SCMR 2025 Judgments

2025 S C M R 1

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Shahid Waheed, JJ

The COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, LARGE TAXPAYERS OFFICE, LAHORE and another---Appellants

Versus

Messrs MAYFAIR SPINNING MILLS LTD. and others---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 947 of 2002, 980, 981 and 982 of 2007 and 224 of 2010 and Civil Petition No. 246 of 2009, decided on 12th November, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 04.12.2001, passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in C.A. No.66 of 1999; the judgment dated 29.11.2006, passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in S.S.T.R.As. Nos.142 and 172 of 2005; the judgment dated 25.03.2008, passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in S.S.T.R.A. No.58 of 2007; and the judgment dated 28.11.2008, passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in S.S.T.R.A. No.350 of 2007).

(a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----Ss. 7(1), 10 & 66---Taxable supplies---Input tax, adjustment of---Whether input tax deduction can be made under section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 in respect of goods which got destroyed by fire and which do not remain available for making taxable supplies----Contention of appellant-tax authority that the right to seek adjustment or refund is available only when the goods on which input tax was paid are used in further taxable activities for making taxable supplies, and not when those goods are consumed or destroyed---Validity---For a registered person to avail himself of the beneficial adjustment of input tax against output tax, section 7 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 [as it was at the relevant time of the present case], mandates the following conditions: firstly, the input tax paid on purchases of inputs or raw materials must be intended for the purpose of making taxable supplies; secondly, the input tax paid must be for producing taxable supplies, irrespective of whether those taxable supplies have actually been made or are to be made in the future; thirdly, the input tax paid in a tax period is to be deducted from the output tax due for the same tax period and not against any future tax period---Words "taxable supplies made, or to be made" in section 7 do not limit the scope of the correlation between the purchase of the input/raw material and the actual manufacture or production of taxable supplies, that is the making of taxable supplies---Instead, they expressly expand its legal ambit to include input/raw materials intended for use in future for making taxable supplies---This explicit legislative intent to encompass future taxable supplies cannot be overlooked---In such circumstances, a registered person need not wait for the raw material, on which input tax has been paid, to be actually consumed in the manufacturing process before availing the adjustment against output tax---This interpretation aligns with sound commercial and manufacturing reasoning---There is no express requirement that the raw material, for which input tax is paid, must be actually used during the same tax period to qualify for adjustment---Denying such adjustment solely because the raw material has not been consumed during the same tax period contradicts the legislative intent---Section 8(1)(a) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, which deals with scenarios in which input tax cannot be reclaimed or deducted, does not apply to cases where input/raw materials have been lost through fire.

(b) Tax---

----Exemption notification/Statutory Regulatory Order (SRO)---Vested rights created under an earlier notification can not be retrospectively nullified by a subsequent notification---Demanding repayment of benefits already accrued to and availed of by taxpayers, by virtue of changes introduced through SROs, would adversely affect their vested rights and undo transactions that are past and closed, which cannot be done through subordinate legislation without specific authorization by primary legislation.

Al Samrez Enterprise v. Federation of Pakistan 1986 SCMR 1917; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex (Pvt.) Ltd. 2024 SCP 316; Federation of Pakistan v. Shaukat Ali Mian PLD 1999 SC 1026; Army Welfare Sugar Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1652; Molasses Trading v. Federation of Pakistan 1993 SCMR 1905 and Super Engineering v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2019 SCMR 1111 ref.

Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Muhammad Abdul Hassan, Advocate for Appellants (in C.A. No.947 of 2002)

Muhammad Siddique Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.As. Nos.980-982 of 2007).

Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No.224 of 2010 and C.P. No. 246 of 2009).

Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court along with Malik Ahsan Mahmood, Advocate Supreme Court and Malik Ghulam Sabir, Advocate High Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 947 of 2002).

Dr. Muhammad Farough Naseem, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Karachi) for Respondents.

Syed Naveed Amjad Andrabi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No.224 of 2010).

Nemo for Respondents (in C.A. No.246 of 2009).

Malik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan for the Federation of Pakistan.

Zubair Khan, Additional Commissioner, CTO, Lahore (via video link from Lahore) for the Department.

2025 S C M R 14

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Chief Secretary, Lahore and others---Petitioners

Versus

QASIM MEHMOOD and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 3520 of 2020, decided on 9th October, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 22.09.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in W.P. No.2572 of 2018).

Punjab Regularization of Service Act (XV of 2018)---

----S. 3---Regularization of service---Matter referred to Scrutiny Committee---Authorities were aggrieved of order passed by High Court referring matter of respondents/contract employees to Scrutiny Committee---Validity---To accommodate and regularize services of contractual employees who gave their blood, toil, tears and sweat for many years, Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 was promulgated with fair intention---It was responsibility of Government to apply and allow benefit to all employees placed in equal and similar circumstances without any discrimination and not to pick and choose employees for conferring benefit or advantage of law---Implementation of Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 has to be unbiased and non-discriminatory, rather it should be evenhanded, fair and square---When law giver enacts any beneficial law, it must be implemented across the board with assiduousness and meticulousness without any conservative or rigid approach---Implementation of beneficial statutes meant for civil servants and labourers are unnecessarily being delayed which forces deprived persons to knock the doors of Courts---If implementation is made in its letter and spirit within a reasonable period of time, then such course would decrease unnecessary burden on Court's docket---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as High Court only held that respondents/contract employees were liable to be considered for regularization under Punjab Regularization of Service Act, 2018 and appointing authority was directed to send their cases for consideration to competent authority and till determination of eligibility, services of respondent/contract employees would not be terminated---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Barrister Muhammad Mumtaz Ali, Addl. A.G., Punjab for Petitioners.

Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 6-8.

2025 S C M R 20

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Shahid Waheed and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

Dr. KHALID IQBAL TALPUR---Petitioner

Versus

PROVINCE OF SINDH and others---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 1417-K of 2022, decided on 15th November, 2024.

(Against judgment dated 17.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Hyderabad in C.P. No.D-1879 of 2022.).

Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Administrative Structure, Powers and Duties of Institute Officers Rules, 2021---

----Rr. 4(7)(i) & 4(7)(iv)---Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021, R. 6---Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Act (XXVI of 2013), S. 11---Executive Director ("ED") of the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences ("Institute")---Appointment and re-appointment---Process and eligibility---Maximum age of candidate, dispute over---Whether an applicant for the post of ED can be up to 65 years of age, or cannot be older than 60 years?---Held, that proper resort to clause (iv) of sub-rule (7) of rule 4 of the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Administrative Structure, Powers and Duties of Institute Officers Rules, 2021 (herein after "clause (iv)") must be regarded as a two-stage process---In the first stage, the Board must, if it is so minded, consider whether the outgoing ED is at all suitable for reappointment under clause (iv)---If it concludes that reappointment is not warranted or legally permissible the matter ends, and the Board must then move to appointing a new ED in terms of clause (i) of sub-rule (7) of rule 4 of the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Administrative Structure, Powers and Duties of Institute Officers Rules, 2021 (herein after "clause (i)") and other applicable provisions---If however, the Board is of the view that a reappointment is both legally permissible and desirable for the purposes, and in the best interests of the Institute the matter would move to the second stage---Board must then move to seeking applications for appointment of other persons as ED under clause (i) and other applicable provisions---Any advertisement or other circular etc issued in this regard must clearly state that the outgoing ED is also under consideration for reappointment under clause (iv)---Once the fresh applications have been received and shortlisted and interviews held etc (which must be done independently of, and separately from, any consideration of the outgoing ED) the Board must then consider why the (best of the) applicants under clause (i) should not be appointed as the new ED and the outgoing ED be reappointed under clause (iv)---Here, the Board must also keep in mind the possibility of a "chilling effect" on actual or potential applicants of the fact that the outgoing ED is also under consideration for reappointment---If a decision is reached in favor of reappointment, then detailed reasons for the same must be given in writing by the Board and made public (by, inter alia, posting the same on the website of the Institute)---It is only by applying this two-stage process that there will be a proper, legally valid and harmonized application of clause (iv), as would allow for a reappointment of the outgoing ED that is sustainable in law---In the present case the retirement age was set by the Board itself, in exercise of section 24 of the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Act, 2013 whereby the power of reappointment was reserved---In the impugned judgment the High Court failed to keep in mind that the only manner in which clause (iv) could be actuated, for purposes of reappointment, was by recognizing that the age limit would get enhanced beyond the sixty years set by the Sindh Institute of Ophthalmology and Visual Sciences Employees (Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021 ("TCS Rules"), which was for appointment---At the same time, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the procedure actually adopted by the Board was also legally defective---There was no application at all of the two-stage process by which alone a lawful resort could be had to clause (iv)---In setting a uniform age of 65 years in its decision and the consequent advertisement, the Board failed to keep in mind that it was dealing with two distinct exercises, one of appointment and the other of reappointment---Leave petition was converted into an appeal and was disposed of with the directions that the Board shall, if it is so minded, consider the case of petitioner for reappointment in terms of clause (iv); that if it is of the view that petitioner cannot or ought not to be considered for reappointment his case will come to an end, and the Board shall then proceed to consider the shortlisted candidates for appointment in terms of clause (i); that if however the Board is of the view that petitioner can be considered for reappointment, it shall then proceed to consider the shortlisted candidates for appointment in terms of clause (i) and thereafter and thereupon make a decision for appointment or reappointment, as the case may be; that the detailed reasons in writing required (twice) from the Board must be made public by inter alia posting the same on the website of the Institute and, in particular, provided to the respondent-candidate.

Prof. Dr. Asad Alam Khan and others v Government of Punjab and others 2021 PLC (C.S.) 304 distinguished.

Malik Naeem Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Hakim Ali Sh., Addl. AG., Sindh, Saghir Ahmed Abbasi, Addl. A.G., Sindh for Respondents Nos. 1-3 (via Video-Link, Karachi).

Sarmad Hani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.4.

2025 S C M R 34

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin ud Din Khan and Shahid Waheed, JJ

KHURSHID ALI and others---Appellants

Versus

MIANGUL ADNAN AURANGZEB (deceased) through LRs and others ---Respondents

C.As. Nos.493 and 494 of 2023, decided on 17th October, 2024.

