat Ali Lohar for Applicants.

Noor Ahmed Memon for Respondent No. 1.

P L D 2017 Sindh 520

Before Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J

Messrs BHANERO ENERGY LTD. and others---Plaintiffs

Versus

SUI SOUTHERN GAS CO. LIMITED---Defendant

Suits Nos. 1145 to 1150 and 1263, 1307 of 2008, 367, 1616, 1783 of 2014, 192 and- 572 of 2015, decided on 30th June, 2015.

Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act (XL of 1997)--

---S. 15---Captive Power (CP) and Independent Power Producers (IPP)---Plaintiff was holding licence to generate electricity and it claimed to be entitled to Sui Gas tariff applicable to IPPs on the ground that it was selling electricity in bulk either to its sister concern or to any other independent entity---Validity---Independent Power Producers after executing all agreements provided their energy produced by them either to national grid or to Bulk Power Consumers through national grid---Distinction between Captive Power and Independent Power Producer was justified as any corporate entity for the purpose of its sole benefit could incorporate any company for uninterrupted supply of energy to its sister concerns and could at the same time claim concession as being Independent Power Producers, which could not provide a fair opportunity to all other entities to thrive in such competitive market---Such prerogative/concessions and indulgence were for independent Power Producers which provided energy to National Grid to overcome shortfall irrespective of their interest as to whom such energy was being provided--- If IPPs were allowed to sell electricity to consumers of their choice and then claim all sorts of concession then it could not justify reasoning of creating IPPs who were to cater National Grid-- Reasoning and logics assigned to all such classes such as IPP, CPP and SPP were thus justified---Since the year 1999 and more importantly since the Policies of 1994 and 2002 were introduced, plaintiff had never considered it to be an IPP; it would be highly inequitable if an entity was allowed to repudiate a former instance or act to deny a constant approach of another entity or person who had been all along insisting on it constantly---Plaintiff could not be considered as Independent Power Producer and it failed to establish the same---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.

Makhdoom Ali Khan and Hyder Ali Khan for Plaintiffs (in Suit No.1145 of 2008).

Ghulam Murtaza for Plaintiffs (in Suit No.1263 of 2008).

Muhammad Ameen Bundukda and Muhammad Ishaq for Plaintiffs (in Suit No.572 of 2015).

Asim lqbal and Farmanullah for Defendants.

P L D 2017 Sindh 528

Before Syed Saeeduddin Nasir, J

Bishop EJAZ INAYAT---Plaintiff

Versus

Rt. Rev. ALEXANDER JOHN MALIK and 7 others---Defendants

Suit No.970 of 2003, decided on 30th December, 2016.

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-

--42---Suit for declaration---Scope---Provisions of S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1.877, are attracted only to a case in which plaintiff approaches Court for safeguard of his right to legal character or property--- Where right to his own legal character or property is not involved, suit is not maintainable.

Miss. Roohi Shaikh v. Board of Secondary Education, Karachi and 2 others 1996 MLD 1190; Abdur Rahman Mobashir and 3 others v. Syed Amir Ali Shah Bokhari and 4 others PLD 1978 Lah. 113; Shafqatullah Qadri v. University of Karachi through Vice Chancellor PLD 1954 Sindh 107; Burmah Eastern Limited v. Burmah Eastern Employees' Union and others PLD 1967 Dacca 190; Al-Haj Abdur Rehman Bhuya and others v. The Commissioners of Narayanganj Municipality and others PLD 1959 Dacca 5; Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, N.-W.F.P. and Bahawalpur v. Mrs. E.V. Miller and others DLR 1959 Dacca 430; Ilam Din v. Hassan Din PLD 2006 Lah. 121; M.A. Naseer v. Chairman Pakistan Eastern Railway PLD 1965 SC 83 and Sheoparsan v. Ramandand AIR 1960 PC 78 rel.

(b) Specific Relief Act (1 of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0.V11, R.11---Suit for declaration and injunction---Plaint, rejection of-Religious rights-Plaintiff assailed elections of church-Validity-Functioning and elections of Synod of Church of Pakistan which was a religious body of Roman Catholic Christians, and for election of which a specific procedure was prescribed in Constitution of Church of Pakistan, could not be called in question before Civil Court---No Court was empowered to deal with question purely ecclesiastical, whether arising in Christian or any other religious community-With such matters, Civil Court had nothing to do, until and unless they resulted in an infraction of civil rights---Plaintiff filed the suit to avenge his defeat in elections to the office of Bishop of Karachi---Plaintiff did not want to part with possession of house which was temporarily given to him when he was temporarily appointed as Commissary of the Diocese of Karachi until the Consecration Ceremony and being Commissary plaintiff entered into premises of the Bishop House, Holy Trinity Cathedral, temporarily and started living there, where his illegal occupation was continuing even after losing his election, which normally, plaintiff should have vacated for elected Consecrated Bishop---No cause of action accrued to plaintiff for filing suit---Plaintiff did not disclose any cause of action for filing suit against defendants, no ultimate relief could be granted to plaintiff in the suit as the same was not maintainable---Plaint was rejected in circumstances.

Uppangala Subraya v. Bedradi Subraya v. Indian Cases 57(DB)=(1910); Saifuddin Sahib v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 853 and Abdur Rahman Mobashir and 3 others v. Syed Amir Ali Shah Bokhari and 4 others PLD 1978 Lah.113 ref.

(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--­-

---O. VII, R.11---Rejection of plaint--- Cause of action--­Determination---Principles---For the purpose of determination whether plaint discloses a cause of action or not, Court has to presume that every averment made in the plaint is true---Besides the plaint, Court may also take into consideration certain admitted or uncontroverted material placed on record by defendant, the genuineness and veracity of which is beyond doubt and upon examining the same, Court conies to the conclusion that to continue with the suit would be a futile exercise or the case has been filed by plaintiff with manifest dishonesty of purpose, oblique object, to retain or claim ,benefit of such gain which plaintiff is not entitled to and to simply cause prejudice and harassment to defendant.

S.M. Shafi Ahmad Zaidi through legal heirs v. Malik Hassan Ali Khan (Moira) through legal heirs 2002 SCMR 338, Jewan and 7 others v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others 1994 SCMR 826; Messrs Noble (Pvt.) Limited, Karachi v. Federal Government Employees Housing Federation 2002 CLC 1670; Messrs Sindh Engineering (Pvt.) Limited v. OTIS Elevation Company and 3 others 2000 CLC 1524 and Messrs Azeem and Sons v. Ministry of Defence and 3 others 2001 CLC 1339 rel.

Ms. Benysh Qureshi for Plaintiff.

Qazi Zia Zahid for Defendants.

P L D 2017 Sindh 542

Before Irfan Saadat Khan, J

HABIB BANK LIMITED---Petitioner

Versus

RAIS AHMED KHAN and 6 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.952 of 2016, decided on 24th October, 2016.

Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979) ---

----S. 8---Fair rent, fixation of---Conditions---Rent Controller enhanced rent from Rs.25,000/- per month to Rs.5,85,000/- per month--­Validity---Landlord, while making a request for fixation of fair rent was not bound to satisfy all the factors mentioned in S.8 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---Rent Controller was authorized to fix the fair rent of a property even upon fulfilment of one condition---Rent Controller had exclusive domain to fix fair rent keeping in view the rent paid in similar situation with regard to properties located in adjoining area apart from rise in cost of construction; repair charges and imposition of new taxes---If landlord was able to bring home his case with regard to the fixation of fair rent being paid by other tenants in respect of similar placed properties then rent paid by those tenants in the adjoining locality would be considered to be "fair rent"---Rent Controller while fixing the fair rent had taken into consideration all the instances and rent agreements furnished by the landlord with regard to the premises being let out in the vicinity---Tenant had not furnished even a single piece of evidence in his defence with regard to the fair rent available in the vicinity---No infirmity was pointed out in the impugned orders passed by the courts below---Tenant was directed by the High Court to pay rent as fixed by the Rent Controller from the date of filing of rent application---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Muhammad Farooq v. Muhammad Waheed Siddiqui and 2 others 2013 YLR 2181; Muhammad Farooq v. Abdul Waheed Siddiqui and others 2014 SCMR 630; President Balochistan High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 754 and Messrs Olympia Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and another v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan 2001 SCMR 1103 ref.

State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Habib Safe Deposit Vault (Pvt.) Ltd. 2008 CLC 517; Muhammad Farooq v. Muhammad Waheed Siddiqui and 2 others 2013 YLR 2181; Muhammad Akhtar Saleem and others v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another 2001 SCMR 1314; Abdul Hamid v. Abdul Ghani 1992 MLD 1588; Mst. Mehrunnisa v. Muhammad Rafiullah 1995 CLC 202; Messrs Habib Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Messrs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. and another PLD 2006 Kar. 294; Messrs Mermaid Constructions (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. State Life insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another PLD 1999 Kar. 322; Muhammad Rafiullah v. Mst. Mehrunnisa 1995 MLD 418 and Banarsi Silk Cloth Museum v. Mst. Amna Bai 1986 CLC 1570 distinguished.

Mukhtarul Omar v. Messrs State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and 2 others 2009 YLR 204; Messrs Rabb Coffee House through Partner v. Muhammad Bakhsh and Sons through Managing Partner and 2 others 2013 MLD 239; Messrs Oceanic International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Lalazar Enterprises and others 2009 MLD 911; Singer Pakistan Limited v. Arshad Riaz Fazail and 2 others 2013 CLC 739; Muhammad Afaq v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, Karachi and 2 others PLD 2008 Kar. 100; Ittehad Chemicals Limited v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Karachi (South) and 2 others p.m SCMR 1582; Muhammad Jamil v. Muhammad Rahim 1987 CLC 176; Abdul Ghaffar v. Noor Jahan Malik 1987 CLC 2182; Muhammad Iqbal through L.Rs. and another v. Mst. Fatima Bai and others 2015 MLD 397 and Moinuddin Paracha v. Messrs Novatrtis Pharma Pakistan Ltd. and 2 others 2015 YLR 947 rel.

Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui for Petitioner

Shabbir Ahmed Sheikh for Respondents Nos. 1 to 5.

Nemo for Respondents Nos. 6 and 7.

P L D 2017 Sindh 555

Before Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Humayon Khan, JJ

ZAHID YOUNUS---Appellant in the matter of Mrs. KHAIR UN NISA (deceased)

High Court Appeal No.233 of 2015, decided on 5th December, 2016.

Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)---

----Ss. 291, 299 & 373---Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.), R.400---Succession certificate and Letters of Administration---Surety bond---Powers of Court---Appellant filed application for grant of Letters of Administration in respect of immovable properties which belonged to his deceased mother---Single Judge of High Court granted Letter of Administration in the name of appellant, subject to his furnishing surety/security bond---Validity---Where Court granted Letters of Administration to petitioner on his application, the Court had no power to dispense with the surety, which was a condition precedent for issuance of Letters of Administration---Under S.281(2)(b) of Succession Act, 1925, there was no discretion with Court to demand a bond from a person to whom a probate was granted in as much as the word 'may' had been used therefore, it was discretionary---Where the case before Court did not fall under S.373(3) or (4) of Succession Act, 1925, the Court had discretion to dispense with the security while granting Succession Certificate but in respect of cases falling under S.373(3) or (4) of Succession Act, 1925, the Court could not grant Succession Certificate without first obtaining security from petitioner---Provision of R.400 of Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.) was in the nature of subordinate legislation and it could not over-ride the effect of S.291 of Succession Act, 1925, as the same was a substantive provision of law---To the extent of inconsistency between the two, the substantive provisions of S.291 of Succession Act, 1925, would prevail over R.400 of Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.)---Where a particular procedure was prescribed for doing something that thing must be done according to that procedure otherwise the entire proceedings would be illegal or irregular---Single Judge of High Court had rightly decided application in accordance with law and the order did not require any interference in intra-court appeal---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Muhammad Shafiq's case PLD 2014 Sindh 541; Kamran Mirza v. Moazzam Mirza PLD 2014 Sindh 500; Mst. Razia Khatoon's case 1996 MLD 873; Ramchandra Ramratan v. Ramgopal Onkarji and others AIR 1957 Mad. Bh. 31 and Muhammad Javed Akhtar's case 1987 CLC 262 ref.

Mst. Rukhsana v. Province of Sindh and others 2013 CLC 370 rel.

Muhammad Arif Sheikh for Appellant.

P L D 2017 Sindh 559

Before Munib Akhtar and Yousaf Ali Sayeed, JJ

SAIFAN-UZ-ZAMAN KHAN---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 7 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-1111 of 2017, decided on 3rd April, 2017.

Constitution of Pakistan-

----Arts. 9, 19-A & 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Public interest litigation---Right to life---Right to information---Locus Standi---Scope---Petitioner, an investigative journalist, sought direction assailing a proposed acquisition of 51% shares of a private company by a foreign buyer vide a share purchase agreement---Contention of the petitioner inter alia was that the said transaction harmed public interest and was in contravention of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and offended Arts.9, 19-A & 26 of the Constitution---Petitioner further contended that per Art. 19-A of the Constitution, the public had right to information in respect of such transactions---Validity---Contention of the petitioner hardly established a public wrong or public injury warranting redressal by High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution and to accept the petitioner's contentions would open door for an invasion of virtually every private transaction on the touchstone of alleged evasion of some duty or tax etc.---High Court observed that High Court should not embark on roving inquiries into private transactions such as that identified by petitioner under banner of "public interest" especially where there were other regulatory authorities in the field mandated by a statutory responsibility of maintaining vigil their respective spheres---Right to information under Art.19-A of the Constitution was of immense value in promoting transparency by ensuring that citizens had knowledge of matters concerning public administration, but the same did not mean that commercial transactions in the private domain which did not have any direct nexus with matter of public administration be opened up for scrutiny before the courts on touchstone of Art.19-A of the Constitution at behest of any member of public whose curiosity may be piqued---Constitutional petition, therefore, did not fall within the domain of "public interest" was not maintainable, and accordingly dismissed.

Javed Ibrahim Paracha PLD 2004 SC 482; Salahuddin Dharaj v. Province of Sindh PLD 2013 Sindh 236 and Atta Ullah Khan Malik v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 Lah. 605 ref.

Shehla Zia's case PLD 1994 SC 693 distinguished.

Dr. Amjad Hussain Bukhari for Appellant.

Nemo for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 563

Before Nazar Akbar, J

Sheikh HAROON BUKSH---Petitioner

Versus

Shaikh TAHIR BUKSH and 2 others---Respondents

S.M.As. Nos.199 and 200 of 2015, decided on 10th April, 2017.

Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)---

----Ss. 295 & 278---Chief Court (Sindh) Rules (OS), Chap. XXII, R.413---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XX, R.13 & S.114---Succession---Procedure in contentious cases---Decree in administration suit---Nature of order under S.295 of the Succession Act, 1925---Conversion of proceedings under Succession Act, 1925 to a suit of administration under O. XX, R.13, C.P.C.---Petitioner sought review of order passed by High Court under S.295 of the Succession Act, 1925, whereby in view of contentious nature of succession proceedings, application seeking issuance of letters of administration were converted into a civil suit--- Contention of applicant inter alia was that impugned order, which converted proceedings into suit for administration and stated that the preliminary decree be passed was contrary to law; and the suit should be regular suit and not a suit for administration---Validity---Impugned order identified the parties and identified as to who should be the plaintiff and defendant and mentioned that the suit would be in the form of a suit for administration of the properties of the deceased and therefore all ingredients of S.295 of the Succession Act, 1925 and O.XX, C.P.C. were fully adhered to---When parties were legal heirs of the deceased and were contesting with regard to share in property left by the deceased, in such situation any one of the legal heirs could file a suit for administration of properties or file an application under S.278 of the Succession Act, 1925 for grant of "letter of administration" and in terms of S.295 of the Succession Act, 1925 in the case where there was contention, then proceedings were supposed to be converted as nearly as they could be, into a "regular suit" according to provisions of the C.P.C.---Court in the impugned order exercised powers of a court of original civil jurisdiction and once an order was passed, the court also had power to take further steps to minimize delay in disposal of dispute and the court was under a statutory obligation to pass an order for preliminary decree---Use of the word "shall" in O.XX, R.13, C.P.C. was of mandatory nature, and the C.P.C. did not envisage any other form a suit except for a suit for administration of properties under O.XX, C.P.C.---No error on the face of record was found in the impugned order---Review application was rejected, in circumstances.

Haq Nawaz Talpur for Petitioner.

Aminuddin Ansari for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Sindh 567

Before Mohammad Shafi Siddiqui, J

SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LIMITED (SSGCL) through Deputy Chief Manager---Petitioner

Versus

OIL AND GAS REGULATORY AUTHORITY (OGRA) through Chairman and another---Respondents

OGRA J.M. Nos.1 and 2 of 2011, 1 of 2012, 2 of 2013, 1 of 2014 and 9 of 2016, decided on 25th November, 2016.

(a) Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002)---

----Ss. 12(2) & 13---High Court, jurisdiction of---Scope---Provisions of S.13 of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, relates to a situation where authority may oblige to review, rescind, change, alter or vary any decision or rehear an application in the event of change in circumstances or discovery of evidence which in the opinion of the Authority, could not have reasonably been discovered at the time of decision or (in the case of rehearing) at the time of original hearing, if consideration of the change in circumstances or of new evidence would materially alter the decision---Situation as described in S.13 of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, is different and distinguishable from the one provided under S.12(2) of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Primary jurisdiction of High Court in terms of S.12(2 of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, is to see whether procedure, as undertaken by Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority is in the letter and spirit of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002.

(b) Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002)---

----Ss. 12(2)---Tariff, fixation of---Jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioner company was aggrieved of decision taken by Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority with regard to fixation of tariff---Validity---Jurisdiction under S.12(2) of Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, is limited to the extent that High Court could only apply judicial view as to whether procedural requirement under Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, Rules and Licenses had been followed---High Court could not sit as Court of appeal and consider such details which Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority had undertaken---Price fixation mechanism was not a function which was to be undertaken by High Court---Where procedural requirements had been flouted, High Court could provide indulgence---Specialized performances which were assigned to regulatory authority could not be undertaken by High Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion---Judicial intervention in the matter was required only where person aggrieved i.e. the petitioner, could show that tariff fixation was a procedure bypassed, arbitrary and ultra vires; it could only then if statutory prescribed procedure was not followed, a tariff could be held ultra vires to be remanded back---High Court declined to interfere with statutory powers exercised by statutory authority while fixing tariff and reasons assigned to Annual Revenue Requirements and tariff---Petition dismissed in circumstances.

2016 SCMR 69 and PLD 2012 SC 132 ref.

Mirza Mahmood Ahmad along with Fahad Malik for Petitioner.

Salman Akram Raja and Tariq Bashir along with M. Rizwan ul Haq, Executive Director Litigation (OGRA) for Respondent No.1.

Nemo for Respondent No.2.

Anwar Mansoor Khan along with Ms. Omemah Khan, Ms. Reem Tashfeen Niaz and Muhammad Ali Talpur for Applicants.

P L D 2017 Sindh 585

Before Nadeem Akhtar and Fahim Ahmed Siddiqui, JJ

MUHAMMAD UMAR---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN, through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 2 others---Respondents

C.P. No.D-361 of 2017, decided on 22nd February, 2017.

(a) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000)---

----Ss. 18 & 23---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Power to 'block' computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) under S. 23 of National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 ("the Ordinance")---Legality---"Impounding" of CNIC in terms of S.18 of the Ordinance---Procedure---No clear provision in the Ordinance authorized the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) to 'block' a CNIC---NADRA had no authority to block a CNIC after issuing a notice to the cardholder under S.23 of the Ordinance, however, instead of blocking, NADRA had the power to physically or digitally "impound" a CNIC in terms of S.18 of the Ordinance, after fulfilling requirement of a notice and granting opportunity of hearing to the cardholder---High Court gave directions laying down the procedure that had to be followed by NADRA before impounding person's CNIC.

Blocking a person's Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) was an extreme act as it amounted to depriving a citizen from his/her identity and depriving him to discharging his routine work. 'Blocking a CNIC' is negating the very identity of a person, which amounted to depriving him of all the necessities, and even imposed restrictions to his freedom of movement. If a person's identity was blocked on the ground of suspicion without giving him an opportunity of hearing, it amounted to a serious violation of his fundamental rights.

Term 'blocking' was alien to the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 ("the Ordinance"). No clear provision in the Ordinance authorized the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) to 'block' a CNIC.

Perusal of section 23 of the Ordinance clearly showed that NADRA had no authority to place an embargo whatsoever on a CNIC under the said section. Any person's CNIC could not be blocked after issuing him/her a notice under section 23 of the Ordinance. No doubt, by issuing a notice under section 23, NADRA may call any person who had given any information to furnish any proof regarding the information so given. Language of the statute indicated that said section was applicable prior to issuance of CNIC and not afterwards. Instead of blocking, NADRA may take action as per provision of section 18 of the Ordinance to physically or digitally impound a CNIC after giving notice and chance of hearing to the cardholder.

High Court directed that impounding of CNIC in terms of section 18 of the Ordinance must be done after fulfilling the requirement of notice to concerned person with full opportunity of a audience; that NADRA must ensure the service of notices to the concerned person through SMS, special messengers, post and/or courier services, and after confirmation of service of all or any of the said mode, and expiry of at least 15 days' time if no response was received then impounding proceeding may be initiated; that if service of notice could not be done or confirmed then NADRA was bound to publish such notice on their website as well as publish the same in a newspaper and after expiry of the 15 days period impounding proceeding should be initiated; that if a person appeared before NADRA authorities, after service of notice or publication then NADRA should complete an inquiry within a period of 30 days after giving full opportunity of the audience to him; that if a person appeared after 'impounding' of his CNIC and gave reasons for his non-appearance, then NADRA must give him an opportunity of hearing and during such hearing his CNIC may be restored, and that the final order passed under section 18 of the Ordinance, must contain, reasons for impounding, cancelling or confiscating the CNIC issued to the card-holder.

(b) Words and phrases---

----"Impound"---Definition.

Black's Law Dictionary, Second Edn. ref.

Shahab Sarki for Petitioner.

Ch. Muhammad Farooq and Ms. Samina Iqbal for NADRA.

Muhammad Aslam Butt, DAG.

P L D 2017 Sindh 592

Before Fahim Ahmed Siddiqui, J

SAEED AHMED KALHORO---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.S-35 of 2017, decided on 25th April, 2017.

(a) Probation of Offenders Ordinance (XLV of 1960)--

----S. 5---Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S. 23(i)(a)---Reformation and rehabilitation of first offender---Scope---Provision of Probation of Offenders Ordinance, 1960 was a reformative measure and its object was to reclaim amateur offender who is spared the indignity of incarceration could be usefully rehabilitated in the society---Accused, in the present case, was an amateur and a novice offender therefore it would be beneficial for him and the society alike to place him on probation---Accused was given under the supervision of Probation Officer for one year while maintaining his sentence---Accused being a Muslim, he would perform the community service by participating in arrangements of Jumma prayer in a Jamia Masjid close to his residence of workplace---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

(b) Probation of Offenders Ordinance (XLV of 1960)--

----Preamble---Object of the Ordinance---High Court observed that Probation System was usually considered as a boon for some of the selected offenders but it was more than such limited scope; that the System would provide means of rehabilitation without the necessity of breaking up the offender's normal life and removing him from the natural surroundings of his home; that such System could be used as a tool to raise the status of a convicted offender by making him a useful member of the society and that institution of probation could be used for recompensing the society if it was integrated with community services for the benefit of the society.

Ghulam Dastagir and 3 others v. The State PLD 2014 Bal. 100 rel.

Ahsan Ahmed Memon for Appellant.

Ali Gul Shaikh, DDPP.

P L D 2017 Sindh 596

Before Nadeem Akhtar and Fahim Ahmed Siddiqui, JJ

Mrs. NIGHAT SAIMI and another---Petitioners

Versus

PROVINCE OF SINDH through Secretary Revenue and 10 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-3522 of 2016, decided on 28th February, 2017.

Stamp Act (II of 1899)---

----Ss. 27, 27-A & 31---Stamp duty, value of---Determination---Notified Valuation Table---Applicability---Grievance of petitioners was that the authorities demanded fixation of court fee according to valuation table and not according to valuation appeared in court order---Validity---Even if a property was sold out on the basis of decree, the sale consideration mentioned in the instrument was the basis for calculation of stamp duty without having any influence of sale price received in pursuance of decree---Authorities had no power to question valuation of property if it was in accordance with notified 'Valuation Table'---If property was sold out for a lesser price than the Valuation Table, the authorities could take recourse to the proviso to S.27-A & S.31 of Stamp Act, 1899, otherwise not, however, in all other cases, worth of property in accordance with 'Valuation Table' was acceptable for the purposes of calculation of stamp duty---Sub-Registrar seeking guidance in respect of sale deed of petitioners from Inspector of Stamps was not necessary---Direction/guidance given in 'guidance letter' as well as act of impounding the document on the pretext of market value or value mentioned in the order of court was contrary to law and the same was set aside---High Court directed Sub-Registrar to register sale deed of petitioner on the basis of notified valuation table without getting any influence from exterior matters---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

1976 SCMR 395 and Khalid Pervaiz Khan Tareen and another v. Deputy Commissioner/Registrar, Quetta and another PLD 1994 Quetta 9 ref.

2016 SCMR 203 rel.

Muhammad Sohail Hassan for Petitioners.

Miran Muhammad Shah,AAG Sindh.

Mir Hussain, Standing Counsel.

P L D 2017 Sindh 604

Before Omar Sial, J

ALLAH WADHAYO---Appellant

Versus

QURBAN ALI and 3 others---Respondents

Criminal Acquittal Appeal No.S-32 of 2008, decided on 26th April, 2017.

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 380 & 457---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.367 & 417(2-A)---Theft in dwelling house, lurking house, trespass---Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Complainant-appellant had raised two grounds in support of appeal against acquittal: firstly, that impugned judgment did not contain the points for determination, which was in breach of S.367, Cr.P.C. and secondly, that the first appellate court heard the appeal and passed judgment in only five days---Validity---Section 367, Cr.P.C. and Part VI of the said Code pertained only to 'Proceedings in Prosecutions' before a Trial Court; matters pertaining to the appellate and revisional courts were provided in Part VII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and said Part of the Code did not contain any provision making it obligatory upon an appellate court to record points of determination in its judgment---No prejudice would be caused to the complainant/appellant due to early hearing of the appeal---Impugned judgment was not perverse, arbitrary, capricious or speculative---Double presumption of innocence worked in favour of accused due to his acquittal---Appeal against acquittal was dismissed in circumstances.

Hassan and others v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793 rel.

Bakhshan Khan Mahar for Appellant.

Shabbir Ali Bozdar for Respondents.

Abdul Rehman Kolachi, A.P.G. for the State

P L D 2017 Sindh 606

Before Fahim Ahmed Siddiqui, J

ALI GOHAR CHANDIO---Applicant

Versus

Mst. HAWA and 5 others---Respondents

Civil Revision No.56 of 2012, decided on 30th May, 2017.

(a) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)---

----Ss. 29 & 30---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 8, 42 & 54---Suit for declaration, possession and permanent injunction---Registered sale deed in favour of peasant/defendant claimed to be executed by predecessor of the plaintiff was assailed---Conveyance of immovable property by de facto guardian of Muslim minor and sale agreement of property of minor without permission of court---Validity---Respondent/plaintiff contended that the defendant being peasant/farmer had fraudulently managed registered sale deed executed in 1946 wherein the share of two minor daughters of predecessor was also shown sold through their mother without permission of court---Respondent/plaintiff who claimed constructive possession as the predecessor had left a widow and three daughters; inheritance of two minor daughters also devolved upon mother of the plaintiff and that she came to know about fraud of the defendant when he stopped giving share of crops a few years back---Applicant/defendant contended that after the demise of predecessor of plaintiff, all legal heirs sold out suit property in 1946 to the father of defendant in which the share of two minor daughters was validly sold by their mother and no guardian was required from the court for the purpose---Validity---Record showed that the daughters were minors in the year 1946 and jurisdiction of Guardian Court was not invoked for the appointment of guardian, as such the said sale itself was questionable in terms of Ss.29 & 30 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890---Conveyance of immovable property by a de facto guardian of a Muslim minor was void and was not binding on the minor---Under the Islamic law, mother of a minor was not his/her legal guardian, and she would have no power to act on behalf of the minor and could not make a valid conveyance of his/her property---In the present case, two of the sisters were admittedly minors while one of them was major and the mother also enjoyed a share in the property as a widow---Question was where a conveyance was effected by three or four persons of whom one or more were minors represented by his de facto guardian, whether such a conveyance was void in so far as it affected the minor or minors, or against the other executants as well who were sui juris and competent to make conveyance of their shares in the immoveable property---High Court observed that if the conveyance was void qua the minor represented by the de facto guardian, it was void as a whole---Void contract was entirely void, and if a part of it had no effect, the other part could not stand by itself and be operative---Applicant had contended that no objection was raised by the mother of the plaintiff during her life time, as such, objection from plaintiff was not to be considered---Such contention of the applicant was also not substantial and could not sustain---Agreement by a person of infirmity due to lunacy or juvenility was void ab initio and had no worth in the eye of law---Even an agreement, which was void ab initio could not be rectified by the minor after attaining the age of majority---For a void document, the question of limitation would not arise, and the same did not specifically require cancellation---Admitted fact of placement of entry in the names of the legal heirs of original owner long after the execution of the alleged sale deed, purported to be executed in 1946, was sufficient to declare the sale deed as highly dubious document---Judgment of appellate forum below was maintained by High Court---Civil revision was dismissed accordingly.

Imambandi v. Mutsadd AIR 1918 PC 11; Pratap Singh v. Sant Kaur AIR 1938 PC 181; Chairman, District Screening Committee, Lahore v. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi PLD 1976 SC 258 and Abdul Rasheed Khan through LRs and others v. Safdar Ali through LRs and others 2016 YLR 2575 ref.

(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)-

----Art. 100---Old registered document---Denial by the opposing party---Onus of proof---Record showed that original sale deed was not available and the same was not produced before the Trial Court---Certified copy of said document was produced before the Trial Court but without fulfilling the requirements of the admissibility of secondary evidence---No doubt under Art. 100 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 a sanctity was attached to a 30 years or more old registered document but whenever the clouds thrown on it by or on the behalf of the executant, the beneficiary of such document was obliged to establish the same as per rules of evidence---After denial by the plaintiff regarding execution of such document, onus to prove the same heavily shifted on the shoulders of applicant/defendant who was beneficiary of the transaction---Entry in the revenue record if disputed by the original owner, the person seeking benefit under the same would not be absolved of his duty to prove the transaction.

Janat Bibi v. Sikandar Ali and others PLD 1990 SC 642; Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani and 10 others 1992 SCMR 1832; Sana Ullah and another v. Muhammad Manzoor and another PLD 1996 SC 256; Muhammad v. Mst. Rehmon through Mst. Sharifan Bibi 1998 SCMR 1354 and Mst. Rasheeda Begum and 3 others v. Muhammad Yousaf and others 2002 SCMR 1089 and Misri and others v. Muhammad Sharif and others 1997 SCMR 338 ref.

Zardad Khan v. Mst. Safia Begum 1998 CLC 2006 and Muhammad Hayat and 38 others v. Abdul Rahim and 24 others 2001 MLD 1524 distinguished.

Muhammad Ashique Dhamraho for Applicant.

Mrs. Najaf Shah for Respondent No.1.

Miss. Shazia Surahyo,State Counsel.

P L D 2017 Sindh 614

Before Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Adnan-ul-Karim Memon, JJ

MANSUR-UL-HAQUE---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and another---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-2543 of 2011, decided on 17th March, 2017.

Pakistan Navy Ordinance (XXXV of 1961)---

----S. 19(4)---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss.9 & 25---Release from service---Corruption and corrupt practices---Plea bargain---Reference was filed against the petitioner before the Accountability Court with the allegations that accused misused his public office and had received commission and kickbacks, bribe from the foreign suppliers in respect of supply of sub-marines, arms, ammunition and other defence material---Petitioner had availed the facility of plea-bargain during the pendency of reference and voluntarily offered to return 7.5 million dollars, which was accepted and he was released---Ministry of Defence suspended all benefits of petitioner including pensionary benefits---Validity---National Accountability Bureau had submitted reference against the petitioner for the offence of corruption and corrupt practices and proceedings against the petitioner had come to an end as he had been released on the basis of plea-bargain---Although National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 had provided that on termination of proceedings as a result of plea bargain, the accused-petitioner would be deemed to have been convicted, therefore, authorities had suspended pensionary benefits and withdrew all his subjective/honorary ranks for his proven misconduct after his retirement from the Naval Service---No illegality had been committed by the authorities by removing the name of petitioner from the list of Retired Personnel of Navy as act of the plea-bargain was an admission of his guilt, therefore, any perks, privileges and pensionary benefits could not be restored to him at any stage---Conviction of the petitioner having been based on corruption and corrupt practices, which fell within the definition of moral turpitude, he was not entitled for restoration of his perks, privileges and pensionary benefits---Authorities, before suspending the pensionary benefits of petitioner, removed his name from the list of Naval Retired Officers as such, question of payment of pension would not arise---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

National Accountability Bureau v. Aamir Lodhi PLD 2008 SC 697; Messrs Pakistan Army Furnishing Stores v. Syed Ali Akbar Rizvi PLD 1985 Kar. 201 and Karachi City Cricket Association, Karachi v. Mujeebur Rahman Chairman AD HOC Committee, Pakistan Cricket Board, Lahore PLD 2003 Kar. 721 ref.

Ghulam Hussain v. Chairman P.O.F. Board, Wah Cantt and another 2002 SCMR 1691 rel.

Obaid-ur-Rehman for Petitioner.

Shaikh Liaquat Hussain, Standing Counsel.

Muhammad Altaf Awan, ADPG, NAB

Akram Jawaid, Prosecutor NAB along with Lieutenant Shafeeq-ur-Rehman Zuberi, Assistant Director Services/Superintendent Law Department, Pakistan Navy.

P L D 2017 Sindh 622

Before Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J

MUHAMMAD SAEED---Plaintiff

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Revenue Division/Chairman and others---Defendants

Suit No.551 of 2017, decided on 21st June, 2017.

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr.1 & 2---Suit for declaration and injunction--- Interim injunction, grant of--- Recovery of possession---Vehicle in question was detained by Customs authorities alleging the same to be a smuggled vehicle--- Plaintiff sought recovery of possession of vehicle on the plea that he was bona fide purchaser of vehicle which was sold by Customs authorities in auction---Validity---No element of mens rea existed on the part of plaintiff who purchased the vehicle against valuable consideration after due verification of title of its former owner---No reasonable grounds existed to postulate and predicate that plaintiff was in any way concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping or concealing or in any manner dealing with smuggled goods or any goods with respect to which there could be reasonable suspicion that they were smuggled goods---Judicial discretion could be exercised for release of vehicle on Superdari/surety---If a court could grant final relief, it also possessed inherent jurisdiction to grant temporary relief pending before it---High Court directed the authorities to hand over possession of vehicle in question to plaintiff subject to final outcome of adjudication proceedings finalized by Customs authorities--- Application was allowed in circumstances.

2013 PTD 765; Collector of Customs, Peshawar v. Wali Khan and others Civil Appeal No.1050 of 2009; Indus Trading and Contracting Company v. Collector of Customs (Preventive) Karachi and others Civil Appeal No.1600 of 2006; Messrs Ghani Tayyab (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others Civil Petitions Nos.832-K to 833-K of 2011; Messrs Binaco Traders v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2006 PTD 1491 and Malik Muhammad Saeed v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2006 PTD 2167 ref.

Jawaid Farooqi for Plaintiff.

Kashif Nazeer for Defendants Nos. 3 to 5.

Abdul Qadir Leghari, Assistant Attorney General.

Muhammad Aftab, Deputy Collector, Appraisement Customs (West).

Ilyas Ahsan, Law Officer, FBR.

P L D 2017 Sindh 634

Before Salahuddin Panhwar, J

MUHAMMAD RAZI and another---Plaintiffs

Versus

KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION through Managing Director and another---Defendants

Suit No.883 of 2009, decided on 8th February, 2017.

(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Arts. 128 & 129---Legitimacy of child---Presumption---Normally, individuals are not permitted to dispute a claim of 'lawful marriage' by two competent persons unless they prima facie show existence of reasons prejudicing their rights under such claim---Burden is always upon the person to prove, who denies or disputes the relation.

(b) Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855)---

----S. 1---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1884), Arts. 117 & 120---Fatal accident---Onus to prove---Principle---Onus of probandi stands shifted upon defendants, in either situation where they deny negligence or take specific plea of not causing accident.

Mst. Sakina v. National Logistic Cell 1995 MLD 633 and Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation v. Malik Abdul Habib 1993 SCMR 848 rel.

(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Art. 71---Oral evidence---Scope---When a witness does not claim to be an eye-witness of incident, legally his words in respect of fact in question cannot be believed nor considered within the meaning of Art.71 of Qanun-e-Shahdat, 1984, which directs that oral evidence must in all cases whatever be direct.

(d) Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855)---

----S. 1---Fatal accident---Damages, recovery of---Son of plaintiffs died in road accident due to rash and negligent driving of defendant---Validity---Deceased died at the age of 20 years and had surmounted his teenage and joined practical life---High Court took the age of deceased for compensation/damages as 'seventy years'---Deceased was a skilled computer embroidery designer and was earning Rs.15,000 per month i.e. Rs.500 per day---High Court accepted the earning as the same matched with quantum of minimum wage---Defendants were jointly and severally liable for the tort in question and were liable to pay such amount to plaintiffs---Suit was decreed accordingly.

Ghazala Tehsin Zohra v. Ghulam Dastagir Khan PLD 2015 SC 327; Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Ltd. Karachi and others v. Ehteshamuddin Qureshi 2005 SCMR 1392 and Catholic Child Welfare Society v. Various Claimant (FC) the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools 2013 SCMR 787 ref.

2011 SCMR 1836 rel.

Farrukh Usman and Aamir Maqsood for Plaintiffs.

Asim Iqbal for Defenedants.

P L D 2017 Sindh 653

Before Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Abdul Maalik Gaddi, JJ

RIZWAN AHMED QURESHI and others---Appellants

Versus

THE STATE and others---Respondents

Special Criminal Anti-Terrorism Appeals Nos.255, 256, 257, 260 and 261 of 2015, decided on 17th June, 2017.

(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 6 & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.353, 385, 386 & 34---Telegraph Act (XIII of 1885), S.25-B---Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S.23(i)-A---Terrorism, Bhatta, Extortion, recovery of weapon---Police encounter---Proof---Appreciation of evidence---Accused persons faced trial for demanding Bhatta by issuing a slip to complainant and also made threatening telephone calls---Accused persons were convicted by Trial Court and sentenced variously maximum up to imprisonment for five years---Validity---Handwriting on Bhatta slip was not got matched not voice was identified---No confessional statements of accused persons was on record---Names of accused persons were not mentioned in the FIR and they were supposed to be produced before Magistrate for holding identification parade but no such parade was held---First Information Report though showed that police encounter took place for few minutes in-between-police and accused persons but neither any damage was caused to the police vehicle nor any injury was caused to any police official---Such fact remained in mystery and created doubt in prosecution case---Police officials narrated different stories in their statements regarding alleged raid, seizure, recovery and property shown in Court and the same could not be safely relief upon for conviction of accused persons---Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused persons and Trial Court did not appreciate evidence properly---High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded by Trial Court and all accused persons were acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 439---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 6 & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 353, 385, 386 & 34---Telegraph Act (XIII of 1885), S.25-B---Sindh Arms Act (V of 2013), S.23(i)-A---Terrorism, Bhatta, recovery of weapon---Supervisory jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Appeal, non-filing of---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted by Trial Court and sentenced variously maximum up to imprisonment for five years but he did not assail his conviction and sentence---High Court acquitted co-accused persons who had filed their appeals---Validity---High Court, had control and superintendence over courts below and could exercise visitorial jurisdiction in respect of matters which did not fall under ambit of appeals---Revisional jurisdiction could be exercised by the High Court in respect of courts below in cases where appeal or leave to appeal was not to be filed---Such jurisdiction was very wide and could be exercised whenever facts calling for its exercise or brought to the notice of the Court, where the order of Trial Court was illegal and superficial based on misconception of law and facts and quite contrary---High Court could exercise jurisdiction to correct, manifest, illegal or to prevent gross miscarriage of justice---Jail authorities were directed to release the accused as his co-accused were also acquitted of the charge---Accused was also acquitted in circumstances.

S. Rashid Ali for Appellants.

Muhammad Iqbal Awan, Assistant Prosecutor General, Sindh.

Abdul Razzak and Qadir Khan Mandokhel, Amici curiae.

P L D 2017 Sindh 661

Before Aftab Ahmed Gorar, J

Messrs LABBAIK (PVT) LTD. through Authorised Officer---Appellant

Versus

PAKISTAN ELECTRONIC MEDIA REGULATORY AUTHORITY through Chairman and 2 others---Respondents

Miscellaneous Appeal No.47 and C.M.As. 5106, 5084, 5080, 5081, 5082, 5083 and 4780 of 2017, decided on 17th May, 2017.

Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)--

----S. 30-A---Broadcasting station licence---Security clearance---Appellant company was aggrieved of the order passed by authorities denying security clearance issued by Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)---Validity---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority wrote letter to the Federal Government to process case for security clearance of appellant and Federal Government requested the Authority to furnish particulars of Directors and the same was complied with---Subsequently Federal Government issued letter regretting the clearance without any reason and justifications---Such refusal was passed without hearing appellate company---Letter regretting security clearance by Federal Government was without any reasons and justification whereupon order in question was based---High Court set aside letter in question and remanded the matter to Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority to verify security clearance issued by the authorities---High Court directed Federal Government to issue fresh letter in respect of security clearance with detailed reasons and justification and matter was to be decided afresh---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Anwar Mansoor Khan, Shahab Sarki and Adnan Memon for Appellant.

Zahid F. Ibrahim for Respondent/PEMRA.

Abdul Karim Khan for Intervenors.

Salman Talibuddin, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan.

Muhammad Javed K.K., Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.

P L D 2017 Sindh 665

Before Muhammad Junaid Ghaffar and Muhammad Humayun Khan, JJ

Dr. ASIM HUSSAIN---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Interior and 3 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-2229 of 2017, D-1696 of 2016 and D-7597 of 2015, decided on 5th June, 2017.

National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9 (b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Bail, grant of---Imposition of conditions---Petitioner was accused under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, who was admitted to bail with a condition to surrender his passport and his name was placed on "Exit Control List"---Plea raised by petitioner was that no condition could be imposed in bail granting order---Validity---When bail was granted to petitioner, it was felt necessary by High Court to procure passport and to place his name on "Exit Control List"---Court while granting bail was duty bound to prescribe type of surety it needed for securing attendance of accused---Even a routine bail order contained certain conditions between the lines---Order of surrendering passport and placing name on "Exit Control List" was done as a practice and routine being followed in bail matter pertaining to NAB---High Court declined to interfere in bail granting order, there being illegality in the order---Courts were not required to pass mechanical orders and had to take into consideration the status of sureties, their validity as well as circumstances which would provide satisfaction to Court that order of concession of bail would not be misused---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

General (Retd.) Pervez Musharaf through Attorney v. Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 2014 Sindh 389; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/O Interior v: General Pervez Musharraf and others PLD 2016 SC 570; Wajid Sharnas-ul-Hasan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad PLD 1997 Lah. 617; Saleent Akhtar v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1999 Karachi 177; Sohail Latif and 2 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2008 Lah. 341; Mian Ayaz Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and 3 others PLD 2010 Lah. 230; Messrs Zurash Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Director and 4 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 3 others PLD 2011 Kar. 385; Abdul Qayyum Khan v. Federal Government of Pakistan through Federal Secretary, Ministry of Interior and 2 others PLD 2009 Kar. 361; Arshad Sami Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and 3 others 1998 MLD 490; Mirza Muhammad Iqbal Baig v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2006 YLR 2797; Mian Tahir Jahangir v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and another 2008 YLR 1857; Mian Munir Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2008 YLR 1508; Ali Sheharyar v. The State 2008 SCMR 1448; Gulzar Hassan Shah v. Ghulam Murtaza and 4 others PLD 1970 SC 335; Muhammad Yaseem v. The State and another 2014 PCr.LJ 1179; Munawar Ali Sherazi v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others PLD 1999 Lah. 459; Sikandar Hayat Khan and 4 others v. Government of Pakistan through Federal Secretary, Ministry of interior, Islamabad and 5 others PLD 2003 Pesh. 102; Rauf B. Kadri v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2007 YLR 560 Mahboob Ali Abro v. Ayyan Ali and others C.P. No.214/2016; Zuhair Siddiqui v. Chairman NAB C.P. No.D-214/2016; Civil Petitions Nos. 781 and 896 of 2016 and C.M.A. No.1986 of 2016 in Civil Petition No.781 of 2016 along with Civil Petition No. 207-K of 2016; Habibullah Niazi v. Federation of Pakistan through Federal Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Pakistan Secretariat, Islamabad and 2 others PLD 2009 Karachi 243; Asif Kamal v. Government of Pakistan and others 2916 YLR 177, Miss Naheed Khan v. Government of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 Kar. 513; Prime Minister Inspection Team National Highway Authority v. Zaheer Mirza and others 2011 SCMR 271 and Tariq Masood v. Director General, National Accountability Bureau, Lahore and another PLD 2012 Lah. 287 ref.

Muhammad Ayub v. Mst. Nasim Akhtar and another 1984 PCr.LJ 160 and Hakim Ali Zardari v. The State PLD 1998 SC 1 rel.

Sardar Mohammad Latif Khan Khosa, Anwar Mansoor Khan and Qadir Khan Mandhokhail for Petitioner in all 3 petitions.

Shaikh Liaquat Hussain, Asstt. Attorney General for Federation of Pakistan.

Qazi Mohammad Bashir, AAG and Asadullah Lashari, State Counsel for Government of Sindh.

Muhammad Altaf, Special Prosecutor for NAB.

P L D 2017 Sindh 678

Before Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Nazar Akbar, JJ

TRADING CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN (PVT) LTD.---Appellant

Versus

Messrs FRIENDS CORPORATION STEVEDORES (PVT.) LTD---Respondent

High Court Appeal No.248 of 2014, decided on 31st July, 2017.

(a) Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance (II of 1962)---

----S. 7---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.10---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---High Court appeal---Pecuniary jurisdiction---Return or rejection of plaint---Scope---Dispute between the parties was whether after determination of pecuniary jurisdiction plaint was to be returned or rejected---Validity---Suit filed by plaintiff was barred by virtue of S. 7 of Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, for want of pecuniary jurisdiction---Court was either supposed to reject the plaint for want of pecuniary jurisdiction or it was to be returned to plaintiff---Rule of propriety demanded that when there was a Court having jurisdiction to try the suit and plaint was wrongly filed in another Court, which had 'no jurisdiction' either on the ground of pecuniary value of the suit or territorial limits, to be tried by Court where it was filed, instead of rejecting the plaint, such Court should return the plaint to plaintiff for presentation before a Court having both pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction, as if the suit had never been instituted; it was not the case of propriety alone, rather it was necessary to return the plaint because even order of 'rejection of plaint' was a case of implied exercise of jurisdiction by the Court in a case where cognizance was expressly barred by S.7 of Sindh Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962---Division Bench of High Court returned the plaint and allowed plaintiff to present the same before Court of competent jurisdiction resultantly order passed by Single Judge of High Court was set aside---High Court appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Rimpa Sunbeam Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Karachi Metropolitan Corporation through Administrator PLD 2006 Kar. 444; S.M. Waseem Ashraf v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 338; National Bank of Pakistan v. Humayun Sultan Mufti 1984 CLC 1401; Malik Jehangir Khan v. Banking Tribunal No.1, Karachi Division Karachi and 4 others 2002 CLD 1466; National Logistic Cell through Commanding Officer NLC v. Abdul Qayyum Khan and others 2009 MLD 948; Rahmatullah v. Ikramullah 1984 CLC 886; PLD 1957 Lah. 689; PLD 1971 SC 247; Shafi-ur-Rehman and 2 others v. Fateh Muhammad PLD 2002 Kar. 511 and Muhammad Naveed Aslam and 3 others v. Mst. Aisha Siddiqui and 2 others PLD 2010 Kar. 261 ref.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O.VII, R. 10---Return of plaint---Scope---Order to 'return of plaint' is not an order by exercising jurisdiction in a case where Court is not competent to try the same, it is a declaration to the effect that suit is triable by some other Court which is in existence.

Rafiq Ahmed Kalwar for Appellant.

Amel Khan Kasi for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Sindh 690

Before Nadeem Akhtar and Fahim Ahmed Siddiqui, JJ

KARACHI PROPERTY INVESTMENT COMPANY (PRIVATE) LTD. through Authorised Officer---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF SINDH through Secretary and 3 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-2386 of 2011, D-315/2012, D-3323/2012, D-3443/2013, D-1428/2015, D-5679/2016, D-1047/2017, D-1048/2017 and D-1092/2017, decided on 28th July, 2017.

(a) Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act (XII of 1994)--

----S. 3---Protected Heritage---Declaration---Procedure---Decision of government to declare property of a private person/entity as protected heritage under Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 depends only on recommendation of Committee.

Gadoon Textile Mills and 814 others v. WAPDA and others 1997 SCMR 641 and Khawaja Ahmad Hassan v. Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 186 rel.

(b) Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act (XII of 1994)---

----Ss. 8, 10, 12, 18 & 19--- Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance (V of 1979), S. 21-A--Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations, 2002, Chap. 15---Vires of Chap. 15 of Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations, 2002---Heritage building---Preservation or protection---Scope--- Preservation or protection of heritage building/protected heritage mentioned in Chap.15 of Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations, 2002 does not fall within scope of Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979---Such power, authority and jurisdiction rests only with the Committee and government under Ss. 8, 10, 12 & 18 of the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994---Such jurisdiction has overriding effect by virtue of S.19 of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994---Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 and Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979 are special laws and independent of each other having specific provisions for making rules and regulations only for carrying out their respective purposes---Rules or regulations made under either of the two laws cannot be applied to subject matter of the other law---Provisions of Chap.15 of Karachi Buildings and Town Planning Regulations, 2002 are ultra vires the Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 and Sindh Building Control Ordinance, 1979 and in clear conflict with Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, therefore, cannot be applied to protected heritage declared under Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994.

Khawaja Ahmad Hassan v. Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 186 rel.

(c) Interpretation of statutes--

----Framing of rules---Principle---When legislature confers power on the government to frame rules, it is expected that such power has been used only bona fide, in a responsible spirit, in true interest of public and in furtherance of the object for attainment of which such powers have been conferred--- Power conferred upon government to frame rules is not unlimited but subject to certain prerequisites and preconditions---Unlimited right of delegation is not an inherent in legislative power itself--- Court may reject a regulation as invalid and ultra vires if it fails to comply with statutory essentials.

Khawaja Ahmad Hassan v. Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 186 rel.

(d) Administration of justice---

----Statutory powers--- Balance, maintenance of--- Where authorities fail to regulate their discretion by framing of rules, policy statements or precedents, it becomes mandatory for Court to intervene in order to maintain requisite balance for exercise of statutory power.

Amanullah Khan and others v. The Federal Government of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 1092; Ellahi Cotton Mills Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582 and Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630 rel.

(e) Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act (XII of 1994)-

----Ss. 3, 6, 7, 12 & 13---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 10-A, 23, 24, 25 & 199---Constitutional petition---Protected heritage---Discretion, exercise of---Petitioners in the present case, are private persons who are owners of private properties subject matter of proceedings under Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994---Plea raised by petitioners was that before declaring their properties as protected heritage, no prior notice of such decision/declaration was ever served upon them and all proceedings were illegal and mala fide---Validity---While exercising discretion and taking decision in such behalf, burden was upon government to show that discretion was not arbitrary, mala fide or biased and decision was taken after recording cogent and valid reasons fulfilling all requirements of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 and rules made thereunder and by strictly adhering to well established principles of natural justice--- Provisions of acquisition or compulsory acquisition of any property by government under S.7 or S.12 of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 or agreement in respect thereof under S.8 of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 or imposition of restrictions on its owner's rights under Ss.8 or 10(1) or 15 of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 or imposition of any penalty under S. 18 of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 was applicable only to such properties which were declared as protected heritage through due process of law, rules made thereunder and by strictly adhering to well established principles of natural justice failing which any of such provisions of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 would be deemed to be a clear violation of inalienable fundamental rights of owner to acquire, hold and dispose of his property enshrined in Arts.23 & 24 of the Constitution--- High Court set aside all notifications issued without exercising proper discretion, without fulfilling requirements of Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994, without making any rules under Sindh Cultural Heritage (Preservation) Act, 1994 or following such rules and in violation of well-established principles of natural justice---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Amanullah Khan and others v. The Federal Government of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 1092; Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Ch.Muhammad Altaf PLD 1991 SC 27; Ellahl Cotton Mills Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1997 SC 582; Federation of Pakistan and others v. Shaukat Ali Mian and others PLD 1999 SC 1026; New Jubilee Insurance Company Limited v National Bank of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 1126; Director Food NWFP and another v Madina Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and 18 others PLD 2001 SC 1; Rauf Bakhsh Kadri v. The State and others 2003 MLD 777; Waris Meah v. The State and another PLD 1957 SC 157; Briq. Retd.) F.B. Ali and another v. The State PLD 1975 SC 506; Chairman, Regional Transport Authority, Rawalpindi v. Pakistan Mutual Insurance Company Limited, Rawalpindi PLD 1991 SC 14; lnamur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 563; Gadoon Textile Mills and 814 others v. WAPDA and others 1997 SCMR 641; Abid Hassan and others v. PlAC and others 2005 SCMR 25; Khawaja Ahmad Hassan v. Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 186; Azam Wazir Khan v. Industrial Development Bank and others 2013 SCMR 678; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630 and Government of NWFP through Secretary v. Mejee Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. Mardan, 1997 SCMR 1804 ref.

FOR PETITIONERS

Salahuddin Ahmed (in C.P.No.2386 of 2011).

Nasir Hussain Jafferi (in C.P.No.315 of 2012).

Mustafa Lakhani (in C.P.No.3323 of 2012).

Muhammad Abdur Rahman (in C.Ps.Nos. 3443 of 2013, 1428 of 2015, 5679 of 2016, 1047, 1048 and 1092 of 2017).

FOR RESPONDENTS

Miran Muhammad Shah, A.A.G. for Government of Sindh.

Rao Sarfaraz Khan for Sindh Building Control Authority.

Called absent (City District Government).

P L D 2017 Sindh 717

Before Syed Muhammad Farooq Shah, J

SHAHID alias PUNJABI---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Jail Appeal No.69 of 2011, decided on 24th May, 2017.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--

----S. 342---Examination of accused---Scope---Evidence not put to accused at the time of recording his statement under S. 342 Cr.P.C. could not be considered against him.

(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Art. 133(2)---Cross-examination---Object---Cross-examination was the great legal engine invented for the discovery of truth---Opportunity to cross-examine contemplated by the law must be real, fair and reasonable---Cross-examination was not an empty formality, but a valuable right and best method for ascertaining the truth---Right of cross-examination in criminal cases was a valuable right of the accused---Cross-examination was a weapon which could be a wield for the purpose of testing the veracity of the statement made by the witness.

(c) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Prosecution was duty bound to prove its case beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt---If any single or slightest doubt was created, benefit would go to the accused and would be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case.

(d) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Benefit of doubt would go to the accused, regardless of the fact whether he had taken such plea or not.

Tariq Pervaiz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram's case 2009 SCMR 230 and Faryad Ali's case 2008 SCMR 1086 rel.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----302---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused-appellant was charged for the murder of maternal uncle of the complainant---Material on record showed that the version of prosecution was without corroboration, which adversely affected the credibility of prosecution witnesses' testimony---Circumstances established that the deposition of prosecution witnesses were totally inconsistent---Circumstances of the case had created serious doubts in the prosecution case, which would go to the roots of the prosecution case---Benefit of such doubt would resolve in favour of accused---Accused appellant was acquitted in circumstances by setting aside conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court.

(f) Criminal trial--

----Conviction-Principle-Conviction must be based on unimpeachable evidence and certainty of guilt---Any doubt arising in the prosecution case, must be resolved in favour of accused.

Zakir Hussain Leghari for Appellant.

Rahat Ehsan, D.P.G.Sindh for the State.

P L D 2017 Sindh 723

Before Salahuddin Panhwar, J

HC MUHAMMAD KHAN and 3 others---Appellants

Versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Revision Application No.S-83 of 2014, decided on 5th June, 2017.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 223---Escape from confinement or custody due to negligence of public servant---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Prosecution case was that an undertrial prisoner was admitted in the hospital due to urinal pain, who escaped from the hospital, when the accused-appellant (Police officials) were on duty---Accused appellants were held guilty of negligence which resulted into the escape---Offence wherein the accused-appellants had been convicted was of two folds, first that said public servants were bound to keep the prisoner in confinement and that the escape must have been due to the negligence of said police officials---Prosecution, in such cases, must establish that burden was upon the officials to disprove that escape was not the result of their negligence---In the present case, nothing was brought on record with regard to duty of accused-applicants over the escaped undertrial prisoner or at such place---Duties of police officials including that of jail were regulated under entries in the relevant record---Prosecution was required to produce such entries on record but no such entry or proof had been produced---In absence of such proof, conviction could not be sustained---Circumstances established that case of prosecution was not free from doubt, benefit of which would resolve in favour of accused-appellants---Accused-appellants were acquitted in circumstances by setting aside conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court.

(b) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single infirmity creating reasonable doubt was sufficient for giving benefit of doubt to the accused.

Muhammad Luqman v. The State PLD 1970 SC 10 rel.

Dilbar Khan Laghari for Appellants.

Shahid Ahmed Shaikh, A.P.G. for the State.

P L D 2017 Sindh 725

Before Salahuddin Panhwar and Khadim Hussain Tunio, JJ

IMTIAZ AHMED---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Health and 4 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.D-971 of 2016, decided on 13th February, 2017.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---"Aggrieved person"---Scope---Person can said to be "aggrieved" only when his legal right is denied by someone who has a legal duty to perform relating to that right---Not only the right but a justifiable right has to exist to give jurisdiction to High Court in the matter---Unless whatever right, personal or otherwise on which petition is based is established, no order can be issued under Art.199 of the Constitution.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199--- Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Object and scope---When relevant law provides other forums for purpose then, approach to extraordinary jurisdiction is not advisable because in constitutional jurisdiction, court does not go into a question involving minute details nor can it decide facts of which no foundation is made, unless it is shown that such controversy is devoid of supporting or perverse---Such extraordinary jurisdiction is intended primarily for providing an expeditious remedy in a case where illegality of action of an executive or other authority can be established without any elaborate inquiry into complicated or disputed facts.

N.-W.F.P Public Service Commission and others v. Muhammad Arif and others 2011 SCMR 848; Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niaz v. Ali S.Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813; Shoukat Khan v. Assistant Political Agent, Landhi Kotal, Khyber Agency and others PLD 2002 SC 526; Chief Administrator Aukaf v. Muhammad Ramzan PLD 1991 SC 109; Messers S.H.Pesticides (Pvt) Ltd and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2004 Kar. 620 and Muhammad Azhar Khan and another v. Assistant Commissioner/Collector Toba Tek Singh and others 2006 SCMR 778 rel.

(c) Drugs Act (XXXI of 1976)---

----Ss. 9 & 9-A---Sindh Drug Rules, 1979, R. 19--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Alternate remedy, availability of---Cancellation/suspension of drug licence---Petitioner was a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products and his manufacturing unit was raided by authorities---Drugs being prepared by petitioner were declared to be substandard, resultantly, his licence was cancelled---Plea raised by petitioner was that he was discriminated by authorities---Validity---Authorities recorded reasons in support of orders in question while issuing show cause notice to petitioner and after affording opportunity of hearing, passed orders in question---Such orders could not be termed as illegal as well, as an effective remedy was accessible to petitioner before Appellate Board as provided under S.9-A of Drugs Act, 1976 against any decision or action of authorities---Awarding of different penalties by authorities in two or more different cases of similar charges could not be pressed as 'discrimination' if penalties were otherwise within jurisdiction and competence because each charge had its own peculiar facts and circumstances---Principle of equity could be insisted upon for due process but the same could not be used to limit discretion, that would fail its meaning---Plea of discrimination had no force and petitioner had adequate remedy provided under law which was convenient beneficial and cumbersome to achieve the object---High Court declined to interfere in orders passed by authorities---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Independent Newspaper Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. through Authorized Attorney v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory through Chairman PLD 2014 Isl. 7; Mst. Kalsoom Malik and other v. Assistant Commissioner and others 1996 SCMR 710; Muhammad Rafiq Gazdar v. Additional Commissioner, Karachi and 3 others PLD 1972 Kar. 119; Rimsha Shaikhani v. Nixor College through Board of Directors/Governors and another PLD 2016 Sindh 405; Muhammad Gul Kakar v. Province of Balochistan 1986 PLC(C.S.) 50; Messrs Kakasian Pharmaceuticals (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore v. Government of Punjab and others 2003 YLR 3056 and Messrs Harmone Laboratories v. Government of Pakistan through the Registration Board, Ministry of Health, Special Education and Social Welfare, Health Division Islamabad 1986 CLC 1610 ref.

Syed Haider Imam Rizvi for Petitioner.

Fezal Hussain Jamali, Standing Counsel for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Sindh 733

Before Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Arshad Hussain Khan, JJ

Messrs SUI SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY LIMITED through Attorney---Appellant

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, MP&NR and 5 others---Respondents

High Court Appeals Nos.192 and 257 of 2016, decided on 15th August, 2017.

Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XVII of 2002)--

----S. 8---National Gas Tariff Rules, 2002,R.,18---Natural gas pricing for retail consumer---Appellant company was engaged in distribution of natural gas to general consumer---Consumers of natural gas were aggrieved of the notification issued by Authorities fixing price of natural gas for financial year 2014-2015---Single Judge of High Court set aside notification in question issued by the Authority whereby price was fixed by the Authority---Validity---One determination was made by the Authority on Estimated Revenue Requirements, sent by the Company for a particular period such determination could be used and applied for that particular financial year and not for the next financial years for which company was required to file its fresh petition on the first day of December each year for the purpose of estimating its total revenue for upcoming financial year---When the notification in question was issued, company had already filed its "Estimated Revenue Requirements" petition for the year 2015-2016---Notification in question was not issued for the financial year, 2015-2016, starting from 1-7-2015 for which fresh "Revenue Requirements" had already been submitted---Advice of Federal Government issued on 31-8-2015, on said "Requirement" filed by the company on 3-1-2014 for the financial year 2014-2015 with the Authorities the same was issued by some Financial Analyst, without referring to any of the documents/letters of the Authority on which the advice in question issued by Federal Government and Notification of the even date issued by the Authority to such effect did not meet the criteria as laid down by superior courts---Advice of Federal Government and notification issued by the Authority pursuant to such advice were constitutionally invalid and a nullity in the eyes of law---Single Judge of High Court while passing judgment had considered all material facts and had also examined relevant provisions of the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 and thereafter correctly applied his judicial mind in deciding the case---No factual infirmity or legal error in judgment passed by Single Judge of High Court having been found by the Division Bench, High Court appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

2014 SCMR 220; Najam-uz-Zaman and others v. Engineer-in-Chief, G.H.Q., Rawalpindi and 2 others 2005 SCMR 1802; Printek (Pvt) Ltd. through Executive Director and 3 others v. Shahid Nabi Malik and 4 others 2011 YLR 2941; Muhammad Nadeem Arif and others v. Inspector-General of Police Punjab, Lahore and others 2011 SCMR 408; Securities and Exchange Board of India v. M/s Akshya Infrastructure Pvt. Limited AIR 2014 SC 1963; Mst. Ubaida Manzoor v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary Education (Schools) Lahore and 4 others 2012 PLC (C.S.) 101; Zahid Rehman v. The State PLD 2015 SC 77; Muhammad Rafi Ere.v. Additioal Commissioner (Rev.) Sargodha 1981 SCMR 1181; Ashfaq Khalid and others v. Muhammad Hanif and 9 others 1988 SCMR 74; Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division PLD 2012 SC 132; Engineer Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2013 SC 224; Messrs Mustafa Impex, Karachi and others v. The Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 808 and Messrs Farooqui Ice Factory Gambat through Proprietor and 24 others v. Revenue Officer SEPCO (WAPDA) Ranipur District Khairpur and 14 others PLD 2014 Sindh 443 ref.

Appellant by:

Asim Iqbal and Farmanullah for Appellant.

Respondents by:

Adnan I, Chaudhry for Respondents.

Amel Kansi for Respondents Nos. 3, 4, 5, 8, 758, 759 and 902;

Navin Merchant, Salman Yousuf and Darvesh K. Mandhan for Respondents Nos. 53 to 58, 1345 and 1346.

Hyder Ali Khan and Sami-ur-Rehman for Respondent No.1233.

M. Anas Makhdoom and Ahmed Farhaj for Respondents Nos. 886 to 890 and 1283.

Naeem Suleman and Arshad Hussain Shahzad for Respondents Nos. 6, 149 to 152, 156 to 162, 164, 166, 168, 169, 286, 289, 292, 295, 298, 303 to 321, 324, 326 and 327, 708 and 709, 733 to 734, 777, 866, 870, 935 to 937, 1235, 1239, 1291, 1386 to 1388.

Faiz Durrani, Samia Faiz Durrani and Ghulam Muhammad for Respondents Nos. 10, 145 to 148 and 864.

M. Amen Bandukda for Respondents Nos. 11 to 19, 21 to 31, 33 to 40, 58, 69 to 81, 83 and 84, 88 and 89, 93, 99 to 109, 112 to 115, 198, 200 to 213, 219 to 222, 226, 228 to 230, 234 to 250, 256 to 260, 263 to 268, 272, 274, 761 to 785, 789, 794 to 799, 803, 805, 809, 872 to 876, 878 to 882, 1274 to 1277, 1279, 1331 to 1335, 1346 to 1349 and 1351.

Shahzad Raheem and Qazi Ajmal Kamal for Respondent No.68.

Junaid Siddiqui for Respondents Nos. 885, 1340 and 1418.

Syed Mohsin Ali for Respondents Nos. 133 to 136, 138 to 142, 170 to 177, 366, 370, 812, 886, 903 to 909, 1213, 1215 to 1218, 1262 to 1264, 1268, 1284, 1285, 1288, 1323, 1355, 1374, 1381 and 1403.

Muhammad Iqbal Bhatti for Respondents Nos. 178 to 192, 331 to 342.

Imran Ahmed for Respondent No.286.

Jahanzeb Awan, Naresh Aruwani, Darvesh K. Mandhan and Patras Piyara for Respondents.

Ms. Sofia Saeed for Respondent.

Ms. Lubna Pervaiz for Respondent.

Salman Talibuddin, Additional Attorney General along with Ms. Alizeh Bashir.

Mir Hussain, Assistant Attorney General.

Dates of hearing: 19th January, 8th and 16 February 2017, 1st March, 2017, 10th and 24th April, 2017, 8th and 15th May, 2017.

P L D 2017 Lahore 1

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, CJ

Hafiz JUNAID MAHMOOD---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2565 of 2014, heard on 19th December, 2016.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199--- Constitutional petition--- Maintainability--- Public/ Government policy----Judicial review---Scope---Government policy was generally enforceable against a citizen when it was translated into legislation, subordinate legislation or executive action, and such legislation or executive action was then subject to judicial review---Policy, generally, was a guideline for the internal working of the Government, however, if such Policy impinged upon the Fundamental Rights of a citizen, then the same could be judicially reviewed, like any other legislation or executive action.

Executive District Officer (Revenue), District Khushab at Jauharabad and others v. Ijaz Hussain and another 2011 SCMR 1864; Aqsa Manzoor v. University of Health Sciences, Lahore through Vice-Chancellor and 3 others PLD 2006 Lah. 482; Lt. Muquddus Haider v. Federal Public Service Commission through Chairman, Islamabad 2008 SCMR 773; Punjab Public Service Commission and another v. Mst. Aisha Nawaz and others 2011 SCMR 1602 and Mian Muhammad Afzal v. Province of Punjab and others 2004 SCMR 1570 ref.

Human Rights case No.14392 of 2013 (2014 PTD 243); Messrs Al-Raham Travels and Tours (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Hajj, Zakat and Usher through Secretary and others 2011 SCMR 1621; Messrs Shaheen Cotton Mills, Lahore and another v. Federation of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce through Secretary and another PLD 2011 Lah. 120 and Wattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697 rel.

(b) Words and phrases---

----"Disability" and "disabled person"---Meanings---"Disability" meant lacking one or more physical powers, such as the ability to walk or to coordinate one's movements, as from the effects of a disease or accident, or through mental impairment---"Disabled person" was a person who, on account of injury, disease or congenital deformity, was handicapped for undertaking any gainful profession or employment in order to earn his livelihood and included a person who was blind, deaf, physically handicapped or mentally retarded---Persons with disabilities included those who had long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others---"Disability" was an evolving concept and resulted from interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hindered their full and effective participation in a society---"Disabilities" was an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations and participation restrictions---Impairment was a problem in body function or structure---Activity limitation was difficulty encountered by an individual in executing a task or action, while a participation restriction was a problem experienced by an individual in involvement in life situations---"Disability" was not just a health problem, and was a complex phenomenon reflecting the interaction between features of a person's body and features of the society in which he or she lived.

UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD or Convention) and World Health Organization (2016) Disabilities, Retrieved on December 19, 2016 from http://www.who. int/topics/disabulities/en/ rel.

----Arts. 9, 14, 25, 8, 2A, 4 & Preamble---United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011---Fundamental Rights in the context of persons with disabilities---Constitutional values of universality, indivisibility interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms---Concept of "reasonable accommodation" for disabled persons---Constitutional obligations of the State with regard to disabled persons---Scope---Constitution proactively reached out to persons with disabilities with force and vigour and the wisdom of the United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, was already embedded in the soul of the Constitution and could be easily rediscovered by using principles of the said Convention to purposively interpret the Constitution---Right to life, dignity and equality were further emboldened, illuminated and vitalized when interpreted in the context of the said Convention---Right to life and dignity were epicenters of the Constitutional architecture and recognized the importance of accessibility to physical, social, economic and cultural environment, to health and education, and to information and communication---Fundamental right to life, therefore, enabled persons with disabilities to fully enjoy all human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a disabled person, like every human being, had an inherent right to life and its effective enjoyment at par with others---Right to life and dignity of a person with disabilities could only be realized if the State and its institutions took steps provide "reasonable accommodation" that would facilitate and ensure that a person with disabilities could enjoy life with honour and dignity like others---Inherent in Art. 25 of the Constitution was the recognition that discrimination against any person on basis of disability was a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of a human being---Article 25 of the Constitution promoted inclusiveness, effective participation and recognized human diversity in a society and therefore mandated that reasonable accommodation be provided by the State and other institutions to actualize such Constitutional goal and to avoid exclusion of persons with disabilities from effective participation in the society---Constitutional values of social, economic and political justice recognized free choice and individual autonomy and therefore, there existed a bold and passionate Constitutional support for persons with disabilities---State and its institutions had a Constitutional obligation to ensure, within means available, that a person with disabilities got reasonable accommodation and to provide the architecture, structure, assistive and adaptive technology, system and equipment and facilitative support to persons with disabilities in order to enable them to actualize their Constitutional rights and freedom.

Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. and others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary Law and others PLD 2002 SC 460; Reference No.01/2012 (Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (PLD 2013 SC 279); M/s. Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Millieum Chennai Broadcast (Pvt) Ltd. 2008 (13) SCC 30; Aharon Barrack-Human Dignity---The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right. Cambridge 2015 P.144 and Jeeja Ghosh and another v. Union of India and others AIR 2016 SC 2392 rel.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Preamble & Art. 8---Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution---Nature---Interpretation of Constitutional provisions containing Fundamental Rights---Fundamental Rights were the heart and soul of a living Constitution and must at all times, be ready to embrace and protect the sensibilities and sensitivities of the people---Fundamental Rights must be progressively and purposively interpreted to advance frontiers of freedom, individual autonomy and free choice, and such vibrance and vitality were the hallmark of a living Constitution in a democracy.

Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. and others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary Law and others PLD 2002 SC 460 and Reference No.01/2012 (Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (PLD 2013 SC 279) rel.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 9, 14 & 25---Recruitment Policy (2013) For Educators, Para. 4D---Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981), Ss. 10, 2(c) & Preamble---United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011---Vires of Recruitment Policy (2013) For Educators, Para. 4D---Constitutional obligations of the State with regard to disabled persons---Interpretation of Arts. 9, 14 & 25 in the context of Constitutional protections of disabled persons---Recruitment to public/Government posts for disabled persons---Reasonable accommodation for disabled persons---Scope---Petitioner, who had permanent visual impairment, impugned the Provincial "Recruitment Policy-2013 for Educators", which barred blind persons from applying to posts of educators---Contention of the Provincial Government, inter alia, was that it was not possible for a blind teacher to use the blackboard to teach or to control the classroom---Validity---Fundamental Rights to life, dignity and equality mandated that State and its organs should make serious endeavors to provide reasonable accommodation to persons with disabilities so that they can be mainstreamed and made useful and productive members of the society---Impugned recruitment policy was devoid of any such thought or realization and lacked openness, inclusiveness and accessibility for persons with disabilities---Provincial Education Department, in the present case, had failed to consider that the petitioner could have been made able enough to teach with the help of assistive technology and qualification of the petitioner was not otherwise questioned---Ability to use a blackboard and maintain discipline could be easily achieved through assistive technology and additional human resource---Department did not take the plea that reasonable accommodation could not be provided or that the same was burdensome or cumbersome and paid no heed to the rights of the petitioner under the Constitution, United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, And The Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981---High Court observed that the impugned Recruitment Policy to the extent of its Para. 4D, impaired Fundamental Rights of the petitioner and was accordingly declared unconstitutional and illegal and hoped that Provincial Government will set a healthy precedent for others to follow---Advocate General shall place the judgment before the authorities, so that the anguish and pain of persons with disabilities in the Province was redressed and the Government succeed in making the Province a disability sensitive Province---High Court directed the Provincial Government and the Provincial Education Department to reframe the relevant portion of the impugned Recruitment Policy accordingly, keeping in view observations of the High Court and the wisdom of the United Nations Convention On The Rights of Persons With Disabilities--- Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Assistive Technology for Visually Impaired and Blind People. Marion A Hersch, Michael A Johnson. Springer. p.670 rel.

(f) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 25, 9 & 14--- Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981) S. 10---United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011---Fundamental Rights in the context of persons with disabilities---Recruitment to public/Government posts for disabled persons---Establishments to employ disabled persons---Reserved quota for employment of disabled persons---Nature---Scope---Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in the light of United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, indubitably showed that a person with disabilities could not be debarred from applying on open merit for the general seats and the three percent quota under the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance, 1981 was an additional benefit and did not restrict a person with disabilities to apply for the general quota---To restrict a person with disabilities to a limited quota of three percent, which may or may not be available, depending on the sanctioned posts, would amount to depriving equality, accessibility and opportunity to a person with disabilities and offended Art. 25 of the Constitution---Such restriction was opposed to the Constitutional mandate and the United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities.

(g) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Recruitment Policy (2013) For Educators, Para. 4D--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) Ss. 35 & 35A---Constitutional petition---Awarding of costs to petitioner---Scope---Petitioner, who with permanent visual impairment had to approach the High Court to impugn the Recruitment Policy of a Department of the Provincial Government under Art. 199 of the Constitution could be awarded costs, which were to be paid to the petitioner by the Provincial Government.

Kawas B. Aga and another v. City District Government, Karachi (CDGK) through Nazim-e-Ala and others PLD 2010 Kar. 182; The Postmaster-General, Northern Punjab and (AJ&K), Rawalpindi v. Muhammad Bashir and 2 others 1998 SCMR 2386; Province of Sindh through Secretary, Home Department and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 2008 SC 132; Inayatullah v. Sh. Muhammad Yousaf and 19 others 1997 SCMR 1020; Mst. Afsana v. District Police Officer, (Operation), Khairpur and 5 others 2007 YLR 1618 and M.D. Tahir, Advocate v. Federal Government and others PLD 1999 Lah. 409 rel.

Harris Azmat and Ali Khalid Sindhu along with Petitioner in person.

Anwaar Hussain and Ahmad Hassan Khan, Assistant Advocates-General, Punjab.

Iftikhar Ahmad Mian for Respondent No.2.

Rana Muhammad Younus Aziz, Senior Law Officer, School Education Department.

Zubair Khan, Deputy Secretary, School Education Department, Government of Punjab.

Tariq Ismail, Litigation Officer, Social Welfare Department, Punjab.

Iqbal Hussain, EAD o/o EDO (Education) Lahore.

Date of hearing: 19th December, 2016.

"It is not the eyes that are blind, but the hearts"

P L D 2017 Lahore 23

Before Ali Baqar Najafi and S.M. Kazim Raza Shamsi, JJ

Brig. (R) IMTIAZ AHMAD---Appellant

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.25-E of 2002, heard on 19th June, 2016.

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14---Assets beyond known sources of income---Appreciation of evidence---Shifting of onus, principle of--- Applicability---Benami properties---Onus to prove---Accused was convicted by Trial Court and sentenced to imprisonment for 8 years with fine---Validity---Accused could not be held responsible for having owned the properties purchased through unknown sources of income or illegitimate means---Prosecution had not urged that accused was required to explain the specific source beyond known sources of income---Accused was made to explain his legal source of income and in response to the same, he not only produced his own defence witnesses but had also explained his entire assets and had reasonably explained the source to purchase those assets which were in the form of profits in various business which he had declared in his wealth statements and income tax returns as well as in declaration form prescribed for a government servant---Merely by showing details of assets and without disclosing source of income, prosecution was not successful in shifting onus to accused to prove his innocence---High Court set aside conviction and sentence passed by Trial Court and acquitted accused of the charge and also released properties in question---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Ghumman's case PLD 2004 Lah. 155; Ghani-ur-Rehman v. National Accountability Bureau and others PLD 2011 SC 1144 and Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others PLD 2011 SC 607 ref.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 17(b)---Proceedings of Trial Court---Nature of proceedings---Inquisitorial/Adversarial---Assets beyond known sources of income---Scope---Trial Court on its own cannot adopt inquisitorial proceedings to calculate known sources of income in the judgment---Trial Court is simply required to weigh prosecution evidence and to see as to whether it has successfully proved the case against accused persons beyond reasonable doubt.

Ghani-ur-Rehman v. National Accountability Bureau and others PLD 2011 SC 1144 rel.

(c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 26---Approver, statement of---Properties in question were confiscated by the Trial Court on the statements of co-accused who were made approvers---Validity---Properties in question could not be confiscated on the statements of approvers who were not permitted to become approver by the order of the Chairman National Accountability Bureau, furthermore, vendors of the properties in questions were not produced before Trial Court.

(d) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 5(d)(a) & 14(a)(v)---Benami transaction---Proof---Possession of the property, the written transaction, and the circumstances under which benami transactions are made are required to be disclosed before Trial Court by prosecution.

Mst. Zahida Sattar and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2002 SC 408 rel.

(e) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9(a)(v)---Assets beyond known sources of income---Income Tax and Wealth Tax declarations---Source of income---Proof---Declaration for the purpose of income tax and wealth tax cannot be used to ascertain source of income to determine assets beyond means of accused by National Accountability Bureau.

(f) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 27---Power to seek assistance--- Intelligence Bureau, information from--- Scope--- National Accountability Bureau, under S.27 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 can always probe and receive information from any government department including Intelligence Bureau to dig out the reality of funds which may have been utilized to purchase properties.

Kh. Haris Ahmad and Syed Maqsooma Zahra Bokhari for Appellant.

Muhammad Shoaib Khan, ADPG and Muhammad Shahid Mehmood, Senior Special Prosecutor for NAB.

P L D 2017 Lahore 41

Before Ibad-ur-Rehman Lodhi, J

Mst. GHANIA HASSAN---Appellant

Versus

SHAHID HUSSAIN SHAHID and another---Respondents

F.A.O. No.159 of 2010, heard on 19th February, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XXXVII, Rr. 2 & 3---Summary suit---Execution petition---Objection---Additional dower---Scope---Executing Court attached property of judgment-debtor---Contention of applicant was that she had entered into marriage with the judgment-debtor and property in question (attached property) had been given to her against dower---Objection petition was dismissed by the Executing Court---Validity---No concept of additional dower existed---Dower in question was allegedly settled after almost four years of the marriage---Spouses could exchange gifts during their matrimonial life but such gifted property could not be given the status of "dower"---Judgment-debtor had not finally transferred the property in question in favour of applicant---Applicant had filed a suit for recovery of her dower and till its final conclusion she could not claim to be having any lien over such property---Applicant could not frustrate the proceedings of execution of decree granted in favour of respondent---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Ashiq Ali and others v. Mst. Zamir Fatima and others PLD 2004 SC 10; Mst. Tahira Begum v. Federal Land Commission, Islamabad and 5 others 1983 CLC 663; Wali Dad v. Mst. Tasneem Kausar and another 1999 CLC 163 and Inayat Ullah v. Mst. Parveen Akhtar 1989 SCMR 1871 ref.

(b) Islamic law---

----'Dower'---Meaning---Dower was a consideration on the basis of which a Muslim man and woman entered into a marriage contract.

(c) Islamic law---

----"Dower"---Additional dower---Exchange of gifts during matrimonial life between spouses could not be given status of "downer"/Additional dower.

Syed Riaz-ul-Hassan Gilani for Appellant.

Syed Muhammad Ali Gillani for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Lahore 45

Before Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J

KHAWAR PERVAIZ BUTT---Appellant

Versus

MUHAMMAD TAHIR QASIM AWAN---Respondent

R.F.A. No.555 of 2009, heard on 23rd February, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XXXVII, Rr. 2 & 3---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.17(2)(a)---Stamp Act (II of 1899), Ss. 12(2) & 36---Institution of summary suit on the basis of promissory note---Promissory note not attested by two witnesses---Words "unless otherwise provided in any other special law" contained in Art. 17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Scope---Adhesive stamps---Cancellation of---Purpose---Contentions of defendant was that his signature and thumb impression on promissory note were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation and promissory note was without consideration and same did not bear signatures of two attesting witnesses---Suit was decreed by the Trial Court---Validity---Defendant had admitted his signature and thumb impression on the promissory note---Promissory note or cheque was not required to be attested by two witnesses---Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was a general law and provisions of special law i.e. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were applicable to the present case---No legal compulsion existed that in all cases adhesive stamps should bear the signature of a party to the said document---Object of cancellation of adhesive stamps was that same might not be used again on any other document---Provisions of Stamp Act, 1899 were not intended to deny the vested rights of the parties and to punish the beneficiary of a promissory note merely on the technical grounds---Promissory note had been admitted in evidence without any objection on the part of defendant---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Munir Ahmad Kahloon v. Rana Muhammad Yousaf PLD 2003 Lah. 173; Muhammad Shafi v. Sheikh Riaz-ud-Din and another 2004 YLR 1669 and Muhammad Hanif v. Kissan Dost (Pvt.) Limited 2003 CLD 224 ref.

Mst. Sajida Abbas Zaidi v. Syed Arshad Ali Jafri 1990 CLC 1018; Mirza Arif Baig v. Mubarik Ali PLD 1992 Lah. 366; K.M. Muneer v. Mirza Rashid Ahmad PLD 1963 (W.P.) Kar. 905; Arjumand Azhar and others v. Salim Akhtar Khan and another 2004 YLR 2368; Asif Ali and 6 others v. Saeed Muhammad 2009 CLD 1301 and Malik Liaqat Ali v. Muhammad Sharif 2009 CLD 1313 distinguished.

Qazi Abdul Ali and others v. Khawaja Aftab Ahmad 2015 SCMR 284; Abdul Rauf v. Farooq Ahmed and another PLD 2007 Lah. 114; Sheikh Muhammad Shakeel v. Sheikh Hafiz Muhammad Aslam 2014 SCMR 1562; Mst. Sajida Abbas Zaidi v. Syed Arshad Ali Jafri' 1990 CLC 1018; Messrs United Bak Limited, Karachi v. Muhammad Ali Haji Kassim Ali 1987 CLC 2321; Hafizullah v. Haji Hussain Bakhksh 1990 CLC 603 and Habib Bank Ltd. v. Raza Sons and another PLD 1978 Kar. 425; Munir Ahmad Kahloon v. Rana Muhammad Yousaf PLD 2003 Lah. 173; Muhammad Ashiq and another v. Niaz Ahmad and another PLD 2004 Lah. 95 and Muhammad Shafi v. Sheikh Riaz-ud-Din and another 2004 YLR 1669 rel.

(b) Stamp Act (II of 1899)---

----Preamble---Stamp Act, 1899 was a revenue collecting law.

Mian Zafar Iqbal Kalanori for Appellant.

Malik Mushtaq Ahmad for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Lahore 59

Before Mazhar Iqbal Sidhu, J

ZAHEER AHMAD---Appellant

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.396-J of 2010, heard on 1st December, 2015.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 100---Self-defence, right of---Scope---Even in absence of a specific plea taken by accused for exercising his right of self-defence, court could infer and construe from the whole material provided in all reasonableness that case of self-defence was made out---Court could not be restrained to draw a conclusion independently, when both the parties had suppressed their respective part---Court had inquisitional jurisdiction to reach to truth---Exercising of right of self-defence, could not be measured by a golden scale, but, if a reasonable force was exercised/used by the aggressed genuinely to save his right when no other option was left with him; then he could not be declined its benefits by virtue of exceptions, contained in S.100, P.P.C.

Ahmad Khan v. Nazir Ahmad and others 1999 SCMR 803 ref.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 100---Qatl-i-amd---Right of private defence, qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Injury received by accused, was on his vital part of the body, "chest"---Accused had received two injuries; whereas, the deceased received solitary injury---Accused survived, whereas the deceased, died---Exercise of right of self-defence of accused, had been proved which was corroborative---Accused acted in exercise of his right of self-defence legitimately within the parameters of restrictions of law---Accused, in circumstances, had committed no offence---Prosecution having failed to prove its case against accused, conviction and sentence of accused, were set aside, and he was acquitted of the charge imputed against him---Accused being on bail, his surety stood discharged, in circumstances.

Ali Muhammad Zahid Bokhari, Defence Counsel at state expense.

Malik Riaz Khalid Awan for the Complainant.

Iftikhar ul Haq Ch., Addl. P.G. for the State.

P L D 2017 Lahore 68

Before Ayesha A. Malik, J

JDW SUGAR MILLS LTD. and others---Petitioners

Versus

PROVINCE OF PUNJAB and others---Respondents

Writ Petitions Nos.37, 35, 61, 76, 78 and 23145 of 2016, decided on 10th October, 2016.

(a) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963) ----

----Ss. 3, 4 & 11---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Government of Punjab Notifications No. AEA-III-3-5/2011 (Vol-III) dated 04.12.2015 and No.AEA-III- 3-3/03 (VOL-III) dated 6.12.2006; (issued under S.11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963)---Object, scope and interpretation of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963---Restrictions on establishment/enlargement of industrial undertakings---Exemptions---Public interest considerations---Relocation of existing sugar mills to a new location---Nexus between ban on establishment of new sugar mills and relocation of existing sugar mills---Considerations of relocation policy and scheme of the law were location-specific and not production-capacity specific---Judicial review of Government policy---Judicial estoppel---Scope---Petitioners, which were operating various sugar mills, impugned issuance of Notification No.AEA-III-3-5/2011 (Vol-III) dated 04.12.2015 ("impugned notification") whereby existing sugar mills were allowed to relocate within the Province---Contention of the petitioners, inter alia, was that under the garb of shifting/relocating of an existing sugar mill, respondents were in fact establishing new sugar mills despite the ban imposed on establishment of new sugar mills under S. 3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 read with Notification No. AEA-III- 3-3/03 (VOL-III) dated 06.12.2006---Validity---Question to be determined was whether relocation of sugar mills fell within ambit of establishment of new sugar mills as provided under Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, read with the ban imposed by notification dated 06.12.2006---Impugned notification reiterated the ban imposed by the earlier notification dated 06.12.2006, meaning thereby that the ban on establishment or enlargement of new sugar mills continued by way of policy of the Government and bare reading of clauses of the impugned notification revealed that relocation must be considered in context of the ban on establishment of new sugar mills as well as public interest---Impugned notification therefore, created a direct nexus between relocation of a sugar mill and establishment of a new sugar mill---Relocation of a functional sugar mill meant that the mill would close its operations in one area and relocate to another area and in the present case, relocation was without increasing the production capacity of sugar mills, so essentially relocating the sugar mill meant moving from one location to another, based on the licensed production capacity of the sugar mill---Key element for the purposes of relocation was the location to which the functional sugar mill would shift to and for the purposes of the new location, the sugar mill will establish itself in that area as a new sugar mill in the local area---Establishment and relocation of sugar mills, were correlated when seen in the context of the ban and public interest, as the key element for both was the location of the sugar mill and hence, relocation of a sugar mill was the establishment of a new sugar mill in the local area, and provisions of Ss.3 to 12 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 were therefore applicable to it and thus "relocation" fell within the ambit of establishment of a new sugar mill---Establishment of a new sugar mill was not to be justified simply on basis of production capacity but was also to be seen in the context of its location and factors relevant to the local area, and there could be no relocation of a functional sugar mill without due consideration of the new location---Argument that "relocation" was different from establishment of a new sugar mill was without merit, as factors considered at time of grant of permission for establishment or relocation of a sugar mill would have to be identical since both were location-specific---Objective of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 and notifications issued thereunder; was to control the location where the sugar mill was to carry out its business and to protect national interest---Impugned notification failed to set out the guidelines on the basis of which an application for relocation should be considered and did not provide for any of the conditions or factors on the basis of which a recommendation could be made---Basic objective of the policy which was to make relocation subject to the ban on establishment of new sugar mills and public interest was therefore not achieved in the impugned notification and could not be given effect to---Purpose of the various notifications issued under S.11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 from time to time, evidenced the need to protect the national interest, that was cotton growing areas, and all such notifications had been location-specific, and intended to control the location of the sugar mill, therefore the contention that production capacity was the key factor controlling relocation was against the record and public interest---Record further revealed that the Provincial Government has in the past, held the view that relocation and establishment were synonymous and that relocation effectively meant to establish at a new location---Contention that relocation policy was necessary to protect the capital investment of the owners of sugar mills and to respond to change in market conditions was not tenable as said reasons did not justify making relocation a way to shift into cotton growing areas because the policy of imposing the ban on new sugar mills meant that national interest overrode the capital investment requirements of any sugar mill and the need to respond to market conditions---Section 3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 mandated that individual requirements had to be weighed against national interest, general health of the people and causes of nuisance in the local area and notifications issued under S.11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 especially notification dated 6.12.2006 meant that a sugar mill could not establish in a cotton growing area, therefore while the long standing policy of the ban prevented setting up mills in cotton growing areas, the relocation policy created a way to defy the ban and thus impugned notification did not benefit the public interest nor did it protect the national interest but on the contrary facilitated sugar mills to bypass the requirements of S.3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963---Provincial Government had also taken a contradictory stance on the matter in the present case, than the one taken by it before the Supreme Court, to which the doctrine of judicial estoppel was applicable and as such the position taken before the Supreme Court, wherein the Provincial Government supported the ban on establishing of new sugar mills---High Court observed that the decision making process in the present case, leading to the issuance of the impugned notification, was not initiated in the national or public interest and the process was initiated to protect certain business interests at the expense of public interest---High Court directed that the respondent sugar mills be restrained from carrying out the business in the relocated premises, and that show-cause notices be issued to the same for establishment of new sugar mills without seeking permission from the competent authority under the law---High Court further struck down the Provincial government's policy to the extent of the "relocation"---Constitutional petitions were allowed, accordingly.