(Against judgment dated 04.07.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar ul Qaza), Swat, passed in Civil Revision No.304-M of 2012).

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S.8---Suit for recovery of possession and mesne profit---Declaration, non-seeking of---Defective title of opponent---Effect---Respondents/ plaintiffs sought recovery of possession of suit property and mesne profit on the plea of their ownership---Trial Court dismissed the suit but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same in favour of respondents/ plaintiffs---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction maintained judgment and decree in favour of respondents/plaintiffs but dismissed the suit to the extent of recovery of mesne profit---Validity---Respondents/plaintiffs had no title, and those under whom they claimed also had no title, and the very gift of disputed shops never existed---Respondents/plaintiffs failed to establish their ownership or title to suit property---Respondents/plaintiffs could not call upon appellants/ defendants to establish legitimacy of their property title, nor could they seek a decree for possession based on claims that appellants/defendants either lacked a title or possessed a flawed one---Respondents/plaintiffs were to succeed based solely on the strength and validity of their own title rather than capitalizing on any potential shortcomings of the situation of appellants/defendants---Trial Court was precluded from examining validity of the title of appellants/defendants, particularly since respondents/plaintiffs did not formally challenge the same---Simple suit for possession filed by respondents/appellants was not maintainable---Despite appellants'/defendants' assertions in their written statement, respondents/plaintiffs did not take any step to seek declaration of title---Supreme Court declined to affirm judgment and decree passed by High Court as such oversight went unaddressed---Respondents/plaintiffs did not demonstrate necessary diligence in pursuing their suit and failed to call any witnesses to substantiate alleged gift transaction, which significantly weakened their position---Solitary statement provided by attorney of respondents/plaintiffs was insufficient to support their claims, particularly since it did not effectively demonstrate that appellants/defendants, as licensees, had possession of shops in question---Rationale behind demand of respondents/plaintiffs for mesne profits of Rs.10,000 per month was not adequately established and there was lack of tangible evidence to justify such figure---Appellants/plaintiffs did not provide credible basis for seeking eviction of appellants/defendants from shops in question---Supreme Court dismissed suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs resultantly decrees issued by High Court and Lower Appellate Court were set aside and that of Trial Court was restored---Appeal was allowed.

Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 and Sultan Mahmood Shah through LRs and others v. Muhammad Din and 2 others 2005 SCMR 1872 rel.

(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 8, 42 & 54---Relief of possession with or without declaration of title---Principle---If plaintiff is in possession but his title to property is disputed or clouded, or if defendant claims title and poses a threat of dispossession, plaintiff must sue for declaration of title and seek injunctive relief---If plaintiff's title is clouded or disputed and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession, he must file suit for a declaration, possession and injunction.

Zia ur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (via video link from Peshawar) (in C.A. No. 493 of 2023) and Tariq Aziz, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record (in C.A. No. 494 of 2023).

Tariq Aziz, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.A. No. 493 of 2023) and Zia ur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Peshawar) (in C.A. No. 494 of 2023).

2025 S C M R 40

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Secretary Elementary and Secondary, Education Department, Peshawar and others ---Petitioners

Versus

AURANGZEB (EX-PRIMARY SCHOOL HEAD TEACHER) GPS WANNA KHEL TEHSIL TAKHTBHAI DISTRICT MARDAN (deceased) through L.Rs ---Respondents

Civil Petition No.531-P of 2024, decided on 4th October, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 26.02.2024 passed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Peshawar in Service Appeal No.1267 of 2023).

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunals Act (I of 1974)--

----S. 4--- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 2011, Rr. 5 & 7---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.212(3)---Misconduct---Proof---Death of civil servant---Departmental proceedings---Object, purpose and scope---During pendency of service appeal civil servant passed away, therefore, disciplinary actions initiated by authorities were set aside by Service Tribunal---Validity---Predominant goal of initiating departmental proceedings including inquiry is to decide whether allegations of misconduct in show cause notice are proven and then to confront delinquent regarding why disciplinary action, including imposition of minor or major penalty should not be taken---Before taking such drastic action, a fair opportunity should be provided to employee to defend allegations---In departmental inquiries, standard of proof is based on balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence---Regular inquiry is commenced only when an even handed and fair opportunity to present a defense is offered---Service Tribunal in determination of facts and law, is the highest appellate forum with exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to terms and conditions of service of civil servants---Supreme Court may grant leave to appeal under Article 212 (3) of the Constitution, against judgment, decree, order or sentence of Administrative Court or Tribunal only if it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law of public importance, which is otherwise sine qua non---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Service Tribunal as no such question was involved---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Secretary Revenue Division v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabbasum PLD 2019 SC 563 rel.

Zahid Yousuf Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record along with Sajid Khan, Focal Person, Education Department for Petitioners.

Nemo for the Respondents.