Civil Appeals Nos.1242 to 1245 of 2013; Engineer Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2013 SC 224; Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455; Muhammad Aslam v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary Industries Department and another PLD 2013 Lah. 528; Madina Sugar Mills v. Secretary, Ministry of Industries and others PLD 2001 Lah. 506; Messrs Al-Raham Travels and Tours (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Hajj, Zakat and Ushr through Secretary and others 2011 SCMR 1621; Asaf Fasihuddin Khan Vardag v Government of Pakistan and others 2014 SCMR 676; Dossani Travels Pvt. Ltd. and 4 others v. Messrs Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2013 SCMR 1749; Arkison v. Ethan Allen 160 Wn.2d 535 (Wash.2007); New Hampshire v. Maine 532 U.S.742 (2001); Habiba Kassam and others v. Habib Bank Ltd. 1989 CLC 1433; Sheikh Gulzar Ali & Co. Ltd. and others v. Special Judge, Special Court of Banking and another 1991 SCMR 590; Noor Muhammad, Lambardar v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others 2003 SCMR 708; Overseas Pakistanis Foundation and others v. Sqn. Ldr. (Retd.) Syed Mukhtar Ali Shah and another 2007 SCMR 569; Amrital N. Shah v. Alla Annapurnamma (Andhra Pradesh) 1959 AIR (A.P) 9:1958(2) An.WR 447:1958 ALT 584:1958 ILR (Andhra Pradesh) 509; Cornell Law Review, Volume 89 Issue 1 November, 2003, Article 3, titled Judicial Estoppel and Inconsistent Positions of Law Applied to Fact and Pure law by Kira A. Davis and Pir Imran Sajid and others v. Managing Director/General Manager (Manager Finance) Telephone Industries of Pakistan and others 2015 SCMR 1257 rel.

(b) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (IV of 1963)---

----Ss. 7 & 11---Constitution of Pakistan Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Efficacious alternate remedy---Scope---Maintainability of Constitutional petition in presence of alternate remedy under S. 7 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963---Petitioners impugned notification issued under S.11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, granting permission for sugar mills to relocate---Question before the High Court was "whether the Constitutional petition was maintainable in presence of availability of alternate remedy of revision and appeal under S.7 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963"---Held, that petitioners had challenged Government policy on relocation of functional sugar mills and had also challenged intent behind issuance of such policy on the ground that same was mala fide and intended to benefit the respondent sugar mills---Under such circumstances, any remedy before a government functionary in the form of an appeal or revision would not be proper and efficacious as a government functionary could not deliberate on the vires of the impugned policy nor was it likely that such government functionary would comment on the allegations of collusion and mala fide intent---Availing of alternate remedy under the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 would therefore be an exercise in futility since a government functionary was not likely to take a decision contrary to government policy---Constitutional petition was held to be maintainable, in circumstances.

Civil Appeals Nos.1242 to 1245 of 2013 rel.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Judicial Review of administrative action---Public interest and national interest---Exercise of executive authority---Judicial review of Government policy---Scope---Where Government policy was stated to be against public and national interest, High Court could look into the reasonableness of such policy and review the manner in which the executive exercised its powers to ensure that the rights of citizens were protected---Power of judicial review could also be exercised to ensure that the decision making process was reasonable and not arbitrary or tainted with mala fide---Government notification or policy was not immune from challenge if it was demonstrated that such notification was issued for reasons against public or national interest---While exercising its Constitutional jurisdiction, High Court could look into the reasons for issuance of a policy where there were serious allegations of flouting transparency and good governance---Government could exercise its executive authority and formulate policies necessary for governance and Courts generally did not interfere in such policy matters, however, where there were elements of abuse of power, arbitrariness and violation of the process, High Court could look into the legality of the policy.

Engineer Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2013 SC 224; Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455; Messrs Al-Raham Travels and Tours (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Ministry of Religious Affairs, Hajj, Zakat and Ushr through Secretary and others 2011 SCMR 1621; Asaf Fasihuddin Khan Vardag v. Government of Pakistan and others 2014 SCMR 676 and Pir Imran Sajid and others v. Managing Director/General Manager (Manager Finance) Telephone Industries of Pakistan and others 2015 SCMR 1257 rel.

(d) Judicial estoppel, doctrine of---

----Integrity of the judicial process---Nature of, and rationale for the principle of judicial estoppel---Estoppel by inconsistent positions taken before judicial forums---Approbate and reprobate---Application of judicial estoppel---Scope---Fundamental duty of court to protect the integrity of the judicial process and a party could not approbate and reprobate at the same time---When a party took an inconsistent position in the same case or in a prior case, the principle of judicial estoppel should be applied---Judicial estoppel was an equitable doctrine, which precluded a party from taking inconsistent positions before the court and protected the integrity of the judicial system and not of the litigant---Principle of judicial estoppel sought to ensure respect for judicial proceedings and to avoid inconsistency and abuse of process---Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, court could stop a party from taking up contradictory stances if it was clearly inconsistent with the previous position taken by that party before another Court---Application of judicial estoppel depended upon the facts and circumstances of each case and when a party put forth a position, as a matter of fact in one case and was successful in such an assertion, then that party was estopped from asserting a different position on the same facts in a second case---Party, who was to be estopped in the second case had to be the same party in the earlier case meaning thereby the party is the same in both cases---Issue for which the party was estopped from asserting its facts must have had some nexus in both proceedings and it was imperative that such equitable principle be applied so that a judicial process functions properly and effectively---Litigants must approach the Court in a truthful manner especially if the litigant party was the government---Party could always vigorously assert its position, but could not misrepresent the facts in order to gain some advantage in the process---When a party had formally asserted a certain version of the facts in litigation, he or she could not later change those facts because the initial version no longer suits him or her---For application of the principle of judicial estoppel, the Court must ascertain that a party had asserted a contradictory position before another Court which position was accepted by that Court---Party's later position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position, and the courts should inquire whether the party had succeeded in persuading a court to accept its earlier position and it had to be determined whether the party seeking to assert the inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped---Party's change in its factual or legal position threatened to produce inconsistent decisions by the courts and therefore, the doctrine of judicial estoppel was necessary to protect the integrity of the court from the harm caused when a litigant engaged in cynical gamesmanship, achieving success on one position yet arguing a different position in another case to satisfy an exigency of the moment---Allowing a litigant to adopt contradictory positions in different courts would mean that one court was misled or perhaps defrauded.

Arkison v. Ethan Allen 160 Wn.2d 535 (Wash.2007); New Hampshire v. Maine 532 U.S.742 (2001); Habiba Kassam and others v. Habib Bank Ltd. 1989 CLC 1433; Sheikh Gulzar Ali & Co. Ltd. and others v. Special Judge, Special Court of Banking and another 1991 SCMR 590; Noor Muhammad, Lambardar v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and others 2003 SCMR 708; Overseas Pakistanis Foundation and others v. Sqn. Ldr. (Retd.) Syed Mukhtar Ali Shah and another 2007 SCMR 569; Amrital N. Shah v. Alla Annapurnamma (Andhra Pradesh) 1959 AIR (A.P) 9:1958(2) An.WR 447:1958 ALT 584:1958 ILR (Andhra Pradesh) 509; Cornell Law Review, Volume 89 Issue 1 November, 2003, Article 3, titled Judicial Estoppel and Inconsistent Positions of Law Applied to Fact and Pure law by Kira A. Davis rel.

(e) Public functionary---

----Functions of---Public officials to act as trustees of public funds and public property---Decisions/actions of public functionaries to be transparent, reasonable and free from abuse of public office and from personal advantage---Conflict of interest arising from private interests of public officials---Fairness in the decision-making process of public functionaries---Scope---Public officers were trustees of public funds and public property and were expected to take decisions based on public interest---Transparent and reasonable decision must be free from abuse of public office and from personal advantage---Where there existed a conflict of interest between private interest and public duty; the same must be clearly identified, appropriately managed and effectively resolved in order to ensure public confidence in public institutions---Conflict of interest would arise where an official decision will impact a personal interest, financially or otherwise such that a public official was seen to have gained from that decision or was perceived to have gained from such a decision---Where there existed a conflict between a public official's interest as a private citizen and his duty as a public official, there was potential for a conflict of interest to arise---Jurisprudence on conflict of interest aimed to ensure that private interest would not prosper from decisions taken in public office, while carrying out official duties and responsibilities---Mandate of any elected government was based on trust and public confidence and both such elements found its tools in transparency, good governance and fairness in the decision making process---Any conflict of interest, in fact or perceived, would destroy public trust and malign the decisions making process.

Pir Imran Sajid and others v. Managing Director/General Manager (Manager Finance) Telephone Industries of Pakistan and others 2015 SCMR 1257 rel.

Aitzaz Ahsan and Shahid Saeed for Petitioners (in W.P. No.37.2016).

Shehzad A. Elahi for Petitioner (in W.P.No.35 of 2016).

Syed Ali Zafar for Petitioner (in W.P. No.61 of 2016).

Jawad Hassan, Taimur Akhtar, Umair Saleem, Haider Zaman Qureshi, Rana Muhammad Asif and Ali Usman for Petitioner (in W.P. No.78 of 2016).

Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Barrister Shehryar Kasuri and Muhammad Hamza for Petitioners (in W.P. No.76 of 2016).

Syed Ali Zafar, Shehzad A. Elahi and Mubashar Aslam Zar for Petitioners (in W.P. No.23145 of 2016).

Muhammad Akhtar Shabbir, DAG along with Muqtedir Akhtar Shabbir and Mian Umar Hayat for Respondent.

Ch. Sultan Mahmood, A.A.G. along with Asif Mushtaq Ahmad, Senior Law Officer, Industries Department, Muhammad Bakhsh SO, Food Department; Javed Iqbal, Law Officer; Agriculture Department, Nawaz Malik, Director Law on behalf of Secretary Environment Protection Department and Waqas Alam, Cane Commissioner, Punjab for Respondents.

Salman Akram Raja, Tariq Bashir, Malik Ahsan Mehmood and Usman Ali Bhoon, for Respondent No.9 (in W.Ps. Nos.35 of 2016, 37/2016, 76/2016) and for Respondent No.17 (in W.P. No.78/2016).

Ali Sibtain Fazli, Hasham Ahmad Khan and Abad-ur-Rehman, for Respondents Nos.10, 11 and 12 (in W.Ps. Nos. 35/2016, 37/2016, 76/2016 and for Respondents Nos. 18, 19, 20 (in W.P. No.78/2016) and for Respondents Nos. 9, 10, 11 (in W.P. No.61/2016 and for Respondent No.14 (in W.P. No.23145/2016).

P L D 2017 Lahore 103

Before Erum Sajad Gull, J

GHULAM YASIN---Petitioner

Versus

THE STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Miscellaneous No.25168-B of 2015, decided on 30th December, 2015.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 498/497 & 345(2-A)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302---Qatl-i-amd---Bail before arrest, refusal of---Compounding of offences---Honour killing---Compromise in cases of honour killing---Permissibility---Mere fact, that the legal heirs of the deceased had pardoned the accused, was not sufficient to entitle him to the grant of bail, as the offence alleged against him was against the State as well as against the society---High Court observed that 'honour killing' was prevailing in the society and every day innocent people were being murdered in cold blood---Section 345(2-A), Cr.P.C. provided that in case of 'honour killing', compromise could be allowed only subject to certain conditions, and approval of the Trial Court was also mandatory in that regard---Applicability of S.302(c), P.P.C. had been excluded in cases of qatl-i-amd committed in the name or on the pretext of honour which fell within the ambit of S.302(a) & (b), P.P.C.---Accused failed to point any mala fide either on part of the complainant or the police to falsely implicate him---Recoveries were yet to be effected from the petitioner---Pirma facie the offence of murder was made out against the accused---Application for bail before arrest was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 498/497---Bail---Principles---Extraordinary judicial relief requires extraordinary circumstances, and the same is granted to protect innocent persons from humiliation and disgrace.

Sardar Muhammad Ramzan for Petitioner along with the Petitioner.

Ms. Ummul Baneen, Deputy District Public Prosecutor along with Javaid, S.I. with record for the State.

P L D 2017 Lahore 106

Before Muhammad Tariq Abbasi, J

HASSAN---Petitioner

Versus

THE STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Miscellaneous No.1888-M of 2015, decided on 16th February, 2016.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 31, 439(3), 439-A & 561-A---Enhancement of sentence of imprisonment and compensation by revisional court beyond sentencing powers of Trial Court---Scope---Trial court, convicting the accused of the charge under S. 377, P.P.C. sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for 3 years along with payment of compensation, but the revisional court enhanced the sentence of imprisonment to 10 years and also enhanced the compensation awarded by the Trial Court---Question before the High Court was whether under revisional jurisdiction, the sentence exceeding to the competency of Trial Court could be awarded---Under S. 439-A, Cr.P.C, Sessions Judge, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, would exercise the same powers and jurisdiction as provided under S. 439, Cr.P.C---Section 439, Cr.P.C provided that under revisional jurisdiction, a sentence greater than the competency of Trial Court could not be awarded---Assistant Sessions Judge was a judicial officer, who for all purposes, exercised powers which were vested in Magistrate of Section 30, which meant that the latter could rightly be termed as an Assistant Sessions Judge---Trial Court/Magistrate Section-30 was not competent to impose sentence to an accused beyond 7 years imprisonment; accordingly, as provided under S. 439 (3), Cr.P.C, the revisional court was not competent to enhance the sentence beyond the jurisdiction of the Trial Court---Enhancement of sentence to 10 years by the revisional court was therefore illegal ab initio and abuse of process of the court, which could be looked into under inherent powers of S. 561-A, Cr.P.C---High Court, setting aside the impugned order of the revisional court as to enhancement of the sentence of imprisonment, maintained the same regarding enhancement of compensation---Application under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C was partially allowed accordingly.

Mst. Sarwar Jan v. Ayub and another 1995 SCMR 1679 rel.

Shahid Nazir Jarra for Petitioner.

Dr. Muhammad Anwar Khan Gondal, Addl. Prosecutor-General for the State.

Javed Imran Ranjha for Respondent No.2.

P L D 2017 Lahore 111

Before Ayesha A. Malik, J

TEZ GAS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and others---Petitioners

Versus

OIL AND GAS REGULATORY AUTHORITY and others---Respondents

Writ Petitions Nos. 33661/2015, 31817/2013, 6569/2014, 1461 of 2016 9214/2011, 9693 of 2011 and 262 of 2016, decided on 23rd November, 2016.

(a) Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Production and Distribution) Rules, 2001 ---

----R. 18---Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Production and Distribution) Policy, 2013, Cl. 3.4---Tender notices for upliftment/sale of Liquefied Petroleum Gas ("LPG")---"Signature Bonus" charged by Oil and Gas Development Company Limited ("OGDCL") for awarding contract for lifting LPG from different gas fields---Nature and legality of 'Signature Bonus'---Whether Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority ("OGRA") could intervene to ensure that Signature Bonus was not charged---Whether Saudi Aramco Contract Price ("Aramco Price") was relevant for the purposes of fixing base stock price of LPG---The price of LPG was deregulated and determined by market forces in terms of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Production and Distribution) Policy, 2013---Neither the Government nor OGRA was required to fix the price of LPG---'Aramco Price' was no longer relevant for the purposes of fixing base stock price of LPG---'Signature Bonus' was not pegged or related to the price of LPG; it was a term and condition of the tender and did not increase the price of LPG---Licensees'/petitioners' participation in the tender process was based on their own free will, thus, payment of 'Signature Bonus' was neither compulsory nor mandatory for the licensees/petitioners---Object of calling for bids on 'Signature Bonus' was to provide equal opportunity to all prospective bidders and to receive the highest bid---Charging of 'Signature Bonus' by OGDCL did not tantamount to unjust enrichment or abuse of dominant position in the market---Charging of 'Signature Bonus' was neither illegal nor did it infringe any fundamental right of the licensees/petitioners---Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.

Petitioners were in the business of marketing Liquefied Petroleum Gas ("LPG") pursuant to licenses issued by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority ("OGRA"). Petitioners purchased LPG from LPG Producers, and sold it to consumers. Petitioners impugned Tender Notices for upliftment/sale of LPG from different gas fields on the basis that Oil and Gas Development Company Limited ("OGDCL") was charging a "Signature Bonus" payable by the successful company prior to signing of the sale/purchase agreement. Petitioners contended that Signature Bonus raised the price of LPG such that it exceeded the Saudi Aramco Contract Price ("Aramco Price") which was not permissible as per the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Production and Distribution) Policy, 2013, and that OGRA was not intervening for regulating the LPG price and ensuring that a premium over and above the price was not charged.

In terms of the clause 3.4 of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Production and Distribution) Policy, 2013, the price of LPG was determined by market forces. Said policy clarified that LPG price was deregulated and that neither the Government nor OGRA was required to fix the price of LPG.

'Aramco' Price was not relevant for the purposes of fixing base stock price of LPG because the price was fixed by market forces.

'Signature Bonus' was clearly a term of the tender. It was the price that the LPG licensees were required to pay for award of the contract and essentially qualified as a commercial deal between the parties. In order to participate in the bidding process for the uplifting of gas, the licensees had to tender their bid on the basis of 'Signature Bonus' and the highest bidder was to be awarded the contract accordingly. 'Signature Bonus' was a part of the terms and conditions of the tender process and the licensees' participation was based on their own free will, thus, it was neither compulsory nor mandatory for the licensees to pay the same. 'Signature Bonus', therefore, was not a component of the price but was the methodology adopted by OGDCL for the purposes of selection of the highest bidder and it was a one-time amount that had to be paid.

Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 (6) SCC 651 ref.

Prime object of calling for bids on 'Signature Bonus' was to provide equal opportunity to all prospective bidders and to receive the highest bid. The settlement of the terms and conditions was the discretion of the LPG producers in awarding the contract for uplifting of gas from different gas fields. The fact that OGDCL charged 'Signature Bonus' did not tantamount to unjust enrichment or abuse of its dominant position in the market. It is a commercial deal between the parties and there was no restriction on OGDCL in putting forward terms and conditions that in its opinion represented the best commercial deal.

Licensees did not have any fundamental right or vested right to insist that the Government must offer a particular tender on more favourable terms and conditions or that it should adopt a particular method for selection and not follow the given method. Licensees must either accept or reject the terms offered but could not require it to be changed through the present constitutional petitions. Charging of Signature Bonus was therefore neither illegal nor did it infringe any fundamental right of the licensees. Constitutional petition was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Tender ---

----Acceptance of tender and award of contract---Scope---Terms and conditions of tender set by the Government---Judicial scrutiny---Scope---High Court did not sit as a court of appeal in relation to the terms and conditions of tender but merely reviewed the manner in which the decision was made---Terms of the invitation to tender could not be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender was in the realm of a contract---Normally, decision to accept the tender or award the contract was reached through a process of negotiation and deliberations through several tiers---More often than not, such decisions were made qualitatively by experts and the government was free to settle the terms of the contract with the parties---In such cases, if the terms and conditions of the contract were not suited to a party, they need not participate in the tender process or accept the contract---State could fix its own terms of invitation to tender and those terms were generally not open to judicial scrutiny---Court could examine the decision making process and interfere if it was found tainted with mala fides or was arbitrary.

Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 (6) SCC 651 ref.

(c) Tender---

----Preconditions or qualifications---Permissibility---For tenders certain preconditions or qualifications could be laid down to ensure that the contractor had the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the works---Fair and transparent process was necessary to ensure that the contract was awarded to a credible party.

Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and others 2005 (1) SCC 679 ref.

Kh. A. Tariq Rahim and Muhammad Azhar Siddique for Petitioners.

Feisal Hussain Naqvi for Petitioners (in W.P.No.31817 of 2013).

Muhammad Ahmad Pansota for Petitioner (in W.P. 6569 of 2014).

M.N. Beg and Tariq Farooqi for Petitioner (in W.P.No.1461 of 2016).

Dr. A. Basit for Petitioner (in W.P.No.262 of 2016).

Salman Akram Raja for Petitioners (in W.Ps.Nos.9214/2011 and 9693/2011).

Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Muzammil Akhtar Shabbir and Muhammad Zikria Sheikh, DAGs.

Mustafa Ramday and Jehanzaib Inam for Respondent PPL (in W.P. No.33661/2015).

Ali Sibtain Fazli for Respondent PARCO (in W.P.No.33661/2015).

Tahir Ali Zahi and Asad Javed for Respondent PARCO (in W.P.No.33661/2015).

Haroon Dugal for Respondent OGRA.

Mehmood Azam Awan, Sardar Qasim Farooq and Muhammad Umar Qureshi for Respondent OGDCL along with Sajid Mehmood, Corporate Law Officer, OGDCL.

Asim Iqbal for Respondent SSGCL.

Kh. Saeed uz Zafar for Respondent Ministry of Petroleum, Islamabad.

Khaliq uz Zaman for Respondents Nos. 1-3 (in W.P.No.6569/2014).

P L D 2017 Lahore 124

Before Shams Mehmood Mirza, J

Messrs ALFALAH MEDICOS through Sole Proprietor and another---Petitioners

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Secretary, Primary and Secondary Healthcare and 4 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.10045 of 2016, heard on 6th May, 2016.

(a) Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act (XXI of 2012)--

----Ss. 32, 4 , 2(v) & Sched. 1---Drugs (Licensing, Registering and Advertising) Rules 1976, R. 29----Public Procurement ----Prequalification---Procurement of medicines/ drugs----Bio-similarity/bio-equivalence of drugs---"Guidelines On Evaluation of Similar Bio-therapeutic Products (SBP's) Standards" issued by the World Health Organization (WHO)----Nexus of WHO Guidelines and the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012---Petitioners, who were drug manufacturers and distributors, impugned the rejection of their prequalification bids, on a tender for procurement of a drug issued by the Provincial Government---Petitioners were deemed not prequalified due to the fact that certain clauses of the pre-qualification document, required bio-equivalence/bio-similarity studies according to the prescribed guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO), which the petitioners could not provide---Question before the High Court was whether the terms and conditions of said clauses of the bidding document stifled free competition and the terms of Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012---Held, Regulatory authorities all over the world had outlined robust data requirements to demonstrate bio-similarity of drugs and bio-similar manufacturers would need to generate data from lab-testing, and non-clinical testing to show that the bio-similar drug they had developed would provide the same therapeutic benefits and risks to patients as the reference bio-therapeutic product---Petitioners, in the present case, were required to conduct bio-similarity study along the WHO Guidelines---Perusal of the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 revealed that the same had adopted standards/protocols prescribed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in its guidelines for licensing of bio-similar drugs and after its promulgation, all applications for seeking authorization for manufacturing and marketing of bio-similar drugs, were required to be done on basis of said WHO Guidelines , and thus said guidelines had a statutory force---Stringent regulatory framework had been provided by the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012, by adopting the WHO Guidelines, to ensure the health and safety of the public and the petitioners had not obtained the requisite certificate from the prescribed laboratories---Provincial Government, in the present case, was within its rights to demand and lay down the conditions in the tender for bio-similarity studies which were consistent with and conformed to the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012 and the larger public interest outweighed the narrow commercial interest of the petitioners---Inclusion of impugned clauses in the pre-qualification document, therefore, did not offend the Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan Act, 2012---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust Lahore and another PLD 1969 SC 223 and Messrs S. M. Ilyas and Sons Ltd. v. Monopoly Control Authority, Islamabad and others PLD 1976 Lah. 834 distinguished.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Public policy---Judicial review---High Court, in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction, was only concerned with the process of the decision for which judicial review was sought and not the merits of the decision---Ordinarily, the High Court was reluctant to interfere in, or judicially review, decisions related to Government policy initiatives as the same was neither the duty of the High Court nor was it desirable for it to pass a decision on the fairness of a particular policy or the decision(s) taken in fulfilment of that policy, however the same did not apply to cases where the impugned decision was based on irrelevant considerations or was arbitrary, whimsical or illegal.

Imran M. Sarwar for Petitioner No.1.

Faisal Naqvi for Petitioner No.2.

Haider Ali Khan for Respondents.

Mrs. Samia Khalid, Assistant Advocate General.

P L D 2017 Lahore 144

Before Ibad-ur-Rehman Lodhi, J

Mst. WAZIRAN MAI through Special Attorney and another---Petitioners

Versus

ALLAH WASAYA and 3 others---Respondents

Civil Revision No.810 of 2013, decided on 30th March, 2016.

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XLI, R. 27---Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court---Scope---Additional evidence was produced in the Appellate Court according to order passed in revision petition but Appellate Court refused to allow the opposite party to produce rebuttal of said evidence holding that same was not allowed in the revision petition---Validity---Procedure prescribed for recording of evidence was based on common sense---Plaintiff while examining his evidence in affirmative had no idea as to by which evidence defendant would rebut his evidence whereas defendant while leading his evidence knew what evidence had been led by the plaintiff and by which evidence he had to rebut the same---Defendant should be permitted to lead evidence with regard to whole case which right had also been given to the plaintiff by way of rebuttal---When additional evidence was led, opposite party was to be permitted to rebut same---Leading evidence in rebuttal was also a part of plaintiff's evidence---Impugned order passed by the Appellate Court was set aside and opportunity to lead rebuttal evidence was granted---Revision was allowed in circumstances.

Harichand and others v. Mst. Bachan Kaur and others AIR 1971 Punjab and Haryana 355; The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore v. H. Narayanaiah and others AIR 1976 SC 2403; Avtar Singh and another v. Baldev Singh and others 2015(1) CivCC 728 and (1) The Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan, Communication and Works Department and (2) The Advisor, Town Planning v. Gulzar Muhammad PLD 1969 SC 60 rel.

Ch. Liaqat Ali for Petitioners.

P L D 2017 Lahore 147

Before Faisal Zaman Khan, J

Mir ABDUL RAZZAQ---Appellant

Versus

D.C.O., GUJRAT---Respondent

Press Civil Appeal No.651 of 2016, heard on 21st June, 2016.

Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance (XCVIII of 2002)---

----Ss. 19, 2(m) & 20---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.25---Publication of a news item by newspaper qua an incident involving desecration of Holy Quran---Cancellation of declaration of newspaper---Jurisdiction---District Coordination Officer issued show cause notice and after reply cancelled the declaration issued in favour of appellant---Validity---District Coordination Officer could take the cognizance of the issue on the application of Press Registrar involving violation of S.19 of Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration Ordinance, 2002 and thereupon after inquiry and affording an opportunity of hearing could cancel the declaration---Matter was not referred by the Press Registrar to the District Coordination Officer---District Coordination Officer on his own motion and without any referral from the Press Registrar took up the matter and cancelled the declaration---District Coordination Officer had no authority to take up the matter himself and cancel the declaration of the appellant---Impugned order was without lawful authority and coram non judice---Exercise by the District Coordination Officer was hit by Art.25 of the Constitution as another newspaper which committed same offence was not proceeded against---Criminal case had been registered in furtherance of the offence and trial had commenced---News item was not without any basis---Impugned order being without lawful authority and coram non judice was set aside---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Qaisar Nadeem Saqi v. District Coordination Officer (DCO) Hafizabad and 8 others PLD 2006 Lah. 76; Muhammad Idrees AASI v. District Coordination Oficer, Faisalabad and 2 others 2009 CLC 1163 and Abdul Samad Khan v. Assistant Commissioner (SECTT) IC, Islamabad and another PLD 2013 Isl. 71 rel.

Muhammad Irfan Malik for Appellant.

Faisal M. Buttar, A.A.G. along with Ikram ul Haq D.O. (Industries), Gujrat for Respondents.'

P L D 2017 Lahore 153

Before Mirza Viqas Rauf, J

Mst. HIFSA NASEER---Petitioner

Versus

A.D.J. GUJAR KHAN and 3 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.3149 of 2014, decided on 30th June, 2016.

(a) Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890)---

----Ss. 17 & 25---Custody of minor---Welfare of minor---Scope---Paternal grand-mother of minor moved application for custody of minor daughter which was accepted concurrently---Mother of minor daughter was disentitled from the custody due to her second marriage---Validity---Paramount consideration in the matter with regard to custody of minor was the welfare of minor---Mother of a child had natural love and affection for her children having no substitute---Daughter required company and association of her mother for preparing her to shoulder responsibilities in future---Mother would lose her preferential right of custody in case she married a person not related to the child within the prohibited degree but this was not an absolute rule---Welfare of minor would play pivotal role in deciding the question of custody of minor albeit mother had contracted second marriage---Father was not willing to obtain the custody of minor---Custody of minor in presence of real mother could never be handed over to the paternal grand-mother---Second marriage of mother or father could not be sole fact to decide the fate of custody of minor rather it was the welfare of minor which would prevail upon all other considerations---Both the courts below had disturbed the custody of minor on extraneous reasons---Courts below had mis-read the material piece of evidence---Impugned orders passed by the courts below were set aside by High Court being illegal and unlawful---Petition by the grand-mother was dismissed---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Shabana Naz v. Muhammad Saleem 2014 SCMR 343; Mehmood Akhtar v. District Judge, Attock and 2 others 2004 SCMR 1839 and Mst. Gulnaz Bibi v. Faraqat Ali Shah and another PLD 2000 Pesh. 23 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---High Court to curb any illegality or perversity in the proceedings of courts below floating on the surface of record while exercising constitutional jurisdiction.

Raja Farrukh Arif Bhatti for Petitioner.

Raja Muhammad Jawwad Arsalan for Respondent No.3.

Mehnaz Begum for Respondent No.4.

P L D 2017 Lahore 159

Before Muhammad Farrukh Irfan Khan, J

FAROOQ YOUSAF GHURKI---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.24409 of 2016, decided on 22nd July, 2016.

Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 78(3)(4), 82 & 94(1)---Corrupt practice---Cognizance of offence---Cancellation of election result--- Petitioner contested election for Member Provincial Assembly and was declared returned candidate---Election Commission declared B.A. degree of petitioner as forged, therefore, his election was declared void and criminal complaint against him was filed---Plea raised by petitioner was that tenure of Provincial Assembly of which petitioner was elected as a Member completed its term, therefore, Election Commission lacked jurisdiction to investigate allegations levelled against him---Validity---Election Commission did not lack jurisdiction as it had started action against petitioner in compliance with the directions of Supreme Court---When B.A. degree of petitioner was found bogus criminal proceedings were ordered to be initiated against him---No limitation existed for initiation of criminal proceedings against any accused of a cognizable offence---Election Commission, during thorough investigation, collected sufficient incriminating material/evidence to connect petitioner with commission of offence falling within the mischief of S.82 of Representation of the People Act, 1976---Action taken by Election Commission against petitioner was within the mandate given by Supreme Court---High Court did not find any legal or jurisdictional defect in the order calling for interference by High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Muhammad Rizwan Gill v Nadia Aziz and others PLD 2010 SC 828 and Muhammad Fiaz Khan v. Ajmer Khan and another 2010 SCMR 105 ref.

Ms. Shabina Riaz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2016 CLC 458 distinguished.

P L D 2017 Lahore 164

Before Shahid Karim, J

Dr. AURANGZEB ALAMGIR and others---Petitioners

Versus

PROVINCE OF PUNJAB and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.37411 of 2015, decided on 1st December, 2016.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Fourth Sched.---Items/Entries appearing in the Federal Legislative list---Interpretation and scope---While interpreting Entries or Items in the Federal Legislative List, the same were to be interpreted in the broadest possible sense and should not be given any restrictive, narrow or pedantic meaning---Entries in the Federal Legislative List were broad areas defining the subjects of legislation to be done and must be interpreted liberally.

ICC Textile Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2001 PTD 1557 ref.

(b) Higher Education Commission Ordinance (LIII of 2002)---

----Ss. 10(1)(q) & 21---Punjab Higher Education Commission Act, 2014 (I of 2015), S. 10---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched. Part II, Item No.12---Government of Punjab, Higher Education Department Notification No.>SO(Univ.) 5-3/09, dated 7th April, 2015---Public sector universities---Vice Chancellors---Appointment criteria---Provincial Higher Education Department issued a notification setting out the criteria for appointment to post of Vice Chancellors for public sector universities---Constitutionality and legality---In view of Entry 12 of Part II of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, the power to determine standards in institutions of higher education and research, scientific and technical institutions laid with the Parliament to the exclusion of the Provincial Assemblies---Such power to determine standards was all-encompassing and included the laying down of eligibility criteria for appointment of Vice Chancellors in public sector universities---Provinces could not be allowed to read anything into the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 so as to carve out for themselves the power to prescribe criteria for appointment of Vice Chancellors of public sector universities---Notification whereby Provincial Higher Education Department laid down the qualification, experience and other criteria for the post of Vice Chancellors of public sector universities was an action extra juris and was accordingly struck down---High Court directed that the Higher Education Commission should lay down criteria for appointment of Vice Chancellors to public sector universities by specifying concrete and clear terms of the said criteria, and that the Provincial Government should initiate a fresh process for appointment of Vice Chancellors---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Entry No.12 of Part II of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution dealt with "standards in institutions for higher education and research, scientific and technical institutions". Said Entry had to be construed as encompassing all that could conceivably be included in the words "standards in institution for higher education and research". Question as to what was comprised in the term "standards' was not to be lent a narrow and austere interpretation.

Gujarat University v. Krishna Ranga Nath Mudholkar AIR 1963 SC 703; State of T.N Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute (1995) 4 Supreme Court cases 104 and Osmania University Teachers Association v. State of A.P (1987) 4 Supreme Court cases 671 ref.

In view of Entry 12 of Part II of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, the power to determine standards in institutions of higher education and research, scientific and technical institutions laid with the Parliament to the exclusion of the Provincial Assemblies. This power to determine standards was all-encompassing and included the laying down of eligibility criteria for appointment of Vice Chancellors in the public sector universities.

Mere fact that the subject of education had devolved on the Provinces did not confer on the Provinces the power to legislate with regard to the standards in institution for higher education and research, which included the criteria regarding appointment of Vice Chancellors as it was a concomitant part of the whole process of determining standards.

Appointment of the Vice Chancellor was to be made by the Provinces but the criteria and the qualifications of the Vice Chancellors to be appointed was covered by the subject of Entry No.12 in Part II of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution and had to be laid down by the Higher Education Commission.

Hassan Aamer Shah v. Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary and 5 others 2012 PLC (C.S) 290 distinguished.

Shahid Mehboob Rana v. Province of Punjab through Secretary and 2 others 2010 PLC (S.C) 769 ref.

Criteria for appointment of a Vice Chancellor was an important plank of the standards of higher education as the post of a Vice Chancellor was of pivotal standing and was at the forefront of those standards. Vice Chancellor guided the way and his vision shaped the future of not only the academia but the students too and in turn of the nation as a whole. It was his leadership role that determined and ensured the sustenance of those standards.

Provinces could not be allowed to read anything into the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 so as to carve out for themselves the power to prescribe criteria for appointment of Vice Chancellors of public sector universities.

Power of legislating on all facets of standards of higher education resided in the Parliament and was delegated to Higher Education Commission by the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002. Prudence demanded that it should be exercised by the Higher Education Commission in order to instil the same standard in all public sector universities across the country, whether federal or provincial. This would help to attain the objects of federalism and harmony. Fixing of criteria of appointment of a Vice Chancellor was included in the standards of higher education.

Professor Yashpal and another v. State of Chhattisgarh and others (2005) 5 Supreme Court cases 420 ref.

Kalyani Mathivanan v. K.V. Jeyaraj (2015) 6 Supreme Court Cases 363 held to be erroneous, and not to be relied upon.

Notification whereby Provincial Higher Education Department laid down the qualification, experience and other criteria for the post of Vice Chancellors of public sector universities was an action extra juris and was accordingly struck down.

High Court directed that Higher Education Commission should lay down criteria for appointment of Vice Chancellors to public sector universities by specifying concrete and clear terms of the said criteria, preferably in terms of section 21 of the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002; that if the same was not possible, the eligibility criteria ought to be laid down under the current dispensation and the procedure prescribed by the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002; that the Higher Education Commission shall take care to issue the eligibility criteria as elaborately and extensively as possible by taking into account such criteria which was prevalent internationally and the standards which the universities all over the world were obliged to follow; that during the interregnum while the process for the appointment of the Vice Chancellors was being undertaken, the most senior professor in terms of length of service shall be appointed by the Provincial Government as Vice Chancellors for the public sector universities in respect of whom the appointments had to be made; that the same shall apply to the Universities in which the tenure of the Vice Chancellors had come to an end and the Vice Chancellors were continuing in office on an acting-charge basis under the directives of the Chancellor, and that the Provincial Government shall, after the criteria had been settled by the Higher Education Commission and search committees constituted, initiate fresh process for appointment of Vice Chancellors for the public sector universities. Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

(c) Higher Education Commission Ordinance (LIII of 2002)---

----S. 10(1)(q)---University of the Punjab Act (IX of 1973), Ss.14(2) & 14(4)---University of Engineering and Technology Act (V of 1974), Ss.13(2) & 13(4)---Bahauddin Zakariya University Act (III of 1975), Ss.14(2) & 14(4)---Islamiya University Bahawalpur Act (IV of 1975), Ss.14(2) & 14(4)---University of Engineering and Technology Ordinance (VII of 1994), Ss.12(2) & 12(4)---Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi Ordinance (VI of 1999), Ss.11(2) & 11(4)---Government College University, Lahore Ordinance (XLVIII of 2002), Ss.12(2) & 12(4)---Lahore College for Women University, Lahore, Ordinance (XLIX of 2002), Ss.12(2) & 12(4)---University of Education, Lahore Ordinance (L of 2002), Ss. 13(2) & 13(4)---Government College University, Faisalabad Ordinance (LXX of 2002), Ss. 12(2) & 12(4)---University of Sargodha Ordinance (LXXX of 2002), Ss.12(2) & 12(4)---University of Gujrat Act (IX of 2004), Ss.13(2) & 13(4)---Women University, Multan Act (XV of 2010), Ss.11(2) & 11(4)---Ghazi University, Dera Ghazi Khan Act (XXIX of 2012), Ss. 11(2) & 11(4)---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched. Part II, Item No.12---Public sector universities---Vice Chancellors---Appointment criteria---Power of Provincial Government to determine the qualifications, experience and other relevant requirements for the post of the Vice Chancellor for public sector universities---Constitutionality---Power to lay down eligibility criteria for appointment of Vice Chancellors in public sector universities laid with Higher Education Commission and not the Provincial Government---High Court accordingly held that subsection (2) of S.14 of the University of the Punjab Act, 1973 and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4) were unconstitutional and shall be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.13 of the University of Engineering and Technology Act, 1974 and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4), were unconstitutional and shall be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.14 of the Bahauddin Zakariya University Act, 1975, and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4), were unconstitutional and shall also be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.14 of the Islamiya University Bahawalpur Act, 1975, and the words "and criteria" in Subsection (4) were unconstitutional and shall also be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.12 of the University of Engineering and Technology Act, 1994, and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4) were unconstitutional and shall be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.11 of Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi Ordinance, 1999, and words "and criteria" in subsection (4) were unconstitutional and shall be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.12 of the Government College University, Lahore Ordinance, 2002, and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4) were unconstitutional and shall also be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.12 of the Lahore College for Women University, Lahore, Ordinance, 2002, and the words "and criteria" in sub-section (4), were unconstitutional and shall be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.13 of the University of Education, Lahore Ordinance, 2002, and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4), were unconstitutional and shall also be struck down; that subsections (2) of S.12 of the Government College University, Faisalabad Ordinance, 2002, and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4), were unconstitutional and shall be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.12 of the University of Sargodha Ordinance, 2002, and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4), were unconstitutional and shall be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.13 of the University of Gujrat Act, 2004, and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4), were unconstitutional and shall also be struck down; that subsection (2) of S.11 of the Women University, Multan Act, 2010, and the words "and criteria" in subsection (4), were unconstitutional and shall also be struck down, and that subsection (2) of S.11 of Ghazi University, Dera Ghazi Khan Act, 2011, and the words "and criteria" in sub-section (4) shall also be struck down---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Fourth Sched. Part II, Item No. 12---Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act (X of 2010), S. 101(2)(ii)---Legislative List---"Standards of education"---Federal and Provincial Legislatures, domain of---Scope---Post Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, standards of 'higher education' were under the domain of Parliament, whereas standards of education at secondary and intermediate level could be legislated upon by the Provincial Assemblies---Constitution intended that the standards in institution for higher education and research in all its ramifications should be legislated upon by the Parliament, while greater leeway had been given to the Provincial Assemblies on all aspects of education including curriculum, syllabus, planning with regard to the primary, secondary and intermediate education---Matters relating to the standards in institution for higher education, research, scientific and technical education had been left to the Parliament---Although, the formation of a university and the setting up of institutions of higher education was within the domain of the Provinces, it was within the powers of the Parliament to lay down standards for such higher education institutions.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Fourth Sched. Part II, Item No. 12---Constitution of India, Seventh Sched. List-I (Union List), Entry No. 66---Federal Legislative List---Subject of education---Similarity between Entry No.12 of Part II of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution of Pakistan, and, Entry No.66 of List-1 (Union List) of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1956 stated.

(f) Interpretation of Constitution ---

----Interpreting the text of the Constitution required attention to linguistic context and structural analysis.

American Constitution Law by Lawrence H. Tribe (Ch. 1: Approaches to Constitutional Analysis) and Intratextualism, by Akhil Reed Amar, 112 Harv. L. RW. 747 (1999) ref.

(g) Educational institution ---

----"University"---Definition, functions and attributes of a university stated.

Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition (Vol.15) and American Jurisprudence, 2d, 15A ref.

(h) Statute, vires of

----Provision in a statute which was unconstitutional, must be struck down and erased from the statute.

(i) Punjab Higher Education Commission Act 2014 (I of 2015) ---

----S. 10---Public sector universities---Vice Chancellors---Appointment process---Constitution of a Search Committee for the purposes of making recommendations for appointment of Vice Chancellors to all public sector universities---Legality and propriety---One Search Committee had been formed or constituted to undertake the search of a Vice Chancellor for all the public sector universities---Certain public sector universities specialized in their fields and dealt with a specific area of learning, thus, it was imperative that the expertise of the Committee members would differ for each different genre of universities---One Search Committee should not have been constituted to undertake the search of a Vice Chancellor for all the public sector universities---Legal requirement was that separate Search Committee should have been constituted for each public sector university under the relevant law for that university---Search Committee should conform to the requirements of the particular university and the nature of academic activity that that university was required to impart under its statute---While constituting a Search Committee the majority of the members ought to have no connection with the Government so as to keep the process free of taint and nepotism---Notification whereby a single Search Committee was constituted to undertake the search of a Vice Chancellor for all public sector universities was non est and unlawful and was, therefore, set aside---High Court directed that the Provincial Government should initiate a fresh process for appointment of Vice Chancellors for public sector universities---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

For Petitioners

Saad Rasool, Muhammad Azhar Siddique, Aftab Ahmad Bajwa, Hafiz Abdul Rehman Ansari, Malik Ghulam Abbas Nissuana Anum Azhar, Aitzaz Aslam Ch., Waqas Asghar Jathol, Tahir Ishaq Butt, S.Perveen Mughal, Munir Ahmad, Mian Shabbir Asmail, Irfan Mukhtar, Humayun Faiz Rasul and Safdar Shaheen Pirzada.

For Respondents

Shakil ur Rehman Khan, Advocate General, Punjab.

Muhammad Jamal ud Din Mamdot and Anwar Hussain, Ahmad Hassain Khan, A.A.Gs.

Mrs. Shama Zia, Addl. Secretary, HEC.

Ali Zafar Syed and Iftikhar Ahmad Mian for Respondent Dr.Mujahid Kamran.

Khurram Saeed and Malik Muhammad Awais Khalid for P.U.

Sajid Ijaz Hotiana for HEC.

Amir Sohail and Mian Abdul Shakoor for PHEC.

Aurangzeb Rashid, for Respondent No.8 (in W.P.No.32719 of 2016).

P L D 2017 Lahore 219

Before Shahid Bilal Hassan, J

JAMIA KHAIR UL MADARIS, AURANGZEB ROAD, MULTAN---Petitioner

Versus

MANZAR and 5 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.4299 of 2016, decided on 9th August, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. III, R. 4 & O.I, R.10 & Ss. 119 & 12(2)---High Court (Lahore) Rules and Order, Vol. I, Chap. 16, Part A and Vol. V, Chap. 6, Part B---Appointment of pleader by client---Requirements---Power-of-attorney---Necessity---Application for impleadment of a party was filed without any power-of-attorney or authorization which was accepted---Validity---Counsel should have a duly executed power of attorney in his favour so as to represent any litigant before any legal forum---Unauthorized person could not address a court---No counsel could represent a client or litigant unless and until he was authorized by execution of power-of-attorney---Neither memorandum of appearance nor power-of-attorney was submitted at the time of filing of application for impleadment of a party in the present case---Such practice could not be endorsed or permitted to carry the day merely on the assumption and presumption that it was an irregularity and curable---No exertion had been made by the applicant to file power-of-attorney or to appear before the court in person or through a special attorney or general attorney for making his better statement in order to rectify the acts done by his counsel retrospectively---Appointment of pleader should be in writing and duly signed by persons(s) who appointed the pleader and such instrument must be before the court---When pleader who filed an application under O.I, R.10, C.P.C. was neither authorized through a written instrument i.e. power-of-attorney nor he filed any memorandum of appearance with the undertaking of production of power-of-attorney, said application was not entertainable and was incompetent to proceed on---Impugned orders had been passed beyond jurisdiction which could not be allowed to remain in field---Revisional Court had committed illegality by not applying the correct law---Impugned order passed by the courts below were set aside and application for impleadment of a party was dismissed---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Khayam Films and another v. Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. 1982 CLC 1275; Said Muhammad and others v. M. Sardar and others PLD 1989 SC 532; Mst. Sardar Begum v. Muhammad Anwar Shah and others 1993 SCMR 363; Messrs Adamjee Construction Company Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Government of Punjab through Director-General, Punjab Sports Board, National Hockey Stadium, Lahore 1999 MLD 2202; and Fazal-Ur-Rehman and 2 others v. Begun Sughra Haque 2000 MLD 562 distinguished.

Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government v. Habibullah Lone PLD 1984 SC (AJ&K) 13; Abdul Hameed Khan v. Mrs. Saeeda Khalid Kamal Khan and others PLD 2004 Kar. 17; Muhammad Ali and 21 others v. Abdul Jalil 2015 CLC 1315; Qamar-ud-Din v. Muhammad Din and others PLD 2001 SC 518; Muhammad Ashraf Butt and others v. Muhammad Asif Bhatti and others PLD 2011 SC 905; Muhammad Anwar and others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum and others PLD 2013 SC 255 and Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others PLD 1987 SC 447 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---When basic order passed by the courts below was illegal, same could be interfered with while exercising constitutional jurisdiction.

Mian Habib ur Rehman Ansari and Mirza Muhammad Kaleem for Petitioner.

Saghir Ahmad Bhatti for Respondent No.6.

P L D 2017 Lahore 228

Before Shahid Hameed Dar, J

ALI RAZA---Petitioner

Versus

ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, SHEIKHUPURA and 2 others---Respondents

Criminal Revision No.1714 of 2016, heard on 18th November, 2016.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 161 & 172---Statement made by complainant before the investigating officer---Right of accused to obtain copy of such statement---Scope----Statements of all persons examined by the police in connection with the case were to be supplied irrespective of the fact, whether they had or had not been cited by the prosecution as witnesses, and it was immaterial whether the investigating officer did or did not choose to say that he was recording the statements under S.161 Cr.P.C.---Accused could not be deprived of the right of having access to statements made by witnesses before the police on the hyper-technicality that the investigating officer did not describe them as statements under S.161 Cr.P.C,---All statements made before the police, whether recorded under S.161 Cr.P.C. or not, should be supplied to the accused before the trial---Accused must have access to every statement recorded by the investigating officer, either under S.161 Cr.P.C. separately or having embodied it in a case-diary prepared under S.172 Cr.P.C.

Ch. Muhammad Ashraf Kamboh for Petitioner.

Rana Tassawar Ali Khan, Deputy Proscutor General Punjab for the State.

Tahir Shahzad Kamboh for Respondent No.2.

P L D 2017 Lahore 230

Before Shahid Karim, J

MURREE BREWERY COMPANY LIMITED through Chief Executive---Petitioner

Versus

PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Chief Secretary and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.24811 of 2015, decided on 27th June, 2016.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art.151---Constitution of the United States of America, Art.1, S.8---Inter-Provincial trade---Similarities and distinction between Art.151 of the Constitution of Pakistan and S. 8 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America. [pp. 247, 269] A & P

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 151---Inter-Provincial trade---Scope---Article 151 of the Constitution enjoined all Inter-Provincial trade and commerce to be free and resided all power to legislate, and thereby to regulate, in the Parliament lest the freedom to trade and carry out commerce be shackled by the Provinces in any manner---Article 151 of the Constitution gave expression to the important concept of Federalism---Said Article was repository of the powers that were to vest in the Federal Government with regard to trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the country---By virtue of Art.151(2) of the Constitution such power had come to reside in the Parliament which, by law, could impose such restrictions on the freedom of trace, commerce or intercourse between one Province and another or within any part of Pakistan as may be required in the public interest---Provincial legislature was not empowered to enact a law which imposed such a restriction and it was with this intention that Art.151(1) stated in emphatic terms that the trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the country shall be free.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 151---Inter-Provincial trade---Scope---Where there was commerce which concerned more Provinces than one, the power to regulate the same laid with the Parliament and a Province could not regulate such activity---Commercial activities which were completely within a province, were the only ones immune from federal power; the rest must yield in favour of federal commerce power.

Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed.23 (1824)

(d) Interpretation of the Constitution---

----Legislative history was a worthwhile aid to ascertain the intention behind an enactment and in particular a constitutional document.

(e) Punjab Excise Act (I of 1914) ---

----Ss. 31 & 32---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 151 & 199---Notification No.SO(E&M)/2-3/2011 dated 24.06.2015 issued by the Excise and Taxation Department, Government of the Punjab ("impugned notification")---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---'Still head duty', levy of---Levy of 'still head duty' had been extended by the impugned notification to Pakistan Made Foreign Liquor and Beer consumed outside the Province of Punjab---Petitioner-brewery was directly affected by the 'still head duty' as they contended that their liquor and beer was likely to become uncompetitive and, therefore, may not be purchased by the ultimate consumers outside the Province of Punjab to whom the duty was likely to be passed on---Constitutional petition filed by the petitioner-brewery challenging the impugned notification, whereby 'still head duty' was levied was held to be maintainable.

Messrs Nishat Talkies and another v. The Director/Collector, Excise and Taxation, Karachi and another PLD 1976 Kar. 712 and Province of Balochistan through Secretary Excise and Taxation Department, Quetta and 2 others v. Murree Brewery Company Ltd. through Secretary 2007 PTD 1195 distinguished.

(f) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 151---Inter-Provincial trade---Scope---Any law which imposed financial burdens on the trade or impeded the flow of trade and commerce (between Provinces) was violative of Art.151 of the Constitution.

Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Government of N.W.F.P PLD 2002 SC 460 rel.

(g) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 141---Extent of Federal and Provincial laws---Scope---Laws which had an extra-territorial or Inter-Provincial operation were beyond the competence of a Provincial Assembly and resided within the Parliament's remit.

(h) Punjab Excise Act (I of 1914) ---

----Ss. 31 & 32---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 141 & 151---Notification No.SO(E&M)/2-3/2011 dated 24.06.2015 issued by the Excise and Taxation Department, Government of the Punjab ("impugned notification")---Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse between different Provinces---Scope---'Still head duty' (excise duty), levy of---By way of impugned notification 'still head duty' was extended to Pakistan Made Foreign Liquor and Beer consumed outside the Province of Punjab---Legality---No prohibition on inter-provincial trade and commerce could be imposed by a levy which had the effect of taking away the freedom of movement envisaged by Art.151 of the Constitution---Constitution took away all powers from a Provincial Government to take any executive action which caused the prohibition or restriction on imports or exports---'Still-head duty' under challenge not only burdened the petitioner and commercially made them run out of competition but also impeded the flow of trade and commerce to their detriment and was tantamount to prohibition of the export from the Province of Punjab---'Still head duty' in question also ran counter to the doctrine of Federalism on which the Constitution was based---Impugned notification, whereby 'still head duty' was imposed was thus declared ultra vires and without lawful authority and was set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

By way of Notification No.SO(E&M)/2-3/2011 dated 24.06.2015 issued by the Excise and Taxation Department, Government of the Punjab, "still head duty" was extended to Pakistan Made Foreign Liquor and Beer consumed outside the Province of Punjab. Petitioner-brewery which manufactured liquor and beer within the province of Punjab contended that levy of "still head duty" tantamount to export duty on liquor and beer being manufactured by the petitioner and consumed outside the Province of Punjab, which had the effect of rendering the petitioner as uncompetitive in the markets of other provinces.

Fundamental factor which prompted the framers of the Constitution to enact clauses (1) and (2) of Article 151 of the Constitution was to prevent goods manufactured in one Province from being put at disadvantage by imposition of taxes so as to destroy the market for those goods in a particular Province. Entire crux of petitioner's challenge to the 'still head duty' was that their goods were put at a disadvantage by the imposition of the duty, which had the effect of virtually destroying the market of those goods in the other Provinces. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to obviate possibility of such a course of action to take place and to thwart any attempt by one Province to impose a tax or a duty without the regard for its consequences, then the 'still head duty' under challenge must be held to be ultra vires as it had precisely the same effect as was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution.

No prohibition on inter-provincial trade and commerce could be imposed by a levy which had the effect of taking away the freedom of movement envisaged by Article 151 of the Constitution. Any restriction which directly and immediately affected the flow of trade, commerce or intercourse, must be held to offend the provisions of Article 151.

Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited v. District Council, Tharparkar through Chairman and 3 others 1991 MLD 715 ref.

Laws which had an operation across the territory of a Province were beyond the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution and, in case they impacted freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse, they impinged upon the right guaranteed by Article 151.

Constitution took away all powers from a Provincial Assembly to make any law or a Provincial Government to take any executive action which caused the prohibition or restriction on imports or exports. There could not be a greater restriction than the imposition of a tax which placed a 'discriminatory burden' on certain goods. Such discrimination in the present case was accentuated by the fact that similar goods being imported by other Provinces were not subject to the same tax and were thus at a clear advantage with regard to the ultimate price at which they were sold in the market.

'Still-head duty' under challenge not only severally and fatally burdened the petitioner and financially and commercially made them run out of competition but also impeded the flow of trade and commerce to their detriment and was tantamount to prohibition of the export from the Province of Punjab.

Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Government of N.W.F.P PLD 2002 SC 460; Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Ltd. v. District Council, Tharparkar and 2 others 1990 MLD 317 and Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited v. District Council, Tharparkar through Chairman and 3 others 1991 MLD 715 ref.

'Still-head duty' was, in fact, an excise duty as per the Provincial Government's own showing and was not for the purposes of regulation or for providing services which in fact benefited the petitioner. Absent such element, the levy was a prohibition and restriction which directly and immediately affected the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse and must be held to be invalid.

Entire concept of Article 151 of the Constitution would be rendered nugatory and facile if the levy under challenge was allowed to stand. Levy in question also ran counter to the doctrine of Federalism on which the Constitution was based.

Progress of a country as a whole also required free flow of commerce and intercourse as between different parts, without any barrier so that the economic resources of the various parts may be exploited to the common advantage of the entire nation. This was particularly essential in a federal system.

Impugned notification trampled upon the mandate of Article 151(3)(a) of the Constitution and must be held to be void to such extent. Notification in question ran counter to the freedom of trade rule embodied in Article 151 of the Constitution and was thus declared ultra vires and without lawful authority and was set aside as a consequence.

Shahid Hamid and Mrs. Ayesha Hamid for Petitioners (in W.P. No.24811 of 2015).

Syed Irteza Ali Naqvi for Petitioner (in W.P.No.21927 of 2015).

Nasar Ahmad, D.A.G., Samia Khalid, A.A.G. for Respondents.

Rizwan Ahmad Sherwani, Director E&T.

Mian Abid Zia, Law Officer, E&T Deptt. Lahore

P L D 2017 Lahore 271

Before Ayesha A. Malik, J

ASIF NAZ---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.39823 of 2016, decided on 22nd December, 2016.

Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Petitioner impugned decision of the Administrative Committee of the High Court whereby he was debarred from sitting in a judicial examination---Validity---Propriety demanded that a decision of the Chief Justice of High Court or the Administrative Committee of judges, be challenged at a higher forum, which was the Supreme Court since invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court would affect the comity and concordance amongst Judges and upset their administrative working---All actions and orders taken by the High Court or order of any High Court Judge in exercise of functions and powers of his/her office, shall not be amendable to the constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Ch. Muhammad Akram v. Registrar Islamabad High Court PLD 2016 SC 961 distinguished.

P L D 2017 Lahore 273

Before Shams Mehmood Mirza, J

ABDULLAH MALIK---Petitioner

Versus

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION BROADCASTING and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.20552 of 2016, decided on 30th September, 2016.

(a) Motion Pictures Ordinance (XLIII of 1979)--

----Ss. 5 & 9(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 19---Feature film---Freedom of expression---Scope---Notification declaring the film to be an uncertified film---Legality---Satisfaction of the Ministry of Information that a movie and its content violated the "grund norms" mentioned in S.9(2)(a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 was a sine qua non for the decertifying the said movie---Ministry of Information, in the present case, however, failed to present a demonstrable case either that the decision to decertify the film was remised on valid reasons that met the satisfaction required by proviso to S.9 (2) (a) of the Ordinance or that the movie and its contents in fact offended the class of things mentioned therein---Film in question was at best a work of fiction; its plot and the characters portrayed therein may or may not have similarity and relevance to the real persons or situation in the country, but this was not a justification to place a ban on the screening of the film---Central Board of Film Censors ('Censor Board') at the time of initial screening of the film did not find anything objectionable in it and granted it the requisite certificate for public exhibition---Subsequently, the Chairman of the Censor Board simply recommended decertification of the film to the Ministry of Information which, without application of mind, acted upon the said recommendation---Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 did not allow decertification of a movie on the value judgment of the Government rather the case must fall within the limitations provided in the proviso to S.9(2) thereof---Notification and the reasons furnished for decertifying the said film had no nexus with the permissible limitations provided for in proviso to S.9(2) of the Ordinance on the freedom of expression---Said notification was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Film "Maalik" was granted a censorship certificate on 06.04.2016 on the recommendation of Central Board of Film Censors ('Censor Board') but subsequently the Ministry of Information in exercise of powers under section 9(2) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 decertified the said film. Censor Board at the time of initial screening of the film did not find anything objectionable in it and granted it the requisite certificate for public exhibition. Censor Board at the time of reviewing the film did not find the content thereof to be in any way non-compliant of the requirements of section 5 of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 ('the Ordinance'). It was only on the receipt of certain alleged complaints from the general public that the Censor Board took the action of recommending to the Ministry of Information to decertify the film. No doubt the Ministry of Information reserved the power to decertify any film in terms of section 9 (2) of the Ordinance. However, such power by virtue of the proviso to section 9 (2) of the Ordinance was circumscribed by the satisfaction of the Ministry of Information that such decertification was necessary in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or friendly relation with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or to prevent the commission of, or incitement to, an offence. It was evident from the record that no such determination was made by the Ministry of Information regarding its satisfaction of the objective criteria provided for in the proviso to section 9(2) of the Ordinance. It was furthermore apparent that the Chairman of the Censor Board simply recommended decertification of the film to the Ministry of Information which, without application of mind, acted upon the said recommendation.

Objective of the impugned decision to decertify a film and its underlying reasons must not only satisfy the criteria set out in the proviso to section 9(2) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 but they must be of sufficient importance to override the constitutionally protected right of freedom of expressions. In addition thereto, the means adopted by the decision making authority must pass the proportionality test. In other words, the means employed must be rationally connected to the objective and should not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations and that they be such that their effects on the limitation of rights and freedoms were proportional to the objective.

R v. Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 ref.

Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979 did not allow decertification of a movie on the value judgment of the Government rather the case must fall within the limitations provided in the proviso to section 9(2) thereof. Satisfaction of the Ministry of Information that a movie and its content violated the "grund norms" mentioned in section 9(2)(a) of the Ordinance was a sine qua non for the decertifying the said movie. The Ministry of Information, in the present case, however, failed to present a demonstrable case either that the decision to decertify the film was remised on valid reasons that met the satisfaction required by proviso to section 9 (2) (a) of the Ordinance or that the movie and its content in fact offended the class of things mentioned therein. The film "Maalik" was at best a work of fiction. Its plot and the characters portrayed therein may or may not have similarity and relevance to the real persons or situation in the country. But this was not justification enough to place a ban on the screening of the film. The reasons furnished in the comments filed by the Ministry for Information for decertification of the film did not meet the requirements of section 9(2) (a) of the Ordinance.

Messrs Baho Film Corporation v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 981 Lah. 295 ref.

High Court observed that ideas were strengthened when they were challenged and were debated and not by acquiescence and enforced silence.

Notification and the reasons furnished for decertifying the film "Maalik" had no nexus with the permissible limitations provided for in proviso to section 9(2) of the Ordinance on the freedom of expression. Said notification was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

(b) Motion Pictures Ordinance (XLIII of 1979)---

----S. 9(2)(a), proviso---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 19---Freedom of expression---Scope---Censorship Notification declaring a film to be an uncertified film---Task of censorship was always delicate and a balance had to be struck between the right to freedom of expression and the various limitations mentioned in proviso to S.9(2) (a) of the Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979.

Bhagwati Charun Shukla v. Provincial Government AIR 1947 Nag. 1 ref.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan --

----Art. 19---Freedom of expression---Scope---Principle underlying a free, democratic society was that every individual had a right to decide what art he or she wanted or did not want---Similar freedom to create art must also be made available to the artists---Freedom of expression would also apply to artistic work presenting controversial and shocking ideas---Choice, however, remained with the society for rejection of certain expressions of art forms that was controversial.

Redmond-Bate v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2000] HRLR 249 ref.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan --

----Art. 19---Freedom of expression---Marketplace of ideas, theory of---Scope---Said theory postulated a laissez faire approach to the regulation of speech and expression and stated that the success or failure of ideas, theories and propositions would depend on their own merits and demerit---Notion behind said theory was that rational individuals had the capacity to discern through the process of deliberation and exchange of competing ideas to realize the best possible result.

Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ref.

Muhammad Azhar Siddique and Sheraz Zaka for Petitioner (in W.P. No.14322 of 2016)

Imran Aziz Khan, Deputy Attorney General for Respondents.

Mrs. Samia Khalid, Assistant Advocate General.

P L D 2017 Lahore 289

Before Ayesha A. Malik, Abid Aziz Sheikh and Shahid Karim, JJ

INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS CORPORATION (PVT) LTD and others---Petitioners

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.25317 of 2016, decided on 28th December, 2016.

Per Ayesha A. Malik, J; Shahid Karim, J, agreeing.

(a) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)---

----Ss. 23, 39 & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.19---Regulatory objective of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 in the context of the Fundamental Right to "freedom of speech" under Art. 19 of the Constitution---Enlargement of choice and optimization of free flow of information in the electronic media---Open and healthy competition in the electronic media---Rationale for prevention of undue concentration of ownership---Determination of circumstances in which concentration of ownership undue---Exercise of power under S.39 Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 to make rules in order to achieve regulatory objectives, and limitations thereto---Nature of the regulatory landscape, contours of the regulation, and limitations to authority to frame rules, extensively explained.

Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and others PLD 2016 SC 692; In the Book titled the Judge in Democracy by Professor Aharon Barak; Dr. Raja Aamer Zaman v. Omar Ayub Khan and others 2015 SCMR 1303; Muhammad Nawaz Chandio v. Muhammad Ismail Rahu and others 2016 SCMR 875 and Khawaja Ahmad Hassaan v. Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 186 rel.

(b) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)---

----S. 23(2) & Preamble---Exclusion of monopolies---Media ownership concentration and exclusion of monopolies---Vertical and horizontal integration of media ownership---Nature of such vertical and horizontal integration---Rationale for regulation of "vertical integration" of media---Any enterprise or owner who operated publication, distribution or broadcast was a media enterprise---Media enterprise could own more than one company engaged in the media business which would include a group of companies which were engaged in different areas of the media sector---Within electronic media, a media enterprise engaged in broadcast, distribution or publication and could operate another media enterprise engaged in the same line of work being broadcast, distribution or publication which was horizontal integration---Horizontal integration could give rise to oligopoly and in extreme cases monopoly, hence such integration was regulated by capping the number of licences a media enterprise could own in the same medium being broadcast, distribution or publication---Vertical integration, on the other hand, was caused when one media enterprise integrated within the electronic media to operate some other media enterprise, so a broadcaster would integrate to operate distribution services or publication or publication would integrate to operate broadcast media---Vertical integration included cross-ownership, that was, when a common entity would operate broadcast media as well as distribution service---Vertical integration was of concern for Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) because if a smaller group of owners controlled a large share of the market through broadcast and distribution it would cause concentration of ownership, which in turn meant reduction in diversity and plurality of content and the free flow of information.

(c) Interpretation of statutes---

----Purposive tool of interpretation---Subjective and objective purpose of a statute---While construing law, purposive interpretation was necessary to give the fullest possible meaning to the law which included the subjective and objective purpose of the law---Legislative intent must be seen in the context of the legal system in which the statute operated and must be sensitive to changing environment---Objective purpose of the statute would involve interests, values, objectives and functions which the law sought to protect and its interpretation must reflect the fundamental values and principles which the law-maker wished to preserve---Subjective purpose would be seen in the context of the statute and its purpose and therefore a dynamic purposive interpretation bridged the gap between law and society and could not be insensitive to the technological advancements and changing needs of the public because if the courts were to focus on subjective purpose only it would not manifest the objective of the law and would create stagnation and would be a time-centric interpretation possibly freezing the meaning of the law in one historical moment.

In the Book titled the Judge in Democracy by Professor Aharon Barak; Dr. Raja Aamer Zaman v. Omar Ayub Khan and others 2015 SCMR 1303 and Muhammad Nawaz Chandio v. Muhammad Ismail Rahu and others 2016 SCMR 875 rel.

(d) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)---

----Ss. 23, 39 & 2(1)---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009, Rr. 13(3) & 13(4)---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Eligibility Criteria and Bidding Procedure for Direct to Home (DTH) Distribution Service Licensing) Regulations, 2016, Reglns. 2.11 & 3.23---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Vires of Rr.13(3) & 13(4), Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 and Reglns. 2.11 & 2.23 of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Eligibility, Criteria and Bidding Procedure for Direct to Home (DTH) Distribution Service Licensing) Regulations, 2016---Media ownership concentration and exclusion of monopolies---Legislative intent, nature and scope of S. 23 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Rules/delegated legislation cannot go beyond the statute---Role of PEMRA as a frontline regulator---Scope---Petitioner challenged the legality of Rr.13(3) & 13(4) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 and Reglns. 2.11 & 3.23 of the PEMRA (Eligibility Criteria and Bidding Procedure for Direct to Home (DTH) Distribution Service Licensing) Regulations, 2016; on the ground, inter alia, that the same went beyond the scope of S. 23 read with S. 39 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Validity---Impugned Rules and Regulations ousted broadcast media licence owners from owning, controlling or operating distribution service licence and vice versa, meaning thereby that it totally prohibited "vertical integration"---Scope of S.23(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 was to provide PEMRA with its regulatory objectives so that it could regulate the electronic media and achieve its stated purpose which was diversity and plurality in content---To accomplish said stated purpose, maximum participation of stakeholders was required for grant of a licence---Section 23 of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, did not envision any prohibition on broadcast media operating distribution services or vice versa but to the contrary it required all media enterprises to compete in the media market with each other and with new media entities---Intent of S.23(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 was for PEMRA to ensure that ownership conglomerates were not formed given that the regulatory objective was to prevent undue concentration of media ownership in a given market---Use of the word "and" in S.23(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 separated two distinct regulatory objectives being "fair competition and prevention of undue concentration"; and whether the said word "and" was read disjunctively or conjunctively, it would not change the intent of the law--- Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) was required to regulate vertical integration of all media enterprises so that they did not form concentrated ownership and under S.23(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002; Legislature delegated the authority to PEMRA to define the circumstances, which could cause such undue concentration in any market and PEMRA could set out a regulatory environment within which the Legislature's intent was effectuated---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority, in the present case, defined such circumstances to mean a total restriction on vertical integration between broadcast media and distribution services which restriction was based on the presumption that any vertical integration between broadcast media and distribution services would result in undue concentration of ownership---Section 23(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 did not mandate such an ouster or restriction and required ownership concentration to be regulated so that it did not become undue, meaning thereby that some element of concentration was permissible---Impugned Rules and Regulations were enacted by PEMRA without setting any standards or thresholds on the basis of which it could measure, monitor or control media ownership---Effect of the impugned Rules and Regulations was that by restricting two specific media enterprises from vertically integrating and allowing other media enterprises to vertically integrate, undue concentration of media ownership was left unregulated because it was seen only in the context of integration between broadcast media and distribution services and not in the context of the relevant market, which was illogical and is not in furtherance of the objectives or purpose of the law---High Court observed that S.23(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 did not leave it open to PEMRA to set out a new regulatory authority but instead required it to work within the confines of the prescribed objectives and in the present case, PEMRA abdicated from its functions as a regulator and instead transgressed into the domain of the Legislature, which is not permissible---High Court further observed that if the intent of the law was to prohibit vertical integration it would not have required PEMRA to define the circumstances, which created undue concentration of ownership and the Legislature would have prescribed the restriction in the stated section---High Court held that Rr.13(3) & 13(4) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 and Reglns. 2.11 & 3.23 of the PEMRA (Eligibility Criteria and Bidding Procedure for Direct to Home (DTH) Distribution Service Licensing) Regulations, 2016 were enacted without lawful authority and were struck down---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and others PLD 2016 SC 692; In the Book titled the Judge in Democracy by Professor Aharon Barak; Dr. Raja Aamer Zaman v. Omar Ayub Khan and others 2015 SCMR 1303; Muhammad Nawaz Chandio v. Muhammad Ismail Rahu and others 2016 SCMR 875; Khawaja Ahmad Hassaan v. Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 186; Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited and others v. Said Rehman and others 2013 SCMR 642; PLD 2014 SC 389 and Mian Zaiuddin v. Punjab Local Government and others 1985 SCMR 365 rel.

(e) Delegated legislation ---

----Framing of rules/regulations under a parent statute---Rules and regulations framed under a statute could not transgress the limits set by the statute---Rule-making body/authority could not frame rules which were in conflict with or in derogation of the substantive provisions of the statute under which said Rules were framed and in case of any inconsistency with the parent statute; the excessive rule would be considered illegal if it went beyond its delegated authority---When the Legislature conferred powers on a regulatory authority to frame rules, it was expected that such rules would advance the purpose of the Legislature and not run contrary to it.

(f) Delegation of powers ----

----Delegated authority was incidental to statutory function and could not run parallel to the statutory function---Regulators drew their authority from Legislation which created it, and limits placed on a regulator were prescribed by law.

(g) Regulatory authority--

----Exercise of powers by a regulatory authority/public regulator---Flexibility and independence of regulatory authorities---Subordinate legislation/rules enacted by a Regulator---Test to determine validity of such subordinate legislation/rules---Whenever there was an element of flexibility, a regulator may run the risk of over stepping its boundary and going beyond the authority delegated to it and therefore it was important to examine the question as to whether the rules and regulations made under a statute were inconsistent with the statute itself and whether such rules and regulations achieved the purpose of the statute---Courts were to ensure that a regulator remained within its regulatory domain and did not attempt to step into the role of the Legislator.

Khawaja Ahmad Hassaan v. Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 186 rel.

Per Shahid Karim, J; agreeing with Ayesha A. Malik, J

(h) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)---

----Ss. 23 & 39---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009, Rr.13(3) & 13(4)---Media ownership concentration and exclusion of monopolies---Exercise of power of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority ("PEMRA") for grant of licence---Concept of "undue concentration of media ownership" in the context of S.23 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Limits on the power of PEMRA to shut the door on a whole category of media enterprise---Concept of "ex ante ownership" and "ex-post competition" regulation---Various ways in which Rr.13(3) & 13(4) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 travel beyond the scope of the statutory domain of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, discussed.

FCC v. National Citizens Comm, For Broadcasting 436 U.S. 775 (1978) distinguished.

(i) Interpretation of statutes ----

----Canons of statutory interpretation---"Omitted-Case Canon", explained.

Felix Ferankfuther, Some reflection on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum, L.Rev. 527, 533 (1947) and Interpretation of Legal Texts by Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner rel.

(j) Rules---

----Framing of Rules---Rules are forged in the furnace of everyday experience---Rules cannot be framed to render a provision of the primary legislation as dormant and redundant.

"The Rule of Law" by Lord Bingham rel.

(k) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 199---Judicial Review of administrative actions---Judicial review of delegated legislation/enactment of secondary legislation---Courts had the authority to review subordinate legislation if it was satisfied that in making it, the delegatee acted outwith the legislative powers conferred upon it by Legislature.

F. Hohman La Roche and Co v. Secretary to State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295; RV Her Majesty's Treasury, Ex p Smedley [1985] 1 QB 651 (666-667); R (Asif Javed) v. Secretary of State for Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 789 and Bank Mellat v. Her Majesty's Treasury [2013] UK SC 39 rel.

(l) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Judicial review of administrative actions---Principle of judicial restraint---Exercise of judicial restraint by High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---If a case could be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court would decide only the latter---Where a statute was susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arose and by the other of which such questions were avoided, the Court's duty was to adopt the latter.

Ashwander v. Tennessee Vally Auth. 297 US 288, 347 (1936) and Attorney Gen. v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 US 366 (1909) rel.

Ms. Asma Jahangir assisted by Ms. Noor Ejaz Chaudhary, Hamid Azam Leghari and Ms. Namra Gilani, for Petitioners.

Mirza Nasar Ahmad and Muzammil Akhtar Shabbir, DAGs for the Federation.

Salan Akram Raja assisted by Asad Ladha, Ms. Unsa Manzoor, Bilal Bashir, Nadeem Shehzad Hashmi, along with Wakeel Khan General Manager (Lecensing), PEMRA and Tahir Farooq Tarar, ACM(Legal) PEMRA for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Lahore 337

Before Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed, J

Mst. SHAMA---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and 3 others---Respondents

Criminal Miscellaneous No.483-M of 2016, decided on 15th November, 2016.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 176(2)---Exhumation of dead body---Court of Session set aside Magisterial order declining exhumation of dead body of deceased child who passed away without any apparent cause---Subsection (2) of S.176 Cr.P.C. did not put any clog of locus standi to approach a Magistrate for exhumation of dead body; it could be carried out by Magistrate on his own---No specific period of limitation was provided under the law---Registration of First Information Report was not a sine qua non to launch a probe into cause of a suspicious death---Existence of some positive proof was not required as relevant provision of law was meant to attend situation where cause of death was inferred other than being natural---Contention deceased was suffering from acute asthma and reliance upon an x-ray film and some prescriptions to substantiate the position was beside the point in absence of any medical opinion about cause of death---Dependant upon positive proof beyond reasonable doubt, accusation of illicit liaison and possible involvement of accused (mother of child) at least warranted an investigative probe which was only possible through forensic analysis of the corpse---Further contention that flux of time spanning over a period of almost two years had by itself rendered proposed exercise as being inconsequential in view of possible decomposition of corpse, though ingeniously articulated was nonetheless conclusory being devoid of any empirical foundation---Autolysis would set in immediately after the last breath, followed by different stages of putrefaction, however, possibility of a forensic analysis was not entirely eliminated even at stages subsequent to skeletonization---Instances of natural mummification owing to arid soil or with high salinated contents were not that rare---Asphyxial death due to strangulation invariably left its symptoms on hyoid bone detectable even at skeletonized stage and same was the case with the remains of poisonous contents even in decomposed viscera; arsenic was possibly detectable not only in hair but also in the soil where the dead body was buried, therefore, to deny a probe on this ground would render the provisions of law as nugatory---Court of Session rightly reversed the decision taken by the Magistrate---Application was dismissed accordingly.

Muhammad Ramzan and others v. The State and others 1987 SCMR 272 rel.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---

----S. 176(2)---Exhumation of dead body---Scope----Subsection (2) of S.176 Cr.P.C. did not put any clog of locus standi to approach a Magistrate for exhumation of dead body; it could be carried out by Magistrate on his own---No specific period of limitation was provided under the law.

Muhammad Ramzan and others v. The State and others 1987 SCMR 272 rel.

(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---

----S. 176(2)---Exhumation of dead body---Scope----Registration of First Information Report was not a sine qua non to launch a probe into cause of a suspicious death nor there was any legal compulsion for existence of some positive proof as relevant provision of law was meant for to attend situation where cause of death was inferred as other than being natural.

(d) Medical jurisprudence---

----Forensic analysis of dead body---Scope---Possibility of a forensic analysis of dead body could not entirely eliminate even at stages subsequent to skeletonization.

(e) Medical jurisprudence---

----Asphyxial death due to strangulation---Asphyxial death due to strangulation would invariably leave its symptoms on hyoid bone detectable even at skeletonized stage.

(f) Medical jurisprudence---

----Poisonous contents---Poisonous contents even in decomposed viscera; arsenic were possibly detectable not only in hair but also in soil where dead body was buried.

Tariq Mehmood Dogar for Petitioner.

Mehr Nazar Abbas Chawan, AAG and Mirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G with Muhammad Saleem, DSP.

P L D 2017 Lahore 342

Before Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J

AYYAZ AHMAD---Petitioner

Versus

SAQIB NAZIR, SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL JAIL---Respondent

Criminal Original No.2191-W of 2016, decided on 20th October, 2016.

Pakistan Prison Rules, 1978---

----R. 197---Contempt of Court Ordinance (IV of 2003), Ss.3 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4 & 204---Contempt of Court---Medical treatment of prisoner---Petitioner was a convict prisoner and his grievance was that he had not been given medical treatment as prescribed by Medical Specialist---Validity---State was responsible to provide facility of treatment when a person was confined through process of law---Punishing a wrong doer was demand of law but provision of facility of health was a basic necessity, safeguarded under R.197 of Pakistan Prison Rules, 1978---Such facility was also guaranteed under Art. 4 of the Constitution---Health of a prisoner was a primary duty of local administration, hierarchy of jail and finally Government of the Province---High Court depreciated the act of local administration, jail hierarchy as well as government functionaries, who failed to perform their duties and directed the authorities to provide health facility to petitioner in letter and spirit as per Jail Manual---Contempt petition was disposed of accordingly.

Abid Saqi for Petitioner.

P L D 2017 Lahore 347

Before Ayesha A. Malik and Jawad Hassan, JJ

ASGHAR BIN SHAHID JAFRI---Petitioner

Versus

DEFENCE HOUSING AUTHORITY and another---Respondents

Intra-Court Appeal No.689 of 2011, decided on 12th January, 2017.

(a) Defence Housing Authority Construction and Development Regulations, 2014 ---

----Reglns. 56 & 57---Defence Housing Authority Construction and Development Regulations, 2009, Regln. 53---Defence Housing Authority Lahore Order, (26 of 2002), Arts.4(2), 7(2)(k), 13 & 23---Defence Housing Authority ("housing authority)---Graveyard---Eligibility for burial---Housing authority had a burial policy with regard to its graveyard which stated that such facility was only available for the parents, spouse, dependent children of the registered persons/members/owners of plot or building in the Housing Authority---Legality---Housing Authority had allocated specific areas, for use of residential and commercial purposes, and also earmarked/reserved areas to provide essential needs to its residents, consisting of parks, graveyards, parking areas etc.---Since the management and control of the specified areas was with the Housing Authority, it had made Regulations and Policies, to manage the areas for better allocation of its resources to create structural harmony, privacy, security and tranquillity for its residents, who had developed vested rights through ownership of any plot or building---Vested rights of the owners of the Housing Authority may be harmed, encroached and restricted if persons other than registered person, members or owners of any plot/building in the Housing Authority were allowed to be buried in its graveyards---Intra-court appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Burial policy of Defence Housing Authority ("Housing Authority") with regard to its graveyards stated that such facility was only available for the parents, spouse, dependent children of the registered persons/members/owners of plot or building in the housing authority. Petitioner was refused permission to be buried in the graveyard along with his spouse after their death since they were only tenants of a house in the Housing Authority.

Respondent Authority was a recognized corporate organization, and was authorized in its independent capacity to do all such acts for its planning, development and regulating housing facilities, either through its Executive Board or Governing Authority. Therefore, the decision on the request of the petitioner to be buried in the graveyard of Housing Authority along with his wife, squarely fell within the domain of the Housing Authority because the specified area of graveyards was under its management and control.

Generally, the Housing Authority allocated specific areas, so notified, for use of residential and commercial purposes, and also earmarked/reserved areas to provide essential needs to its residents, consisting of parks, graveyards, parking areas etc. Since the management and control of the specified areas was with the housing authority, it had the mandate to make Rules, Regulations and Policies, to manage the areas for better allocation of its resources to create structural harmony, privacy, security and tranquillity for its residents, who had developed vested rights through ownership of any plot or building. The vested rights of the owners of the Housing Authority may be harmed, encroached and restricted if the facilities were not properly managed, controlled or provided. For this purpose, the Executive Board of the Housing Authority had made Defence Housing Authority Construction and Development Regulations of 2009 and 2014. Both said Regulations, amongst other things, provided the burial policy of the Housing Authority with regard to its graveyards and stated that facility of burial of the deceased was for the parents, spouse, dependent children of the registered persons/members/owners of plot or building in the Housing Authority. Since the petitioner had failed to establish that he was a registered person, member or owner of any plot/building in the Housing Authority, therefore, the court could not overrule the policy of the Housing Authority to manage, control and maintain its specified areas, and to preserve graveyards for its members and owners.

Petitioner could not establish that he had paid anything against which the Housing Authority was liable to provide him services of burial in its graveyard. Therefore, allowing petitioner's request would encroach upon the rights of the members of the Housing Authority to be buried in such graveyard.

Since the petitioner was a non-resident, therefore, he had no vested right to be buried in the graveyard of the Housing Authority after his death as the same was owned by the Housing Authority and nobody could avail benefit therefrom except with the permission of the authority. Petitioner had many other places and graveyards for his burial along with his spouse after their death. Intra-court appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Defence Housing Authority Construction and Development Regulations, 2014 ---

----Reglns. 56 & 57---Defence Housing Authority Construction and Development Regulations, 2009, Regln. 53---Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance (IV of 1979), S. 2(e)---Defence Housing Authority ("Housing Authority)---Graveyard---Whether graveyards in the Housing Authority could be declared to be "waqf property" and used for burial of public-at-large---Property owned by a private entity and specified to provide facilities to the members could not be used for burial of dead bodies of public-at-large---Housing Authority was expected to act in the interest of its members by providing amenities and facilities and not to take away such rights by allowing everyone or public-at-large to be buried in its specified area --- Graveyard in the Housing Authority did not fall within the definition of 'waqf'---Even if such graveyard was considered as 'waqf', it did not create any right in favour of public-at-large who could claim to be buried in the said property---Property was allocated in the master plan of the Housing Authority for specific purpose and the waqf, if considered, was for specific purpose to accommodate the needs of the members and owners of the Housing Authority---Intra-court appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Defence Housing Authority ("Housing Authority") owned the land that had been earmarked for the burial of dead bodies of its inhabitants and their dependants and owners of specific land or building in the housing authority, who had paid a price for it while purchasing the plot/property. Thus, property owned by a private entity and specified to provide facilities to the members could not be used for burial of dead bodies of public-at-large. However, even if the allocated land for graveyard of Housing Authority was considered as 'waqf', it did not create any right in favour of public-at-large who could claim to be buried on the said property. It was important to keep in mind the good of residents/owners of plot or building and vested rights conferred on all persons who owned any land or building in the Housing Authority, which were absolute, and were granted to maintain public order. Property was allocated in the master plan of the Housing Authority for specific purpose and the 'waqf', if considered, was for specific purpose to accommodate the needs of the members and owners. As an easement right had been created in favour of owner of any building or land in the Housing Authority to use facilities for the general convenience, no one had authority to take away such right of enjoyment. Housing Authority was expected to act in the interest of its members by providing amenities and facilities and not to take away such rights by allowing everyone or public-at-large to be buried in its specified area. The rights and facilities available to the members of the Housing Authority were available against the whole world and could be described as a right against land itself.

Even if land allocated for graveyard by the Housing Authority was considered as a 'waqf', there must be persons or Authority responsible to administer such trust/waqf property. In the present case, it was a statutory Authority (i.e. Defence Housing Authority) which was managing it and making policies for its use. Such private trust was established for benefit of members and their families, and as such its objectives must be achieved through permissible means and not at the cost of giving the public-at-large right to be buried. Intra-court appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Muhammad Ahmad Qayyum for Appellant.

Mian Sultan Tanvir for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Lahore 360

Before Atir Mahmood and Mujahid Mustaqeem Ahmed, JJ

Mst. JAMEELA MANZOOR and another---Appellants

Versus

RAJA ZAFAR MEHMOOD and others---Respondents

R.F.As. Nos. 152 and 159 of 2010, heard on 22nd December, 2016.

(a) Defence Saving Certificates Rules, 1966---

----R. 13---Behbood Savings Certificates, Rules, 2003, R. 17---Special Savings Certificates Rules 1990, R. 16---Investment certificates---Oral gift---Proof---Deceased died issueless leaving behind his widow, one brother and four sisters---Widow claimed that her deceased husband in his life time had gifted the entire amount of his investments/saving certificates in her favour, as such she was exclusively entitled to receive these amounts---Validity---Deceased had not conveyed any written instructions to the bank staff to the effect that except for his wife, no other legal heir would have any right in respect of amounts lying in his bank accounts---During cross-examination the widow showed her lack of knowledge about the fact that till death of her husband, the assets remained in his name---Widow conceded that no deed was written in her favour by her deceased husband in respect of his assets---No other witness has come forward to support factum of gift of assets in favour of widow---No date, time or place of such oral gift or name of the witnesses in whose presence the gift was made was given---Widow had not taken the stance that investment certificates, etc. were delivered to her, at the time of gift---Necessary ingredients of a valid gift were missing in the present case---Moreover application for one of the Regular Income Certificates showed that the deceased had mentioned on it name of her widow and one his sisters as nominees to the extent of 1/2 share each and such fact alone belied the claim of widow that deceased intended that all these amounts be exclusively shared by her---Had the deceased intended to gift away all his investments to his widow, it was quite easy for him to transfer such amounts in her account or execute a gift deed or will deed in her favour---Deceased being an advocate, fully knew the difference between nomination and gift and deliberately mentioned name of his wife in investment certificates as nominee alone---Widow had failed to establish that she was entitled to receive her deceased husband's assets/investments to the exclusion of other legal heirs---High Court observed that R.17 of Behbood Savings Certificates Rules, 2003 and R.13 of Defence Saving Certificates Rules,1966 pertaining to nomination by purchaser of these certificates being a subordinate delegated legislation could not be given preference /overriding effect in the matter of inheritance of movable assets /debts of a deceased person and Islamic law would be applicable and have precedence over said Rules---Appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Malik Safdar Ali Khan and another v. Public at Large and others 2004 SCMR 1219; Imtiaz Shamim and others v. Muhammad Irfan ul Haq and others 2006 CLC 1189; Mst. Ameeran Khatoon v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2005 SCMR 512; Mst. Rukhsana v. Province of Sindh through Home Secretary and 4 others 2013 CLC 370; Mst. Hussan Jamala and another v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secrtary, Home and Tribal Affairs, Peshawar PLD 2013 Pesh. 1 and Muhammad Akram Bhatti and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sughra and others PLD 2011 Lah. 355 ref

(b) Islamic law---

----'Tarka'---Scope---Pensioner's Benefit Account --- Such account was an investment by pensioners, under the National Saving Schemes, with the aim and object of reducing hardships faced by pensioners---Amount deposited in such account could be withdrawn by the pensioner at any time during his life, thus, it squarely fell within the definition of 'tarka'---All legal heirs of a pensioner would be entitled to inherit the amount in the Pensioner's Benefit Account.