2025 S C M R 45

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Naeem Akhtar Afghan, JJ

MUHAMMAD AKHTAR and others---Appellants

Versus

The STATE and others---Respondents

Criminal Appeals Nos. 505 to 507 of 2019, decided on 24th May, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 11.02.2015 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Crl. A. No. 21-ATA/2009, Crl.A. No.29-ATA of 2010 and CSR No. 12 of 2009).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324, 452 & 34---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, house-trespass after preparation for hurt, common intention--- Reappraisal of evidence---Crime empties and recovered weapons not sent for forensics---Presence of complainant at scene of occurrence doubtful---Dishonest improvements made by complainant and witnesses---Injured witness and material witness not produced for evidence---Adverse presumption---Crime empties recovered during investigation and firearm allegedly recovered from the appellant (accused person) were not sent to the firearm expert for analysis and in this regard no explanation had been offered by the prosecution at the trial---Surprisingly, complainant did not receive a single firearm injury in the whole occurrence despite indiscriminate firing by the six nominated accused and despite allegedly witnessing the entire occurrence from a close range---Non-receiving of any firearm injury by the complainant during the occurrence and his accurate attribution of each injury of the deceased and injured to each accused specifically with specific firearms casted serious doubt about his presence at the place of occurrence and his plantation as an eye witness of the occurrence due to previous enmity with the nominated accused could not be ruled out of consideration particularly when his testimony was lacking independent corroboration in material aspects---There was no medico legal certificate of an alleged injured witness on record---Said alleged injured witness and brother of the complainant allegedly present at the place of occurrence had not been produced as prosecution witnesses at the trial---Presumption under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was to be drawn to the effect that had these two witnesses been produced at the trial, they would have not supported the prosecution version---Ocular testimony of the injured witnesses was contradictory to the medico legal evidence---Statements of complainant, eye-witnesses and the injured witness were suffering from dishonest improvements and material contradictions rendering their testimony doubtful---Prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the appellant and the acquitted co-accused beyond reasonable doubt---Acquittal of co-accused by the Appellate Court did not suffer from any illegality or irregularity---Appellant was acquitted of the charge, while the appeal challenging the acquittal of the co-accused and the appeal seeking enhancement of sentence of the convicts were dismissed.

Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Crl. A. No. 505 of 2019).

Sardar Ashiq Hussain Baloch, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in Crl.As. Nos. 506 and 507 of 2019).

Irfan Zia, Addl. P.G., Punjab for the State (in all cases).

2025 S C M R 50

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Musarrat Hilali and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

SUBHA SADIQ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Petition No.786-L of 2016, decided on 22nd April, 2024.

(Against judgment dated 16.05.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Criminal Appeal No. 745 of 2012).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, 186 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7 & 21-L---Murderous assault on police, acts of terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Testimonies of witnesses not reliable---Three persons who were stopped for personal search by the police on the basis of suspicion were not known either to the deceased or the complainant---There is no explanation why the three unidentified accused did not flee from the crime scene immediately after they had fatally wounded the deceased---Their presence at the crime scene till two other police officials from the Police Station had arrived there was unexplained---Arrest of the petitioner was also shrouded in mystery---Evidence brought on record by the prosecution showed that he was arrested on the same day when the investigation was transferred to another Inspector---Recovery of the firearm weapon and the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory was disbelieved by the High Court and this factum had not been challenged by the prosecution---Testimonies regarding the circumstances which had led to the arrest of the petitioner and his identification by the two witnesses had not been found to be confidence inspiring nor reliable---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the appellant was extended the benefit of doubt---Consequently, his conviction and sentence were set aside.

(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Art. 22---Test identification parade---Principles and scope---Identification parade is one of the methods of proof contemplated under section 22 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---It must be carefully conducted in order to achieve its main object i.e. to enable a witness to properly identify a person involved in a crime and to exclude the possibility of a witness simply confirming a faint recollection and impression---The process has to be carried out having regard to the exigencies of each case in a manner that is fair and does not indicate any collusiveness---It is merely a corroborative piece of evidence and holding of test identification parade is not mandatory---If the testimony of the witness qua the identity of the accused inspires confidence and the witnesses are consistent in all material particulars and there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the latter had deposed falsely then in such an eventuality not conducting a test identification parade is not fatal to the prosecution's case---Omission of salient features in a crime report is not necessarily a ground to discard a test identification parade---Test identification parade is, therefore, not required when the victim had identified the accused and his statement has been found reliable.

Muhammad Siddique and others v. The State 2020 SCMR 342; Javed Khan Bacha v. The State 2017 SCMR 524; M.Akram Rahi v. State 2011 SCMR 877; Muhammad Hayat v. The State 2021 SCMR 92 and Ghulam Abbas v. The State 2022 SCMR 1102 ref.

(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Art. 22---Test identification parade---Necessary guidelines for conducting a test identification parade provided.