Federal Government of Pakistan v. Public at Large (Shariat Appellate Bench) PLD 1991 SC 731 and Mst. Ameeran Khatoon v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2005 SCMR 512 ref

Muhammad Asif Chaudhry for Appellant.

Saeed Akhtar for Respondents Nos. 1, 2-C, 3 to 5.

Mubashar Rauf Bhatti for Respondents Nos. 2-A and 2(b).

P L D 2017 Lahore 370

Before Ayesha A. Malik, J

Ch. SABIR ALI---Petitioner

Versus

CITY DISTRICT GOVERNMENT and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.10795 of 2015, decided on 15th February, 2017.

Punjab Local Government Act (XVIII of 2013)---

----Ss. 87, 2(ss), 115 & 141---Punjab Local Government (Commercialization) Rules, 2004, R.5(2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 140A---Local Government---Functions of Metropolitan and Municipal Corporations---Local Government Taxation---"Public place", definition of---Setback requirements for the roads selected for commercialization---Regulation of parking fees by Local City District Government through the local Parking Company established by City District Government---Petitioners, who were private contractors running various parking stands within or around commercial buildings, inter alia, impugned notification issued by Local City District Government, whereby parking fee rates to be charged by petitioners were notified and fixed---Contention of the petitioners was that being private contractors, they could not be regulated by the Local City District Government or its Parking Company---Validity---"Public place" was defined under S. 2(ss) of the Punjab Local Government Act , 2013 to mean any building, premises or place to which the public had access and said definition clarified that the same would include a private place to which the public had regular and continuous access---Any place where the public would have a right of access on a regular and continuous basis fell within the meaning of "public place", hence parking in public places fell within the scope of the Local City District Government and its Parking Company---Private parking-stand operating in a public place was bound to collect parking rates notified by the City District Government and would be regulated by the Local City District Government Parking Company, since it controlled and monitored parking at public places---All parking stands, in the present case, were located in public places as they were either shopping malls, business centers or hospitals and such areas which were accessed by the public, regularly on a daily basis within which the facility of parking must be provided, therefore the argument that the petitioners were private contractors operating parking spaces within private premises was factually and legally incorrect---Test as per the Punjab Local Government Act, 2013 was whether the parking space fell within the meaning of a "public place"---Punjab Local Government (Commercialization) Rules, 2004, provided that building owners were required to provide proper provision for parking within the building premises, and the "setback area" had been surrendered in favour of the City District Government for such purpose and thus so far as the setback area was concerned: the same fell within the regulatory control of the Local City District Government---High Court observed that moving forward local City District Government established Parking Company shall devise a parking policy and plan parking spaces within the city, which policy must be robust and was not reactive in nature, but catered to the requirement of the city and furthermore, that the same should change and evolve with changing patterns in the usage of private and public vehicles and would consider the traffic issues; and furthermore, that the Parking Company shall work in close liaison with the traffic police so that parking spaces had the least impact on the flow of traffic---Constitutional petitions were disposed of, accordingly.

Petitioner in person.

Mian Abdul Aziz, Talaat Farooq Sheikh, Mian Irfan Akram for Petitioners in connected Writ Petitions and Ms. Noor Aitzaz, vice counsel for Petitioner in W.P. No.26939 of 2015.

Ch. Sultan Mahmood, A.A.G.

Salman Mansoor for Respondent LDA.

Ms. Lubna Altaf for Lahore Parking Company Respondent No.8.

P L D 2017 Lahore 381

Before Jawad Hassan, J

Dr. MASROOR ELAHI---Petitioner

Versus

UNIVERSITY OF VETERINARY AND ANIMAL SCIENCE and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.13239 of 2016, decided on 8th February, 2017.

(a) Higher Education Commission Plagiarism Policy---

----Cls. 8(e) & 9(c)---Allegation of plagiarism in publication of research papers---Inquiry and penalty---Procedural propriety, principle of---Scope---Under Cl.8(e) of the Higher Education Commission Plagiarism Policy ("Policy"), the Vice-Chancellor of the University was under obligation to provide opportunity to the author under investigation to justify original concepts and research work and a similar opportunity was also to be provided to the author whose paper was deemed to have been plagiarised and/or the complainant to justify the complaint---In the present case, no communication with the other author of the research paper had been annexed, and no opportunity of personal hearing had been provided to the author, who had published the paper, similar to the plagiarised paper of the petitioner, therefore, there had been a violation of Cl.8(e) of the Policy---Under Cl.9(c) of the Policy, the Plagiarism Standing Committee may solicit comments to the claim from the Editor in Chief (of a journal) or Program Chair (of conference proceedings) and referees of either or both papers---Such comments had not been solicited by the Plagiarism Standing Committee ("Committee") in the present case (although it was not obligatory to solicit the same)---Further at no stage during the proceedings of the Syndicate of the University the petitioner was informed about the cogent reasons for the notification imposing penalties on the petitioner---Syndicate had not passed a well-reasoned order after application of its mind thus has violated the principle of providing the petitioner with procedural propriety---Impugned notification imposing penalties on the petitioner was set aside in circumstances---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

(b) Higher Education Commission Plagiarism Policy ---

----Cl. 11 --- Allegation of plagiarism in publication of research papers---Penalty---'Ban on the reasercher of foreign travel relating to research for a period of one year'---Legality---Clause 11 of the Higher Education Commission Plagiarism outlined the penalties for plagiarism for teachers, researchers, staff and students---Penalty of 'ban on foreign travel relating to research' had not been provided in Cl.11---Constitutional petition was allowed and notification imposing penalty of ban on foreign travel was set aside accordingly.

(c) Higher Education Commission Plagiarism Policy--

----Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art, 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Higher Education Commission Plagiarism Policy was statutory in nature, hence any action taken under the said policy may be challenged under the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Constitutional petition was held to be maintainable accordingly.

Shafique Ahmed Khan and others v. MESCOM through Chairman, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 377 ref.

(d) Civil service--

----Disciplinary proceedings---Inquiry---Public functionaries, duty of---Public functionaries were bound to decide cases of their subordinates after application of mind with cogent reasons within reasonable time---Further, public functionaries were obliged to act within four corners of mandate of the Constitution and the law.

Government of Pakistan and others v. Farheen Rashid 2011 SCMR 1 ref.

Hafiz Tariq Naseem for Petitioner.

Syed Bilal Haider for Respondents Nos.1 to 3

P L D 2017 Lahore 390

Before Atir Mahmood, J

Messrs NATIONAL HIGHWAY AUTHORITY through Duly Authorised Director (Legal)---Petitioner

Versus

The CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE and 5 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.1779 of 2005, heard on 24th November, 2016.

Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002--

----R. 234---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XLVII of 1967), S.49---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Alternate remedy---Factual controversy---Grievance of petitioner was that authorities had issued mining licence for exploration of minerals to respondent for the land which was already acquired by petitioner--- Validity---Question of ownership of land under reference was a matter of factual controversy which could not be decided under Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Appeal was provided under R.234 of Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002, which remedy was not availed by petitioner and had directly filed Constitutional petition---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court could not be invoked if there was some alternate remedy available---"Minerals" and "land" were two distinct commodities and land could be owned or acquired by public or private sectors but minerals could not be acquired---All minerals beneath the surface of land, either it was owned by government or any other private person or body, were property of government concerned---Land in question was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Punjab and mines and minerals under the land in question were owned by Punjab Government---Petitioner had no concern therewith and Punjab Government could issue public auction notice for issuance of mining licence and could make lease agreement in result thereof and petitioner had no locus standi to challenge the same---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Water and Power Development Authority and another v. Assistant Director Mines and Minerals, Attock and others PLD 2012 Lah. 83 and Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) through its G.M. and Project Director Attock and another v. The Assistant Director, Mines and Mineral Attock and others C.A. No.123/2013 ref.

Ms. Shahina Akbar for Petitioner.

Tanvir Iqbal Khan for Respondents.

Rashid Hafeez, Additional Advocate-General and Rashid Latif, Assistant Director, Mines and Mineral Department for the State.

P L D 2017 Lahore 394

Before Muhammad Qasim Khan and Shams Mehmood Mirza , JJ

MUZAFAR ABBAS---Appellant

Versus

Maulana MUHAMMAD AHMAD LUDHIANVI and 31 others---Respondents

Election Appeal No.4-A of 2016, heard on 11th November, 2016.

Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 14 & 19---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 62 & 63---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 11-EE---Election for the seat of Member Provincial Assembly---Amendment in the nomination papers---Objection---Inclusion of name of candidate in the notification issued under S.11-EE of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Effect---Scrutiny of nomination papers---Procedure---Concealment of assets---Effect---Candidate moved application for correction of entries with regard to assets of his dependent son which was accepted---Contention of contesting candidate was that false declaration was filed by concealing the assets by the candidate---Validity---Election Tribunal was not expected to assess the taxes of the candidates; Government was only competent to assess the taxes---No one could be disqualified to contest the election nor could be declared wilful defaulter by mere an assertion that candidate had not paid income tax or any other tax or dues which were yet to be assessed by the Authority---Candidate would be disqualified to contest election inter alia if he had been convicted by a Court of competent jurisdiction for propagating any opinion or acting in any manner prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan---Mere adding name of any person in the Fourth Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 could not be equated with conviction---Order passed under S.11-EE of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 could not be equated with "conviction" for all intents and purposes---Candidate could not be said to have worked against the integrity of the country or ideology of Pakistan by inclusion of name in the notification under S.11-EE of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Specific date and time was given for scrutiny of nomination papers by the Returning Officer but same was adjourned without any order---Returning Officer was bound to inform the Election Commission for adjournment of scrutiny proceedings and pass an order in writing for the next date---Returning Officer could allow any defect to be remedied if it was not of substantial nature---Candidate had filed a declaration which was incorporated in the nomination papers that there was no other property except mentioned in the nomination papers in his name and in the name of his dependents---High Court observed that relevant information must be provided fairly and nothing must be concealed---If assets of a candidate, his spouse or dependent were concealed in the nomination papers, he could be disqualified on that score alone---Person who wanted to represent a large number of people if elected to participate in the legislation must not be so casual in filing declaration and providing the details in the relevant columns of his nomination papers---Non-providing the details of assets of dependent child could not be considered as minor omission and could not be allowed to be remedied---Permission granted by the Returning Officer by allowing the application to amend the nomination papers was beyond the scope of S.14 (3) (d) (ii) of Representation of the People Act, 1976---Candidate was aware with regard to criminal cases pending against him but he did not mention details of the same and mentioned "NIL" in the relevant column which was concealment of fact---Candidate had concealed the assets of his dependant son at the time of filing of nomination papers and verified the nomination papers through declaration---Personality and pen-picture of the candidate must be before the electoral at the time of casting their votes---Candidate, in circumstances could not be said to be a sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest and ameen person to contest election---Orders of Returning Officer accepting the nomination papers of the candidate and granting permission to amend the same were illegal which were set aside---Candidate was held to be disqualified to contest election---Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Mulchand v. Smt. Indra and others PLD 1985 Kar. 362; Rashid v. Returning Officer Nankana Sahib PLD 2013 Lah. 509; PLD 2013 SC 239, Rao Tariq Mehmood v. Election Tribunal, Punjab, Lah. PLD 2003 Lah. 169 and Muhammad Ilyas v. Returning Officer and others PLD 2016 Lah. 179 ref.

Chaudhry Abid Raza v. Election Tribunal Punjab/Lahore High Court, Lahore and 3 others PLD 2008 Lah. 200 and Sheikh Muhammad Akram v. Abdul Ghafoor and 19 others 2016 SCMR 733 distinguished.

Mian Najeem ud Din Owasi and another v. Amir Yar Waran and others PLD 2013 SC 482; Barkhurdar v. Appellate Tribunal/Additional District and Sessions Judge, and 3 others PLD 2016 Lah. 101; Irfan Gul Magsi v. Haji Abdul Kahliq Soomro and others 1999 PTD 1302; Rana Muhammad Tajammal Hussain v. Rana Shaukat Mahmood PLD 2007 SC 277 and Muhammad Ahmad Chatta v. Iftikhar Ahmad Cheema and others 2016 SCMR 763 ref.

Syed Kalim Ahmad Khurshid and Muhammad Umar Riaz for Appellant.

Rana Baleegh ur Rehman for Respondent No.1.

Ch. Muhammad Imtiaz Elahi, Stnding Counsel for the Federation of Pakistan.

P L D 2017 Lahore 406

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C J

MUHAMMAD YOUSAF and another---Petitioners

Versus

CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and 4 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.7572 of 2016, heard on 11th January, 2017.

(a) Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance (XLV of 1977)

----Ss. 7-A & 10---Rules for Competitive Examination (CSS) 2014, R.9(ii)---United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14, 25 & 199---Civil Service---Recruitment---Federal Public Service Commission---Allocation of occupational groups---Disabled persons---Reasonable classification---Accommodation for disabled persons---Inviolability of dignity of man---Equality of citizens---Constitutional petition---Petitioners, who were visually impaired, impugned the legality and constitutionality of R. 9(ii) of the Rules for Competitive Examination (CSS), 2014, whereby being disabled (visually impaired), they could only compete in the competitive examination against four occupational groups, and were excluded from the rest---Validity---Petitioners, if they were not visually impaired, were entitled to allocation in a occupational group of their choice in the open merit quota reserved for Punjab---Rule 9(ii) of the Rules for Competitive Examination (CSS), 2014 allowed a person with disability to be considered for FSP if he/she fell within the 7.5% quota on all-Pakistan basis but was not allowed to be considered against open merit in the Provincial quota; and to allow person with disabilities one category of merit based quota but deny the same person another category of merit quota was outright discriminatory and neither the Constitution nor the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 or the Civil Servants Act, 1973 permitted such a classification---Rule 9(ii) of the Rules For Competitive Examination (CSS), 2014 was therefore devoid of any reasonable classification and discriminatory, offending Art.25 of the Constitution, and furthermore, also underrated a person with disabilities, by hurting his/her self esteem and dignity and thereby offended Art.14 of the Constitution---High Court observed that contention that sedentary posts were only available in the four occupational groups mentioned in R. 9(ii) of the Rules for Competitive Examination (CSS), 2014 was not borne out from any record or statutory instrument and lacked rationale---Rules framed under S.7-A of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 were supposed to deal with, among other things, internal governance, and the Rules under S. 10 of the said Ordinance were to be framed to carry out the purpose of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977, which was to conduct tests and examination for recruitment---Any rule framed under said S. 10 could only elaborate and provide further details regarding conducting of tests and examinations and could not transgress the mandate of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 and could not set restriction and thresholds for any class of candidates to enter civil service, which in the present case was disabled persons---High Court observed that R.9(ii) of the Rules for Competitive Examination (CSS), 2014 framed under Ss.7-A and 10 of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977, transgressed the scope of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 and was ultra vires to the same---High Court further held that being in violation of Arts.14 and 25 of the Constitution, R.9(ii) of the Rules for Competitive Examination (CSS), 2014 was unconstitutional and was accordingly struck down---High Court further observed that the Federal Government was free to formulate a more inclusive recruitment policy keeping in view the observations of the High Court, the Constitution and United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011 and after thoroughly assessing the possibility of providing reasonable accommodation to disabled persons---Constitutional petitions were allowed, accordingly.

Moving from the margins-Mainstreaming persons with disabilities in Pakistan (A custom research report produced for the British Council, August, 2014). rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Arts. 9, 2A, 14, 25, 8, 4 & Preamble---United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011---Nature of Fundamental Rights under the Constitution---Fundamental Rights in the context of persons with disabilities---Constitutional protections for disabled persons---Constitutional values of universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all human rights and fundamental freedoms---Concept of "reasonable accommodation" for disabled persons---Nature of "human dignity"---Legitimate interests of a person with disabilities---Constitutional nexus with the United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, Ratified by Pakistan in 2011---Obligations of the State with regard to disabled persons, in the context of recruitment to civil service, extensively discussed.

Aharon Barack-Human Dignity-The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Rights. Cambridge 2015, pp.85, 86 & 144; Pakistan Tobacoo Co. Ltd. and others v. Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary Law and others PLD 2002 SC 460; Reference No.01/2012 (Reference by the President of Pakistan under Article 186 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 PLD 2013 SC 279;Moving from the margins-Mainstreaming persons with disabilities in Pakistan; Collins English Dictionary-Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edn. 2014 Harper Collins Publishers, quoted at URL http://www.thefreedictionary.com/disabled; Word Health Organization. (2016) Disabilities, Retrieved on December 19, 2016 from http:///www/who.int/topics/disablities/en/; Jeeja Ghosh and another v. Union of India and others AIR 2016 SC 2392;Hafiz Junaid Mahmood v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2017 Lah. 1 and Assistive Technology for Visually Impaired and Blind Peole. Marion A Hersch, Michael A Johnson. Springer, P.670 rel.

(c) Words and phrases

----"Disability"---Meaning of---Nature and concept of the word "disability"---Disability meant lacking one or more physical powers, such as the ability to walk or to coordinate one's movements, as from the effects of a disease or accident, or through mental impairment---Disabled person is a person who on account of injury, disease or congenital deformity, was handicapped from undertaking any gainful profession or employment in order to earn his livelihood and included a person who was blind, deaf, physically handicapped or mentally retarded---Per United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, persons with disabilities include those who had long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others---Disability was an evolving concept and resulted from the interaction between persons with impairments and the attitudinal and environmental barriers that hindered their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others---"Disabilities" was an umbrella term, covering impairments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions---Impairment was a problem in body function or structure; an activity limitation was a difficulty encountered by an individual in executing a task or action; while a participation restriction was a problem experienced by an individual in involvement in life situations---"Disability" was not just a health problem but also was a complex phenomenon, reflecting the interaction between features of a person's body and features of the society in which he or she lived.

Collins English Dictionary-Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edn. 2014 (c) Harper Collins Publishers, quoted at URL http://www.thefreedictionary.com/disabled and Word Health Organization. (2016) Disabilities, Retrieved on December 19, 2016 from http:///www.who.int/topics/disablities/en/; rel.

(d) Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance (XLV of 1977)---

----Ss. 7-A, 10 & Preamble---Conduct of Business of Federal Public Service Commission---Rules framed under Ss. 7-A & 10 of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977---Scope---Rules under S.7-A of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 were supposed to deal with the internal governance and business of the Federal Public Service Commission in order to effectively achieve its main purpose under the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 which was to conduct tests and examinations and advise the President when required----Rules under S.10 of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance 1977, on the other hand, were to be framed to carry out the purposes of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 and any Rule framed under said section could only elaborate and provide further details regarding how to conduct tests and examinations---Such Rules could not transgress the mandate of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 and could not proceed to set restrictions and thresholds for any class of candidates to enter the civil service---Federal Government under S.10 of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance 1977 could only further the purposes of the Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 and no more, and S.7 of the same lay down the purpose of the Ordinance and nowhere did it empower the Federal Public Service Commission to set new qualifications or impose restrictions on any class of candidates.

Petitioners represented by:

Sardar Faiz Rasool Jabani, Rana Moazzam Siddique, Yousaf Naseem Chandio, Usman Nawab and Dildar Hussain, Advocates along with Petitioners in person.

Respondents represented by:

Nasar Ahmad, Deputy Attorney General of Pakistan.

Ms. Hina Hafeezullah Ishaque, Standing Counsel for Pakistan.

Nasir Saeed Akhtar Warriach, D.S., Establishment Division.

Haroon Rashid, Assistant Director, FPSC, Islamabad.

Ms. Riffat Butt, Deputy Legal Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ms. Iqra Ashraf, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Research assistance by:

Qaisar Abbas and Mohsin Mumtaz, Research Associates and Civil Judges, Lahore High Court Research Centre (LHCRC).

P L D 2017 Lahore 435

Before Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, J

IQBAL BIBI---Petitioner

Versus

ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.17182 of 2013, decided on 26th January, 2017.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 176---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Application for disinterment/exhumation of dead body---Mala fides of applicant---Effect---Applicant/widow moved application before the Magistrate for disinterment of dead body of her deceased-husband alleging that he had been poisoned by his other wife and children---Magistrate allowed said application and gave directions for disinterment of dead body of deceased---Validity---Widow of deceased kept mum for a long time allegedly on the basis that although she had suspicion in her mind, but she was forbidden by the elders of the family to raise any voice---Such reasoning given by widow at a belated stage was not sufficient to accept her stance---Widow moved her first application for disinterment of dead body after a lapse of about two and half years from death of deceased and then a second application was filed by her with the further delay of more than one month---While filing succession certificate the widow had stated that death of the deceased was natural but subsequently after a lapse of about three years coupled with the registration of criminal case against the opposite party, filing of application for disinterment of the dead body was nothing but a malicious attempt to involve her opponents in the said case to keep away from demanding their share in inheritance---Every likelihood was there that the application for disinterment of the dead body was filed with an attempt to settle old scores with the other party under the garb of depriving them from an expected division of inheritance of the deceased---Impugned order passed by Magistrate for disinterment of death body was set aside accordingly---High Court observed that in Islam, sanctity had been attracted to human beings irrespective of being alive or dead---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly

Muhammad Naseer v. The State PLD 1988 FSC 58; Messrs Bank of Oman Ltd. v. Messrs Estate Trading Co. Ltd. and others PLD 1987 Kar. 404 and Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others PLD 1988 Kar. 169 ref.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S.176---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Disinterment/exhumation of dead body---Scope---Disinterment could be done in pursuance of a judicial intervention and there was no legal bar on the same---Court was however under obligation to ascertain the element of personal grouse or grudge, coupled with mens rea or ill-will before passing such order which might cause disgrace even to a dead subject while exercising powers under Art. 199 of the Constitution.

Naseer ud Din Khan Nayyar for Petitioner.

Ch. Akbar Ali Kang, Assistant Advocate-General.

P L D 2017 Lahore 442

Before Ch. Muhammad Iqbal, J

Messrs EDEN DEVELOPERS (PVT.) LIMITED---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.24493 of 2012, heard on 12th January, 2017.

(a) Maxim--

----"Salus poluli suprema lex"---Meaning---Interests of public are supreme and private interests are subordinate to the interest of State.

(b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)---

----S. 4---Notification---Object, scope and purpose---Notification under S.4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is merely an introductory measure, tentative in nature and furnishes foundation of subsequent proceeding for acquisition---Such is a caution to public that any transaction/alienation made subsequent would be at the risk and cost of respective parties---Purpose of such notification is to carry on preliminary investigation to find out whether the land is required for public purpose or otherwise---Government through such notification expresses its tentative primary intention to acquire land for public purposes which cannot be considered as conclusive and ultimate decision of government rather it is a precautionary notice/warning to public at large.

Muhammad Ashiq and another v. Water and Manpower Development Authority, Lahore through Chairman, WAPDA House and another PLD 2008 SC 335 rel.

(c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)---

----S. 4(1)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 24 & 199---Constitutional petition--- "Public purpose"--- Determination---Judicial review---Scope---Acquisition for company---Principle---Land owners assailed notification issued under S. 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on the plea that acquisition in favour of private limited company was not for public purpose, resultantly the notification was withdrawn---Validity---Acquisition of land in favour of a company for welfare of public at large was permissible---Determining factor of "public purpose" fell exclusively within the domain of government which was the adjudicating and arbitral forum of the same---Government had to define public purpose scrutinizing scrupulously request for acquisition of land by requiring company---Government had to evaluate public purpose objectively on the basis of reasonable material as sacred Fundamental Right of individual duly safeguarded under the provision of Art.24 of the Constitution was likely to be affected---Such determination of "public purpose" was also justiciable and amenable to judicial review by courts---No mala fide on the part of government or Board of Revenue was established---Petitioner company was intending to set up a private housing scheme under garb of acquisition which purpose could not be equated in any manner with "public purpose"---De-acquisition proceedings were initiated on the application of land owners who were necessary parties as their rights/interest were directly involved in the matter and despite having knowledge, petition did not implead them as party in petition, whose land was going to be acquired compulsorily---Non-impleading of necessary parties in petition minimized maintainability of petition---Petitioner failed to point out any illegality or material irregularity or any violation of acquisition laws in the order passed by authorities and also there was no jurisdictional defect---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edn.; Muhammad Saqib Abbasi v. Province of Punjab through Secretary Local Government, Lahore and 2 others 2013 CLC 158; Federal Government Employees' Housing Foundation through Director-General, Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Akram Alizai, Deputy Controller, PBC, Islamabad 2002 PLC (CS) 1655; Messrs Dewan Salman Fiber Limited and others v. Government of N.-W.F.P., through Secretary, Revenue Department, Peshawar and others PLD 2004 SC 441; National Police Foundation Corporation Housing Society Limited, Islamabad v. Board of Revenue, Government of Punjab and 2 others PLD 1984 Lah. 191; Radba Kanta Banik v. The Province of East Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1969 SC 545; Muhammad Ishaq and another v. Collector, Lahore District Lahore and others 2000 YLR 1074; Mst. Maqbool Begum and others v. Gullan and others PLD 1982 SC 46; Akhtar Ali Khan and another v. Settlement Commissioner, Peshawar and 4 others 1989 SCMR 506 and Muhammad Suleman v. Abdul Rashid and 13 others PLD 1987 Lah. 387 rel.

Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat for Petitioner.

Muhammad Hammad Khan Rai, A.A.G. for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Lahore 457

Before Jawad Hassan, J

PUNJAB EMPLOYEES' SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION---Petitioner

Versus

ZULFIQAR ALI and 2 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.21987 of 2014, decided on 28th February, 2017.

(a) Punjab Office of the Ombudsman Act (X of 1997)---

----Ss. 3 & 9---Ombudsman---Cognizance, taking of---Scope---Punjab Ombudsman may take cognizance of any matter and undertake any investigation into any allegation of mal-administration on the part of any agency or its officers or employees.

(b) Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance (X of 1965)---

----Ss. 57 & 59-Punjab Office of the Ombudsman Act (X of 1997), Ss.3 & 9---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Alternate remedy---Ombudsman, jurisdiction of---Social Security Institution was responsible for collecting social security contributions from industrial and commercial establishments on behalf of the workers---Establishment was aggrieved of the demand notice issued by the Institution and assailed the same before Provincial Ombudsman who set aside the demand notice---Validity---If recommendations/ decisions of Ombudsman were correct on merit and in accordance with law, the same were liable to be implemented even by invoking jurisdiction of High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction but the same could be deferred on the ground that appropriate remedy had been skipped, which the establishment had done---Provincial Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to take up and investigate the complaint as it pertained to determination of contribution for which alternate remedy was available to Establishment under S.57 of Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965---Entire exercise by Establishment to bypass statutory remedy under S.57 of Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965, and orders passed by Ombudsman were without jurisdiction and against Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution---Institution could not be compelled to implement order passed by Ombudsman as the same were without jurisdiction and were set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Nestle Milkpak Limited v. Judge, Social Security Court, Lahore and 2 others 2016 PLC 261; Mayfair Spinning Mills Limited v. Punjab Employees Social Security Institution 2002 PLC (CS) 1146; Chakwal Textiles Mills Limited, Rawalpindi Road Chakwal and another v. Director Social Security, Rawalpindi and 2 others 2012 PLC 270; Naveed Ulah Khan Bhatti v. Director, Punjab Employees' Social Security Institution and 2 others 2006 PLC 593; Sohail Bin Rashid v. Secretary, Revenue Division 2005 PTD 1390; Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Islamabad PLD 2016 SC 940; Khalil Ahmed Awan v. Secretary, Ministry of Interior 2015 PLC (CS) 1357; Rashida Bibi v. Border Area Committee 2004 PLD Lah. 86; Faisal Sultan v. E.D.O. (Education) and others 2011 PLC (CS) 419; Azizullah Memon v. Province of Sindh and another 2007 SCMR 229; Muhammad Haleem and another v. General Manager (Operation) Pakistan Railways Headquarter, Lahore and others 2009 SCMR 339; Sharafat v. Additional Sessions Judge/Justice of Peace 2015 PCr.LJ 1758; Abdul Fatah Bhutto v. Election Commission of Pakistan through Secretary 2014 CLC 639; Abdul Khaliq Mandokhel v. Chairman, Balochistan Public Service Commission 2016 PLC(CS) 1184; Falak Niaz v. Amal Din 2016 YLR 2047; Sabz Ali Khan v. Inspector General of Police KPK 2016 YLR 1279; Cantonment Board Clifton v. Sultan Ahmed Siddiqui 2016 CLC 919 and Federation of Pakistan v. Asad Javed PLD 2016 Isl. 53 ref.

Muhammad Numan Aslam Raza for Petitioner.

Hafiz Abdul Rehman for Respondent N o.1.

P L D 2017 Lahore 470

Before Ayesha A. Malik and Jawad Hassan, JJ

Syed KHURRAM ABBAS BUKHARI and others---Petitioners

Versus

ELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.39505 of 2016, heard on 22nd February, 2017.

Punjab Local Government Act (XVIII of 2013)-

----Ss. 37, 38, 39 & 41---Punjab local Government (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013, Rr. 36, 62 & 78-Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 140-A, & 218---Recounting of votes---Election Commission, powers of---Petitioners were returned candidates but Election Commission after recounting of votes declared respondents as returned candidates-Validity-Executive functions of Election Commission, under R.78 of Punjab Local Government (Conduct of Election) Rules, 2013 were prescribed to ensure that elections were carried out justly, fairly and in accordance with law as per mandate of Art.140-A read with Art.218 of the Constitution---Exercise of power under R.78 of the Punjab local Government (Conduct of Election) Rules, 2013 was to be exercised in relation to the conduct of elections and not to adjudicate on election disputes---Once election result was notified under S.37 of Punjab Local Government Act, 2013 any election dispute that had arisen thereafter was to be referred to Election Tribunal which included any dispute with respect to recount of votes---Election Commission could not have interfered in the matter as petitioners were declared winning candidates for Union Council in question and any dispute in relation to such victory had to be raised before Election Tribunal as that was remedy prescribed under law---Such act of Election Commission was without jurisdiction and illegal---High Court set aside order passed by Election Commission and notification declaring respondents to be returned candidates, consequently earlier notification was revived along with oath of office taken by petitioners---Constitutional petition was allowed under circumstances.

Ch. Muhammad Abdullah v. Ch. Abdul Wakil and others PLD 1986 SC 487; Election Commission of Pakistan through its Secretary v. Javaid Hashmi and others PLD 1989 SC 396; Jam Madad Ali v. Asghar Ali Junejo and others 2016 SCMR 251; Muhammad Mamoon Tarar v. Election Commission of Pakistan and others 2016 CLC 1708; Workers' Party Pakistan through Akhtar Hussain, Advocate, General Secretary and 6 others v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 2012 SC 681 and Aftab Shahban Mirani and others v. Muhammad Ibrahim and others PLD 2008 SC 779 ref.

Mahmood A. Sheikh for Petitioners.

Nasir Javed Ghumman for Respondent Election Commission of Pakistan.

Mubeen-ud-Din Qazi for Respondents Nos., 5 and 6.

P L D 2017 Lahore 479

Before Muhammad Qasim Khan and Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz Dogar, JJ

ALAMDAR HUSSAIN---Petitioner

Versus

NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU through Chairman and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.5948 of 2016, decided on 19th December, 2016.

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-

--S. 9(b)---Pail---Accused cannot be left at the mercy of investigating agency to establish charge of a particular offence against him and to investigate the matter---High Court has ample jurisdiction while deciding bail application after examining available record whether any particular offence under which investigating agency is trying to arrest accused prime .facie attracts in circumstances of the case or not.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 3---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S.4---Overriding effect of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---Scope---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 is not only a special law but same being also later in time prevails over provisions of National Accountability ordinance, 1999---To deal with dispute inter se Bank and Customer, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 has its own comprehensive mechanism to deal with.

Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. and others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. PLD 2012 SC 268 and Mahmood Khan Achakzai and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 426 rel.

(c) Lenity, rule of--

--Scope-Where accused can be tried or punished under two different statutes then 'Rules of Lenity' (a rule of construction of statutes that criminal statute ambiguities are resolved in favour of defendant or accused) would also attract in favour of accused person.

(d) Administration of justice-

-When law requires a thing to be done in a specific manner, it must tie done in that way or not at all.

Raheel Rashid v. National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad through Chairman and 2 others PLD 2005 Lah. 692 rel.

(e) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 3, 9(b) & 31-D---Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001), S. 4---Pre-arrest bail, confirmation of---Suit for recovery of finance---Wilful default---Petitioner was accused in a reference by National Accountability Bureau on complaint of Bank---Complainant Bank had earlier instituted recovery suit but later also invoked jurisdiction of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Plea raised by accused was that provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 had overriding effect in cases of such wilful default---Validity---National Accountability Bureau did not have authority in the matter and their actions against petitioner led to an inference of mala fide on their part---Finance facility subject matter of National Accountability Bureau reference was duly secured against adequate collateral in addition to other documents---Bank had not claimed that documents prepared for sanction of loan were bogus; property subject matter of mortgage was non-existent; such property was not in specific ownership of petitioner or that the same was already under some encumbrance---Despite such clear position, without touching factual aspects of allegations against customer, action of complainant Bank in filing complaint before National Accountability Bureau and further proceedings by National Accountability Bureau under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, including attempted arrest of the customer per force of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, was indicator of mala fide on part of complainant as well as National Accountability Bureau---Pre-arrest bail was confirmed in circumstances.

Muhammad Asif Nawaz v. ASJ and others (2014 PCr.LJ 1 = 2014 CLD 45; Abid Mahmood Malik v. Station House Officer, Police Station Margalla and others 2013 CLD 508; Muhammad Iqbal v. Station House Officer, Police Station Hajipura, Sialkot and 2 others PLD 2009 Lah. 541; Suo Motu No.10 of 2015 out of Civil Petitions Nos.1377 and 1378 of 2015 ref.

Muhammad Amjad Pervaiz, Muhammad Nawaz Chaudhry, Sultan Mehmood Khan and Anwaar Hussain along With the Petitioner.

Syed Faisal Raza Bokhari, Special Prosecutor for NAB with Muhammad Ramzan Khan, Deputy Director/1.0.

P L D 2017 Lahore 489

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C.J. and Shujaat Ali Khan, J

PUNJAB HIGHER EDUCATION COMMISSION---Appellant

Versus

Dr. AURANGZEB ALAMGIR and others---Respondents d

I.C.A. No.1766 of 2016, decided on 27th April, 2017.

(a) Words and phrases---

----"Education"---Meaning, legislative connotation and scope----"Education" is defined as the process of teaching and learning, usually at school, college, or university; and was therefore an expansive and wide-ranging legislative subject, including all tiers of education, which included higher education and standards in education at all levels.

Longman dictionary of contemporary English, 6th Edition, Third Printing, 2015 by Pearson Education Limited, at page. 568; The Chambers Dictionary, 12th Edition, 2011 by Chambers Harrap Publishers Ltd, at page 490 and Oxford Dictionary of English rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Preamble & Part V [Arts. 141 to 159]---Federal system of Government---Concept of "federalism" generally, and under the Constitution of Pakistan---Federal and Provincial authority and distribution of legislative authority---Structure, distribution and redistribution authority under the "Federal Principle" of the Constitution and concept of cooperation, as part of the Constitution---Features of "federalism", extensively explained.

The Oxford Handbook of Indian Constitution. edited by Sujit Choudhry Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta. Oxford University Press © 2016 Federal Scheme- Chapter 25; A K Brohi- Fundamental Law of Pakistan -1958. p 56-58; Guy Regimbald & Dwight Newman- The Law of the Canadian Constitution (Lexis Nexis) p.97-98 and Zubair Faisal Abbasi- Federalism, Provincial Autonomy and Conflicts. Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives. Friedrich Naumann Stiftung. 2010. p.2 rel

(c) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Arts. 142 & 143---"Federal Principle"---Concept of Federalism in the Constitution---Relations between Federation and Provinces---Distribution of Legislative Powers---Overlap of legislative competence between Provinces and Federation---Reading exclusivity of Federal legislative competence under Art.142(a) of the Constitution in situations where there was vertical sharing of legislative power between Federation and Province(s)---Cooperative/participatory federalism, concept of---Cooperative federalism as an intrinsic part of the Constitution of Pakistan---Horizontal and vertical sharing of Legislative powers between the Provinces and Federation---Concept of cooperative federalism prevails over and dilutes legislative exclusivity in Art.142 of the Constitution into a workable and Constitutionally compliant inclusivity---Nature, scope and extent of legislative exclusivity of Art.142 of the Constitution---Application of Art.143 of the Constitution in situations where Federal and Provincial Legislatures were locked in an unavoidable and ineluctable direct conflict---Concept of cooperative / participatory federalism, in the context of legislative powers of the Federation and the Provinces, extensively discussed.

International Conference on Cooperative Federalism , National Perspectives and International Experiences. New Delhi. Conference Booklet, 2016. p.1; https://definitions.uslegal.com/m/marble-cake-federalism/;Theories of Federalism, Ademola Ariyo, Adhoc Expert Group Meeting, 2003. Economic Commission for Africa. United Nations; Philip J Weiser - Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism and the Enforcement of Telecom Act. New York University Law Review -2011. vol.76 1692. At 1692/1697/1732; Reference re Securities Act, [2011] SCJ No. 66 and Madav Khosla, The Indian Constitution, Oxford 2012 Chapter 2 rel.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 142 & 143---Relations between Federation and Provinces---Distribution of Legislative Powers---Overlap of legislative competence between Provinces and Federation---Nature, scope and interpretation of Arts.142 & 143 of the Constitution---Cooperative federalism as a tool for interpretation of the Constitution---Subject-matter of Federal and Provincial laws---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial Law---Legislative overlap, resolution of---Cooperative / participatory federalism---Scope---Cooperative Federalism, being an intrinsic part of Constitutional design, was also an effective and potent interpretative tool for the courts---Overlap in legislative space between the Federation and the Province and the limits of exclusivity under Art.142 of the Constitution could be resolved through purposive interpretation with said Constitutional purpose in mind---Article 142 of the Constitution opened with words, "subject to the Constitution," which meant that while interpreting said Article, other provisions of the Constitution and foundational Constitutional principles envisaged in the Constitution would take preference over Art.142 of the Constitution---Legislative subjects where there was overlap, had to be contextualized within the Constitutional architecture of Federalism and made to coexist under principles of cooperative federalism---Courts must, therefore, favour functional coexistence of the Federal and Provincial statutes in cases where there was vertical sharing or an overlap of legislative powers---Cooperative federalism flowing through the Constitution helped prevail over and dilute the exclusivity of Art.142 into a more workable and Constitutionally compliant inclusivity; giving both the Legislatures space to co-exist and only in cases of irreconcilable inconsistency between the Federal and Provincial statutes, Art.143 of the Constitution provided a solution, but only as a last recourse.

Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue [1995] 3 R.C.S. 453, Para 162 and Attorney General for Saskatchewan v. Lemare Lake Logging [2015] 3 R.C.S. 419, para 21, 22 and 23 rel.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Arts. 142, 143, 141 Preamble & Fourth Sched. Part II, Item No.12----Cooperative/participatory federalism---Overlap of legislative competence between Provinces and Federation---Standards in institutions for higher education and research, scientific and technical institutions---Question before the High Court was "whether legislative power to set standards in education was exclusivity in the federal legislative domain, or whether subject of "education" falling also in the unwritten Residuary list, empowered Provinces to legislate on the subject"---Held, that while standards in institutions of higher education was a federal legislative subject, it also, indubitably, fell within the larger Provincial legislative subject of "education" and there was therefore an overlap of legislative competence in the area of education and standards of higher education between the Federation and the Provinces---Principle of "cooperative federalism" led to an understanding of Entry No. 12 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution---Federal or national standards by design would always be the baseline minimum national standards, reflective of national integrity and unity and such overarching national architecture of minimum standards provided a baseline for institutions of higher education---Provincial public sector universities and provincial governments exercising their legislative power under the Residuary List were fully empowered to go beyond these minimum standards by setting their own higher standard of excellence and Federation could not stifle or stunt the progress of higher education in the Provinces---In case of vertical power sharing, as in the case of education, federalism encouraged cooperation and interdepartmental coordination, which took the form of participatory or cooperative federalism---Federation could set standards in institutions of higher education, however, they would always pass as minimum or mean standards as they cater to all the public sector universities in the country and simultaneously, the Provinces were fully empowered to develop their own standards in institutions of higher education as long as they were not below the federal standards, which limitation supported national unity and the "federal principle".

Professor Yashpal and another v. State of Chhattisgarh and others AIR 2005 SC 2026 distinguished.

Modern Dental College and Research Centre and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others AIR 2016 SC 2601 rel.

(f) Higher Education Commission Ordinance (LIII of 2002)---

----S. 10---University of the Punjab Act (IX of 1973), Ss. 14(2) & 14(4)---Public Sectors Universities (Amendment) Act (LX of 2012), Ss.2 & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched. Part II, Item No.12 & Arts. 142, 143 & 199---Government of Punjab, Higher Education Department Notification No.SO(Univ.) 5-3/09, dated 7th April, 2015---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972) S. 3---Public sector universities---Vice Chancellors---Appointment criteria--Nature of guidelines issued for said appointments under Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 --- Competence of the Provincial Legislature to legislate, expand and improve upon such guidelines---Constitutional structure of federalism and cooperative federalism---Scope---Appellant impugned order of High Court whereby Ss.14(2) & 14(4) of the University of the Punjab Act, 1973 along with other similar provisions in statutes of various public universities, were struck down inter alia on the ground that per Entry No. 12 of Part II of the Fourth Schedule read with Arts. 142 & 143 of the Constitution, standards in institutions for higher education was within the exclusive domain of Federal Legislative Subject, on which the Provinces could not legislate---Validity---Impugned judgment over-emphasized on exclusivity of the federal legislature, sidelining the overarching constitutional structure of federalism and cooperative federalism, which prevailed over Art. 142 of the Constitution---Scheme of the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 provided for minimum guidelines and standards, giving leeway to the Province to improve on these standards exercising its own legislative and executive power---No conflict existed between Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002, setting minimum standards and S. 14 of the University of the Punjab Act, 1973 providing for qualifications, experience and criteria for appointment of a Vice Chancellor---Province, in the present case, had fully applied the minimum guidelines issued by the Higher Education Commission without objecting to its directory nature and view of the impugned judgment that setting standards in institutions of higher education fell within the exclusive domain of the federal legislature due to said Item 12, was not sustainable for the reason that Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 itself provided for minimum guidelines which were non-binding----Constitutional scheme of cooperative federalism gave space to both the federation and the province to have a functional co-existence---High Court observed that even if the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 provided standards (as opposed to minimum standards) in institutions of higher education, they would be contextualized in the Constitutional scheme and interpreted in a manner to promote cooperative federalism so that the federal and provincial standards smoothly co-existed and only in case of inescapable conflict between the two, would recourse be made to Art.143 of the Constitution to give pre-emptive status to the federal law---Impugned judgment declaring S.14(2) and (4) of the Act to be unconstitutional was therefore not sustainable in law as the same amounted to depriving federal Constitution of its new found vitality post eighteenth Constitutional Amendment and was set aside---Intra-court appeal was allowed, accordingly.

Kalyani Mathivanan v. K.V. Jeyaraj and others 2015 (6) SCC 363; Haji Nasir Mehmood v. Mian Imran Masood and others PLD 2010 SC 1089; Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabd and others PLD 2012 SC 132 and Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another PD 1988 SC 416 ref.

Modern Dental College and Research Centre and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others AIR 2016 SC 2601; Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 236; Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. through Chief Executive and another v. Muhammad Ashiq and others PLD 2006 SC 328; Major (Retd.) Barkat Ali and others v. Qaim Din and others 2006 SCMR 562 and Suo Motu Case No.13 of 2007 (PLD 2009 SC 217) rel.

Professor Yashpal and another v. State of Chhattisgarh and others AIR 2005 SC 2026 distinguished.

(g) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 154, 153, 142, 143 & Fourth Sched. Part II---Cooperative/ participatory federalism---Council of Common Interest (CCI)---Constitutional role and importance of the CCI under Art.154 of the Constitution over matters falling in Part-II of the Federal Legislative List---Scope---Legislative subjects under Part-II of the Federal Legislative List required a coordinated and intergovernmental policy and the CCI was to formulate and regulate policies in relation to matters in Part-II of the Federal Legislative List and to exercise supervision and control over related institutions---CCI also acted as an intergovernmental forum to avoid conflict and dysfunctionality between the policies of the provinces and the federation under vertical sharing of power and encouraged cooperative federalism and strengthened provincial autonomy---CCI could also formulate and regulate policies in respect of matters in Part-II of the Federal Legislative List and Constitutional wisdom behind this was to embed and mainstream participatory and cooperative federalism in national governance---Such policies, with Constitutional fiat behind them, may be considered by the Legislature while legislating on subjects falling under Part-II of the Federal Legislative List so that the footprint of Provincial autonomy and Federalism was visible in a proposed legislation which was also a constitutional requirement as Art.142 of the Constitution had been made subject to the Constitution.

Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills and 814 others v. WAPDA and others 1997 SCMR 641; Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. United Sugar Mills Ltd., Karachi PLD 1977 SC 397; Khawaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim v. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and another PLD 1992 SC 646; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 SC 473 and Khalid Malik and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1991 Kar. 1 rel.

(h) Higher Education Commission Ordinance (LIII of 2002)---

----S. 10---University of the Punjab Act (IX of 1973), Ss. 14(2) & 14(4)---Public Sectors Universities (Amendment) Act (LX of 2012), S.2 & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Fourth Sched. Part II, Item No.12 & Arts. 142, 143, 154 & 199---Government of Punjab, Higher Education Department Notification No.SO(Univ.) 5-3/09, dated 7th April, 2015---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972), S.3---Public sector universities---Vice Chancellors---Appointment criteria---Directions and declaration of the High Court in respect of, inter alia, legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature in the subject of higher education, appointment of Vice Chancellors, nature of guidelines issued by Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 and role of the Council of Common Interest (CCI).

High Court declared and held as under:---

i. That Federation can set standards in institutions of higher education under Entry 12 of Part-II of the Federal Legislative List, however, they will always pass as minimum national standards, as they cater to all the public sector universities in the country and maintain national unity and federal compact. Simultaneously, the Province, under the legislative subject of "education" in the unwritten residuary legislative list is fully empowered to develop standards in institutions of higher education for the Province, these standards can be higher and more stringent as compared to the federal standards, but they cannot be below the federal standards.

ii. That the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002, as it stands today, sets minimum and non-binding guidelines for the appointment of Vice Chancellors in public sector universities. Provincial legislature has the power to set standards i.e., procedures and criteria for selection of the Vice Chancellor, as long as, they are not below the minimum and baseline standards set by the Federation. If any future legislation under Entry 12 Part-II of the Federal Legislative List provides for mandatory minimum standards they will be binding on the Provincial Government, but in no manner restrain the provincial government to develop standards higher than the federal standards in order to improve the quality of higher education in the Province.

iii. That section 14(2) and (4) of the University of the Punjab Act, 1973 and the corresponding provisions in the statutes of other public sector universities are intra vires the Constitution.

iv. That Notifications dated 3-3-2015 and 7-4-2015 issued by the Higher Education Department, Government of Punjab are valid and intra vires the Act subject to the directions (given above) and to be followed in future appointments to the post of Vice Chancellor.

v. That the role of CCI over the years has been disturbingly dormant. CCI is directed to review all the standards in institutions of higher education framed by HEC in order to make them constitutionally compliant in the next six months.

vi. that the Higher Education Commission, as well as, Federal Government was directed that in future, Higher Education Commission will work under the supervision and control of CCI and any policies or regulations prepared by the Higher Education Commission shall be routed through the CCI and will only be considered to be legally binding, if approved by CCI.

vii. The Government/Chancellor was directed to proceed with the appointment of the Vice Chancellors for the four public sector universities namely:

a. Lahore College for Women University, Lahore

b. University of Sargodha

c. University of the Punjab, Lahore, and

d. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif University of Engineering and Technology, Multan; strictly on the basis of the recommendations of the Search Committee by considering a panel of three persons in the case of each University, however, all future appointments in the public sector universities in Punjab will be made in accordance with law settled in the present judgment. The provisional appointments made vide interim orders dated 19.12.2016 and 12.01.2017 shall come to an end when appointment of the regular Vice Chancellors is made in compliance of present judgment.

High Court observed that there has been slight confusion whether the impugned judgment has set aside the appointments made in the other seven public sector universities as cases of four public sector universities were before the Single Judge. Division Bench held as a matter of clarification that impugned judgment was restricted to the (abovementioned) four universities and Division Bench could not upset or affect the appointments made in the other seven universities, which were valid and intact.

Appellant(s) by

Shakil-ur-Rehman, Advocate General, Punjab, assisted by Shan Gul, Anwaar Hussain and Barrister Qasim Ali Chowhan, AAGs.

Muhammad Amir Sohail for the appellant.

A.K. Dogar for the applicant/appellant in connected matter.

Ahmad Waheed Khan for the Applicant.

Taimoor Khan for the appellant in connected matter.

Ijaz Khalid Khan for the Applicant.

Khurram Saeed for the appellant in connected matter.

Respondents by:

Nasar Ahmad and Imran Aziz Khan, Deputy Attorneys General for Pakistan.

Sajid Ijaz Hotiana, Malik Awais Khalid, Saad Rasool and Shahzad Shaukat for the Respondents.

Nazeer Hussain, Director General-I, HEC, Islamabad.

Humayun Rasheed, Law Officer, HEC, Islamabad.

Ishtiaq Ahmad, Section Officer (Universities) Higher Education Deptt. Government of the Punjab.

Ms. Zia Batool, D.G. Q&R Accreditation, Punjab Higher Education Commission, PHEC.

Dr. Mubashir Nadeem, Director Training PHEC.

Dr. Zafar Iqbal Qureshi, Member Search Committee (on Court's call).

Research assistance by:

Qaisar Abbas and Mohsin Mumtaz, Civil Judges/Research Associates at LHCRC.

P L D 2017 Lahore 545

Before Ayesha A. Malik, J

LUNG FUNG CHINESE RESTAURANT through Atiq Ahmed and 2 others---Petitioners

Versus

PUNJAB FOOD AUTHORITY through Secretary and 6 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.25124 of 2015, heard on 27th January, 2017.

Punjab Food Authority Act (XVI of 2011)--

----Ss. 13, 16, 40 & 52---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 10-A & 199---Constitutional petition---Punjab Food Authority---Powers of the Food Safety Officer---Improvement notice---Nature and exercise of powers under Ss.13 & 16 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---Distinction between nature of powers of Food Safety Officer under Ss. 13 & 16 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---Precautionary principle in food safety laws---Scope---Question before High Court was whether Punjab Food Authority and its Food Safety Officer(s) were required to issue notice and provide an opportunity of hearing before exercising powers of sealing premises under S.13(1)(c) of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011, and whether the said provision was ultra vires the Constitution---Validity---Contention that in order to invoke powers under S.13(1)(c) of the Punjab Food Authority Act 2011, the Food Safety Officer had to first issue improvement notice under S.16 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 before sealing premises, was misconceived as powers under said S.13 were independent of powers under S.16 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011---Powers under S.16 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 were invoked when a food operator had failed to comply with provisions of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011, and rules and regulations thereunder, despite notice from a Food Safety Officer---Section 13 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 on the other hand authorized Food Safety Officer to carry out functions of regulating and monitoring the food business---Fundamental difference existed between Ss.13 & 16 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011, in that the former was an enforcement mechanism while the latter was a regulatory tool allowing the Food Safety Officer to ensure that food provider provided safe food---Food Safety Officer could exercise powers under S.13 as well as under S.16 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011, in different situations as neither section was dependent upon the other---Clear intent of the Legislature was to give the Food Safety Officer the ability to take action not only to stop the harm but also to prevent further harm in cases where imminent danger to public health was involved---Section 13 of the Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011 was based on the precautionary principle and Food Safety Officers must have self-executing powers that allowed them to act immediately which was necessary to protect the overriding objective public health and food safety---High Court observed that the temporary nature of Food Safety Officer's order and ability to review any action taken by the said officer satisfied the due process requirement and there was no violation of Art.10-A of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Khawaja Ahmad Hassaan v. Government of Punjab and others 2005 SCMR 186; Messrs Pearl Continental Hotel, through Executive Manager, Khyber, Peshawar v. Government of N.W.F.P through Secretary Excise and Taxation of N.-W.F.P, Peshawar and 3 others PLD 2005 Pesh. 25; Mst. Afsana v. District Police Officer (Operation), Khairpur and 5 others 2007 YLR 1618 and Government of KPK and others v. Khalid Mehmood 2012 SCMR 619 ref.

Ms. Shehla Zia and others v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693; Imrana Tiwana v. Province of Punjab and others 2015 CLD 983; Adeel ur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2005 PTD 172; Regarding Pensionary Benefits of the Judges of the Superior Courts PLD 2013 SC 829; Justice Khurshid Anwar Binder v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 483 and Warid Telecom (Pvt) Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority 2015 SCMR 338 rel.

M. Irfan Khan Ghaznavi for Petitioners

Mrs. Samia Khalid, AAG along with Muhammad Khurshid, Assistant Director (Legal), Punjab Food Authority, Lahore for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Lahore 558

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C J

MOHAMMAD SHAFIQ-UR-REHMAN---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary and another---Respondents

Writ Petition No.7122 of 2017, decided on 15th March, 2017.

General Statistics (Reorganization) Act (XIV of 2011)--

----Ss. 31 & 2(c)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 14, 9, 25 & 199---United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, ratified by Pakistan in 2011, Art. 31---Constitutional petition---Public interest litigation---Population census---Inclusion of persons with disabilities in the national census---Security of person---Inviolability of dignity of man---Equality of citizens---Scope---Contention of petitioner was that the housing and population census under Ss.2(c) & 31, of the General Statistics (Reorganization) Act, 2011 should include all classes of the population and by not enumerating persons with disabilities in the upcoming national census, the same was incomplete and violative of Fundamental Rights---Validity---Per Art.31 of the United Nations Convention On The Rights Of Persons With Disabilities, ratified by Pakistan, in 2011; an international obligation was cast upon Pakistan to collect appropriate information regarding persons with disabilities in order to formulate and implement policies to give effect to the purposes of the Convention---Lack of data and information on disability and situation of persons with disabilities at the national level contributed to invisibility of persons with disabilities in official statistics, presenting an obstacle to achieving development planning and implementation that was inclusive of persons with disabilities---Depriving persons with disabilities from being included and counted in the National Census would offend their welfare and future prospects as the State had no credible information regarding their population, hence, exclusion of persons with disabilities from Census (head count) was in violation of right to life and human dignity under Arts. 9 & 14 of the Constitution besides being discriminatory under Art.25 of the Constitution---High Court observed that having a general headcount of persons with disabilities was more important than having no information at all regarding the same, and the said mechanism would not upset the calendar of the upcoming population census and was workable---High Court directed that census codes, in machine readable formats, should include collecting information regarding disability along with gender and Pakistan Bureau of Statistics to ensure that the next population census included a special column relating to persons with disabilities along with various categories of disabilities---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Monitoring and Evaluation of Disability-inclusive Development, United Nations and Writ Petition No.37499 of 2016 rel.

Mohammad Nabeel Khan Dahir and Hamza Khalid Randhawa for Petitioner.

Nasar Ahmad, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan.

Ms. Hina Hafeezullah Ishaq, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.

Akbar Ali Dogar, Joint Census Commissioner, Pakistan Bureau Statistic, Lahore.

Khalil-ur-Rehman Rana, Deputy Census Commissioner/Admn, Pakistan Bureau Statistic, Lahore.

P L D 2017 Lahore 563

Before Ayesha A. Malik, J

TRADE SERVE INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED and others---Petitioners

Versus

PAKISTAN ELECTRONIC MEDIA REGULATORY AUTHORITY and others---Respondents

Writ Petitions Nos.2446, 4366, 4367, 4368, 4369, 4370, 4371, 12908, 12909 of 2013 and 29949 of 2014, decided on 12th May, 2017.

(a) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)--

----S. 14---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 73 & 19---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Radio Broadcast Station Operations) Regulations, 2012. Reglns. 7 & 9---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009, R. 9---Money Bill---Nature of procedure---"PEMRA Fund"---Grant of licence by Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority, (PEMRA)---Licence to operate radio broadcasting---Licence fee---Renewal of such licence fee---Nature of licence fee deposited into the PEMRA Fund in terms of S.14 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Scope---Petitioners, impugned vires of S. 14 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, in reference to imposition of "licence fee" and renewal for the same, for radio broadcasting licences---Contention of petitioners inter alia was that "renewal fee" was a "tax" and not a fee, as there was no quid pro quo for the said fee, and that the same was not passed as a Money Bill within meaning of Art.73(3)(a) of the Constitution---Validity ----Per Art.73(3)(a) of the Constitution, it was clear that a "licence fee" or "fee" was not a "tax" and that a licence fee was distinct from a fee or a charge for services rendered and it was not necessary that every licence have a quid pro quo or that licence fee or renewal fee be passed through a Money Bill---Article 73(3)(a) of the Constitution distinguished between "licence fee" and a "fee for services rendered" which meant that a licence fee did not require any quid pro quo but there must exist a correlation between fee charged and cost of administration under the relevant law---Licence fee must commensurate with the cost of regulating although exact arithmetical equivalence was not expected and such licence conferred a right on the licence-holder to do something which it otherwise could not do---PEMRA, in the present case, was required to regulate the licence-holder to ensure compliance of the law and terms of the licence---High Court observed that per the terms of the Constitution, a licence fee could be regulatory in nature where the regulator imposed a fee for regulating activities of the licence-holder and hence licence fee and its renewal fee did not need to be passed through a Money Bill nor did it require any quid pro quo.

Secunderabad Hyderabad Hotel v. Hyderabad Municipal AIR 1999 SC 635; A.P. Paper Mills Ltd. v. Government of A.P. and another 2000 8 SCC 167; Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. (1983) 4 SCC 353; (1983) 3 SCR 843 and Corpn of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema AIR 1965 SC 1107: (1965) 2 SCR 477 rel.

(b) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)-

----Ss. 39, 4(3), 20 & Preamble---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 Rr.5, 8 & 12---Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Radio Broadcast Station Operations) Regulations, 2012, Reglns. 4, 6, 7 & 9---Broadcast licence(s) issued by Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)---Radio broadcasting licence(s)---Grant of licence---Renewal of licence on expiry of the licence term---Procedure for renewal---Determination of quantum of renewal fee(s)---Rebidding tantamount to grant of fresh licence---Nature and scope---In terms of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 and the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Radio Broadcast Station Operations) Regulations, 2012, a clear process had been set out for renewal of radio broadcasting licence and said prescribed process did not contemplate rebidding for the purpose of determining renewal fee or for renewal of licence, and in such circumstances, rebidding for renewal purposes, tantamount to issuance of fresh licence which was clearly contrary to statutory procedure---Rule 12 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009 and Regln.9 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Radio Broadcast Station Operations) Regulations, 2012 when read together created a statutory right for licence-holder to have licence renewed on terms and conditions provided---PEMRA was obligated to follow prescribed Rules and Regulations and could not go beyond its delegated powers and set out a new process for renewal of licence for radio broadcasting---Manner in which renewal fee was to be determined was clearly stipulated in the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Radio Broadcast Station Operations) Regulations, 2012 and Regln.9 of the same, provided that renewal fee shall be the applicable licence fee plus the rate of inflation calculated by the State Bank of Pakistan---In such cases where the licence fee was regulatory, where no service or privilege was granted by the government authority and where the only purpose of the licence was regulatory for enforcement of statutory requirements, then such a fee could not be excessive.

Pakcom Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 44 ref.

For Petitioners

Raza Kazim, Muhammad Nawaz Bajwa and Usman Raza Jamil and Ms. Fatima Malik (in W.P.No.2446 of 2013).

Jam Asif Mehmood, M. Saim Hashmi, Behzad Haider, Wasif Riaz, Salman Faisal and Ms. Farah Salman (In W.Ps. Nos. 4366, 4367, 4368, 4369, 4370 and 4371 of 2013).

Ali Sibtain Fazli and Hasham Ahmad (in W.Ps.Nos.12908 and 12909 of 2013).

Raheel Kamran Sheikh, Abuzar Salman Khan and Shahzad Burki (in W.P.No.29949 of 2014).

For Respondents

Muhammad Zikria Sheikh, DAG.

Salman Akram Raja, Muhammad Azam Zia, Tariq Bashir, Bilal Bashir, Yasir Islam Chaudhary and Ms. Unsa Manzoor for Respondent PEMRA along with Tahir Farooq Tarar, Head Legal PEMRA, Punjab.

P L D 2017 Lahore 584

Before Atir Mahmood, J

WAJID ALI---Petitioner

Versus

PAKISTAN BAR COUNCIL and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.15279 of 2016, decided on 3rd April, 2017.

Higher Education Commission Ordinance (LIII of 2002)---

----S. 10(1)(o)---University of the Punjab Act (IX of 1973), S.28(h)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.143---Inconsistency between Federal and Provincial Laws---Powers and functions of the Higher Education Commission---Issuance of degree equivalence certificate by University of the Punjab, in the presence of similar powers available to the Higher Education Commission---Scope---Contention of the petitioner, inter alia, was that the University of the Punjab could not issue an equivalence certificate for a degree issued by its counterpart university and only some other department such as the Higher Education Commission could do the same---Validity---Reading of S.10(1)(o) of the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 revealed that it was the domain of the Higher Education Commission to determine equivalence and recognition of degrees issued by various institutions within and outside the country---Section 20(2)(h) of the University of the Punjab Act, 1973 gave such powers to the University of the Punjab as well, however, per Art.143 of the Constitution, the Higher Education Commission Ordinance, 2002 having been enacted by the Parliament (Federal Legislature) had precedence over the University of the Punjab Act, 1973 to the extent of repugnancy---High Court observed that respondent University of the Punjab was neither competent nor required to issue equivalence certificates for degrees issued by other universities and the same could be solely done by Higher Education Commission---High Court further observed that practice of a parallel system of issuing equivalence certificates by the University of the Punjab amounted to usurpation of powers of the Higher Education Commission and was unconstitutional as the legislative field for higher education fell within the jurisdiction of the Federal Legislature, which undisputedly prevailed over the Provincial Legislature---High Court declared the act/function of the University of the Punjab in issuing equivalence certificates as illegal, void and of no legal effect---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Rais Munir Ahmed v. Returning Officer/Additional District and Sessions Judge, Sadiqabad and 4 others 2008 CLC 1111 rel.

Sheraz Zaka for Petitioner.

Amir Mahmood for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Lahore 588

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J

JUDICIAL ACTIVISM PANEL---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF THE PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.32328 of 2014, decided on 28th April, 2017.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Public interest litigation---Constitutional petition pertaining to Public Interest Litigation, withdrawal of---Scope---Such petition could only be withdrawn with the permission of the Court as it was not a dominus litis, and the petitioner in such a petition, had no right to withdraw the Constitutional petition on his/her sweet will.

AIR 1988 SC 2211; S.P. Anand v. H.D. Dewe Gowda AIR 1997 SC 272 and Muhammad Alam and others v. Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan through Additional Chef Secretary and others PLD 2014 Bal. 1 rel.

(b) Words and phrases---

----"Dominus Litis"---Meaning---"Dominus Litis" was a person to whom a suit belongs and also meant "master of a suit"; and was a person who had real interest in the decision of a case.

Mohammad Azhar Siddique for Petitioner.

P L D 2017 Lahore 590

Before Abdul Rahman Aurangzeb, J

ADEEL SULTAN---Petitioner

Versus

KHALID RASHEED and 2 others---Respondents

Civil Revision No. 2822 of 2013, heard on 2nd March, 2017.

(a) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---

----S. 11---Competency to enter into a contract---Scope---Property belonging to a minor sold by his father or natural guardian---Legality---Section 11 of the Contract Act, 1872 provided that competence of father to contract on behalf of minor could not be questioned until and unless the same was found against the interest of the minor---Benefit of minor had to be viewed as the paramount consideration---Every contract on behalf of minor must be for his benefit.

Muhammad Mursaleen v. Syed Noor Muhammad Hussaini PLD 1968 Kar. 163 and Barkat Ali v. Aftab Ahmad 1992 CLC 1490 ref.

(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---

----S. 11---Competency to enter into a contract---Scope---Immovable property belonging to a minor---Circumstances under which a legal guardian could sell immoveable property belonging to a minor stated.

Legal guardian could sell immovable property belonging to his ward/minor in the following circumstances;

(i) Where the guardian could obtain double the value of property; or

(ii) Where the minor had no other property, and the sale was absolutely necessary for his maintenance; or

(iii) Where the minor died in debt, and there were no other means of paying the debt but by sale of the property; or

(iv) Where there were legacies to be paid, and no other means of paying them but by sale of the property or

(v) Where the income or produce of the property was not sufficient to meet the expenses of keeping it; or

(vi) Where the property was falling into decay or may be in danger of being destroyed; and

(vii) Where the property had been usurped and the guardian had reasons to fear that there was no chance of fair restitution.

Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob Sindhu for Petitioner.

Haris Azmat and Mohammad Bilal Ramzan for Respondents Nos.1 and 2.

Ex parte: Respondent No.3.

P L D 2017 Lahore 597

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C J

Mian SHABIR ASMAIL---Petitioner

Versus

CHIEF MINISTER OF PUNJAB and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.9156 of 2017, heard on 20th April, 2017.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Public interest litigation---Nature, scope and precondition for petition pertaining to Public Interest Litigation.

"Public interest litigation" is an effort to provide legal representation to groups and interests that have been unrepresented or under-represented in the legal process. These include not only the poor and the disadvantaged but ordinary citizens.

"Public interest litigation" is an innovative strategy which has been evolved over the years for providing easy access to justice to the weaker sections of the humanity and is a powerful tool in the hands of public, spirited individuals and social action groups for combating exploitation and injustice and securing for the underprivileged segments of society their social and economic entitlements.

"Public interest litigation" is, therefore, in the interest of public at large. It is a legal action or proceeding initiated for the protection or enforcement of the rights of public at large. It is totally different from the traditional litigation which is essentially of adversary character, where there is a dispute between two litigating parties, one making claim or seeking relief against the other and that other opposing such claim or resisting such relief. Public interest litigation is brought before the court not for the purpose of enforcing the rights of one individual against another, as happens in ordinary litigation, but it is intended to promote and vindicate public interest, it demands that violation of constitutional or legal rights of large number of people who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and un-redressed.

"Public interest litigation" is essentially a cooperative or collaborative effort on the part of the petitioner, the State or public authority and the Court to secure observance of the constitutional or legal rights, benefits and privileges conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the community and to provide social justice to them. Then a court entertains public interest litigation, it does not do so in a caviling spirit or in a confrontational mood or with a view of tilting an executive authority or seeking to usurp it, but its attempt is only to ensure observance of social and economic rescue programmes, legislative as well as executive, framed for the benefit of the have-nots and the handicapped and to protect them against violation of their basic human rights, which is also the constitutional obligation of the executive. The court thus merely assists in realization of the constitutional obligations. Such sacrosanct public spiritedness forms the foundation of public interest litigation.

It is, therefore, a precondition that any public interest litigation is grounded in bona fide public interest. the Courts do not allow that the corridors of justice are polluted by vested interest or unscrpulous litigants. The Court must, therefore, be satisfied regarding the credentials of the petitioner, the prima facie correctness of the information placed before the Court, the specific and definite nature of the information and seriousness of the pleadings. The court must distinguish between the public interest litigation and a publicity interest litigation or private interest litigation or politics interest litigation.

Public interest litigation should not be allowed to become a deal to settle personal vendetta or to wreak vengeance or to malign any party or to bring anybody into disrepute with baseless allegations. There must be at all times, real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and credible information for maintaining a cause before the court. Public interest litigation should not be mere adventure or an attempt to carryout fishing expedition to settle personal scores.

V.G. Ramachandran's Law of Writs, Sixth Edition Volume-I Pp-961-966, 969 and 1000-1001 and Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India AIR 2004 SC 1923 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.35 & 35-A---Punjab Public Procurement Rules, 2014, Preamble---Constitutional jurisdiction of high Court---Public interest litigation---Abuse of process of public interest litigation---Imposition of special costs on such petitioner---Public procurement---Public Policy---Scope---Petitioner, impugned procurement of police uniforms by the Provincial Government and police Force, inter alia, on the ground that the same was a violation of public procurement laws---Validity---Perusal of the record, in the present case, revealed that the tender for the procurement was done strictly in accordance with the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014 and no specific violation of law was pointed out by petitioner---Introduction of new police uniforms was a policy issue and did not call for interference by the High Court under Art. 199 of the Constitution---High Court observed that there had been no serious effort made by the petitioner to verify whether contract for such procurement was in accordance with the Punjab Public Procurement Rules, 2014 and that such petitions brought a bad name to public interest litigation and lowered credibility of the same in the eyes of the Court and such practice was therefore strongly deprecated---High Court further observed that the petitioner had not only abused the process of public interest litigation but also burdened the Court and drawn upon its time and resources, besides, eating into the time allocated for other cases---Constitutional petition was dismissed, with imposition of special costs of Rupees Ten Thousand on petitioner, accordingly.

Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary Peshawar and others v. Hayat Hussian and others 2016 SCMR 1021; Kawas B. Aga and another v. City District Government, Karachi (CDGK) through Nazim-e-Ala and others PLD 2010 Kar. 182; The Postmaster-General, Northern Punjab and (AJ&K), Rawalpindi v. Muhammad Bashir and 2 others 1998 SCMR 2386; Inyatullah v. Sh. Muhammad Yousaf and 19 others 1997 SCMR 1020 and M.D. Tahir, Advocate v. Federal Government and others PLD 1999 Lah. 409 rel.

Abdullah Malik, M. Rizwan Gujjar, S. Parveen Mughal and Hafza Mafia for Petitioner.

Anwaar Hussain and Ahmad Hassan Khan, Assistant Advocaes-General Punjab for Respondents.

Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqi, Shehryar Kasuri and Raza Imtiaz for Respondent No.9.

Kamran Adil, AIG (Legal), Hman Rihts Cell.

Rana Ilyas, AIG (Legal), Punjab.

Saleem Chughtai, Muhammad Imtiaz Ali and Asif Ali Sheikh, DSPs. (Legal).

P L D 2017 Lahore 604

Before Muhammad Ali, J

Mst. RUBINA KAUSAR---Petitioner

Versus

ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.12443 of 2015, heard on 18th January, 2017.

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 42---Suit for declaration---Inheritance---Determination of paternity through DNA test---Scope---Application for DNA test of plaintiff was dismissed by the Trial Court but same was accepted by the Appellant Court---Validity---Paternity of plaintiff was never disputed during the lifetime of her deceased father---Defendant had questioned the paternity of plaintiff when she claimed share in the property of her deceased father---DNA test could only be conducted when same was inevitable in rare and exceptional circumstances---No one could be forced to have his/her blood test samples obtained for conducting of DNA test, court had to consider the facts and circumstances of each case---If a person did not give consent for such test then he/she could not be compelled for test which would amount to interference with personal liberty---Court had power to order for DNA test or any blood test in order to ascertain the truth about allegations but such order should be passed with the consent of the concerned party and not in routine---Compelling a person to undergo a DNA test could have serious consequences---Court should safeguard and protect personal liberty of every citizen---Paternity issue could be proved by oral and documentary evidence recorded by the Trial Court---Impugned judgment passed by the Appellant Court was set aside having been passed without lawful authority---Application seeking DNA test was dismissed---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Salman Akram Raja and another v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and others 2013 SCMR 203; Mst. Shamim Akhtar v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and another PLD 2015 Lah. 500; Goutam Kundu v. The State of W.B. AIR 1993 SC 2295; Khizar Hayat v. Additional District Judge, Kabirwala and 2 others PLD 2010 Lah. 422 and Azeem Khan v. Mujahid Khan 2016 SCMR 274 rel.

Waqar Ahmad Bhatti for Petitioner.

Iftikhar Ahmad Bhatti for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.

P L D 2017 Lahore 610

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C J

AMEEN MASIH---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.623 of 2016, decided on 19th June, 2017.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance (XXVII of 1981), Item 7(2) of the Second Sched.---Divorce Act (IV of 1869) Ss.7 & 10---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court in relation to matters affecting minority rights and ecclesiastical beliefs of minorities vis-à-vis family/personal law---Distinctiveness of State law and personal law---Scope---Question before the High Court related to the Constitutionality of the repeal of S. 7 of the Divorce Act, 1869 via the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance 1981; whereby grounds for Christian divorce, other than adultery, were abolished---Contention of members of the Christian Clergy was, inter alia, that divorce other than on the ground of adultery was not permitted in the Holy Bible and judicial examination of the impugned repeal amounted sitting in judgment over the personal/Biblical law of Christians and that Biblical law or Christian personal law fell outside the jurisdiction of High Court and any judicial interference in the same by the High Court would be a direct affront to the religious sensibilities of the Christians---Validity---High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction was to adjudicate matters in accordance with the Constitution and the law and there was no room for personal interest, belief, passion or inclinations in the same---Biblical Law or Christian personal law was not under discussion in the present case and it was a State law, Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance, 1981 which was under review---High Court was only to judicially review the existing State law on the yardstick of Constitutional values and fundamental rights guaranteed to the minorities-cum-citizens under the Constitution and nothing else and apprehension of the clergy that High Court was deciding against teachings of the Holy Bible was unfounded ----High Court observed that the present case was not about examining the canonical or Biblical law but about assessing the legality and Constitutionality of item 7(2) of the Second Schedule of Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance, 1981.

(b) Christian Personal Law---

----"Divorce"---Meaning of---Meaning of the term "divorce" in the context of Chirstian personal law---Two distinct types of divorces under Christian law---Scope---Term "divorce" as a verb meant "to separate" and the word "divorce" confined to its strict legal sense, meant legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage---Divorces under Christian law were generally of two distinct types: Absolute divorce, or divorce "a vinculo matrimonii" was a judicial dissolution of the marriage ordered as a result of marital misconduct or other statutory cause arising after the marriage ceremony, whereas limited divorce, sometimes referred to as divorce "a mensa et thoro," "divorce from bed and board," or legal separation was a change in status by which the parties were separated and were precluded from cohabitation, but actual marriage was not affected---Limited divorce was sometimes termed as judicial separation, which suspended the marriage relation and modified its duties and obligations, leaving the bond in full force.

Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume 27A. p.16 Thomson/West. Ed. 2008 rel.

(c) Christian Personal Law ---

----Dissolution of marriage under Christian personal law---Concept of "no fault" divorce and "irretrievable breakdown of marriage" in Christian personal law---Legislation to incorporate concept of "no fault" divorce in various jurisdictions---Liberalization and emancipation of Christian Divorce Law across the world, particularly in Christian-majority countries---Statutory introduction of grounds other than adultery for dissolution of marriage/divorce---Right to human dignity and right to a happy family life as basis for liberalization of Christian divorce laws---Concept and various aspects of Christian divorce law in various jurisdictions, extensively examined.

Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume 27A. p.16 Thomson/West. Ed. 2008; John D. Cannell - Abolish Fault-Oriented Divorce in Ohio-As a service to society and to restore dignity to the domestic relations courts; The effect of divorce law on Divorce rates in Europe-Liberted Gonzalez. March 2006 (IZA DP No.2023) and Sovereign States and defendant territories - Chirstianity by Country; Law Commission of India, 15th Report (Law relating to marriage and divorce amongst Christian in India); Law Commission of India, 22nd Report (Chirstian marriage etc. Bill); Letter addressed to the Law Commission by Ms. Aud Sonia Reberts, New Delhi, dated 15th September, 1981; Aharon Barak - Human Dignity-The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right - Cambridge 2015. Pp.292-293; Aharon Barak-The Judge in a Democracy. Princeton. P.86 and Nadeem Asghar Nadeem and others v. Province of the Punjab and others 2015 CLC 1509 rel.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Arts. 30(2) & 29---Principles of Policy under the Constitution---Constitutional responsibility with respect to Principles of Policy---Bar under Art.30(2) of the Constitution against calling into question the validity of an action or of a law on ground that the same was not in accordance with the Principles of Policy---Scope---Principles of Policy provided Constitutional aspirations, goals and mission statement for the State of Pakistan and it was a Constitutional obligation of the State and its organs and authorities to synchronize with and promote said Principles---Constitutional Principles of Policy nourished roots of democracy and helped actualize and fertilize Constitutional values and were a roadmap to democracy and for ensuring that the State remained on course to achieve social, economic and political justice---State or any authority may take time to achieve the said Constitutional aspirations due to the non-availability of resources but they could not at any stage or at any cost go against the Principles of Policy---Article 3(2) of the Constitution protected a law which was not in accordance with the Principles of Policy, that is, where the law had not yet fully actualized the Principles of Policy but did not protect a law that was inconsistent with the Principles of Policy.

Minerva Mills Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1980 SC 1789; Miss Farhat Jaleel and others v. Province of Sindh and others PLD 1990 Kar 342 and Shirin Munir and others v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Health, Lahore and another PLD 1990 SC 295 rel.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 9---Fundamental rights---Right to life and liberty---Phrase "right to liberty", meaning of---Right to liberty meant the state of being free within society from oppressive restrictions imposed by authority on one's behaviour.

Oxford Dictionary of English rel.

(f) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--

----Ss. 7 & 10---Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance (XXVII of 1981), Item 7(2) of the Second Sched.---United Kingdom Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Section 1 of Part I of Chapter 18---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 2A, 9, 14, 25, 20, 29, 36, 270A & 199---Christian personal law---Dissolution of marriage in Christian personal law---Grounds for dissolution of marriage other than adultery---Irretrievable breakdown of marriage/no-fault divorce---Constitutionality of the repeal of S. 7 of the Divorce Act, 1869 which provided Pakistani Christians grounds for divorce under the United Kingdom Matrimonial Causes Act 1973---Minority Rights---Safeguard of legitimate interest of religious minorities under the Constitution---Freedom of Religion---Scope---Petitioner, who was a Christian, impugned repeal of S. 7 of the Divorce Act, 1869, vide Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance, 1981---Contention of petitioner, inter alia, was that the repealed S. 7 of the Divorce Act, 1869 made available grounds for divorce under the United Kingdom Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 , other than adultery, and the repeal of the same was unconstitutional---Validity---Impugned amendment (deletion of S.7 of the Divorce Act, 1869) was to be reviewed and examined on the touchstone of the minority rights under the Constitution available to the petitioner and minorities in Pakistan---There existed liberalization in the grounds of divorce all over the Christian world and the UK Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 also provided for irretrievable breakdown of marriage, which freedom would have been automatically available to the Christian minority in Pakistan had S.7 of the Divorce Act, 1869 been available on the statute book---Right to life and liberty were separate Fundamental Rights under the Constitution and impugned amendment limited the choice of a person to divorce and forced a person to lead an unhappy and an oppressive life unless he or she could prove charge of adultery against a spouse---Such limitation perpetuated a dead marriage and impaired quality of life and curtailed the liberty of a person by forcing him to live through an unhappy family life against his free choice---Impugned amendment by limiting grounds of divorce stunted growth and freedom of minority rights in Pakistan and deprived Christians from fashioning their divorce law with the same freedom, emancipation and liberation as Christians around the world---Limited grounds of divorce under the State divorce law when compared with the rights enjoyed by the Christians in the world, amounted to discriminating against the Christian minority in Pakistan and such gap and deprivation in State law, could best be abridged by extending the same rights enjoyed by Christians in majority countries to the Christians in Pakistan which could be easily achieved by restoring S.7 of the Divorce Act,1869 as was the case prior to the impugned amendment/repeal---High Court observed that impugned amendment did not pass the test of minority rights and in particular the Fundamental Rights to life, liberty, dignity and non-discrimination and therefore Item 7(2) of the Second Schedule to Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance,1981 was declared to be unconstitutional---High Court held that S.7 of the Divorce Act, 1869 stood restored, in the manner it stood in the year 1981, making available to the Christians of Pakistan the relief based on the principles and rules of divorce under United Kingdom Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 and that the term "subject to the provisions of the Act" used in S. 7 of the Divorce Act, 1869 was to be read down in order to make Ss.7 & 10 of the same work together and to make them Constitutionally compliant---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Sindh High Court Bar Association through its Secretary and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and others PLD 2009 SC 879; Miss Asma Jilani v. The Government of the Punjab and another PLD 1972 SC 139; Wattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697; Al-Jehad Trust through Raeesul Mujahideen Habib-ul-Wahab-ul-Khairi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 324; Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan through Secretary and others PLD 2010 SC 61 and Mst. Nazir Yasin v. Yasin Farhat PLD 2000 Lah. 594 ref.

A Question of Faith-A Report on the Status of Religious Minorities in Pakistan. Jinnah Institute Research Report. 2011 p.14; Minority Rights-International Standards and Guidance for implementation-2010. UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner; Mumtaz Oad and 2 others v. Sindh Public Service Commisison through Secretary and 2 others 2015 CLC 1605; District Bar Association Rawalpindi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2015 SC 401; Suo Motu Case No.1 of 2014 etc. PLD 2014 SC 699; Aharon Barak - Human Dignity-The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right - Cambridge 2015. Pp.292-293; Aharon Barak-The Judge in a Democracy. Princeton. P.86; Oxford Dictionary of English; Alleged Corruption in Rental Power Plants etc.: in the matter of 2012 SCMR 773; Wattan Party and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 292; All Pakistan Newspapers Society and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 1; Watan Party and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 997; Ms. Shehla Zia and others v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693; The Employees of the Pakistan Law Commission, Islamabad v. Ministry of Works and 2 others 1994 SCMR 1548; Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh and others 2013 SCMR 66; Arshad Mehmood v. Commissioner/Delimitation Authority, Gujranwala and others PLD 2014 Lah. 221; Liaqat Ali Chughtai v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Railways and 6 others PLD 2013 Lah. 413; Raja Rab Nawaz v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2014 SCMR 101; N.-W.F.P. Public Service Commission and others v. Muhammad Arif and others 2011 SCMR 848; Pakcom Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 44; Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through Chairman and others v. Samina Masood and others PLD 2005 SC 831; Mst. Attiyya Bibi Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary of Education (Ministry of Education), Civil Secretariat, Islamabad and others 2001 SCMR 1161; I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041; Shrin Munir and others v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Health, Lahore and another PLD 1990 SC 295; Minerva Mills Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1980 SC 1789; Miss Farhat Jaleel and others v. Province of Sindh and others PLD 1990 Kar. 342; Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1988 SC 416; Federation of Pakistan and another v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar PLD 1989 SC 26; Sindh High Court Bar Association through its Secretary and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and others PLD 2009 SC 879; Miss Asma Jilani v. The Government of the Punjab and another PLD 1972 SC 139; Wattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697; Al-Jehad Trust through Raeesul Mujahideen Habib-ul-Wahab-ul-Khairi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 324; Chief Justice of Pakistan Iflikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan through Secretary and others PLD 2010 SC 61; Dr. Mobashir Hassan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2010 SC 265; Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and others PLD 2012 SC 870; Mrs. Marie Palmer v. O.R.J. Palmer PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lah. 200; Messrs Chenone Stores Ltd. through Executive Director (Finance Accounts) v. Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and 2 others 2012 PTD 1815 and Nadeem Asghar Nadeem and others v. Province of the Punjab and others 2015 CLC 1509 rel.

Sheraz Zaka for Petitioner.

Respondents by:

Nasar Ahmad and Muhammad Javed Kasuri, Deputy Attorney Generals for Pakistan.

Ms. Hina Hafeezullah Ishaq, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.

Rana Zafar Iqbal, Standing Counsel for Pakistsan.

Anwaar Hussain and Ahmad Hassan Khan, Additional Advocates General, Punjab assisted by Miss Rutaaba Gul for Respondent.

Ms. Uzma Rafique, Deputy District Attorney/Senior Law Officer of Respondent No.2.

Ijaz Farhat, President Christian Lawyers.

Kashif Alexander, Ch. Aneel Ashiq, Salvance Jacob, representing Christian Community.

Ms. Hina Jillani, amicus curiae.

Mian Zahid, Law Officer, HR & MA.

Ms. Fauzia Viqar, Chairperson, Punjab Commission on the Status of Women.

Ms. Shunila Ruth, MPA.

Ms. Marry Gill, MPA (Christian Community).

Kamran Michael, Senator/Federal Minister Human Rights Pakistan.

Khalil Tahir Sandhu, Minister for Human Rights and Minorities Affairs, Punjab.

Father Emanuel Yousaf Mani, Sr. Priest, St. Anthony Church, Lahore.

Wilson John Gill, Bishop, Chairman/founder United Holiness Church Pakistan (Korea).

Rt. Rev. Sabstian Francis Shaw, Archbishop of Roman Catholic Church, Lahore.

Rt.Rev. Irfan Jamil, Bishop of Lahore, Church of Pakistan, Mall Road, Lahore.

Rev. Dr. Majid Abel, Moderate Presbyterian Church of Pakistan, Empress Road, Lahroe.

Bishop Azad Marshall, Co-Adjutor Bishop of Raiwind Diocese, Church of Pakistan and President, National Council of Churches in Pakistan.

Revd. Shahid P. Mehraj, Dean of Lahore Cathedral.

Johnson Bernard, Deputy Registrar, Lahore High Court, Lahore on Court's Call.

Asif Aqeel, Human Right Activist/Journalish.

Assisted by:

Qaisar Abbas and Mohsin Mumtaz, Civil Judges/Research Officers, Lahore High Court Research Centre (LHCRC) and Ali Uzair Bhandari (law intern).

P L D 2017 Lahore 640

Before Muhammad Farrukh Irfan Khan, J

ALL PAKISTAN PARAMEDICAL STAFF FEDERATION UNIT, SZPMI, LAHORE---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.6104 of 2012, decided on 16th June, 2017.

Constitution of Pakistan--

----Arts. 270AA, 254, 90, 91 & 199---Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act (X of 2010), Preamble, Ss. 96 & 101---Federal Cabinet Office Memorandum/Notification No. 4-3/2012-Min.I dated 14.02.2012---Devolution to Provinces---Scope, nature and effect of the omission of the Concurrent List by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010---Effect of the cut-off date for devolution provided in Art.270AA(8) of the Constitution---Declaration and continuance of laws post Constitutional (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2000---Devolution of an autonomous hospital/research institution under the administrative control of the Federal Government, via the Cabinet Division---Protection under Art. 254 of the Constitution with regards to failure to comply with requirement as to time provided in Art. 270AA(8) of the Constitution---Scope---Petitioners impugned the transfer of the administrative control of "Shaikh Zayed Postgraduate Medical Institution" ("SZPMI") from the Federal Government to the Provincial Government vide Cabinet Office Memorandum/Notification No.4-3/2012-Min.I dated 14.02.2012 on orders of the Prime Minister---Contention of the petitioners inter alia was that the said transfer was illegal and unconstitutional as the devolution of "SZPMI" did not have legal sanction---Contention of the respondents, inter alia, was that the "SZPMI" having been established by a Trust Deed was an autonomous Department of the Federal Government and had been competently devolved to the administrative control of the Province---Validity---Perusal of the alleged Trust Deed clearly reflected that none of its objects specifically provided that any research institution was to be established in Lahore or anywhere else and the Federation of Pakistan had failed to show nexus of the Trust Deed with the "SZPMI" or failed to show that the purported Trust was instrumental in any activity involved in the creation of the "SZMPI" or purchase land for the same---Said devolution of the "SZPMI" took place on 14.02.2012 much after the cut-off date provided in Art.270AA(8) of the Constitution which could not be regarded as a mere irregularity curable under Art.254 of the Constitution---Keeping in view the role of the Implementation Committee constituted for the purpose of devolution, it was clear that the process for devolution of the "SZPMI" could only be legally and validly completed in terms of Arts.270AA(8) & 270AA(9) of the Constitution---Impugned Office Memorandum/Notification was issued by the Prime Minister to the exclusion of the Cabinet, and per Art.90 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister alone was not the Federal Government, therefore, the same did not carry legal sanction behind it and as such was liable to be struck down on the Constitutional plane---High Court held that "SZPMI" was an institution established by the Federal Government and not by the purported Trust Deed and therefore all notifications regarding the Trust and Board of Trustees were held to be ultra vires of the Constitution and of no legal effect; and that the impugned Notification/Office Memorandum was unconstitutional and coram non judice and all acts made pursuant to the transfer shall cease to have any legal effect---High Court further held that the "SZPMI" stood restored to the Federal Government in the position before the issuance of the Notification/Office Memorandum and was returned to the administrative control of the Federation, and all the appointments made by the Provincial Government were held to be void ab inito---High Court directed that the Federal and Provincial Governments shall cooperate and provide full assistance in so far as the transfer was concerned---Constitutional petitions were allowed, accordingly.

Ghazala Perveen's case 1994 PLC (C.S.) 684; Sheikh Zayed Hospital and Post Graduate Medical Institute v. Dr. Muhammad Saeed 2010 PLC (C.S.) 967 and Salman Kazmi v. Secretary of Cabinet Division PLD 2014 Lah. 451 ref.

C.P.D.1692 of 2011 and Messrs Mustafa Impex, Karachi and others v. The Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others 2016 PTD 2269 rel.

Shafqat Mehmood Chohan, Mian Bilal Bashir (assisted by Raja Tasawar Iqbal), Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal, Faisal Rafiq Mirza and Mirza Ahsan Ahmad Bhindar for Petitioners.

Ahmar Bilal Sufi, Hafiz Tariq Naseem, Jawad Tariq Naseem and Ghulam Ali Raza for Respondents.

Irfan Akram, D.A.G.

Malik Abdul Aziz Awan, A.A.G.

P L D 2017 Lahore 665

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C J

HASSAN SHAHJEHAN---Petitioner

Versus

FPSC through Chairman and others---Respondents

Writ Petitions Nos.28579 and 23578 of 2016, heard on 13th June, 2017.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 199, 201, 202, & 203---Interpretation of Constitutional construct of the Judicature---Exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution---Nature of the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court vis-à-vis Provincial character of the High Court---Relief granted by the High Court while exercising its Constitutional jurisdiction could not go beyond the Provincial boundary and affect any other Province, area or its peoples---Concept and contours of the territorial jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution, expounded.

Constitutional terms like "High Court for each Province" "within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court" and "all courts subordinate to it" construct a High Court, which has a provincial character. The term "within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court" ubiquitously recurs throughout Article 199 emphasizing the territorial limitation on the jurisdiction of a High Court. The term "All courts subordinate to it" repeated in Articles 201, 202 and 203 place the Provincial High Court atop a provincial pyramidical hierarchy of courts. Constitutional architecture of a Provincial High Court provides that while it enjoys judicial power to examine all laws or actions of the federal, provincial and local governments or authorities, it can only do so if the cause of action arises or the respondent government or authority is located or if the impugned act or order affects a person within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court i.e., within the Province. As a corollary, the relief granted or the writ issued by the High Court also remains within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and can only benefit or affect a person within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The relief cannot go beyond the Provincial boundary and affect any other Province or Area or its people. So for example, if a federal law or federal notification is struck down by Lahore High Court, it is struck down for the Province of Punjab or in other words the federal law or the federal notification is no more applicable to the Province of Punjab but otherwise remains valid for all the other Provinces or Areas. Unless of course the Federation or the federal authority complying with the judgment of the Lahore High Court, make necessary amends or withdraw the law or the notification. Which of course would then be open to challenge by the other Provinces or Areas or their people, if they so decide. The other eventuality is that the Federation or the federal authority may or may not enforce the said law or notification in other Provinces, as a matter of administrative decision and instead challenge the judgment of the Lahore High Court before the apex Court of the country. These are the operational repercussions and effects of a judgment, setting aside a federal law or federal notification or decision. However, on a purely constitutional and legal plane, the federal law or federal notification remains in existence for the rest of the country but for the Province of Punjab. This is further fortified by the fact that in case the same federal law or federal notification is challenged in any other Province or Area, the High Court concerned is not bound by the decision of the Lahore High Court and can declare the same federal law or federal notification to be valid law (Reference Article 201 of the Constitution). Therefore, under the Constitution, while the High Courts can judicially examine and strike down a federal law or federal notification, infact, the said federal law or notification is made non-applicable to the extent of the Province unless the matter is finally decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan or else if the Federation or the federal authority decide to withdraw or amend the law on their own, in compliance of the judgment.

What does "Within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court" mean? Relying on the constitutional jurisprudence developed over the years and the provincial constitutional architecture of a High Court, writ cannot be issued by High Court against any person which is located geographically outside the territorial limits of the Province, having no physical or legal presence within the Province.

If the order or action of the Government or Authority (federal or provincial), present within the Province, affect the rights of a person within the Province, writ can be issued against the said Government or Authority (irrespective of its federal character) and relief given to the aggrieved person located within the Province.

Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1997 SC 334; Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Charsadda v. Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others 1997 SCMR 1874; Asghar Hussain v. The Election Commission Pakistan PLD 1968 SC 387; Messrs Al-Iblagh Limited, Lahore v. The Copyright Board, Karachi and others 1985 SCMR 758; Messrs Sethi and Sethi Sons through Humayun Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others 2012 PTD 1869; The Oxford Handbook of Indian Constitution, edited by Sujit Choudhry Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Oxford University Press  2016 Federal Scheme Chapter 25 and Guy Regimbald and Dwight Newman-The Law of the Canadian Constitution (Lexis Nexis) p.97-98 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Nature of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution---Scope---Per developed Constitutional jurisprudence and the Provincial Constitutional architecture of a High Court, a writ could not be issued by a High Court against any person who was located geographically outside the territorial limits of the Province, having no physical or legal presence within such Province---If an impugned order or action of the Government or Authority (Federal or Provincial), present within a Province, affected the rights of a person within such Province, a writ could be issued against the said Government or Authority (irrespective of its federal character) and relief given to the aggrieved person located within the said Province.

Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1997 SC 334; Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., Charsadda v. Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and 2 others 1997 SCMR 1874; Asghar Hussain v. The Election Commission Pakistan PLD 1968 SC 387; Messrs Al-Iblagh Limited, Lahore v. The Copyright Board, Karachi and others 1985 SCMR 758 and Messrs Sethi and Sethi Sons through Humayun Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others 2012 PTD 1869 rel.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Preamble, Part VII [Arts.175 to 212] & Part V [Arts. 141 to 159]---Interpretation of the Constitution---Federal nature of the Constitution---Concept of "Federalism"/"Federal Principle" generally, and under the Constitution of Pakistan---Federalism/federal principle in the context of the Judicature---Vertical sharing of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the High Courts---Concept of Judicial federalism with emphasis on its effect on the territorial jurisdiction of High Courts elucidated.

The commonly accepted features of a federal constitution are: (i) existence of two levels of government; a general government for the whole country and two or more regional governments for different regions within that country; (ii) distribution of competence or power - legislature, executive, judicial, and financial - between the general and the regional governments; (iii) supremacy of the constitution - that is, the foregoing arrangements are not only incorporated in the Constitution but they are also beyond the reach of either governments to the extent that neither of them can unilaterally change nor breach them; (iv) dispute resolution mechanism for determining the competence of the two governments for exercising any power or for performing any function. Federalism is in fact the basis of the division of powers...The principle of Federalism is a central organizational theme of the Constitution and represents a political and legal response to underlying social and political realities... A federal system of government allows different provinces to pursue specific policies tailored to the particular concerns and interests of residents in that province. The Principle of Federalism also enables provinces to enact specific statues to pursue specific collective goals, and may promote different cultures and linguistic minorities within a specific province or areas. At the same time federalism allows citizens to construct and achieve goals on a national scale through a Federal Government acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. Consequently, federalism is key to enable citizens to participate in different collectivities and to pursue objectives at local, provincial and national levels.

Federalism or Federal Principle under Constitution of Pakistan envisages independent federating units with autonomous legislature, executive and judiciary. Chapter 1 of Part V of the Constitution provides for distribution of legislative power between the Federation and the Provinces. Chapter 2 of the same Part deals with distribution of executive power between the Federation and the Provinces. Chapters 1 to 3 of Part-VII deal with Judicature and the vertical sharing of jurisdiction between the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the High Courts, as well as, the horizontal jurisdictional limits between the High Courts. The Constitution provides a separate High Court for each Province and a Supreme Court of Pakistan with an overarching jurisdiction with an overlapping power with the High Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. The provincial jurisdictional limits, delineating judicial power between co-ordinate High Courts on the basis of territory and the vertical overlap of judicial power under Article 184(3) between the High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan is judicial federalism. Every Provincial High Court and the High Court of the Islamabad Capital Territory has its own jurisdictional space. Any order passed by a High Court is, therefore, effective in the Province and has merely a non-binding persuasive value in other Provinces. Province is a federating unit and has its own legislature, executive and judiciary. Similarly, within the Province, the provincial High Court also functions on the same Federal Principle and exercises judicial power within the limited provincial jurisdictional space or within the Islamabad Capital Territory.

The Oxford Handbook of Indian Constitution edited by Sujit Choudhry Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Oxford University Press 2016 Federal Scheme- Chapter 25 and Guy Regimbald and Dwight Newman- The Law of the Canadian Constitution (Lexis Nexis) p.97-98 rel.

(d) Forum non conveniens, doctrine of---

----Principle, concept and scope---Principle of forum non conveniens was a discretionary power, which allowed Courts to dismiss a case where another court or forum was much better suited to hear the same---Such dismissal did not prevent a plaintiff from re-filing his or her case in a more appropriate forum and said doctrine also allowed a Court with jurisdiction over a case to dismiss the same on ground that convenience of the parties and interest of justice would be better served if said case was brought in a court having proper jurisdiction at another venue---Doctrine of forum non conveniens i.e. that some other forum was more appropriate in the sense that the same was more suitable for the ends of justice---Court may decline to exercise jurisdiction, after giving consideration to the interests of the parties and the requirements of justice, on ground that a case could be suitably tried only in another court---Basic principle was that a court was satisfied that there was some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which was the appropriate forum for the trial of the action (meaning such a forum in which the case may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice).

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forum_non_conveniens; https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/forum%20non%20conveniens; Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws, thirteenth Edition, Volumel, London Sweet and Maxwell 2000 and The Conflict of Laws, Seventh Edition, South Asian Edition 2010 rel.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 199, 184(3) & 27---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Civil Service---Safeguard against discrimination in services---Federal Principle of the Constitution---Exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction by High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution, where relief sought would affect other Provinces---Application of the doctrine of "forum non conveniens" in the exercise of the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Petitioner challenged the Constitutionality of geographical allocation of quota amongst Provinces in the national Competitive Examination of the Central Superior Services ("CSS"), inter alia, on the ground that the same violated Art.27 of the Constitution---Validity---High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction enjoyed power to sit in judgment over quota allocated to Punjab, and its power under Art.199 of the Constitution was "subject to the Constitution" and would remain subject to the Federal Principle of the Constitution---In the present case, quota in question was inter-linked and combined with the quotas of other Provinces and any interference by the High Court would affect national allocation of quota in other Provinces and areas---Relief, in such respect, could not be granted to a person in Punjab without depriving the allocation of quota of the people of other Provinces, therefore, such a relief or writ issued by High Court would amount to travelling beyond the territorial limits of the Province and would offend the federal principle and the core value of the Constitution---Application of the principle of 'forum non conveniens" meant that the present case could only be resolved by the Supreme Court---His Lordship observed that if the quota was struck down by High Court, it would not only abolish the Punjab quota but also the quota of other Provinces for the purposes of CSS Examination and such interference would be Constitutionally inappropriate and impermissible---High Court while declining to exercise its Constitutional jurisdiction, left the parties to approach the Supreme Court of Pakistan for the redressal of their grievance---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Ahmad Yar Chohan v. Federal Public Service Commission and 2 others 1998 MLD 1832; Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal and others v. The Honourable Lahore High Court, Lahore and others 1997 SCMR 1043; Messrs Sethi and Sethi Sons through Humayun Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others 2012 PTD 1869; K.B. Threads (Pvt.) Limited through Chief Executive and others v. Zila Nazim, Lahore (Amir Mehmood) and others PLD 2004 Lah. 376 and High Court Bar Association and others v. Government of Balochistan through Secretary, Home and Tribal Affairs Department and 6 others PLD 2013 Bal. 75 ref.

Kh. Isaam Bin Harris and Khalid Ishaq for Petitioner (in W.P. No.28579 of 2016).

Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal and Afrasiab Mohal for Petitioner (in connected writ petition).

Respondents by:

Nasar Ahmad, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan.

Ms. Hina Hafeezullah Ishaq, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.

Anwar Hussain, Additional Advocate General Punjab.

Amanullah Kanrani, Advocate General Balochistan.

Syed Ali Raza, Advocate General, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Malik Akhtar Hussain Awan, AAG, Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Rafey Altaf and Saad Rasool amici curiae.

Assisted by

Qaisar Abbas and Mohsin Mumtaz, Civil Judges/Research Officers, Lahore High Court Research Centre (LHCRC).

P L D 2017 Lahore 683

Before Shahid Karim and Muzamil Akhtar Shabir, JJ

Malik IQBAL AHMAD LANGRIAL, EX-MPA---Petitioner

Versus

THE STATE and another---Respondents

Writ Petition No.5938-Q of 2013, heard on 6th February, 2017.

Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----S. 78(3)(d), 82 & 94---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.4(h), 190 & 193---Filing of false declaration by candidate---Cognizance of offence---Private complaint---Sessions judge, jurisdiction of---Petitioner was accused of filing false declaration at the time of submission of his nomination papers and he was summoned by Sessions Judge---Plea raised by petitioner was that complaint could not be filed by Election Commission directly in the Court of Sessions Judge---Validity---Election Commission or his nominee, in respect of cognizable offence under S.82 of Representation of the People Act, 1976, could file complaint under S.94 of Representation of the people Act, 1976---Sessions Judge had the jurisdiction to directly entertain such complaint---No illegality or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction was pointed out in the orders passed by Sessions Judge---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Mian Najibuddin Oawaisi v. Aamir Yar and others PLD 2011 SC 1 rel.

Rana Muhammad Asif Saeed for Petitioner.

Muhammad Shahid Khan Sherwani for Respondent No.2.

P L D 2017 Lahore 689

Before Jawad Hassan, J

KHURRAM GHULAM RASOOL---Petitioner

Versus

SHAZIA KHURRAM and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.6955 of 2017, heard on 24th March, 2017.

(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----Ss. 5, 17-A & 21-A---Suit for recovery of maintenance---Interim maintenance---Restraining order at the time of institution of suit for defendant to alienate his property---Question was as to whether provision of S.21-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 could be invoked without any order of interim decree under S.17-A of the Act---Petitioner/defendant contended that restraining order not to alienate his property was illegal as the same was passed by Family Court at the outset of proceedings and respondent/plaintiff moved application for interim maintenance after few months---Respondent contended that restraining order was necessary to secure legal rights in the light of apprehension that petitioner might sell his property---Validity---Family Court was not justified in passing the order restraining the petitioner from alienating his property which was not subject matter of the suit because no hard circumstances existed which had made the Family Court to pass an order which otherwise amounted to attachment before judgment---Record showed that plaintiff on the first date of hearing filed application under S.21-A of the Act, on the ground that the defendant was living abroad and would sell the property, therefore, he be restrained from alienating his property---Family Court on the first date had passed status quo order that the defendant was restrained to alienate or sell the property so that expected decree be executed effectively---Such was a premature act of the plaintiff to file the application on the first day because it was against the mandate of procedure provide in the Act as the interim or final decree, had not been passed---Interim maintenance was allowable under S.17-A of the Act, and after recording of evidence and hearing the parties final decree was to be passed and when maintenance was not being paid in pending suit, then S.21-A of the Act could be invoked, if all the ingredients of S.21-A were fulfilled---Intention of the Legislature was very clear with regard to the attachment before judgment that to preserve and protect the property, which was in dispute and for the satisfaction of the decree, then interim order was to be passed; that the basic criteria given for passing restraining order of the property in dispute was for the satisfaction of the decree if considered necessary---Family Court merely on presumptions and apprehensions had assumed without any cogent and convincing evidence on record that after passing of maintenance order, the defendant would abscond out of country and decree would not be satisfied---Family Court had not followed the prescribed procedure provided in law---Power given in S.21-A of the Act was presumptive and not punitive---Jurisdiciton of the court was of an extraordinary in nature and should be exercised sparingly and strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the law---Present suit related to maintenance and Family Court had misconstrued the provision of S.21-A of the Act, which could only be exercised in a suit where subject matter was that of property, if the decree (interim or final) was not satisfied by the defendant, in other words, the party, filing the suit, should have a semblance of right or title over the property---For exercising the powers under S.21-A of the Act, the criteria for the court was to see that party filing the suit had semblance of right or title over the property; compelling cause of action was to be stated by the court; previous record of the defendant was to be seen that he had entered into any agreement to sell or he was trying to further alienate his property through any other mode, like gift or exchange and whether interim maintenance was not being paid by him---Defendant, in the present case, had never refused to maintain his family and was steadily paying maintenance every month, thus complying with the interim decree which was being satisfied---Present suit was only for maintenance and relief sought was being adhered to on the form of payment of interim maintenance, so issuance of restraining order was undesirable---By merely filing a suit/application, or raising any plaint against the defendant did not constitute a right to restrain the defendant from alienating his property---Facts from which the intention of the defendant might be inferred for selling/disposing of the property or portion of the property were to be proved through satisfactory evidence that i.e. an attempt to sell property, benami transfer, rapid sale of the property, past conduct---Transaction of disposing of property must be subsequent to the suit---Mere fact that plaintiffs had claimed for maintenance allowance against the defendant and had an apprehension that the defendant would abscond because he was living abroad for earning his livelihood, was not enough to pass the impugned order---Section 21-A of Act was preventive and not punitive---Family Court had passed impugned order merely on apprehension without application of judicial mind---Impugned order was set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Bank Alfalah Limited v. Messrs Callmate Telips Telecom Ltd. and 5 others 2016 CLD 1202 and Muhammad Athar Hafeez Khan v. Messrs Ssangyong and Usmani JV PLD 1962 SC 119 ref.

(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----Ss. 5, 17, 17-A & 21-A---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVIII, R.5---Suit for recovery of maintenance---Interim maintenance---Applicability of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Scope---Law Officer had argued that since Civil Procedure Code, 1908 was not applicable as per S.17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 but if on any matter, the provisions of the Act were silent provisions of C.P.C. were applicable---Validity---Principles of S.21-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 were similar to the principles of O.XXXVIII, R.5, C.P.C., hence, the objective of O.XXXVIII, R.5, C.P.C. was only preventive and not punitive.

Ghulam Murtaza v. Additional District Judge (ii) D.G. Khan and 2 others 1999 CLC 81; Muhammad Ather Hafeez Khan v. Messrs Ssangyong and Usmani JV PLD 1962 SC 119; Mohiuddin Molla v. (1) The Province of East Pakistan (2) Abdus Sobhan and (3) Ketab Ali PLD 2011 Kar. 605; Messrs STFA C. & Co. v. Naeem Khan 2005 CLC 1270 and Mrs. Rukhsana Yasmeen (Yahya) v. Nazaz Ali and 7 others 2012 MLD 171 ref.

Ch. Riaz Akhtar for Petitioner.

Yasir Ali for Respondents.

Ms. Sadia Malik, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan on Court's call.

Ahmad Khan and Amad-ud-Din Fazil, Research Officers/Civil Judges, Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan

P L D 2017 Lahore 698

Before Muzamil Akhtar Shabir, J

SALMAN AHMAD KHAN---Petitioner

Versus

JUDGE FAMILY COURT, MULTAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.17899 of 2016, decided on 22nd December, 2016.

(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched. & S. 11(1-A)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.164---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Suit for dissolution of marriage---Recording of statement through video link---Evidence recorded through modern device---Scope---Wife filed application for recording her statement through video link which was accepted by the Family Court---Validity---Family Court could regulate its own procedure---Violation of undertaking by the party could not deprive Court of its jurisdiction---Family Court could adopt its own procedure and was not bound by the rigors of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Family Court could proceed on the premise that every procedure was permissible unless prohibited---Evidence received through modern evices was admissible under Art. 164 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, however Qanun-e-Shahadat was not strictly applicable to Family Court but Family Court was not barred from receiving such evidence under any provision of law---Petitioner for invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court was bound to show that court below had exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or there was jurisdictional defect in the order impugned or order was illegal or perverse---No jurisdictional defect had been pointed out in the impugned order passed by the Family Court---Constitutional petition as dismissed in circumstances.

Muhammad Sajjad v. Additional District Judge PLD 2015 Lah. 405; Shakeela Bibi v. M. Israr 2012 MLD 756; Syed Shahid Baig v. Lubna Riaz 2004 CLC 1545; Syed Ghazanfar Abbas Rizvi v. Syed Haider Abbas 2000 YLR 1482 and Khalil ur Rehman Bhatti v. Razia Naz 1984 CLC 890 rel.

(b) Administration of justice---

----Technicalities should not stand in the way of justice.

Miss Fouzia Kausar Bhatti for Petitioner.

P L D 2017 Lahore 703

Before Ibad-ur-Rehman Lodhi, J

MUHAMMAD BASHIR---Appellant

Versus

Chaudhary ABDUL RASHEED---Respondent

Regular First Appeal No.177 of 2011, heard on 20th February, 2017.

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2---Qarz-e-Hasna---Scope---Plaintiff contended that though loan facility extended to the defendant was named as Qarz-e-Hasna but a pronote and receipt were also separately executed---Plaintiff submitted that term Qarz-e-Hasna actually denoted to a loan---Term was not used as a fiscal transaction amongst creature of pronote---Defendant contended that Qarz-e-Hasna was a loan repayable at borrower's convenience which was not recoverable unless the borrower was in a position to repay the same---Defendant denied signatures and thumb impression on the pronote and the receipt---Validity---Holy Quran is the basic and primary source of law and it is complete code of life---Term Qarz-e-Hasna was not coined by anybody, rather it was found in holy Quran itself---Qarz-e-Hasna/goodly loan signified whatever was given to another selflessly and absolutely with the belief that he would get the reward in the next world---Stipulation, however, was that the loan should be a "goodly" one i.e. it should not be tainted with selfish designs and it should be given for the sake of Allah, for the purpose of pleasing Allah---Term Qarz-e-Hasna was not available for a loan to be extended by a person in this world to another person---Although basic transaction was termed by the plaintiff in his plaint and evidence as Qarz-e-Hasna, but at the same time, such transaction was reduced into writing in the shape of pronote and receipt showing such fiscal transanction in between the parties---Execution of pronote although had been denied by the defendant, but both documents were shown to have been signed by the defendant---Signatures had been denied but not only Trial Court but High Court had also obtained his signatures in open court and, while comparing the same with the signatures available on referred documents, this was the consensus that both the documents were duly signed by the defendant---With the consent of the plaintiff/decree holder, the decretal amount was allowed by the High Court to be paid by the defendant/judgment debtor by means of monthly installments---Any single default would entitled the decree holder for lump sum recovery of the remaining decretal amount and for that purpose executing court, if approached, would be at liberty to proceed against judgment debtor---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Sura Al-Baqra, Ayats 245 and 267; Tadabbar Quran, Jild-e-Awal by Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi; Sura Al-Maida, Ayat No.12; Sura Al-Hadeed, Ayat Nos.57 and 16; Ahadid by Hazrat Abdullah Bin Masood; Sura Al-Hadeed, Ayat No.18; Sura Al-Tighabun, Ayat No.17; Sura Al-Muzammal, Ayat Nos.20 and 25 ref.

Haroon Irshad Janjua for Appellant.

Muhammad Kashif for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Lahore 709

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C.J.

Messrs LEO COMMUNICATION (PVT.) LTD. and others---Petitioners

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2581 of 2017, heard on 18th July, 2017.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 19---Fundamental right of freedom of speech---Freedom of speech in the context of broadcast of content through electronic media and wider Constitutional and democratic values---Nature, object, scope and contours of fundamental right to freedom of speech, explained.

Article 19 of the Constitution provides right to freedom of speech and expression. "Speech" means the expression or communication of thoughts or opinions in spoken words. An expression of or the ability to express thoughts and feelings by articulate sounds or a sequence of lines written for one character in a play. "Expression" means the action of making known one's thoughts or feelings; the conveying of feeling in a work of art or in the performance of a piece of music; writings, speech, or actions that show a person's ideas, thoughts, emotions or opinions. Any dramatic work is, therefore, a symbol of speech and expression. The right to communicate and receive ideas, knowledge, information, beliefs, theories, creative and emotive impulses by speech or by written word, theatre, dance, music film, through a newspaper, magazine drama or book is an essential component of the protected right of freedom of speech and expression. The broadcast of ideas, culture, history, literature, opinions, thoughts, emotions and art through the medium of plays and dramas signifies freedom of speech and expression in a country.

The concept of freedom of media is based on the premise that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is sine qua non to the welfare of the people. Such freedom is the foundation of a free government of a free people. Any attempt to impede, stifle or contravene such right would certainly fall foul of the freedom guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan.

The nature and extent of this freedom and fundamental right determines the quality and maturity of democracy in a country. Any unwarranted or arbitrary change in the content of the broadcast abridges the fundamental right of the petitioner company under Article 19 of the Constitution. The balance between the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression on the one hand and public interest on the other, defines the outlook, mindset and tolerance of the people of any country. Nations are enriched by the cross-currents of ideas and thoughts; they progress by expanding their frontiers of freedom; by encouraging plurality and diversity and not by being insular and inward looking. Fundamental rights are the heart and soul of a living Constitution and must at all times be ready to embrace and protect the sensibilities and sensitivities of the people. They must be progressively and purposively interpreted to advance the frontiers of freedom, individual autonomy and free choice. Such vibrance and vitality is the hallmark of a living constitution in a democracy.

Black's Law Dictionary page 1617-10th Edn.; Oxford Dictionary; Ajay Gautam v. Union of India and others AIR 2015 Delhi 92; Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and others PLD 2016 SC 692; Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Simms [1999] 3 ER 400 [1999] UKHL 33; Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. and others v. Government of N-W.F.P. through Secretary Law and others PLD 2002 SC 460; Reference No.01/2012 (Reference by the President of Pakistan under Art.186 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973) PLD 2013 SC 279 and Hafiz Junaid Mahmood v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2017 Lah. 1 rel.

(b) Public Interest ---

----Concept and meaning of---Public interest or collective community interest was a basket of various public interests, including public morality, public order, public health, national security and foreign policy of the country besides fundamental rights of others---Public interest was the general welfare of a populace considered as warranting recognition and protection and something in which the public as a whole had a stake---Anything was said to be in "public interest" if it contributed to the wellbeing of the general public.

Black's Law Dictionary page 1617-10th Edn.; Mian Ayaz Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and 3 others PLD 2010 Lah. 230 and American Hetitage (R) Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edn. 2011, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company 21 Jul. 2017 http//www.thefreedictionary.com/ public-interest rel.

(c) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)---

----Ss. 30(2), 20, 27 & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 19, 199 & Preamble---Power of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority to vary conditions, suspend or revoke the licence---Variation of broadcast licence in "public interest"---Determination as to what constituted "public interest" in terms of S.30(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 --- Prohibition of broadcast media or distribution service operation ---- Fundamental right to freedom of speech---Scope---Petitioner company held licence granted by Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority ("PEMRA") whereby it was allowed to air/broadcast a certain percentage of Indian content---Petitioner impugned Circular issued by respondent PEMRA whereby the terms and conditions of the said license were varied and it was prohibited from broadcasting the Indian content---Contention of the petitioner, inter alia, was that such variance and alteration in its licence was illegal and did not show necessity of public interest in terms of S.30(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Contention of respondent PEMRA, inter alia, was that the consideration behind impugned Circular was ban placed on Pakistani content by a private Indian Channel, and therefore, the same was done on the principle of reciprocity---Validity---Reasonable restrictions in terms of Art.19 of the Constitution, statutory terms and conditions of the license, prohibitions under Ss.20 & 27 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002, and requirements of the License of the petitioner as well as the Code of Conduct for TV Broadcasters under the said licence; constituted factors that endangered and jeopardized public interest, especially in the context of free speech and expression---Principle of reciprocity based on a reaction to a decision of a private Indian channel did not pass test of reasonable restrictions under Art.19 of the Constitution and question as to whether prohibitions provided under the law or the Licence were attracted in present case, did not arise, as there had been no such act or decision on behalf of the Licensee/petitioner---High Court observed that the only consideration that outweighed freedom of speech under the Constitution was a substantive, tangible, existing and sufficient public interest as described in the Constitution and the law, and refusal to air Pakistani content by a private Indian channel did not imperil or jeopardize any public interest in Pakistan---High Court held that impugned Circular was illegal and unconstitutional and was accordingly set aside, with the observation that PEMRA was free to invoke S.30(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 in appropriate circumstances, in order to protect and safeguard public interest---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

(d) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)---

----S. 30(2) --- Constitution of Pakistan, Preamble & Art. 19 ---- Power of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to vary conditions, suspend or revoke licence of a broadcaster---Variation of licence in public interest---Prohibition to broadcast certain content---Determination of what constituted "public interest" to prohibit content under S. 30(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---Fundamental right to freedom of speech---Restrictions on the fundamental right to freedom of speech in the context of preambular Constitutional values---Scope---Thin line existed between something in public interest and against public interest and right balance and equilibrium had to be maintained between the two---What might appear to many to be against the public interest could also be in the public interest, if looked at differently and for effective evaluation of the existence of public interest, subject matter must be filtered out through preambular Constitutional values of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, social, political and economic justice, freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association and an effort must be made to advance the frontiers of freedom by advancing inclusivity, diversity and plurality in society---Restrictions in terms of "public interest" must be substantive, real, proximate, tangible and immediate and not remote, conjectural or far fetched and only if public interest existed in said terms, could PEMRA take action under S.30(2) of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---While PEMRA must be resolute and vigilant in safeguarding public interest, it must also guard the freedom of speech and expression with the same unwavering commitment and vigour.

Ms. Asma Jahangir for Petitioners.

Tahir Mahmood Ahmad Khokhar, Deputy Attorney General for Pakistan.

Mansoor Usman Awan for Respondents/PEMRA along with Tahir Farooq Tarrar, Head Legal for Respondents.

Mohsin Mumtaz,Civil Judge/Research Associate at LHCRC for Research Assistance.

P L D 2017 Lahore 723

Before Muhammad Farrukh Irfan Khan, J

GEPCO and others---Petitioners

Versus

ARSHAD MEHMOOD---Respondent

Civil Revision No.598 of 2017, decided on 17th May, 2017.

Electricity Act (IX of 1910)--

----S. 12---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for declaration and injunction---Interim injunction, grant of---Electric supply line---Land of private owner---Plaintiff was owner of the land on which authorities intended to install tower for laying down electricity supply lines---Plea raised by plaintiff was that authorities did not seek any permission from him for installing such tower---Trial Court granted interim injunction in favour of plaintiff and the same was maintained by Lower Appellate Court---Validity---High voltage electricity transmission line was being laid over the land owned by plaintiff and S. 12 of Electricity Act, 1910, barred the authorities to lay down any electricity supply line or other work without the consent of its owner or occupier---In case of any objection by owner/occupier the authorities were bound to obtain written permission form District Magistrate which was not undertaken by authorities before laying transmission line over the land of plaintiff---Mandatory provisions of law were not complied with by authorities before initiating the project, therefore, prima facie plaintiff had good arguable case in his favour---Imminent danger to the lives of public at large existed as such ingredients of irreparable loss and balance of convenience also leaned in favour of plaintiff---Trial Court was fully justified in accepting application under O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2, C.P.C. read with S.151 C.P.C. which order was rightly maintained by Lower Appellate Court---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction declined to interfere in concurrent orders passed by two Courts below---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Nisar Ahmad v. Masood Akhtar and others 2011 SCMR 226 ref.

Aurangzaib Mirza for Petitioners.

P L D 2017 Lahore 727

Before Shahid Waheed and Ali Akbar Qureshi, JJ

MUHAMMAD IQBAL KHAN---Appellant

Versus

Mst. FARHAT NISA---Respondent

R.F.A. No.214 of 2011, heard on 17th February, 2016.

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 12---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 17 & 79---Suit for specific performance of contract---Agreement to sell---Proof---Requirements---Pardanashin lady, transaction with---Conditions---Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiff did not produce attesting witnesses of alleged agreement to sell---Contention of plaintiff was that defendant did not appear and there was no denial to the execution of agreement to sell and he was not required to produce attesting witnesses of agreement to sell---Validity---Plaintiff was required to examine at least two attesting witnesses of agreement to sell to prove its execution and to get a decree for its specific performance---Decree could not be passed without recording evidence simply on defendant's non-appearance and upon verification of the plaint---Document could be said to be admitted or denied only when defendant appeared before the court and made statement to such effect---Proviso to Art. 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 did not apply where there was no defendant's statement at all---Defendant did not appear before the Trial Court in the present case and it could not be said that agreement to sell was not denied relieving the plaintiff to prove the same---Absence of defendant did not absolve the plaintiff to prove the execution of agreement to sell by calling its two attesting witnesses---Plaintiff had not produced attesting witnesses of agreement to sell and Trial Court was justified in declining to issue decree in the present case---Plaintiff was beneficiary of alleged agreement to sell and he was bound to prove the same as per law---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Farzand Ali v. Khuda Bakhsh and others PLD 2015 SC 187 rel.

(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--

----Arts. 17 & 79---Agreement to sell---Proof of---Requirements---Agreement to sell required compulsory attestation of two witnesses and such document should not be used as evidence until two attesting witnesses were called for the purpose of proving its execution.

(c) Pardanashin lady---

----Transaction with pardanashin lady---Burden of proof---Conditions---Burden of proof with regard to genuineness of transaction with an ignorant/illiterate/parda observing lady and document allegedly executed by such a lady would lie on the person who claimed the transaction or under the document---Beneficiary of such document was bound to prove and satisfy the court that document was executed by an ignorant/illiterate/parda observing lady; that she had complete knowledge and full understanding about the contents of such documents: that such document/deed was read over to her and terms of the same were adequately explained to her and she had independent and disinterested advice in the matter before entering into such transaction and executing the document.

Janat Bibi v. Sikandar Ali and others PLD 1990 SC 642; Amirzada Khan and another v. Itbar Khan and others 2001 SCMR 609; Khawas Khan through Legal Heirs v. Sabir Hussain Shah and others 2004 SCMR 1259 and Mian Allah Ditta through L.Rs. v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others 2013 SCMR 868 rel.

(d) Administration of justice--

----No litigant could obtain his relief from a court unless he established his claim.

Mian Muhammad Ilyas and Muhammad Nawaz for Appellant.

Nemo for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Lahore 731

Before Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed and Ch. Mushtaq Ahmad, JJ

ZISHAN and others---Appellants

Versus

THE STATE and others---Respondents

Criminal Appeals Nos. 879-J of 2011, 771, 741 and Murder Reference No.34 of 2010, heard on 1st November, 2016.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Motive not proved---Effect---Motive for the crime was indirectly referred as the prosecution was reluctant on salient details thereof---Complainant furnished detail of motive and stated that mother of accused had got registered a criminal case of zina-bil-jabr against the deceased, which was cancelled by the police as a false case---Complainant had alleged that in such backdrop, deceased and accused had exchanged hot words; which aspect of prosecution case was not confidence inspiring---Circumstances suggested that prosecution had failed to prove the motive---Accused were acquitted by setting aside conviction and sentence recorded by Trial Court.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Ocular account---Prosecution case was that accused had asked the deceased to accompany him, with the promise that he would facilitate compromise with co accused---Deceased accompanied him and thereafter co-accused persons armed with daggers gave multiple blows on the abdomen of deceased and slit the throat of the deceased with dagger---Ocular account was furnished by witnesses including the complainant---Apparently there was no reason for the deceased to oblige accused in a chilled winter night to accompany him to visit his opponent pitted against him in a dispute involving family honor---Deceased could have safely deferred the proposal to some other convenient time and at a safe venue-- Record showed that complainant was present when deceased left with accused for the settlement of serious dispute---Arrival of witness an odd hour of night to join the complainant, in the absence of any specific reason was mind boggling---Record showed that a good number of FIRs had been registered against the deceased from time to time involving cases of murderous assaults, lurking house trespass, abduction, rape, illicit arms, etc---Said criminal past of deceased showed improbability of prosecution case---Reaching of witnesses at the venue exactly at a point when the deceased came under assault did not fit in comfortably within the ambit of probability---Inference would be that occurrence did not take place in the manner as alleged in the crime report---Circumstances created suspicion in the case, benefit of which would resolve in favour of accused persons---Accused persons were acquitted by setting aside conviction and sentence recorded by Trial Court.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Delay in lodging FIR---Effect---Occurrence had taken place at 10.00 p.m. at a place situated at a distance of one kilometer from the police station---Incident was reported at 12.30 a.m.---Autopsy was conducted at 11.45 a.m. on the following day---Delay in autopsy admitted a real possibility that complaint was not prepared at a point of time mentioned therein---Circumstances created doubt in the prosecution case that matter was not reported to the police with promptitude---Accused persons, in circumstances were acquitted by setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded by Trial Court.

Khawaja Qaisar Butt and Shahnawaz Khokhar for Appellants.

Ch. Faqir Muhammad for the Complainant.

Malik Riaz Ahmad Saghla, Deputy Prosecutor-Gneral, Punjab for the State.

P L D 2017 Lahore 737

Before Abdul Sami Khan and Aalia Neelum, JJ

YASIR ALI and others---Appellants

Versus

THE STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeals Nos. 311, 412 and Murder Reference No.117 of 2012, heard on 8th June, 2016.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Delay about ten days in lodging FIR---Complainant had not advanced any plausible justification as to why he kept mum for such a considerable span of time and did not inform the police about missing of deceased---Inordinate and unexplained delay in reporting the matter to police for lodging FIR cast serious doubt about the veracity of prosecution story--- Conviction and sentence recorded against accused was set aside.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.161---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Supplementary statement---Scope---Supplementary statement got recorded by the complainant immediately after registration of FIR, which was lodged with the delay of ten days---No reason had been explained for not straightway nominating the accused in the FIR---Ante-dated supplementary statement recorded at belated stage had no legal value---Conviction and sentence recorded against accused was set aside accordingly.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--

----Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Last seen evidence---Scope---Prosecution witnesses stated that deceased was seen in the company of accused on the day of occurrence at evening time---According to the story of FIR, deceased was seen sitting at a tube well along with accused and deceased went towards place "M" after receipt of a mobile call---Departure of deceased in the company of accused did not qualify proximity of time and space so as to be treated as last seen evidence---Such fact was alone sufficient to demolish the evidence of last seen---Prosecution witnesses never tried to inquire from the accused about the missing of deceased---Prosecution witnesses did not get recorded their statements under S.161 Cr.P.C. before the investigating officer immediately after registration of FIR about such fact---Evidence of prosecution witnesses was not worthy of reliance---Conviction and sentence recorded against accused was set aside

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Extra-judicial confession---Scope---Story as narrated by the prosecution witnesses was that accused had made extra-judicial confession before them but the said witness neither approached the complainant nor the investigating officer to inform them about alleged extra-judicial confession---Story introduced by prosecution witnesses about extra-judicial confession of the accused seemed to be improbable---Even otherwise, extra-judicial confession was of weak type of evidence and the same needed impartial/strong corroboration from other independent sources, which was missing in the case---Conviction and sentence recorded against accused was set aside accordingly.

Sajid Mumtaz and others v. Basharat and others 2006 SCMR 231 and Tahir Javed v. The State 2009 SCMR 166 rel.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34---Qatle-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Medical evidence---Scope---Supporting evidence---Medical evidence was only a supporting piece of evidence because it might confirm the ocular evidence with regard to the receipt of injury, its locale, kind of weapon used for causing the injury, duration between the injury and the death, but it did not connect the accused with the commission of offence.

Muhammad Tasaweer v. Hafiz Zulkarnain and 2 others PLD 2009 SC 53; Mursal Kazmi alias Qamar Shah and another v. The State 2009 SCMR 1410 and Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another 2008 SCMR 1103 rel.

(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery evidence---Scope---Weapon, recovery of---Weapon of offence pistol .30 bore was recovered from the accused---Positive report of the forensic science laboratory showed that pistol .30 bore matched with the empty recovered by the investigating officer from the place of occurrence, but not even a single firearm injury was found on the body of deceased rather deceased was done to death with the help of blunt and sharp edge weapons---Such recovery of weapon of offence did not render any help to the case of prosecution---Conviction and sentence recorded against accused was set aside accordingly.

(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34-Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Circumstantial evidence---Scope---Case of prosecution was based on circumstantial evidence---Chain of circumstances should be so strong and solid that one circumstance should start right from the toe of the deceased and the same should be encircled around neck of the accused---Single break in the chain of circumstances would definitely make the grip of chain loose and also break the geometrical progression of the chain---Case of the prosecution was a blind murder---No direct evidence was available to prove the ocular account---Delay of 10 days in lodging FIR had not been explained---Medical evidence did not corroborate the ocular account of the complainant---Deceased died due to the injuries of blunt and sharp edged weapon but weapon of offence, pistol .30 bore was recovered from the accused---No reliance could be placed on the evidence of prosecution witnesses in respect of extra-judicial confection---Last seen evidence furnished by prosecution evidence was not worthy of reliance---Prosecution had failed to prove its case against accused beyond any reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence---Conviction and sentence recorded against accused was set aside.

Asadullah and another v. State and another 1999 SCMR 1034; Ch. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia and antoher 1992 SCMR 1047; Sarfraz Khan v. The State and 2 others 1996 SCMR 188 and Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another 2008 SCMR 1103 rel.

(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Scope---Many circumstances were not required for creating doubt in the story of prosecution, one circumstance creating doubt was enough to acquit the accused---Number of circumstances, had created serious doubt about guilt of the accused---Accused, in circumstances, would be entitled to such benefit, not as a matter of grace or concession but as of right---Conviction and sentence recorded against accused was set aside.

Tariq Pervz v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.

Muhammad Arshad Bhatti for Appellants.

Muhammad Ikhlaq Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

P L D 2017 Lahore 750

Before Aalia Neelum, and Syed Shahbaz Ali Rizvi, JJ

MUHAMMAD AFZAL---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE and others---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No.34-J and Murder Reference No.39 of 2012, heard on 9th May, 2016.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 337-J & 109---Qatl-i-amd, causing hurt by means of poison and abetment---Appreciation of evidence---Confessional statement of accused---Accused admitted that he committed murder of eight persons of his family---Accused pleaded guilty at the time of recording statement before the Magistrate---Accused again pleaded guilty at the time of framing charge---During the trial, accused further pleaded guilty---Accused had not denied the occurrence at any stage from the time of his arrest till his statement recorded under S.342 Cr.P.C.---Confessional statements recorded by accused person, proved to be voluntary and was not result of duress and any violence---Judicial Magistrate, had recorded the statements of accused person according to procedure laid down in the Cr.P.C. and no procedural irregularities could be found therein---Accused admitted the prosecution case, the mode and manner of the occurrence was duly proved by the prosecution---Conviction, on the basis of confessional statement, could be awarded to an accused, if the court was satisfied that the confessional statement was true and voluntary---Statements of prosecution witnesses also indicated that accused committed murder of eight persons of his family and he was caught red handed at the spot---Case of prosecution against accused was proved---Appeal against conviction was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--

----Ss. 302 (b), 337-J & 109---Qatl-i-amd, causing hurt by means of poison and abetment---Appreciation of evidence---Ocular account, corroborating medical evidence---Postmortem and medico-legal reports fully corroborated time of occurrence, nature of injuries, weapon of offence used in the occurrence and locale of injuries sustained by the deceased persons--- Medical evidence was absolutely in line with the ocular account and as such had fully supported the case of prosecution---Appeal against conviction was dismissed accordingly.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-

----Ss. 302 (b), 337-J & 109---Qatl-i-amd, causing hurt by means of poison and abetment---Appreciation of evidence---Motive, proof of---During investigation, the prosecution witnesses of ocular account had sufficiently explained about the motive by stating that parents of accused were often used to quarrel with each other---Mother of accused used to blame her husband gambler, while father of accused used to blame his mother of being of loose character---Due to the dispute between his parents, accused committed murder of the inmates of the house---Accused got recorded his confessional statement wherein, he narrated the story as stated by the prosecution witnesses---Accused also stated that 4/5 years ago he saw his mother with another man sleeping together on one bed---Accused made complaint about the illicit relation of his mother to his father and grand mother but of no avail---Prosecution witnesses had not stated that mother of accused was of bad character---Confessional statement of the accused, in circumstances, was sufficient to prove the motive---Appeal against conviction was dismissed accordingly.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--

----Ss. 302 (b), 337-J & 109---Qatl-i-amd, causing hurt by means of poison and abetment---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of weapon of offence from accused---Reliance---Weapon of offence had been recovered on the pointation of accused---Crime empties had also been collected during spot inspection---Positive report of Forensic Science Laboratory had provided full corroboration to the ocular account in the case---Appeal against conviction was dismissed accordingly.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--

----Ss. 302 (b), 337-J & 109---Qatl-i-amd, causing hurt by means of poison and abetment---Appreciation of evidence---Accused was charged of murder and named in FIR---Specific role had been attributed to the accused about making fire-shots on deceased persons---Accused was arrested red handed from the place of occurrence---Prosecution produced two eye-witnesses which had sufficiently explained the mode and manner as well as each and every segment of the occurrence---Evidence of eye-witnesses was supported by medical evidence and corroborated by recovery of weapons of offence along with positive report of Forensic Science Laboratory---Judicial confession of the accused was also available on record---Prosecution had proved the case against the accused---Appeal against conviction was dismissed accordingly.

(f) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Art. 91---Confession---Evidentiary value---Presumption of truth was attached to the confessional statement, which was made voluntarily and recorded in accordance with law---Such statement was admissible in evidence as it was presumed to be genuine as per provision of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.

Ms. Saiqa Javed for Appellant.

Muhammad Jaffar, Deputy Prosecutor General along with Muhammad Safdar, S.I. for the State.

Complainant in person.

P L D 2017 Lahore 769

Before Mudassir Khalid Abbasi, J

MEPCO and others---Petitioners

Versus

ADVISORY BOARD, PUNJAB, LAHORE and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.3439 of 2009, heard on 31st January, 2017.

(a) Electricity Act (IX of 1910)---

----S. 26(6)---Electric Inspector---Jurisdiction---Electric Inspector can only determine disputes relating to defective meter or otherwise.

Water and Power Development Authority and others v. Messrs Kamal Food (Pvt.) Ltd. Okara and others PLD 2012 SC 371 rel.

(b) Electricity Act (IX of 1910)---

----Ss. 26(6) & 26-A---Detection bill---Electric Inspector, decision of---Electricity Distribution Company, was aggrieved of decisions made by Electric Inspector and Provincial Advisory Board against detection bill demanded from the consumer---Validity---Provision of S.26-A of Electricity Act, 1910, only spoke of charging/imposing of amount by licensee upon consumer, regarding dishonest abstraction and consumption of electricity; which might not be through tampering in metering equipment, in any case amount payable on account of audit objection, could be originating from dishonest abstraction did not, in any manner fall within the purview of Electric Inspector---High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction set aside the orders/decisions by Electric Inspector and Provincial Advisory Board---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Water and Power Development Authority and others v. Mian Muhammad Riaz and another PLD 1995 Lah. 56 rel.

Authority and others v. Umaid Khan PLD 1987 Pesh. 48 ref.

Mehr. Irshad Ahmad Arain for Petitioners.

Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan, Assistant Advocate-General along with Muhammad Khurram Zahoor, Asstt. Electric Inspector for Respondents Nos.1 and 2.

P L D 2017 Lahore 774

Before Abdul Sami Khan and Raja Shahid Mehmood Abbasi, JJ

ZEESHAN alias SHANI---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.76-J of 2010 and Murder Reference No.113 of 2010 heard on 14th January, 2016.

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Complainant, who was material witness, was not produced by the prosecution, despite adopting of coercive measures by the Trial Court---Name of accused and his co-accused came on the surface during the course of investigation by recording supplementary statement of complainant, allegedly on the same day, but said material witness was withheld without any cogent reason---All prosecution witnesses made flagrant improvements in their statements by nominating accused and his co-accused and assigning specific role, which were not recorded in their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C.; contradictions existed in the statements of said witnesses---Supplementary statement of complainant was recorded at belated stage in order to involve accused in the case---Autopsy in the case was not carried out soon after death of the deceased---Medical evidence adduced by prosecution was not corroborating ocular account furnished by prosecution witnesses---Complainant, did not give the description and salient features of the assailants; same was the position of testimony of prosecution witness of ocular account---When accused were not nominated in the FIR, identification parade was necessary, but no such parade was conducted---Recovery of pistol, was of no help to the prosecution, as recovery witnesses, did not corroborate each other---Prosecution, had to prove its case against accused by standing on its own legs and it could not take any benefit from weakness of the defence case, but prosecution failed to discharge its responsibility of proving the case against accused beyond the shadow of doubt---Single circumstance, which would create reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case, was sufficient to give benefit of the same to accused---Present case was replete with circumstances which had created serious doubts about the prosecution case---Prosecution had failed to produce cogent, reliable, trustworthy and sure footed evidence to prove, heads of charge against accused---Conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court, were set aside, accused was acquitted of the charges levelled against him, extending him the benefit of doubt.

Riaz Ahmad v. The State 2010 SCMR 849; Mursal Kazmi alias Qamar Shah and another v. The State 2009 SCMR 1410; Muhammad Shah v. The State 2010 SCMR 1009 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 ref.

Malik Abdul Qayyum Khan for Appellant.

Muhammad Waqas Anwar, D.P.G. with Qaiser Qureshi, S.I. for the State.

Arif Majeed for the Complainant.

P L D 2017 Lahore 784

Before Shams Mehmood Mirza, J

ROOMI FOODS (PVT) LTD and others---Petitioners

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.10594 of 2016, decided on 8th February, 2017.

Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act (XL of 1997)---

----Ss. 31 & 7(2)(i)---National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (Tariff Standards and Procedure) Rules, 1998, Rr.18(2) & 3---Tariff, determination of---Tariff to become effective on issuance of notification---Petitioners sought direction to the Federal Government to immediately notify the tariff determined by NEPRA in respect of the Multan Electric Power Company ("MEPCO")---Validity---Schedule of a tariff only became effective once it was notified and till such time a new tariff was notified, old schedule of tariff would remain effective---Pending notification of schedule of the new tariff for the financial year in question, in present case, MEPCO was obliged under law to charge electricity bills from consumers on basis of the old tariff for the previous financial year---High Court disposed of the constitutional petition with permission to file a fresh constitutional petition to the petitioners after vacation of restraining order against notification of tariff pending before another High Court and till such time, MEPCO was at liberty to charge old tariff, however, the same was not to be charged in lump sum from the petitioners but recovered in installments.

Hameed Steel and others v. LESCO and others (W.P. No.25437 of 2015) ref.

Malik Kashif Rafiq Rajwana, Malik Muhammad Tariq Rajwana and Malik Sohail Ashiq Shujra for Petitioners.

Malik Mureed Hussain for NEPRA.

Ghulam Mujtaba for Respondent No.1.

Jaffar Sabtain, Hassan Qunain, Rao Muhammad Iqbal, Abdul Razak Raja, Ch. Muhammad Saleem Waraich, Sajjad Khan, Khush Bakht Khan, Malik Nazar Hussain Arain, Aamir Aziz Qazi, Malik Anwar ul Haq for MEPCO along with Ahmad Hassan Sumroo Section L.O

P L D 2017 Lahore 787

Before Mudassir Khalid Abbasi, J

ALI AKBAR---Petitioner

Versus

ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, MALKWAL and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.14812 of 2012, decided on 2nd May, 2017.

Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 13---Disabled child having attained age of majority---Maintenance by father---Scope---Executing Court while deciding objection by father dropped execution proceedings regarding maintenance allowance of said child---Appellate Court maintained order of Executing Court---Review by executing Court/Family Court---Scope---Disabled child/son had contended that though he had attained majority but, being blind he could not earn his livelihood, so his father was duty bound to maintain him---Validity---Held, although in normal course father was under obligation to maintain his child till attaining the age of majority, however, there was an exception to such rule and that was the disability of a child by infirmity or disease---Disabled son had taken stance that he had lost vision from both eyes and was not in a position to maintain himself---Appellate Court had observed that it was duty of the disabled person to get himself medically examined first and then move the Court---Disability Certificate issued by Social Welfare Department had been produced before the High Court which revealed that the disabled son suffered from diminished vision from both the eyes---Family Court being a quasi-judicial forum could regulate its own procedure, the only exception being that it must not be in contravention to any settled principle of law and caused injustice to the parties---Family/Executing Court was fully equipped with powers to review its order---High Court set aside impugned order and judgment---Review petition filed by the petitioner disabled son before Executing Court would be deemed pending and the same would be decided on merits---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Humayun Hassan v. Arslan Humayun and others PLD 2013 SC 557 and Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge Lahore and others 2014 SCMR 1365 ref.

Mehboob Rasul Awan for Petitioner.

P L D 2017 Lahore 790

Before Shahid Jamil Khan, J

Mehar PERVAIZ AKHTAR---Petitioner

Versus

DIRECTOR GENERAL EXCISE AND TAXATION, LAHORE and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.3851 of 2017, heard on 24th May, 2017.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 23, 24, 4, 10A & 7---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.24-A---Power of State to impose and collect taxes---Constitutional provisions as to property of citizens and protection of property rights---Due process and natural justice in imposition of taxes---Non-association of tax payer in assessment proceedings as a violation of due process---Scope---Power to impose tax was predominant and paramount attribute of the State under Art. 7 of the Constitution; however imposition and collection of tax necessarily had an effect of depriving a citizen from his property, to which he was entitled under Art.23 of the Constitution and Art.24 of the Constitution bestowed a Fundamental Right that he shall not be deprived of his property which was saved under law---Non-association of any citizen in assessment proceedings, for charging of a tax not only amounted to denial of fair trial and dealing with him against the law, but was a sheer violation of due process which was meant to protect a citizen from arbitrary use of executive power; exercised without following exact course of law---Such non-association in assessment proceedings also amounted to condemning a citizen unheard ---Assessment of a tax, levied under a valid statute, was meant to determine the tax liability subject to conditions stipulated in law and a taxpayer, who fell within the mischief of a charging provision had Fundamental Right to defend himself from such levy or its charging as per the conditions under a statute---Any doubt in the charging provision had to be resolved in favour of the taxpayer because it deprived the taxpayer from his/her property, therefore, the same fell within the exception under Art. 24 of the Constitution---For providing opportunity to defend, issuance of show cause notice was mandatory, therefore, any assessment order without issuance and due service of the show-cause notice was a nullity in law and if a statute did not provide specifically for issuance of show cause notice, such procedure had to be prescribed by subordinate legislation under said statute---On receipt of reply to such show-cause notice, an assessing officer was bound to provide opportunity of being heard and pass a reasoned assessment order as required under S.24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and communication or service of such assessment order, as per law, was a necessary requisite of due process, absence of which denied the right of appeal or revision under the law and any demand of tax or coercive measures for its recovery, without due process was illegal, being violative of the Arts.10A, 4 read with Arts. 23 & 24 of the Constitution.

Messrs Mustafa Impex v. The Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808 rel.

(b) Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act (V of 1958)---

----Ss. 10, 4, 8, 9 14 & 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules, 1958, Rr. 7, 11 & 10---Recovery of property tax---Valuation of property---Objections of taxpayers---Exemption---Adjudication of objections by authorities---Communication of reasons to taxpayer(s)---Scope---Petitioner impugned notice for sealing of his premises as well demand notice for property tax issued under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules, 1958, on the ground that the same were issued without following the process prescribed under the law and without associating petitioner in the assessment proceedings and the valuation of the property was done without confronting the petitioner about the same---Validity---Form P.T.1 was an assessment order containing all the assessed information regarding property to be taxed and duly authenticated by the assessing authority and R. 11 of Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules, 1958 was silent about communication of said form to taxpayer and if S.10 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 was examined, it provided a right of appeal and revision to a taxpayer---Person aggrieved by an order of appropriate authority upon which objections made before that authority under Ss. 8, 9, 14 or 15 Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 may file appeal against such order within thirty days, however, procedure for communication of the reasons for rejection of the objections was not provided under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules, 1958 and R.10(4) envisaged that the reasons for the disposed of objections shall be recorded in register and through said register, as well as, P.T.1 is open to inspection, yet order in this regard was never communicated to the taxpayer---High Court observed that such practice or procedure could not be allowed to be continued and directed that the Provincial Government revise the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules, 1958 accordingly and till such revision the Authorities shall communicate the reasons for rejection of the objections in writing to the taxpayer and shall also communicate a copy of Form P.T.1 to the taxpayer on taxpayers' address, enabling him to seek his right of appeal or revision and limitation for same shall commence from the date of such communication---High Court held that impugned notices for sealing of property in the present case, the valuation list and assessment was completed without following mandatory provisions/procedure and were declared without lawful authority and set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Muhammad Khalid Qureshi v. Province of Punjab through Secretary Excise and Taxation Department, Lahore and another 2017 PTD 805 rel.

Ch. Shafat Ali and Mughees Aslam Malik for Petitioner.

Umar Farooq Khan and Malik Muhammad Bashir Lakhesir, Assistant Advocates General, Punjab for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4.

Mian Muhammad Ashfaq Hussain for Respondent No.5/Pakistan Railways.

Tariq Manzoor Sial, Amicus Curiae.

Qurban Ali Shahid, Excise and Taxation Officer, Vehari, Bashir Ahmad Kharal, Assistant Excise and Taxation Officer, Vehari, Rana Sakhawat Ali, Excise and Taxation Officer (Property Tax) Multan, and Munawar, Inspector Legal Excise and Taxation Department.

P L D 2017 Lahore 802

Before Jawad Hassan, J

MUNDA ELEVEN CRICKET CLUB---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and 4 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.59837 of 2017, decided on 23rd August, 2017.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Sports (Development and Control) Ordinance (XVI of 1962), Ss. 3 & 4---SRO No. 43(K.E)/2014 dated 10.07.2014---Constitution of Pakistan Cricket Board---Nature and object---Question before the High Court was whether the Constitution of Pakistan Cricket Board was a statutory instrument and actions under the same could be challenged in the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Held, Constitution of the Board was for the internal control and management amongst the members of the Board only and such members had been defined in the Constitution of the Board----Constitution of Pakistan Cricket Board was made specifically to promote and regulate the conduct of its members, to set up a code of conduct for discipline and to regulate affiliation of constituent members, which was purely the internal management of the Board---Constitution of Pakistan Cricket Board, was non-statutory in nature and actions under the same could not be challenged under the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Constitutional petition was not maintainable in circumstances.

Muhammad Zaman and others v. Government of Pakistan and others 2017 SCMR 571; Shafique Ahmad Khan and others v. NESCOM and others PLD 2016 SC 377; Muhammad Tariq Badr and another v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 314 and IPC through Secretary v. Arbab Altaf Hussain and others 2014 SCMR 1573 rel.

Dr. Zafar Ullah and 5 others 2016 CLD 1283; Air Marshal (R) Syed Qaiser Hussain v. Sajid Hussain Toori and 4 others 2017 CLC 617; Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455; Syed Ghazi Gulab Jamal v. Presiding Officer, Election Tribunal Peshawar and 2 others 2015 CLC 953; Syed Mashooq Mohiuddin Shah v. Syed Fazul Ali Shah and 37 others 2014 CLC 1181; Pakistan WAPDA Employees Pegham Union v. Member National Industrial Relations Commission, Islamabad and others 2014 SCMR 1676; Amir Jamal and others Malik Zahoor and others 2011 SCMR 1023; Syed Imran Shah and others v. Government of NWFP and others PLD 2004 SC 285 and MQM and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2014 CLC 335 ref.

(b) Administration of justice---

----When law required a thing to be done in a particular manner, the same must be done accordingly and if the prescribed procedure was not followed, then presumption would be that the said thing had not been legally done.

Syed Bhais (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Local Government PLD 2012 Lah. 52 rel.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Determination as to whether Constitutional petition had been competently filed by authorized person(s)---Constitutional petition was filed by President of a Cricket Club, on behalf of said Club, against an action taken by the Pakistan Cricket Board ("PCB"), in absence of any resolution authorizing President of the said Club to initiate such proceedings---Held, that since the petitioner (President of the Club) had not submitted any resolution authorizing him to specifically initiate such proceedings, therefore Constitutional petition was not maintainable.

TNB Liberty Power Ltd. v. Director of Labour, Government of Sindh 2014 PLC 382; Munawar Ali Khan v. Secretary, Land Utilization Department, Government of Sindh, Karachi 2014 YLR 1602; Syed Bhais (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Local Government PLD 2012 Lah. 52 and Poineer Cricket Club v. Election Commissioner, PCB and others W.P. No.30656 of 2013 rel.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Factual controversy/question of facts---Authenticity of documents---Scope---Questions as to authenticity of documents involved a factual controversy as such authenticity stood on the touchstone of evidence which the High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction could not record---Scope of the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court was dependent on questions which were devoid of factual controversies.

Poineer Cricket Club v. Election Commissioner, PCB and others W.P. No.30656 of 2013; Pakistan WAPDA Employees Pegham Union v. Member, National Industrial Relations Commission, Islamabad and others 2014 SCMR 1676 and Amir Jamal and others v. Malik Zahoor and others 2011 SCMR 1023 rel.

(e) Substantial Compliance, doctrine of---

----Applicability---Principles---Doctrine of substantial compliance was a doctrine in equity and it stated that if a good faith attempt was made to perform requirements of a law or contract, but failed to exactly meet the specifics, and if the essential aim of the law or contract had been met, such law or contract would still be considered as having been complied with or completed---Doctrine of substantial compliance was compliance with essential requirements of something (as a statute or contract) that satisfied its purpose or objective even though its formal requirements were not complied with---When the relevant provisions of law were complied with, substantial compliance was to be held to be sufficient and strict compliance of rules was not required as long as it was not detrimental to public policy---Substantial or no compliance of directory provisions, if existed, then an Act could not be invalidated so long as it was in accordance with the law---Where an authority or performance of formalities was delegated upon a person under a special law or was prescribed by the statute, then doctrine of substantial compliance could not be valid---Mandatory provisions required strict compliance however, for provisions that were directory in nature, the doctrine of substantial compliance was sufficient.

Air Marshal (R) Syed Qaiser Hussain v. Sajid Hussain Toori and 4 others 2017 CLC 617; Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455; Syed Ghazi Gulab Jamal v. Presiding Officer, Election Tribunal, Peshawar and 2 others 2015 CLC 953; Syed Mashooq Mohiuddin Shah v. Syed Fazul Ali Shah and 37 others 2014 CLC 1181 and MQM and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2014 CLC 335 ref.

Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise v. Zamindar Paper and Board Mills, 2008 SCMR 615; Abdul Aziz v. Malik Aman 2007 SCMR 383; Azmatullah through L.Rs. v. Hameeda Bibi 2005 SCMR 2001; Muhammad Nawaz v. Province of Punjab 2005 SCMR 1612; Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 SCMR 455; Abdur Rahim Ghulam Qadir v. The Federation of Pakistan PLD 1957 (W.P.) Lah. 279; Nishat Mills Limited v. Superintendent of Central Excise PLD 1989 SC 222; E.A. Evans v. Muhammad Ashraf PLD 1964 SC 536;Nishat Mills Limited v. Superintendent of Central Excise PLD 1989 SC 222; The Controller of Estate Duty (Representing Central Board of Revenue) Pakistan v. Radha Kanta Das PLD 1959 SC 330; Habib Bank Limited v. Sultan Ahmad 2001 SCMR 679; Federal Public Service Commission v. Syed Muhammad Afaq PLD 2002 SC 167; Haji Khuda Baksh Nizamani v. Election Tribunal 2003 MLD 607; Manzoor Ahmed v. The State PLD 2008 Lah. 243; Muhammad Mushtaq v. The State PLD 2006 Pesh. 39; Director Intelligence and Investigation (Customs and Excise), Faisalabad and aother v. Bagh Ali 2010 PTD 1024 and Syed Musadiq v. The State PLD 2003 Kar. 216 rel.

Shaigan Ijaz Chadhar for Petitioner.

P L D 2017 Lahore 825

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C J

IFTIKHAR AHMAD---Petitioner

Versus

KING EDWARD MEDICAL UNIVERSITY and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.32046 of 2017, decided on 16th August, 2017.

(a) King Edward Medical University, Lahore Act (V of 2005)---

----Ss. 13 & 9---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199 --- Constitutional petition--Statutory appointment---Appointment of Vice-Chancellor---Temporary appointment of Acting Vice-Chancellor---Interpretation of S.13(9) of the King Edward Medical University, Lahore Act, 2005---Petitioner impugned appointment of respondent as acting Vice---Chancellor on a stop-gap arrangement, on the ground that under S.13 of the King Edward Medical University, Lahore Act 2005, if the office of the Vice Chancellor was vacant, the Pro-Vice Chancellor was to perform functions of the Vice-Chancellor, and currently a Pro-Vice-Chancellor was available, therefore, temporary appointment of the respondent was illegal---Validity---Under S.13 of the King Edward Medical University, Lahore Act, 2005, Chancellor was vested with powers to make temporary arrangements for the performance of the duties of the Vice-Chancellor as he may deem fit and such temporary arrangement could only be recoursed to when office of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor was vacant and not otherwise and word "temporary" was used in the said section, for arrangements made by the Chancellor and not for the functions of the Vice-Chancellor to be performed by the Pro- Vice-Chancellor---Powers enjoyed by the Chancellor under S.9(7) King Edward Medical University, Lahore Act, 2005 were general powers of appointment to any post in the University and could not override the specific powers of appointing the Vice-Chancellor on a stop-gap arrangement as given in S.13(9) of the King Edward Medical University, Lahore Act 2005 ---Intention of the law was that the Pro-Vice-Chancellor by stepping into the shoes of the Vice Chancellor was to assume the role of the Vice-Chancellor and got to perform his functions and on the other hand, the temporary arrangement made by the Chancellor, in the absence of the Pro-Vice-Chancellor was of a different nature---Such person to be selected by Chancellor was only to perform the duties of the Vice-Chancellor, as deemed appropriate by the Chancellor, as opposed to the "functions" of the Vice-Chancellor under the law and such "duties" may entail only important obligations and not all the functions and the Chancellor may specify as to which duties were being temporarily assigned to the new person---Functions on the other hand, meant all the functions, under the King Edward Medical University, Lahore Act, 2005---High Court set aside impugned appointment and directed the Pro-Vice-Chancellor to assume functions of the Vice-Chancellor in terms of S.13(9) of the King Edward Medical University, Lahore Act, 2005---Constitutional petition was allowed, accordingly.

Punjab Higher Education Commission v. Dr. Aurangzeb Alamgir and others PLD 2017 Lah. 489 ref.

Black's Law Dictionary, Tenth Edn. p.787 and oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 8th Edn. p.608 rel.

(b) Words and phrases---

---"Function"---meaning---"Function" meant activity that was appropriate to a particular profession, or special activity or the purpose of a person.

Black's Law Dictionary, Tenth Edn. p.787 rel.

(c) Words and phrases---

----"Duty"---Meaning---"Duty" meant legal obligation that was owed or due to another and that needed to be satisfied; that which one was bound to do, something that one feel that he has to do because it wa a legal responsibility.

Black's Law Dictionary, Tenth Edn. p.787 and oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 8th Edn. p.608 rel.

Rana Muhammad Afzal for Petitioner.

Ahmad Hasan Khan, Addl. Advocate-General, Punjab for Respondent.

Muhammad Saleem Shahnazi for Respondent No.8.

P L D 2017 Lahore 830

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C.J., Shams Mahmood Mirza and Mudassir Khalid Abbas, JJ

PAKISTAN COLLEGE OF LAW---Petitioner

Versus

UNIVERSITY OF PUNJAB and others---Respondents

Writ Petitions Nos.45178 of 2017, 40218 of 2016, 54945 and 47756 of 2017, decided on 10th August, 2017.

(a) Words and Phrases---

----"Equivalent", meaning---"Equivalent" meant equal in value, amount, function or meaning.

New Oxford American Dictionary, Third Edn. p.586 rel.

(b) Interpretation of statutes---

----"Ejusdem generis" doctrine of---Application, scope and illustration---"Ejusdem generis" postulated that when a drafter had tacked on a catchall phrase at the end of an enumeration of specifics, for example "dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other animals," then "other animals" in the same was to be read as other similar animals, the same implied addition of the word "similar" after the word "other" ---- When a general word or phrase followed a list of specifics, such general word or phrase would be interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed.

Antonin Scalia and Bryan A Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. 2012. p.199; Black's law Dictionary. 10th Edition, p.631; Mercantile Traders (Pvt.) ltd. and another v. State Bank of Pakistan 2002 SCMR 250 and Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan through Syed Munawar Hassan, Secretary General v. Federation of Pakistn through Secretary Law. Justice and parliamentary Affairs PLD 2000 SC 111 rel.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 142, 143 & 199---Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, (XXXV of 1973) Ss. 55 & 56 ---Pakistan Bar Council Legal Education Rules, 2015 R. 4---University of Punjab Admission Regulations 2016-2017, Regln. 24---Cooperative federalism---Overlap of legislative competence between Provinces and Federation---Educational Institution---Public University---Legal education (LLB)---Admission criteria---Petitioner, which was an affiliated Law College of the University of Punjab, impugned letters issued by the University, whereby students holding third division in their intermediate examinations, were denied admission to LLB, on the ground that students must hold at least a second division to be eligible for admission---Contention of petitioner inter alia was that the Rule 5 of Pakistan Bar Council Legal Education Rules, 2015, framed under Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 did not provide a minimum threshold of second division for LLB program, therefore, the University Regulations, framed under a Provincial Law, could not override the same---Validity---Regulation 24 of the University of Punjab Admission Regulations 2016-2017 included all Bachelors and Masters programs and ineligibility of students holding third division was clearly laid down by the University since the year 2011 and the petitioner, being an affiliated law college , was bound to follow such statutory requirement---Federal law on the subject, catered to all Provinces and set an overarching standard that addressed legal education across the country and Provincial legislature also enjoyed independent legislative space to legislate on legal education under the rubric of education but only to the extent of improving and enhancing the overarching, general, countywide standards in legal education set by the Federal Legislature---Such two powers had been reconciled on the principle of cooperative federalism and Provincial Legislature was free to improve upon standards set by the Federal legislature by setting more robust and stringent standards for admission in the Province---High Court further observed that the Provincial Legislature could not lower standards set by the Federal Legislature and held that the minimum eligibility threshold of second division for admission into LL.B imposed under by the University was in accordance with the Constitution and the law---Constitutional petitions were dismissed, in circumstances.

University of Health Science, Lahore through Vice Chancellor and others v. Arslan Ali and another 2016 SCMR 134; Muhammad Asif Khan v. Province of Sindh and others (2014 YLR 1038) Government of N.W.F.P., Health and Social Welfare Department through its Secretary v. Dr. Sheikh Muzaffar Iqbal and others 1990 SCMR 1321; Punjab Higher Education Commission v. Dr. Aurangzeb Alamgir and others pLD 2017 Lah. 489; Dr. Hassan Amir Shah v. Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary and 5 others 2012 PLC (C.S.) 290, Ch. Nazir Ahmad v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2013 Lah. 621 and State of T.N. and another v. S.V. Bratheep (minor) and others 2004 (4) SCC 513 ref.

Punjab Higher Education ?Commission v. Dr. Aurangzeb Alamgir and others PLD 2017 Lah. 489 and 2014 PTD 1939 rel.

PETITIONERS BY

Muhammad Afzal Khan for Petitioner.

Malik Asrar Elahi, Irfan Ahmad wattoo vice Muhammad Safdar Shaheen Pirzada and Sohaib Ahmad Sidhu for Petitioners in connected writ petitions.

RESPONDENTS BY

Shan Gul, Anwar Hussain and Ahmad Hasan Khan, Addl. Advocate-General, Punjab.

Anwar Kamal, Advocate-Chairman Law College Commission.

Malik Muhammad Awais Khalid, Advocate/Legal Adbvisor of the University of the Punjab, Lahore.

Raza Chohan, Direector General, Higher education Commission, Islamabad.

Nazeer Hussain, Director General, Higher Education Commission, Lahore.

Hamayun Rasheed, law Officer, higher Education Commisison.

ASSISTED BY

Mohsin Mumtaz, Civil Judge/Research Officer, Lahore High Court Research Centre (LHCRC).

P L D 2017 Lahore 848

Before Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, C.J. and Shujaat Ali Khan, J

Messrs CHAUDHRY SUGAR MILLS LTD.---Appellant

Versus

PROVICE OF PUNJAB and others---Respondents

I.C.A. No.1456 of 2016, decided on 11th September, 2017.

(a) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (XXV of 1963)---

----Ss. 3, 4 ,11 & Preamble Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 9, 14, 18 & 38---Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972) S. 3---Notification No.No.AEA-III 3-3/03 (VOL-III) dated 6.12.2006 [issued under section 11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963]---Restrictions on establishment/enlargement of industrial undertakings---Exemption---Public interest considerations---Relocation of existing sugar mills to a new location Nexus between ban on establishment of new sugar mills and relocation of existing sugar mills---Question before the High Court was whether relocation of existing sugar mills to a new area required permission in terms of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 and whether such relocation/shifting of sugar mills fell outside the purview of the Government of Punjab Notification No.AEA-III-3-3/03 (VOL-III) dated 6.12.2006, whereby ban was imposed on setting up of new sugar mills---Validity---Purposive interpretation of Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 showed that the same was geared to protect social, environmental, ecological, civic and economic interests of local residents while achieving planned and organized growth of industry and such Legislative policy synchronized with the Constitutional values, of social and economic justice and provided safeguards to the legitimate interests of backward and depressed classes and furthermore, also promoted the Fundamental Rights and the Principles of Policy, in particular, the promotion of social and economic well-being of the people---Permission required under section 3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 was for the establishment of an industrial undertaking in a local area and therefore, when an existing sugar mill was shifted or relocated to another local area, it was no different from a sugar mill being established for the first time in such local area---Word "new" sugar mill, under the Notification meant new in the context of the local area and its residents, but not for the owners or proprietors of an industrial undertaking---High Court held that the appellant sugar mills, even though they were relocating or shifting, but for the purposes of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, they were being established anew and required prior permission in terms of section 3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963---Intra-court appeals were dismissed, in circumstances.

2015 CLC 272; PLD 2014 Lah. 583; The American Heritage (R)Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition, URL; https:// ahdictionary. com/ word/ search.html?q= relocate;Oxford Dictionary 9URL:https;//en.exforddictionaries.com/definition/establish) and Oxford Advance learner's Dictionary p.498 rel.

(b) Words and Phrases

----"Relocation---Meaning---Relocation meant "to move to or establish in a new place"; to "become established in a new residence or place of business."

The American Heritage(R) Dictionary of the English language, Fifth Ediition, URL; https://ahdictionary. com/ word/ search.html?q= relocate rel.

(c) Words and Phrases

----Establish---Meaning---To set up on a firm or permanent basis or start or create a new organization.

Oxford Dictionary (URL: https;//en. exforddictionaries. com/ definition/establish) and Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary p.498 rel.

(d) Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance (XXV of 1963)---

----Ss.11, 3, 4 & Preamble---Notifications No. AEA-III-3-5/2011 (Vol-III) dated 04.12.2015 & No.AEA-III- 3-3/03 (VOL-III) dated 6.12.2006 [issued under section 11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963]---Restrictions on establishment enlargement of industrial undertakings---Exemption Public interest considerations---Relocation of existing sugar mills to a new location---Scope, nature, application and reading down of S. 11 of Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance 1963---Exercise of power of exemption under S.11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 ---Scope---Question before the High Court was whether Notification No.AEA-III-3-5/2011 (Vol-III) dated 04.12.2015 issued under S.11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, allowing for relocation of existing sugar mills despite ban on establishment of new sugar mills, was ultra vires the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963---Validity---Power or discretion to exempt enjoyed by executive could not be exercised in a manner that frustrated or defeated legislative policy under the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963, as it rested on public interest---Power to exempt under S. 11 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 was to be read down and restricted to situations where Government was satisfied that substantive requirement of S.3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 was fully met or theoretically, where there existed such an overwhelming justification (for reasons to be recorded) to override fundamental considerations for even greater public good---Discretion enjoyed by Government for exemption was so structured that it considered and met substantive requirements of S.3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 and such exemption was an enabling provision as it provided facility for businesses desirous of setting up new industry---Notification No. AEA-III-3-5/2011 (Vol-III) dated 04.12.2015 was a clear usurpation of legislative policy under the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 and an abuse of limited powers available under S.11 of the same; as it wrongly assumed that relocation or shifting of an existing sugar mill did not affect the requirements of S.3 of the Punjab Industries (Control on Establishment and Enlargement) Ordinance, 1963 or in any manner upset legislative assumptions behind imposition of a ban on establishment of new sugar mills---Said notification was held to be ultra vires the Punjab industries 9control on Establishment and Enlargement0 Ordinance, 1963 and not sustainable in law, in circumstances.

John W. Salmond. Jurisprudence 9Stevens and Haynes, London, 1902, p.127; JDW Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2017 Lah. 68 and Tariq Khan Mazari and 3 others v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Industries and 3 others PLD 2016 SC 778 rel.

APPELLANTS BY

Makhdoom Ali Khan for Ch. Sugar Mills Ltd.

Messrs Salam Akram Raja, Malik Ahsan Mehmood, Muhammad Shabbir Hussainand Usman Ali Bhoon for Ittefaq Sugar Mills Ltd.

Messrs Aoli Sibtain Fazali, Hasham Ahmad Khan, Umar Tariq Gill and Abad-ur-Reman for HWSML and abdull Sugar Mils Ltd.

Messrs Syed Ali Zafar and Mubashir Aslam Zar, for Indus Sugar Mills Ltd.

Meessrs Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Shaharya Kasuri and Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, for Ashraf Sugar Mills Ltd.

Shahzad A. elahi, for Fatima Sugar Mills Ltd.

Muhammad Raza Qureshi, for Tandlianwala Sugar Mills Ltd.

RESPONDENTS BY

Adnan Tariq, Assistant Advocate general, Punjab.

Messrs Khawaja Haris Ahmad and Hasam Bin Haris, for Punjab Government/Advocates for the Appellants in connected ICAs.

Messrws Aitzaz Ahsan, Shahid Saeed ch. And Ch. Shaukat Ali Javed for JDW Sugar Mills Ltd.

Waqas Aolam, Cane Commissioner, Punjab.

Syed Murtaza Aoli Zaidi, for Respondent-MEPCO.

Haider Zaman Qureshi for Pakistan Cotton Ginners Association.

Asif Mushtaq Ahmed, senior law Officer, Industries Commerce and Investment Department.

Malik Javed, Senior Economic Advisor, Industries Commerce and Investment Department.

RESEARCH ASSISTANCE BY

P L D 2017 Lahore 882

Before Ayesha A. Malik and Jawad Hassan, JJ

ABU TALIB KHAN BARKI---Appellant

Versus

JUDGE FAMILY COURT and others---Respondents

I.-C.A. No. 1175 of 2015, decided on 19th September, 2017.

Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 10 (4) & proviso---Dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula---Haq Mehr, restoration of---Special condition of Nikkah not related to Haq Mehr---Husband impugned order of Family Court whereby khula was granted to wife---Contention of husband, inter alia, was that the wife was required to return gold given as Haq Mehr in lieu of decree of dissolution of marriage, which was not ordered by Family Court---Validity---Husband relied on cl. 17 of the Nikkahnama which provided for special condition attached to contract of marriage, which condition was not related to Haq Mehr, but was an independent clause, and any item given under the said clause did not have to be returned by wife at time of grant of Khula---No illegality therefore existed in impugned order---Intra-court appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

P L D 2017 Lahore 884

Before Amin-ud-Din Khan and Tariq Iftikhar Ahmad, JJ

Dr. FAIZA ASGHAR---Appellant

Versus

NIGHAT NASIR SHEIKH and others---Respondents

R.F.A. No.95 of 2010, heard on 13th April, 2017.

(a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)--

----S. 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VII, R. 10 & S. 9---Defamation---Damages---Jurisdiction of civil court---Plaint, return of---Scope---Civil court accepted application under O. VII, R. 10, C.P.C. and returned the plaint---Contention of plaintiff was that it was option of the aggrieved person to avail remedy by filing suit under S.9, C.P.C. or under Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Validity---Civil court was court of ultimate jurisdiction---Neither there was any repealing clause nor ouster of jurisdiction of civil court to try the suit filed before it with regard to damages on account of defamation---If in respect of same dispute/litigation general law and special law were in field, special law would prevail subject to condition that special law contained provisions of ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts---Aggrieved person, therefore, had option either to opt for redressal against defamatory action before court of general jurisdiction i.e. civil court or under the special law---Jurisdiction of civil court covered all kinds of civil litigation on the strength and force of S. 9, C.P.C.---Plaintiff had availed the option of the civil court but his plaint was returned while misinterpretin g the law---Impugned order was not sustainable in circumstances which was set aside and matter was remanded for decision afresh in accordance with law---Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Shafaqat-ur-Rehman v. Daud-ur-Rehman and 11 others PLD 2006 Pesh. 206; Pakistan Herald Publications (Pvt.) Ltd. and 2 others v. Karachi Building Control Authority through Controller of Buildings 2012 CLD 453 and Khadim Hussain and 12 others v. Gul Hassan Tiwano and 3 others 2013 CLD 981 ref.

Raees Ghulam Sarwar through Attorney v. Mansoor Sadiq Zaidi and 4 others PLD 2008 Kar. 458; Surjan and others v. Lajja Ram, Vendee and another, Vendor AIR (30) 1943 Lah. 48 and Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Farman Bi PLD 1990 SC 28 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan-

----Art. 4---Reputation of a person was important civil right guaranteed under Art.4 of the Constitution.

Mehmood A. Sheikh for Appellant.

Jamshaid Alam and Umer Tahir for Respondent No.2.

P L D 2017 Lahore 889

Before Asjad Javaid Ghural, J

MUMTAZ HUSSAIN-Petitioner

Versus

THE STATE and 2 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.17013-Q of 2016, decided on 24th January, 2017.

Punjab Security of Vulnerable Establishments Ordinance (XIV of 2015)---

----Ss. 9 & 14(1)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Quashing of F.I.R.---Filing of Challan---Abuse of authority---Petitioner was aggrieved of registration of F.I.R. against him under the provisions of Punjab Security of Vulnerable Establishments Ordinance, 2015, and sought quashing of F.I.R. even though Challan had been filed by police in Trial Court---Validity---Station House Officer of Police Station/complainant was not competent to register F.I.R. in question against petitioner---Station House Officer was under legal obligation to report the matter to Committee, who after verifying and satisfying with inspection reports received from any source or inspection report of Station House Officer, could issue a written warning to the manager of petrol station and in case of non-compliance of direction within the stipulated period, the Committee could direct complete or partial sealing of the vulnerable establishment---Act committed by Station House Officer for registration of F.I.R. against petitioner was illegal, unwarranted and viod ab initio---Challan was submitted before Trial Court and normally after submission of Challan, High Court whiling exercising constitutional jurisdiction declined to quash F.I.R., as an alternate remedy was available to accused by filing application under S.249-A/265-K, Cr.P.C.---Where an illegal act committed by an officer of Law Enforcing Agency was clearly in violation of the statute, interference by High Court was not circumvent---High Court quashed the FIR registered against petitioner as non-existent under law---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

James Joseph for Petitioner.

P L D 2017 Lahore 892

Before Habib Ullah Amir, J

MUHAMMAD NAWAZ---Petitioner

Versus

Mst. SHAMIM MAI and 4 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.9730 of 2015, decided on 16th January, 2017.

Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 7---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 128---DNA Test---Scope---Suit for recovery of dowry articles, dower amount and maintenance for herself and minors was filed by respondent/wife and the same was pending trial before Family Court---Petitioner/husband, during pendency of the suit, disowned two minor daughters and sought permission to conduct DNA Test--- Application of petitioner / husband was dismissed by Family Court as well as by Lower Appellate Court--- Validity--- Birth certificates of two minor girls were brought on record which depicted that both minor girls were born when plaintiff was legally wedded wife of defendant and he did not dispute the same--- Plea that minor girls were not born out of the wedlock of parties was raised for the first time in written statement---Nothing was brought on record from the side of petitioner/husband to establish that he had disputed legitimacy of children soon after their birth---Petitioner/husband remained silent till he filed written statement in the suit---DNA Test was always conducted with the consent of the person concerned and no such consent was available---Once consent was not given, DNA Test could not be conducted--- High Court declined to interfere in orders passed by two courts below---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Mst. Shamshad Bbi v. Bushra Bibi and 3 others PLD 2009 Isl. 11 and Naseer Ahmed v. Mst. Azrah and another PLD 2010 Kar. 61 distinguished.

Ghazala Tehsin Zohra v. Mehr Ghulam Dastagir Khan and another PLD 2015 SC 327; Mst. Shamim Akhtar v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala and another PLD 2015 Lah. 500 and Khizar Hayat v. Additional District Judge, Kabirwala and 2 others PLD 2010 Lah. 422 rel.

Sh. Dilawar Hussain, Advocate.

P L D 2017 Lahore 896

Before Ali Baqar Najafi and Abdul Sattar, JJ

Mst. FAIZ MAI---Appellant

Versus

HOME SECRETARY and others---Respondents

I.C.A. No. 455 of 2015, decided on 25th September, 2017.

(a) Police Order [22 of 2002]---

----Arts. 120 & 121---Police Act (V of 1861), Ss. 30 & 30A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 20---Right to take out a religious procession---Licnese for Muharram procession, issuance of---Principles.

Following are the principles relating to issuance of a license for Muharram procession:

(a) Under Article 120 of the Police Order, 2002 it was the head of District Police or Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police who was empowered to issue or refuse the license for the Muharram procession.

(b) The corresponding section 30(a) of the Police Act, 1861 or the whole scheme of law did not mention the Home Secretary as competent authority to grant or refuse such license.

(c) Minority sects (having less population) were not debarred from indulging into lawful religious practices as it was the responsibility of the State to protect enforcement of Fundamental Right under Article 20 of the Constitution, as long as they did not infringe into the rights of other communities.

(d) In rare cases the license may be refused but such refusal could not be permanent and would be only for a particular occasion.

(e) The police was required to be vigilant in finding out the programme of procession being taken out.

(f) The requirement of license was for procession on new routes.

(g) The authorities while dealing with such applications (for issuance of license) shall apply their mind and abstain from dealing with it arbitrarily or capriciously and shall remain even handed strictly as mandated by law.

(h) As a requirement for taking out a procession, the licensee, organizer, manager, and the leader, could be identified with a view to prescribe the route, timing, halting places, the accompaniments and the conduct of the procession itself, only with the sole object of avoiding breach of peace.

Hakim Sher Ahmad Chishti v. Syed Abbas and 2 others PLD 1976 Lah. 85; Mian Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan and another 1970 SCMR 645; Muhammad Aslam alias Muhammad Mehdi v. District Magistrate, Gujrat and another 1980 PCr.LJ. 707; Muhammad Hussain Bhatti v. District Magistrate, Gujrat 1985 PCr.LJ 301; Sharafat Hussain v. Deputy Commissioner, Kasur and another 1983 PCr.LJ 1485; Syed Sarfraz Hussain Bokhari v. District Magistrate, Kasur and others PLD 1983 SC 172; Kaneez Fatima v. District Magistrate, Sialkot and others 1985 PCr.LJ 2707; Dr. Muhammad Bashir and another v. District Magistrate Lahore and 2 others 1988 MLD 1400; Syed Tausif Hussain Shah and others v. District Magistrate, Chakwal and others 2000 MLD 199; Malik Ghulam Yusaf v. District Magistrate, Attock 1995 MLD 1510; Muhammad Siddique v. District Magistrate, Lahore and 3 others 1997 MLD 588 and Syed Manzoor Hussain Shah v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Collector Dera Ismail Khan and others 2005 SCMR 995 ref.

(b) Police Order [22 of 2002]---

----Arts. 120 & 121---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 20---License for Muharram procession, issuance of---Licensee---Pre-requisites---Not mandatory that a licensee must possess a certain property in the area for taking out the procession since it was the consent of the owner of the property which was required to carry out procession from his place---Even otherwise, participants of a procession walked on the public roads and streets, therefore, the ownership of any property for issuance of the license would be meaningless.

(c) Police Order [22 of 2002]---

----Arts. 120 & 121---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 20---License for Muharram procession---Right of daughter to inherit such license from her deceased (Shia) father---Nowhere in the scheme of (Shia) personal law a daughter was debarred from being substituted as a licensee provided her male family members were capable of fulfilling such responsibility.

Muhammad Yafis Naveed Hashmi for Appellant.

Malik Shahzad Hassan Awan and Malik Muhammad Azam Sandheela for Respondent No.5.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 1

Before Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, C J

WALI KHAN---Appellant

Versus

ALI MUHAMMAD---Respondent

R.F.A. No.139-P of 2015, decided on 14th March, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----Ss. 13 & 44-A---Judgment of foreign court---Procedure---Plaintiff, after obtaining a foreign judgment, could either file an application to the District Court for the execution of said decree, if the country from which the decree had been passed was any reciprocating treaty or he could file suit in Pakistan on the basis of foreign judgment.

Habib Bank Limited v. Bahjani Scrap Trading Company LLC and 2 others PLD 2011 Kar. 257 rel.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 13---Foreign judgment---Question of correctness---Scope---Courts in Pakistan could not question the correctness of the foreign judgment subject to the exceptions as enumerated in S.13, C.P.C. and if the said exceptions, were fulfilled, the judgment was conclusive between the parties.

(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 13---Foreign judgment---Validity---Defendant admitted the passing of foreign judgment in his written statement as well as in his statement recorded as witness---Such judgment was not challenged through appeal nor any objection was raised under any of the exceptions provided by law---Foreign judgment would become conclusive and irrefutable in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Jan Muhammad for Appellant.

Muhammad Hamayun for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 5

Before Ikramullah Khan and Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan, JJ

QUDRATULLAH---Appellant

Versus

The STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No.60-D of 2014, decided on 14th March, 2016.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 (b) & 34----Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Act done by several persons in furtherance of common intention---Proof, requirement of---Accused had although been charged for sharing common intention with the absconding co-accused, but no overt act towards commission of the offence had been attributed to him, and no evidence regarding his active participation in the crime was available on the file---Mere presence at the spot, ipso facto, would not be sufficient to hold a person vicariously liable---Sufficient evidence should have been available to prove the factum of sharing of common intention, even prior to commission of offence--High Court, setting aside the impugned conviction and sentence acquitted the accused---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly.