Kanwar Anwar Ali's case PLD 2019 SC 488 ref.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324, 353, 186 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7 & 21-L---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Murderous assault on police, acts of terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Test identification parade---Infirmities---In the present case the test identification proceedings were fraught with serious infirmities and, therefore, could not be relied upon for handing down the conviction---Proceedings were conducted and supervised by a Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, who had admitted in his testimony that the features of the petitioner and the eight dummies were not recorded in the report---It was unlikely that the two police officials who had arrived at the crime scene after the incident had taken place could have identified the accused who had fired at the deceased---None of the witnesses had attributed a specific role to the petitioner---In the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be ruled out that the witnesses of the test identification proceedings may have seen the petitioner after his arrest---It also appeared from the deposition of the Judicial Magistrate, who had supervised and conducted the test identification proceedings that he was not familiar with the guidelines and principles enunciated by the Supreme Court regarding the test identification proceedings---Probity and evidentiary value of the test identification proceedings were definitely questionable and, thus, could not have been relied upon for the purposes of handing down the conviction---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the appellant was extended the benefit of doubt---Consequently, his conviction and sentence were set aside.

Javed Iqbal Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Irfan Zia, Addl.PG, Punjab along with Khalil ur Rehman (complainant) for the State.

2025 S C M R 60

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, C.J. and Shahid Bilal Hassan, J

MUHAMMAD MANSAB---Petitioner

Versus

MUHAMMAD HANIF---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 1970-L of 2024, decided on 19th November, 2024.

(Against the order dated 27.05.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in C.R. No. 31785 of 2024).

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O.XXXVII, Rr. 1, 2 & 4---Summary suit for recovery based on cheques---Ex parte decree---Application for setting aside ex parte decree dismissed---Validity---All available modes of service were adhered to by the Trial Court so that the petitioner (defendant) should join the proceedings and after failure in ordinary means of service, the Trial Court resorted to publication of Court notice in newspaper but even then the petitioner did not bother to join the proceedings, therefore, he was proceeded against ex parte on 18.02.2022---Even the order dated 09.06.2022 goes to divulge that after closure of ex parte evidence, the Trial Court kept the file of the case in wait but none on behalf of the petitioner joined the proceedings and ultimately the Trial Court proceeded to pass the ex parte judgment and decree dated 09.06.2022---After lapse of about 19 months, the petitioner filed application seeking setting aside of ex parte judgment and decree dated 09.06.2022 and not the order dated 18.02.2022 when he was proceeded against ex parte, that too, without filing an application for leave to appear and defend the suit, which otherwise ought to have been filed along-with the application for setting aside ex-parte proceedings, judgment and decree, because proceedings under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('C.P.C.') are of summary nature and special procedure has been provided for the same---Rule 4 of O. XXXVII, C.P.C. deals with the situation where the defendant fails to appear and files application for leave to defend; however, in the instant case, no application for leave to appear and defend was filed by the petitioner and only application seeking setting aside of ex parte judgment and decree, but not the order for initiating ex parte proceedings, was filed.

Haji Ali Khan and Company v. Allied Bank of Pakistan PLD 1995 SC 362 ref.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XXXVII, R. 4---Summary suit for recovery---Ex parte decree---Power of Court to set aside decree---'Special circumstances'---Scope---Under Rule 4 of Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ('C.P.C.') "under special circumstances" the court can set aside the decree---Rule 4 is subject to the condition there must be 'special circumstances' to support any application for setting aside decree---Plain reading of Rule 4 makes it diaphanous that it excludes 'ordinary circumstance' or 'circumstances which may happen every day'---Meaning thereby that heavy burden lies on the defendant to show the circumstances due to which he was unable to appear during proceedings of the suit---'special circumstances' are different from 'ordinary circumstance' and 'circumstance which may happen every day', rather the same are rare, exceptional and beyond the control of a human being---Same can be categorized as: 1) Serious illness or accident preventing defendant's appearance; 2) Death or sudden incapacitation of defendant's counsel; 3) Natural calamity or unforeseen events; 4) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. 5) Failure of justice due to non-service or inadequate service.

(c) Pleadings---

----Party cannot lead or take a different stance from what it has pleaded in its application or plaint and written statement/written reply.

Sh. Fateh Muhammad v. Muhammad Adil and others PLD 2007 SC 460 and Hyder Ali Bhimji v. Additional District Judge Karachi South and another 2012 SCMR 254 ref.

Muhammad Tariq Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video-link from Lahore).

Nemo for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 64

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan JJ

UFAID GUL---Appellant

Versus

Mst. FARKHANDA AYUB KHAN and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No.785 of 2022, decided on 23rd September, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 04.07. 2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court in R.F.A. No. 117 of 2021).

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 22---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Discretion of Court---Scope---In a suit for specific performance grant of decree is a discretionary relief with the court---If the court comes to the conclusion that in grant of a decree equity leans in favour of the plaintiff then decree can be granted, otherwise, it is the discretion of the court---Even if the plaintiff has proved the agreement to sell even then it is the discretion of the court to grant a decree or refuse the same.

(b) Administration of justice---

----Appeal entertained by Court despite lacking jurisdiction---Contributory negligence of Court---Condonation of delay in seeking relief---Where a party, despite acting with reasonable diligence, is misled by the Court or fails to receive timely guidance about jurisdictional matters, the resulting delay or error is not entirely attributable to that party---If there is contributory negligence of the person knocking the door of the court and also by the court, then the person knocking the wrong door cannot be deprived of his/her legal rights available under the law.