Falak Sher and another v. The State 2008 PCr.LJ 837; Gul Muhammad v. Said Karim and 3 others 1994 PCr.LJ 1640; Muhammad Yaqoob, Sub-lnspector v. The State PLD 2001 SC 378; Allah Wadhayo and another v. The State 2001 SCMR 25; Riaz Ahmad v. The State and another 2016 PCr.LJ 114; Said Zamin v. Shair Azaim and others 2016 MLD 76; Fazal Maula v. The State through Additional Advocate General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and another 2016 MLD 42; Riaz Masih alias Mithoo v. The State 1995 SCMR 1730; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Arshad alias Kausar v. The State 1998 MLD 192 ref.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----

----S. 34---Common intention---Scope---Section 34, P.P.C. is neither punitive, nor it enacts a rule of evidence, but mainly relates to joint liability.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----

----S. 34---Common intention---Meaning---Provisions of S.34, P.P.C. means that if two or more persons intentionally commit an offence jointly, which amounts to as if each of them has committed it individually, and they will have to share the consequences jointly, subject to the proof that at the relevant time each one of them remained involved in the commission of offence.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----

----S. 34---Common intention---Proof, requirement of---Mere presence at the spot, ipso facto, would not be sufficient to hold a person vicariously liable and sufficient evidence should be available to prove the factum of sharing of common intention, even prior to commission of offence---Offence must be proved to have been committed in concert and pursuant to pre-arranged plan.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----

----S. 34---Common intention---Inference of common intention should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances of the case.

(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----

----S. 34---Common intention--- Requirements---All that is necessary is either to have direct proof or prior concert, or proof of circumstances which necessarily lead to that inference, or the incriminating facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation of any other reasonable hypothesis.

(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----

----S. 34---Common intention---Offence must be proved to have been committed in concert and pursuant to pre-arranged plan.

Sanaullah Khan Gandapur and Muhammad Wahid Anjum for Appellant.

Kamran Hayat Miankhel, Addl. A.G. for the State and Ghulam Hur Khan Baloch for the Complainant.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 10

Before Rooh-ul-Amin Khan, J

MUHAMMAD MUNIR---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.1426 of 2015, decided on 21st August, 2015.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Electronic Transactions Ordinance (LI of 2002), Ss.36 & 37---National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance (VIII of 2000), S.30---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.419 & 420---Privacy of information, damage to information system etc., cheating by personation and cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property---Bail, refusal of---Allegation against the accused was that he created and operated fake facebook profile in the name of complainant and uploaded her picture without her consent---Inquiry was conducted wherein relevant record was obtained from the Facebook Incorporation---Sufficient material had been collected against the accused with the data from Facebook Incorporation---Accused was involved in the offence which was against society---Reasonable grounds existed to connect the accused with the commission of offence---Bail was declined, in circumstances.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 189---Judgment of Supreme Court---Binding effect---Decision of Supreme Court deciding a question of law or enunciating a principle of law was binding on every organ of the State.

(c) Legal practitioner---

----Legal profession, functions, ethics and propriety---Professional duty of a legal practitioner was that he was supposed to appear in the court when a case was called---Failure would indicate lack of respect of counsel toward his professional duties---Advocates were officers of the courts and they were expected to maintain the dignity of legal profession.

Liaqat Ali Khan v. The State and 6 others PLD 2015 Pesh. 115 and Nazir Ahmed and another v. The State and others PLD 2014 SC 241 rel.

Nemo for the Petitioner.

Abdul Latif Khan, Standing Counsel along with Miss Shagufta Amin, Complainant.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 14

Before Abdul Latif Khan, J

SAFDAR SHAH and others---Petitioner

Versus

MEHBOOBUR REHMAN---Respondent

C.R.No.79 of 2010 along with C.M.No.13 of 2012, decided on 3rd April, 2015.

(a) Easements Act (V of 1882)---

----Ss. 12 & 15---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.I, R.10 & OXXVI, Rr.9 & 10---Easement---Right of way---Burden of proof---Claim of easement of necessity---Scope---Necessary parties to claim of easement---Report of Local Commission---Evidentiary value---Availability of alternate access way---Effect---Plaintiff filed suit for declaration and perpetual injunction claiming to be owner on suit property which was shamilat deh and seeking that defendant be restrained from raising construction on path which was being used by him for more than fifty years---Trial Court decreed the suit but appellate court dismissed the same---Validity---Both parties had admittedly constructed their houses on suit property/shamilat deh---As per statement of witness, there were more than one access paths to the house of plaintiff---Plaintiff alleged that there was no access to his house other than disputed path, but no cogent and independent evidence was produced to that effect---Plaintiff did not produce any person of locality to support his claim and based the same on his own statement---Plaintiff in plaint gave disputed path on northern side of his house, but bailiff after inspection of spot stated the same to be on eastern side---Plaintiff had no prerogative to claim easement of passage on ground of convenience---Easement was always claimed on property owned by others which was not the case of plaintiffs---Easement of necessity was not to be allowed at wish and whims of plaintiffs if another alternate access was available though inconvenient---No claim could be entertained for easement of passage on choice of plaintiff---Mere use of path through passing property would not bestow any right upon claimant and owner of property at any stage had right to restrain claimant from using the same---All owners of suit property, who had constructed their houses on shamilat deh, were not arrayed as party---Huge property of shamilat was in possession of all owners and there were numerous access paths to the same---Plea of plaintiff that path leading to his house had been blocked by raising wall was not proved by cogent evidence---Burden of proof was on plaintiff that he had right to disputed path to the exclusion of other owners including defendants---Mere opinion of Local Commission being not binding on court would not bestow any right upon plaintiff to claim ownership and use all paths to the exclusion of others---Present was not a case of private ownership rather pertained to shamilat deh wherein all owners were necessary parties and in their absence no effective decree could be passed regarding ownership and possessory rights---Finding of appellate court were not based on true appreciation of evidence and correct appreciation of the law---Plaintiff had to stand on his own legs and could not be given benefit of weaknesses of defence---High Court allowing revision petition set aside impugned judgment and decree and dismissed the suit.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XXVI, Rr. 9 & 10---Report of Local Commission---Evidentiary Value---Mere opinion of Local Commission being not binding on court, would not bestow any right upon party.

(c) Easements Act (V of 1882)---

----S. 15---Right of way, claim for---Easement of necessity---Scope---Plaintiff has no prerogative to claim easement of passage on ground of convenience---Easement is always claimed on property owned by others---Easement of necessity was not to be allowed at wish and whims of plaintiff if other alternate access were available; though were inconvenient---No claim could be entertained for easement of passage on choice of plaintiff---Mere use of path through passing property would not bestow any right upon claimant and owner of property at any stage has right to restrain claimant from using the same.

(d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. I, R. 10---Easements Act (V of 1882), Ss.12 & 15---Parties to suit---Right of way, claim for---Shamilat deh---Necessary and proper parties---All owners of suit property, who had constructed their houses in shamilat deh, were not arrayed as party---Such was not a case of private ownership rather pertained to shamilat deh wherein all owners were necessary parties and in their absence no effective decree could be passed regarding ownership and possessory rights.

Raja Shakeel Ahmed for Petitioner.

Shoukat Zaman Khan for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 19

Before Ikramullah Khan and Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan, JJ

ABDUR RASHID---Appellant

Versus

S. FIDA-UR-REHMAN SHAH---Respondent

R.F.A. No.28 of 2010, decided on 2nd December, 2015.

Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)---

----Ss. 3, 4 & 10---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Suit for damages on ground of defamatory publication---'Defamation', definition of---Rejection of plaint---Validity---Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Applicability---Suo motu rejection---Permissibility and object---Defamation Ordinance, 2002, although did not contain any provision regarding summary dismissal/rejection of plaint, but S.10 of the Ordinance provided that C.P.C. and Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 would mutatis mutandis apply to the proceedings under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Court, therefore, applying the provisions of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. at any time could reject the plaint, and said provisions could be invoked without waiting an application from the defendant's side, where the provisions were attracted in the opinion of the court---Wisdom behind said provision was to save the parties from the agony of frivolous litigation---Appeal against the decree was dismissed in circumstances.

2012 CLC 773 rel.

Muhammad Ghazanfar Ali for Appellant.

Abdul Qayyum Qureshi for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 21

Before Qaiser Rashid Khan, J

Mst. SHAH SANAM alias SHEMA---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Miscellaneous/Bail Application No.953-P of 2016, decided on 13th May, 2016.

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S.497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S.9(c)---Possessing and trafficking narcotics---Bail, refusal of---Counsel for accused pleaded that accused lady, could be granted bail, as she was a widow, and she had remained in judicial lock-up for the last two months---Plea, was repelled in view of the recovery of huge quantity of contraband charas from the direct personal possession of accused---Offence for which accused was charged squarely fell within the restrictive limb of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Mere womanhood or widowhood, was no good ground to enlarge accused on bail in such like cases and that too, when the smuggling of narcotics through ladies and minors had become a common phenomenon---Accused, prima facie linked with the commission of offence, was disentitled to bail---Bail petition being bereft of any merits, stood dismissed, in circumstances.

Farhat Ullah Khan for Petitioner.

Arshad Ahmad Khan, A.A.G. for the State.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 23

Before Ikramullah Khan and Qalandar Ali Khan, JJ

GULFARAZ KHAN---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.73-A of 2015, decided on 10th May, 2016.

(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 11-EE & Fourth Sched.---Security for good behaviour---Restriction on movement and proscription of a person---Remedy---Federal Government might publish, in the official Gazette, a list of persons as proscribed persons in the Fourth Schedule under S.11-EE of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, if there were reasonable grounds to believe that such persons were involved in any activities linked in any manner with a proscribed organization or had concerns in terrorism---In terms of S.11-EE(3) of the Act, any person, being aggrieved of the order passed by the Federal Government under S.11-EE of the Act, might file a review application before the Federal Government, and if such review application was refused, then he might file appeal before the High Court within 30 days of the refusal of the review---Petitioners, in the present case, had been declared as proscribed persons through various notifications issued by the Government, and their description was fully mentioned in the list, which notification had not been challenged through present petition---Impugned list only described those persons, who had already been placed in Fourth Sched. of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 by Federal Government---Petitioners had not challenged the notifications under which their names had been placed in Fourth Sched. of the Act, either by filing a review application or appeal in terms of S.11-EE(3) of the Act within the prescribed period of limitation---Jurisdiction of High Court under Art, 199 of the Constitution could not be invoked where other adequate remedy was available to an aggrieved person---No legal infirmity or fault was pointed out in the impugned list---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 11-EE & Fourth Sched.---Security for good behaviour---Proscription of persons---Parameters---Liberty of the citizens cannot be curtailed merely on presumptions, satisfaction, as described under S.11-EE of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, would be objective in nature and not subjective---Authorities are not to act on whims and caprices without there being any material before them in support of grounds for placing name of a person in Fourth Sched. of the Act.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 4 & 10-A---Right of individual to be dealt with in accordance with law---Right to fair trial---Fundamental rights of citizen cannot be curtailed or otherwise restricted---Every citizen, in terms of Arts. 4 & 10-A of the Constitution, is to be dealt with in accordance with law, and no action detrimental to life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law.

Ch. Abdul Raufehohan for Petitioner.

Muhammad Naeem Abbasi, A.G. for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 27

Before Assadullah Khan Chamkani, J

SAIF UR REHMAN---Appellant

Versus

The STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No.725-P of 2015, decided on 26th January, 2016.

Foreigners Act (XXXI of 1946)---

----Ss. 14, 14-A & 16---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.5(2), 241-A & 537---Revision/appeal under Foreigners Act, 1946---Scope---Applicability of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898---Scope---Foreigners Act, 1946 neither expressly provided for appeal or revision nor regulated the procedure of inquiry, investigation and trial of an accused for any offence under the Act---Certain provisions of the Act, however, impliedly indicated towards the application of Cr.P.C---Section 14-A of the Act, although, barred the application of Cr.P.C, but, as evident from the language of S. 14-A, the bar was only to the extent of bail and not in respect of the other matters--- Section 16 of Foreigners Act, 1946 made the other laws applicable to the Act--- Words 'application of other law' or 'provisions of any other enactment' in S. 16 of the Act were sufficient to suggest that the application of Cr.P.C. had not been barred---Provisions of Cr.P.C. were applicable to trial before Special Court under Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, and if Special or Local law created offences and provided procedure to deal with, then procedure thus provided in the Special law had to be adopted---Where, however, the Special law provided no specific procedure and there was no provision in the same regarding overriding effect of the other law, then the provisions of Cr.P.C. would be applicable within the meaning of S.5(2), Cr.P.C---In case of offences other than provided in P.P.C., the provisions of Cr.P.C. would apply subject to specific or contrary provisions made by the law under which those offences were to be investigated---Unless a Special Law expressly or impliedly provided that certain offences were to be tried exclusively by the Courts constituted under such law, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to try the offences under Cr.P.C. was not excluded---Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was, therefore, applicable to Foreigners Act, 1946--- Accused, instead of filing a revision against the decision of the appellate court, filed second appeal before the High Court, which the High Court converted into revision in the interest of justice---Accused had been convicted and sentenced by the Trial Court, after he had pleaded guilty to the charge---Use of the word 'shall' in S. 241-A, Cr.P.C. had made that mandatory for the Trial Court not to charge sheet the accused without providing a gap of at least seven days in between supply of the copies of documents and framing of the charge---Magistrate, without complying with the provision of S.241-A, Cr.P.C, had charged sheeted the accused and convicted/sentenced him, which illegality was not curable under S.537, Cr.P.C.---High Court, therefore, setting aside the impugned order, remanded the case for de novo trial to be concluded in one month---Revision was disposed of accordingly.

Syed Dawran Sh. for Appellant.

Mujahid Ali Khan, A.A.G. for the State.

P LD 2017 Peshawar 31

Before Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, C.J. and Muhammad Younis Thaheem, J

KHAN ASGHAR and another---Petitioners

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Defence, Islamabad and 8 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2012-P of 2013 with C.M. No.879-P of 2013, decided on 24th March, 2016.

Negligence---

----Death by negligence---Accidental air strike---Compensation---Scope---Petitioners sought recovery of compensation for deaths and damages caused by accidental air strike by an aircraft of Pakistan Air Force---Validity---Death certificates and medical reports of all injured were available on file and were not touched by anyone which affirmed the stance of petitioners and it went un-rebutted---When deaths/injuries/collateral damages were established on record, then by keeping in view guaranteed Constitutional and Fundamental Rights, legal heirs of all deceased, as per available record, who suffered injuries and collateral damage of their houses were entitled for compensation---High Court directed Federal Government to pay compensation amount to true legal heirs of each deceased, injured and for damages caused due to the incident---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Qabal Shah v. The Federation of Pakistan and others W.P. No.1014 of 2011 fol.

Muhammad Ilyas Orakzai for Petitioners.

Umar Farooq Adam, A.A.G. for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 36

Before Qaiser Rashid Khan and Mrs. Irshad Qaiser, JJ

ABDUL NASIR and another---Petitioners

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and 3 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.4441-P of 2015, decided on 27th January, 2016.

Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act (XXXV of 1973)--

----S. 2(a)---Advertisement for appointment of Civil Judges/Judicial Magistrates---Amendment of two year experience at Bar as an eligibility criteria after submission of applications form---Scope---Petitioners being qualified for the posts of Civil Judges/Judicial Magistrates applied for the same but said posts were re-advertised by the Public Service Commission and two year experience at Bar was made mandatory for filing of fresh application forms---Validity---Amendment inserted in the relevant Rules with regard to two year experience at Bar was made through proper consultative process of High Court and Public Service Commission after the judgment of Supreme Court---Petitioner who though was a law-graduate but opted for the first time to apply for the post of Civil Judge did not qualify to be termed as advocate and he was not eligible for the post of Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate---Mere submission of application for the post could not confer any vested right upon the candidate to take the matter back---Petitioners had failed to point out any mala fide on the part of authorities whereby only they had been discriminated against---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Faisal Noor Junejo v. High Court of Sindh through Registrar 2013 SCMR 29; Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal and others v. The Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Lahore and others 1997 SCMR 1043; Sh. Muhammad Sadiq v. Federal Public Service Commission and others 2013 SCMR 264 and Dr. Alyas Qadeer Tahir v. Secretary M/O Education (Now M/O CADD), Islamabad and others 2014 SCMR 997 rel.

Mumtaz Ahmad for Petitioners.

Abdul Latif Yousafzai, Advocate-General for Government of KPK along with Muhammad Saeed, Deputy Secretary (Litigation) KPK Public Service Commission for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 47

Before Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, C.J. and Qaiser Rashid Khan, J

AIZAZ-UL-MULK---Petitioner

Versus

ELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Election Commission, Islamabad and 4 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2080-P of 2015, decided on 10th March, 2016.

Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----S. 103-AA---Election to the seat of Member Provincial Assembly---Disenfranchisement of female voters---Effect---Election Commission of Pakistan, on suo motu notice, declared the by-election of the constituency as void due to disenfranchisement of female voters---Validity---Neither there was any evidence nor any contesting candidate had made complaint or any male or female voter had come forward with the allegation that election in the constituency was not held fairly, justly, honestly and in accordance with law---Nothing was on record before the Election Commission to form an opinion in a summary proceedings to declare the election of the constituency as void on suo motu notice---Nothing was available on file to show that female voters were restrained either by the elders of the locality or male voters of the constituency---Voter had a choice either to vote or not and no punitive law was available in the field to compel such a voter to cast his/her vote by all means---Election Commission having exercised its powers on a hearsay evidence in the present case, re-polling could not be ordered only on the basis of presumption when otherwise election was conducted in a fair and transparent manner---Impugned order and new election schedule were declared to have been passed/issued in excess of authority and jurisdiction which were set aside---Election Commission of Pakistan was directed to issue notification of returned candidate from the concerned constituency---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Lt.Gen. (R.) Salahuddin Tirmizi v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2008 SC 735; Dravesh Khan v. Muhammad Sher Khan and others 1986 SCMR 352 and Dr. Raja Aamer Zaman v. Omar Ayub Khan and others 2015 SCMR 1303 rel.

Ghulam Mohyuddin and Amir Javed for Petitioner.

Shumail Ahmad Butt for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 55

Before Qaiser Rasheed Khan and Assadullah Khan Chamkani, JJ

AKHTAR MUHAMMAD---Appellant

Versus

The STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No.341-P of 2013, decided on 26th November, 2015.

(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----

----Ss. 19(10), 19(14) & 7(e)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Court---Procedure and powers---Scope---Trial in absentia---Permissibility and effect---Some of the co-accused, in the present case, having been declared as Proclaimed Offenders, had not been tried in absentia, as contemplated under S. 19(10) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Question before the High Court was as to whether non-compliance of the provisions of S. 19(10) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 against the absconding co-accused would vitiate the onward proceedings in the trial of the arrested accused---Trial in absentia, being violative of Arts. 9 & 10(1) of the Constitution, non-compliance of the provisions of S. 19(10) of the Act against the absconding co-accused by the Trial Court would not vitiate the trial of present accused---Anti-Terrorism Court, in terms of S. 19(14) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, exercising the powers of Court of Session, had proceeded against the absconding co-accused within the meaning of S.512, Cr.P.C and declared them as Proclaimed Offenders, followed by issuance of perpetual warrant of arrest.

Mir Ikhlaq Ahmad and another v. The State 2008 SCMR 951; Arbab Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 755; The State v. Khurram Shahzad and others 2011 MLD 378; Muhammad Shoaib and others v. The State 2013 MLD 1469; Abdul Majeed v. The Accountability Judge-I, Quetta and others 2012 PCr.LJ 1647; Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 1445 and Malik Iftikhar Ahmad v. Ali Asghar and another PLD 1957 SC (AJ&K) 47 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----

----S. 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(e)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 221 to 240 & 367(2)---Kidnapping or abducting for extortion of property, valuable security, etc., act of terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Charge sheet framing of---Principles---Question before the High Court was as to whether the accused had been confronted with clear and specific charge by providing them proper opportunity to defend themselves or they had been prejudiced in their defence by confronting them with ambiguous charge-sheet, and whether the accused had been convicted and sentenced in accordance with law or otherwise---Anti-Terrorism Court had framed charges of offences under the Third Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as well as connected offences of P.P.C. under single head by simply mentioning at the end of the charges "and you thereby committed an offence punishable under S.365-A, P.P.C. read with S.7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or Ss.365-A/149, P.P.C. read with S.7(e)/21-I of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997"---Such was a wrong exercise of law on the subject (framing of charge)---Separate charge-sheet, in such like cases, would be formulated under each offence of each statute as well as offence of the Third Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Charge-sheet, in the present case, was ambiguous, as the same did not speak specifically as to under which offence or law the accused had been confronted with the charge---Convictions and sentences of the accused recorded by the Trial Court in each case were also on the same footing, from which one could not ascertain as to under which statute the accused had been convicted and sentenced---Charge-sheet did not specifically determine as to whether the accused had been charge sheeted under S. 365-A, P.P.C. or S.7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, as the same had been framed under a single head and it was not certain as to under which offence, the accused had been charge sheeted and then convicted and sentenced---Under S. 367 (2), Cr.P.C, the judgment would specify the offence (if any) of which and the section of P.P.C. or other law under which the accused was convicted and the punishment for which he was sentenced---Accused had been prejudiced by not confronting them with specific charge and had been deprived of their right of defence---High Court, setting aside the conviction/sentence, remanded the case for de novo trial, from the stage of framing of fresh formal charge against the accused---Appeal was allowed accordingly.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----

----S. 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 2(t), 6, 7(e), 8, 13, 17 & Third Schedule---Kidnapping or abducting for extortion of property, valuable security, etc., act of Terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court---Scope---Question before High Court was as to whether the offence under S. 365-A, P.P.C., if having no nexus with the object of Ss. 6, 7 and 8 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, would still be triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court or an ordinary court---Under S.2(t) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, 'Scheduled Offence' meant an offence as set out in the Third Schedule of the Act---Abduction or kidnapping for ransom had been inserted in the Third Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; therefore, S. 365-A, P.P.C. was a Scheduled Offence, which was similar to offence under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, punishment of which had been provided under S. 7(e) of the Act---Both offences were identical except that the quantum of punishment of both the offences slightly varied from each other---Punishment provided under S. 7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for the offence of kidnapping for ransom or hostage taking was death or imprisonment for life---Abduction or kidnapping for ransom had been added in the Third Schedule to Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, but punishment thereof had not been provided therein; rather, the punishment had been provided under S. 365-A, P.P.C., that was death or imprisonment for life and forfeiture of property---Forfeiture of property, in addition to death or imprisonment for life under S. 365-A, P.P.C., was the point of variation in the sentences to the two offences; therefore, the accused was to be charged under S. 7(e) of the Act and under S. 365-A, P.P.C. separately---In case of proof of the charge of abduction for ransom, if the offences had nexus with the object of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the accused would be convicted under S.7(e) of the Act, otherwise under S. 365-A, P.P.C.; however, at the same time, the accused would not be convicted under both the offences---All offences with regard to use or threat of actions under S.6 of the Act, and offences mentioned under the Third Schedule, would be exclusively triable by Anti-Terrorism Court along with offences with which the accused might be charged under the Code (P.P.C.) at the same trial, as provided under S.17 of the Act---Anti-Terrorism Court could also try other offences with which an accused might under the Code be charged at the same trial if the offence was connected with such other offence---If accused was charged under S. 7(a) of the Act and under S. 302, P.P.C., then he would be separately charge sheeted under S.7(a) of the Act and under S. 302, P.P.C., and on proof of the charges, the accused could be convicted and sentenced under each of the two sections of the laws, as one related to special law while the other related to ordinary law---However, in case of an offence under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and scheduled offence, the accused though would be charge sheeted separately, but he would be convicted under only one offence keeping in view the proof available on the record---Words 'under this Act' used in S. 13 of Anti-Terrorism Act clarified trial of the cases under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the words 'of scheduled offences' spoke about the trial of scheduled offence as according to S. 2(t) of the Act, 'Scheduled Offence' meant an offence as set out in the Third Schedule---Offences mentioned in the Third Schedule, even having no nexus with the object or terrorism, would be exclusively triable by Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and not by an ordinary court.

(d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----

----Chap. XIX [Ss. 221 to 240]----Charge, framing of---Prime object of framing of charge stated.

Charge against accused shall be specific, fair and clear in all respects to provide an opportunity to the accused to defend himself/herself in due course of trial. The charge shall be clear and by no means, confused to prejudice the accused. Charge is a precise formulation of specific accusations made against an accused person, who is entitled to know its nature at the early stage. Its aim is to explain to the accused as correctly and precisely as well as concisely as possible the allegations with which the accused is to be confronted. The charge must convey to the accused with sufficient transparency and in clear terms what the prosecution intends to prove against the accused. It shall contain all essential details as to time, place as well as specific manner of the alleged offence, the manner in which the offence was committed with full description of the accusation so as to afford the accused an opportunity to explain the accusations with which he is confronted. The prime object and the principle of framing charge shall be, to make aware the accused, of the substantive accusations which are to be proved by the prosecution with clear intention and with unambiguous description of the offence so as to enable the accused to defend himself.

Sahibzada Riazat ul Haq for Appellant.

Mian Arshad Jan, A.A.G. for the State.

Syed Abdul Fayaz for the Complainant.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 70

Before Yahya Afridi and Rooh-ul-Amin Khan, JJ

TORSAM and 2 others---Petitioners

Versus

IBRAHIM KHAN and 5 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.284-P of 2014, decided on 15th December, 2015.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 9 & O.VII, R.10---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 8---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.172---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Rules, 1968, R.67(B)---Suit for declaration and possession---Demarcation of boundaries of agricultural land by the revenue authorities---Jurisdiction of civil court to entertain suit for possession of agricultural land---Scope---Revenue authorities found encroachment on the suit property by the defendants---Plaintiffs instituted suit for declaration and possession wherein application for rejection of plaint was moved which was dismissed by the Trial Court but Appellate Court accepted the same and plaint was ordered to be returned---Validity---Present suit was to be filed in a civil court which was validly triable under S.9, C.P.C.---Matter of demarcation of boundaries of agricultural land would exclusively fall in the domain of revenue authorities---Jurisdiction of civil court had been barred with regard to demarcation of agricultural land---Where claim was for declaration, permanent injunction and possession of the area demarcated by the revenue authorities then suit must lie before civil court---Jurisdiction of civil court had been excluded only to the extent of taking functions of revenue authorities in hand---Civil court was court of ultimate jurisdiction and it should continue to assume jurisdiction with regard to civil matters unless same had been expressly barred---Aggrieved person had choice to choose the forum in revenue hierarchy or remedy under S.9, C.P.C.---After selecting one remedy the other would become barred---Impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court was set aside and that of Trial Court was restored---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Mehram Khan and others v. Fateh Khan and others 1983 SCMR 366 rel.

(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)---

----S. 172---Demarcation of agricultural land by the revenue authorities---Scope---Matter of demarcation of boundaries of agricultural land would exclusively fall in the domain of revenue authorities and jurisdiction of civil court was barred.

(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 9---Jurisdiction of civil court---Scope---Civil court was court of ultimate jurisdiction and it should continue to assume jurisdiction with regard to civil matters unless same had been expressly barred.

Adil Majeed for Petitioners.

Fawad Khan for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 74

Before Waqar Ahmad Seth and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD FAYAZ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.545-P of 2014, decided on 20th September, 2016.

(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----Preamble---Purpose and nature of Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997---Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, was a special law, which the Legislature had enacted mainly for awarding deterrent punishments to the persons involved in the trade of narcotics in any manner.

(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 9(c)---Possession and trafficking narcotics---Appreciation of evidence---Police witnesses, credibility of---Police officials were as good witnesses as other citizens---Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 was a stern law---Accused could be awarded death sentence or life imprisonment on the basis of testimony of police officials---Prosecution in such circumstances, was duty bound to conduct diligent, honest and flawless investigation.

(c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 9(c)---Possession of narcotics---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Allegation on the accused was that 171 Kilograms heroin was recovered from the secret cavities of his tanker---Prosecution had not produced the case property as well as tanker in order to strengthen the case against the accused---Effect---Case property was not produced during trial which was best evidence with the prosecution against the accused---Circumstances of the case showed that no recovery of contraband substance as well as tanker was effected from the accused or the prosecution was not interested in pursuing the case against the accused---Such circumstances created reasonable doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case---Benefit of all this was given to the accused as a matter of right---Appeal was accepted and conviction and sentence of accused was set aside.

(d) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 9(c)---Possession of narcotics---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Allegation on the accused was that 171 Kilograms heroin was recovered from the secret cavities of his tanker---Prosecution instead to produced the case property, submitted that case property had been destroyed---Photocopies of destruction certificates were produced---Neither the original destruction certificates were produced by the prosecution during trial for exhibition nor had brought the actual fact regarding destruction of case property into the notice of Trial Court---Effect---Accused could not be convicted for an offence bearing capital punishment on the basis of mere photocopies of destruction certificates---Such circumstances of the case created doubt in a prudent mind regarding recovery of alleged contraband from the possession of the accused, benefit of which was resolved in favour of accused---Appeal was accepted and conviction and sentence of accused were set aside.

(e) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 9(c)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 79---Possession and trafficking narcotics---Unattested document of destruction of case property---Scope---Prosecution produced photocopies of destruction certificates about disposal of case property which was inadmissible in evidence and could not be relied upon---Accused could not be convicted for an offence bearing capital punishment on the basis of mere photocopies of destruction certificates.

(f) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 6---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 516-A---Case property---Custody and disposal of narcotic substance---Procedure---Right of accused---Destruction of case property, pending trial---Scope---Notice must be given to the accused person, at the time of passing the order of destruction of the case property---If the court suo motu passed order for destruction of narcotics, even then, it was essential to give notice not only to accused but also to prosecution so that after hearing contentions and objections, if any, by any party, order of destruction of property could properly be passed---Non-issuing notice to the accused and without hearing him before passing the order of destruction of the case property made the case doubtful, benefit of which was to be given to the accused---Appeal was accepted and conviction and sentence of accused were set aside.

Ali Muhammad v. The State PLD 2010 SC 623 rel.

(g) Natural justice, principles of ---

----Condemning unheard---Effect---Nobody should be condemned unheard and no adverse order, concerning person's rights could be passed against any party without hearing him---Such rule of natural justice, which unless prohibited by wording of statute, must be read in each and every statute.

Abdul Majeed Zafar v. Governor of the Punjab 2007 SCMR 330 and Asim Khan v.Zahir Shah 2007 SCMR 1451 rel.

(h) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 9(c)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.129(g)---Possession and trafficking narcotics---Withholding of best evidence---Effect---Destruction of case property---Procedure---Prosecution had to produce original destruction certificates before the court and in case of absence of the same, the Magistrate concerned who had carried out the destruction proceedings could have been examined in support of the stance of the prosecution---By not examining the said witness, prosecution had withheld the best evidence---Presumption could be drawn that party had some motive behind it by not producing the said evidence and in case such evidence was produced, the same would not have supported the prosecution case---Such circumstances made the case of prosecution dubious---Appeal was allowed and conviction and sentence recorded against the accused were set-aside.

(i) Criminal trial---

---Benefit of doubt---Prosecution was duty bound to prove its case beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt against accused---Multiple doubts were not required in the prosecution case for giving benefit of doubt to accused---Single circumstance creating reasonable doubt was sufficient for the acquittal of accused.

Syed Akbar Ali Shah for Appellant.

Muhammad Iabal Mohmand for Respondents

P L D 2017 Peshawar 83

Before Musarrat Hilali and Qalandar Ali Khan, JJ

SAJID KHAN JADOON---Petitioner

Versus

KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA EHTESAB COMMISSION (KPEC) through Chief Commissioner and 3 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2531-P of 2016, decided on 3rd August, 2016.

(a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission Act (I of 2014)---

----S. 35---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission Ordinance (II of 2016), Preamble---Reference---Accused seeking quashment of proceedings due to non-completion of inquiry and investigation within a specific timeframe---Validity---Proceedings initiated under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission Act, 2014 had to reach its logical conclusion under the Act and not under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ehtesab Commission Ordinance, 2016 promulgated thereafter---Reference was filed in the Court and notices had been issued to the parties---Constitutional petition was dismissed in limine.

(b) Interpretation of statutes---

----When language of the statute was capable of only one interpretation only that meaning was to be given to the language, irrespective of other considerations.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 88

Before Yahya Afridi, J

GHULAM SHER and 6 others---Petitioners

Versus

Mst. BIBI SHAN and 21 others---Respondents

Civil Revision No.508-P of 2013, decided on 23rd December, 2016.

(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--

----Arts. 64 & 129(g)---Parentage---Proof---Pedigree-table---Non-appearance in witness box in support of claimed relationship---Effect---Parentage cannot be proved by mere production of pedigree-table, without appearing in witness box to depose in support of claimed relationship---Non-appearance leads to an adverse inference to be taken by Trial Court under Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984.

Ghulam Muhammad's case PLD 1965 Lah. 482 and Shah Nawaz's case PLD 1976 SC 767 rel.

(b) Spcific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 8 & 42---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 46(5) & 64---Suit for recovery of immovable property and declaration---Parentage---Proof---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Plaintiff claimed to be daughter of deceased owner of suit property and had sought recovery of possession of the property---Trial Court partially decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff by declaring her to be a legal heir of deceased owner of suit property and found her entitled to possession only to the extent of her share---Lower Appellate Court maintained judgment and decree passed by Trial Court---Validity---To establish relationship of one person with another as provided under Art.64 read with Art.46(5) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, the same was effectively done by plaintiff, by producing documentary evidence of more than thirty years old public documents, through custodian of the same---In absence of any cogent disputed evidence produced by opposite side such documents had safely proved claim of plaintiff---Provisions of Arts. 64 & 46(5) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, were exception to general rule of not allowing indirect hearsay evidence---When plaintiff produced direct and that too documentary evidence in support of her claim, the same could not be rejected only on the ground that no oral evidence in support thereof was produced or that the beneficiary thereof did not personally appeared in witness box---High Court declined to interfere in the judgments sand decrees passed by two Courts below, as plaintiff was rightful daughter of deceased owner of suit property and she was entitled to her Sharai share in the legacy of her father---Revision was dismissed accordingly.

Mst. Jiwai's case 1994 CLC 1570; Mst. Jameela Khatoon's case 1997 CLC 1691; Jaleb Khan's case 1999 SCMR 2502; Ahmed Nawaz's case PLD 2002 Lah. 10; Rehmat Khan's case 2002 SCMR 1355; Mst. Safia's case 2005 MLD 646; Ali Bahadur's case PLD 2005 Lah. 218; Ghulam Abbas's case 2006 YLR 498; Talib Hussain Shah's case 2006 CLC 652; Karamat's case 2007 MLD 1910; Habib Khan's case PLD 2012 Pesh. 80; Nasir Khan's case 2013 MLD 1557; Mst. Grana's case PLD 2014 SC 167; Mst. Rooh Afza's case 2015 YLR 2199; Nadir Khan's case 2015 MLD 191; Riaz Hussain's case 2015 YLR 1903; Asal Janan's case 2016 YLR 561; Mehboob Khan's case 2016 MLD 143; Abdullah's case 1989 SCMR 735; Messrs Nabi Bakhsh's case 1990 CLC 1443; Habibullah Khan's case 1990 MLD 355; Mst. Rasul Bibi's case 1991 MLD 2008; Mst. Fazal Jan's case PLD 1992 SC 811; Mst. Namdara's case 1998 SCMR 996; Muhammad Shafi's case 2000 YLR 2477; Khushnood Iqbal's case 2001 MLD 1908; Muhammad Nazir's case 2003 SCMR 1183; Mst. Ghulam Janat's case 2003 SCMR 362; Eada Khan's case 2004 SCMR 1524; Mst. Asma Naz's case 2005 SCMR 401; Mst. Janntan's case PLD 2006 SC 322; Ihsanullah's case 2011 CLC 989; Mosam Khan's case 2012 CLC 1944; Sahib Jan's case 2013 SCMR 1540; Naimatullah's case 2016 YLR 263; Shahida Shaheen's case 2016 CLC 1672; Nanhak Lal's case AIR 1935 Patna 474; Mst. Zainab Jehan's case 2012 YLR 1480; Roshan Din's case 2002 YLR 2706; Allah Bakhsh's case 1995 CLC 331; Mirza Khan's case PLD 1991 SC 383 and Mst. Hameeda Bibi's case 2014 YLR 2520 ref.

(c) Evidence---

----Quality/quantity---Principle---Quality and not the quantity of evidence was required to be produced---When documentary evidence is available and produced, the same cannot be discarded simply because there is no oral evidence in support thereof.

Razia Khatoon's case 1991 SCMR 840 and Abdul Ghani Khan's case 2011 SCMR 837 rel.

(d) Islamic law---

----Illegitimacy---Proof---Courts are generally reluctant to stigmatize a child to be declared illegitimate---Every effort is made in favour of child's legitimacy.

Sadiq Hussain Khan's case AIR 1916 PC 27 and Ghazala Tehseen Zuhra's case PLD 2015 SC 327 rel.

(e) Islamic law---

----Inheritance---Limitation---Legal heir may seek his/her Sharai share during his/her lifetime, without any limitation of time.

Ghulam Ali's case PLD 1990 SC 1; Muhammad Qasim Khan's case 1991 SCMR 515; Mst. Jannat Saeed's case PLD 2001 SC 322; Muhammad Anwar's case 2008 SCMR 905 and Mst. Grana's case PLD 2014 SC 167 rel.

(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 115 & O.XLI, R.23---Revision before High Court---Scope---Legal issue---Non-remanding of case---Precondition---Legal issue can be decided even by High Court exercising its revisional jurisdiction, when sufficient evidence is available on record.

Abdul Zakir Tareen for Petitioners.

Muhammad Hamayun for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 102

Before Syed Afsar Shah, J

Mst. ZEENAT BIBI---Petitioner

Versus

FAZAL HAQ and another---Respondents

Writ Petition No.4515-P of 2015 with C.M. No.561 of 2016, decided on 20th January, 2017.

(a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched.---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XIV R.1 & O.XLI, R.24---Suit for recovery of dower---Non-framing of issue---Effect---Territorial jurisdiction---Determination of---Family Court decreed the suit but Appellate Court remanded the case on the ground that no specific issue was framed with regard to dower deed---Validity---Plaintiff-wife had set up her claim of dower on the basis of 'Kabin Nama'---Proper issue had been framed on the subject matter---Even if no specific issue had been framed on a particular matter but evidence had been led in that behalf, Court was to go for resolution of the controversy on the evidence already adduced by the parties---Sufficient evidence was available to enable the Appellate Court to pronounce judgment---Where the wife ordinarily resided, Family Court of that territory had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with all the matrimonial disputes---Impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court was set aside---Appellant Court had not decided the matter on merits---Case was remitted to the Appellate Court for decision in the light of available evidence on record---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XLI, R. 24---Purpose of O.XLI, R.24, C.P.C. was to minimize the hardship of litigant and to avoid unnecessary delay in disposal of cases by remitting to the lower Court.

Mian Iftikhar Jan for Petitioner.

Khan Ghawas Khan for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 105

Before Qaisar Rashid Khan and Qalandar Ali Khan, JJ

Syed GHAZANFAR KAZMI---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Tribal and Home Affairs Department and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.2825 of 2015, decided on 22nd March, 2017.

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 11-EE & Fourth Sched.---'Proscribed person'---Placing of name on Fourth Schedule to Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ("the Fourth Schedule")---Legality---Name of petitioner was placed on the list of proscribed persons under the Fourth Sched.---Case record showed that Government authorities had annexed an old report of the Provincial Special Branch, dated 26.09.2012, with their comments, without substantiating the report with supporting proof/evidence of involvement of the petitioner in terrorism or his being associate of or taking part in activities of an organization kept under observation or proscribed or in any way concerned or suspected to be concerned with such organization or affiliated with any group or organization suspected to be involved in terrorism or sectarianism---In the absence of evidence/proof, substantiating allegations against the petitioner, together with failure on the part of the Government authorities to prove on record any fresh order/notification listing the petitioner as a proscribed person in the Fourth Schedule, after the previous notification, which became inoperative in the year 2015, neither the petitioner could, in any way, be proceeded against under S.11-EE of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; nor, be unduly harassed or intimidated or subjected to other coercive methods in order to unlawfully curtail his constitutionally guaranteed freedom and liberty---Act of harassment and pressurizing the petitioner on the pretext of his name included in the list of suspected persons and restraining and detaining him was illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional---High Court directed the concerned Government authorities to act in accordance with the letter and spirit of law in general and S. 11-EE of the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, in particular, and provide protection to the petitioner against his undue harassment instead of becoming a party to such practice---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Abu Bakar Muhammad Reza v. Secretary to Government of Punjab, Home Department and 3 others PLD 2005 Lah. 370; Abdul Rauf v. Chief Commissioner, Islamabad and 5 others PLD 2006 Lah. 111; Muhammad Yousaf Farooqi v. Government of Punjab 2012 PCr.LJ 905 and Khawaja Mureed Hussain v. Government of the Punjab, Home Department, Lahore and 6 others 2013 PCr.LJ 312 ref.

Qazi Jawad Ihsanullah Qureeshi for Petitioner.

Syed Sikander Hayat Shah, AAG along with Siraj Khan, Special Secretary Home, Tahir Khan CCPO, Peshawar and Bashir Ahmad, DSP for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 111

Before Qaiser Rashid Khan and Qalandar Ali Khan, JJ

JEHANGIR KHAN---Petitioner

Versus

MUHAMMAD ASIF AWAN and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.466-A of 2016, decided on 15th November, 2016.

Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 63, 54 & 55---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VI, Rr.15 & 17---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Councils (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013, Rr.44, 45, 46 & 51---Election petition---Procedure---Discretion, exercise of---Annexures verification of---Election petition was dismissed on the ground that annexures were not attested by Oath Commissioner/Notary Public---Validity---Rule 51 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Councils (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2013 did not provide any penalty rather dismissal of election petition due to non-compliance of Rr.45 & 46 of said Rules was left at the discretion of Election Tribunal---Election Tribunal could exercise discretion in order to advance the requirements of law and justice by deciding election petition on merits on the basis of evidence/material brought before it---Summary disposal of election petition on technical grounds was to be avoided---Petitioner was to be allowed to amend election petition---Election petition was duly verified and affidavit of petitioner was attested by the Notary Public---Annexures attached to the election petition were also signed/attested by the petitioner---Impugned order passed by the Election Tribunal was set aside and election petition was sent back to the Election Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

2010 SCMR 1877; 2016 SCMR 750 and 2016 SCMR 430 rel.

Syed Amjad Shah and Ayesha Nayab Qureshi for Petitioner.

Muhammad Arshad Khan Tanoli and Auranzeb Khan, Deputy Attorney General for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 115

Before Waqar Ahmad Seth and Rooh-ul-Amin Khan, JJ

KHALID AZIZ---Appellant

Versus

PAKISTAN TELEVISION through Managing Director and 5 others---Respondents

R.F.A. No.91-P of 2006, decided on 5th May, 2017.

(a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)---

----Ss. 3, 4 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.19---Defamation---Essential ingredients---Actionable defamation---Defamation against persons by print and electronic media---Adjudication of cases under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002---Fundamental Right to Freedom of Speech and defamation---Scope---In order to constitute defamation in a suit under Defamation Ordinance, 2002; allegations levelled against a plaintiff should be false, baseless and unfounded; the wording used and allegation levelled against a plaintiff should on the face of it be defamatory and derogatory in nature, and such allegations should have been published in widely circulated newspapers or spoken in large gathering and said publications made or wording used should have been with malice without any reasonable excuse and justification and such allegations should have been directly attributed to plaintiff by specifically mentioning his/her name---In cases of defamation, falsehood was presumed on part of the defendant unless proved that the published/broadcasted materials were true and plaintiff could only be burdened to prove malice in case defendant succeeded in proving that defamatory words were true and privileged otherwise court shall presume that defamatory materials published or broadcast were false and male fide existed on part of the defendant---Article 19 of the Constitution guaranteed freedom of speech but it also imposed certain restrictions and limitations and did not provide licence to any person to make personal attempt on an individual to disgrace his/her dignity and reputation---Print and electronic media were in no way vested with unfettered liberty and impunity to public and telecast any material which was prejudicial to interest of any person or harmed or caused damage to a reputation, honour, prestige of a person---Author or broadcasting agency were not free to telecast anything for promotion of a company or corporation or on instruction of some quarter or according to its desires but their freedom was subject to a moral code of conduct and such reasonable restrictions as may be legitimately imposed under law in public interest and glory of Islam---When an untrue statement or scene was broadcast, and added to an evil act of person, the law of defamation would plunge into the rescue of such a person.

Sheikh Muhammad Rashid v. Majid Nizami Editor in Chief, the Nation and Nawa-e-Waqat, Lahore and another PLD 2002 SC 514; Mst. Kaneez Fatima v. Farooq Tariq and others PLD 2002 Kar. 20; Altaf Gohar v. Wajid Shamsuddin PLD 1981 Kar. 515 and Pakistan Coast Guards v. Umar Saleya 1997 CLC 1 rel.

(b) Islamic law---

----Defamation under Islamic Law elucidated.

Islam provides to every citizen the right to the protection of his/her honour. In the famous sermon of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him), on the occasion of the Farewell Hajj, He not only prohibited the Muslims from taking the lives and properties of other Muslims but also condemned and prohibited any encroachment on their honour, respect and chastity. The Islamic law is superior to the Western law of defamation. Under the Islamic Law if it is proved that someone has attacked the honour of another person, then, irrespective of whether the victim is able to prove himself an honourable person, the culprit is to be punished. Islam has declared defamation, a crime irrespective of whether the accused is a man of honour or of whether the words used have actually disgraced the victim and harmed his reputation. Under the Islamic law it is sufficient to prove that the accused said things which according to common sense, could have damaged the reputation and honour of the plaintiff. Making false allegation against an innocent person is one of the meanest misdeeds that have been severely censured by Islam. Deriving guidance from the teaching of Islam, it should be remembered that defamation or false allegation is one of the worst kind of lies because it contains the great evil of falsity as well as the harms of back-biting. Moreover it is the worst kind of oppression.

Barrister Syed Mudasser Ameer for Petitioner.

Aziz-ur-Rehman for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 133

Before Waqar Ahmad Seth and Rooh-ul-Amin Khan, JJ

Syed NADIR ALI SHAH---Petitioner

Versus

MOHTAMIM/RAEES UL MADRASSA, MADRASSA ARABIA QASIM-UL-ALOOM, GHOTKI DISTRICT GHOTKI SINDH and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.526-A of 2013, decided on 14th March, 2017.

(a) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 52, 54 & 55---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.199 & 62(1)((f)---Writ of quo warranto---Maintainability---Laches, principle of---Applicability---Election for the seat of Member Provincial Assembly---Honest and Ameen---Scope---Election Tribunal declaring a candidate being not an honest and Ameen---Supreme Court allowing appeal against the judgment of Election Tribunal only on the point of maintainability of election appeal---Effect---Writ of quo warranto could be issued on application of a person having some interest in the matter and being a citizen and for that matter a voter who had every right to have honest, ameen, righteous and sagacious person as his/their representative---Election of elected candidate could be challenged by filing of election petition by contested candidate or by a writ of quo warranto by any voter of the area---Petitioners were not barred from challenging the election and holding of public office by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Petition for writ of quo warranto of the petitioners was maintainable in circumstances---Private respondent was still holding the public office and till the time of holding the same was a recurring cause of action---Principle of laches did not apply to writ of quo warranto in circumstances---Returned candidate was not an honest and Ameen nor he was sagacious or righteous as per judgment of Election Tribunal---Judgment of Election Tribunal was still in field as Supreme Court had recorded findings with regard to non-compliance of mandatory provisions of Ss. 54 & 55 of Representation of the People Act, 1976---Returned candidate in his nomination form for General Electioon of 2008 declared himself to be graduate while in the nomination forum for succeeding General Election of 2013 declared as Matriculate which resulted in his disqualification---Returned candidate was not entitled to hold the office---Election Commission was directed to de-notify the returned candidate and proceed in accordance with law---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

PLD 1974 SC 228; PLD 2010 SC 34; PLD 2008 SC 735; PLD 2008 SC 85; 2008 YLR 1493; PLD 2016 SC 79; 2004 MLD 36; 2014 SCMR 1015; 2015 PTD 438; PLD `1988 SC 416; 2016 SCMR 439; PLD 1965 SC 236; Sardar Asmatullah Khan v. Moulvi Muhammad Sarwar and others 2011 SCMR 107; Muhammad Jameel v. Amir Yar and 6 others PLD 2010 Lah. 583; Mian Najeeb ud Din Owasi and another v. Amir Yar Waran and others PLD 2013 SC 482; Abdul Ghafoor Lehri v. Returning Officer, PB-29, Naseerabad-II and others 2013 SCMR 1271 and Malik Iqbal Ahmad Langrial v. Jamshed Alam and others PLD 2013 SC 179 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan-

----Art.199---Writ of quo warranto---Scope.

PLD 2013 Lah. 586; Naqeebullah Khan v. Malik Imran Khan and 6 others PLD 2006 Pesh. 21; Hafiz Hamdullah v. Saifullah Khan and others PLD 2007 SC 52 and Lt. Col. Farzand Ali and others v. Province of West Pakistan through the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Government of West Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 98 rel.

(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 11---Res judicata, principle of---Scope.

Section 11, C.P.C. qualifies insofar as suit are concerned the doctrine of res judicata, where there is a judgment inter se parties, it will prevent a fresh suit between them regarding the same matter. This principle/doctrine is of universal application and in fact a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society. Justice requires that every cause should be once fairly tried and public tranquilities demands that having been tried once all litigations about that cause should be concluded for ever between those parties.

Syed Sajjad Hassan Shah for Petitioner.

Ghulam Mohy-uddin Malik and Mussarat Ullah Khan, DAG for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 160

Before Lal Jan Khattak and Qalandar Ali Khan, JJ

USMAN ALI KHAN and others----Petitioners

Versus

KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA BAR COUNCIL and others----Respondents

W.P. No.1006-A of 2015, decided on 18th February, 2016.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Legal Practitioners and Bar Council Rules, 2010---

----Chap. V. P-1. R.35---Enrollment of advocate---Submission of first intimation form and deposit of fee---Requirement---Petitioners, relying on earlier interim order of the High Court, claimed that they were entitled to be enrolled as advocates from the date of their actual commencement of training, as furnished by their seniors---Respondent took the plea that requirement as to passing the National Testing Services was in field, thus no senior was in position to take any of the petitioners as his pupil---Validity---Petitioners could not show submission of their first intimation forms along with fee for first intimation earlier than dates mentioned against their names---Submission of first intimation forms along with deposit of fee for first intimation was indispensable first step for issuance of licence which could neither be abridged nor enlarged, save with direction or order of the Court---Direction by High Court in an earlier constitutional petition had been issued only in favour of the petitioners of that petition; therefore, the petitioners of present petition could not benefit from the interim order---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

W.P. 2525 of 2014 ref.

Naz Elahi Mughal for Petitioners.

S. Amjad Shah for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 163

Before Nisar Hussain Khan and Waqar Ahmad Seth, JJ

SARHAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES FEDERATION and 31 others----Petitioners

Versus

GOVERNMENT and others----Respondents

W.P. No.1480-P of 2015, decided on 10th March, 2016.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Development Authority Act (XI of 1973)---

----S. 31---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Development Authority Service Rules, 2015, R.13---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.139-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Development Authority, dissolution of---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Economic Zones Development Company, establishment of---Statement of Provincial Government that no adverse action would be taken against the employees of Development Authority---Transfer of assets of Development Authority to the company---Effect---Service of employees of Development Authority had attained the statutory status after promulgation and framing of service rules which could not be dispensed with through an ordinary administrative order---Development Authority which had been established by an Act of Provincial Assembly though might be wound up by order of Government but in accordance with the Constitution and rules framed thereunder---Properties of Development Authority had been transferred or proposed to be transferred to a Public Limited Company which was an illegal exercise of authority---Public assets could not be transferred or disposed of through a simple letter of Provincial Secretary---Employees of the Development Authority should be provided a legal protection through statutory instrument and they should be proceeded in accordance with provision of Constitution law and rules---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

Mian Muhibullah Kakakhel and Saifullah Mohib for Petitioners.

Abdul Latif Yousafzai, Advocate General and Barrister Waqar Aziz Qureshi for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 169

Before Rooh ul Amin Khan and Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD ISRAR KHAN and another---Appellants

Versus

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU, ISLAMABAD and 2 others---Respondents

Eh. Crl. Appeal No.24-P of 2016, decided on 13th April, 2017.

National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--

----Ss. 12, 13(c) & 34-A---Freezing of properties---Delegation of powers---Appellants were accused facing trial under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, who were aggrieved of approval granted by Trial Court to freezing order passed by Director-General National Accountability Bureau---Plea raised by appellants was that powers to freeze property vested with Chairman and not Director-General National Accountability Bureau---Validity---Chairman National Accountability Bureau possessed power under S.12 of National Accountability Ordinance,1999 to freeze property---Chairman National Accountability Bureau could delegate under S.34-A of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, such or any of his powers to and could authorize performance of any of his functions to any officer of National Accountability Bureau---Freezing order passed by Chairman could not remain in force more than 15 days unless confirmed by Accountability Court where the reference under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 was sent by the Chairman---High Court declined to interfere in order passed by Trial Court as same was well reasoned and based on proper appreciation of law---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Sardar Ali Raza for Appellants.

Zair Nawaz Khattak, Special Prosecutor for the NAB.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 173

Before Ikramullah Khan and Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, JJ

Mst. ULFAT BIBI and another---Appellants

Versus

THE STATE through Additional Advocate-General and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No.215-M of 2015, decided on 7th February, 2017.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 365-B, 493-A & 494---Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing or belief of lawful marriage, marrying again during lifetime of hushand or wife---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Prosecution case was that the accused abducted the wife of the complainant for the purpose of unlawful marriage---Co-accused lady knowingly that she was under the lawful wedlock of the complainant contracted unlawful marriage with the accused and accused after abducting the co-accused cohabited with her through deceitful means of lawful marriage---Accused was charged under S.365-B, P.P.C. pre-requisite of which was kidnapping or abducting a woman with intent to compel her to marry any person against her will and forcing or seducing her to illicit intercourse---in the present case, illicit intercourse in between the accused persons by force was lacking---Statement of co-accused recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C. did not show her abducting or subjected to illicit intercourse---Prosecution witnesses were silent about kidnapping or abducing of co-accused---In order to prove the charge under S.494, P.P.C. prosecution should have brought any evidence to the effect that from the date of alleged abducting of co-accused till the accused person were arrested, they had contracted unlawful marriage---Neither any witness had been examined to that effect nor any documentary evidence in the shape of Nikah-Nama were produced---Accused was alleged to have abducted co-accused and co-habitated with her through deceitful means of lawful marriage---Medical officer, who medically examined co-accused lady, formed opining that she had conducted intercourse and she was pregnant for a period of eight weeks and six days but there was no sign of fresh intercourse as she could not give the exact date of intercourse---Attending circumstances suggested that co-accused lady had become pregnant in consummation with her husband a month earlier---Said pregnancy had not taken place during the time of alleged kidnapping of co-accused till the arrest---Circumstances established that prosecution failed to prove its case beyond shadow of doubt, benefit of which would resolve in favour of accused-appellant---Accused were acquitted in circumstances by setting aside conviction and sentence recorded by Trial Court.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 465-B, 493-A & 494---Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel for marriage, cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing or belief of lawful marriage, marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife---Appreciation of evidence---Retracted confession---Scope---Prosecution case was that the accused abducted the wife of the complainant for the purpose of unlawful marriage---Co-accused lady knowingly that she was under the lawful wedlock of the complainant contracted unlawful marriage with the accused and accused after abducting the co-accused cohabited with her through deceitful means of a lawful marriage---Judicial Magistrate, who recorded confessional statement of accused deposed that order for producing the accused for recording evidence was not available---Identification of the accused before the judicial Magistrate was doubtful---Record showed that retracted confession was neither voluntary nor true, thus no reliance could be placed on the said retracted confession of the accused---Accused-appellants were acquitted in circumstances by setting aside convictions and sentences recorded by Trial Court.

(c) Criminal trial---

----Confession---Retracted confession---Scope---Conviction could be based on the retracted confession alone, if it was found voluntary, true and confidence inspiring.

Bahadur Khan v. The State PLD 1995 SC 336 rel.

Sajjad Anwar for Appellants.

Sabir Shah, A.A.G. for the State and Allah Dad Khan for Respondent

P L D 2017 Peshawar 179

Before Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan and Muhammad Younis Thaheem, JJ

AQAL ZAMEER---Appellant

Versus

MOHI-UD-DIN and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No.28-B of 2014 with Criminal Jail Appeal No.26-B of 2014, decided on 27th January, 2016.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324 & 337-A(i)---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah---Appreciation of evidence---FIR was lodged promptly---Occurrence had taken place at 11-45 a.m.---Report was lodged on the same day at 12-40 p.m.---Distance between the place of occurrence and hospital where the report had been lodged, was about fifteen kilometer---Facts and circumstances established that matter was reported promptly within reasonable time of one hour of the occurrence.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324 & 337-A(i)---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah---Appreciation of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Recovery of weapon of offence from accused---Effect---Two empties of 12-bore were recovered from the place of occurrence---Report of Forensic Science Laboratory was in line to the effect that these empties were fired from 12 bore shotgun recovered from the house of accused-appellant---Said recovery established that accused-appellant was present at the place of occurrence---Sentence was reduced from death to imprisonment for life in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324 & 337-A(i)---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah---Appreciation of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Mitigating circumstances---Ocular account were supported by medical evidence---Allegation against the accused was that he made firing with double barrel shotgun on the complainant and his relative, as a result of which they both were injured---Matter was reported to the police by the injured persons, thereafter injured relative of the complainant succumbed to the injures---Ocular account was furnished by complainant and wife of deceased---Statement of said eye-witnesses were in line with the prosecution's case and corroborative with each other on other facts and circumstances despite lengthy and searching cross-examination---If statement of one eye-witness was discarded, even then case against the accused appellant was proved by cogent, reliable, trustworthy and natural evidence of the complainant---Complainant had no motive, nor any blood feud with the accused-appellant to falsely implicated him---Complainant therefore, would not substitute the accused-appellant with the real culprit by charging him falsely---Statement of complainant corroborated the medical and circumstantial evidence---Forensic Science Laboratory's report regarding blood-stained pebbles recovered from the place of occurrence, as well as blood stained garments of the injured/complainant and deceased, established that complainant and deceased were present at the sport---Defence had objected that name of wife of deceased was not mentioned in the FIR as witness, her statement that she witnessed the occurrence, was recorded by Investigating Officer, was an improvement---Said fact would not shatter the entire prosecution case---Prosecution failed to produce the post-mortem report of the deceased in the present case---Circumstances established that guilt of the accused-appellant had been proved from the confidence inspiring evidence of the eye-witnesses---Prosecution having not been able to produce the post-mortem report of the deceased and failure to state reasons for not mentioning the name of wife of deceased in FIR, constituted mitigating circumstances for reduction of sentence---Sentence was reduced from death to imprisonment for life in circumstances---Appeal was dismissed with said modification in sentence.

Khurshid v. The State PLD 1996 SC 305 rel.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324 & 337-A(i)---Qatl-i-Amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah---Appreciation of evidence---Substitution for real culprit---Scope---Substitution for the real offender was a rare phenomenon---Nobody would spare the actual culprit for such a crime and would falsely implicate an innocent person, when there was no previous enmity.

Mirza Ali Khan for Appellant.

Anwar ul Haq for Respondent.

Saifur Rehman Addl. Advocate-General for the State.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 186

Before Waqar Ahmad Seth and Ijaz Anwar, JJ

SAHIBZADA SANAULLAH, MEMBER, PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Chief Minister and others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.463-P of 2017, decided on 13th June, 2017.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Establishment of District Development Advisory Committee Act (IV of 1989)---

----S. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4 & 199---Constitutional petition---Development fund---Distribution---Principle---Petitioner was Member Provincial Assembly and his grievance was that authorities had not provided him development fund---Validity---All elected representatives had equal right to allocation of funds, specially, development funds---Any deviation amounted to discrimination and against fundamental and legal rights of elected representatives and even inhabitants of their constituency---Government/public functionaries were bound to function in good faith, honestly and within parameters of its power and person concerned should be treated in accordance with law as guaranteed by Art.4 of the Constitution---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Writ Petition No.4264-P of 2015 and Pir Imran Sajid and others v. Managing Director/General Manager (Manager Finance) Telephone Industries of Pakistan, 2015 SCMR 1257 ref.

Muhammad Muzammil Khan for Petitioner.

Ms. Moin ud Din Hamayun, AAG and Saba-u-din Khattak for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 193

Before Yahya Afridi, C.J. and Muhammad Ayub Khan, J

AHMAD DANYAL---Petitioner

Versus

ISLAMIA COLLEGE, PESHAWAR through Registrar and 10 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.3011-P of 2016, decided on 18th May, 2017.

Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 4, 22, 25, 27 & 199---Constitutional petition---Educational institution---Allocation of quota for admission---Category of students---Scope---Petitioner assailed categories of students to which quota was allocated by the Colleges and Universities for admission in pre-medical and pre-engineering subjects---Validity---Allowing quota to sons of employees/teachers of Universities showed arbitrariness and authoritarianism---Educational institutions were public Universities and did not belong to its employees or administration---Open merit had gone up to candidate who got 1004 out of 1100 while University employees' children who secured 560 marks entered such institutions through quotas in question---Cases of disabled person and candidates from backward/underdeveloped districts and Federally Administered Tribal Area was altogether different---Provisions of Arts.22 & 27 of the Constitution permitted reservation of quota to students hailing from socially and educationally backward areas---Reservation of quotas for all categories in colleges was illegal and without lawful authority except for disabled students or underprivileged class of students from Federally Administered Tribal Area or underdeveloped districts of the Province---High Court directed public Educational Institutions in the province to follow law and provide no quotas for admission except for disabled students or underprivileged class of students or students from underdeveloped/backward areas of the Province and Federally Administered Tribal Area---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

Attiya Bibi Khan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 1161; Nusrat Baig Mirza v. Government of Pakistan and another PLD 1992 FSC 412 and I.A. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 1041 rel.

Muhammad Isa Khan Khalil for Petitioner.

Qazi Jawad Ihsanullah for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Peshawar 203

Before Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, J

SHAFIULLAH---Petitioner

Versus

SAIFULLAH KHAN and 7 others---Respondents

Writ Petition No.394-M of 2013, decided on 8th June, 2017.

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----Ss. 47 & 145---Execution petition---Objection---Surety not party to the suit---Execution of decree against such surety---Liability of surety---Scope---Executing Court deleted the names of sureties from execution proceedings on the ground that they were not party in the original suit and no decree was passed against them---Validity---Impugned order in view of the provisions of S.145, C.P.C. had not been passed in accordance with law---Guarantor could be burdened to the extent and in accordance with the terms of guarantee executed by him---Surety was liable to fulfil his commitment with regard to payment to which he had taken responsibility---Executing Court could lawfully proceed against the sureties for recovery of amount to the extent of decree---Names of sureties were unlawfully deleted from the panel of judgment debtors in execution proceedings---Executing Court could recover decretal amount from guarantors/sureties---Impugned order passed by the Executing Court was set aside---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Habib Bank Limited v. Malik Ata Muhammad and 4 others 2000 CLC 451 and Mst. Parveen Amir v. National Bank of Pakistan and 3 others 2002 CLD 509 rel.

Yaseen Aman for Petitioiner.

Nemo for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 1

Before Muhammad Ejaz Swati and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ

RAJAB ALI---Petitioner

Versus

HAYATULLAH KHAN and 6 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.419 of 2014, decided on 30th December, 2014.

Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013---

----Rr. 36. 40, 41, 45 & 47---Local bodies' election---Recounting of ballot papers due to close competition between the winning and losing candidates---Scope---Election Tribunal ordered for recounting of votes of polling station on the ground of close competition between the winning/returned and losing candidates---Validity---Election Tribunal might order for opening of packet of counterfoils and certificates or inspection of any accounted ballot papers provided that no vote should be disclosed until it had been held to be invalid by the Election Tribunal---Envelop of accounted ballot papers of returned/winning candidate was not sealed as provided under R. 45 of Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013---Election Tribunal had excluded/rejected 32 votes of winning/returned candidate while counting the votes of accounted ballot papers of winning/returned candidate---Election Tribunal was bound to fix responsibility of said discrepancy---Nothing was on record to arrive at the findings to exclude 32 votes of the winning/returned candidate---Losing candidate had neither raised any objection at the close of polling nor objected the process of voting prior to consolidation of result---If there was any mistake or error committed by any officer in making or stamping the ballot papers same should not be used against the winning/returned candidate---Election Tribunal was not justified in directing recounting of the votes merely on the premise of close competition----Election Tribunal could permit scrutiny of ballot papers and order recounting when election petition contained an adequate statement of material facts on which allegations of irregularity or illegality in counting were founded---Election petition did not contain the allegation of violation of any Rule of Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013---Allegations raised in the election petition were vague---Losing candidate had failed to state material facts with regard to failure of election officers or Returning Officer to reject or accept invalid votes---Narrow margin of votes between the returned and losing candidate did not per se give rise to a presumption that there had been any illegality or irregularity in the counting of votes---Exclusion of 32 votes of returned candidate by the Election Tribunal was an illegality and impugned order could not be sustained---Impugned order passed by Election Tribunal and pursuant to that notification for declaring the losing candidate as returned candidate were declared illegal, having no legal effect---Notification declaring the winning candidate as returned candidate was restored---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

1995 CLC 1426 and 2005 SCMR 1699 ref.

Suresh Prasad Yadav v. Jai Parkash Mishra AIR 1975 SC 376 and Vadivelu's case AIR 2000 SCW 3664 (Para.16) rel.

H. Shakeel Ahmed and Mohibullah Shah for Petitioner.

Muhammad Qadir Shah and Adnan Basharat for Respondent No.1.

Tariq Ali Tahir, Addl. A.-G for Official Respondents.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 11

Before Naeem Akhtar Afghan, J

LAFARGE PAKISTAN CEMENT LTD. through Attorney---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs DECENT COAL COMPANY through Managing Director---Respondent

Civil Revision No.133 of 2015, decided on 31st May, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. VII, Rr. 2 & 10 & Ss.19 & 20(c)---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S.4---Money suit---Contract for sale and purchase through letter---Plaint rejection of---Scope---Agreement for sale and purchase was entered at place "A" through letter between the parties whereas suit for recovery of amount was filed at place "B"---Contention of defendant-corporation was that Court at place "A" had jurisdiction to try the present suit---Defendant-corporation filed an application for return of plaint which was dismissed---Validity---Parties had entered into a contract for sale and purchase through correspondence via e-mail and fax---Offer of defendant-corporation was e-mailed to plaintiff at place "B" from place "A"---Said offer was accepted by the plaintiff from place "B" and conveyed to the defendant-corporation at place "A" via e-mail---Purchase order was faxed by the defendant- corporation from place "A" to plaintiff at place "B"---When proposal and acceptance were made by letters then the contract was made at the time when and the place where from the letter of acceptance was posted/mailed---Acceptance of offer by the offering party and intimation with regard to such acceptance would result in contract---Contract would be completed when offer of one party was accepted by the other party---Contract by correspondence would be completed where the acceptance had taken place---Place of delivery of acceptance would be irrelevant and same did not provide any cause of action---Suit could not be filed at the place where letter of acceptance was delivered as delivery of letter of acceptance was not a part of cause of action---Plaintiff in case of breach of contract had option to file suit at the place where it was made---Present suit had rightly been filed at place "B" in view of accrual of cause of action at the said place---Civil Court at place "B" had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit filed by the plaintiff---No illegality had been committed by the Trial Court while rejecting the application for return of plaint---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

Rahmania Trading Co. v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. PLD 1960 SC 202 and Registered Firm Sheikhan Industries v. West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation PLD 1976 Quetta 94 distinguished.

Abdur Rahim Baig v. Abdul Haq PLD 1994 Kar. 388; American Pipe Co. v. State of U.P. AIR 1983 Cal. 186; Messrs Progressive Construction Ltd. v. Bharat Hydro Power Corporation Ltd. AIR 1996 Delhi 92; Businet Internatinal (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Aramex International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2001 CLC 104 and Baroda Oil Cakes Traders v. Parshottam AIR 1954 Bom. 491 rel.

(b) Contract Act (IX of 1872)--

----S. 4---Communication when complete---Communication of a proposal would be complete when it came to the knowledge of the person to whom it was made---Communication of acceptance would be complete as against the proposer, when it was put in a course of transmission to him, so as to be out of power of acceptor.

Taimoor Aslam for Petitioner.

Syed Ayaz Zahoor and Arthur Victor for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 22

Before Mrs. Syeda Tahira Safdar and Muhammad Ejaz Swati, JJ

BIBI HUMERA---Petitioner

Versus

GHULAM DASTAGIR and 3 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.1046 of 2014, decided on 29th June, 2016.

(a) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)---

----S. 375---Succession certificate---Surety bond---Petitioner was widow of government official who lost his life while he was on duty---Award, pay and allowances given by government on the death of petitioner's husband were distributed among legal heirs in view of succession certificate issued by Court---Respondent was brother of deceased husband of petitioner and succession certificate was issued in his favour who submitted surety bond before the Court---Grievance of petitioner was that her brother in law had kept minor children with him and had also not distributed shares of petitioner and her minor children---Validity---Respondent was granted succession certificate being attorney of petitioner and other legal heirs and he was required to be dealt with under S.375 of Succession Act, 1925---High Court directed the Court which issued succession certificate to proceed with the matter and to get the amount of shares of minors recovered from respondent and the matter was remanded for the purpose---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

(b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched.---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Alternate remedy---Custody of minors---Petitioner was mother of minors and sought custody of her minor children who were living with her brother-in-law---Validity---For custody of minors and alternate remedy was available before Courts established under Family Courts Act, 1964, and petitioner had every right to avail the same---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly.

Abdul Basit for Petitioner.

Muhammad Ibrahim Lehri, Naseer Ahmed Bangulzai, Additional Advocate General and Muhammad Ayub, Superintendent Deputy Commissioner, Mastung for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 29

Before Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J

ROSSMERE INTERNATIONAL LTD. through Authorized Representative---Plaintiff

Versus

SEA LION INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING INC and 6 others---Defendants

Civil Suit No.2 of 2016, decided on 22nd December, 2016.

(a) Arbitration--

----Scope, purpose, and object---Arbitration is a concessional process, in which parties voluntarily agree for determination of their dispute through their chosen persons---When award is completed, it is permissible only against a party to arbitration---Award is not enforceable against persons not party to arbitration agreement.

(b) Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--

----S. 6---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11---Enforcement of foreign arbitral award---Rejection of plaint---Territorial jurisdiction---Plaintiff sought enforcement of award announced by London Maritime Arbitrators Association---Defendant sought rejection of plaint on the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction---Plea raised by plaintiff was that after passing of award, defendants were not permitted to sell the vessel, therefore, he wanted realization of award through sale proceeds of the vessel---Validity---For the enforcement of award, the subject matter of which was money, the suit had to be filed in the Court, within whose jurisdiction, Bank account of defaulting party was located---Bank account of defaulting party i.e. the defendant was not located within the jurisdiction of High Court---High Court did not agree with the plea raised by plaintiff, as vessel in question was not subject matter of award---Court could enforce money award, either through Bank account or to order realization of amount through assets or sale proceeds of assets of defaulting party---Vessel was sold by one defendant to the other before enforcement of award, therefore, the vessel did not remain as their asset---No movable or immovable asset of defendant existed within the jurisdiction of High Court, nor defendant was party to award, therefore, no effective order could be passed---Earlier, plaintiff had approached the Court at England, which not only recognized the award but also decreed the amount; it was for the Court in England to give effect to its own order---Application had already been filed in a competent Court of law, which had passed order thereon, therefore, unless and until it was proved that the award before said Court was unenforceable, second application was not competent--- Plaint was rejected in circumstances.

Sayed Iqbal Shah and Muhammad Mansoor Mir for Plaintiff.

Mujeeb Ahmed Hashmi and Usman Hadi for Defendants.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 37

Before Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Abdullah Baloch, JJ

NASEEBULLAH---Appellant

Versus

SPECIAL JUDGE, ANTI-TERRORISM COURT-II, QUETTA and another---Respondents

Criminal Appeals Nos. 157 of 158 of 2014, decided on 28th November, 2016.

(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)--

----Ss. 6(2)(a)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302(b), 364-A, 367-A, 376 & 377---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Chap. XXXIV [Ss.464-475]---Terrorism, qatl-i-amd, kidnapping, rape and sodomy---Appreciation of evidence--- Lunatic, trial of---Procedure---Accused was convicted by Trial Court and was variously sentenced maximum up to imprisonment for life---Plea raised by accused was that he was suffering from Schizophrenia and needed proper medical treatment---Validity---Provisions of Ss.464, 465 & 466, Cr.P.C. related to unsoundness of mind at the time of inquiry or trial and not at the time of commission of offence---Once Court reached to conclusion that accused facing trial was of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, the trial was to be postponed---Such person could be released under S.466, Cr.P.C., on sufficient surety given that he would be properly taken care of and would be prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person or for his appearance when required by Court---Court was also empowered to direct accused to be detained in safe custody in such a place and manner as it could think fit, if the Court was of the view that bail should not be taken or sufficient security was not given---Mere making of an application on behalf of a person committed for trial, that he was of unsound mind, was not sufficient to necessitate holding of an inquiry---When it appeared to the Court or the Court had reason to believe that accused could be of unsound mind, inquiry was necessary and the question, whether accused person was of unsound mind or not and incapable of making his defence, had to be decided prior to framing of charge and recording of evidence---If Court was unable to detect simulation that accused could be of unsound mind, such question had to be tried as a fact and medical evidence on the point was an indispensible necessity---High Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and case was remanded to Trial Court to decide the matter in terms of statutory provisions as contained in Chap. XXXIV, Cr.P.C.--- Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 84---Unsound mind---Maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea"---Applicability--- Any act is not criminal unless there is criminal intent---Law mandates that nothing is an offence, which is done by a person, who at the time of committing an offence by reason of unsoundness of mind, if incapable of knowing nature of the act or that whatever he is doing is wrong or contrary to law.

(c) Maxim:

----"Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea"---Applicability.

Jameel Ramzan for Appellant.

Abdul Latif Kakar, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 46

Before Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, J

ABDUL GHAFFAR---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Revision No.133 of 2015, decided on 23rd June, 2016.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 84, 302, 337, 354 & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.464 & 465---Act of a person of unsound mind, qatl-i-amd, shajjah, assault or criminal force to women with intent to outrage her modesty, common intention---Insanity, proof of---Accused filed application under S.464, Cr.P.C., for referring him to the Medical Board for examination being an unsound mind, during pendency of the trial---Said application was dismissed by the Trial Court---Trial Court had conducted preliminary inquiry and after examining accused had observed that; applicant/accused looked a fit person mentally, physically and psychologically; that each and every question asked to him of general nature and regarding matters of life, such as marriage, hobbies, daily activities, past moments, family relations etc., he did understand them---Trial Court proceeded with the trial of accused---Validity---When court would find that insanity was feigned one, the court was competent to reject such plea and it was not mandatory to send such accused for medical checkup and postpone the trial---Merely because accused made an application that he was of unsound mind was not sufficient for holding an inquiry under S.464 or 465, Cr.P.C.---Burden of proof of insanity lay on accused and under S.84 of P.P.C., the crucial point of time; at which unsoundness of mind should be established, was the time of the trial, when the act, constituting the offence, was committed---Medical report submitted by Standing Board, had revealed that accused was suffering from "Bipolar disorder"---Person suffering from bipolar mental illness could not be considered as a person of unsound mind---Petition of accused was dismissed by High Court.

Jalal Din v. The State 1968 PCr.LJ 187 and Black's Law Dictionary ref.

(b) Medical jurisprudence---

----Person of unsound mind---Scope---Bipolar disorder---Nature---"Bipolar disorder" which was also known as 'manic-depressive illness', was a brain disorder that would cause unusual shifts of mind, energy, activity levels and the ability to carry out day-to-day tasks---Bipolar disorder was of four types and all of them involved clear changes in mind, energy and activity levels---Person suffering from Bipolar disorder, could not be declared a person of unsound mind; it was mental disease, which could be characterized by periods of depression and periods of elevated mood---Petition of accused claiming that he was of unsound mind being devoid of any force, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Jalal Din v. The State 1968 PCr.LJ 187 and Black's Law Dictionary ref.

Muhammad Ibrahim Lehri for Petitioner.

Shabir Ahmed Rajput for the Complainant.

Yahya Khan, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 52

Before Abdullah Baloch and Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, JJ

NOOR MUHAMMAD---Appellant

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.(T) 01 of 2017, decided on 15th March, 2017.

(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Ss. 156 & 178---Smuggling of narcotic, drug, psychoropic substance(s) etc.---Punishment of persons accompanying a person possessing goods liable to confiscation---Appellants were convicted under S.156(1) read with S.178 of the Customs Act, 1969---Contention of appellants, inter alia, was that prosecution had failed to substantiate its charge against them and sought acquittal---Validity---All witnesses recorded their statements in line with each other and no contradiction was shown by the appellants---No motive for false implication of appellants was brought on record---Report of Forensic Science Laboratory further strengthened the case of the prosecution---Trial Court therefore, rightly found the appellants guilty and on merits the impugned judgment of Trial Court did not call for any interference---Conviction of appellants was upheld, accordingly.

(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Ss. 156 & 178---Smuggling of norcotic, drug, psychotropic substance(s)---Punishment of persons accompanying a person possessing goods liable to confiscation---Accused was liable only for contraband that was chemically examined---Sentence, reduction in---Defendants were convicted under S.156(1) read with S.178 of the Customs Act, 1969 for smuggling large quantitates of liquor---Appellants, inter alia, sought reduction in quantum of sentence---Validity---Examination of each and every separate portion of contraband either sealed in a plastic bag or contained in cans and tins was essential to have been conducted by the Chemical Examiner and after receipt of affirmative analysis report of the Chemical Expert, it would be believed that alleged recovered material/contraband, was a substance that was prohibited under the law---If no such examination of all the recovered substance was carried out, then under such circumstances it could not be presumed that the entire recovered substance was contraband, rather the presumption to be drawn was that the substance which had been chemically examined was the contraband and an accused could only be held responsible for the contraband that was chemically examined---In the present case, only three bottles of whiskey and one bottle of beer were chemically examined and in absence of chemical analyst report in respect of all recovered contraband, appellants could only be convicted and sentenced for recovery of three bottles of whiskey and one bottle beer---High Court while maintaining conviction of appellants, reduced their sentences from five years to that already undergone, and observed that all other remaining sentences would remain intact---Appeal was disposed of, accordingly.

Ameer Zeb v. The State PLD 2012 SC 380 and Fareedullah v. The State 2013 SCMR 302 rel.

Muhammad Qasim Gajizai and Naseem Jan for Appellants.

Allah ud Din Saeed, Standing Counsel for the State.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 57

Before Mrs. Syeda Tahira Safdar and Syed Anwar Aftab, JJ

MANZOOR HUSSAIN JAMALI---Petitioner

Versus

NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (BALOCHISTAN), QUETTA through Director General and 3 others---Respondents

Criminal Quashment No.155 of 2016, decided on 3rd April, 2017.

National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 16-A---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.13---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.403 & 561-A---Petition for quashment of proceedings---Trial of accused before two Courts (Anti-Corruption Court and Accountability Court)---Double jeopardy, principle of---Applicability---Accused raised the plea of double jeopardy on the ground that he was facing trial before two Courts on same set of facts and allegations---Validity---Neither trial before Anti-Corruption Court, nor before Accountability Court had been finally concluded, nor any conviction or acquittal was recorded to accused---In absence of necessary ingredients, right available under Art.13(1) of the Constitution neither could be pressed, nor benefit of S. 403, Cr.P.C. could be extended---Petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Tariq Ali Tahir for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 61

Before Muhammad Ejaz Swati, J

MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and 2 others---Petitioners

Versus

CHUGAIR and 3 others---Respondents

Civil Revision No.116 of 2011, decided on 6th April, 2017.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 12(2)---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C.---Forum---Scope---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. would lie to the Court which passed the final judgment---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C was to be filed before a court which was last in series except where an appeal, revision or leave to appeal was dismissed on any ground except merit---Where decree/order of a forum below had been affirmed by the higher forum on merit both on point of fact and law then same would merge into the decree of higher forum---Said decree/order of higher forum would be final for the purpose of S.12(2), C.P.C.---If Supreme Court had merely affirmed the judgment or order of High Court by refusing leave to appeal then final judgment in terms of S.12(2), C.P.C. would be that of the High Court and not of Supreme Court---If Supreme Court had reversed the judgment of High Court and recorded findings on question of fact or law contrary to what was held by the High Court then final judgment or order would be of Supreme Court for the purpose of S.12(2), C.P.C.---Impugned judgment and decree was assailed in appeal and appellate Court had affirmed the same on merits both of fact and law involved therein---Judgment and decree which attained the status of final decree/order in terms of S.12(2), C.P.C. was that of appellate Court---Application under S.12(2), C.P.C. should have been filed before the appellate Court---No illegality or irregularity had been pointed out in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court---Revision was dismissed in circumstances.

PLD 1995 SC 564; PLD 2002 SC 391; PLD 2009 Kar. 123; 1983 CLC 1948; 2012 CLC 1897 and PLD 2010 SC 580 ref.

PLD 2013 SC 478 rel.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 12(2)---'Final'---Meaning.

Muhammad Usman Lasi for Petitioners.

Khalil Ahmed Panezai for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 65

Before Muhammad Kamran Khan Mulakhail and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ

Haji MUHAMMAD NAEEM---Petitioner

Versus

SIRAJ-UD-DIN and 6 others---Respondents

Review Application No.2 of 2015 in C.P. No.74 of 2015, decided on 25th April, 2016.

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XLVII, R.1 & S.114---Review---Object and scope---Applicant had failed to point out any apparent error or mistake in the order under review---Object of power of review was to enable correction of error alone and nothing else---Review could not be equated with an appeal or for that matter it could not be made basis for rehearing of a case---Power of Court to review its own judgment/order was only discretionary---Reason for conferring discretionary power of review on a court was to prevent injustice being done---Case could not be re-opened on the pretext of review.

Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 1; Fatima v. Shan Muhammad PLD 1975 SC 318 and Faqir Muhammad Khan v. Akbar Shah PLD 1973 SC 110 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 199 & 203---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 199 & 203---Certiorari, writ of---Scope.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Vacation Judge (during vacations) while sitting as a single member Bench could hear the cases pertaining to Division Bench at Katcha Peshi stage or for admission except otherwise provided by any special statute---Vacation Judge while hearing the Division Bench matters had to decide as to whether a case for admission was made out or not and he could also grant an interim relief but if no case for admission was made out then he could also dismiss the petition in limine.

General Manager, Pearl Continental Hotel, The Mall Lahore/Rawalpindi v. Farhat Iqbal PLD 2003 SC 952 and Shah Jahan v. Amjad Ali, Hawaldar 2000 SCMR 88 distinguished.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 199 & 203---Certiorari, writ of---Scope---High Court while issuing a writ of certiorari would act in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction but not under its appellate or revisional jurisdiction.

(f) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 199 & 203---Certiorari, writ of---Principles to be considered while issuing writ of certiorari.

The principles for issuing a writ of certiorari in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction can be summarized in the following manner:

(i) Any order passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of appeal or revision has not been provided;

(ii) A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting gross error of jurisdiction when subordinate judicia or quasi-judicial forum has acted without jurisdiction, by wrongly assuming the jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or acted in clear disregard of law or rules of procedure and where there is no procedure specified, has acted in violation of principles of natural justice, which ultimately occasioned the failure of justice;

(iii) When any judgment/order of the subordinate court has miserably failed to follow the directions of law or the rules of procedure framed thereunder.

(iv) A writ of certiorari can also be issued when the Court or Tribunal act illegally or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Failure on the part of statutory functionay or a Court to make a visible effect with diligent application of mind to adjective assertion or to strive in search of truth for dispensing justice, the same tantamount to failure to exercise jurisdiction.

Dilawar Jan v. Gul Rehman PLD 2001 SC 149; Muhammad Lehrasab Khan v. Mst. Aqeel-un-Nisa 2001 SCMR 338 and Rahim Shah v. The Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan PLD 1973 SC 24 rel.

(g) Jurisdiciton-

----Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter had jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right.

Khushnood Ahmed for Applicant.

Nemo for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 76

Before Mrs. Syeda Tahira Safdar and Syed Anwar Aftab, JJ

WALI MUHAMMAD---Petitioner

Versus

SPECIAL JUDGE, ANTI-TERRORISM COURT-I, QUETTA and another---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.862 of 2016, decided on 27th March, 2017.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 369---Power of High Court to alter judgment---Scope---While exercising power under S.369, Cr.P.C. High Court could take the cognizance of the matter in order to correct the clerical/typographical mistake occurred inadvertently in the judgment.

Abdul Hussain v. The State 2003 PCr.LJ 1847 rel.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 152---Correction of clerical mistake---Scope---Clerical and typographical mistake occurred inadvertently in the judgment and decree or errors arising in order could be corrected under S.152, C.P.C. and without such exception no judgment and decree or order could be reviewed, altered or modified.

1989 SCMR 189 rel.

(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss.367 & 369---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.7---Qatl-i-amd, Act of Terrorism---Appreciation of evidence---Correction of error in judgment---Scope---Initially accused-appellants were implicated in the offence under Ss.302(b), 365-A, 34, P.P.C. read with S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Charge under Ss.302, 365-A & 34, P.P.C. was framed and read over to accused persons to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial---Trial Court passed conviction order to the extent of accused-petitioner under S.302(b) & 34, P.P.C. however accused persons were acquitted of the charge under S.365-A Penal Code, 1860---Appellate Court dismissed both the appeals and maintained the conviction recorded by Trial Court under provisions of Ss.302(b), 34, Penal Code, 1860 read with S.7 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Accused persons assailed judgments passed by the Trial Court and High Court before the Supreme Court which was dismissed---Matter was compromised to the extent of accused-petitioner, for the offence under S.302/34 Panel Code, 1860 by the legal heirs of the deceased---Application under S.345 Cr.P.C. was filed before the Trial Court, which was dismissed---Validity---Record showed that accused-petitioner was acquitted under S.365-A, P.P.C. and was only convicted under Ss.303/34, P.P.C.---Neither he was charged under S.7 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 nor was convicted---While maintaining the conviction and dismissing the appeal, words "read with S.7, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were added in the judgment of High Court which were inadvertently or through clerical mistake or by an oversight could not be added---Addition of said words was not agitated before the Supreme Court---Appellate judgment of High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court, as such there was no occasion for High Court to interfere in an order which had already attained finality, lest to ponder to correct, alter, or rectify any intentional or unintentional error even if floating on the face of the record---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

2008 SCMR 204 rel.

Muhammad Aslam Chishti for Petitioner.

Ajmal Khan Kakar for the Complainant.

Zahoor Ahmed Baloch, Asstt. Advocate-General and Noor Jahan Kahoor, Additional Advocate-General for the State.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 85

Before Muhammad Ejaz Swati and Abdullah Baloch, JJ

IBRAHIM SHAH---Appellant

Versus

PERVEZ RANA---Respondent

R.F.A. No.140 of 2009, decided on 30th May, 2017.

Malicious prosecution--

----Damages---Acquittal on benefit of doubt---Plaintiff faced criminal trial initiated on complaint of defendant from which he was acquitted on benefit of doubt--- Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of damages on allegation of malicious prosecution against defendant which was dismissed by Trial Court---Validity---Plaintiff, in suit for malicious prosecution was to prove three things; that plaintiff was prosecuted by defendant and prosecution was terminated in plaintiff's favour; that defendant was actuated by malice; and that defendant acted without reasonable and plausible cause---Plaintiff could not succeed unless he could prove all said three points---Plaintiff was acquitted on basis of benefit of doubt and not on ground that plaintiff proved his innocence before Trial Court---Suit for damages could only be decreed when all ingredients were successfully established---Mere filing of criminal case and acquittal of plaintiff by extending him benefit of doubt was not sufficient by itself to establish case for malicious prosecution against defendant---Judgment and decree passed by Trial Court did not suffer from any irregularity or illegality neither same was perverse or ridiculous---Trial Court had passed a well-reasoned judgment in accordance with law after discussing each and every issue and evidence brought on record---Plaintiff failed to point out any material misreading and non-reading of evidence by Trial Court--- Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Abdul Raoof v. Abdul Razzaq PLD 1994 SC 476 ref.

Jamil Lodeen for Appellant.

Abdul Sattar for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 89

Before Mrs. Syeda Tahira Safdar and Zaheer-ud-Din Kakar JJ

IMRAN GICHKI---Petitioner

Versus

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU through Director-General and another---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.257 of 2017, decided on 16th June, 2017.

National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)--

----S. 9(a)(iv) & (b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497--- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Bail, refusal of---Assets beyond known sources of income---Petitioner was ex-Personal Staff Officer to the Chief Minister and he was arrested by National Accountability Bureau on allegation of accumulation of assets beyond his known sources of income---Validity---Analysis of income and existing assets of petitioner were investigated and tabulated by National Accountability Bureau which prima facie made out a case of accumulation of assets beyond his known sources of income with specification of role on part of petitioner who was connected to offences as charged---All offences under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 were non-bailable and bail could not be granted under S.497, Cr.P.C., to accused facing charges under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, could exercise powers available under S.497, Cr.P.C., to grant bail to an accused for offences under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, in appropriate circumstances---Powers as conferred by Art.199 of the Constitution placed a discretion with the Court to be exercised judiciously---Material available on record prima facie connected petitioner with acts alleged, thus, there was no justification to allow concession to petitioner---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Anwarul Haq Qureshi v. National Accountability Bureau and others 2008 SCMR 1135; Aga Jehanzeb v. NAB and others 2005 SCMR 1666; Arif Sharif v. Chairman NAB 2004 SCMR 1805; Muhammad Irshad Khan v. Chairman NAB and others 2007 PCr.LJ 1957; Brig. (R) Imtiaz Ahmad v. The State PLD 2017 Lah. 23; Khan Haroon Resikh v. The State and 2 others PLD 2003 Lah. 517; Abdul Aziz Khan Niazi v. The State PLD 2003 SC 668; Muhammad Nadeem Anwar and another v. NAB and others PLD 2008 SC 645; Syed Qasim Shah v. The State 2009 SCMR 790; Saeed Ahmed v. The State 1996 SCMR 1132; Muhammad Saeed Mehdi v. The State and 2 others 2002 SCMR 282; Ghani-ur-Rehman v NAB and others PLD 2011 SC 1144; Akhtar Ali Mahoto v. NAB 2004 MLD 2039 and Muhammad Hashim Babar v. The State 2010 SCMR 1697 ref.