Sherin and others v. Fazal Muhammad and others 1995 SCMR 584 and Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor and others PLD 1991 SC 957 ref.

Syed Asghar Hussain Sabzwari, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Sardar Muhammad Tariq Farid Gopang, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Taimoor Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.

Raja Khalid Mahmood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No 3.

Assisted by Miss Maira Hassan, Judicial Law Clerk.

2025 S C M R 69

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

BILAL HAQUE and another---Petitioners

Versus

KAMRAN ALI AFZAL, SECRETARY, CABINET DIVISION, ISLAMABAD and

others---Respondents

Criminal Original Petitions Nos. 19 and 20 of 2024, decided on 25th October, 2024.

(a) Administration of justice---

----Every judge must abide by the law and must not fall prey to the process of the Court being misused nor should in any manner become a party.

(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Forest Ordinance (XIX of 2002)---

----Ss. 2(23) & 44---Galiyat Development Authority Act (XII of 2016), S. 6---Part of Margalla Hills National Park ('the National Park") in the territory of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province---Preservation and conservation---Protected 'guzara forest'---Galiyat Development Authority ('GDA') of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa granted approvals to raise construction in respect of designated guzara forests that fell within the area of GDA---Legality---Galiyat Development Authority cannot approve construction in lands which prohibit it, including in guzara forest nor in the National Park---Galiyat Development Authority is also required to undertake forest conservation and the preservation of wildlife---Galiyat Development Authority must also serve and protect the National Park---Galiyat Development Authority must withdraw any permission which had already been granted pursuant to which construction had not been completed and should stop issuance of permissions/approvals in respect of the said lands---It must be ensured that the National Park remains a protected area and Supreme Court directed all concerned to ensure its preservation---Petitions were disposed of.

Malik Javed Iqbal, A.A.G.P. for the Federation of Pakistan.

Hafiz Arfat Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and Irfan Azim, DD(G), Environment for the CDA.

Rashid-ul-Haq Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court and Ehtisham Khan, AD, GDA for GDA.

Shah Faisal Ilyas, Additional A.G., Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

M. Ahsan Bhoon, Advocate Supreme Court, Hafeez-ur-Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court along with Luqman Ali Afzal (on Court Notice).

2025 S C M R 74

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ

GHULAM RASOOL---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 57 of 2019, heard on 19th April, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 21.03.2013 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Appeal No. 92 of 2018 and M.R. No. 53 of 2008).

Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J.; Musarrat Hilali, J. agreeing; Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. dissenting.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S.302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Reappraisal of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Mitigating circumstances---Death sentence reduced to imprisonment of life---Principle of life expectancy, applicability of---[Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. [Majority view]: FIR was lodged after a considerable delay without any explanation---It was not clear that out of the four shots fired by the appellant (convict), how many bullets hit the deceased---Similarly, it was also not explained that how many bullets were fired by each of the three accused and how many of them had hit the deceased---Admittedly, no empty was recovered from the place of the occurrence, therefore, in the given circumstances, it could not be said with certainty that out of all the four assailants, whose fire shots resulted into fatal injury(s), causing death of the deceased---Occurrence had taken place all of a sudden without there being any proof of premeditation---It was a free fight, without proof of the motive alleged in the FIR---One of the co-accused, had already been acquitted by the Trial Court on the same set of evidence---Appellant remained in prison since May 2006 and was incarcerated in death cell w.e.f. 2013 till date, almost for more than eleven years---Section 302(b), P.P.C. provides a punishment for death or imprisonment for life---Total period of detention of the appellant in prison was about 18 years, without earning a single day of remission, because of being awarded death sentence---If remissions were counted towards his sentence, the appellant had served a period of almost an imprisonment for life---Delay in conclusion of judicial proceedings was on account of the system in vogue and for no fault of the appellant---After serving a sentence for life, including eleven years detention in death cell, executing his death penalty at present stage would not only be harsh, but would also be contrary to the principle of life expectancy---Under such circumstances, the appellant could not be sentenced twice for one and the same offence, hence punishment for death awarded to the appellant could not sustain---Appeal was dismissed; conviction awarded to the appellant under section 302(b), P.P.C. was maintained, however, the sentence of death awarded to him was altered to that of imprisonment for life]---[Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. [Minority view]: Considering the distance between police station and place of occurrence it could safely be concluded that there was no delay in the registration of the FIR---Primary eye-witness was a resident of the same locality, and was a natural eye-witness to the occurrence, as he lived in close proximity to the place of incident---Ocular account furnished by the eye-witness stood fully corroborated by the medical evidence---Incident in the present case could not be characterized as a free fight or unpremeditated murder because firstly deceased was shot to death by the appellant, then his dead body was thrown in a nala---Moreover, when the FIR in the present case was registered by the complainant, the appellant not only murdered the complainant in a brutal and gruesome manner but also assassinated his son---Appellant was a habitual criminal/murderer, who had no regard for human life---Case of acquitted co-accused was fundamentally distinct from that of the appellant, therefore, his acquittal held no bearing on the appellant's case---Because of the brutality and dangerousness of the appellant's actions, it was necessary to impose a strict punishment on him i.e. capital punishment in order to deliver justice and protect society---Mitigating the punishment based on the long trial or the time the appellant spent in custody did not change the severity of the crime---Appeal was dismissed and death penalty imposed by the High Court was maintained]

Ghulam Shabbir v. The State (Crl. R. P. No. 103/2017) and PLD 2013 SC 793 ref.

Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J; dissenting with Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. [Minority view]

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S.302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Sentence, quantum of---Motive not proved---Whether a mitigating circumstance to reduce death penalty to life imprisonment---Absence of motive, failure to prove motive, or a motive that remains unclear or not alleged does not constitute a mitigating circumstance (justifying reduction of sentence)---Death penalty cannot be withheld solely because the prosecution fails to allege or establish a motive---Underlying reason behind this is that true motive for an offence is typically known only to the accused, rather than to the complainant, informant, or any other witnesses, unless it is explicitly or implicitly conveyed---Witnesses may describe the actions of accused during the commission of the offence---Others may try to infer or label the motive based on their observations or the information available to them, but the actual motive remains solely with the accused.

Moazam Shah v. Mohsin Shah PLD 2001 SC 458; Ghalib Hussain v. Muhammad Arif 2002 SCMR 29; Nazakat v. Hazrat Jamal and another PLD 2007 SC 453 and Muhammad Latif v. The State PLD 2008 SC 503 ref.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S.302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Sentence, quantum of---Delay in conclusion of trial or deciding the appeal---Whether a mitigating circumstance to reduce death penalty to life imprisonment---Mere length of time taken in concluding the trial and in deciding the appeal filed by the appellant would not by itself constitute an extenuating circumstance justifying the imposition of the lesser penalty.

Muhammad Hassan v. The State 1973 SCMR 344; Samano v. The State 1973 SCMR 162; Shah Muhammad v. The State PLD 1973 SC 332 and Bakshish Elahi v. The State 1977 SCMR 389 ref.

Munir Ahmed Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

Irfan Zia, D.P.G., Punjab for the State.

2025 S C M R 88

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

Mst. AKSAR JAN and others---Petitioners

Versus

Mst. SHAMIM AKHTAR and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 4576 of 2023, decided on 25th September, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 03.10.2023 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Civil Revision No. 100 of 2010).

Islamic law---

----Inheritance---Female legalheirs---Inheritance denied through bogus gift mutations and Razi Nama---An attempt to deprive the widows of the deceased from their inheritance was made through two gift mutations purportedly made by their husband---Petitioners (alleged donees) made an attempt to show that the respondent (one of the widows) had given up her claim/right to inheritance by preparing an undated Razi Nama (agreement), which commenced by stating that it was being executed on behalf of the other widow through her special attorney, namely, "MF", but the same was not signed by him---A fingerprint or thumb impression purporting to be that of respondent (widow) was affixed on it---However, no consideration was given to respondent or received by her for executing the Razi Nama and giving up the claim to her inheritance---For the sake of argument, if it be assumed that respondent had executed the Razi Nama it was wholly without consideration which would make it inconsequential---However, it was tendered to the Court and the Judge without ensuring that respondent had executed it with knowledge of its contents assumed that all of a sudden she had surrendered her rights for which she had filed a suit---On its part the High Court did not attend to the main issue, which was the denial of inheritance, and instead concerned itself with peripheral matters---It was now the twenty-fifth year since respondent, a widow, had been struggling to get her inheritance---Bogus gift mutations were made and dated just before the death of her husband and then the bogus Razi Nama emerged---Unfortunately, and all too often, females continue to be deprived of their inheritance by employing various nefarious tactics, bogus documentation, fraudulent statements with the facilitation of Revenue department officials and some advocates---Courts too at times are not vigilant enough to protect inheritance rights, particularly of females and other vulnerable members of society---And, simple cases such as the present one are not expeditiously decided, and when they do get decided the decision is assailed---Practice of depriving females of their inheritance must be put a stop to, and those who do so must be made to pay substantial costs and not be permitted to benefit from procedural technicalities---Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment and the orders passed by the High Court were set aside, and judgment and decree passed by First Appellate Court was restored with the direction that petitioners (alleged donees) shall pay five hundred thousand rupees as costs to the respondent within three months, failing which the said amount shall be recovered from them as arrears of land revenue.

Iftikhar Ahmad Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court along with Pervez Akhtar, Petitioner No. 4 for Petitioners.

M. Atif Farzauq Raja, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 and L.Rs. of R.No.3.

2025 S C M R 92

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

FAISAL ALI---Petitioner

Versus

DISTRICT POLICE OFFICER, GUJRAT and another---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 3109-L of 2016, decided on 23rd September, 2024.

(Appeal against the judgment dated 03.06.2016 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No.2236 of 2015).