Sardar M. Latif Khan Khosa, Mustafa Abbasi, Nadir Ali Chalgari and Khursheed Anwar Khosa for Petitioner.

Ch. Mumtaz Yousaf, DPG, NAB for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 96

Before Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Abdullah Baloch, JJ

NOOR MUHAMMAD---Petitioner

Versus

SAJJAD AKHTAR and 3 others---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.(T) 96 of 2016, decided on 12th June, 2017.

Establishment of Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Balochistan Ordinance (VI of 2001)---

----Ss. 9(1), 29 & 32---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 10-A & 199---Constitutional petition---Audi alteram partem, principle of---Applicability---Alternate remedy---Scope---Petitioner was aggrieved of order passed by Ombudsman accepting complaint filed by respondent against him---Plea raised by petitioner was that he was condemned unheard whereas authorities contended that alternate remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner---Validity---Ombudsman accepted complaint of respondent without issuing notice to him--- Order passed by Ombudsman without affording opportunity of hearing to petitioner could not be blessed with blanket of authenticity, being violative of universally acknowledged principle of audi alteram partem---After insertion of Art.10-A to the Constitution, said principle had gained much importance---When alternate remedy was available, Constitutional petition was not maintainable but in cases where order assailed was patently illegal and without jurisdiction, Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court could not be abridged on account of availability of alternate remedy---High Court was custodian of Fundamental Rights of citizens of the country and was under obligation to take care of orders passed by executives and quasi-judicial forums when same were brought before it in Constitutional petitions---High Court set aside orders passed by Ombudsman as same was without lawful authority, void ab initio and of no legal effect as matter pertained to civil dispute and parties were at liberty to invoke court of competent jurisdiction for redressal of their grievances---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances.

Pakistan Cromines Limited v. The Inquiry Officer, WarRisk Insurance (Sindh Balochistan Ministry of Commerce) 1983 SCMR 1208; Muslim Abad Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. M/s Siddiqa Faiz PLD 2008 SC 135 and Messrs Ahmed Clinic v. Government of Sindh 2003 CLC 1196 rel.

Tahir Ali Baloch for Petitioner.

Jadain Dashti for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 100

Before Muhammad Noor Meskanzai, C.J. and Abdullah Baloch, J

Messrs SINO PAK MINERALS PRIVATE LIMITED, ISLAMABAD through Law Associates Office---Petitioner

Versus

SECRETARY MINES AND MINERALS, GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN and another---Respondents

Constitutional Petition No.718 of 2013, decided on 21st April, 2017.

(a) Balochistan Minerals Rules, 2002---

----Rr. 33(3), 47(2)(f) & 56(3)(4)---Mine lease, cancellation of---Lease of mines granted in favour of petitioner were cancelled by authorities on the ground that petitioner did not submit quarterly progress reports and violated the rules---Plea raised by petitioner was that no notice was served upon petitioner and it was unaware of letter on its addresses issued by authorities---Notice issued to petitioner for submission of quarterly progress reports and thereafter for cancellation of mining lease were not served upon petitioner in a proper and authenticated manner---Petitioner was condemned unheard and no opportunity was afforded to it---High Court set aside orders passed by authorities, as they were void ab initio and of no legal effect---High Court directed authorities to provide proper opportunity to petitioner and to decide the matter in accordance with law---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan--

----Art. 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.151 & O.I, R.10---Constitutional petition---Necessary party---Scope---Applicants sought to be impleaded as respondents---Validity---After surrender of rights in favour of petitioner, interveners had no character in title of leasing, having no locus standi to be impleaded as necessary party---Application was dismissed in circumstances.

Iqbal Shah for Petitioner.

Zahoor Ahmed Baloch, Assistant Advocate General assisted by Abdul Mateen Kakar, Law Officer Mines and Minerals Department for Respondents.

Behlol Khan Kasi for Intervener Abdul Jaleel, Proprietor of Messrs Bagh Metal for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Balochistan 105

Before Muhammad Ejaz Swati and Nazeer Ahmed Langove, JJ

ABDUL RAHIM and another---Appellants

Versus

CHIEF SECRETARY BALOCHISTAN, GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN and 2 others---Respondents

Regular First Appeal No.40 of 2012, decided on 29th April, 2017.

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. VII, R.2---Money suit---Contract for construction of road---Damages, recovery of---Scope---Plaintiffs were awarded contract for construction of road---Contention of plaintiffs was that due to law and order situation in the area, insurgents fired rockets and missiles on the labour and machinery which resulted in stoppage of work and government, in circumstances, was responsible to pay damages---Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---Plaintiffs could not deviate from the terms and conditions of contract agreed upon between the parties---Law and order situation, if any, could have been handled with the help of local administration---Plaintiffs instead of resorting to legal course, opted an easy and shortcut way to sue the government with another unjustified demand that they be accommodated by awarding another contract---Such demand was not only beyond the scope of contract awarded to the plaintiffs but beyond the premises of law---Plaintiffs had failed to establish their claim through reliable and confidence inspiring evidence and did not approach the Court with clean hands by suppressing material facts with regard to award of actual contract---Plaintiffs were not entitled for the relief claimed for---Impugned judgment passed by the Trial Court was based on proper appreciation of evidence---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Nemo for Appellants.

Muhammad Saleem Balochi, A.A.G. for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 1

Present: Mian Saqib Nisar, Manzoor Ahmad Malik and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ

AL-MEEZAN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT COMPANY LTD. and 2 others---Appellants

Versus

WAPDA FIRST SUKUK COMPANY LIMITED, LAHORE and others---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 104-L, 106-L and 107-L of 2015, decided on 10th October, 2016.

(Against the judgment dated 17-2-2015 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in R.F.A. No.779 of 2010).

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 88---Interpleader suit---Origins, scope and description of the law of interpleaders stated.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 88 & O. XXXV, R. 1---Interpleader suit---Pre-requisites---Certain conditions must be satisfied before an interpleader suit could be competently filed; firstly, there must be rival claimants; secondly, the same debt, sum of money or other property, moveable or immoveable, must be claimed by two or more claimants, and thirdly, the person from whom such debt, sum of money etc. was being claimed must claim no interest in the same.

(c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 88 & O. XXXV, R. 1---Interpleader suit---Maintainability and pre-requisites---Sukuk certificates---Dispute over ownership of sukuk certificates---Sukuk certificates were issued by respondent-company, which was wholly owned by a statutory authority (WAPDA)---Claimants (a corporation and several banks) made conflicting claims to the sukuk certificates---Respondent-company and statutory authority filed an interpleader suit under S.88, CPC before the civil court stating that they claimed no title in the certificates and were ready to pay the rental profits, and ultimately the principal amount, to whoever was determined to be the true owner by the court---Whether interpleader suit was maintainable in terms of proviso to S. 88, CPC----For an interpleader suit to be competent, firstly, there must be rival claimants; secondly, the same debt, sum of money or other property, must be claimed by two or more claimants, and thirdly, the person from whom such debt, sum of money etc. was being claimed must claim no interest in the same---Statutory authority and respondent-company were faced with several rival claimants---Disputed sukuk certificates which were claimed by the corporation and banks, represented the same debt, sum of money or other property---Statutory authority and respondent-company did not claim an interest in the disputed sukuk certificates, and had deposited the rental ijara payments along with the encashment value of the disputed sukuk certificates with the court---Three conditions precedent for an interpleader suit thus stood satisfied in the present case---Indemnity/undertaking obtained from the corporation by the statutory authority was not the outcome of some deceitful arrangement or some secret negotiations, and did not tantamount to collusion---Interpleader suit was held to be maintainable accordingly.

Statutory authority (WAPDA) wanted to raise funds for its various projects and to this end it incorporated a company (Wapda First Sukuk Company), which is a public limited company wholly owned by the statutory authority. Respondent company issued sukuk certificates to a corporation. Due to an admitted fraud in the corporation the sukuk certificates were sold to another entity, which in turn sold it to claimants/Banks. Dispute arose between the corporation and the claimant Banks over ownership of the sukuk certificates. Respondent-company and statutory authority filed an interpleader suit under Section 88, CPC before the civil court stating that they claimed no title in the certificates and were ready to pay the rental profits, and ultimately the principal amount, to whoever was determined to be the true owner by the court. Question was whether the interpleader suit was maintainable in terms of Order XXXV and proviso to section 88, CPC.

Certain conditions precedent must be satisfied before an interpleader suit could be competently filed; firstly, there must be rival claimants; secondly, the same debt, sum of money or other property, moveable or immoveable must be claimed by two or more claimants, and thirdly, the person from whom such debt, sum of money etc. was being claimed must claim no interest in the same.

Statutory authority and respondent-company were faced with several rival claimants. Corporation and Banks were calling on statutory authority and respondent-company to make good for various amounts in respect of rental ijara payments as well as laying claim to differing sums of money on account of the encashment value of the disputed sukuk certificates on the basis of their holding of the said certificates. Therefore, the first condition precedent stood satisfied in the present circumstances.

Disputed sukuk certificates which were claimed by the corporation and Banks, represented the same debt, sum of money or other property. Disputed sukuk certificates were originally purchased by the corporation. At the time of the fraudulent "sale" of the disputed sukuk certificates, apparently 72 forged physical sukuk certificates were surrendered to the (WAPDA) Bonds Cell and instead of the surrendered certificates the Cell issued/substituted 6 physical sukuk certificates. Substitution of the 72 physical sukuk certificates by the 6 physical sukuk certificates did not give rise to a new debt. Banks and those who claim to derive title from it, including the corporation, were rival claimants for the same debt/sum of money.

Statutory authority and respondent-company did not claim an interest in the disputed sukuk certificates, as they had categorically stated before the court that they had divested themselves of the entire amount to be paid on account of the disputed sukuk certificates and had deposited the rental ijara payments along with the encashment value of the disputed sukuk certificates with the court. All three conditions precedents for an interpleader suit thus stood fulfilled in the present case.

Indemnity/undertaking obtained from the corporation by the statutory authority was not the outcome of some deceitful arrangement or some secret negotiations. Such undertaking did not tantamount to either collusion with a party to the interpleader suit or an interest in the suit property i.e. the disputed sukuk certificates. Appeal was dismissed accordingly and interpleader suit was held to be maintainable.

(d) Fraud---

----Fraud vitiated the most solemn of proceedings and a superstructure built on a foundation of fraud must fall.

(e) Words and phrases

----"Indemnity"---Meaning---Indemnity was a collateral contract or assurance, by which one person engaged to secure another against an anticipated loss or to prevent him from being damnified by the legal consequences of an act or forbearance on the part of one of the parties or of some third person.

(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 88 & O. XXXV, R. 1(c)---Interpleader suit, bar against---Scope---"Indemnity agreement" between the plaintiff and one or more of the defendants---When interpreting the requirement under S. 88, CPC that the plaintiff "claims no interest" in the debt/sum of money etc in dispute and requirement under O. XXXV, R.1(c), C.P.C. that, "that there is no collusion between the plaintiff and any of the defendants" in an interpleader suit, one must first look to the text of the statute, its history, traditions, precedent, purpose and consequences --- Purposive interpretation of the said provisions led to the conclusion that what was to operate as a bar to an interpleader suit was collusion; collusion between the plaintiff and one or more of the defendants that would destroy the neutrality of the plaintiff in an interpleader suit--- Indemnity per se was not barred under the relevant provisions.

(g) Words and phrases

----"Collusion"---Meaning---Collusion was a deceitful agreement or compact between two or more persons, for the one party to bring an action against the other for some evil purpose, as to defraud a third party of his right: a secret arrangement between two or more persons, whose interests were apparently conflicting, to make use of the forms and proceedings of law in order to defraud a third person, or to obtain that which justice would not give them, by deceiving a court or its officers.

Black's Law Dictionary ref.

(h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XXXV, R. 5---Interpleader suit, bar against---Principal-agent relationship---Question as to why an agent was precluded from interpleading his principal in a suit---Agent had a fiduciary duty to his principal, having been entrusted with the care of the principal's property or funds---Agent could not absolve himself of his responsibility to be held accountable to his principal by suing him and compelling him to interplead with another party (other than a person who claimed through the principal)---Said rule was based upon the sound legal principle that an agent could not be allowed to dispute the authority of his principal.

(i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. VII, R.11(d)---Rejection of plaint---Suit dismissed as being not maintainable---Distinct concepts---Question whether a suit was maintainable or not was moot with respect to whether or not a plaint was to be rejected as being barred by law---Both were a different species altogether and it may well be that a plaint was not rejected in terms of O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. but the suit was dismissed eventually as not maintainable for a possible host of reasons.

Uzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Tasneem Amin, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.A.No.104-L of 2015).

Shehryar Kasuri, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in C.A.No.106-L of 2015)

Asad Javed, Advocate Supreme Court and Mahmudul Islam, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant (in C.A.No.107-L of 2015)

Ms. Ayesha Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Fayyaz A. Sherazi, Advocate-on-Record (for Respondents Nos.1 and 2 (in all appeals).

Asad Javed, Advocate Supreme Court and Mahmudul Islam, Advocate on Record (for Respondent No.3 in C.As. 104-L and 106-L of 2015).

Uzair Karamat Bhandari Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Tasneem Amin, Advocate-on-Record (for Respondent No.4 in C.A. No.106-L of 2015 and for Respondent No.3 in C.A. 107-L of 2015).

Fayyaz A. Sherazi, Advocate on Record (for Respondent No.6 in C.As. 106-L and 107-L of 2015)

Shehryar Kasuri, Advocate Supreme Court (for Respondent No.5 in C.As. 104-L and 107-L of 2015).

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 18

Present: Anwar Zaheer Jamali, C.J., Amir Hani Muslim and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ

Mst. SAFIA BANO---Petitioner

Versus

HOME DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No.2990 of 2016, decided on 27th September, 2016.

(On appeal from the order of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench dated 23-8-2016 passed in W.P.No.10816 of 2016).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 84 & 302(b)---Mental Health Ordinance (VIII of 2001), S.2(1)(m)---Pakistan Prison Rules, 1978, Rr. 104(ix) & 444---Qatl-i-amd---Defence of insanity---"Schizophrenia"---Scope---Plea on behalf of convict that at the time of issuance of his black warrants he was a patient of "Paranoid schizophrenia", therefore, before his execution, he needed medical treatment so that he may be able to make a will, which was permissible under the Prison Rules, 1978---Validity---Schizophrenia was not a permanent mental disorder, rather it was an imbalance, increasing or decreasing in nature, depending on the level of stress---In recent years, its prognosis had improved with drugs, by vigorous psychological and social management, and rehabilitation---Schizophrenia, therefore, was a recoverable disease, which, in all the cases, did not fall within the definition of "mental disorder" as defined in the Mental Health Ordinance, 2001---From the stage of trial, convict took plea of suffering from 'schizophrenia' in his defence, but all the courts up to the Supreme Court discarded such plea of mental illness, which could be made basis to term him as lunatic---Even the medical record produced before the court revealed that convict was all along considered as psychiatric patient suffering from "paranoid schizophrenia"---Supreme Court observed that rules relating to mental sickness could not be used to delay the execution of death sentence awarded to the convict, which had attained finality up to the level of the Supreme Court, and when mercy petition of convict had already been dismissed by the President---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Amrit Bhushan Gupta v. Union of India AIR 1977 SC 608 ref.

(b) Medical jurisprudence---

----"Schizophrenia"---Definition and explanation.

New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language; Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 7th Edition; Wharton's Law Lexicon, Fifth Edition and Ram Narain Gupta v. Smt. Rameshwari Gupta AIR 1988 SC 2260 ref.

Syed Iqbal Hussain Shah Gillani, Advocate Supreme Court and M.A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Petitioner.

Razzaq A. Mirza, Addl. A.G., Punjab, Rizwan Saeed, Dy. Superintendent Jail, Khurram Bilal, Medical Officer and Raja Abdul Qayum, Sr. LO. Home Department for Official Respondents.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 28

Present: Mian Saqib Nisar, Mushir Alam and Tariq Parvez, JJ

WORKERS' WELFARE FUNDS, M/O HUMAN RESORUCES DEVELOPMENT, ISLAMABAD through Secretary and others---Appellants/Petitioners

Versus

EAST PAKISTAN CHROME TANNERY (PVT) LTD. through G.M. (Finance), Lahore and others---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 1049 to 1055/2011, Civil Misc. Application No.1841/2016 in Civil Appeal No.1054/2011, Civil Appeals Nos. 24 to 26, 64 to 66, 918 to 944, 961 and 1061/2013, 1266 to 1299, 1364 to 1379/2014, 72 to 74, 178, 179, 388, 316 to 321, 583 to 585/2015 and Civil Petition No.1767/2012, Civil Misc. Application No.8118/2015 in Civil Petition No.1767/2012, Civil Appeals Nos. 107 to 114 and 755/2016, Civil Petition No.1005/2016, Civil Appeals Nos. 1022 and 1341/2016 and Constitution Petitions Nos. 5 to 8/2016, Civil Appeal No.1298/2016, Civil Misc. Applications Nos. 3520 to 3522/2016 in Constitution Petitions Nos. 5 to 7/2016.

(Against the judgment dated 19-8-2011/3-10-2012, 15-2-2012/ 1-3-2013/ 20-5-2013/ 1-5-2013/ 28-5-2013/ 29-5-2014/ 11-3-2011/ 29-10-2015/27-10-2015/23-9-2014/25-2-2016,/17-11-2015/ 20-5-2015/ 12-1-2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore/High Court of Sindh, Karachi/Lahore High Court, Lahore/High Court of Sindh, Karachi/Peshawar High Court, Peshawar/High Court of Sindh, Karachi/Peshawar High Court Peshawar/Islamabad High Court, Islamabad/Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.Ps.Nos.8763, 4216, 4217, 8766, 8767 and 8768/2011, Const.Ps. Nos.1588-D, 1589-D and 1743-D/2012, W.Ps.Nos.2100 to 2102/2012, Const. Ps.Nos.3753-D/2009, 1483-D, 4119-D, 4120-D and 4121-D/2011, 3618-D/2010, 367-D, 699-D, 3482-D, 3483-D, 3484-D, 3488-D to 3494-D and 495-D/2011, 3521-D/2010, 702-D, 703-D, 704-D, 706-D, 1048-D and 1619/2011, 452-D/2010, 2109-D/2013 and 2039/2010, T.Rs. Nos.2 to 4, 38 and 42/2012, 9, 34, 42, 44, 45, 76, 79, 86, 98 and 100/2013, 4/2014, 43, 46, 48, 64, 65, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 97, 99, 101 and 123/2013, 5/2014, 87/2013, W.Ps. Nos. 1425/2010, 981 and 3420/2012, 1139/2014, 981/2012, 144 and 579/2014, 1425/2010, T.Rs Nos. 9/2012, 19 and 102/2013 and 15 and 16/2014, 74, 18, 55 to 57, 51, 52 and 81 to 83/2014, Const.P.No.260/2008, T.Rs. Nos.35, 38 and 45 to 50/2015, W.Ps. Nos. 2250 and 4203/2012 and T.Rs. No.58/2015, W.P.No.31/2015 and T.R.No.54/2015)

(a) Tax---

----"Tax" and "fee"---Distinction---Tax was a compulsory exaction of monies by public authorities, to be utilized for public purposes---Distinguishing feature of tax was that it imposed a common burden for raising revenue for a general as opposed to a specific purpose; the latter being one of the key characteristics of a fee.

Government of North-West Frontier Province through Secretary Agriculture and others v. Rahimullah and others 1992 SCMR 750 and Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Petroleum and Natural Resources and another v. Durrani Ceramics and others 2014 SCMR 1630 ref.

(b) Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance (XXXVI of 1971) ---

----Ss. 2, 4, 6, 10 & 10A [as amended by section 12 of the Finance Act (III of 2006) and subsequently by S. 8 of the Finance Act (I of 2008)] & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 73(2)---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), S.60A---Vires of amendments made by Finance Acts, 2006 and 2008---Obligation on industrial establishments to contribute towards the Workers' Welfare Fund---Whether such obligation was a 'tax'---Whether amendments to the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 could have been lawfully brought through Money Bills i.e. Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008---Contributions made to the Workers' Welfare Fund were not in the nature of a "tax"---Workers' Welfare Fund could only be used for very specific purposes as stated exhaustively in the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 itself, and not for general or undefined purposes---Such particular feature of the contribution made in terms of the said Ordinance automatically precluded it from being classified as a "tax"---Further S.60A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 provided that any contributions made by a person under the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 would be deducted from the total income of that person, which suggested that the contributions were not a tax, as they were being deducted from the total income, as opposed to being considered as a "tax credit"---Amendments made in the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 by way of Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008 did not fall within the parameters of Art.73(2) of the Constitution, therefore, they were declared to be unlawful and ultra vires the Constitution.

According to Preamble to the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971, it was passed to provide for the establishment of a Workers' Welfare Fund, in order to provide residential accommodation and other facilities for workers and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

Governing Body of the Workers' Welfare Fund, established to manage and administer the said fund, was supposed to do so in light of the exhaustive purposes enumerated in section 6 of the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971. Further, the Governing Body could only allocate funds to the Provincial Government, or any agency of the Federal Government and any Body Corporate for the purposes mentioned in Section 6(a) and (b) of the Ordinance and for no other purpose, and any funds so allocated to any such body could not be used for any purpose other than that for which they were allocated or as permitted by the Governing Body. This clearly established two things: that the Government had no control over the Workers' Welfare Fund, and that the funds could only be used for very specific purposes as stated exhaustively in the Ordinance itself, and not for general or undefined purposes. This particular feature of the contribution(s) made in terms of the Ordinance automatically precluded them from being classified as a "tax"

Section 4(7) of the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 stated that the payments made by industrial establishments to the Workers' Welfare Fund under the Ordinance were to be considered as expenditure while assessing income tax. It was a necessary corollary that the contributions to the Workers' Welfare Fund could not be a "tax" if they were to be considered as an expenditure while assessing income tax. Such argument was bolstered by section 60A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 which provided that any contributions made by a person under the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 would be deducted from the total income of that person. This also suggested that the contributions were not a tax, as they were being deducted from the total income, as opposed to being considered as a tax credit, in which case the contributions would be subtracted from the total tax to be paid. Contributions made to the Workers' Welfare Fund were not in the nature of a tax.

Amendments sought to be made in the Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971 by the Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008 pertaining to the contributions towards the Workers' Welfare Fund did not relate to the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax, or any matter incidental thereto. Since the amendments relating to such contributions did not fall within the parameters of Article 73(2) of the Constitution, the impugned amendments by the respective Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008 were declared to be unlawful and ultra vires the Constitution.

(c) Employees' Old Age Benefits Act (XIV of 1976)---

----Ss. 9, 22, 22A, 22B & 23 [as amended by the Finance Act (IV of 2007) and Finance Act (I of 2008)] & Preamble---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 73(2)---Vires of amendments made by Finance Acts, 2007 and 2008---Obligation on employers to contribute towards the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Fund---Whether such obligation was a 'tax'---Whether the amendments made to the Employees Old Age Benefits Act, 1976 could have been lawfully brought through a Money Bill i.e. Finance Act, 2008---Contribution under the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976 did not come within the ambit of a "tax"---Scheme of the said Act clearly suggested that the contributions were to be used for specific purposes pertaining to employees' old-age benefits, as opposed to general purposes---Amendments made in the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976 by way of Finance Acts of 2007 and 2008 did not fall within the parameters of Art. 73(2) of the Constitution, therefore, they were declared to be unlawful and ultra vires the Constitution.

According to Preamble to the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976 it was a law relating to old-age benefits for the persons employed in industrial, commercial and other organisations and matters connected therewith.

Section 17(4) of the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976, provided that the assets of the Institution shall be utilized solely for the purposes of the Act. The various benefits available under the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976 were old-age pension (section 22), old-age grant (section 22A), survivors' pension (section 22B) and invalidity pension (section 23). Thus the scheme of the Act clearly suggested that the contributions were to be used for specific purposes pertaining to employees' old-age benefits, as opposed to general purposes. Such feature of the contribution removed it from the ambit of a tax.

Amendments sought to be made in the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976, by the Finance Acts of 2007 and 2008 pertaining to the contributions towards the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Fund did not relate to the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax, or any matter incidental thereto. Since the amendments relating to such contributions did not fall within the parameters of Article 73(2) of the Constitution, the impugned amendments by respective Finance Acts of 2007 and 2008 were declared to be unlawful and ultra vires the Constitution.

(d) Workmen's Compensation Act (VIII of 1923) ---

----S. 3 [as amended by the Finance Act (IV of 2007)] & Preamble --- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 73(2)---Vires of amendments made by Finance Act, 2007---Obligation to pay compensation to employees under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923---Whether such obligation was a 'tax'---Whether the amendments made to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, could have been lawfully brought through a "Money Bill" i.e. Finance Act, 2007---Preamble to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 states that it was passed to provide for the payment of compensation for injury by accident by certain classes of employees to their workmen---Scheme under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was a form of insurance, providing compensation to workers (or their dependents in case of a fatal accident) injured in the course of employment in exchange for relinquishment of the employee's right to take legal action against the employer---Compensation payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 were not a common burden exacted to meet the general expenses of the State, rather they were particular payments made for a very specific purpose, i.e. to compensate workmen injured in the course of employment, therefore they could not be said to be in the nature of a "tax"---Amendment sought to be made in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, by the Finance Act of 2007 pertaining to payment of compensation to employees did not relate to the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax, or any matter incidental thereto---Since the amendment relating to such compensation did not fall within the parameters of Art.73(2) of the Constitution, the impugned amendment by the Finance Act, 2007 was declared to be unlawful and ultra vires the Constitution.

(e) Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)---

----S.O. 12(6) [as amended by the Finance Act (IV of 2007)]---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 73(2)---Vires of amendment made by Finance Act, 2007---Payment of gratuity under the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968---Whether obligation to pay such gratuity was a 'tax'---Whether the amendments made to the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 could have been lawfully brought through a Money Bill i.e. Finance Act, 2007---Standing Order 12(6) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, as amended by the Finance Act, 2007, broadly provided for payment of gratuity by the employer in case a workman resigned from service or his services were terminated by the employer for any reason other than misconduct---Gratuity was a lump sum payment made by the employer to an employee at the end of his service (either by retirement or termination for reasons other than misconduct) as a mark of recognition for the latter's service---Gratuity was a defined benefit plan---Gratuity payments made by employers were very specific as opposed to having a generic purpose to meet the State's expenses and could therefore by no stretch of imagination be referred to as a tax---Amendment sought to be made in the Industrial and Commercial Employees (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, by the Finance Act, 2007 pertaining to payment of gratuity to workmen did not relate to the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax, or any matter incidental thereto---Since the amendment relating to such gratuity did not fall within the parameters of Art. 73(2) of the Constitution, the impugned amendment by the Finance Act. 2007 was declared to be unlawful and ultra vires the Constitution.

(f) Companies Profit Workers' Participation Act (XII of 1968)---

----Ss. 2(b), 2(f) & 4 [as amended by the Finance Act (IV of 2007)] --- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 73(2)---Vires of amendment by Finance Act, 2007---Payment of certain percent of profits of a company to the Workers' Participation Fund---Whether such payments were a 'tax'---Whether the amendments made to the Companies Profit Workers' Participation Act, 1968 could have been lawfully brought through a Money Bill i.e. Finance Act, 2007---Companies' Profit Workers' Participation Act, 1968 provided for companies to which the Act applied to establish a Workers' Participation Fund and to make annual payments of certain percent of its profits during that year to the said Fund to provide benefits that accrued from it to the eligible workers of the company---Employees may voluntarily choose to contribute to the Workers' Participation Fund---Workers' Participation Fund was to be managed and administered by a Board of Trustees in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the scheme and any rules made in such behalf---Workers' Participation Fund was a profit-sharing plan that gave employees a share in the profits of a company, with the primary aim to give the employees a sense of ownership and greater participation in the company---Such contributions were for a specific purpose, i.e. a plan for the benefit of employees, much like other investment plans, and therefore did not qualify as a "tax"---Amendment sought to be made in the Companies Profit Workers' Participation Act, 1968, by the Finance Act, 2007 pertaining to payments in the Workers' Participation Fund did not relate to the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any "tax", or any matter incidental thereto---Since the amendment relating to such payment did not fall within the parameters of Art.73(2) of the Constitution, the impugned amendment by the Finance Act, 2007 was declared to be unlawful and ultra vires the Constitution.

(g) Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance (XX of 1969) ---

----S. 3 & Sched. [as amended by the Finance Act (IV of 2007)]---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 73(2)---Amendments made to the Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969 through a Money Bill i.e. Finance Act, 2007---Constitutionality---Preamble to the Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969, provided that the said Ordinance was enacted to fix the minimum rates of wages for unskilled workers employed in certain commercial and industrial establishments---Requirement of payment of minimum wages to unskilled workers could not be construed as a "tax", thereby amendments made to the Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969, could not be effected through a Money Bill i.e. Finance Act, 2007.

(h) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 70 & 73---Practice of making amendments in statutes through a Money Bill i.e. Finance Act---Supreme Court observed that not everything that pertained to finance would necessarily be related to tax; that merely inserting amendments, albeit relating to finance but which had no nexus to tax, in a Finance Act did not mean that such Act was a Money Bill as defined in Art.73(2) of the Constitution; that the tendency to tag all matters pertaining to finance with tax matters in Finance Acts must be discouraged, for it allowed the legislature to pass laws as Money Bills by bypassing the regular legislative procedure under Art. 70 of the Constitution by resorting to Art.73 thereof which must only be done in exceptional circumstances as and when permitted by the Constitution.

(i) Fee ---

----Characteristics---Payment/contribution would qualify as a fee if it was for specific purpose and possessed the element of quid pro quo.

For the Appellant(s):

Mir Afzal Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record (in C.As. 1049 to 1055/2011 and 64 to 66/2013).

Mir Afzal Malik Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record (in C.As. 1364 to 1371/2014).

Ms. Asma Jaehangir, Advocate Supreme Court, and Ch. Akhtar Ali Advocate-on-Record (in C.As. 24 to 26/2013).

Abid S. Suberi, Advocate Supreme Court, (in C.A. 918/2013).

Hashmat Ali Habib, Advocate Supreme Court, (in C.A. 919/2013).

Rashid Anwar, Advocate Supreme Court, (in C.As. 923 to 930, 937 to 938/2013).

Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate Supreme Court, and M.S.Khattak, Advocate-on-Record (in C.As. 1266 to 1299/2014, 1372 to 1379/2014, 72 to 74, 178, 179, 316 to 321, 388 and 583 to 585/2015, 1022, 1341 & 1298/2016).

Rehman Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. 107 to 114 and 755/2016).

Nemo (in C.As. 920 to 922, 936, 942 to 944, 931 to 935, 939 to 941 and 961/2013).

For the Petitioners:

Hafiz S.A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (in C.Ps. 1767/2012 and C.M.A. 8118/2015.

Malik Jawwad Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court ((in C.P. 1005/2016).

Raheel Kamran Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.Ps Nos.5 to 8 of 2016).

Raja Nadeem Haider, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.No.1841 of 2016).

For the respondents:

Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No.937/2013, 1271, 1276, 1373, 1377/14, 388, 316, 584, 585/15, 107 to 109, 111, 113/2016).

Mian Yousaf Umar, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. 1049 to 1055/2011).

Mehmood Abdul Ghani, Advocate Supreme Court and M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record (in C.As. 24 to 26/2013).

Naveed Ahmed Andrabi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. 64 to 66/2013).

Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record (in Const.Ps. 5 to 8/2016 and C.M.As. 3520 to 3522/2016).

Mir Afzal Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record (in C.As. 918 to 920, 923 to 935, 938 to 941, 943 and 944/2013).

Khalil-ur-Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court and M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record (in C.A. 1274/2014).

Muhammad Saleem Mangrio, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As.Nos.64/2013, 918 to 929/2013, 931 to 936, 939 to 942/2013).

Syed Arshad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. 1365/2014).

Mian Shafaqat Jan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. 320 to 321/2015).

Shumail Butt, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. 1378/2014).

Arshad Zaman Kiyani, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Saleem Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Asif Fasih-ud-Din Vardaq, Advocate Supreme Court, Qazi Ahmed Naeem Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court, and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record (in C.A. 1767/2012).

Ms. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. 942/2013).

Tasleem Hussain Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. 1374 to 1379/2014).

Habib Ahmed Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. 1364/2014).

Sohail Mahmood, DAG, Abid Hussain Channa, S.O.(Finance), Mudassir Khalid Abbasi, A.A.G. Punjab and Abbas Ali, Law Officer, Labour Deptt. Punjab.

Noor Ahmed Wahgra, Dy. Director (Legal), EOBI

Faisal Tariq, Dy. Director (Legal) Workers Welfare Fund, Islamabad.

Nemo (in C.As. 1272, 1274, 1278 and 1299/2014).

Not represented (in C.As. 1061, 1266 to 1268, 1270, 1273, 1275, 1277, 1279 to 1289, 1364, 1366 to 1368, 1370 to 1372, 1375/2014, 72 to 74, 178, 179, 317 to 319, 583/2015, 110, 112, 114 and 1022/2016).

Date of hearing: 27th September, 2016.

JUDGMENT

MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.---These matters involve common questions of law, thus are being disposed of together. The key question involved in these matters is whether the levies/contributions/payments under various laws which were amended through different Finance Acts are in the nature of a tax or not. This would in turn determine whether or not the amendments were lawfully made through Finance Acts, i.e. Money Bills, as defined in Article 73 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution).

1. The facts pertaining to these matters are broadly divided into three categories for ease of reference. The first set of facts are that Sections 2 and 4 of the Workers' Welfare Ordinance, 1971 (Ordinance of 1971) were amended by Section 12 of the Finance Act of 2006 and subsequently by Section 8 of the Finance Act of 2008 which broadened the scope of the obligation on industrial establishments to contribute towards the Workers' Welfare Fund established under Section 3 of the Ordinance of 1971. The said amendments (and notices demanding enhanced payment by virtue of the amendments) were challenged through writ petitions before various High Courts of the country. It is pertinent to mention that there are divergent views of the learned High Courts on this question. The view of the learned Lahore High Court in the judgment dated 19.8.2011 reported as East Pakistan Chrome Tannery (Pvt.) Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2011 PTD 2643) is that the levy in question was a fee and not a tax, therefore the amendments made by the Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008 to the Ordinance of 1971 could not have been lawfully brought through a money bill, rather should have been brought through the regular legislative procedure under the Constitution. The learned Peshawar High Court, vide judgment dated 29.5.2014, followed suit. Subsequently the learned Peshawar High Court disposed of numerous tax references on the basis of this decision, against which the appeals are before us. We would like to point out at the very outset that as regards those cases in which the revenue authorities/ collecting agencies have assailed the judgment of the learned Peshawar High Court, although no rights of the collecting agencies have been affected as their job is to merely collect contributions for the Workers' Welfare Fund, we are nevertheless deciding those cases as well keeping in view the importance of the matter and the conflicting judgments impugned before us. There is a contrary view of the Full Bench of the learned High Court of Sindh expressed in the judgment dated 1.3.2013 reported as Shahbaz Garments (Pvt.) Ltd v. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Revenue Division, Islamabad and others (PLD 2013 Kar. 449) (Full Bench judgment) to the effect that the levy in question was a tax and not a fee, therefore the amendments made by the Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008 to the Ordinance of 1971 were lawfully brought through a money bill. The aforementioned judgments have been challenged by the parties before us.

2. The second set of facts are that various provisions of the Employees' Old Age Benefits Act, 1976 (Act of 1976) pertaining to contributions to be made thereunder were amended by Section 9 of the Finance Act of 2008 effectively widening the scope of the obligation on employers to contribute towards the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Fund established under Section 17 of the Act of 1976. These amendments were challenged through constitution petitions before the learned High Court of Sindh which, through its judgment dated 3.10.2012 reported as Soneri Bank Limited through Jaffar Ali Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and Justice Division, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad and others (2013 PLC 134), held that the levy in question was a fee and not a tax, therefore the amendments made by the Finance Act of 2008 to the Act of 1976 could not have been lawfully brought through a money bill.

3. The third set of facts are that various provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employees (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (Ordinance of 1968), the Companies' Profit Workers' Participation Act, 1968 (Act of 1968), the Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers Ordinance, 1969 (Ordinance of 1969) and the Act of 1976 were amended through the Finance Act of 2007 which amendment(s) in effect broadened the scope of the obligation of the employers in the respective statutes (the obligation(s) in each statute shall be discussed during the course of the opinion). These amendments were challenged through a constitution petition before the learned High Court of Sindh which, through its judgment dated 26.2.2011, held that the changes sought to be made by amendments through the Finance Act of 2007 did not fall within the purview of Article 73(2) of the Constitution, hence, the said amendments could not have been lawfully brought through a money bill. All the aforementioned judgments have been challenged before us.

4. The contentions of the learned counsel can be grouped into two for the sake of convenience. The first set of arguments is of those counsel who espouse the view that the levies/contributions in question are in the nature of a tax, hence, the amendments brought in the respective statutes were validly and lawfully made through Money Bills, i.e. different Finance Acts.

5. Ms. Asma Jehangir, learned counsel for Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution (Institution), sought to challenge the judgment passed in the case of Soneri Bank (supra). Her basic argument was that the levy in the Act of 1976 is a tax and not a fee, and an amendment could be validly brought in the Act of 1976 through a money bill. The Act of 1976 is the outcome of the obligation of the State to sustain the working class from falling below the poverty line. This obligation has been recognized in the Constitution (Articles 9, 37 and 38). Under Article 37 of the Constitution the State has become a signatory to and ratified the conventions of the International Labour Organisation to set up institutions so that the aged, disabled, pregnant women, and survivors of accidents and their families are paid benefits. The Institution is a conduit for the obligation that the State owes in terms of ensuring social benefits and economic rights. Therefore these payments are not a privilege or a service rendered, rather they are tantamount to a right. Additionally, a vested right had been created in favour of the beneficiaries. Further, the employers are contributors to the welfare of the State [on behalf of the general public including the employees] and therefore it has become a common burden. Moreover, the State can contribute as per Section 9 of the Act of 1976 hence the levy/contribution is a tax and not a fee. She relied upon the judgments reported as Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and another v. Durrani Ceramics and others (PLD 2015 SC 354), Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Petroleum and Natural Resources and another v. Durrani Ceramics and others (2014 SCMR 1630), Mir Muhammad Idris and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance and others (PLD 2011 SC 213), Sindh High Court Bar Association through its Secretary and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad and others (PLD 2009 SC 879), Collector of Customs and others v. Sheikh Spinning Mills (1999 SCMR 1402), Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance, Islamabad and 6 others (PLD 1997 SC 582), Sheikh Muhammad Ismail & Co. Ltd, Lahore v. The Chief Cotton Inspector, Multan Division, Multan and others (PLD 1966 SC 388), Flying Cement Company v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2015 PTD Lah. 1945), Tata Textile Mills Ltd., through Authorized Attorney/ Representative, Karachi and 57 others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division/FBR, Islamabad and another (2013 PTD Kar. 1459), Shahbaz Garments (supra), Messrs Mutual Funds Association of Pakistan (MUFAP) v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finances, Government of Pakistan and another [2010 PLC (Lab) Kar. 306], Syed Nasir Ali and 33 others v. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law, Islamabad and 3 others (2010 PTD 1924), Messrs Fatima Enterprises Ltd. v. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Education, Ministry of Education, Islamabad and others (1999 MLD 2889), Messrs Saif Textile Mills Limited v. Pakistan through Secretary, Finance (Finance Division), Islamabad and 3 others (PLD 1998 Pesh. 15), Sindh Glass Industries Limited v. Chief Controller of Import and Export, Islamabad (1990 CLC 638) and Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Gujranwala Steel Industries and another (1990 CLC 197). From the Indian jurisdiction, learned counsel relied upon the judgments reported as Calcutta Municipal Corporation and others v. Shrey Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. and others (AIR 2005 SC 1879), City Corporation of Calicut v. Thachambalath Sadasivan and others (AIR 1985 SC 756), The Chief Commissioner, Delhi and another v. The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd and others (AIR 1978 SC 1181), The State of Maharashtra and others v. The Salvation Army, Western India Territory (AIR 1975 SC 846), The Secretary, Government of Madras, Home Department and another v. Zenith Lamp and Electrical Ltd. (AIR 1973 SC 724), The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd v. The Chief Commissioner, Delhi and others (AIR 1971 SC 344) and The Comissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sir Shirur Mutt. (AIR 1954 SC 282).

6. Mr. Mir Afzal Malik, learned counsel for the Workers' Welfare Fund submitted that the levy/ contribution in the Ordinance of 1971 is also in the nature of a tax and not a fee, therefore the amendments have been validly brought about by Money Bills. He argued that although both tax and fee are compulsory extractions, tax is not related to a particular service but is intended to meet the expenses of the State, whereas a fee is meant to compensate the Government for expenses incurred in rendering services to the person from whom the fee is collected. Further, the money received in the Workers' Welfare Fund is for the benefit of the workers and not for the payers, i.e. industrial establishments, therefore such levy/ contribution does not fall within the definition of fee. He referred to various constitutional provisions including Articles 70(4), 73, 77, 142(b) and (c), 143, 165A and 260(1) and Entry No.52 of Part I of the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution. He relied upon the judgments reported as Shahbaz Garments (supra), Mutual Funds Association (supra), Collector of Customs (supra), Abdul Majid and another v. Province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1960 Dacca 502), The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras (supra), Pakistan Burmah Shell Limited and another v. Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 3 others (1998 PTD 1804), Muhammad Ismail (supra), Messrs Khyber Electric Lamps Manufacturing Limited and others v. Chairman, District Council, Peshawar and another (1986 CLC 533), Rahimullah Khan and 65 others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary Agricultural Forest and Co-operation Department, Peshawar and 5 others (1990 CLC 550), PLD 1997 Kar. 604, 1990 CLC 638, Calcutta Municipal Corporation (supra), The Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and others v. The State of Orissa and others (AIR 1961 SC 459), Mahboob Yar Khan and another v. Municipal Committee, Mian Channu and 2 others (PLD 1975 Lah. 748) and Elahi Cotton (supra).

7. Mr. Rehman Ullah, learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos.107 to 114 and 755/2016 submitted that the subject levies/ contributions were in the nature of tax, not fee. Mr. Hafiz S.A. Rehman, learned counsel for the appellant in Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1767/2012, submitted that the amendments made in several labour laws through the Finance Act of 2007 were lawful for the reasons enumerated in the Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Sindh which (judgment) he fully supported. Mr. Malik Jawwad Malik, learned counsel for the appellant in Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1005/2016 adopted the arguments of Mr. Hafiz S. A. Rehman, learned ASC.

8. The second set of arguments is of those counsel who oppose the view that the levies/contributions in question are in the nature of a tax, rather it is their stance that they are in the nature of a fee, hence, the amendments brought in the respective statutes through Money Bills, i.e. different Finance Acts, were made without lawful authority.

9. Mr. Rashid Anwar, learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos.923 to 930, 937 and 938/2013, identified two main issues:- firstly, with respect to the scope of Article 73 of the Constitution pertaining to Money Bills, and secondly, whether the Ordinance of 1971 levies a tax or a fee. He briefly discussed the history and origins of the concept of Money Bills and how it became a part of our constitutional structure. He made reference to the Parliament Act, 1911 according to which in case there is a conflict between the House of Commons and the House of Lords regarding a Money Bill, when the Speaker of Parliament certifies a bill as a Money Bill, the word of the House of Commons will prevail: according to him this principle is reflected in our Constitution too. Generally, all bills should be passed by both houses of Parliament, i.e. the National Assembly and the Senate. The Senate can be bypassed only to the extent permitted by the Constitution, that is, in respect of matters which fall strictly within the definition of a Money Bill, as provided in Article 73 supra. He submitted that the amendments made by the Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008 did not fall within the definition of a Money Bill and hence such amendments were invalid. He then moved on to the question of whether the levy/contribution in the Ordinance of 1971 was a tax or a fee. In this regard he referred to the Durrani Ceramic's case (supra) and submitted that there are two tests to answer such a question, first, we ought to examine whether any benefit is being provided to any class, particular individuals, community or a specific area and if/where the benefit cannot be measured in exactitude, so long as the levy is to the advantage of the payers, consequential benefit to the community at large would not render the levy a tax. Further, where there is ambiguity, reference can be made to the stance of the Government itself, because the budget documents are prepared by the Government and if it classifies the levy/ contribution as non-tax revenue then that is conclusive proof that it is not a tax. In this respect he referred to certain documents according to which the Accountant General Pakistan Revenues has taken a categorical position that the Workers' Welfare Fund receipts are accounted for under the heads of account of 'non-tax receipts'. Learned counsel by referring to the Preamble and Section 6 of the Ordinance of 1971 stated that this law is meant to provide facilities to workers, and according to judgments of the Supreme Court, a fee should confer some benefit on the contributor directly or indirectly. When an employer makes contributions to the Workers' Welfare Fund it directly benefits the worker but also indirectly benefits the employer in that the worker is enabled to be more productive. He further submitted that as a general rule, tax revenues go to the national exchequer and are disbursed by it to meet the Government's budgetary requirements and the same cannot be done by statutory bodies which are not the Government.

10. Mr. Hashmat Ali Habib, learned counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No.919/2013 argued that the levy/contribution is in the nature of a fee and not a tax. The same argument(s) were put forward by Mr. Ishaq Ali Qazi, learned ASC and Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani, learned ASC (while responding to Ms. Asma Jehangir's arguments), the latter of whom relied upon the judgments reported as Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. and another v. Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution and another (PLD 1977 SC 197), 2004 PLC 121, Government of North-West Frontier Province through Secretary Agriculture and others v. Rahimullah and others (1992 SCMR 750), Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana and others v. Pakistan and others (2013 SCMR 836), Mir Muhammad Idris (supra), Messrs Azgard Nine Ltd. v. Pakistan through Secretary and others (PLD 2013 Lah. 282), Messrs Quetta Textile Mills Limited through Chief Executive v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Excise and Taxation, Karachi and another (PLD 2005 Kar. 55) and Niaz Ahmed Khan v. Province of Sindh and others (PLD 1977 Kar. 604).

11. Mr. Raheel Kamran, learned counsel for the petitioners in Constitutional Petitions Nos.5 to 8/2016 submitted that after the 18th Constitutional Amendment the concurrent legislative lists were abolished and the subjects devolved upon the Provinces. He argued that there is an order dated 14.1.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh stating that the Full Bench (of the High Court of Sindh) has declared such a levy to be a tax, and the outcome of this is that as a tax, it would fall within Entry 47 of the Federal Legislative List which is tax on income, therefore the Provinces can neither legislate on this subject nor collect the levy.

12. Heard. The Constitution has provided the legislative procedure for the introduction and passing of Bills by Parliament. Generally, all Bills (pertaining to matters in the Federal Legislative List) though they may originate in either house, i.e. National Assembly or Senate, must be passed by both houses after which the Bill receives the Presidential Assent. However there is an exception provided by the Constitution. According to Article 73 of the Constitution, Money Bills are to originate in the National Assembly and can be passed by the Assembly whilst bypassing the Senate. What constitutes a Money Bill has been set out in Article 73(2) of the Constitution, and Article 73(3) specifically sets out what shall not constitute a Money Bill. The relevant portions of Article 73 are reproduced below for ease of reference:--

13. Procedure with respect to Money Bills.---(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 70, a Money Bill shall originate in the National Assembly:

Provided

(1A)

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, a Bill or amendment shall be deemed to be a Money Bill if it contains provisions dealing with all or any of the following matters, namely:-

(a) the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax;

(b) the borrowing of money, or the giving of any guarantee, by the Federal Government, or the amendment of the law relating to the financial obligations of that Government;

(c) the custody of the Federal Consolidated Fund, the payment of moneys into, or the issue of moneys from, that Fund;

(d) the imposition of a charge upon the Federal Consolidated Fund, or the abolition or alteration of any such charge;

(e) the receipt of moneys on account of the Public Account of the Federation, the custody or issue of such moneys;

(f) the audit of the accounts of the Federal Government or a Provincial Government; and

(g) any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in the preceding paragraphs.

(3) A Bill shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill by reason only that it provides-

(a) for the imposition or alteration of any fine or other pecuniary penalty, or for the demand or payment of a licence fee or a fee or charge for any service rendered; or

(b) for the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax by any local authority or body for local purposes.

(4) … … … … … … … … … … … … ….

(5) … … … … … … … … … … … … ….

Therefore any Bill which does not fall within the purview of Article 73(2) of the Constitution would not constitute a Money Bill and cannot be passed under the legislative procedure (mandate) provided by Article 73, by bypassing the Senate, rather the regular legislative procedure under Article 70 would be required to be followed. In the instant matters, the relevant sub-Article is (2)(a) of Article 73, which pertains to the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax, read with sub-Article (2)(g) which relates to any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in sub-Articles (2) (a) to (f). Thus we must consider whether the levies/ contributions in question under the various laws are in the nature of a tax: which would render the amendments thereto through the Finance Acts valid and lawful.

1. Whether the various levies/ contributions in the instant matter constitute a tax as opposed to a fee depends on whether they possess the characteristics of a tax or not. The key characteristics of a 'tax' and a 'fee' have been the subject of much debate in our jurisprudence. In the judgment reported as Government of North-West Frontier Province through Secretary Agriculture and others v. Rahimullah and others (1992 SCMR 750) it was held that:--

"The distinction between "tax" and "fee" lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of common burden while a fee is paid for a special benefit or privilege."

This Court in the more recent judgment reported as Federation of Pakistan through Secretary M/o Petroleum and Natural Resources and another v. Durrani Ceramics and others (2014 SCMR 1630), after taking into account considerable case law from our jurisdiction and abroad, came to the following definitive conclusion:--

1. Upon examining the case-law from our own and other jurisdictions it emerges that the 'Cess' is levied for a particular purpose. It can either be 'tax' or 'fee' depending upon the nature of the levy. Both are compulsory exaction of money by public authorities. Whereas 'tax' is a common burden for raising revenue and upon collection becomes part of public revenue of the State, 'fee' is exacted for a specific purpose and for rendering services or providing privilege to particular individuals or a class or a community or a specific area. However, the benefit so accrued may not be measurable in exactitude. So long as the levy is to the advantage of the payers, consequential benefit to the community at large would not render the levy a 'tax'. In the light of this statement of law it is to be examined whether the GIDC is a 'tax' or a 'fee'.

[Emphasis supplied]

There are no two opinions about the fact that a tax is basically a compulsory exaction of monies by public authorities, to be utilized for public purposes. However its distinguishing feature is that it imposes a common burden for raising revenue for a general as opposed to a specific purpose,#; the latter being one of the key characteristics of a fee. Now let us examine each of the subject levies/contributions in light of the above touchstone.

1. According to the Preamble of the Ordinance of 1971, it was passed to provide for the establishment of a Workers' Welfare Fund, in order to provide residential accommodation and other facilities for workers and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Workers' Welfare Fund is constituted under Section 3 of the Ordinance of 1971 which, amongst other things, consists of contributions by industrial establishments. 'Industrial establishments', as defined in Section 2(f) of the Ordinance of 1971, are liable to pay to the Workers' Welfare Fund a sum equal to two percent of their total income per year, provided that the total income of which [in any year of account commencing on or after the date specified by the Federal Government in the official gazette in this behalf] is not less than five lakh rupees. Section 7 pertains to the creation of the Governing Body of the Workers' Welfare Fund to whom the management and administration whereof shall be entrusted. According to Section 10, amongst other things, the function of the Governing Body shall be:-

(a) to allocate funds, in accordance with the principles laid down under section 9, to the Provincial Governments, any agency of the Federal Government and any body corporate for any of the purposes mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 6;

[Emphasis added]

Section 6 provides for the purposes to which monies in the Workers' Welfare Fund may be applied. It reads as follows:-

"6. Purposes to which moneys in the Fund may be applied.-Moneys in the Fund shall be applied to -

(a) the financing of projects connected with the establishment of housing estates or construction of houses for the workers;

(b) the financing of other welfare measures including education training, re-skilling and apprenticeship for the welfare of the workers;

(c) the meeting of expenditure in respect of the cost of management and administration of the Fund;

(d) the repayment of loans raised by the Governing Body; and

(e) investment in government, government guarantees, non-government securities and Real Estate."

Going further, Section 10A provides that:-

10A. Vesting of money allocated from the fund.---Any money allocated under clause (a) of section 10 shall be a grant-in-aid and shall vest in the Government, agency or body corporate, to whom it is allocated under that clause, but it shall not be applied to any purpose other than that for which it is allocated, or permitted, by the Governing Body.

[Emphasis added]

From the above it is clear that the Governing Body of the Workers' Welfare Fund, established to manage and administer the said fund, is supposed to do so in light of the exhaustive purposes enumerated in Section 6 ibid. Further, the Governing Body can only allocate funds to the Provincial Government, or any agency of the Federal Government and any Body Corporate for the purposes mentioned in Section 6(a) and (b) and for no other purpose, and any funds so allocated to any such body cannot be used for any purpose other than that for which they are allocated or as permitted by the Governing Body. This clearly establishes two things: that the Government has no control over the Workers' Welfare Fund, and that the funds can only be used for very specific purposes as stated exhaustively in the Ordinance of 1971 itself, and not for general or undefined purposes. This particular feature of the contribution(s) made in terms of the Ordinance of 1971 automatically preclude them from being classified as a tax.

1. Besides there are certain other features of the contributions made to the Workers' Welfare Fund that suggest they are not in the nature of a tax. In this regard, Section 4(7) of the Ordinance of 1971 is important which reads as follows:--

"4(7) The payment made by an industrial establishment to the Fund under subsection (1) shall be treated as an expenditure for purposes of assessment of income-tax.

Section 4(7) basically states that the payments made by industrial establishments to the Workers' Welfare Fund under the Ordinance of 1971 are to be considered as expenditure while assessing income tax. It is a necessary corollary that the contributions to the Workers' Welfare Fund cannot be a tax if they are to be considered as an expenditure while assessing income tax. This argument is bolstered by Section 60A in Part IX of Chapter III of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Ordinance of 2001) which reads as follows:--

"60A. Workers' Welfare Fund.---A person shall be entitled to a deductible allowance for the amount of any Workers' Welfare Fund paid by the person in tax year under Workers' Welfare Fund Ordinance, 1971. "

A deductible allowance has been defined in Section 2(16) of the Ordinance of 2001 as "an allowance that is deductible from total income under Part IX of Chapter III", meaning thereby that any contributions made by a person under the Ordinance of 1971 will be deducted from the total income of that person. This also suggests that the contributions are not a tax, as they are being deducted from the total income, as opposed to being considered as a tax credit, in which case the contributions would be subtracted from the total tax to be paid. In the light of the foregoing, we are of the view that the contributions made to the Workers' Welfare Fund are not in the nature of a tax.

1. We now advert to the levies/ contributions made under the Act of 1976. According to the Preamble of the Act of 1976, it is a law relating to old-age benefits for the persons employed in industrial, commercial and other organisations and matters connected therewith. The Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution was set up under Section 4 of the Act of 1976; the Institution is to be generally directed and superintended by the Board (see Section 6). The Employees' Old-Age Benefits Fund was set up under Section 17 of the Act of 1976 into which all contributions made under the said Act are to be paid. The employer [defined in Section 2(c)] is required to make monthly payments or contributions to the Institution in respect of insured employees at the rate of five per cent of his wages (see Section 9). Section 3 provides that all employees in an industry or establishment [both of which terms have been defined in Section 2(g) and (e) of the Act of 1976 respectively] shall be insured in the manner prescribed by or under the Act of 1976. Under the said Act, the insured person is also required to make monthly contributions under Section 9B thereof at the rate of one per cent of his wages, from 1.7.2001. Section 17(4) of the Act of 1976 is important, it provides that "the assets of the Institution shall be utilized solely for the purposes of this Act". The various benefits available under the Act of 1976 are old-age pension (Section 22), old-age grant (Section 22A), survivors' pension (Section 22B) and invalidity pension (Section 23). Thus the scheme of the Act of 1976 clearly suggests that the contributions are to be used for specific purposes pertaining to employees' old-age benefits, as opposed to general purposes. Again this feature of the subject contribution removes it from the ambit of a tax.

2. Coming to the five different labour laws amended by the Finance Act of 2007; one of them was the Act of 1976 which we have discussed in the preceding paragraph hence is not required to be addressed again. The Preamble to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 states that it was passed to provide for the payment of compensation for injury by accident by certain classes of employees to their workmen. According to Section 3 of the Act of 1923, an employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of the said Act if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Act of 1923 contains very comprehensive details of the amount of compensation to be paid (Section 4), the method of calculation of wages (Section 5) and the distribution of compensation (Section 8), etc. The scheme under the Act of 1923 is a form of insurance, providing compensation to workers (or their dependents in case of a fatal accident if the Commissioner thinks fit) injured in the course of employment in exchange for relinquishment of the employee's right to take legal action against the employer (see Section 3(5) of the Act of 1923). In the light of the above it is manifest that the compensation payments made under the Act of 1923 are not a common burden exacted to meet the general expenses of the State, rather they are particular payments made for a very specific purpose, i.e. to compensate workmen injured in the course of employment, therefore they cannot be said to be in the nature of a tax.

3. The same is the case with the payments made under the Ordinance of 1968 which provides for the regulation of the conditions of the employment of workmen and other incidental matters in industrial or commercial establishments in accordance with the Standing Orders in the Schedule to the said Ordinance (See section 3). The Ordinance of 1968 is quite extensive, however we are only concerned with the contributions which have been amended by the Finance Act of 2007, as it is the said Act which has been called into question as being unlawful. The provision which was amended by the Finance Act of 2007 is Clause (6) of Standing Order 12 which broadly provides for payment of gratuity by the employer in case a workman resigns from service or his services are terminated by the employer for any reason other than misconduct. The proviso that was added by the Finance Act of 2007 reads as follows:--

"Provided further that if through collective bargaining the employer offers and contributes to an "Approved Pension Fund" as defined in the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001), and where the contribution of the employer is not less than fifty per cent of the limit prescribed in the aforesaid Ordinance, and to which the workman is also a contributor for the remaining fifty per cent or less, no gratuity shall be payable for the period during which such contribution has been made."

The subject contribution is gratuity payments. What is gratuity? Basically it is a lump sum payment made by the employer to an employee at the end of his service (either by retirement or termination for reasons other than misconduct) as a mark of recognition for the latter's service. In other words it is a defined benefit plan. These payments made by employers are very specific as opposed to having a generic purpose to meet the State's expenses and can therefore by no stretch of imagination be referred to as a tax.

1. The Act of 1968 provides for companies [defined in Section 2(b)] to which the Act applies to establish a Workers' Participation Fund and to make annual payments of five per cent of its profits during that year to the said Fund (see Section 3) to provide benefits that accrue from it to the eligible workers of the company. Employees may voluntarily choose to contribute to the Workers' Participation Fund as per Clause 7 of the Schedule of the Act of 1968. The Workers' Participation Fund is to be managed and administered by a Board of Trustees in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1968, the scheme and any rules made in this behalf [see Section 4(5)]. The Workers' Participation Fund is basically a profit-sharing plan that gives employees a share in the profits of a company, with the primary aim to give the employees a sense of ownership and greater participation in the company. These contributions too, are for a specific purpose, i.e. a plan for the benefit of employees, much like other investment plans, and therefore do not qualify as a tax.

2. Finally, according to the Preamble of the Ordinance of 1969, it was enacted to fix the minimum rates of wages for unskilled workers employed in certain commercial and industrial establishments [defined in Section 2(b) and (f) respectively]. Such responsibility was pinned on commercial and industrial establishments under Section 4 of the Ordinance of 1969. Not only was this statute enacted for the aforementioned specific purpose, we fail to understand as to how the requirement of payment of minimum wages to unskilled workers can be construed as a tax, thereby permitting any amendments made to the Ordinance of 1969 to be effected through a Money Bill.

3. As we have established from the discussion above that none of the subject contributions/payments made under the Ordinance of 1971, the Act of 1976, the Act of 1923, the Ordinance of 1968, the Act of 1968 and the Ordinance of 1969 possess the distinguishing feature of a tax, i.e. a common burden to generate revenue for the State for general purposes, instead they all have some specific purpose, as made apparent by their respective statutes, which removes them from the ambit of a tax. Consequently, the amendments sought to be made by the various Finance Acts of 2006, 2007 and 2008 pertaining to the subject contributions/ payments do not relate to the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax, or any matter incidental thereto (tax). We would like to point out at this juncture that the word 'finance' used in Finance Act undoubtedly is a term having a wide connotation, encompassing tax. However not everything that pertains to finance would necessarily be related to tax. Therefore, merely inserting amendments, albeit relating to finance but which have no nexus to tax, in a Finance Act does not mean that such Act is a Money Bill as defined in Article 73(2) of the Constitution. The tendency to tag all matters pertaining to finance with tax matters (in the true sense of the word) in Finance Acts must be discouraged, for it allows the legislature to pass laws as Money Bills by bypassing the regular legislative procedure under Article 70 of the Constitution by resorting to Article 73 thereof which must only be done in exceptional circumstances as and when permitted by the Constitution. The special legislative procedure is an exception and should be construed strictly and its operation restricted. Therefore, we are of the candid view that since the amendments relating to the subject contributions/ payments do not fall within the parameters of Article 73(2) of the Constitution, the impugned amendments in the respective Finance Acts are declared to be unlawful and ultra vires the Constitution.

4. There is another aspect of the matter which requires due attention. No doubt the feature of having a specific purpose is a characteristic of a fee, which the subject contributions/ payments possess as discussed in the preceding portion of this opinion. However, there are certain other characteristics of a fee, such as quid pro quo, which must be present for a contribution or payment to qualify as a fee. This was the main argument of the learned counsel who categorized the subject contributions in the nature of a tax, that they (the contributions) lacked the element of quid pro quo or in other words the benefit of the contribution did not go to the payers. The industrial establishments or employers etc. were liable to pay the contribution but they were not the beneficiaries of the purpose for which such contributions were being made; the beneficiaries were their employees or workers etc. Mr. Rashid Anwar attempted to argue that the benefit need not be direct and can be indirect, therefore although the employees were directly benefited by contributions made to the Employees' Old-Age Benefit Fund as they received the disbursements, the employers received an indirect benefit in that this results in happier employees which ultimately leads to greater productivity. Whilst this may be true, albeit a strained argument, the attempt of the learned counsel challenging the legality of the amendments in the Finance Acts has all along been to categorize the contributions/ payments as a fee, which would mean that they were not a tax. While a fee is obviously not a tax, there was absolutely no need to try and squeeze the contributions/payments into the definition of a fee, when all that is required is to take them out of the ambit of a tax. We may develop this point further; although Article 73(3)(a) of the Constitution states that a Bill shall not be a Money Bill if it provides for the imposition or alteration of a fee or charge for any service rendered, this does not mean that if a particular levy/ contribution does not fall within Article 73(2) it must necessarily fall within Article 73(3). Sub-Articles (2) and (3) are not mutually exclusive. There may very well be certain levies/contributions that do not fall within the purview of Article 73(3) but still do not qualify the test of Article 73(2) and therefore cannot be introduced by way of a Money Bill, and instead have to follow the regular legislative procedure. The discussion above that the subject contributions/ payments do not constitute a tax is sufficient to hold that any amendments to the provisions of the Ordinance of 1971, the Act of 1976, the Act of 1923, the Ordinance of 1968, the Act of 1968 and the Ordinance of 1969 could not have been lawfully made through a Money Bill, i.e. the Finance Acts of 2006 and 2008, as the amendments did not fall within the purview of the provisions of Article 73(2) of the Constitution.

5. In light of the foregoing, the instant matters are disposed of in the following manner:--

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 53

Present: Mian Saqib Nisar and Manzoor Ahmad Malik, JJ

PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Secretary to Government of Punjab, Communication and Works Department, Lahore and another---Appellants

Versus

Messrs MUHAMMAD TUFAIL AND COMPANY through Muhammad Tufail (deceased) through Legal Heirs---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.417-L of 2009, decided on 6th September, 2016.

(Against the judgment dated 16-3-2004 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in C.R.No.368-D of 1998).

(a) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---

----S. 31(1)---Nature and object of S.31(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940--Arbitration award, filing of---Jurisdiction of court---Scope---Section 31(1) of the Act was not an enabling provision, rather one which identified and defined the jurisdiction of the Court in which an award should be filed---Object of S.31(1) was to clothe a single court with jurisdiction in the matter so as to avoid conflict of jurisdiction which may arise between different courts so that all the matters pertaining to arbitration, once having been initiated and dealt with by one court, should subsequently continue to be determined by the same court.

(b) Jurisdiction---

----Meaning and concept of 'jurisdiction'---Scope---"Jurisdiction" meant the authority to decide---Concept of jurisdiction of a court encompassed, territorial jurisdiction; pecuniary jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction---¬Jurisdiction had its genesis in the physical power of a court to issue process to persons within the reach of the court---Court was to decide matters when persons relating thereto were within its reach---Such basic jurisdiction was then regulated by defining the limits of that 'reach' by setting pecuniary limits, or by assigning different 'subjects' within one territory to different courts, for example, by assigning banking and environmental matters to different courts within one territory.

R. Viswanathan and others v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid since deceased and others AIR 1963 SC 1 and Dennis Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990) ref.

(c) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---

----Ss. 2(c), 14, 17 & 31(1)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 20---Arbitration award, filing of---Application filed before civil court for making an arbitration award the Rule of the Court---Territorial jurisdiction of court---Scope---Agreement between private company and Provincial Government for performance of civil work at place "T"---Dispute arose over payment and arbitration clause was invoked by company---Arbitration proceedings were held at place "L" and award was also announced at place "L" in favour of company---Application was filed by company before the civil court at place "L" for making the award the Rule of the Court---Whether court at place "L" had territorial jurisdiction---Section 2(c) read with S.31(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 required that the court suspend the existence of the arbitration agreement to consider which court(s) may have jurisdiction with respect to the "subject matter of the reference" if a civil suit were to be filed in respect thereof---In the absence of an arbitration agreement, the company could have filed a civil suit at place "T" on the basis that the cause of action accrued there---Civil courts at place "L" would also have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to the putative civil suit as S 20, C.P.C. was applicable in a case where the Government was carrying on some commercial activity through a contract with a private contractor, as was the situation in the present case---Conjunctive reading of Ss. 2(c) & 31(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 would therefore confer jurisdiction, for purposes of filing an application under Ss. 14 & 17 of the said Act for making an award a Rule of the Court on both the civil courts at place "T" and "L"---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Provincial Government (appellant) awarded civil work of widening and strengthening a road in place "T" to the respondent-company. After the work was completed a dispute arose on account of an amount deducted by the Provincial Government from company's final bill. Company invoked the arbitration clause of the agreement inter se the parties. Sole arbitrator entered upon the reference and arbitral proceedings were held at place "L". Arbitrator passed an award at place "L" in favour of the company and directed Provincial Government to pay the sum due to the company. The company filed an application under sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 before the civil court at place "L" for the purposes of making the award the Rule of the Court which was resisted by the Provincial Government on the ground that the courts at place "L" did not have the territorial jurisdiction.

Section 2(c) read with section 31(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 required that the court suspend the existence of the arbitration agreement to consider which court(s) may have jurisdiction with respect to the "subject matter of the reference" if a civil suit were to be filed in respect thereof. The subject matter of a reference could not be limited to the physical construction of the road at place "T". The subject matter of the reference was an inclusive term which would cover the physical road constructed at place "T", the contract executed at place "T", the arising of all the disputes regarding the violation and enforcement of the terms and conditions of the contract, and the rights emerging and based thereupon, including payment of/deduction from the final bill of the company. In such circumstances, in the absence of an arbitration agreement, the company could have filed a civil suit at place "T" on the basis that the cause of action accrued therein. Question then was could the company have filed a civil suit at the civil courts at place "L" on the basis that the head office of the Provincial Highways Department was situated at place "L".

When the State/Government carried on commercial activities such as road building through construction contracts with a private contactor, then it was subject to section 20, C.P.C. in its entirety. Therefore, the civil courts at place "T" and "L" would have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to the putative civil suit.

Arbitration agreement was a part of the contract between the parties in the present case.

Conjunctive reading of sections 2(c) and 31(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 would therefore confer jurisdiction, for purposes of filing an application under sections 14 and 17 of the said Act for making an award a Rule of the Court on both the civil courts at place "T" and "L". Award therefore was competently filed by the company before the civil court at place "L" to be made a Rule of Court.

Supreme Court observed that Governments should litigate only where necessary and the might of the State should not be employed to make an ordinary litigant run from pillar to post. Supreme Court directed the Provincial Government to make immediate payment of the sum due under the award to the company. Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 90 & 129---Core functions---Scope---Commercial activities undertaken by a government, regulation of---Scope---Such activities were not included in the "ordinary connotation" of the word "Government"---Commercial activities did not form a part of the core functions of a government---Government in the exercise of its core functions viz, its executive, legislative, judicial and quasi-judicial, and administrative roles exercised sovereign powers, but when it engaged in commercial activities it was not exercising sovereign power, rather it was engaging in business/commercial activities and merited no undue advantage over ordinary litigants---When a government entered into the domain of business and commerce it could not be given a premium of its position and must be treated at par with its competitors or near competitors in the private sector---Commercial activities of government must be regulated in the same manner as those of the private sector; it could not be exempted therefrom simply by the dint of being a "government" [Mian Fazal Muhammad Nizam-ud-Din Baig & Co. v. The Province of West Pakistan and others PLD 1969 Lah. 453 not approved].

Mian Fazal Muhammad Nizam-ud-Din Baig & Co. v. The Province of West Pakistan and others PLD 1969 Lah. 453 not approved.

Subah Sadiq Wattoo, A.A.G., Punjab for Appellants.

Respondent No.1(ii) (In person).

Rassal Hassan Syed, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs.Ayesha Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court: Amici Curiae:

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 70

Present: Anwar Zaheer Jamali, C.J., Sh. Azmat Saeed and Umar Ata Bandial, JJ

Rai HASSAN NAWAZ---Appellant

Versus

Haji MUHAMMAD AYUB and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.532 of 2015, decided on 25th May, 2016.

(On appeal from the judgment/order dated 12-5-2015 passed by learned Election Tribunal, Multan in Election Petition No.44/2013-ECP and 5/2013-ETM).

(a) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 12(2) & 78(3)(d)---Constitution of Pakistan , Art. 62(1)(f)---Nomination papers---Concealment of assets---False statement or incorrect declaration about assets in nomination papers---Returned candidate attached a statement of his assets and liabilities along with his nomination papers, which failed to mention a certain piece of land ("subject land") owned by him---Election Tribunal declared election of returned candidate from the National Assembly constituency as void for filing a false statement or incorrect declaration about his assets in his nomination papers and for his failure to possess the qualities specified in Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution---Plea of returned candidate that subject land did not belong to him but to a factory owned by his family---Validity---Returned candidate admitted that in the revenue record the ownership of some part of the subject land was recorded in his name and the rest in names of his family members---No mutation of transfer of ownership of the subject land in favour of factory was available on record---Returned candidate accepted that although the subject land was described as agricultural land, however, it had been put to commercial and residential use by construction of buildings thereon, comprising of shops that had been rented out, quarters and one Petrol/CNG pump---Rent agreements for said shops were in the name of returned candidate--- Neither the subject land nor any of its superstructures were mentioned in the statement of assets made and filed by the returned candidate with his nomination papers---Merely because income derived from the buildings constructed on the subject land was declared in the tax returns of the factory owned by returned candidate's family, did not make the factory the owner of subject land---Disguised ownership of the subject land and superstructures thereon was aimed at avoiding the personal scrutiny and accountability of the returned candidate---Statement of assets and liabilities made by the returned candidate in his nomination papers was, therefore, intentional and not a bona fide or an innocuous omission made without design or purpose---Finding of concealment of assets given by the Election Tribunal against the returned candidate was fully warranted on the merits and record of the case---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 12(2) & 78(3)(d)---Corrupt practices---Nomination papers---False statement or incorrect declaration of assets---Trivial error induced by reliance placed upon information furnished by a government functionary would not fall within the pale of S.78(3)(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, rather said section constituted a false statement or incorrect declaration made by a contesting candidate in respect of a 'material' particular, inter alia, about his assets and liabilities, to be a corrupt practice---Error or omission that was neither intentional nor pertained to a material particular in relation to the assets or liabilities of a contesting candidate would not constitute a corrupt practice---Any plausible explanation that exonerated, inter alia, mis-declaration of assets and liabilities by a contesting candidate should be confined to unintended and minor errors that did not confer any tangible benefit or advantage upon an elected or contesting candidate---Where assets, liabilities, earnings and income of an elected or contesting candidate were camouflaged or concealed by resort to different legal devices including benami, trustee, nominee, etc. arrangements for constituting holders of title, it would be appropriate for an Election Tribunal to probe whether the beneficial interest in such assets or income resided in the elected or contesting candidate in order to ascertain if his false or incorrect statement of declaration under S.12(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, was intentional or otherwise.

Muhammad Yousaf Kaselia v. Peer Ghulam PLD 2016 SC 689; Muhammad Ahmad Chatta v. Iftikhar Ahmad Cheema 2016 SCMR 763 and Shamuna Badshah Qaisarani v. Muhammad Dawood 2016 SCMR 1420 ref.

(c) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----S. 12(2)---Nomination papers---Declaration of assets and liabilities---Significance---Honest and truthful declaration of assets and liabilities by a returned candidate in his nomination papers furnished a benchmark for reviewing his integrity and probity in the discharge of his duties and functions as an elected legislator---Statement of assets and liabilities of returned candidate along with other financial disclosures contemplated by S.12(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 provided the Election Commission and the general public with a picture of both his wealth and income---Such disclosures were crucial for demonstrating the legitimacy and bona fides of the accrual and the accumulation of economic resources by such a candidate---Such disclosures showed the returns received from his economic activities and could indicate if these activities may be tainted with illegality, corruption or misuse of office and authority.

Muhammad Yousaf Kaselia v. Peer Ghulam PLD 2016 SC 689 ref.

(d) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----S. 76A---Suo motu powers of the Election Tribunal---Scope---Power conferred on the Election Tribunal under S.76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 was exercisable on its own motion on the basis of material brought to its knowledge from any source---Election Tribunal was therefore vested with a suo motu power to scrutinize, inter alia, false or incorrect statements made by a returned candidate in respect of his own assets and liabilities and those of his spouse or his dependents---For triggering the remedy under S.76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, there was no requirement of an election petition to be filed let alone for its contents to be verified---Power under S.76A dispensed with any locus standi requirement for the informant; excluded any constraint of a prescribed limitation period, and empowered the Election Tribunal to adopt a summary procedure initiated from a show cause notice---Section 76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, did not envisage opposing parties in its proceedings, therefore the power vested under the said section was inquisitorial rather than adversarial in nature---Election Tribunal in exercise of its powers under S.76A could summon requisite evidence on its own motion to satisfy itself whether the allegation under scrutiny was justified or not.

Watan Party v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 997 and Riaz-ul-Haq v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2013 SC 501 ref.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 62 & 63---Election---Candidate, qualifications of---Scope---Honesty, integrity, probity and bona fide dealings of a returned candidate were matters of public interest because such standards of rectitude and propriety were made the touchstones in the constitutional qualifications of legislators laid down in Arts. 62 & 63 of the Constitution.

(f) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 55(3) & 63---Election petition---Verification of pleadings---Fraud ---Bar of limitation for seeking re-verification of pleadings---Scope---Person who verified the election petition and annexures thereto at the time of its filing did not actually possess a Notary Public/ Oath Commissioner's licence and committed fraud with the election petitioner---Upon learning about the defect of non-verification of the contents of his election petition, the petitioner filed an application seeking permission for the reverification of its contents---Said application, however, was filed after the 45 days limitation period prescribed for such purposes---Election Tribunal permitted the petitioner to re-verify the relevant pages of and the documents attached to his election petition, beyond the limitation period, as fraud was committed upon the petitioner by a fake Notary Public/Oath Commissioner---Legality---Fraud could not stop the period of limitation from running altogether unless convincing evidence of fraud combined with evidence of timely reaction from the date of knowledge of such fraud was established by the affected election petitioner---Election petitioner, in the present case, filed application for re-verification of the election petition on 27-03-2014 more than seven months after receipt of notice of the defect i.e. fraud on 12-08-2013---Prescribed limitation period for filing an election petition and therefore an amendment thereto was 45 days---From the record no sufficient cause was found which induced the delay in filing application for re-verification of election petition---Said application was time barred and liable to dismissed---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(g) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 67(3) & 76A---Suo motu powers of the Election Tribunal---Scope---False and incorrect statement by the returned candidate of his assets and liabilities---Plea of returned candidate that since the Election Tribunal had not used its suo motu powers under S.76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, to decide the election petition, therefore, the Supreme Court, sitting in appeal, should not treat the proceedings before Election Tribunal as having been conducted under S.76A---Validity---Such plea was inconsequential as appellate proceedings were a continuation of the original proceedings---Sitting in appeal the Supreme Court could treat the proceedings before the Election Tribunal as having been conducted under S.76A of the Representation of the People Act, 1976---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Uzair Karamat Bhandari, Advocate Supreme Court and M.A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.

Sardar Muhammad Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court, Mughees Aslam Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 83

Present: Anwar Zaheer Jamali, C.J. Amir Hani Muslim and Sh. Azmat Saeed, JJ

Messrs POWER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF CHINA LTD. through Authorised Representative---Petitioner

Versus

PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY through Chairman WAPDA and 2 others---Respondents

Civil Petition No.2222 of 2016, decided 25th October, 2016.

(On appeal from judgment dated 31-5-2016, passed by the Lahore High Court in W.P. No.12535 of 2016 and I.C.A. No.1114 of 2016).

(a) Public Procurement Rules, 2004 ---

----R. 5---Guidelines for the Procurement of Goods, Works and Non- Consulting Services under the IBRD Loans and the IDA Credits Grants by World Bank Borrowers, Appendix-I, para. 2(a)---Hydroelectric Power Project funded by an International Financial Institution---Prequalification of interested contractors/bidders---Right of International Financial Institution to request removal of a pre-qualified contractor/bidder---Scope---Funds for the Hydroelectric Power Project ("Project") had been raised through a finance agreement between the Government of Pakistan and International Development Association ("IDA"), an organization which was an integral part of the World Bank Group---Finance agreement provided that the bidding process with respect to selection of contractors for the Project would be conducted in accordance with the Guidelines for the "Procurement of Goods, Works and Non- Consulting Services under the IBRD Loans and the IDA Credits Grants by World Bank Borrowers" (the World Bank Guidelines)---Loans obtained from International Financial Institutions like the IDA, came coupled with conditionalities, which included the mode and method of the award of contracts for the projects and the process of pre-qualifications of bidders---Compliance with and enforceability of such conditionalities was contemplated by R.5 of the Public Procurement Rules, 2004, therefore, the 'World Bank Guidelines' were enforceable---Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) had included the name of the petitioner-company in the list of pre- qualified bidders, however IDA intimated WAPDA to delete the name of the petitioner-company from the list, by exercising its right in terms of para.2(a) of Appen. I of the 'World Bank Guidelines', which provided that IDA had a right or a privilege of making a reasonable request for the modification of or deletions from the list of pre-qualified contractors---Further the petitioner-company had not impleaded IDA as a party either before the High Court or in the present proceedings before the Supreme Court, therefore, the decision of the IDA and the conclusion drawn by it that the petitioner-company was disqualified and not entitled to pre-qualification, was not the subject matter of the lis before the High Court---Decision by WAPDA not to agitate the matter further with the IDA at the behest of the petitioner-company was a pragmatic commercial decision taken not to jeopardize the funding from the IDA and thereby putting the entire project at risk---Constitutional petition filed by the petitioner-company before the High Court had been rightly dismissed---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Asia Foundation and Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd. and others [(1997) 1 SCC 738] and Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 455 ref.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 184(3) & 199---Judicial review---Scope---Public policy---Judicial restraint---Courts in the exercise of their powers of judicial review, ordinarily, did not interfere with public policy decisions and exercised judicial restraint.

Dossani Travels Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Messrs Travels Shop (Pvt) Ltd. and others PLD 2014 SC 1 and Suo Motu Case No.25 of 2009 (2011 SCMR 1743) ref.

Salman Aslam Butt, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Mehr Khan Malik, Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Petitioner.

Shahzada Mazhar, Advocate Supreme Court with Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record, Shahzad, Director (Legal) WAPDA and Inayat Ali, Chief Engineer, WAPDA for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Muhammad Waqar Rana, Addl. Attorney General for Respondent No.3.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 95

Present: Ejaz Afzal Khan and Mushir Alam, JJ

NADEEM FAROOQ and others---Appellants

Versus

NEWZE LAND ELECTRONIC TRADING CO. LEE SHARJA---Respondent

Civil Appeal No.1793 of 2016 and C.M. Appeal No.206 of 2016, decided on 30th November, 2016.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 31-5-2016 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in FAO No.49 of 2015).

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----Ss. 13 & 44-A---Government of Pakistan, Law, Justice and Human Rights Division, Notification No.S.R.O. 208(I)/2007, dated 6-3-2007---Execution of decree passed by Court in United Arab Emirates---Hierarchy of Courts in United Arab Emirates for purposes of S.44-A, C.P.C.---Scope---United Arab Emirates had been declared as a reciprocating State in context of S.44-A, C.P.C.---Federal Court of Appeal in the United Arab Emirates was a "superior court" for the purposes of S.44-A, C.P.C.---Decree, in the present case, had been passed by the Court of First instance in United Arab Emirates which could neither be construed as Court of Appeal nor a superior court in terms of S.44-A, C.P.C.---Said decree, thus, could not be executed without having recourse to the process of S.13, C.P.C.---Appeal was allowed accordingly with the observation that respondent was at liberty to institute a suit in terms of S.13, C.P.C.

Sh. Zamir Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court and Ahmed Nawaz Ch. Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Appellants.

Shaukat Rauf Siddique, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sh., Advocate-on-Record (absesnt) for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 99

Present: Mian Saqib Nisar, Faisal Arab and Ejaz ul Ahsan, JJ

CHIARMAN, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD---Appellant

Versus

Messrs AL-TECHNIQUE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD. and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.1419 of 2009, decided on 22nd November, 2016.

(Against the judgment dated 16-6-2009 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in STR No.1 of 2009).

(a) Interpretation of statutes---

----Tax/fiscal statute---Scope---Tax could not be charged and levied unless it fell squarely within the purview of the charging provisions---Taxing laws were not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used.

(b) Interpretation of statutes---

----Tax statute---Tax laws should be construed in favour of the taxpayer and any substantial doubt should be resolved in favour of the citizen and against the government.

(c) Interpretation of statutes---

----Fiscal statute---Charging provision---Scope---Charging provision in a fiscal statute was to be given a strict interpretation and if a case did not fall within the purview thereof, tax could not be charged from a person from whom it was being claimed.

(d) Interpretation of statutes---

----Definition clause in a statute---Scope---Definition clause was foundational when construing provisions of law---Definition given in the Act should be construed in a way so that it was not repugnant to the context and did not defeat or enable the defeating of the purpose of the Act---Definition clause must be read in its context and the background of the scheme of the statute and the remedy intended by it.

Interpretation of Statutes, N.S. Bindra, tenth edition. ref.

(e) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----S. 2(16)---"Manufacture"---Definition---Definition of 'manufacture' provided in S. 2(16) of Sales Tax, 1990 suggested that it was a process where an article singly or in combination with other articles, materials, components, was either converted into another distinct article or product; or an article was so changed, transformed or reshaped that it became capable of being put to use differently or distinctly; and included any process, incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product.

(f) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----Ss. 2(16), 2(17) & 2(41)---'Manufacture'---Scope---Sterilization of syringes or other medical/ surgical products---¬Whether process of sterilization fell within the definition of 'manufacture' under S.2(16) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 and consequently chargeable to sales tax---Activity of gamma sterilization, which the respondent-company was engaged in - a process that eliminated all forms of living organisms did not involve the conversion of any article singly or in combination with other articles into another distinct article or product---Said process did not change, transform or reshape the syringes in any way, thereby rendering them capable of being put to use differently or distinctly---Syringes remained syringes after sterilization---Process of sterilization of medical/surgical products did not fall within the meaning of 'manufacture' as provided in S. 2(16) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, thus the respondent company was not a 'manufacturer' under S.2(17) and was not making a 'taxable supply' as per S.2(41) of the said Act and therefore could not be charged to sales tax---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Khalid Abbas, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Sh.Iftikhar Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court, Sohail Akram Malik, Senior Law Officer, Al-Technique Corporation for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 105

Present: Mian Saqib Nisar, Faisal Arab and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ

ABDUL HAQ KHAN and others---Appellants

Versus

Haji AMEERZADA and others---Respondents

Civil Appeals No.1023, 1024, 1357, 1358 and 2155 of 2016, decided on 17th January, 2017.

(Against the judgment dated 19-1-2016 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Writ Petitions Nos. 2485-P and 506-A/2014).

(a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Districts (Reconstitution) Ordinance (XXXII of 1960)---

----S. 3---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.6---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.246(b)(i)---Whether reconstitution of districts in the Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province was violative of the provisions of Art.246(b)(i) of the Constitution---Creation or variation of the limits of a district was not governed by the Constitution, but by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967---No bar existed in the Constitution which prevented the limits of districts, whether in relation to a Provincially Administered Tribal Areas or not, from being changed without a constitutional amendment.

Provincial Government carved out Kohistan (Lower) District from the existing Kohistan District, which was a Provincially Administered Tribal area. High Court found that Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) excluded from Kohistan District and included in the newly established Kohistan (Lower) District did not figure any where in Article 246 of the Constitution thus the same could not be regarded as territory forming part of PATA, and hence the impugned action of the Provincial Government had disturbed the constitutional status of the said area.

Article 246(b) of the Constitution defined and described "Provincially Administered Tribal Areas" (PATA). Mention of particular names of certain districts or areas in Article 246(b) was only for the purposes of describing the geographical limits of PATA or to mark a certain area as a tribal area it was not the "district" mentioned in the said Article which had attained territorial sanctity, rather it was the area identified as PATA which had attained territorial sanctity.

Creation or variation of the limits of a district was not governed by the Constitution, but by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967. There was no bar in the Constitution which prevented the limits or districts, whether in relation to a PATA or not, from being changed without a constitutional amendment. To impute such a bar into Article 246(b) of the Constitution would be to read into it something which was not there and was not envisaged by the Constitution.

Supreme Court set aside findings of High Court which provided that Kohistan (Lower) District did not find mention anywhere in Article 246 of the Constitution, thus the same could not be regarded as territory forming part of PATA, and that the Provincial Government had disturbed the constitutional status of the said area. Appeal was allowed accordingly.

(b) Interpretation of statutes--

----Reading in of words or meaning into a statute when its meaning was otherwise clear was not permissible.

(c) Interpretation of statutes--

----"Casus omissus", doctrine of---Scope---Courts generally abstained from providing 'casus omissus' or omissions in a statute, through construction of interpretation---Exception to such rule was, when there was a self-evident omission in a provision and the purpose of the law as intended by the legislature could not otherwise be achieved, or if the literal construction of a particular provision lead to manifestly absurd or anomalous results, which could not have been intended by the legislature---Such power, however, was to be exercised cautiously, rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.

(d) "Casus Omissus", doctrine of---

----Scope.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 246(b)---Provincially Administered Tribal Area---Scope---No bar was provided in the Constitution that prevented a district from comprising both a settled area and Provincially Administered Tribal Area.

(f) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Districts (Reconstitution) Ordinance (XXXII of 1960)---

----S. 3---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S.6---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.246(b)---Reconstitution of districts in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA)---Variation in the limits of a district did not affect the PATA status of an area, therefore the tribal areas of one district would remain tribal areas even after they became a part of another district in PATA.

(g) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)--

----S. 6---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.246(b)---Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Application of Laws) Regulation (I of 1974), Regln. 3 & Sched. Entry No.5---Whether the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967, that was made applicable to the tribal areas of Swat District through Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Application of Laws) Regulation, 1974 ("Regulation") continued to remain applicable to such tribal areas when they were taken out from Swat District and made part of Kohistan District and Kohistan (Lower) District---Tribal areas of one district would remain tribal areas even after they became a part of another district in Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA)---Since all the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas in Kohistan District and Kohistan (Lower) District were once a part of Swat District to which the "Regulation" had extended the application of the Kayber Pakhtunkhwa Land Revenue Act, 1967, therefore, the said Act would be deemed to be extended to the tribal areas in both Kohistn Distric t and Kohistan (Lower) District---Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Aitzaz Ahsan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.As. Nos.1023 and 1024 of 2016).

Sardar Abdul Raziq Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.As. Nos.1357 and 1358 of 2016).

Waqar Ahmed Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK, Mugees Sana Ullah, Assistant Commissioner, PATA (in C.A. No.2155 of 2016).

Arshad Zaman Kayani, Advocate Supreme Court, Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents 1 to 7 (in C.A. No.1023 of 2016).

Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents 1 to 5 (in C.A. No.1024 of 2016).

Waqar Ahmed Khan, Addl. A.G. KPK for Respondents 6 to 11 (in C.A. No.1023 of 2016).

Arshad Zaman Kayani, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch.Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No.1357 of 2016).

Waqar Ahmed Khan, Additional A.G. KPK for Respondents 8 to 13 (in C.A. No.1357 of 2016).

Imtiaz Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents 1, 11 to 15 (in C.A. No.1023 of 2016).

Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, D.A.G. for Federation.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 121

Present: Dost Muhammad Khan, Qazi Faez Isa and Faisal Arab, JJ

RASHEED AHMAD---Appellant

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.1216 of 2015, decided on 3rd February, 2017.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 6-10-2015 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in I.C.A. No.267 of 2015)

(a) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance (XIII of 2002)---

----Ss. 6(2), 7 & 10---Chairman of Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority ("PEMRA"), dismissal of---Misconduct---Serving Government servant appointed as Chairman, PEMRA---Non-disclosure of personal interest---Appellant in his position as Secretary to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting recommended himself to be appointed to the position of Chairman, PEMRA---Summary which the appellant prepared for such purpose attempted to give it a veneer of credibility by proposing three names, however, its author (the appellant) did not specifically disclose his personal interest---Appellant was in Government service when he proposed his name for the post of Chairman PEMRA, and subsequently when he was appointed to such post, he violated another rule, which was not having obtained the prior written permission before applying---Appellant, therefore, committed misconduct as he had violated S.10 of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 ("the Ordinance") by continuing in Government service whilst holding the position of Chairman, PEMRA---Appellant claimed that he had relinquished charge of the Government before assuming the charge of the post of Chairman PEMRA, however relinquishment of charge did not sever the appellant from Government service---Appellant's appointment was also in violation of SI. No. 140 of Vol. 1 of the Esta Code which prescribed the, "Procedure Regarding Appointments in Autonomous/Semi-Autonomous Bodies, under the Federal Government"---Section 6(2) of the Ordinance set out the qualifications of Chairman, PEMRA who, "shall be an eminent professional of known integrity and competence having substantial experience in media, business, management, finance, economics or law"---Appellant could not be categorized as "an eminent professional" having "substantial experience" in any of the areas mentioned in S.6(2) of the Ordinance---Rules of natural justice were fully complied by the inquiry officer; show cause notice was served upon the appellant, and reply submitted by the appellant was duly considered---Inquiry officer provided more than one opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant but he did not avail such opportunities---Inquiry report recommended the dismissal of the appellant from the position of Chairman, PEMRA and the Prime Minister accepted his recommendation and advised the President to remove him and the President accepted his advice---Appeal filed by appellant against his dismissal as Chairman, PEMRA was dismissed accordingly.

Badshah Gul Wazir v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2015 SCMR 43; Secretary to Government of N.W.F.P. v. Sadullah Khan 1996 SCMR 413; Collector of Customs and Central Excise v. Abdul Waheed 2004 SCMR 303 and Muhammad Shoaib v. Government of N.W.F.P. 2005 SCMR 85 distinguished.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 100 & 140---Attorney-General for Pakistan (Terms and Conditions) Rules, 2011, R. 4---Central Law Officers Ordinance (VII of 1970), S.2(1)---Additional Attorney-General, Deputy Attorney-General and Standing Counsel Rules, 2011, R. 4(1)---Practice in Federal/Provincial Government departments of engaging private counsel---Supreme Court deprecated such practice by observing that Federal Government and the Provincial Governments had a host of law officers who were paid out of the public exchequer; that if a government contends that none amongst its law officers were capable of handling cases then the question would arise why had incompetent persons been appointed; that in such a scenario the public suffered twice, firstly, they had to pay for incompetent law officers, and secondly, they had to pay again for the services of competent counsel the government engaged; that the public exchequer could not be squandered in such manner, and the State must protect its belongings and assets and those of citizens from waste and malversation; that the Constitution, the Rules of Business, the Attorney-General for Pakistan (Terms and Conditions) Rules, 2011, the Central Law Officers Ordinance, 1970 and the Additional Attorney-General, Deputy Attorney-General and Standing Counsel Rules, 2011 did not specifically permit the Federal Government to engage a private counsel, therefore such practice must stop---Supreme Court further observed that there may however be cases which involved complicated questions of the Constitution or some extremely technical law which the Attorney General or the Advocate General, and their law officers did not have the requisite ability to attend to, in such a case the concerned constitutional office holder should certify that he and the law officers did not have the requisite expertise in the field and that the engagement of a private counsel who was competent and experienced was required; that the engagement of private counsel could only be sanctioned for compelling reasons and in the public interest and not to protect or save a particular individual or for any other ulterior reason; that if such procedure or a better one prescribed by the government was not followed before engaging a private advocate then any statement made before a court or comments/written statement that were filed would not be binding on the concerned government; that to pay the fee of such private advocate would constitute financial impropriety by the person who did so on behalf of the government, subjecting him/her to disciplinary action in accordance with the applicable law---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 132; Mahmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Government of Sindh 2015 SCMR 810; Punjab Agriculture (Bagh-e-Jinnah) v. Registrar of Trade Unions 1997 PLC 579 and Mumtaz Rasool Mir v. Tariq Mir PLD 2011 SC (AJ&K) 36 ref.

Waseem Sajjad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ahmed Nawaz Ch., Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Appellant.

Sohail Mehmood, D.A.G. and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 4.

Hafiz S.A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood Ahmed Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.5.

Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 and 6.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 134

Present: Mian Saqib Nisar, C.J., Ejaz Afzal Khan and Umar Ata Bandial, JJ

Messrs SHIFA INTERNATIONAL HOSPITAL, ISLAMABAD---Petitioner

Versus

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX/WEALTH TAX, ISLAMABAD---Respondent

Civil Petition No.2640 of 2016, decided on 2nd February, 2017.

(Against the judgment dated 31-5-2016 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R. No.24 of 2008).

(a) Interpretation of statutes---

----Fiscal statute---Provisions of a fiscal statute were to be strictly construed and applied.

(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) [since repealed]-

----S. 23 & Third Sched. Entry I & II---Hospital building---Depreciation allowance---"Factory" or "workshop"---Scope---Deprecation allowance allowed for buildings was 5% [Entry I of Third Sched. to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979], whereas for "factory" or "workshop" it was 10% [Entry II of Third Sched. to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979]---Question was whether a hospital could be considered as a "factory" or "workshop", entitling it to 10% depreciation allowance---Hospital whilst being an enclosed structure was undoubtedly a building, however, by no stretch of imagination could it be considered to fall within the definition of a "factory" or "workshop" as it was not a building where goods were manufactured, repaired or assembled---Hospital was, thus, only entitled to depreciation allowance at the general rate of 5% instead of 10%---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dr. B. Venkahta Rao 2001 PTD 1124 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dr. B. Venkata Rao [(1993) 202 ITR 303] distinguished.

(c) Precedent---

----Judgments from foreign (Indian) jurisdiction---Scope---Such judgments may be relevant in understanding and resolving the issues before the courts but had no binding effect upon the courts in Pakistan.

Hafiz Muhammad Idrees, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Babar Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms. Shazia Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 139

Present: Mian Saqib Nisar, C.J., Umar Ata Bandial and Maqbool Baqar, JJ

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue Division, Islamabad and others---Appellants

Versus

Messrs SAHIB JEE and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.1074 of 2009, decided on 19th January, 2017.

(Against the judgment dated 20-3-2009 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No.11983 of 2005).

(a) Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXV of 2000)---

----Ss. 11 & 32---Reference to the President against recommendation of Ombudsman---Scope---When the Revenue Division or any person was aggrieved of a recommendation made by the Federal Tax Ombudsman in terms of S.11 of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000, it/he may file a representation to the President of Pakistan within 30 days of such recommendation---Said remedy of representation, though not stricto sensu akin to an appeal, was nevertheless a statutory remedy and, therefore, the provision must be strictly construed and applied, meaning thereby that a representation was only available to either the Revenue Division or an aggrieved person as against a recommendation of the Federal Tax Ombudsman within 30 days' time.

(b) Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXV of 2000)---

----Ss. 11 & 32---Reference to the President against recommendation of Ombudsman---Scope---Section 32 of the Ordinance, providing for representation before the President, did not envisage a representation against an order passed by the Federal Tax Ombudsman which was not in the nature of a recommendation.

(c) Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXV of 2000)---

----S.14(8)---Federal Tax Ombudsman---Review, power of---Scope---Section 14(8) of the Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 empowered the Ombudsman to review any finding communicated or recommendation made or any order passed by him---Said power of review either invoked on behalf of an aggrieved person or the Revenue Division had a wider scope and three kinds of decisions could be reviewed by the Ombudsman; first, the findings which were communicated in terms of S.11 of the Ordinance; second, a recommendation made by him; and third, any other order passed by him.

(d) Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance (XXV of 2000)---

----Ss. 14(8) & 32---Reference to the President against order of Ombudsman passed in review jurisdiction---Scope---Whilst exercising power of review, if the Ombudsman sets aside his earlier decision, irrespective of whether it was a recommendation or not, and passed a new recommendation in the order of review, then such (new recommendation) shall have been passed pursuant to S. 11(1) of the Ordinance and a representation would be competent against---Conversely, where a recommendation earlier made by the Ombudsman was not set aside while exercising the power of review, the order dismissing the review petition would not tantamount to a fresh recommendation in terms of Ss.11 & 32 of the Ordinance against which a representation could be competently filed.

Khalid Abbas Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Nemo for Respondent No.1.

Ex parte: for Respondents Nos.2 and 3.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 142

Present: Amir Hani Muslim, Mushir Alam and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

SHAHZADA ASLAM and others---Applicants

Versus

Ch. MUHAMMAD AKRAM and others---Respondents

C.M.As. Nos. 204 and 233 of 2017 in C.R.P. No.474 of 2016, decided on 20th January, 2017.

(Review arising out of the judgment dated 26-9-2016 passed by this Court in Constitutional Petition No.3 of 2014).

(a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980---

----O. XI---Constitution of Benches---Request by litigant/lawyer for constitution of a larger Bench---Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, powers of---Scope---Constitution of larger Bench was covered by O.XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 which clearly provided that the constitution of Benches was the domain of the Chief Justice and no litigant or lawyer could be permitted to ask that his case be heard by a Bench of his choice.

(In re: M.A. No.657 of 1996 in Reference No.1 and 2 of 1996 (PLD 1997 SC 80) ref.

(b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980---

----O. XXVI, R. 8---Review of Supreme Court judgment---Constitution of Bench---Scope---Rule 8 of O.XXVI of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 stated that "as far as practicable the application for review shall be posted before the same Bench that delivered the judgment or order sought to be reviewed"---Said Rule meant that the same Bench that delivered the judgment needed to hear the matter, but subject to the availability and practicability of the Bench---Review petition needed to be assigned by the Chief justice or the office at least before a Bench of which the author Judge was a Member.

Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif PLD 2009 SC 391 and Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421 ref.

Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Applicants.

Nemo for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 147

Present: Dost Muhammad Khan, Qazi Faez Isa and Faisal Arab, JJ

ADNAN PRINCE---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through P.G., Punjab and another---Respondents

Criminal Petition No.1232 of 2016, decided on 1st February, 2017.

(Against the order dated 2-10-2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Criminal Misc. No.7923-B/2016).

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-

----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.295-A, 295-B & 295-C---Maliciously insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of any class, defiling etc. of copy of Holy Quran, using of derogatory remarks etc. in respect of the Holy Prophet--- Bail, grant of---Scope---Delay of more than two years in conclusion of trial---Record showed that three years and three months had passed since arrest of accused---Delay in conclusion of trial had mainly been caused by the prosecution or the court itself---Even if the adjournments sought by the accused due to absence of his counsel or his non-availability were excluded, his total detention during the trial was more than two years---Despite lapse of three years and three months examination-in-chief of only a single witness had been recorded during trial---Speedy trial was the right of every accused person, therefore, unnecessary delay in trial of such cases would amount to denial of justice---Accused had made out a case for grant of bail due to inordinate delay in conclusion of his trial---Accused was granted bail accordingly.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 173---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10-A---Delay in submitting charge sheets, challans and interim-challans in court---Inefficiency by police---Preventive/detective, investigation and prosecution wings of police force---Supreme Court observed that supervising officers of said three wings took least interest to streamline the working of each wing, in an efficient and effective manner and to comply with the mandatory provisions of law; that charge sheets and submission of challans and interim-challans before the courts in criminal cases were delayed beyond the mandatory statutory period for no reason; that on the one hand the police was disregarding the law while on the other hand, with the passage of time and long delay in the submission of challans, trial in each case was delayed and some of the witnesses including star witness either vanished being killed by the opponents, meet natural death or abandoned their permanent abode making it a cumbersome job for the Trial Court to procure their attendance; that this was one of the major contributory factors in the backlog/pendency of criminal cases and it also became a cause for frustration forcing the parties to take the law into their own hands by indulging in revengeful acts---Supreme Court directed that copy of present judgment should be sent to all concerned law officers, police officials and government officers, who should collectively and individually devise a proper strategy/policy to prevent the grave menace of delay in submitting charge sheets, challans and interim-challans in court and to immediately redress the same within the minimum possible time so that compliance was made with the mandatory provision of law and the relevant Articles of the Constitution in its true letter and spirit; that every officer who was found responsible for such delay should be made accountable; that copy of the actions taken along with minutes of each and every action taken, should be submitted periodically to the Registrar of the Supreme Court with detailed information about the cases pending investigation before the investigating agency, the prosecution branch and to explain the delay in the submission of challans to the Trial Court---Petition was allowed accordingly.

Mrs. Asma Jahangir, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Ch. Zubair Ahmed Farooq, Addl. P.G. Punjab and Muhammad Akram, S.I./I.O. for Respondent No.1/State.

Ghulam Mustafa Ch., Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Hussain, Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Respondents No.2.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 152

Present: Amir Hani Muslim, Umar Ata Bandial and Khilji Arif Hussain, JJ

AMJAD SHAH---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.103 of 2010, decided on 1st February, 2016.

(On appeal from the judgment/order dated 4-2-2009 passed by Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in Cr.As. Nos.351, 560 and 217 of 2002).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Postmortem of the deceased was conducted within fifty (50) minutes of his death---FIR was also promptly lodged within one (1) hour and ten (10) minutes of death of deceased, which excluded the availability of time for deliberations or substitution---No previous enmity was alleged between the complainant and accused parties---Medical evidence fully corroborated the ocular account---Accused had fired a single fire shot on the forehead of the deceased both effectively and decisively in achieving the object of murder---Conviction of accused for murder was maintained in circumstances---Appeal was partly allowed accordingly.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Death sentence reduced to imprisonment for life---Mitigating circumstances---No motive whatsoever for the commission of offence was attributed to the accused by the prosecution---Absence of repeated firing dispelled premeditation by the accused to kill the deceased---Accused was merely a volunteer in the occurrence and not a party to the friction between the complainant and accused party---Actual cause of the occurrence, therefore, was not known; its origin vis-a-vis the accused was vague and incomprehensible---Intention, guilty mind or motive of the accused to commit the offence remained shrouded in mystery and was therefore unproven---Possibility existed that the eye-witnesses had withheld evidence that could fairly explain the immediate cause of the occurrence---Sentence of death awarded to accused was altered to that of life imprisonment under S.302(b), P.P.C.---Appeal was partly allowed accordingly.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S.302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Sentence, reduction in---Mitigating circumstances---Motive---Where the motive was not proved or was not alleged by the prosecution, the court for the sake of safe administration of justice, adopted caution and treated the lack of motive as a mitigating circumstance for reducing the quantum of sentence awarded to a convict.

Zeeshan Afzal v. The State 2013 SCMR 1602 ref.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Sentence, reduction in---Mitigating circumstances---Age of accused---Youthful tendency toward excitement and impulsiveness were treated by the law as a mitigating circumstance.

Qadeer Ahmed Rana, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Ahmed Raza Gillani, Addl. PG for the State.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 158

Present: Mian Saqib Nisar, C.J. and Maqbool Baqar, J

JAN MUHAMMAD and others---Appellants

Versus

Mst. SAKINA BIBI and others---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 833 to 835 of 2006 and Civil Review Petition No.117 of 2006 in Civil Petition No.2535 of 2001, decided on 14th February, 2017.

(Against the judgment dated 4-7-2001 of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur passed in R.S.As. Nos. 123, 102 and 122 of 1971 - On review of this Court's Order dated 18-5-2006 passed in C.P. No.2535 of 2001).

(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)---

----S. 5---Right of pre-emption---Scope---Cultivation rights could be sold and were, therefore, pre-emptible.

(b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980 --

----O. XIX, R. 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Leave to appeal, grant of---New plea raised before the Supreme Court---Scope---Whether a new point/plea could be raised by the appellant before the Supreme Court which was neither agitated at any stage of the proceedings nor set out as a ground in the memo of appeal and for which leave was not granted---Held, appellant did not have a right to raise an absolutely new plea before the Supreme Court and seek a decision on the basis thereof---Nor could such plea be allowed to be raised and the case decided accordingly as a matter of course or right on the pretext of doing complete justice---Leave of the Supreme Court in such context was mandatory but the considerations for the purposes of granting leave to raise a new point depended upon the facts and circumstances of each case---Supreme Court had the discretion to grant leave at the time of hearing an appeal in which leave had been granted on a different point(s) and to consider such point of law, including for instance the question of inherent jurisdiction, being a pure question of law; even if not earlier taken up in any proceedings including those before the Supreme Court---Such principle could very well apply to the point of limitation too where such plea was not dependent upon any factual determination, however, those cases which required a factual foundation and adjudication for the purposes of settling a legal issue could not be said to be pure questions of law and the same could not be allowed to be raised before the Supreme Court for the first time.

Abdul Hameed and others v. Muzamil Haq and others 2005 SCMR 895; Mst. Shamim Akhtar v. Syed Alam Hussain and others 1975 SCMR 16; Dr. Zulfiqar Haider v. Riaz Mahmud PLD 1992 SC 238; Gatron (Industries) Limited v. Government of Pakistan and others 1999 SCMR 1072; Caltex Oil (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Collector, Central Excise and Sales Tax and others 2006 SCMR 1519 and The State through Advocate-General, Sindh High Court of Karachi v. Raja Abdul Rehman 2005 SCMR 1544 ref.

Ch. Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, and M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As.833 to 835/2006).

Nemo for Appellants (in C.R.P. 117 of 2006).

Ex parte: for Respondents (in C.A. No.833 of 2006).

Nemo for Respondent No.1 (in C.A. No.834 of 2006).

Nemo for Respondents Nos.33, 34, 36, 43 (in C.A. No.835 of 2006).

Ex parte (For other Respondents (in C.As 834 and 835 of 2006).

Not represented (in C.R.P. No.117 of 2006).

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 165

Present: Ejaz Afzal Khan and Qazi Faez Isa, JJ

ZEESHAN @ Shani---Appellant

Versus

THE STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.463 of 2014, decided on 15th March, 2016.

(On appeal from the judgment dated 3-10-2013 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Crl.A.No.679 of 2010).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Reappraisal of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Conviction under S.302(b), P.P.C. altered to one under S.302(c), P.P.C.---Evidence revealed that a fight had ensued during which the accused swung a stick with force that landed on the head of the deceased---Such fact had been mentioned by deceased himself in his report to the police---Accused did not premeditate the killing, nor could he have since the complainant party had arrived unannounced at his house---Accused struck only a single blow with a simple stick and not with any weapon---Accused, without premeditation and in the heat of a free fight had struck the deceased with a single blow of a stick---In such circumstances his case would come within clause (c) of S. 302, P.P.C.---Conviction of accused recorded under S.302(b), P.P.C. was altered to one under S.302(c), P.P.C. and, consequently, his sentence of life imprisonment was reduced to ten years rigorous imprisonment.

Piran Ditta v. State 1993 SCMR 1934; Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad PLD 1996 SC 274; Zahid Rehman v. State PLD 2015 SC 77 and Muhammad Saleem v. State 2007 SCMR 1896 ref.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 & 337-A(i)---Qatl-i-amd, shujjah-i-khafifah---Reappraisal of evidence---Death occurring few days after the injury---Contentions of accused were that he had only caused a single injury on the head of the deceased; that the deceased was fine thereafter and went to the doctor himself; that all of a sudden three days after the injury, the deceased expired; that in such circumstances accused could only be liable for offence of shujjah-i-khafifah, and not qatl-i-amd---Validity---Accused gave a blow with a stick with considerable force, fractured deceased's skull, which eventually resulted in his death---Fact that death did not occur instantaneously or even the same day would not detract from the nature of the offence---Post-mortem report identified only one injury on the deceased, which was caused by the accused, therefore, merely because deceased did not die instantaneously or within hours of receiving the blow would not exonerate the accused from causing his resultant death---Had the deceased not expired the accused would have been liable for one of the shujjah offences, however, the blow resulted in his death, consequently, it attracted S. 302, P.P.C.---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) --

----Ss. 300, Exceptions & 304 (erstwhile) & 302(c)---Cases covered by the Exceptions in the old S.300, P.P.C. and the old S. 304, P.P.C. were to be dealt with under clause (c) of the S. 302, P.P.C.

Piran Ditta v. State 1993 SCMR 1934; Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad PLD 1996 SC 274 ref.

Arshad Ali Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Ch. Muhammad Sarwar Sidhu, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 173

Present: Anwar Zaheed Jamali, Dost Muhammad Khan and Umar Ata Bandial, JJ

KHUSHDIL KHAN MALIK---Appellant

Versus

SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE RAWALPINDI CANTT and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.654 of 2007, heard on 29th May, 2015.

(On appeal from the judgment dated 25-7-2006 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in C.P. No.788 of 2005).

Per Dost Muhammad Khan, J; Anwar Zaheer Jamali, C.J. agreeing; Umar Ata Bandial, J dissenting.

(a) Allotment--

----Employee of Directorate of Education, Garrison---Entitlement to plot in Defence Housing Authority ("DHA")---Natural justice, principles of---Scope---[Per Dost Muhammad Khan, J; Majority view] Directorate of Education, Garrison was under the administrative control and management of the Ministry of Defence/Defence Directorate---Employee of Directorate of Education, Garrison for all intents and purposes, belonged to Education Corp of the Garrison and was under the effective administrative control and management thereof---Employee was competent to be a member of the Defence Housing Authority ("DHA") and hence entitled to allotment of plot therein---Unilateral cancellation of plot in employee's name without any show cause notice, amounted to condemning him unheard against the principles of natural justice---Impugned order cancelling allotment of plot to employee was set aside---[Per Umar Ata Bandial, J; Minority view] Civilian employee of the Federal Government Educational Institutions (Cantonments/Garrisons) Directorate ("the Directorate") was not paid out of Defence Estimates therefore he did not qualify for eligibility notified by Defence Housing Authority for the allotment of its plots.

Per Dost Muhammad Khan, J: Majority view:

Wholesome budget was allocated to the Ministry of Defence and was placed at the disposal of Military Accountant General (MAG) for further disbursement on defence expenditures and other emoluments of the Armed Forces of Pakistan and those civilian officials, who were serving in the departments attached to the Defence Services. Employee in question who was serving in Directorate of Education, Garrison, was paid from the Defence Estimates through internal arrangements of the Defence Services and in such way, he had no nexus or connection with the Ministry of Education. Directorate of Education, Garrison was under the administrative control and management of the Ministry of Defence/Defence Directorate, and not under the control of Education Ministry or Directorate of Education of Federal Government.

Employee for all intents and purposes, belonged to Education Corp of the Garrison and was under the effective administrative control and management thereof, otherwise the order of his promotion, would have been issued by the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan and not by a Colonel In charge in active service of the Defence Services.

Employee was competent to be a member of the Defence Housing Authority ("DHA") and hence entitled to allotment of plot therein.

Employee was successful in balloting process and got a plot; he deposited the seed money/installment, therefore, a decisive step was taken in the matter and vested right had already accrued to the employee, hence unilateral cancellation of plot from his name without any show cause notice, clearly amounted to condemning him unheard against the principles of natural justice.

Impugned order of the Ministry of Defence cancelling allotment of plot from the name of the employee was held to be in disregard of law, principles of justice and without lawful authority and the same was set at naught. Supreme Court directed that the same plot shall be restored/allotted to the employee or if that was not possible then some other plot of the same market value and of the same size be allotted to the employee, subject to payment of the dues.

Per Umar Ata Bandial, J; [Minority view]

Civilian employee of the Federal Government Educational Institutions (Cantonments/Garrisons) Directorate ("the Directorate") was not paid out of Defence Estimates therefore he did not qualify for eligibility notified by Defence Housing Authority for the allotment of its plots. However in derogation of such non-eligibility, the Defence Division had issued a letter extending the eligibility criteria to civilian employees of the Directorate. His Lordship observed that whether any relevant and cogent ground existed to justify the Defence Division to confer on its civilian employees a proprietary privilege reserved for employees paid out of Defence Estimates was a matter that deserved judicial scrutiny upon the initiative of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Per Dost Muhammad Khan, J:

(b) Natural justice, principles of--

----Scope---Principles of natural justice were to be construed as part and parcel of every statute even if not contained in the statute and it shall apply to all proceedings, whether judicial or administrative in nature.

Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. and another 1994 SCMR 2232 ref.

Per Umar Ata Bandial J; dissenting with Dost Muhammad Khan, J [Minority view]

(c) Rules of Business, 1973 --

----Sched. II, Defence Division, Item No. 2 & Sched. III, S. No. 19---Civilian employees of Federal Government Educational Institutions (Cantonments/Garrisons) Directorate ("the Directorate")---Civilian employees not paid from Defence Estimates---Contention of civilian employee of Directorate was that he was paid out of the Defence Budget/Estimates---Validity---Such contention was not proved from the record, as it was at best a conjectural inference drawn from the method of payment rather than the demonstration of the source and account of the funds disbursed---Rules of Business and Current Expenditure Statement in the Federal Budget showed that employees of Directorate were not paid from the Defence Estimates, however there was lack of an express legal instrument to such effect issued by the competent authority defining rights and liabilities of the employees of the Directorate be it through rules, notification, guidelines or instructions---His Lordship observed that an appropriate legal instrument should be issued by the competent authority in the Federal Government for setting out the essential details regarding rights, privileges and terms and conditions of service of the civilian employees working in the Directorate and in the Defence Division and other attached departments thereto. [Majority view].

(d) Interpretation of executive instructions--

----Scope---Executive instructions that were expressed in precise terms and were capable of being applied with particularity to a great variety of cases were treated to have binding effect particularly where they had been applied strictly and not been departed from.

Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. and another 1994 SCMR 2232 ref.

Appellant in person.

Waqar Rana, Addl. A.G. Pakistan for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Arshad Ali Chaudhary, ASC/AOR for Respondent No.3.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 187

Present: Dost Muhammad Khan, Qazi Faez Isa and Maqbool Baqar, JJ

ISHTIAQ AHMAD---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and others---Respondents

Criminal Petition No.1252 of 2016, decided on 21st February, 2017.

(On appeal against the order dated 20-6-2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, in Crl. Rev. No.484 of 2016).

(a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961) ---

----S. 6---Polygamy---Husband contracting another marriage without permission from Arbitration Council---Question as to whether S.6 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 was against the Injunctions of Islam---Held, that concealment by a husband of his previous marriage/s or contracting another marriage with callous disregard of his wife may disrupt the love, tranquillity and mercy ordained by Allah Almighty---When a husband, without his wife's permission or in secret, took another wife, question was whether his dealing with the first wife could be categorized as just or whether he was maintaining the footing of kindness and equity---After issuing the warning that wives must be dealt justly, Almighty Allah wanted to prevent husbands from doing injustice by prescribing that in such cases a man should take only one [wife]---Since S.6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 sought to prevent injustice being done, thus, it conformed to the Islamic injunctions.

(b) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961) ---

----S. 6(2)---Polygamy---Husband contracting another marriage without permission from Arbitration Council---Plea of husband that at the time of second marriage term of elected councillors had expired and local government elections had not been held, therefore, there was no Chairman of the Arbitration Council before whom he could submit an application for second marriage---Validity---Said plea was not sustainable because in the absence of elected representatives the Administrator or another designated officer acted as the Chairman---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(c) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---

----S. 6(5)(b)---[Punjab] Rules made under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, R. 21---Polygamy---Husband contracting another marriage without permission from Arbitration Council---Person competent to file complaint---Scope---Plea of husband that the court could not take cognizance of the offence on the complaint of the first wife since the Union Council had not itself complained to the court---Validity---Said plea was not correct because R.21 of the [Punjab] Rules made under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 required the submission of complaint by an "aggrieved party"---Wife clearly was an aggrieved party and sent a written complaint, which was forwarded to the Magistrate by the Administrator, Union Council---Since the rule did not stipulate whether the complaint was to be submitted to the Court by the aggrieved party herself or it may be routed through the office of the Chairman or the Union Council it would not be appropriate to impose any particular mode of submission of complaints in such regard---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(d) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961) ---

----S. 6(5)(b)---[Punjab] Rules made under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, R. 6(2)---Polygamy---Husband contracting another marriage without permission from Arbitration Council---Husband was sentenced to imprisonment for one month and directed to pay a fine of five thousand rupees---Legality and propriety of sentence---Husband conceded that he was already married and he also had a child from his first wife when he contracted a second marriage without obtaining permission from the Arbitration Council---Admittedly, the husband did not submit an application seeking permission to enter into another marriage, as required by subsection (2) of S.6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 read with R.6(2) of the [Punjab] Rules made under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, therefore, the Arbitration Council was not constituted, let alone one that could have granted him the requisite permission---Husband had disregarded the law and must suffer its consequences---First wife had not given her consent for the second marriage as she herself submitted a complaint against the husband, and testified in court---Husband did not testify on oath to aver that his wife gave her consent for him to contract another marriage---Ingredients of the offence under S.6(5)(b) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 thus stood established---Supreme Court observed that husband was lucky as the Trial Court had treated him very leniently in the matter of punishment by sentencing him to imprisonment for only one month as he could have been imprisoned for up to a year---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly and leave was refused.

Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioner in person and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 194

Present: Dost Muhammad Khan, Qazi Faez Isa and Maqbool Baqar, JJ

KHALID HUMAYUN---Petitioner

Versus

The NAB through D.G. Quetta and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No.3912 of 2016, decided on 22nd February, 2017.

(Against the judgment dated 1-12-2016 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in C.P.No.760 of 2016).

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss.9 & 24(d)---Corruption and corrupt practices---Bail, refusal of---Accused in his capacity as the Finance Advisor to the Provincial Government was alleged to have misappropriated huge sums of money that was allocated for development projects---Plea of accused that no reference against him had been filed by National Accountability Bureau despite lapse of nine months, and that the Bureau could not keep the same pending for an indefinite period---Validity---Sufficient prima facie material was available on record to suggest that the accused had exercised his authority to enrich himself and a number of persons had also implicated him as the principal beneficiary of the defalcated amounts---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and bail was refused accordingly.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----S. 9---Corruption and corrupt practices---Bail, refusal of---Medical grounds---Accused in his capacity as the Finance Advisor to the Provincial Government was alleged to have misappropriated huge sums of money that was allocated for development projects---Plea of accused that he was entitled to bail on medical grounds---Validity---Medical Board and the doctor had not opined that the accused's continued incarceration would prove detrimental to his life or health---Accused was 40 years old, at which age generally a person did not have serious ailments; and there was nothing on record to show his pre-incarceration ailment---Medical Board had noted that the dorso-lumbar spine of the accused had developed "mild diffuse bulging" of two discs and had recommended further examination through a DEXA scan machine, however, as said machine was not available in the province, the Medical Board had suggested that he be referred to a hospital in another province for such purpose---Accused, if so advised, could move an application to the Trial Court and the Trial Court could make suitable arrangements for his transportation to the other province where he could be taken for a few days for such examination and then returned---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and bail was refused accordingly.

(c) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999) [before amendment by the National Accountability (Amendment) Ordinance (II of 2017)]---

----Ss. 8(b), 9 & 25(b)---Corruption and corrupt practices---Plea bargain, acceptance of---Legality---Raid was conducted at the official residence of the accused (Finance Advisor to the Provincial Government) and an enormous sum of money in the form of cash, prize bonds, gold, foreign currency was recovered, which was the biggest seizure of misappropriated monies in the country's history---Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau ("Bureau" ) accepted the plea bargain offer made by the accused---Propriety---Record showed that Chairman of the Bureau in accepting the plea bargain offer of the accused reproduced the views of his subordinates and accepted the offer in one line---Such acceptance could hardly be categorized as a decision arrived at after independently considering the facts and circumstances of the case---Chairman had to exercise his discretion after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, as stipulated in S.25(b) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ("the Ordinance") but he did not do so---Cache had been seized from the official residence of the accused, however, the Bureau amazingly stated that the accused was ready to surrender it to the Bureau, as if he had an option---Cache constituted the largest seizure of embezzled public exchequer funds in the country's history however such self-evident fact was disregarded---Concerned Director Generals of the Bureau recommended the acceptance of the plea bargain application without investigating, let alone determining, whether the accumulated trove of the cache was a one-time attempt at defalcation by the accused and co-accused persons or if they had siphoned off monies from the public exchequer in the past as well---No mention was made of investigating the financial history / income tax returns/bank accounts/properties of the accused and co-accused persons to uncover their past practices despite the extraordinary powers vesting in the Bureau to do so---Chairman of the Bureau too remained remiss of his responsibility to ensure that his subordinates had fully investigated the case and if their recommendations were well founded---Prosecutor General [Accountability] was required to give advice on legal matters but he did not render any legal advice in the present case---More than nine months had passed since the raid was conducted but till date the Chairman had not filed the requisite reference against the accused---Accused who was supposed to safeguard public funds and ensure their proper utilization in his official capacity was himself caught red-handed with an astronomical amount---Under such circumstances the acceptance of the plea bargain by the Chairman ran counter to the stated object of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 to eradicate corruption and to hold accountable all those persons accused of such practices; instead, the message that emanated from the Bureau in the present case was that, if one surrendered only the amount which was seized, he would be let off --- Chairman of the Bureau could not be permitted to exercise his discretion under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 in a manner which effectively engendered corruption---Plea bargain offer of the accused had been rightly rejected by the Accountability Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused accordingly.

Abdul Aziz Memon v. State PLD 2013 SC 594; Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan PLD 1993 SC 473 and Dr.Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 265 ref.

(d) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999) [before amendment by the National Accountability (Amendment) Ordinance (II of 2017)] ---

----S. 25(b)---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24-A---Corruption and corrupt practices---Plea bargain, acceptance of---Chairman of National Accountability Bureau ("the Bureau"), discretion of---Scope---National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 did not give the Chairman absolute discretion to accept a plea bargain, however, even if the Ordinance had not curtailed his discretion, by making it dependent on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Chairman's discretion would be circumscribed by S.24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897---Section 24-A reiterated the principle that statutory power was to be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly and for the advancement of the purposes of the enactment and further clarified that an executive authority must give reasons for its decision---Any action by an executive authority which was violative of such principles was liable to be struck down.

Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630 ref.

Farooq H. Naek, Senior Advocate Supreme Court along with Ch. Riaz Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate on Record for Petitioner.

Qamar-uz-Zaman, Chairman, NAB, Waqas Qadeer Dar, P.G., NAB, Ch. Fareed -ul-Hassan, Special Prosecutor, NAB, Maj (R) Tariq, D.G. NAB, Balochistan and Shoaib Sheikh, I.O., NAB for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 207

Present: Abdul Kadir Shaikh, Naimuddin, Ajmal Mian, Sajjad Ali Shah and Nasir Aslam Zahid, JJ

PROVINCE OF SINDH---Appellant

Versus

Haji RAZZAQ and others---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 137-K to 145-K of 1976, decided on 25th February, 1991.

(On appeal from the judgment/order of High Court of Sindh and Balochistan, Karachi dated 2nd July, 1975 in High Court Appeal No.61 of 1974)

(a) Sindh Courts Act (VII of 1926) [since repealed]--

----S. 8---High Court of West Pakistan (Establishment) Order (XIX of 1955), Para.5---High Court Establishment Order (P.O. 8 of 1970), Art.3(1)(c)---Balochistan and Sindh (High Courts) Order (P.O. No. 6 of 1976) , Art.3(b)---Government of India Act 1935, S. 219---Original civil jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court---Historical perspective and scope---Original civil jurisdiction exercised by Sindh High Court was of the same nature as was exercisable by the Chief Court of Sindh under S.8 of the Sindh Courts Act, 1926 (since repealed]---Chief Court of Sindh was no doubt a High Court within the meaning of S.219 of the Government of India Act, 1935 but the jurisdiction which it exercised in the civil district of Karachi was not that of an ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court but it was only performing the duties of the principal civil court of original civil jurisdiction within the district of Karachi under a special statute i.e., S.8 of the Sindh Courts Act, 1926---After establishment of High Court of the West Pakistan under the High Court of West Pakistan (Establishment) Order, 1955, original civil (and criminal) jurisdiction was conferred upon the Karachi Bench of said Court---Original civil (and criminal) jurisdiction of the West Pakistan High Court (Karachi Bench) was of a special nature and not ordinary civil jurisdiction---Such nature of jurisdiction both on civil and criminal sides/ that was conferred on the Karachi Bench of West Pakistan High Court under S.5 of the High Court of West Pakistan (Establishment) Order, 1955, continued to be exercised by the Sindh and Balochistan High Court established under High Courts (Establishment) Order, 1970 and presently by the High Court of Sindh under Balochistan and Sindh (High Courts) Order, 1976---View taken by Waheeduddin Ahmed, J., in Firdous Trading Corporation v. Japan Cotton and General Trading Co. Ltd. (PLD 1961 Karachi 565) on the nature of original civil jurisdiction exercised by the Sindh High Court was declared to be the correct statement of law.

Razak v. Usman PLD 1975 Kar. 944 held to be incorrectly decided.

(b) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) --

----Ss. 3, 4 & 6---Sindh Courts Act (VII of 1926) [since repealed], S.8---High Court of West Pakistan (Establishment) Order (XIX of 1955), Art.5---High Court Establishment Order (P.O. 8 of 1970), Art.3(1)(c)---Balochistan and Sindh (High Courts) Order (P.O. No. 6 of 1976), Art.3(b)---Establishment of West Pakistan Act (XIX of 1955), S.10(1)---Payment of court fee on suits on the original side of the former High Court of West Pakistan (Karachi Bench) now Sindh High Court, and on appeals against the judgments and orders passed on the original side of that High Court---Original civil jurisdiction of Karachi Bench of the West Pakistan High Court was special jurisdiction and not 'ordinary civil jurisdiction' within the scope of S. 4 of the Court Fees Act, 1870---Court-fee was payable on an appeal from a Single Judge of the Karachi Bench of the West Pakistan High Court inasmuch as the earlier position was continued intact by virtue of S.10(1) of Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955---Court fees which were levied in the Chief Court of Sindh on appeal continued to be levied on appeal from suits on the original side of the Sindh High Court---View taken by Waheeduddin Ahmed, J., in Firdous Trading Corporation v. Japan Cotton and General Trading Co. Ltd. (PLD 1961 Karachi 565) as to the payment of court fee under the Court Fees Act, 1870 on suits filed in the original side of the former High Court of West Pakistan (Karachi Bench), now Sindh High Court, and on appeals against the judgments and orders passed on the original side of that High Court stated the correct position of law.

J. H. Rehmatoola, Advocate Supreme Court, Abdul Ghafoor Mangi, Assistant Advocate-General, Sindh and A. A. Dastagir, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.

A. Aziz Khan, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.A.137-K of 1976).

S. Irteza H. Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. 139-K of 1976).

Ahmedullah Farooqi, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.A. 140-K and 144-K of 1976).

Ali Akbar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.A. 143-K of 1976).

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 231

Present Sh. Azmat Saeed, Umar Ata Bandial and Faisal Arab, JJ

MUHAMMAD SHOAIB SHAHEEN and others---Petitioners

Versus

PAKISTAN BAR COUNCIL and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No.3345 of 2016, decided on 16th November, 2016.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 13-10-2016 passed by the Islamabad High Court Islamabad in Writ Petition No.3394 of 2016)

Per Faisal Arab, J; Sh. Azmat Saeed, J, agreeing; Umar Ata Bandial, J dissenting.

(a) Custom/usage ---

----No customary practice or usage could be sought to be enforced which was contrary to the codified law---Past practice could never substitute codified law.

(b) Law --

----No law could be made inoperative through obsolescence as long as it was in the field.

(c) Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 ---

----R. 100---Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act (XXXV of 1973), S.15---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 14---Reconstitution of Committees by the Pakistan Bar Council before expiry of their tenure---Legality---[Per Faisal Arab, J: Rule 100 of the Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 ("Councils Rules") made the term of the Committees co-terminus with the term of the Council or any other term fixed by the Pakistan Bar Council ("the Council") at the time of creating them---Said Rule did not mean that the Committees could not be reconstituted and shall remain absolutely immune from Council's interference till their whole term expired---Council could not be prevented from exercising its power to withdraw its delegated authority from a set of Committee members and entrust it to another as and when deemed appropriate]---[Per Sh. Azmat Saeed, J, agreeing]: Minimum tenure of the Committee was fixed by the Council---Such power once exercised or not exercised was not exhaustive and could be re-exercised again]---[Per Umar Ata Bandial, J; dissenting: Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 ("the Act") and the Councils Rules did not provide any provision for removal from office of an elected Chairman or member of a Committee of the Council by any means whatsoever---No impeachment, recall or vote of no confidence mechanism was available in the Act or the Councils Rules for authorizing remedial action by the Council---Term of office of Members of the Committees ran co-terminously with the term of the Council because notwithstanding the Council's one time power to fix a shorter term of the Committees at the time of constituting them, the Council did not do so, and thereby confirmed the full term of five years for such Committees---Such accrued right of Chairmen and Members of the Committee could not be defeated by a majority vote in the Council without a suitable amendment in the Councils Rules to incorporate the right of the members of the Council to bring a motion of no confidence or of impeachment---His Lordship issued certain directions in such regard] [Minority view]---Petition was dismissed accordingly and leave was refused.

Pakistan Bar Council ("the Council"), by exercising majority vote reconstituted all its Committees, at a time when the tenure available to the Committees under Rule 100 of the Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 ("the Councils Rules") had not yet expired. Council suspended Rule 100 before reconstituting the Committees. Petitioners challenged the reconstitution of the Committees on the basis that no change in their composition could be brought about during subsistence of their available term.

Per Faisal Arab, J: [Majority view]

Rule 100 of the Councils Rules could not be interpreted so as to tie the hands of the Council and render it powerless that it could not reconstitute its Committees as and when deemed appropriate. Mere fixation of term of an office did not necessarily mean that the possibility to prematurely terminate such term stood ruled out, therefore it was not legally tenable to maintain that simply because Rule 100 had made the term of the Committees co-terminus with the term of the Council or any other term fixed by the Council at the time of creating them, the Committees could not be reconstituted and shall remain absolutely immune from Council's interference till their whole term expired. In order to make premature changes in the composition of Committees, the Bar Council did not need to suspend the provisions of Rule 100 of the Councils Rules. Committee was a body that exercised authority originally vested in the Council, which was delegated to the Committees through the mandate of law or through a decision of the Council itself. Members of the Committees simply held office in the Committees during the pleasure of the Council. In its capacity as the principal, the Council had the inherent power to decide to reconstitute its Committees in an appropriately convened meeting. In exercise of such power, the Council may of its own choose to give reasons though it was not obliged by law to do so. No provision of the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 or the Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 required that an opportunity of hearing was to be first given to a member of the Committee which the Council intended to prematurely replace. Not even a notice period was envisaged to be given to the member sought to be removed from the Committee before induction of a new member in his place. Rule 100 of the Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 could not be used as a shield to prevent the Council from exercising its power to withdraw its delegated authority from a set of Committee members and entrust it to another.

[Per Sh. Azmat Saeed, J; agreeing with Faisal Arab, J] : [Majority view]

Life of the Committee was determined by Rule 100 of the Councils Rules, which empowered the Council to fix the tenure of the Committee at the time of constituting the same. Minimum tenure of the Committee was, thus, not fixed by the statute (i.e. Council Rules) but by the Council. Such power once exercised or not exercised was not exhaustive and there was nothing to prevent the Bar Council from re-exercising of such power in terms of the principle laid down in section 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Per Umar Ata Bandial, J; dissenting: [Minority view]

Neither the Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Act, 1973 ("the Act") nor the Councils Rules made any provision for removal from office of an elected Chairman or member of a Committee of the Council by any means whatsoever. Both the Act and the Councils Rules also did not address the matter of cessation of membership of Committees. Hence no impeachment, recall or vote of no confidence mechanism was available in the Act or the Councils Rules for authorizing remedial action by the Council. In the present case, no difficulty, or inconsistency in the application of the Act or the Councils Rules was noted by the Council to justify the suspension of Rule 100 of the Councils Rules. No ground for dissatisfaction with the Chairmen and members of all Committees was disclosed or discussed in the General Meeting of the Council wherein all the Committees were reconstituted. In the facts of the present case Rule 100 of the Councils Rules envisaged in mandatory words that the term of office of members of the Committees shall run co-terminously with the term of the Council; this was because notwithstanding its one time power to fix a shorter term of the Committees at the time of constituting these, the Council did not do so, and thereby confirmed the full term of five years for such Committees. Consequently, it was an accrued legal right of the Chairmen and members of the Committees that the tenure of their offices equalled the full term of the Council. Such right of elected office bearers could not be defeated by a majority vote in the Council without express authority under the Councils Rules, i.e. a suitable amendment in the Councils Rules to incorporate the right of the members of the Council to bring a motion of no confidence or of impeachment as may be deemed appropriate against, inter alia, members and Chairmen of the Committees. [Minority view]

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2009 SC 644 ref.

His Lordship directed that the Council must incorporate an appropriate mechanism within its Rules setting out the conditions on which the terms of the Chairmen and members of the Committees may be terminated by the members of the Council; that an amendment in the Pakistan Legal Practitioners and Bar Councils Rules, 1976 was therefore necessary for carrying out the scheme of the Act and for enforcing better democratic governance of the Council; that in case the Council failed to frame the requisite amended Rule(s) within a period of six months, then as a default measure, the presently elected members of the Committees and the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council shall be deemed to have a term of two years rather than five years. [Minority view]

Per Umar Ata Bandial, J:

(d) Interpretation of statutes ---

----Generally, the power conferred on a competent authority to suspend or relax rules was construed narrowly because it permitted deviation from the applicable law.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Preamble---Democratic order---Fundamentals---'Rule of law' and 'rule by the chosen representatives of the electorate' were the two fundamental pillars of a democratic order.

Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif PLD 2009 SC 644 ref.

(f) Statutory functionary ---

----Accrued legal rights---Scope---Statutory functionaries did not have the authority to take away accrued legal rights of affected persons.

Alsamrez Enterprise v. Federation of Pakistan 1986 SCMR 1917; Zaman Cement Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue 2002 SCMR 312 and Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs v. Azizuddin Industries Ltd. PLD 1970 SC 439 ref.

Hamid Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court and Ahmed Nawaz Ch, Advocate-on-Record (Absent) for Petitioners.

Ms. Asma Jehangir, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Qalb-i-Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate on Record for Respondent No.12.

Kamran Murtaza, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.5.

Azam Nazir Tarar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.8.

Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.9.

Qousain Faisal, Advocate Supreme Court, Ghulam Mustafa Kandowal, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate on Record for Respondent No.20.

Nemo for other Respondents.

Abdul Rashid Awan, DAG for Attorney General.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 258

Present: Amir Hani Muslim, Qazi Faez Isa and Faisal Arab, JJ

ALI MUHAMMAD MARRI---Petitioner

Versus

PROVINCE OF SINDH and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No.703-K of 2016, decided on 8th March, 2017.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 29-9-2016 passed by the High Court of Sindh Circuit Court, Hyderabad in C.P. No.D-1075/16).

(a) Sindh Local Councils (Election) Rules, 2015---

----Rr. 18(5) & 51(5)---Nomination papers, scrutiny of---Appeals under R.18(5) & R.51(5) of the Sindh Local Councils (Election) Rules, 2015---Distinction---Appeal under R.18(5) laid against a decision of the Returning Officer with regard to accepting or rejecting the nomination papers, without specifying who may file it; whereas, under R.51(5) the appeal could only be filed by a candidate whose nomination papers had been rejected.

(b) Sindh Local Councils (Election) Rules, 2015---

----R. 18(5)---Nomination papers, scrutiny of---Appeal against decision of Returning Officer---Necessary parties as respondents---Scope---Rule 18(5) of Sindh Local Council (Election) Rules, 2015 did not require that the 'Election Commission of Pakistan' and/or the Returning Officer be arrayed as respondents---Appellant could not be non-suited on such ground.

(c) Sindh Local Government Act (XLII of 2013)---

----Ss. 2(xxxv-a) & 18(2)(d)---Local Government Elections---Reserved seat for 'labourer'---Eligibility---Candidate who contested election for reserved seat of 'labourer' worked in a foreign Bank as an Assistant Relationship Manager and was paid a fairly substantial salary---Such candidate could not be termed as a 'labourer' on the basis that he performed a clerical job---When a person falsely projected himself to belong to a weak, vulnerable or under represented class, and captured a seat reserved for such persons he deprived those that the law had sought to protect and promote---Supreme Court directed that the respondent should immediately be de-notified from the reserved seat of labourer/peasant, and the said reserved seat should be filled-in as per law---Appeal was allowed accordingly with costs in the sum of twenty thousand rupees on the respondent since an advantage, not otherwise available to him, was blatantly sought and obtained and a genuine labourer/peasant was deprived of his/her right.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 32, 34 & 36---Concept of 'reserved seats' in elections---Scope---Elections were contested on the basis of adult franchise however reserved seats were introduced to enable certain categories of persons who may not otherwise be able to compete fairly, including women, peasants, workers and non-Muslims---Reserved seats could be categorized as a form of compensatory justice aimed at alleviating deprivations, not at the cost of others but to create a level playing field.

Rafiq Ahmed Kalwar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Muhammad Umar Lakhani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.5.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 265

Present: Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, Ejaz Afzal Khan, Gulzar Ahmad, Sh. Azmat Saeed and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ

IMRAN AHMAD KHAN NIAZI---Petitioner

Versus

MIAN MUHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF, PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN/MEMBER NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, PRIME MINISTER’S HOUSE, ISLAMABAD and 9 others---Respondents (Panama Papers Scandal)

Constitution Petitions Nos. 29, 30 of 2016 and 03 of 2017, decided on 20th April, 2017.

Per Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J; Ejaz Afzal Khan, J, dissenting [Minority view]

(a) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 62(1)(f), 63(2), 184(3) & 225---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Maintainability---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers” [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---Failure on the part of state institutions to investigate the matter or to refer the matter to the Election Commission against the Prime Minister---Prime Minister was the Chief Executive of the Federation and it was practically he who appointed the heads of all the institutions in the country which could have inquired into or investigated the allegations levelled against him and his family on the basis of the ‘Panama Papers’---Even the Speaker of the National Assembly who could refer the matter to the Election Commission belonged to the Prime Minister’s political party and was his nominee---Present petitions had been entertained by the Supreme Court in the backdrop of refusal/failure on the part of all the relevant institutions in the country like the National Accountability Bureau, the Federal Investigation Agency, the State Bank of Pakistan, the Federal Board of Revenue, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan and the Speaker of the National Assembly to inquire into or investigate the matter or to refer the matter to the Election Commission against the Prime Minister---Remedy of filing an Election Petition before an Election Tribunal under Art.225 of the Constitution was not available to the petitioners---Speaker of the National Assembly could have referred the matter to the Election Commission of Pakistan under Art.63(2) of the Constitution but he had already dismissed various petitions filed before him in such regard by as many as twenty-two members of the National Assembly---Supreme Court entertained present petitions in view of such background, therefore, it could not turn around and shy away from deciding the matter simply because it purportedly involved some disputed or intricate questions of fact, which it did not---His Lordship observed that if the Supreme Court stopped short of attending to the issue merely because it involved some disputed or intricate questions of fact then the message sent would be that if a powerful and experienced Prime Minister of the country/Chief Executive of the Federation appointed his loyalists as heads of all the relevant institutions in the country which could inquire into or investigate the allegations of corruption, etc. against such Prime Minister then a brazen blocking of such inquiry or investigation by such loyalists would practically render the Prime Minister immune from touchability or accountability.[Minority view].

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 62(1)(f) & 184(3)---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution---‘Disputed questions of fact’---Petitioner seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers” [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---Question as to whether disputed questions of fact were involved in the present case which the Supreme Court could not decide in its jurisdiction under Art.184(3) of the Constitution---Present petitions did not involve any disputed and intricate questions of fact which the Supreme Court could not attend to or adjudicate upon in the present proceedings under Art.184(3) of the Constitution---Ownership and possession of the relevant properties situated aboard were not denied by the Prime Minister’s family and the only question relevant to the issue before the Supreme Court was as to whether the Prime Minister’s denial of any connection with acquisition of those properties was honest or not---Properties situated aboard were not in issue before the Supreme Court but what was at issue was Prime Minister’s honesty for the purposes of a disqualification under Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution, therefore, in order to attend to the said core issue, the material produced by the petitioners regarding the properties was not being taken into account, and the primary considerations were the explanations offered and the material supplied by Prime Minister and his children in order to see whether their explanations vis-à-vis acquisition of the said properties were on the face of it honest or not---Adopting such approach left the court with no disputed or intricate questions of fact on the issue and the court focused solely on the issue of honesty of Prime Minister with reference to the explanations advanced by him and his family---Prime Minister and his family could not claim that their explanations offered on the issue were themselves disputed or intricate questions of fact. [Minority view].

Lt.-Col. Farzand Ali and others v. Province of West Pakistan through the Secretary, Department of Agriculutre, Government of West Pakistan Lahore PLD 1970 SC 98; Muhammad Azhar Siddiqui and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 774 and Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and others PLD 2012 SC 1089 ref.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution---Scope---‘Disputed questions of fact’---Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution was inquisitorial in nature rather than adversarial and while exercising such jurisdiction the Supreme Court could ascertain, collect and determine facts where needed or found necessary.

Pakistan Muslim League (N) through Khawaja Muhammad Asif, M.N.A. and others v. Federation of Pakistna through Secretary Ministry of Interior and others PLD 20067 SC 642; Air Marshal (Retd.) Muhammad Asghar Khan v. General (Retd.) Mirza Aslam Baig, Former Chief of Army Staff and others PLD 2013 SC 1; General Secretary, West Pakistan Salt Miners Labour Union (CBA) Khewra, Jhelum v. The Director, Industries and Mineral Development, Punjab, Lahore 1994 SCMR 2061; Ms. Shehla Zia and others v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693 and Watan Party and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 292 ref.

(d) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution---Scope---Pendency of same subject matter before another forum---Effect---Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution was an independent and original jurisdiction which was not affected by pendency of any matter on the same subject before any other court or forum or even by a prior decision of the same issue by any other court or forum below.

Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 1988 SC 416; Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 SC 473; Suo Motu Case No. 10 of 2009 (2010 SCMR 885); Shahid Orakzai v. Pakistan through Secretary Law, Ministry of Law, Islamabad PLD 2011 SC 365; Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others PLD 2012 SC 132; Khawaja Muhammad Asif v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2014 SC 206 and Jamshoro Joint Venture Ltd. and others v. Khawaja Muhammad Asif and others 2014 SCMR 1858 ref.

(e) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 10A, 62(1)(f) & 184(3)---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Proceedings before the Supreme Court under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Contention of Prime Minister and his children that in exercise of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Art.184(3) of the Constitution ordinarily no evidence was recorded, no right of cross-examination of witnesses was available and no right of appeal existed against the decision rendered and, therefore, rendering a finding of fact in exercise of such jurisdiction may militate against the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art.10A of the Constitution regarding fair trial and due process---Validity---Present proceedings/petitions under Art.184(3) of the Constitution hardly involved any “determination” of civil rights of the Prime Minister and his children and no “trial” of theirs on any “criminal charge” was being conducted---Only Constitutional aspects of the present case were being decided by the Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution --- Contention was dismissed accordingly. [Minority view].

Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and another v. President of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 388; Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 2000 SC 77 and Air Marshal (Retd.) Muhammad Asghar Khan v. General (Retd.) Mirza Aslam Baig, Former Chief of Army Staff and others PLD 2013 SC 1 ref.

(f) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 51(1)---Public office---Scope---Member of National Assembly---Words ‘public office’ included those who performed legislative functions ---Member of National Assembly did hold a ‘public office’.

Salahuddin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd., Tokht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 244 and Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and others PLD 2012 SC 1089 ref.

(g) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution---Scope and procedure for exercise of such jurisdiction---Exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution kept evolving and no specific procedure for exercise of such jurisdiction had been laid down by the Supreme Court---Cases dealt with by the Supreme Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction varied vastly in their subject and content and, therefore, the Supreme Court consciously avoided to shut the door to any procedural modality which may be best suited to an effective and proper determination of an issue competently brought to the Court under such jurisdiction---No hard and fast rule had been laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the mode, mechanism or modality through which the jurisdiction under Art. 184(3) of the Constitution may be exercised and it had been left to the Court to decide as to which lawful procedure would suit the requirements of a given case best---Nature of the issue and the circumstances of the case determined the procedure to be adopted.

(h) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976), S. 99(1)(f)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 62(1)(f) & 184(3)---Qualification for being Member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---‘Honest’ and ‘ameen’---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers” [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---Question as to whether the incumbent Prime Minister was not “honest” and “ameen” within the purview of Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution and was thus disqualified from being a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Explanations advanced by the Prime Minister in respect of the subject properties situated abroad and even in respect of his and his family’s businesses and resources were found to be nothing but evasive and the statements made by him in that regard appeared to be contradictory to each other---Explanations advanced by the Prime Minister remained utterly unproved through any independent evidence or material---Even the children of the Prime Minister had not been able to bring anything on the record to show that the explanations advanced by the Prime Minister were true and correct – Prime Minister had categorically distanced himself from the subject properties by maintaining that he was not a director, shareholder or beneficial owner of the offshore companies which owned subject properties, however, he had taken up divergent and contradictory stands at different stages in his bid to show how money belonging to his family had been utilized for “purchase” of subject properties---Contradicting the stance of the Prime Minister, his children advanced the explanation that subject properties were “transferred” by a foreign royal family to the Prime Minister’s eldest son in settlement of an investment made by the Prime Minster’s father---Except for two vague and obscure statements of a member of the foreign royal family, which statements were based upon hearsay, no independent evidence or material had been produced by the Prime Minister’s children to show that there in fact was any investment with the foreign royal family, and that the funds generated through settlement of such investment had then in fact been utilized for acquisition of the subject properties abroad---In different televised interviews, which were never denied or controverted, different members of Prime Minister’s family including his wife, sons and daughter had talked about purchasing, mortgaging or hiring of subject properties on rent for which no evidence or material whatsoever had been produced by them---Prime Minister, his family, and their chief financial advisor had categorically maintained at different stages that the entire relevant record in relation to subject properties was available with them and the same would be produced before any court or forum but that commitment or claim was never honoured by presenting the alleged record before the Supreme Court---Valuable properties had statedly been acquired by the Prime Minister’s children and many businesses had been set up and run by them in different parts of the world since the time when they had no independent sources of income---No definite source of income had been disclosed, no bank account had been identified, no receipt had been produced, no money trail had been established and no document relating to transfer of interest in any of the companies or properties had been supplied by them---Prime Minister held high public offices when his dependent children, and through them he himself, came in possession of the very expensive subject properties situated abroad---Refusal/failure on the part of the Prime Minister to produce any record to account for the subject properties clearly attracted the provisions of Ss.9(a)(v) & 14(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---In the matter of explaining possession and acquisition of subject properties the Prime Minister had not been ‘honest’ to the nation, to the nation’s representatives in the National Assembly and even to the Supreme Court---Due to lack of honesty on the part of the Prime Minister he had become disqualified from being a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in terms of Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution and S.99(1)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976---His Lordship directed that the Election Commission should issue a notification of disqualification of the Prime Minister from being a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) with effect from the date of announcement of the present judgment; that the National Accountability Bureau should proceed against the Prime Minister and any other person connected with him in respect of the offence of corruption and corrupt practices and also probe into other assets acquired and businesses set up by his children in the country and abroad---His Lordship requested that Chief Justice to constitute an Implementation Bench for the present judgment. [Minority view].

In his address to the nation on 05-04-2016 (“the first address”), the Prime Minister did not disclose as to how and through which resources his father had established six new factories within 18 months of nationalization of their business, especially when statedly the entire savings of the Prime Minister’s elders stood obliterated and wiped out. In his address the Prime Minister made no mention whatsoever of setting up of any factory in foreign city ‘D’which was later on sold. He also failed to disclose any detail of the funds available or procured for setting up of the factory near foreign city ‘M’. Prime Minister had proclaimed that what he had disclosed were the “true” facts, however, case record showed that he had economized with the truth as there was absolutely no explanation offered in his address to the nation as to how the subject properties located outside the country had been acquired and he had never stated that he had no concern with the ownership of those properties or that no money belonging to him had been utilized for their acquisition.

Prime Minster addressed the nation again on 22-04-2016 (“the second address”), but said speech did not contain any specific information about the resources or assets of the Prime Minister and his family, and once again no explanation whatsoever was offered in that speech as to how the four subject properties located abroad had been acquired.

Prime Minister read out a written speech in the National Assembly on 16-05-2016 wherein he for the first time mentioned setting up and sale of a factory in foreign city ‘D’, whereas no mention of the same had been made by the Prime Minister in his first or second address to the nation on the issue. It had been stated in the speech that the entire record of the family’s business had been taken away by the authorities and the same had not been returned despite repeated requests but later on in the same speech the Prime Minister categorically stated that the entire record and documents pertaining to the businesses abroad was available and that such record could be produced before any committee or forum. When counsel for the Prime Minister was asked to produce said record before the Supreme Court, he stated that no such record existed and the statement made by the Prime Minister in the National Assembly in such respect was a ‘political statement’. First address of the Prime Minister to the nation mentioned setting up of a steel factory near foreign city ‘M’ but the speech made in the National Assembly referred to a steel factory in foreign city ‘J’. In the first address to the nation Prime Minister had claimed that the proceeds of sale of the steel factory near foreign city ‘M’ had been utilized by his two sons for setting up their business but in the speech made in the National Assembly he had changed his earlier stance and had maintained that the generated resources had been utilized for “purchase” of the subject properties abroad. Even in his speech before the National Assembly the Prime Minister had never stated that he had no concern with the ownership of subject properties or that no money belonging to him had been utilized for their acquisition.

Another remarkable feature of the present case was that the whole case was about legitimate acquisition of some properties but no detail of any bank account, any banking transaction or any money trail had been brought on the record of the case by the Prime Minister or his children. Eldest son of the Prime Minister allegedly started doing his own business while in exile in a foreign country, however nothing had been brought on the record to show as to when he had started his own business and as to how sufficient funds generated through his own business were available with him so as to “purchase” the subject properties aboard. This was in contrast to the claim of the Prime Minister in his speech before the National Assembly that the said properties had been “purchased” through proceeds of sales of the factories (and not through any private resources of his eldest son or through any settlement of an investment of his late father).

Upon the death of Prime Minister’s father in the year 2004 all his assets had automatically devolved upon all his legal heirs including the Prime Minister and if the subject properties had been acquired through the funds generated through sale of the factories abroad then the said funds belonged to the Prime Minister and the other heirs, which did not include the Prime Minister’s eldest son.It was, thus, evident from the stands of the Prime Minister and his children themselves that funds belonging at that time to the Prime Minister had been utilized for acquisition of the subject properties in the year 2006, establishing an undeniable connection between the Prime Minister and the relevant properties, a connection which had not been explained by the Prime Minister at all.

Serious doubts existed over the claim of the Prime Minister and his family that the subject properties had legitimately and lawfully been acquired by them through the resources and funds stated by them and such doubts had been compounded by some interviews given by them to the local and international print and electronic media. Said interviews painted a very confusing picture of when and how the subject properties had been “purchased” by the Prime Minister or his eldest son and all the stories advanced were not only contradictory to each other but also incompatible with the stands taken by the Prime Minister before the nation, the National Assembly and the Supreme Court. Authenticity of the reports regarding such interviews had never been denied by the persons giving the interviews nor the counsel for the Prime Minister and his family members contested the same when specifically asked by the Court.

During one of the hearings of the present case counsel for the Prime Minister presented a document in court containing the statement of a member of foreign royal family. Said document mentioned that Prime Minister’s late father had invested certain sum with the foreign royal family in 1980, and that accounts in relation to the investment were settled by transferring the subject properties in the name of the eldest son of the Prime Minister. Speeches of the Prime Minister spoke of “purchase” of the subject properties whereas the document in question from member of foreign royal family spoke of “transfer” of subject properties as a result of a “settlement” in the backdrop of an earlier investment. It was obvious from that document itself that the maker of the statement did not have personal knowledge of most of the critical things stated therein and he had failed to disclose how the requisite funds were transferred for investment. He had not referred to any date or place of the transactions mentioned. He had failed to state about any document executed in furtherance of such transactions and he had also omitted to mention as to how the relevant funds were dealt with. No detail of the business in which investment was made by the Prime Minister’s late father was provided. No record of the relevant offshore companies was produced to show as to how and when the foreign royal family had allowed the family of Prime Minister to use the subject properties, and then how those offshore companies and properties were transferred to the ownership of eldest son of the Prime Minister. Member of foreign royal family mentioned in his document about longstanding business relations and partnership between the foreign royal family and the late father of Prime Minister, which relationship and partnership existed even prior to the investment made by the latter. No details of the previous business dealings had been provided to the Court and, therefore, it was not clear as to where such business was conducted, whether any money for such business was generated out of the country or money for such business was laundered from the country through illegal means or unofficial channels. An impression was, thus, unavoidable that it was not just the resources and the routes of resources which were being changed from time to time but it was the “truth” which was being improved, moulded and sacrificed at the altar of expedience.

No will of Prime Minister’s late father had been brought on the record to show as to why and how the entire proceeds of his stated settlement of investment with a foreign royal family had been handed over to his grandson, who was not his heir, and all the actual heirs had been deprived of such proceeds. The family settlement qua inheritance of Prime Minister’s late father had come about after the purchase of the subject properties. There was, thus, a real likelihood that the subject properties had actually been purchased or acquired by the Prime Minister but ownership of the same had been shown in the name of his eldest son and that the Prime Minister had not been honest in his oscillating and vacillating explanations advanced in such respect at different stages.

Millions of dollars were involved for setting up business in foreign countries by the Prime Minister’s sons in the Middle East and the United Kingdom. The claim regarding handling of some money in cash may be accepted with a pinch of salt as far as the transactions taking place in the Middle Eastern countries were concerned but cash running in millions of dollars being transferred to the United Kingdom and then utilization of such cash in some business in that country or for acquisition of property there may be very hard to believe or accept in the absence of any legitimate transfer, a banking transaction, a money trail or a proper and lawful disclosure. If that was how it all actually happened then it would be nothing but money laundering.

Value of the subject properties situated abroad was ostensibly disproportionate to the declared and known sources of Prime Minister’s income keeping in view his tax returns. Prime Minister refused to account for the subject properties and adopted a mode of complete denial vis-à-vis his connection with those assets. Adoption of such mode of denial and refusal/failure on the part of the Prime Minister to produce any record prima facie amounted to failure to account for the subject properties and the matter, therefore, clearly and squarely attracted the provisions of section 9(a)(v) as well as section 14(c) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999. His Lordship directed that the National Accountability Bureau (“the Bureau”) should proceed against the Prime Minister and any other person connected with him in respect of the offence of corruption and corrupt practices under section 9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999; that the Bureau should also probe into other assets acquired and businesses set up by Prime Minister’s children in the country and abroad to find out whether they had acted as benamidars of the Prime Minister in those assets and businesses or not, and if so, whether the Prime Minister could satisfactorily account for those assets and businesses or not, if he was discovered to be their actual owner; that the incumbent Chairman of the Bureau was compromised and not neutral in the matters of the Prime Minister, therefore, he should not exercise any power, authority or function in respect of the probe, therefore the Chief Justice was requested to constitute an Implementation Bench of the Supreme Court which shall have all the powers, authority and functions of the Chairman of the Bureau; that the Bureau should proceed against the incumbent Finance Minister in connection with an Accountability Reference [Reference No. 5 of 2000] wherein he made confessional statement as an approver before a Magistrate, confessing to laundering money for the benefit of the incumbent Prime Minister and others, and after setting aside of the said confessional statement his status stood revived as an accused person. [Minority view].

In the matter of explaining possession and acquisition of subject properties the Prime Minister had not been ‘honest’ to the nation, to the nation’s representatives in the National Assembly and even to the Supreme Court.As a consequence of the lack of honesty on the part of the Prime Minister he had become disqualified from being a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in terms of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution and section 99(1)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. His Lordship directed that the Election Commission should issue a notification of disqualification of the Prime Minister from being a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) with effect from the date of announcement of the present judgment, and that the President of the country was required to take necessary steps under the Constitution to ensure continuation of the democratic process through parliamentary system of government.[Minority view].

(i) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 66(1) & 184(3)---Parliamentary privilege---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Prime Minister delivered a speech in the National Assembly to explain the financial sources that were used to purchase subject properties---Certain factual contradictions were found between the said speech and the statements provided by the Prime Minister before the Supreme Court---Contention on behalf of Prime Minister that he could not be held liable for anything said in his speech in the National Assembly as the same was covered by parliamentary privilege under Art.66(1) of the Constitution---Validity---Issue of parliamentary privilege was not relevant to the present case---Relevant speech made by Prime Minister was not just a speech made in the National Assembly but it was also an address to the nation because of live radio and television coverage of it---At least four or five microphones of different television companies including the official national television channel were placed on the desk of Prime Minister and a television camera was placed right in front of him when he had made that speech and that speech was broadcast and telecast live on the national hookup---Apart from that by making the speech the Prime Minister had merely utilized the floor of the National Assembly for advancing a personal explanation regarding a matter which was not even on the agenda of the National Assembly on the relevant day and was personal to himself and his family---Parliamentary privilege under Art. 66(1) of the Constitution was in respect of liability to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said in the Parliament but in the present case the speech made by the Prime Minister was not the basis of any liability to any proceeding in a court and the speech was being referred to in the present proceedings only as a circumstance in a series of circumstances showing lack of honesty of the Prime Minister before the nation, before the representatives of the nation in the National Assembly and before the Supreme Court---Prime Minister was not being proceeded against for making the speech but said speech was being utilized in the present proceedings only for a collateral purpose to determine as to whether he had been making divergent statements on the same issue at different occasions or not and as to whether he had been honest in the matter or not.

Zahur Ilahi, M.N.A. v. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto PLD 1975 SC 383; Syed Masroor Ahsan and others v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and others PLD 1998 SC 823 and Regina v. Chaytor (2011 UKSC 52, [2011] 1 A.C. 684 SC-UK ref.

(j) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984) ---

----Arts. 2(7), 8, 117, 122 & 129---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c) --Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5-C---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Corruption and corrupt practices---Burden of proof---Scope---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers” [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---Initial onus of proof on the petitioners stood discharged when the Prime Minister and his children admitted their possession and ownership of the subject properties situated abroad---Thereafter, it was for the Prime Minister and his children to account for such properties as they had the special knowledge of all the relevant facts and only they could bring on the record material establishing their bona fide in the matter, therefore, the onus of proof had indeed shifted to them---Facts about generation and availability of the requisite funds for taking over or setting up the relevant offshore companies and acquisition of the relevant properties abroad, about transfer of such funds abroad, about the modes of payment, about how, when and from whom possession of the relevant properties was obtained and about who became the beneficial owner of the said properties were all especially within the knowledge of Prime Minister and his children and, thus, the burden of proving said facts was upon them (Art.122 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984)---Prime Minister and his children had always maintained that the relevant properties had been acquired through lawful money generated and transferred through legitimate means and that the matter ought to be decided by a court of law before which they would establish their claim by producing all the relevant record which was in their possession---Burden of proof in such respect, therefore, laid on them (Art.117 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984) --–Prime Minister and his children admitted being in possession of the relevant properties which were being alleged to have been acquired through corruption, corrupt practices and money laundering, etc. and, thus, a court may presume correctness of the allegations (Art. 129 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984) and it was for Prime Minister and his children to establish otherwise (Art.2(7) & (8) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984)---Furthermore the Prime Minister was a holder of a public office when he and his children came in possession of the relevant properties abroad---Issue of corruption and corrupt practices was essentially a criminal law issue but when it arose in the electoral context of a constitutional or statutory qualification or disqualification then such issue became a quasi criminal issue---When dealing with a quasi criminal issue, one of the basic features governing such field of the law was that where a public servant or a holder of a public office was in possession of an asset either directly or through his dependents or Benamidars then it was for him to account for that asset which was disproportionate to his known sources of income. [Minority view].

(k) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 184(3)---Proceedings before the Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution---Scope---Such proceedings were essentially civil in nature.

(l) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999) ---

----S. 9---Corruption and corrupt practices---Burden of proof---Scope---Survey of case-law from foreign jurisdictions demonstrating that in civil proceedings the standard of proof in relation to corruption and corrupt practices was ‘balance of probabilities’ (allowing inferences from circumstantial evidence) and not ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.

Agrima Ltd. v. Republic of Zambia [ICC Case No.12732) [(2011) 22 ICC International Court of Asrbitration Bulletin at p.78; ICC Case No.8891 (2000) 127 Journal du droit International at pp.1076, 1079; Argentine Engineer v. British Company (ICC Case No.1110) [Award of 1963 (Lagergren) 1996 47 Yarbook of Internatioal Arbitration 47; Oostergetel v. The Stovak Republic [UNCITRAL Final Award (23 April, 2012); Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Uzbekistan (ICSID Case No.ARB/10/3, Award, 4 Octoebr, 2013; Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine [Case No.ARB/02/18, Award 26 July 2007); Corfu Channel (ICJ Rep 1949 at p.18 and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman [2001] UKHL 47, [2002] All ER 122 ref.

(m) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution---Scope---Such jurisdiction was inquisitorial in nature and not adversarial.

(n) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 187(1)---Power of the Supreme Court to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case---Scope---Common law concept of justice, equity and good conscience were translated into the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court under Art.187(1) of the Constitution according to which in a case or matter pending before it the Supreme Court had the power to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice---In exercise of such jurisdiction to do complete justice a strict application of the black letter law may not stand between the Supreme Court and the noble cause of justice if the circumstances of the case so warranted.

(o) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 62(1)(f)---Declaration by a court of law regarding lack of honestly of a Parliamentarian---Scope---Such declaration could not be undone by the Speaker of the National Assembly, Chairman Senate or the Election Commission by overriding or sitting in judgment over the same---Such declaration had an automatic effect of disqualification of the Parliamentarian.

Muhammad Azhar Siddique and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 774 ref.

Per Ejaz Afzal Khan, J: Sh. Azmat Saeed and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ agreeing; dissenting with Asif Saeed Khan Khosa and Gulzar Ahmed, JJ, [Majority view]

(p) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976) ---

----S. 12(2)(f)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court---Maintainability---Disputed question of fact---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Contentions of petitioners that the Prime Minister’s daughter being a dependent of Prime Minister was the beneficial owner of the subject properties situated abroad; that the Prime Minister was bound to disclose his daughter’s assets and liabilities in his nomination form in terms of S.12(2)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and that when he failed to do so, he was liable to be disqualified from being member of Parliament---Validity---Contention raised by the petitioners on the face of it was a disputed question of fact, and in the absence of undisputed evidence it could not be decided by the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art.184(3) of the Constitution. [Majority view].

Imtiaz Ahmed Lali v. Ghulam Muhammad Lali PLD 2007 SC 369; Mian Najeeb-ud-Din Owasi and another v. Amir Yar Waran and others PLD 2013 SC 482; Muhammad Rizwan Gill v. Nadia Aziz and others PLD 2010 SC 828; Muddasar Qayyum Nahra v. Ch. Bilal Ijaz and others 2011 SCMR 80; Malik Umar Aslam v. Mrs. Sumaira Malik and others 2014 SCMR 45; Sadiq Ali Memon v. Returning Officer, NA-237, Thatta-I and others 2013 SCMR 1246; Muhammad Ijaz Ahmad Chaudhry v. Mumtaz Ahmad Tarar and others 2016 SCMR 1; Malik Iqbal Ahmad Langrial v. Jamshed Alam and others PLD 2013 SC 179; Muhammad Khan Junejo v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/O Law Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others 2013 SCMR 1328; Abdul Ghafoor Lehri v. Returning Officer, PB-29, Naseerabad–II and others 2013 SCMR 1271; Allah Dino Khan Bhayo v. Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and others 2013 SCMR 1655; Haji Nasir Mehmood v. Mian Imran Masood and others PLD 2010 SC 1089; Nawabzada Iftikhar Ahmad Khan Bar v. Chief Election Commissioner Islamabad and others PLD 2010 SC 817; Rana Aftab Ahmad Khan v. Muhammad Ajmal and another PLD 2010 SC 1066; Muhammad Siddique Baloch v. Jehangir Khan Tareen and others PLD 2016 SC 97; Muhammad Rizwan Gill v. Nadia Aziz and others PLD 2010 SC 817; Ishaq Khan Khakwani v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif PLD 2015 SC 275; Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani, Prime Minister of Pakistan v. Assistant Registrar Supreme Court of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 466; Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division Islamabad and others PLD 2012 SC 132; Workers' Party Pakistan through Akhtar Hussain Advocate, General Secretary and 6 others v. Federation of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 2012 SC 681; Muhammad Azhar Siddiqui and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 774; Watan Party and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2011 SC 997 and Muhammad Azhar Siddique and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 660 distinguished.

(q) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999) ---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 62(1)(f) & 184(3)---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers” [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---‘Joint Investigation Team’ directed to be (JIT) formed to probe into the allegations against the Prime Minister and his family---Sufficient material had surfaced on the record which prima facie showed that the Prime Minister, his dependents and benamidars acquired assets (in the early nineties) which were disproportionate to his known means of income---Thorough investigation was needed to answer the “questions as to how did Gulf Steel Mill come into being; what led to its sale; what happened to its liabilities; where did its sale proceeds end up; how did they reach Jeddah, Qatar and the U.K.; whether the Prime Minister’s children in view of their tender ages had the means in the early nineties to purchase and possess the flats; whether sudden appearance of letters from Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jaber Al-Thani (a member of a foreign royal family) was a myth or a reality; how bearer shares crystallized into the subject properties; who, in fact, was the real and beneficial owner of M/s. Nielsen Enterprises Limited and Nescoll Limited (offshore companies); how did Hill Metal Establishment come into existence; where did the money for Flagship Investment Limited and other companies set up/taken over by younger son of the Prime Minister come from; where did the working capital for such companies come from; and, where did the huge sums running into millions gifted by eldest son of Prime Minister to the latter drop in from”---His Lordship directed that a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) should be formed to investigate the case and collect evidence, if any, showing that the Prime Minister or any of his dependents or benamidars owned, possessed or had acquired assets or any interest therein disproportionate to his known means of income; that the Joint Investigation Team shall complete the investigation and submit its final report before the Bench of the Supreme Court constituted for implementation of present judgment, within a period of sixty days from the date of its constitution; that upon receipt of the reports, periodic or final of the Joint Investigation Team, the matter of disqualification of the Prime Minister shall be considered and appropriate orders, in such behalf, be passed, if so required. [Majority view].

(r) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 62, 63 & 184(3)---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss. 9(a)(v), 10 & 15---Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976), Ss.12(2)(f) & 99---Disqualification for being Member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Assets belonging to Prime Minister and his dependents disproportionate to his known means of income---Question as to whether failure of Prime Minister, a public office holder, to account for such assets and the sources through which the same were acquired called for his disqualification from being Member of Parliament---Reading of Arts.62 and 63 of the Constitution and S.99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, revealed that none of them required any member of Parliament to account for his assets or those of his dependents even if they were disproportionate to his known means of income---Section 12(2)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 only required the Parliamentarian to disclose his assets and those of his spouse and dependents but not the means whereby such assets were acquired---When none of the provisions of the Constitution or the Representation of the People Act, 1976 dealing with disqualifications required a member of Parliament to account for his assets and those of his dependents, even if they were disproportionate to his known means of income, question was as to how the Supreme Court could on its own or on a petition of any person under Art.184(3) of the Constitution require him to do that, and declare that he was not ‘honest’ and ‘ameen’ if he did not account for such assets---Only S.9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, required a public office holder ,including a Parliamentarian,to account for his assets and those of his dependents and benamidars if they were disproportionate to his known means of income in a trial before an Accountability Court but not in proceedings under Art.184(3) of the Constitution---Allegation leveled against a holder of public office under the provisions of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 required an investigation and collection of evidence followed by a full-fledged trial before an Accountability Court, but where neither the investigation agency investigated the case, nor any of the witnesses had been examined and cross-examined in an Accountability Court, nor any of the documents incriminating the person accused had been produced and proved in accordance with the requirements of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, nor any oral or documentary pieces of evidence incriminating the person accused had been sifted, no verdict disqualifying a holder of public office could be given by the Supreme Court in proceedings under Art.184(3) of the Constitution on the basis of a record which was yet to be authenticated---Distinction had to be drawn between the scope of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution and that of the Accountability Court under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and between the disqualifications envisioned by Arts.62 & 63 of the Constitution and S.99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and the criminal liabilities envisioned by Ss. 9, 10 and 15 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Sections 9 & 15 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 could not be lifted and grafted onto Arts.62 & 63 of the Constitution, to declare that the member of Parliament proceeded against was not ‘honest’ and ‘ameen’ and as such was liable to be disqualified---Verdict of such nature would not only be unjust but coram non judice for want of jurisdiction and lawful authority---Failure of the Prime Minister to do something that he was not required by law to do would not be of any consequence---Failure of the Prime Minister to account for his assets and those of his dependents which were disproportionate to his known means of income, thus, could not call for his disqualification at least during present proceedings. [Majority view].

(s) Administration of justice---

----Courts of law decided cases on the basis of the facts admitted or established on the record---Surmises and speculations had no place in the administration of justice.

(t) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 62, 63, 184(3), 199(1)(b)(ii) & 225---Forums/courts for challenging the qualification or seeking disqualification of a Member of Parliament---Where a candidate was not qualified or was disqualified from being elected or chosen as a Member of Parliament in terms of Arts. 62 & 63 of the Constitution, his nomination could be rejected by the Returning Officer or any other forum functioning in the hierarchy---Where, however, the returned candidate was not, on the nomination day, qualified for or disqualified from being elected or chosen as a member, his election could be declared void by the Election Tribunal constituted under Art.225 of the Constitution---Election of a member of Parliament whose disqualification was overlooked, illegally condoned or went unquestioned on the nomination day before the Returning Officer or before the Election Tribunal, could still be challenged before the High Court or the Supreme Court under Art.199(1)(b)(ii) and Art. 184(3) of the Constitution respectively.

Lt. Col. Farzand Ali and others v. Province of West Pakistan through the Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Government of West Pakistan, Lahore PLD 1970 SC 98 and Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and others PLD 2012 SC 1054 ref.

(u) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 62(1)(f)---Qualification for membership of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Scope---Sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest and ameen---‘Declaration to the contrary by a court of law’---Meaning---In a case of disqualification under Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution, the Returning Officer or any other fora in the hierarchy could not reject the nomination of a person from being elected as a member of Parliament unless a court of law had given a declaration that he was not sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest and ameen---Even the Election Tribunal, unless it itself proceeded to give the requisite declaration on the basis of the material before it, would not disqualify the returned candidate where no declaration, had been given by a court of law---Expression “a court of law” essentially meant a court of plenary jurisdiction, which had the power to record evidence and give a declaration on the basis of the evidence so recorded---Such a court would include a court exercising original, appellate or revisional jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, but in any case a court or a forum lacking plenary jurisdiction could not decide questions of such nature at least when disputed. [Majority view].

(v) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 63(2) & 63(3)---Disqualification for membership of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Scope---When any question arose whether a member of Parliament had become disqualified in terms of Art.63 of the Constitution, it shall be dealt with only by the Election Commission on a reference from the Speaker of the Parliament in terms of Arts.63(2) & 63(3) of the Constitution.

(w) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 62(1)(f), 66(1) & 184(3)---Parliamentary privilege---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Prime Minister delivered a speech in the National Assembly to explain the financial sources that were used to purchase subject properties---Certain factual contradictions were found between the said speech and the statements provided by the Prime Minister himself and his children before the Supreme Court---Contention on behalf of Prime Minister that he could not be held liable for anything said in his speech in the National Assembly as the same was covered by Parliamentary privilege under Art.66(1) of the Constitution---Validity---Mere contradiction between the speeches of the Prime Minister and statements of his children did not prove any of his speeches false or untrue unless it was determined after examining and cross-examining both of them that their statements were correct and true---Where it was not determined that statements of Prime Minister’s children were correct and true, no falsity could be attributed to the speeches of the Prime Minister---If at all, the speeches of the Prime Minister were sought to be used to incriminate him for declaring that he was not ‘honest’ and ‘ameen’, he had to be confronted therewith---Where no effort was made to prove the statements of Prime Minister’s children to be true and correct, nor was the Prime Minister confronted with his speeches, it would be against the cannons of law of evidence to use such speeches against him---Since the speech of the Prime Minister could not be used against him, the question of availability of Parliamentary privilege under Art.66 of the Constitution became irrelevant. [Majority view].

Per Gulzar Ahmed, J; agreeing with Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J [Minority view]

(x) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 184(3) & 199 & Pt. II, Chapt.1 [Arts.8 to 28]---Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Scope---Under Art.184(3) of the Constitution the Supreme Court had the jurisdiction to give any sort of declaration and to pass any consequential order that may be the need of the case which may arise out of any given facts and circumstances---Supreme Court had been given free and unbridled powers to make an order of such nature, if it considered that the question of public importance with reference to enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chap.1 of Part II of the Constitution was involved---When exercising jurisdiction under Art.184(3) of the Constitution the Supreme Court was not constrained with any of the technicalities or any of the conditions that had been imposed on the High Court fo exercising jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution.

Shahid Pervaiz and others v. Ejaz Ahmad and others 2017 SCMR 206; Lahore Bachao Tehrik v. Dr. Iqbal Muhammad Chauhan and others 2015 SCMR 1520; Anjum Aqeel Khan and others v. National Police Foundation through M.D. and others 2015 SCMR 1348; Ali Azhar Khan Baloch and others v. Province of Sindh and others 2015 SCMR 456; Khalid Iqbal and 2 others v. Mirza Khan and others PLD 2015 SC 50; Jamshoro Joint Venture Limited and others v. Khawaja Muhammad Asif and others 2014 SCMR 1858; Asaf Fasihuddin Khan Vardaq v. Government of Pakistan and others 2014 SCMR 676; Human Rights Case No.14392 of 2013 and others [2014 SCMR 220]; Abdul Wahab and others v. HBL and others 2013 SCMR 1383; Maulana Abdul Haque Baloch and others v. Government of Balochistan through Secretary Industries and Mineral Development and others PLD 2013 SC 641; Air Marshal (Retd.) Muhammad Asghar Khan v. General (Retd.) Mirza Aslam Baig, Former Chief of Army Staff and others PLD 2013 SC 1; President Balochistan High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2012 SCMR 1958; Muhammad Yasin v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Islamabad and others PLD 2012 SC 132; Suo Motu Case No.18 of 2010 [PLD 2011 SC 927]; Watan Party and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2011 SC 997; Suo Motu Case No.24 of 2010 [PLD 2011 SC 963]; Bank of Punjab and another v. Haris Steel Industries (Pvt) Ltd. and others PLD 2010 SC 1109; Suo Motu Case No.10 of 2007 [PLD 2008 SC 673]; Pakistan Muslim League (N) through Khawaja Muhammad Asif, MNA and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Interior and others PLD 2007 SC 642; Wattan Party through President v. Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Committee of Privatization, Islamabad and others PLD 2006 SC 697; Maulvi Iqbal Haider v. Capital Development Authority and others PLD 2006 SC 394; Javed Jabbar and 14 others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2003 SC 955 and Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1999 SC 57 ref.

(y) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976), S. 99(1)(f)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 62(1)(f) & 184(3)---Qualification for being Member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---‘Honest’ and ‘ameen’---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers” [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---Question as to whether the incumbent Prime Minister was not “honest” and “ameen” within the purview of Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitutionand was thus disqualified from being a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Being in possession and occupation of the subject properties situated abroad and by paying their dues and maintaining them like an owner does, it heavily rested upon the Prime Minister to explain in a very clear and unambiguous terms with supporting material about his and his family’s connection with the subject properties, more so when he himself stated that he had nothing to hide and that all records were available with him---Prime Minister owed a duty towards the people of his country, who had a Fundamental Right to know about the standing of their chosen Prime Minister, which was also a question of great public importance---When the Prime Minister was called upon by the Supreme Court to explain his stance in relation to subject properties, he choose to remain silent and gave a bare statement that he was not the owner of the subject properties or offshore companies which owned said properties---Such evasive attitude of the Prime Minister was not justified or bona fide rather its purpose appeared to throw the Supreme Court in a dark alley---In his speech before the National Assembly the Prime Minister had claimed that subject properties were purchased from the funds made available from sale of certain steel mills, however, the admitted material placed before the Supreme Court altogether give a different story regarding the source of funds for the purchase of subject properties---Member of a foreign royal family who claimed that the subject properties were owned by the royal family and were transferred to the family of the Prime Minister in settlement of an investment did not provide any information as to on what date subject properties were purchased, for what consideration and from whom they were purchased---Another circumstance that connected the Prime Minister and his family with the subject properties was a decree passed by a foreign court by which a charge was placed over the subject properties to the extent of interest therein of the Prime Minister and his brothers---Admittedly the liability under the decree was discharged by the defendants i.e. the Prime Minister and his brothers, who at no stage before the foreign court claimed to have no interest in the subject properties, nor any other person or entity filed any objection in court claiming ownership of the subject properties---As holder of a public office the Prime Minister failed to satisfy the court and the nation about the true facts regarding the subject properties, therefore, he had not been ‘honest’ and ‘ameen’ in terms of Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution, and thus rendered himself disqualified from being a Member of National Assembly and ceased to be the Prime Minister of the country. [Minority view].

Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and others PLD 2012 SC 1054 ref.

(z) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--

----O. VIII, R. 4---Written statement---Scope---Written statement must deal specifically with each allegation of fact in the plaint and when the defendant denied any such fact, he must not do so evasively but answer the point with substance---Where denial of fact was not specific but evasive, the fact shall be taken to be admitted.

Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, Karachi and another v. Raheel Ghayas and 3 others PLD 2002 SC 446; Secretary to Government (West Pakistan) now N.W.F.P. Department of Agriculture and Forests, Peshawar and 4 others v. Kazi Abdul Kafil PLD 1978 SC 242 and Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 ref.

Per Sh. Azmat Saeed, J; agreeing with Ejaz Afzal Khan and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ [Majority view]

(aa) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976) ---

----Ss. 12(2)(f) & 78---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), S. 9(a)(v)---Non-disclosure of assets owned by member of Parliament, his spouse or dependents---Effect---Non-disclosure of source of funds for acquiring assets, relevance of---When a person failed to disclose any asset owned by him, his spouse or dependent in his nomination papers in terms of S.12 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, he exposed himself not only to disqualification but also prosecution for corrupt practices under S.78 of the said Act besides any other liability prescribed by the law---Reference to the source of funds for acquisition of such undisclosed assets was, however, wholly irrelevant under the Representation of the People Act, 1976---Explanation of the source of funds for acquiring the property was a requirement only under S.9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, which requirement could not ipso facto migrate into the Representation of the People Act, 1976 or the Constitutional provisions pertaining to elections especially in the absence of any legislation.[Majority view].

(bb) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 62(1)(f)---Qualifications for membership of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Term ‘honest’ used in Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution---Meaning and scope---Term “honest” as employed in Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution referred to legal honesty, an objective concept and not mere moral or ethical honesty, which was subjective---Courts of law were concerned with the matters of law not morality.

(cc) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 62(1)(f)---Disqualification of member of Parliament for not being sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest and ameen---Scope---Person could not be disqualified under Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution in the absence of an established and proved breach of a legal obligation or violation of a law---Person could not be disqualified under Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution for being dishonest where such alleged dishonesty did not offend against the law or involve a breach or non-fulfilment of a legal obligation---Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution could not be permitted to be used as a tool for political engineering by the court nor should the court arrogate unto itself the power to vet candidates on moral grounds.[Majority view].

Ghaznafar Ali Gull v. Ch. Tajammul Hussain and others 1997 CLC 1628; Nawabzada Iftikhar Ahmed Khan Bar v. Chief Election Commissioner, Islamabad and others PLD 2010 SC 817; Muhammad Rizwan Gill v. Nadia Aziz and others PLD 2010 SC 828; Rana Aftab Ahmad Khan v. Muhammad Ajmal and another PLD 2010 SC 1066; Muddasar Qayyum Nahra v. Ch. Bilal Ijaz and others 2011 SCMR 80; Mian Najeeb-ud-Din Owaisi v. Aamir Yar and 7 others 2011 SCMR 180; Malik Iqbal Ahmad Langrial v. Jamshed Alam and others PLD 2013 SC 179; Mian Najeeb-ud-Din Owasi and another v. Amir Yar Waran and others PLD 2013 SC 482; Sadiq Ali Memon v. Returning Officer, NA-237 Thatta-I and others 2013 SCMR 1246; Abdul Ghafoor Lehari v. Returning Officer PB-29, Naseerabad-II and others 2013 SCMR 1271; Muhammad Khan Junejo v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/o Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others 2013 SCMR 1328; Allah Dino Khan Bhayo v. Election Commission of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 1655; Molvi Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Returning Officer PB-15 Musa Khail and others 2013 CLC 1583; Malik Umar Aslam v. Mrs. Sumaira Malik and others 2014 SCMR 45; Muhammad Siddique Baloch v. Jehangir Khan Tareen and others PLD 2016 SC 97 and Muhammad Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry v. Mumtaz Ahmed Tarar and others 2016 SCMR 1 ref.

(dd) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 62(1)(f) & 184(3)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 140---Televised speeches and interviews---Evidentiary value---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Prime Minister made televised speeches to explain the financial sources that were used to purchase subject properties situated abroad---Family members of Prime Minster, including his wife and children, gave televised interviews wherein they mentioned as to how the subject properties were acquired and through what resources---Certain factual contradictions were found between the speeches of the Prime Minister and the interviews of his family members in relation to the subject properties---Question as to whether the Prime Minister was not “honest” and “ameen” within the purview of Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution and was thus disqualified from being a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Speeches and interviews in question were, at best, previous statements with which the makers thereof could be confronted in the event of an evidentiary hearing, especially as the Prime Minister and his family members were under no legal obligation to make such statements or give such interviews; the compulsion was political and so to its effect---Furthermore true facts in respect of the title to and the source of funds for the acquisition of the subject properties had not been consecutively established through cogent, undisputed or reliable evidence, therefore, truthfulness or otherwise of the statements/ interviews of the Prime Minister and his family members could not be ascertained---Petitioners had attempted to present their case for disqualification of Prime Minister on the alleged lack of probity in statements/interviews of his children---Vicarious liability had no place in election laws, including the Constitutional provisions pertaining to the qualification and the disqualification of candidates contesting elections --- Father could not be disqualified in terms of Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution, if his child was allegedly dishonest. [Majority view]

(ee) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984) ---

----Arts. 74 & 76---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 62(1)(f) & 184(3)---Photocopies of unsigned documents which were not duly certified---Evidentiary value---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers”[leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---Question as to whether a judicial pronouncement of disqualification of the Prime Minister could be handed down by reliance upon the ‘Panama Papers’---Primary basis of the case of the petitioners were the series of documents, which allegedly formed a part of the record of a foreign law firm, which were leaked and were commonly referred to as the ‘Panama Papers’---Said documents were, in fact, copies, including of e-mails and were by and large unsigned---Said documents were neither duly certified nor in a form acceptable in a court of law---Furthermore, the said documents to the extent that the same pertained to the Prime Minister and his children, were in fact, denied---Court could not be expected to give a finding or pronounce judgment based upon the copies of unsigned documents, which were disputed and had not come from proper custody; it was a legal impossibility in view of the provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Such documents could not form the basis of a judicial pronouncement in any civilized country with a developed or even a developing legal system, and there was no legal precedent in such behalf---Documents revealed in the ‘Panama Papers’were the purported result of the efforts of investigative journalists---Mere publication of such material discovered by investigative journalists on its own, could not ipso facto result in conviction or impeachment---Investigative journalists were not a substitute for investigators and prosecutors---Revelations made in the ‘Panama Papers’ regardless of the credibility of the journalists responsible for them, legally, at best, would form the basis of allegations until proved through admission or evidence before the court of law---No person could be disqualified from being Member of Parliament on the basis of allegations alone without such allegations being duly proved or the relevant facts duly ascertained before the competent legal forum. [Majority view].

Muhammad Saeed and 4 others v. Election Petitions Tribunal, West Pakistan and others PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 91; Muhammad Khan Junejo v. Fida Hussain Dero PLD 2004 SC 452; Imtiaz Ahmed Lali v. Ghulam Muhammad Lali PLD 2007 SC 369; Nawabzada Iftikhar Ahmed Khan v. Chief Election Commissioner PLD 2010 SC 817; Muhammad Rizwan Gill v. Nadia Aziz and others PLD 2010 SC 828; Rana Aftab Ahmed v. Muhammad Ajmal PLD 2010 SC 1066; Haji Nasir Mehmood v. Mian Imran Masood PLD 2010 SC 1089; Malik Iqbal Ahmad Langrial v. Jamshed Alam and others PLD 2013 SC 179; Mian Najeeb-ud-Din Owaise v. Amir Yar Waran PLD 2013 SC 482; Muhammad Siddique Baloch v. Jehangir Khan Tareen and others PLD 2016 SC 97; Muhammad Yousaf Kaselia v. Peer Ghulam PLD 2016 SC 689; Rai Hassan Nawaz v. Haji Muhammad Ayub and others PLD 2017 SC 70; Muddasar Qayyum Nahra v. Ch. Bilal Ijaz and others 2011 SCMR 80; Mian Najeeb-ud-Din Owaisi v. Aamir Yar and 7 others 2011 SCMR 180; Sadiq Ali Memon v. Returning Officer, NA-237 Thatta-I and others 2013 SCMR 1246; Abdul Ghafoor Lehari v. Returning Officer PB-29, Naseerabad-II and others 2013 SCMR 1271; Muhammad Khan Junejo v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/o Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and others 2013 SCMR 1328; Dilawar Hussain v. The State 2013 SCMR 1582; Allah Dino Khan Bhayo v. Election Commission of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 1655; Malik Umar Aslam v. Mrs. Sumaira Malik and others 2014 SCMR 45; Muhammad Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry v. Mumtaz Ahmed Tarar and others 2016 SCMR 1; Muhammad Ahmed Chatta v. Iftikhar Ahmed Cheema 2016 SCMR 763; Shamuna Badshah Qaisrani v. Muhammad Dawood 2016 SCMR 1420 and Molvi Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Returning Officer PB-15 Musa Khail and others 2013 CLC 1583 ref.

(ff) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 184(3) & 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court---Scope---Recording of conviction---Neither the Supreme Court nor the High Court could directly convict a person, while exercising their Constitutional original jurisdiction that too without recording any evidence.

(gg) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999) ---

----S. 9(a)(v)---Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976), S.12(2)(f)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 62(1)(f) & 184(3)---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers” [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---Joint Investigation Team (JIT) formed to probe into the allegations against the Prime Minister and his family---Present case involved various properties, including the subject properties owned through offshore companies and businesses established in foreign countries---Clear cut explanation for the title of such properties and all the documents in support thereof should have been in the custody of the Prime Minister’s children, who claimed to be the owners---Such documents had been deliberately withheld from the Supreme Court---Subject properties had been in occupation of the Prime Minister’s family since early 90s through one of his sons, who at that time was a student and was dependent upon his father (incumbent Prime Minister) at that point of time---Alleged source of funds through which the various properties were acquired was shrouded in mystery and no clear cut transparent transactions had been shown---Prime Minister had admittedly benefited from such assets and business owned by his children as his eldest son sent him millions of rupees from abroad through various “gifts”---Possibility of the Prime Minister’s equitable or beneficial interest in subject properties and business owned by his children could not be ruled out---Investigation and eventually adjudication was required on the issue as to whether the Prime Minister directly or indirectly owned the subject properties and foreign businesses and assets, which had not been disclosed in his nomination papers---Sources of funds for acquisition of such properties also needed to be identified as they might be relevant for identifying the true ownership of the subject properties and foreign businesses and assets, and if such sources were unexplained or beyond the known sources of income of the owner of such assets, criminal proceedings might follow---Consequently, it was appropriate that the matter should be investigated by a Joint Investigating Team (JIT)---His Lordship directed that Joint Investigation Team (JIT) should be constituted which shall submit a final report before the Supreme Court within sixty days from its constitution, and the court would examine the matter of disqualification of the Prime Minister on the basis of such report; that if the conclusions of the investigation by the Joint Investigation Team, so justified, appropriate orders may be passed for initiation of criminal proceedings under S.9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 against the Prime Minister, his family and other respondents. [Majority view].

Ram Jethmalani and others v. Union of India and others [(2011) 8 SCC 1 ref.

(hh) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Scope---‘Disputed questions of fact’---Ordinarily the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art.184(3) of the Constitution tended to avoid deciding disputed questions of facts, however, this was not an absolute rule---Supreme Court could determine disputed question of fact in its Constitutional jurisdiction. [Majority view].

Syed Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law and othrs PLD 2012 SC 1089; Pakistan Muslim League(N) through Khawaja Muhammad Asif, MNA and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secrtary Ministry of Interior and others PLD 2007 SC 642 and General Secretary, West Pakistn Salt Miners Labour Union (CBA) Khewra Jhelum v. The Director Industries and Mineral Development, Punjab, Lahore 1994 SCMR 2061 ref.

(ii) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976) ---

----S. 12(2)(f)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 63(2) & 184(3)---Non-declaration of assets belonging to dependents in nomination papers---Post-election disqualification from being member of Parliament--- Reference sent by Speaker of National Assembly to the Election Commission---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of the Prime Minister for not declaring assets of his dependents in his nomination papers---Question as to whether the matter of disqualification of Prime Minister could be referred to the Election Commission by the Speaker or the Supreme Court in terms of Art.63(2) of the Constitution---Said Article was attracted when a sitting Member of Parliament by virtue of events subsequent to the election had become disqualified---Article 63(2) of the Constitution pertained to post-election disqualification---Allegations against the Prime Minister primarily pertained to the alleged non-declaration of his assets in the nomination papers---Even though such allegations surfaced after the elections, the same would not qualify as a post-election disqualification, hence, the matter could not be referred to the Election Commission through the Speaker or otherwise. [Majority view].

Muhammad Azhar Siddiqui and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 774 ref.

(jj) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 62, 63, 184(3) & 199---Constitutional petition before the High Court or the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of a Member of Parliament---Maintainability---Constitutional petition in the nature of a writ of quo warranto was maintainable against a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), if he was disqualified or did not possess or had lost his qualification, in such behalf---Such Constitutional petition could always be filed before the High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution and before the Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution.

Farzand Ali v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 98 and Muhammad Azhar Siddiqui v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2012 SC 774 ref.

(kk) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 184(3)---Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Scope---‘Power to investigate’---Despite having the jurisdiction to determine disputed questions of facts, the Supreme Court did not have the powers under Art.184(3) of the Constitution to investigate a matter.

Suo Motu Action regarding allegation of business deal between Malik Riaz Hussain and Dr. Arsalan Iftikhar attempting to incluence the judicial process PLD 2012 SC 664 ref.

Per Ijaz ul Ahsan, J; agreeing with Ejaz Afzal Khan and Sh. Azmat Saeed, JJ [Majority view]

(ll) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999) ---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.62(1)(f) & 184(3)---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers” [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---Joint Investigation Team (JIT) directed to be formed to probe into the allegations against the Prime Minister and his family---Different versions about ownership of the subject properties, and sources of funds utilized for their acquisition were presented by the Prime Minister and his family members---Real ownership and control of the subject properties and the offshore companies that owned them and the sources of funds used to acquire subject properties remained shrouded in mystery---Every possible effort was made and every conceivable device was adopted by the Prime Minister and his family to withhold and conceal information and documents from the Supreme Court which were necessary to answer the numerous questions which had been raised regarding probity, transparency and legitimacy of the transactions in relation to the subject properties---Considering the high public office that the Prime Minister held and the requirement of honesty, transparency, clean reputation, unquestionable integrity, financial probity and accountability for a person who held the highest elected office of the land, it was necessary and incumbent upon the Prime Minister to place all information, documents and record before the Supreme Court to clear his own position and that of the members of his family---Admittedly the subject properties were in possession/occupation of the family of the Prime Minister since 1993 or 1996 when these were alleged (without proof) to have been acquired by a foreign royal family through offshore companies---Prime Minister’s children at that point of time did not have any sources to purchase/acquire subject properties, and they were dependent upon their father, who was the Prime Minister of the country at that time---Value of the subject properties was ostensibly disproportionate to the declared and known sources of income of the Prime Minister (if his income tax returns were kept in mind)---Further, the source(s) of funding for businesses and companies set up by the Prime Minister’s sons in foreign countries was also not established---Documents available on record or lack thereof raised a suspicion that the Prime Minister may be the real owner of subject properties, and such ownership may be direct, indirect, beneficial or equitable---Prima facie, the Prime Minister failed to account for subject properties, and the matter clearly attracted the provisions of S.9(a)(v) read with S.14(c) of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 authorizing the Accountability Bureau to proceed against the Prime Minister and any other person connected with him in such regard---Admitted facts or direct and irrefutable evidence, however, was not available on record to justify and support a declaration of disqualification of the Prime Minister from being member of Parliament, however, sufficient material was available to raise valid suspicions which furnished legitimate basis to order probe and investigation to ascertain the true facts and collect evidence---His Lordship directed that a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) should be constituted, which shall investigate the matter, collect all relevant record and material in order to determine and establish the real title and ownership of the subject properties, the source(s) of funds utilized for purchase of the said properties and the mode, manner and time when such funds were transmitted abroad for purchase of subject properties; that the Joint Investigation Team shall also collect evidence to determine the source(s) of funds through which the Prime Minister’s sons established companies in foreign countries that were owned and controlled by them; that the Joint Investigation Team should investigate and find out if the Prime Minister directly or indirectly or through benamidars or authorized agents owned any other properties/assets/financial resources of any nature including but not limited to shares through offshore companies/bank accounts, which had not been disclosed to the concerned authorities; that the Joint Investigation Team shall complete and submit its final report within sixty days before the Bench of the Supreme Court constituted for implementation of present judgment, and that on receipt of said report, the implementation Bench shall pass appropriate orders relating to disqualification of the Prime Minister as a member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), if necessary. [Majority view]

(mm) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 62, 63 & 184(3)---Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976), Ss. 12(2)(f), 42-A(4) & 82---National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999), Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Disqualification for being member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Scope---Assets belonging to Member of Parliament or his dependents---Non-disclosure of such assets and the ‘source’ of funds through which same were acquired---Effect---Articles 62 & 63 of the Constitution did not impose an obligation on a Parliamentarian to disclose his own assets or those of his spouse, dependent or independent children---Similarly, there was no corresponding provision in the Constitution providing a penal consequence for non-disclosure of such assets or failure to explain the source(s) of funds with which such assets may have been acquired --- In the absence of any constitutional requirement, the same could not be read into the language of Art. 62 or 63 of the Constitution---Penal consequences for non-disclosure of assets was provided in the Representation of the People Act, 1976---Where it was established in a Court or Tribunal of competent jurisdiction that a candidate had concealed any of the assets required to be disclosed under the statement of assets and liabilities in his nomination papers [S.12(2)(f) of Representation of the People Act, 1976)] or his Annual Statement of Assets and Liabilities [section 42-A(4)], the same may constitute basis for his disqualification inter alia under the provisions of Art.62 and/or 63 of the Constitution---Where, however, such declaration was properly made there was neither any requirement nor power vesting in the hierarchy provided under the Election laws to require the candidate to explain the ‘source’ of funds used to acquire such assets; but this did not mean that a candidate or holder of a public office, who acquired assets through unlawful means went scot-free as long as he declared the same in his nomination papers---Mechanism provided by the law in order to make such a person answerable and accountable for disclosure of ‘sources’ for acquisition of assets was incorporated in the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, under which a person, holding assets directly or indirectly, which were disproportionate to his known sources of income could be called upon to explain and disclose the sources with which such assets were acquired, and on his failure to do so to the satisfaction of the court, he could be visited with penal consequences provided in the said law---Conviction under National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, or any other law for the time being in force could also trigger the disqualification mechanism provided in the Constitution. [Majority view].

(nn) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4, 25 & 184(3)---Member of Parliament owning or possessing assets through dependents or benamidars which were disproportionate to his known sources of income---Disqualification for being member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for owning and possessing assets or pecuniary resources through his children which were disproportionate to his known sources of income---Question as to whether failure of Prime Minister, a public office holder, to account for such assets could form basis of a judicial pronouncement by the Supreme Court to disqualify the Prime Minister from being a Member of Parliament in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art.184(3) of the Constitution ---Where there was an allegation that a holder of public office or any of his dependents or benamidars owned or possessed any assets or pecuniary resources which were disproportionate to his known sources of income, which he could not reasonably account for, he could be convicted of an offence of corruption and corrupt practices and upon such conviction, penal consequences would follow---Such conviction, however, could only be recorded by an Accountability Court under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, after a proper trial, recording evidence and granting due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the accused---Powers of the Accountability Court could not be transplanted and attached to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution to disqualify a member of Parliament---Such course of action would be violative of the principles enshrined in Arts. 4 & 25 of the Constitution, which guaranteed to every citizen the right to be dealt with in accordance with law, equality before law and entitlement to equal protection of law. [Majority view].

(oo) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Art. 63(2)---Post-election disqualification for being member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Question of disqualification of member of Parliament/Senate---Decision of Speaker National Assembly/ Chairman Senate to refer or not refer the question of disqualification to the Election Commission---Such decision was justiciable before Courts of competent jurisdiction---Where a Court of competent jurisdiction on being approached by any of the parties found that the decision of the Speaker/Chairman was legally or factually incorrect it could set-aside such decision, and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the law and the Constitution to refer the matter to the Election Commission.

(pp) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 62 & 63---Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976), S.12(2)---Post-election disqualification for being member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Scope---Ground for disqualification of a person at the time of filing nomination papers discovered after his election as member of Parliament---Article 63(2) of the Constitution provided a remedy to cater for a situation where a validly elected member became disqualified during the tenure of his membership on the basis of any of the grounds mentioned in Arts. 62 and/or 63(1) of the Constitution i.e. the ground of disqualification occurred after the Parliamentarian had validly been elected and was not in existence (whether known to anybody or not) at the time when he filed his nomination papers and was elected---In such a situation, any other member could approach the Speaker/Chairman seeking disqualification of the member who had incurred the alleged disqualification whereupon the Speaker/Chairman and the Election Commission could exercise powers provided in Art.63(2) and (3) of the Constitution, respectively---Where the ground for seeking disqualification under Art.63 of the Constitution was that a member did not qualify at the time of filing his nomination papers, but such fact (ground seeking disqualification) was discovered subsequently, the matter could not be referred to the Election Commission---In order for the Election Commission to disqualify a member on a reference sent by the Speaker in terms of Art.63 of the Constitution, it must be shown that the disqualifying fact or event occurred after a member had validly been elected, which (ground) was non-existent at the time of filing of nomination papers. [Majority view].

Muhammad Azhar Siddiqui v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 774 ref.

(qq) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 62(1), 63(1), 184(3) & 199---Power of High Court/Supreme Court to disqualify a member of Parliament in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction---Scope---Power to disqualify a member in cases where for some reason he escaped disqualification at the time of filing his/her nomination papers, but such fact/event was discovered subsequently, could, in appropriate cases and subject to availability of admitted facts or irrefutable evidence be exercised by the High Court under Art.199 and by the Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution---Such power to disqualify could also be exercised where facts could be determined, if the exercise of determination did not require voluminous evidence and intricate and disputed questions of fact were not involved. [Majority view].

Farzand Ali v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 98 and Mehmood Akhtar Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 1089 ref.

(rr) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 63(1)(o)---Disqualification for being member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Allegation of tax evasion---Mere allegation of tax evasion would not automatically attract the penal consequences of Art.63(1)(o) of the Constitution---Said Article was attracted only where liability had finally been determined by the competent forum and default had been committed in payment of such determined liability.

(ss) Constitution of Pakistan ---

----Arts. 184(3) & 187(1)---Constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court---Scope---Recording of evidence---No bar existed on the power of the Supreme Court under Art.184(3) of the Constitution to record evidence, provided voluminous record and complicated questions of fact and law were not involved---In order to do complete justice, there was no bar on the power of the Supreme Court to record evidence in appropriate cases and pass such orders as may be necessary. [Majority view].

Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2007 SC 642 ref.

(tt) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999) ---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Fundamental right of people to be governed by honest persons who were open to public scrutiny and accountability---Scope---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---His Lordship observed that the people had a fundamental right to be governed in accordance with law, by those who fulfilled the requirements of the Constitution and the law and whose financial dealings, earnings and expenditures were open to public scrutiny to show that they met the test of honesty, integrity, financial probity and bona fide dealings; that standards had to be set and systems put in place to develop a culture of accountability at all levels in order to cleanse the system and institutions from the evils of corruption, money laundering, loot and plunder of national resources by a few, irrespective of their rank or status in the system.

ORDER OF THE COURT

[By a majority of 3 to 2 (Asif Saeed Khan Khosa and

Gulzar Ahmed, JJ; dissenting]

(uu) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999) ---

----Ss. 9(a)(v) & 14(c)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 62(1)(f) & 184(3)---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Properties situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister’s children through offshore companies were revealed in the “Panama Papers” [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and attorney–client information of thousands of offshore entities]---Joint Investigation Team (JIT) formed to probe into the allegations against the Prime Minister and his family---Thorough investigation was required to answer the questions as to “how did Gulf Steel Mill come into being; what led to its sale; what happened to its liabilities; where did its sale proceeds end up; how did they reach Jeddah, Qatar and the U.K.; whether the Prime Minister’s sons in view of their tender ages had the means in the early nineties to possess and purchase the flats; whether sudden appearance of the letters of Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jaber Al-Thani [member of a foreign royal family] is a myth or a reality; how bearer shares crystallized into the flats; who, in fact, is the real and beneficial owner of M/s Nielsen Enterprises Limited and Nescoll Limited [offshore companies], how did Hill Metal Establishment come into existence; where did the money for Flagship Investment Limited and other companies set up/taken over by Prime Minister’s younger son come from, and where did the Working Capital for such companies come from and where did the huge sums running into millions gifted by Prime Minister’s elder son to the latter drop in from”---Supreme Court directed that a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) should be formed comprising of a senior officer of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), not below the rank of Additional Director General who shall head the team, a representative of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), a nominee of the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) familiar with the issues of money laundering and white collar crimes, a nominee of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), a seasoned Officer of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and a seasoned Officer of Military Intelligence; that the Heads of the said departments/ institutions shall recommend the names of their nominees for the Joint Investigation Team within seven days which shall be placed before the present Bench of the Supreme Court for nomination and approval; that the Joint Investigation Team shall investigate the case and collect evidence, if any, showing that the Prime Minister or any of his dependents or benamidars owned, possessed or had acquired assets or any interest therein disproportionate to his known means of income; that the Prime Minister and his sons should appear and associate themselves with the Joint Investigation Team as and when required; that the Joint Investigation Team may also examine the evidence and material, if any, already available with the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and National Accountability Bureau (NAB) relating to or having any nexus with the possession or acquisition of the subject properties/flats or any other assets or pecuniary resources and their origin; that the Joint Investigation Team shall submit its periodical reports every two weeks before a Bench of the Supreme Court constituted by the Chief Justice for implementation of present judgment, and it shall complete the investigation and submit its final report before the said Bench within a period of sixty days from the date of its constitution; that upon receipt of the Joint Investigation Team’s reports, periodic or final, the matter of disqualification of the Prime Minister shall be considered, and that if found necessary for passing an appropriate order in such behalf, the Prime Minister or any other person may be summoned and examined.[p. 658,660] LLLL & MMMM

Constitution Petition No.29 of 2016

For Petitioner:

Syed Naeem Bokhari, Advocate Supreme Court; Sikandar Bashir Mohmad Advocate Supreme Court, Fawad Hussain Ch. Advocate Supreme Court; Faisal Fareed Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court;; Ch. Akhtar Ali AOR with petitioner in person.

Assisted by:

Yousaf Anjum, Kashif Siddiqui, Imad Khan, Akbar Hussain, Barrister Maleeka Bokhari and Ms. Iman Shahid Advocates.

For Respondent No.1:

Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Khurram M. Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court and Feisal Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court.

Assisted by:

Saad Hashmi, Sarmad Hani and Mustafa Mirza Advocates.

For the National Accountability

Bureau (Respondent No.2)

Qamar Zaman Chaudhry, Chairman, Natioal Accountability Bureau in person, Waqas Qadeer Dar, Prosecutor-General Accountability, Arshad Qayyum, Special Prosecutor Accountability, Syed Ali Imran, Special Prosecutor Accountability, Farid ul Hasan, Ch., Speical Prosecutory Accountability.

For the Federation of Pakistan

(Respondents Nos.3 and 4)

Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Attorney-General for Pakistan, Nayyar Abbas Rizvi, Additional Attorney-Generl for Pakistan and Gulfam Hameed, Deputy Solicitor, Ministry of Law and Justice.

Assisted by:

Barrister Asad Rahim Khan, Salaar Khan, Bilal Naseer and Shahzaib Khan, Advocates.

For the Federal Board of Revenue

(Respondent No.5)

Dr. Muhammad Irshad, Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue in person; Muhammad Waqar Rana, ASC; M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record, Kh. Tanvir Ahmed, Director-General (Intelligence); Shaukat Ali, Director-General Hafiz Muhammad Ali Indhar, Directoer (Legal) and Dr. Muhammad Iqbal Khawaja, Member, Federal Board of Revenue.

For Respondents Nos.6, 9 and 10:

Shahid Hamid, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Ms. Ayesha Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate on Record.

For Resondents Nos. 7 and 8:

Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate on Record.

Assisted by:

Malik Ahsan Mahmood, Malik Ghulam Sabir, Nadeem Shahzad Hashmi, Asad Ladha, Zeshaan Hashmi, Ms.Atira Ikram, Tariq Bashir and Muhammad Shakeel Mughal, Advocates.

Constitution Petition No.30 of 2016

For the Petitioner:

In person.

For the Feederation of Pakistan

(Respondent No.1)

Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Attorney-General for Pakistan, Nayyar Abbas Rizvi, Additionl Attorney-General for Pakistan, Gulfam Hameed, Deputy Solicitor, Ministry of Law and Justice.

Assisted by:

Barrister Asad Rahim Khan, Salaar Khan, Bilal Naseer and Shahzaib Khan, Advocates.

For the National Accountability

Bureau (Respondent No.2):

Qamar Zaman Chaudhry, Chairman, National Accountability Bureau in person.

Waqas Qadeer Dar, Prosecutory-General Accountability, Arshad Qayyum, Special Prosecutory Accountability, Syed Ali Imran, Special Prosecutory Accountability and Farid-ul-Hasan Ch. Special Prosecutory Accountability.

For the Federal Board of Revenue

(Respondent No3)

Dr. Muhammad Irshad, Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue in person, Muhammad Waqar Rana, Advocate Supreme Court, M.S. Khattak, Advocate on Record and Kh. Tanvir Ahmed, Director-General (intelligence), Shaukat Ali, Director-General, Hafiz Muhamamd Ali Indhar, Director (Legal) and Dr.Muhammad Iqbal Khawaja, Member, Federal Board of Revenue.

For Respondent No.4.

Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Khurram M. Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court and Feisal Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court.

Assisted by:

Saad Hashmi, Sarmad Hani and Mustafa Mirza, Advocates.

Constitution Petition No. 03 of 2017

For the Petitioner

Taufiq Asif, Advocate Supreme Court, Sh. Ahsan-ud-Din, ASC, Atif Ali Khan, ASC, Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate on Record with the petitioner in person.

Assisted by:

Khan Afzal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Ajmal Ghaffar Toor, Saif Ullah Gondal, Sher Hamid Khan, Imran Shafiq and Asad Ullah Bhutto, Advocates.

For the Federation of Pakistan

(Respondents Nos. 1 to 3:

Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Attorney-General for Pakistan, Nayyar Abbas Rizvi, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan, Gulfam Hameed, Deputy Solicitor, Ministry of Law and Justice.

Assisted by:

Barrister Asad Rahim Khan, Salaar Khan, Bilal Naseer and Shahzaib Khan, Advocates.

For Respondent No.4:

Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Khurram M. Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court and Feisal Naqvi, Advocate Supreme Court.

Assisted by:

Saad Hashmi, Sarmad Hani and Mustafa Mirza, Advocates.

Dates of hearing: 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 30th, 31st January, 2017, 1st, 15th, 16th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd February, 2017.

P LD 2017 Supreme Court 661

Present: Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, Dost Muhammad Khan and Manzoor Ahmad Malik, JJ

AMJAD ALI and others---Appellants

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.128 of 2012, decided on 27th March, 2017.

(Against the judgment dated 26-5-2009 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No.1375 of 2005 and Capital Sentence Reference No.21-T of 2005).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Death sentence, confirmation of---Three persons had been done to death during the occurrence---FIR in respect of the said incident had been lodged with sufficient promptitude inasmuch the matter had been reported to the police within two hours of the occurrence---Both the accused persons had been nominated in the FIR and specific roles had been attributed to them therein---Eye-witnesses produced by the prosecution, were natural witnesses because they were inmates of the house wherein one part of the occurrence had taken place---Said eye-witnesses made consistent statements before the Trial Court fully incriminating the accused persons in the offences alleged against them and the medical evidence had provided sufficient support to them---Motive set up by the prosecution was based upon a dispute between the parties over some landed property and the suggestions made by the defence to the eye-witnesses produced by the prosecution went a long way in accepting the motive set up by the prosecution---Some crime-empties secured from the place of occurrence had matched with the firearms recovered from the accused persons and such aspect of the case had provided corroboration to the ocular account---Guilt of the accused persons had been established beyond reasonable doubt---Accused persons had demonstrated extreme highhandedness and brutality inasmuch they started firing in a mosque, chased the victims in a street and then followed them inside the complainant party's house and throughout they kept on firing and murdered three innocent persons and injured another---Such kind of conduct displayed by the accused persons surely detracted from any sympathy to be extended to them in the matter of their sentences of death---Death sentence awarded to accused persons was maintained accordingly.

(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) --

----Ss. 6, 7(a) & Third Sched. Item No. 4(ii)---Terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Act of terrorirsm---Scope----Anti-Terrorism Court, jurisdiction of---Power of Court to convict and sentence an accused---Scope---Occurrence in issue had developed in many phases---Accused persons started firing in a mosque, chased the victims in a street and then followed them inside the complainant party's house and throughout they kept on firing and murdered three persons and injured another---Mere firing at one's personal enemy in the backdrop of a private vendetta or design did not ipso facto bring the case within the purview of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 so as to brand the action as terrorism---In the present case there was no 'design' or 'object' contemplated by S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---By virtue of Item No.4(ii) of the Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 a case became triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court if use of firearms or explosives, etc. in a mosque, imambargah, church, temple or any other place of worship was involved in the case---Said entry in the Third Schedule only made such a case triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court but such a case did not ipso facto become a case of terrorism for the purposes of recording convictions and sentences under S.6 read with S.7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Present case had, thus, rightly been tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court but the said Court could not have convicted and sentenced the accused persons for an offence under S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as it had separately convicted and sentenced the accused persons (under S.302(b), P.P.C) for the offences of murder, etc. committed as ordinary crime---Appeal was partly allowed and the accused persons' convictions and sentences recorded for the offence under S.7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were set aside.

Dr. Khalid Ranjha, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Nayyab Hassan Gardezi, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Tanvir Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

Ch. Muhamamd Waheed, Additional Prosecutor-General, Punjab for the State.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 665

Present: Ejaz Afzal Khan, Maqbool Baqar and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ

RAZIA BEGUM---Petitioner

Versus

NAB and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1834 of 2016 and Criminal Petition No. 615 of 2016, decided on 26th May, 2017.

(Against judgment dated 10.03.2016 of Lahore High Court, Lahore, passed in Criminal Appeal No.1238 and Writ Petition No. 10824 of 2010)

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(v) & 25(a)---Property acquired through corruption and corrupt practices held in the name of another person---Jurisidiction of Accountability Court to record a finding regarding real ownership of benami property---Scope---Accused entered into a Voluntary Return Agreement with the National Accountability Bureau surrendering his moveable and immovable assets---Subject property which was in the name of the petitioner was also a part of the list of the properties surrendered---Petitioner moved an application seeking deletion of her property from the said list---Application filed by petitioner as well as the objections filed by her were dismissed by the Accountability Court, and the application of the Accountability Bureau for transfer of title and possession of the properties surrendered by accused was allowed --- Contention on behalf of Accountability Bureau that accused had misappropriated huge sums of money from the Government Bank and had utilized the said funds to purchase moveable and immovable properties which were held in the names of different relatives including the petitioner, therefore the objection filed by the petitioner had been rightly dismissed by the Accountability Court---Validity---Petitioner appeared as a witness and produced the original sale deed of subject property, however, in her cross-examination she admitted that she was a housewife and had no source of income of her own---Petitioner claimed that her husband and son had provided the funds to purchase the property in question, but she did not produce either of them before the Court---Petitioner also failed to produce any evidence to show that her husband or son had the necessary sources of income to provide the requisite funds to purchase the property---While the petitioner claimed to have paid a sum of Rs.600,000/- to purchase the property, in her statement before the Accountability Court she took the stance that she had paid a sum of Rs. 1 million as price of the property---Petitioner also took contradictory positions regarding the mode, manner and place of payment and stated that she had not directly paid the amount in question and that in fact payment had been made by her son/husband---Record also showed that the property in question was initially purchased by the accused and was subsequently sold by him in favour of his real aunt/petitioner---Courts below were, therefore, justified and had valid grounds for coming to the conclusion that the subject property was owned by the accused and was transferred by him in favour of his real aunt/petitioner in order to hoodwink and defraud the Bank---Reasons recorded by the courts below justifying the freezing order as well as the order directing the competent authorities to transfer the properties in favour of the Accountability Bureau/Government Bank were based upon adequate and sufficient evidence available on the record --- Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(v) & 25(a)---Property acquired through corruption and corrupt practices held in the name of another person---Jurisidiction of Accountability Court to record a finding regarding real ownership of property---Scope---Under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, the Accountability Court had the exclusive jurisdiction to decide all questions arising out of a charge of corrupt and illegal practices specially where properties acquired by misappropriated or corruption based funds were surrendered pursuant to a Voluntary Retun Agreement under S. 25 of the Ordinance.

M. Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Nasir Mehmood Mughal, Special Prosecutor, NAB and Arshad Qayyum, Special Prosecutor, NAB for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 671

Present: Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, ACJ and Dost Muhammad Khan, J

STATE through the Deputy Director (Law), Regional Directorate, Anti-Narcotics Force---Petitioner

Versus

MUJAHID NASEEM LODHI---Respondent

Criminal Petition No. 32 of 2017 and Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 54 of 2017, decided on 5th July, 2017.

(Against the order dated 30.11.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 1501 of 2015)

Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) ---

----S. 9---Possession of heroin---Reappraisal of evidence---Admission of guilt during trial---Effect---Sentence, reduction in---Accused was apprehended while in possession of 3.1 kilograms of heroin, while the co-accused was found in possession of 900 grams of heroin---Both accused and co-accused admitted their guilt during trial and the accused also showed remorse for his actions---Trial Court sentenced the accused to three years' imprisonment with fine, whereas the co-accused was sentenced to four months' imprisonment with fine---State through the Anti-Narcotics Force challenged the quantum of sentence passed against the accused by the Trial Court and sought enhancement of the same in accordance with the sentencing guidelines for narcotics substances laid down in the case of Ghulam Murtaza and another v. The State (PLD 2009 Lahore 362); held, that in the said case the High Court had observed that in a particular case carrying some special features relevant to the matter of sentence a Court may depart from the norms and standards prescribed but in all such cases the Court concerned shall be obliged to record its reasons for such departure---In the present case, the Trial Court had recorded reasons for passing a sentence against the accused and made a departure from the sentencing guidelines provided in Ghulam Murtaza and another v. The State (PLD 2009 Lahore 362)---Trial Court had observed that the accused had made a confession before the court besides expressing remorse and repentance with an assurance not to deal with narcotics in future---Co-accused had also made a confession before the Trial Court and on the basis of such confession he was also awarded a sentence which departed from the sentencing guidelines provided in Ghulam Murtaza and another v. The State (PLD 2009 Lahore 362) but the State had not sought enhancement of his sentence---Reasons recorded for passing a reduced sentence against the accused and for making a departure from the sentencing guidelines provided in Ghulam Murtaza and another v. The State (PLD 2009 Lahore 362) were found to be proper by the Supreme Court in the peculiar circumstances of the present case.

The State through Director-General, Anti-Narcotics Force v. Abdul Jabbar alias Jabbara (Criminal Appeal No.254 of 2014 = 2017 SCMR 1213 and Ghulam Martaza and another v. The State PLD 2009 Lah. 362 ref.

Ameer Zeb v. The State PLD 2012 SC 380 approved.

Raja Inaam Ameen Minhas, Special Prosecutor, Anti-Narcotics Force Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record M.Tariq, Deputy Director (law) for Petitioner.

Respondent in person.

Syed Nayyab Hussain Gardezi, Assistant Attorney-General for Pakistan on Courts' Notice.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 674

Present: Sh. Azmat Saeed and Sajjad Ali Shah, JJ

Malik TARIQ MAHMOOD and others---Appellants

Versus

GHULAM AHMED and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.864 of 2012, decided on 5th June, 2017.

(Against the order dated 11.7.2011 passed by the Lahore High Court in W.P. No. 20722 of 2010)

(a) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)---

----S. 24, first proviso---General Clauses Act ( VI of 1956), S. 8---Suit for pre-emption---Zar-e-soim, deposit of---Scope---Court may require the pre-emptor to deposit the zar-e-soim within a period ranging from one day to thirty days but under no circumstances the Court was left with any power/discretion to allow the pre-emptor to make deposit of the zar-e-soim beyond the period of 30 days---First proviso to S. 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, placed a specific embargo/ restriction on the powers of the Court from extending the time for deposit of zar-e-soim beyond the period of 30 days which was to be reckoned from the date of filing the suit---Section 24(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 provided penal consequences for not depositing the zar-e-soim within a period of 30 days by dismissal of the pre-emption suit.

Muhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Bakhsh PLD 2012 SC 764; Hasnain Nawaz Khan v. Ghulam Akbar PLD 2013 SC 489 and Raja v. Tanveer Riaz PLD 2014 SC 466 ref.

(b) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)---

----S. 24, first proviso---Suit for pre-emption---Zar-e-soim, deposit of---Commencement of time for depositing zar-e-soim---Scope---Period of 30 days for depositing zar-e-soim would commence from the date the presentation of plaint was accepted by the court or the officer so appointed by the court.

(c) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)---

----S. 24, first proviso---Suit for pre-emption---Zar-e-soim, deposit of---Scope---Omission on part of the Court in timely directing the pre-emptor to deposit the zar-e-soim within 30 days---Effect---Requirement of depositing zar-e-soim was subject to the order of the Court, therefore, in cases where Court omitted to pass an order or the matter was not placed in Court within the time frame as provided in the first proviso to S.24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 then the pre-emptor could not be blamed and penalized for such non-deposit (within 30 days) as the deposit of zar-e-soim was subject to the order of the Court---In such cases, however, upon realizing its mistake the Court, while granting time for payment of zar-e-soim, would not be exercising power under the first proviso to S.24, which empowered the Court to grant any period of time up to 30 days in one go or by extending the period from time to time up to the maximum of 30 days, but would remedy its fault under the principle "actus curiae neminem gravabit" i.e. an act of the Court shall prejudice no man, therefore, once a reasonable time was granted for deposit of zar-e-soim to remedy its mistake, the Court shall have no power to extend and grant further time---Even otherwise, time for deposit of zar-e-soim was not granted to the pre-emptor to generate fund from his resources as the pre-emptor must have in his pocket one-third of the sale price of the property sought to be pre-empted while approaching the Court.

Nabi Ahmed v. Muhammad Arshad 2008 SCMR 1685 ref.

Syed Najmul Hassan Kazmi, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Mehar Khan Malik, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.

Ch. Muhammad Yaqoob Sindhu, Advocate Supreme Court and Mian Ghulam Hussain, Advocate-on-Record (absent) for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 681

Present: Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, Dost Muhammad Khan and Qazi Faez Isa, JJ

ASAD KHAN---Appellant

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 2013, decided on 24th May, 2017.

(Against the judgment dated 03.06.2013 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No.76-J of 2009 and Murder Reference No. 41 of 2009)

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Case based on testimony of solitary and chance witness---Motive unproved---Delay in conducting post-mortem examination---Accused was alleged to have murdered his wife and minor children inside his house---Trial Court convicted the accused under S.302(b), P.P.C and sentenced him to death, which sentence was upheld by the High Court---Validity---According to the prosecution the incident in issue had been witnessed by the complainant and two other witnesses---During trial said two witnesses had been given up by the prosecution as having been won over as they had refused to support the prosecution's case against the accused---Solitary eye-witness deposing before the Trial Court was the complainant who was not only the father of accused's wife but was also admittedly a chance witness who had come to the place of occurrence from a district situated more than 200 miles away from the scene of the crime---Stated reason for visit of the complainant to the spot had never been substantiated or established before the Trial Court through any independent evidence---Evidence produced before Trial Court showed that on the day of occurrence complainant was at his place of work in another city---Contents of the FIR lodged by the complainant also showed that he admitted working as a regular employee in another city and he had never claimed that on the day of occurrence he was on leave from work---Motive set up by the prosecution was never established through any independent evidence---Alleged recovery of a hatchet from the possession of accused during the investigation was unbelievable as the said hatchet had statedly been recovered from an open field belonging to somebody else and the investigating officer had conceded before the Trial Court that at the time of its recovery the hatchet was not stained with blood---Medical evidence did not support the case of the prosecution for the simple reason that post-mortem examination of the deadbodies had been conducted after more than 17 hours of the alleged occurrence---Delay in conducting post-mortem examination of the deadbodies indicated that time had been consumed by the complainant party and the police in procuring and planting eye-witnesses and in cooking up a story for the prosecution---Prosecution had not been able to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt---Accused was acquitted of the charge of murder by extending the benefit of doubt to him---Appeal was allowed accordingly.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Wife/vulnerbale dependent of accused dying within the confines of his house---Burden of proof---Scope---Where a wife or vulnerable dependent of a person died an unnatural death in the house of such person then some part of the onus/obligation laid on him to establish the circumstances in which such unnatural death had occurred---Where, however, the entire case of the prosecution stood demolished or was found to be utterly unbelievable then an accused person could not be convicted merely because he did not explain the circumstances in which his wife or some vulnerable dependent had lost his life---Entire burden of proof could not be shifted to the accused in that regard, if the case of the prosecution itself collapsed.

Arshad Mehmood v. The State 2005 SCMR 1524; Saeed Ahmed v. The State 2015 SCMR 710 and Abdul Majeed v. The State 2011 SCMR 941 ref.

Syeda B.H. Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Muhammad Jaffar, Deputy Prosecutor-General, Punjab for the State.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 684

Present: Gulzar Ahmed, Maqbool Baqar and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ

Syed KHALIQ SHAH---Appellant

Versus

ABDUL RAHEEM ZIARATWAL and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 13-Q of 2014, decided on 18th May, 2017.

(Against judgment dated 14.04.2014 of the Election Tribunal, Quetta-I passed in E.P. No. 67 of 2013)

(a) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----S. 70(b)---Ground for declaring election as a whole void---Election for seat of Provincial Assembly---Allegations of rigging and corrupt or illegal practices based on unreliable oral evidence---Absence of documentary evidence---Effect---Constituency in question contained a total of 51 polling stations and the runner-up candidate (apellant) alleged rigging, corrupt and illegal practices in 41 polling stations---Out of the said 41 disputed polling stations, returned-candidate prevailed in only 10---In the remaining 31 polling stations, either the runner-up candidate or other candidates secured higher number of votes---Comparative table of votes obtained by the runner-up candidate and some of the other candidates showed that even in those polling stations where returned-candidate won there was no apparent or marked abnormality in the number of votes polled in favour of the returned-candidate---Votes polled were almost evenly divided amongst the candidates---Perusal of statements of the witnesses produced by the runner-up candidate showed that they did not adequately support the statements made in their affidavits, contradicted themselves in cross-examination, and did not inspire confidence as to their truthfulness and veracity---Despite allegations of illegal and corrupt practices, and dereliction of duty and connivance on the part of the election officials, no written application was filed before any competent authority at any stage---Allegation of casting of bogus votes remained unproved and unsubstantiated by any independent and reliable evidence---None of the election agents of returned-candidate or the Election Commission officials allegedly involved in rigging or corrupt practices were named or identified---No documentary evidence of any nature to substantiate allegation of shifting of polling stations and appointment of Returning Officers and Deputy Returning Officers at the behest or under the influence of returned-candidate was brought on record---Runner-up candidate admitted in his cross-examination that he did not have any proof of the unauthorized change of election staff, and no written complaint had been filed by him or his polling agents regarding polling of bogus votes or the use of illegal and corrupt practices in any of the disputed 41 polling stations, despite the fact that he admittedly had polling agents in each of the said polling stations---On the basis of unreliable oral evidence which was unsubstantiated by any credible independent evidence and in the absence of documentary evidence, it would be unjust and unfair to unseat a returned candidate and disenfranchise the entire constituency---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(b) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----S. 70(b)---Ground for declaring election as a whole void---Allegations of rigging and the use of corrput and illegal practices---Burden of proof---Onus to prove such allegations was on the person alleging such practices.

(c) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 38(5)(b) & 39(6)(a)---Election petition---Application for verification of thumb impressions on the counterfoils and recount of the ballots---Scope---Order of recount or verification of thumb impressions would only be justified where there was prima facie evidence of rigging and the casting of invalid ballots available on the record.

(d) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 38(5)(b) & 39(6)(a)---Election petition---Application for recount of the ballots---Pre-requisites and principles---Where the runner-up candidate/election petitioner wished to get ballots recounted by the Returning Officer, he was required to satisfy the Returning Officer that his request was, firstly, reasonable; secondly, prima facie there were errors, omission or flaws in the counting process and, thirdly, the allegations of impersonation or bogus votes being cast were reported in a timely manner through written applications to the competent functionaries---Recounting of ballot papers could only be ordered if the conditions laid down in such behalf were fulfilled and the Returning Officer/Election Tribunal was satisfied on the basis of material produced before it that the request was reasonable---Recount could not be granted as a matter of right on the basis of vague allegations---Power to order a recount was to be used sparingly and with circumspection, the only object being to ensure a fair and lawful result of the electoral exercise.

Sardar Abdul Hafeez Khan v. Sardar Muhammad Tahir Khan Loni 1999 SCMR 284; Kanwar Ijaz Ali v. Irshad Ali PLD 1986 SC 483; Jam Madad Ali v.Asghar Ali Junejo 2016 SCMR 251 and Muhammad Ashraf Warraich v. Muhammad Nasir Cheema 2016 SCMR 998 ref.

(e) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 38(5)(b) & 39(6)(a)---Election petition---Application for recount of the ballots---Grounds---Mere fact that the difference in the number of voles cast for the winning and losing candidate was small was not by itself a justification for recount, especially so where a recount was not claimed at the appropriate stage before the competent-forum and no ground to justify such recount was pleaded or established.

Kamran Murtaza, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Hadi Shakil Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 692

Present: Ejaz Afzal Khan, Sh. Azmat Saeed and Ijaz ul Ahsan, JJ

C.M.A. NO. 4978 OF 2017 IN CONSTITUTION

PETITION NO. 29 OF 2016 ETC.

(Report by JIT)

AND

C.M.A. NO. 2939 OF 2017 IN CONSTITUTION

PETITION NO. 29 OF 2016 ETC.

IMRAN AHMED KHAN and others---Applicants

Versus

Mian MUHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF, PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN---Respondent

AND

CONSTITUTION PETITION NO. 29 OF 2016

(Under Article 184 of the Constitution)

IMRAN AHMED KHAN NIAZI---Petitioner

Versus

Mian MUHAMMAD NAWAZ SHARIF, PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

AND

CONSTITUTION PETITION NO. 30 OF 2016

(Under Article 184 of the Constitution)

Sheikh RASHEED AHMED---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Law, Justice and Parliamentary Division and others---Respondents

AND

CONSTITUTION PETITION NO. 03 OF 2017

(Under Article 184 of the Constitution)

SIRAJ-UL-HAQ, AMEER JAMAT-E-ISLAMI, PAKISTAN---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others---Respondents

C.M.As. Nos. 4978 and 2939 of 2017 in Constitutional Petition No. 29 of 2016 etc., Constitutional Petitions Nos. 29, 30 of 2016 and 3 of 2017, decided on 28th July, 2017.

(a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(v), 10 & 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.184(3)---Corruption and corrupt practices---Acquisition of assets and funds beyond known sources of income---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court seeking disqualification of Prime Minister for acquiring wealth and assets through corrupt and illegal practices and misuse of authority and indulging in money laundering---Assets situated abroad owned by the Prime Minister's sons and daughter through offshore companies were revealed in the "Panama Papers" [leaked documents belonging to a foreign law firm that detailed financial and lawyer-client information of numerous offshore entities]---Careful examination of the material brought on record so far revealed that a prima facie case under Ss. 9, 10 & 15 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 was made out against the Prime Minister, his sons and his daughter vis-à-vis certain assets situated abroad ---Supreme Court directed that the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) shall within six weeks prepare and file before the Accountability Court, references against the Prime Minister, his sons and daughter, and his son-in-law, relating to certain foreign assets, companies and businesses; that the said references shall be filed on the basis of the material collected and referred to by the Joint Investigating Team (JIT) in its report and such other material as may be available with the Federal Investigating Agency (FIA) and NAB having any nexus with the assets or which may subsequently become available including material that may come before it pursuant to the Mutual Legal Assistance requests sent by the JIT to different jurisdictions; that NAB shall also include in the proceedings all other persons who had any direct or indirect nexus or connection with the actions of the Prime Minister, his sons and his daughter, leading to acquisition of assets and funds beyond their known sources of income; that NAB may file supplementary reference(s) if and when any other asset, which was not prima facie reasonably accounted for, was discovered; that the Accountability Court shall proceed with and decide the references within a period of six months from the date of filing such references; that in case the Accountability Court found any deed, document or affidavit filed by or on behalf of the Prime Minister, his sons and his daughter or any other person, to be fake, false, forged or fabricated, it shall take appropriate action against the concerned person(s) in accordance with law, and that the tenure of service of members of the Joint Investigating Team (JIT) and their support and ancillary staff shall be safeguarded and protected and no adverse action of any nature including transfer and posting shall be taken against them without informing the Judge of the Supreme Court who was going to supervise and monitor the implementation of the present judgment---Present Bench requested the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to nominate a Judge of the Supreme Court to supervise and monitor implementation of the present judgment in letter and spirit and oversee the proceedings conducted by the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and the Accountability Court.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 9(a)(v), 10 & 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.184(3)---Possessing assets and funds beyond known sources of income---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court---Incumbent Finance Minister---Careful examination of the material brought on record so far revealed that a prima facie case under Ss. 9, 10 & 15 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 was made out against incumbent Finance Minister vis-à-vis a 91 times increase (from Rs.9.11 million to 831.70 million) in his assets within a short span of time---Supreme Court directed that the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) shall within six weeks prepare and file before the Accountability Court, references against the incumbent Finance Minister for possessing assets and funds beyond his known sources of income; that NAB shall also include in the proceedings all other persons who had any direct or indirect nexus or connection with the actions of the incumbent Finance Minister leading to acquisition of assets and funds beyond his known sources of income; that NAB may file supplementary reference(s) if and when any other asset, which was not prima facie reasonably accounted for, was discovered; that the Accountability Court shall proceed with and decide the references within a period of six months from the date of filing such references, and that in case the Accountability Court found any deed, document or affidavit filed by or on behalf of the incumbent Finance Minister, or any other person to be fake, false, forged or fabricated, it shall take appropriate action against the concerned person(s) in accordance with law.

(c) Words and phrases---

----'Asset'---Definition.

Black's Law Dictionary ref.

(d) Words and phrases---

----'Receivable'---Meaning and connotation.

Black's Law Dictionary ref.

(e) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)---

----Ss. 12(2)(f) & 99(1)(f)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 184(3)---Constitutional petition before the Supreme Court---Nomination papers---Non-disclosure of 'un-withdrawn receivables' by the Prime Minister in his nomination papers---Effect---Disqualification from membership of Parliament (Majlis-e-Shoora) for not being 'honest'---Admittedly the Prime Minister had acquired a work permit in a foreign city, remained Chairman of the Board of a company incorporated in the same foreign city and was entitled to a salary from the said company---Prime Minister claimed that he never withdrew the salary in question, therefore, it was not an "asset" that had to be disclosed in his nomination papers---Validity---Salary not withdrawn would nevertheless be receivable and as such would constitute an asset for all legal and practical purposes, which had to be disclosed by the Prime Minister in his nomination papers in terms of S.12(2)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976---Since the Prime Minister did not disclose the unwithdrawn salary/asset in his nomination papers, it amounted to furnishing a false declaration on solemn affirmation in violation of S.12(2)(f), therefore, he was not 'honest' in terms of S.99(1)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and Art.62(1)(f) of the Constitution, and was consequently disqualified to be a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)---Supreme Court directed that the Election Commission shall issue a notification disqualifying the Prime Minister from being a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) with immediate effect, whereafter he shall cease to be the Prime Minister, and that the President was required to take all necessary steps under the Constitution to ensure continuation of the democratic process.

"FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT

The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) shall within six weeks from the date of this judgment prepare and file before the Accountability Court, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, the following References, on the basis of the material collected and referred to by the Joint Investigating Team (JIT) in its report and such other material as may be available with the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and NAB having any nexus with assets mentioned below or which may subsequently become available including material that may come before it pursuant to the Mutual Legal Assistance requests sent by the JIT to different jurisdictions:--

a) Reference against Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, (respondent No. 1), Maryam Nawaz Sharif (Maryam Safdar), (Respondent No. 6), Hussain Nawaz Sharif (Respondent No. 7), Hassan Nawaz Sharif (Respondent No. 8) and Capt. (Retd). Muhammad Safdar (Respondent No. 9) relating to the Avenfield properties (Flats Nos. 16, 16-A, 17 and 17-A Avenfield House, Park Lane, London, United Kingdom). In preparing and filing this Reference, the NAB shall also consider the material already collected during the course of investigations conducted earlier, as indicated in the detailed judgments;

b) Reference against respondents Nos. 1, 7 and 8 regarding Azizia Steel Company and Hill Metal Establishment, as indicated in the main judgment;

c) Reference against respondents Nos. 1, 7 and 8 regarding the Companies mentioned in paragraph 9 of the judgment unanimously rendered by Mr. Justice Ejaz Afzal Khan, Mr. Justice Sh. Azmat Saeed and Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan;

d) Reference against respondent No. 10 for possessing assets and funds beyond his known sources of income, as discussed in paragraph 9 of the judgment unanimous rendered by Mr. Justice Ejaz Afzal Khan, Mr. Justice Sh. Azmat Saeed and Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan;

e) NAB shall also include in the proceedings all other persons including Sheikh Saeed, Musa Ghani, Kashif Masood Qazi, Javaid Kiyani and Saeed Ahmed, who have any direct or indirect nexus or connection with the actions of respondents Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8 and 10 leading to acquisition of assets and funds beyond their known sources of income;

f) NAB may file supplementary Reference(s) if and when any other asset, which is not prima facie reasonably accounted for, is discovered;

g) The Accountability Court shall proceed with and decide the aforesaid References within a period of six months from the date of filing such References; and

h) In case the Accountability Court finds any deed, document or affidavit filed by or on behalf of the respondent(s) or any other person(s) to be fake, false, forged or fabricated, it shall take appropriate action against the concerned person in accordance with law.

1. It is hereby declared that having failed to disclose his un-withdrawn receivables constituting assets from Capital FZE Jebel Ali, UAE in his nomination papers filed for the General Elections held in 2013 in terms of section 12(2)(f) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (ROPA), and having furnished a false declaration under solemn affirmation respondent No. 1 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif is not honest in terms of section 99(f) of ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and therefore he is disqualified to be a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament).

2. The Election Commission of Pakistan shall issue a notification disqualifying respondent No. 1 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif from being a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) with immediate effect, whereafter he shall cease to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan;

3. The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is required to take all necessary steps under the Constitution to ensure continuation of the democratic process.

4. The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Pakistan is requested to nominate an Hon'ble Judge of this Court to supervise and monitor implementation of this judgment in letter and spirit and oversee the proceedings conducted by NAB and the Accountability Court in the above mentioned matters.

5. This Court commends and appreciates the hard work and efforts made by Members of the JIT and their support and ancillary staff in preparing and filing a comprehensive and detailed Report as per our orders. Their tenure of service shall be safeguarded and protected and no adverse action of any nature including transfer and posting shall be taken against them without informing the monitoring Judge of this Court nominated by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Pakistan."

Syed Naeem Bokhari, Advocate Supreme Court, Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, Advocate Supreme Court, Fawad Hussain Ch., Advocate Supreme Court, Faisal Fareed Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Barrister Maleeka Bokhari, Shahid Naseem Gondal, Advocate, Kashif Nawaz Siddiqui, Advocate and M. Imad Khan, Advocate for the Petitioners (in Const. P. No.29 of 2016).

Khawaja Harris Ahmed, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by M. Amjad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court, Saad Hashmi, Advocate and Adnan Khawaja, Advocate for Respondent No.1 (in Const. P. No.29 of 2016).

Akbar Tarar, APGA, Arshad Qayyum, Spl. Prosecutor, Ch. M. Farid-ul-Hassan, Spl. Prosecutor, Imran-ul-Haq, Spl. Prosecutor and Ajmal Aziz, Spl. Prosecutor for Respondent No.2 (in Const. P. No.29 of 2016).

M. Waqar Rana, Additional A.-G. and M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Barrister Asad Rahim Khan for Respondents Nos.3 to 5 (in Const.P. No.29 of 2016).

Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Asad Ladha, Advocate, Ghulam Sabir Malik, Advocate, Usman Ali Bhoon, Advocate, M. Shakeel Mughal, Advocate and Aftab Zafar, Advocate for Respondents Nos. 6 to 9 (in Const.P. No.29 of 2016).

Dr. Tariq Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 10 (in Const.P. No.29 of 2016).

Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, (in person) for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No. 30 of 2016).

M. Waqar Rana, Additional A.-G. and M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Barrister Asad Rahim Khan for Respondents Nos. 1 and 3 (in Constitutional Petition No. 30 of 2016).

Akbar Tarar, APGA, Arshad Qayyum, Spl. Prosecutor, Ch. M. Farid-ul-Hassan, Spl. Prosecutor, Imran-ul-Haq, Spl. Prosecutor and Ajmal Aziz, Spl. Prosecutor for Respondent No. 2 (in Constitutional Petition No. 30 of 2016).

Khawaja Harris Ahmed, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by M. Amjad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court, Saad Hashmi, Advocate and Adnan Khawaja, Advocate for Respondent No.4 (in Constitutional Petition No. 30 of 2016).

Taufiq Asif, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Atif Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court, Ajmal Ghaffar Toor, Advocate, Saifullah Gondal, Advocate and Sher Hamad Khan, Advocate for Petitioners (in Constitutional Petition No. 3 of 2017).

M. Waqar Rana, Additional A.-G. and M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Barrister Asad Rahim Khan for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 (in Constitutional Petition No. 3 of 2017).

Khawaja Harris Ahmed, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by M. Amjad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court, Saad Hashmi, Advocate and Adnan Khawaja, Advocate for Respondent No. 4 (in Constitutional Petition No. 3 of 2017).

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 718

Present: Mian Saqib Nisar, C.J., Umar Ata Bandial and Faisal Arab, JJ

PAKISTAN TELECOMMUNICATION EMPLOYEES' TRUST---Appellant

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 1352 of 2013, decided on 4th August, 2017.

(On appeal from the judgment of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad dated 2.10.2012 passed in I.C.A. No. 222 of 2010)

(a) Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (XVIII of 1980)---

----Ss. 1(2), 2(xxiii)(b) & 3---Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organisation) Act (XVII of 1996), Ss. 2(w), 44, 45 & 46 --- Sahib-e-nisab --- Scope --- Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust ("the Trust")---Zakat, deduction of---Appellant-Trust was managing the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Employees Pension Fund ("the Pension Fund"), certain amounts of which were invested in various banks and schemes etc.---Zakat and Ushr Department deducted zakat in terms of S.3 the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 ('the Ordinance')---Trust challenged such deductions on the ground that it was owned by the Federal Government, therefore, it was not a sahib-e-nisab and thus, could not be made subject to compulsory deduction of zakat---Validity---Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust ("the Trust") was an independent and autonomous body which was not wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by the Federal Government---Mere creation of the Trust by a notification issued by the Federal Government under S.44 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organisation) Act, 1996, did not, mean that the Trust was wholly owned by the Federal Government---Trust could acquire and hold property, both moveable and immoveable, and could sue and be sued in its own name---Trust was managed by the Board which was free to take decisions by simple majority, and just because half of the members of the Board were appointed by the Federal Government, it could not be concluded that the Trust was owned by the Federal Government---Board was free and independent to exercise its powers and carry out its functions in accordance with law with no interference whatsoever from the Federal Government---For all its actions, the Trust was neither required to obtain prior permission nor was bound to get the same validated from the Federal Government, apart from the framing of rules for the management and conduct of business of the Trust---Federal Government made no contributions whatsoever to the Pension Fund---Additionally, the Trust was a body of individuals, albeit not incorporated, the beneficial ownership of which was held, by Muslim citizens, thus, the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance 1980 was applicable to the Trust in terms of territorial, subject matter and parties' jurisdiction contained in S.1(2) of the Ordinance---Trust was not owned, directly or indirectly, by the Federal Government and was therefore not excluded from the definition of sahib-e-nisab under S.2(xxiii)(b) of the Ordinance---Trust was liable to compulsory payment of zakat under S.3 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Administration General Zakat, Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad and others v. Pakistan Insurance Corporation through Secretary and others PLD 2016 SC 468 distinguished.

(b) Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (XVIII of 1980) ---

----Ss. 2(xxiii)(i) & 3---Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organisation) Act (XVII of 1996), Ss. 2(w) & 44---Societies Registration Act (XXI of 1860), Preamble---Companies Act (VII of 1913), S. 26 [since repealed]---Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979), S. 47 [since repealed]---"Sahib-e-nisab"---Scope---Charitable trust---Zakat, exemption from--- Pre-requisites--- Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust ("the Trust")---Institution, fund, trust, endowment or society was exempt from deduction of zakat in terms of S. 2(xxiii)(i) of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980 if it met two conditions; first, it was registered as a charitable organization under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or as a company under S.26 of the Companies Act, 1913 [since repealed], or registered or approved as a charitable or social welfare organization under any other law for the time being in force; and, secondly, it was approved by the (erstwhile) Central Board of Revenue for the purposes of S.47 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (since repealed)---Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust ("the Trust") was not registered as a charitable or social welfare organization under any relevant law---Besides the Trust was not involved in any social welfare or charitable activity, rather it only provided pension to the retiring employees of the erstwhile Pakistan Telephone and Telegraph Department---Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust was not a trust that fell within the provisions of S.2(xxiii)(i) of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, and was thus not excluded from the definition of sahib-e-nisab---Trust was liable to compulsory payment of zakat under S.3 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

(c) Interpretation of statutes --

----Redundancy could not be attributed to the legislature.

(d) Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (XVIII of 1980) ---

----Ss. 2(xxiii) & 3---Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organisation) Act (XVII of 1996), Ss. 45 & 46---"Sahib-e-nisab"---Scope---Zakat, deduction of---Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Employees Pension Fund ("the Pension Fund")---Scope---Pakistan Telecommuni-cation Employees Trust ("the Trust") was managing the Pension Fund---Contention on behalf of Trust that the Pension Fund was not an asset of the Trust, rather it ('the Trust') was only a conduit and merely held the Pension Fund on trust for the employees/pensioners of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited as 'amanat', thus the Trust was exempt from payment of zakat---Validity---Under S. 45 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organisation) Act, 1996, all assets of the Pension Fund and such liabilities as were specified in the notification, stood vested in the Trust and became its assets and liabilities---Under S.46 of the Act, the Board was to take over and assume the liability of the Pension Fund, including contributions of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. to the Pension Fund---Furthermore, the Board was authorized to, inter alia, administer and operate the Pension Fund [section 46(2)(b) of the Act] and acquire, lease, encumber, dispose of, exchange, invest or otherwise deal with any moveable or immoveable property or any interest therein [section 46(2)(f)]---Trust, therefore, clearly held and possessed the assets, i.e. the Pension Fund---Moreover, to qualify as a "sahib-e-nisab" and to fall within the ambit of the charging section (section 3 of the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980), a person may not necessarily be the owner of an asset rather need only possess the same---For all intents and purposes it was the Trust that owned or had the legal title to the assets, therefore, even if it was accepted that the real ownership was the beneficial ownership which vested in the employees/pensioners who were the beneficiaries of the Pension Fund, the Trust being in possession of such Fund would still qualify as a "sahib-e-nisab" under S. 2(xxiii) of the Ordinance and would fall within the ambit of S. 3 thereof and be liable to payment of zakat---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America through Lahore Church Counsel v. The Government of the Punjab through Secretary Education, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and another 1987 SCMR 1197 distinguished.

(e) Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (XVIII of 1980) ---

----S. 3---Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organisation) Act (XVII of 1996), Ss. 45 & 46---Zakat, deduction of---Double taxation---Scope---Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Employees Pension Fund ("the Pension Fund") managed by the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust ("the Trust")---Contention on behalf of Trust that deducting zakat from the Trust would amount to double taxation as zakat would subsequently be deducted from the person who eventually received the pension (if he was a sahib-e-nisab)---Validity---Zakat under the Ordinance was collected only once a year---If in one year, zakat was deducted from the Trust, and subsequently an employee/pensioner was determined to be entitled to pension and was made such payment from the Pension Fund, for the next year when such pensioner held and possessed his pension amount, if he fulfilled the conditions of S.3 of the Ordinance and was a "sahib-e-nisab", it was only he who would be liable to pay zakat upon the amount held by him, and not the Trust which had ceased to hold and possess such amount---Possibility of double taxation, thus, did not exist---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Hamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and M.S. Khattak, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.

Abdul Rasheed Awan, DAG and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 730

Present: Dost Muhammad Khan, Qazi Faez Isa and Sardar Tariq Masood, JJ

KHALIL AHMED SOOMRO and others---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Petition No. 945 of 2017, decided on 28th August, 2017.

(On appeal from the order dated 17.7.2017 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Karachi in Crl. Bail Application No. 1089 of 2017)

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 498 & 497---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(vi), 337-L(2) & 504---Shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah damiyah, ghayr-jaifah munaqqillah, other hurt, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Mala fide of complainant---Offences with which accused persons were charged were punishable by way of imprisonment which did not fall within the prohibitory part of S. 497, Cr.P.C.---When the accused persons were entitled to post arrest bail, their prayer for pre-arrest bail, if declined, would be a matter of technicality alone---Accused persons were likely to be humiliated and disgraced due to their arrest at the hands of the local police---In the present case, it appeared that net had been thrown wider and the injuries sustained by the victims except one or two, had been exaggerated---Seemingly efforts had been made to show that the offences fell within such provisions of law, which were punishable with five years' or seven years' imprisonment---All said aspects, when considered combindly, constituted mala fides on part of complainant party---Accused persons were granted pre-arrest bail accordingly.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 498---Pre-arrest bail---Pre-conditions---Mala fide, inference of---For grant of pre-arrest bail one of the pre conditions was that the accused person had to show that his arrest was intended by the prosecution out of mala fide and for ulterior considerations---At pre-arrest bail stage, it was difficult for the accused to prove the element of mala fide through positive/solid evidence/materials, therefore, the same was to be deduced and inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case---Where certain events or hints to such effect were available, the same would validly constitute the element of mala fide.

(c) Police Rules, 1934---

----Vol. II, Ch. XXV, R. 25.19(1)---Medico-legal opinion---Description of injuries by the Medico-legal Officer in the examination report---Scope---Practice of describing the sections of penal law under which the injuries fell by the Medico-legal Officer---Supreme Court deprecated such practice by Medico-Legal officers and observed that they should not assume the status of the prosecution/prosecutors, as such was neither their domain nor they had lawful authority to direct or convey to the Investigating Agency the nature of offence; that the Medico-legal Officers should (only) describe the nature of injuries under the dispensation of law and not the provision of law, under which it fell.

Shuaib Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners along with Petitioners.

Zafar Ahmad Khan, Additional P.-G. Sindh for the State.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 733

Present: Dost Muhammad Khan, Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

MUHAMMAD TANVEER---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 662 of 2017, decided on 22nd August, 2017.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 22.5.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in Crl. Misc. No. 2593-B of 2017)

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 381-A & 411---Theft of motor vehicle, dishonestly receiving stolen property---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Accused was alleged to have stolen a motorbike, which was subsequently recovered from his house---No one had witnessed the lifting of the motorbike and no evidence to that effect was available on record, therefore, the insertion of S. 381-A, P.P.C. in the charge against accused, appeared not only unjustified but also spoke about mala fide of the police---Question as to whether in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the petitioner was liable to be prosecuted under S. 381-A, P.P.C. or 411 P.P.C., was a debatable question to which the Trial Court could give due consideration---None of the two offences with which accused was charged were punishable with imprisonment falling within the prohibitory limb of S. of 497, Cr.P.C. thus, refusal to grant bail to the accused would be highly unjustified---Accused was granted bail accordingly.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Cases not falling within the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C. and practice in subordinate courts of refusing bail in such cases on feeble grounds---Supreme Court observed that such practice should come to an end because the public, particularly accused persons charged for such offences were unnecessarily burdened with extra expenditure and the Supreme Court was heavily taxed because hundreds of leave petitions piled up in the Supreme Court and the diary of the Court was congested with such like petitions; that precious time of the Supreme Court was wasted in disposal of such petitions; that the Supreme Court was purely a constitutional court to deal with intricate questions of law and Constitution and to lay down guiding principles for the Courts of the country where law points required interpretation; that prisons were accommodating convicted and under-trial prisoners more than double their capacity and State authorities were involved in transporting such prisoners from the prisons to the court premises on daily basis for court hearings, which involved risks and extra expenditures from the public exchequer; and that grant of bail in offences not falling within the prohibitory limb of S. 497, Cr.P.C. was a rule and refusal an exception, therefore all subordinate courts, special courts and tribunals should follow said principle in its letter and spirit.

Mansha Khan v. The State 1977 SCMR 449; Tariq Bashir v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34; The State v. Syed Qaim Ali Shah 1992 SCMR 2192 and Khan Asfandyar Wali and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607 ref.

(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Bail---Discretion of court---Scope---Once the legislature had conferred discretion on the court to exercise jurisdiction in particular category of offences without placing any prohibition on such discretion then, the court shall not import to such provision of law, reasons or factors alien thereto and not specifically mentioned in the statute.

Ijaz Ahmad Toor, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Ch. Muhammad Sarwar Sidhu, APG Punjab and Muhammad Ijaz, ASI for the State.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court 738

Present: Mushir Alam, Qazi Faez Isa and Sardar Tariq Masood, JJ

Messrs BARA GHEE MILLS (PVT.) LTD. and 2 others---Petitioners

Versus

The ASSISTANT COLLECTOR CUSTOMS and 4 others---Respondents

Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals Nos. 549-P of 2015, 141-P and 142-P of 2017, decided on 6th April, 2017.

(Against the judgment dated 10.07.2015 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 1283-P/2015 and against the common Judgment dated 21.9.2015 passed in W.P. No. 3685-P/2015 and in Review Petition No. 160-P of 2015 (arising out of W.P. No.1283-P/15) respectively)

(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

---S.196---Customs Rules, 2001, Chapt. XI [Rr.133 to 215-A]---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition filed directly before the High Court against recovery of customs duties and other leviable government dues---Maintainability---Procedure for recovery and remedy against recovery of government dues, was provided for under Chapter XI of the Customs Rules, 2001---Appeals and revisions against the orders of adjudicating authority/forum/tribunals were catered for under Chapter XIX of the Customs Act, 1969 which proceedings culminated in the High Court in its referral jurisdiction under S. 196 of the Customs Act, 1969---In matters emnating from income tax reference, customs appeals etc., where the High Court itself was the repository of ultimate appellate, revisional or referral powers conferred by the special relevant statute, it was rare for the High Court to be persuaded to entertain a constitutional petition in preference to its own appellate, revisional or referral jurisdiction.

Khalid Mehmood v. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Lahore 1999 SCMR 1831 and Messrs Paramount Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Customs, Sales Tax and Central Excise Appellate Tribunal and another 2012 SCMR 1860 ref.

(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----S. 202---Recovery of Government dues---Limitation---For recovery of Governmental dues under S.202 of the Customs Act 1969, no limitation was provided.

Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Hafiz Ahsan Ahmed Khokar, Advocate Supreme Court for FBR (on Court's call).

P L D 2017 Supreme Court (AJ&K) 1

Present: Mohammad Azam Khan, C.J., and Raja Saeed Akram Khan, J

NOOR ALAM---Appellant

Versus

MUHAMMAD LATIF and 3 others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.112 of 2012, decided on 30th May, 2013.

(On appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 13-6-2012 in Civil Appeal No.164 of 2010).

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----Ss. 12(2), 96(3) & O.XXIII, R.23---Power of attorney---Compromise decree, setting aside of---Appeal against compromise decree---Competency---Trial Court dismissed the suit against which appeal was filed---Appellate Court accepted the appeal on the basis of compromise and decreed the suit---Contention of applicant was that when application for compromise was moved defendant was not owner of the suit land---Validity---Attorney was appointed for filing suit for cancellation of gift deed---Principal had not appointed his attorney with regard to appeal pending before the Appellate Court---Attorney, in circumstances, had no authority to act on behalf of principal in the said appeal---Attorney could exercise only such powers which were conferred upon him in the power-of-attorney---Agent could neither go beyond nor deviate from the terms of instrument---Attorney, therefore, had no authority to enter into compromise on behalf of principal for acceptance of appeal---Compromise decree passed by the Appellate Court to the extent of the share of principal was nullity and not maintainable---When defendant had alienated land during pendency of suit, he did not remain owner of the property---Defendant after alienating the land could not compromise the matter---Compromise decree on such score was not maintainable---Person who was not party in a compromise could validly challenge the compromise decree---Pro forma respondent had not accepted the compromise which was against his interest---Appeal, in circumstances, was competent before the High Court---Appeal was dismissed by Supreme Court.

Maqsood Ahmad and another v. Muhammad Razzaque and 9 others PLD 2009 SC(AJ&K) 13; Sree Nalini Kanta Sen v. Babu Monarangan Prasad Barman PLD 1967 Dacca 155; Mst. Amna Bibi v. Muhammad Iqbal 1990 CLC 1492; Sindh Road Transport Corporation v. Major (Rtd) S.M. Ali Zaheer Khan 1991 SCMR 425; Umar Bakhsh and 2 others v. Azam Khan and 12 others 1993 SCMR 374 and Shaukat Habib and 5 others v. Raja Muhammad Bashir and another 2004 YLR 1775 ref.

Middle East Contractors, Mirpur v. Project Director, Resettlement Organization Mangla Dam Project WAPDA Mirpur and 2 others PLD 1978 SC(AJ&K) 143; Gul Taj Begum v. Lal Hussain and another PLD 1980 SC(AJ&K) 60 and Muhammad Mehrban v. Sadrud Din and another 1995 SCR 274 rel.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 96(3) & O.XXIII, R.3---Appeal---Compromise decree---Scope---Lawful order passed in the result of compromise was not open to appeal or revision.

(c) Power-of-attorney--

----Power of attorney should be construed strictly. [

Muhammad Akram Mughal for Appellant.

Ch. Yasir Mehmood for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court (AJ&K) 11

Present Mohammad Azam Khan, C.J. and Raja Saeed Akram Khan, J

Kh. ZIA AHMED---Appellant

Versus

AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR EHTESAB BUREAU through Chairman/Chief Prosecutor---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No.78 of 2013, decided on 5th March, 2015.

(On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 19-3-2013 in Revision Petition No.31 of 2007)

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 467, 468, 471, 419, 420 & 109---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)---Ehtesab Act (IX of 1997), S.4---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau Act (I of 2001), Ss.2(3), 10 & 11---Pakistan Rehabilitation Act (XLII of 1956), S.15---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), S.42---Forgery, forgery for purpose of cheating, using as genuine a forged document, cheating by personation, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, abetment, corruption and corrupt practices---Allegation against accused was that he, by misusing his official capacity, procured allotments at six places in the years 1981, 1982, 1995 & 1999---Case against accused was that he procured the allotments of evacuee property in Azad Jammu and Kashmir without entitlement by stating; at one place that he was refugee (1947); whereas he procured the allotment at another place by showing himself a refugee (1965)---Questions, whether accused was entitled to procure the allotments; whether he had misused the authority of Public Office and whether the allotments procured by accused were legal or illegal, could only be resolved after recording the evidence---Provisions of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001, were applicable to the offences which had been committed after first January, 1985---Some allotments had been procured by accused before 1985---Record had shown that allotments at two Mozias had been procured by accused on 7-5-1981 & 14-12-1982---Ehtesab Bureau, in circumstances, could not probe into the matter of said allotments---Under S.2(3) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Ehtesab Bureau Act, 2001, the offences committed after 1st January, 1985 would be triable under that Act---Offences relating to allotments procured prior to 1st January, 1985, would not fall in the ambit of Ehtesab Bureau---Case of accused itself was that if those allotments were procured by making false statement, then he could be proceeded against under S.15 of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956---Appeal to the extent of allotments procured in the years 1981 & 1982, was accepted---Ehtesab Bureau, had no jurisdiction to enquire into the matter and file references in respect of those allotments---Appeals to the extent of remaining allotments which were procured after 1st January, 1985, were dismissed---Trial Court would proceed with the matter accordingly.

Malick Hussain Shah v. S.P. Rangers and others (Civil Appeal No.l90 of 2007); Muhammad Munir Awan v. AJ&K Ehtesab Bureau 2011 SCR 407 and Ehtesab Bureau v. Abdi Hussain and others Criminal Appeal No.47 of 2013 ref.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 265-K---Acquittal of accused---Scope---Section 265-K, Cr.P.C., empowered the court to acquit an accused at any stage of proceedings, if the court was of the opinion that if all the evidence, which was proposed to be produced by the prosecution was admitted as correct even then there was no chance of conviction of accused for the offence he was charged with.

Mushtaq Ahmed Janjua for Appellant.

Mir Khalid Mehmood, Chief Prosecutor, Ehtesab Bureau for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court (AJ&K) 18

Present: Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, C.J., Raja Saeed Akram Khan and Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, JJ

AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Chief Secretary and another---Appellants

Versus

MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE KHAN, PROJECT DIRECTOR and 3 others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.70 of 2015, decided on 22nd May, 2017.

(On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 26-6-2014 in Writ Petition No.1645 of 2011).

Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)---

----S. 44---Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 37---Writ jurisdiction of High Court---Nature and Scope---Alternate remedy---Contractual matters---Questions of fact---Scope---No absolute bar existed for exercising writ jurisdiction regarding matters arising out of contracts or involving contractual liabilities or obligations---Contracts were also a creation of the law and were enforceable, and in some cases, violation of a condition of contract amounted to violation of law as envisaged under S.37 of the Contract Act, 1872---Extraordinary writ jurisdiction conferred upon High Court was of paramount importance in system of administration of justice for redressal of grievance(s) if there was no other adequate remedy available under law---Determination of such adequacy of remedy depended on facts and nature of a case and High Court was the sole authority to decide whether in view of peculiar facts of a case, the exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified or not---Mere availability of alternate remedy should not be a hurdle in the exercise of power of judicial review under S.44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 when the matter was of an urgent nature---Aggrieved party if directed to seek redressal through an alternate remedy available under the law, and where the very remedy would get frustrated then it could be proper for the High Court to exercise writ jurisdiction----Remedy of writ was not available against a private person and writ jurisdiction could only be exercised when the person against whom the same was sought was performing functions in connection with the affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or a local authority---Even contractual rights and obligations may be enforced in situation where such rights were based on statutes or rules framed thereunder or when an obligation or duty was vested in a public functionary or a statutory body performing functions in connections with affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or local authority---Ordinarily exercise of writ jurisdiction in propositions requiring detailed inquiry or recording of evidence and intricate and complicated questions of facts was avoided and on such touchstone, the High Court may decline exercise of writ jurisdiction in matters for enforcement of contractual obligations and liabilities requiring detailed inquiry of recording of evidence.

Zonal Manager UBL and another v. Mst. Perveen Akhtar PLD 2007 SC 298; Brig. Muhammad Bashir v. Abdul Karim and others PLD 2004 SC 271; Nizamuddin and others v. Civil Aviation Authority and others 1999 SCMR 467; Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager and others 1998 SCMR 2268; Haji Amin v. Pakistan Trading Corporation and another PLD 2009 Kar. 112; Messrs Wak Orient Power and Light Limited v. Government of Pakistan and others 1998 CLC 1178; Yousaf A. Haroon v. Custodian of the Karachi Hotel 2004 CLC 1967; Vencil Pushpraj v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1991 SC 536; Mahabir Auto Stores and others v. Indian Oil Corporation and others AIR 1990 SC 1031; Messrs Ittehad Cargo Service and others v. Messrs Syed Tasneem Hussain Naqvi and others PLD 2001 SC 116; Kerala State Eectricity Board and another v. Kurien E. Kalathil and others AIR 2000 SC 2573 and Lahore Cantonment Cooperative Housing Society v. Dr. Nsuratullah Chaudhary and others PLD 2002 SC 1068 rel.

Raja Ikhlaq Hussain Kiani, Additional Advocate-General for Appellants.

Miss Kokab Al Sabah Roohi for Respondent No.1.

Raza Ali Khan, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah Kazmi, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan and Barrister Humayun Nawaz Khan: Amici Curiae.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court (AJ&K) 40

Present: Mohammad Azam Khan, C.J. and Raja Saeed Akram Khan, J

SHAMIM AKHTAR---Appellant

Versus

ARSHAD MEHMOOD---Respondent

Civil Appeal No.57 of 2010, decided on 15th March, 2013.

(On appeal from the judgment of the Shariat Court dated 14-12-2009 in Appeal No.21 of 2006).

(a) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)---

----S. 2---Dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula---Cruelty---Scope---Wife filed suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of non-payment of maintenance charges, non-performance of marital obligations, cruelty and alternately on the ground of khula---Family Court dissolved the marriage on the basis of khula subject to return of golden ornaments---Order of Family Court was upheld by the Shariat Court---Contention of wife was that she had proved her case on the ground of cruelty, non-payment of maintenance charges and non-performance of marital obligations---Validity---Plaintiff and her witnesses categorically stated in their statements that husband habitually assaulted and gave beating to the plaintiff and made her life miserable by cruel conduct---Family Court had misread the evidence produced by the wife---Cruelty of husband had been proved from the record---Wife was thrown out of the house after cruel treatment by husband---Husband had contracted second marriage---Plaintiff had not disentitled herself from seeking dissolution of marriage on the grounds of maintenance charges, non-performance of marital obligations and cruelty---Impugned judgments and decrees passed by the courts below were modified and marriage was dissolved on the ground of cruelty, non-payment of maintenance and non-performance of marital obligations---Appeal was allowed in circumstances.

Mst. Barkat Jan v. Habib Khan and 6 others PLD 1985 SC(AJ&K) 60 ref.

Abdul Rehman v. Khalida Bi and 2 others 1980 CLC 1098 and Dr. Akhlaq Ahmed v. Mst. Kishwar Sultana and others PLD 1983 SC 169 rel.

(b) Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (VIII of 1939)---

----S. 2(viii)(a)---'Cruelty'---Meaning.

Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edn.); Syed Imtiaz Hussain Shah and another v. Mst. Razia Begum and 3 others 2011 SCR 233 and Muhammad Shariful Islam Khan v. Mst. Suraya Begum and others PLD 1963 Dhaka 947 rel.

Miss Ghazala Haider Lodhi for Appellant.

Muhammad Riaz Tabbasum for Respondent.

P L D 2017 Supreme Court (AJ&K) 50

Before Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, C.J. and Raja Saeed Akram Khan, J

FAZAL MEHMOOD BAIG---Appellant

Versus

UNIVERSITY OF AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR through Vice-Chancellor and 11 others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.208 of 2016, decided on 8th June, 2017.

(On appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 26-5-2016 in Writ Petition No.1116 of 2016).

Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)---

----S. 44---University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Act, 1985, S.10---Writ Petition---Maintainability---Pro bono litigation---Appointment of Vice-Chancellor of a university---Vires of statute---Requirements---High Court dismissed writ petition on the ground that petitioner was not an "aggrieved person"---Validity---One could move the Court pro bono publico to challenge the vires of law on the ground that same would offend the provisions of the Constitution---Person who sought a command from High Court for enforcement of fundamental right must first show as to how he was an "aggrieved person"---Writ could be isused only on the petition of an aggrieved person and not by a pro bono publico litigation---Person whose interest had been adversely affected by the impugned legislation or order under challenge could competently file a writ petition and then an appeal before the Supreme Court---Petitioner, in the present case, was not an "aggrieved person"---Neither petitioner was a candidate for the post of Vice-Chancellor nor he was student of the University---No legal right of petitioner appeared to have been infringed---Anyone could not file writ petition as pro bono publico until and unless he had fulfilled the conditions to invoke the writ jurisdiction of High Court---Petitioner while invoking writ jurisdiction had to show that he was litigating in public interest and for public good or for welfare of general public---Petitioner had failed to show any such interest and he was not an aggrieved person to invoke constitutional jurisdiction of High Court as pro bono publico---High Court had rightly held that petitioner did not fall within the definition of "aggrieved person" and had no locus standi to file the present writ petition as "pro bono publico"---Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

Rana Aamer Raza Ashfaq and another v. Dr. Minhaj Ahmad Khan and another 2012 SCMR 6; Begum Nusrat Ali Gonda v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2013 SC 829; Raja Iqbal Rashid Minhas v. AJ&K Council and 3 others PLD 2002 SC (AJ&K) 1 and Raja Tahir Majeed Khan and others v. Azad Government and 6 others 2014 SCR 272 ref.

Javed Ibrahim Paracha v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2004 SC 482 and Col. (Retd.) Muhammad Akram v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others 1998 SCMR 2073 rel.

Sardar Karam Dad Khan, Advocate for Appellant.

Farooq Hussain Kashmiri, Advocate for Respondents Nos. 1 and 3.

Muhammad Zubair Raja, Additional Advocate-General for Respondent No.2.

Raja Akhlaq Hussain Kiani, Additional Advocate-General for Respondent No.5.