Punjab Police (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975---

----R.4(1)(b)(iv)---Police official---Misconduct, allegation of---Dismissal from service---Ex-parte inquiry---Judgment of Tribunal based on allegations/findings which were never part of the show cause notice---Legality---In the show cause notice the allegation of absence from duty was raised, but based on the same show cause notice, the Tribunal reproduced some other allegations regarding the petitioner's conviction in a criminal case, which allegation was alien to the show cause notice, and no other show cause notice was presented by the parties that indicated any allegation of conviction in a criminal case or requested the petitioner to submit a reply---Departmental proceedings may be initiated on the basis of allegations contained in the show cause notice and not on the allegations which were never part of the show cause notice---Therefore, in all fairness, the departmental action on account of any misconduct should be confined to the allegations mentioned in the show cause notice/statement of allegations, and should not travel beyond its precinct because the accused of misconduct who is petitioner in this case was only liable to answer the allegations communicated to him in the show cause and had no supernatural knowledge to respond to the allegations not known to him---Even the holding of the enquiry was claimed to be a regular one, but it was actually conducted ex-parte without involving the petitioner or providing him any opportunity to defend himself---According to the latest position, the petitioner had been acquitted in the criminal case while being extended the benefit of doubt by the Trial Court---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; consequently, the impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Service Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law.

Ch. M. Lehrasib Khan Gondal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Baleegh-uz Zaman Ch., Addl. A.G. Punjab along with Akhtar Ali Mehmood, DSC (Legal) for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 98

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

TANVIR SARFRAZ KHAN---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Director Legal, Islamabad and others---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 3381 of 2024 and C.M.A. No. 7234 of 2024 in Civil Petition No. 3381 of 2024, decided on 2nd October, 2024.

(Against the order dated 26.06.2024 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, passed in W.P. No. 138 of 2023).

Islamic law---

----Inheritance---Females deprived of their right to inheritance---Father of the parties died about eleven years ago and when the sisters of the petitioner sought their share in his inheritance on 11 October 2021 only then did the petitioner (brother) file a suit for partition, declaration, specific performance and permanent injunction two months thereafter---Pendency of the said suit had no effect on the estate of the deceased nor could exclude the legal heirs from their inheritance---Property of a deceased Muslim vested in his legal heirs immediately upon his death---Inheritance rights of the vulnerable members of society, which include females, must be protected---Unfortunately, a practice has developed whereby those defying shariah and the law, facilitated by some lawyers, adopt various nefarious means, including taking the plea of pending litigation in depriving legal heirs from what is rightfully theirs---Filing of present frivolous petition and the dishonest tactics employed by the petitioner justified the dismissal of present petition with costs in the sum of three hundred thousand rupees, which the petitioner was directed to pay equally to the respondents who had been deprived of their legal shares---Said respondents would also be justified to claim mesne profits for all the days that the petitioner did not abide by his 'Consent/Joint Statement' whereby he agreed to have the property evaluated and pay the legal heirs their respective shares as per shariah.

Agha Muhammad Ali Khan, Advocate Supreme Court along with petitioner and Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

In person (Respondents Nos. 3, 4, 6 to 9).

2025 S C M R 100

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Musarrat Hilali and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

ZULFIQAR ALI---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through D.A.G., Islamabad---Respondent

Criminal Petition No. 498 of 2024, decided on 30th September, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 03.05.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Crl. Appeal No. 888-P of 2018).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 409---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5(2)---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, criminal misconduct---Re-appraisal of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Embezzled amount deposited back in State exchequer---Offer of no contest by the convict to seek a lighter sentence to be able to attend to his ailing wife---Petitioner (convict) being an employee of a Corporation was on a carrier job; he was supposed to maintain highest standard of integrity, but he had failed to discharge his duty honestly and had committed an act of breach of trust---Petitioner did not plead guilty, hence, after trial, he was convicted and sentenced---Offer of no contest by the petitioner, meant that the petitioner neither agreed nor disagreed with the charge and with his conviction---Upon depositing of the embezzled amount in the State exchequer, he showed his intention simply to close the case, for the reason that his wife was ill and needed his help and support---By not pursuing the matter, the petitioner would certainly lose his job and would not be entitled for his post-retirement benefits, besides, leaving a stigma on his career---His offer that he did not wish to contest the petition, was with a hope that he would succeed in getting reduction in the quantum of the sentences, awarded to him---Though, as a matter of right, the petitioner cannot claim reduction of sentence, however, he placed himself at the mercy of the Supreme Court---Depositing the embezzled amount and his plea of no-contest showed the intention of the petitioner to escape the agony of proceedings before the Supreme Court and to resolve the case in order to support his family, especially, his ailing wife---Supreme Court while exercising its discretion, can do complete justice, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case---Act committed by the petitioner did not affect the public at large---Loss caused to the Government exchequer had been repaired by the petitioner after depositing the embezzled amount---He had been awarded three years sentence, out of which, he had served out a considerable period---Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, the petitioner had succeeded in making out a case for a lighter sentence---Thus, in view of the above, the conviction awarded to the petitioner under sections 409, Pakistan Penal Code and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 were upheld, however, sentences awarded to him in both the offences were reduced to that of already undergone, by extending the benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C to him---Amount of fine imposed upon the petitioner under section 409, P.P.C. was reduced from Rs. 2,50,000/- to Rs. 40,000/- and the amount of fine imposed upon the petitioner under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was also reduced from Rs. 2,50,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- ---Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Malik Nasrum Minallah, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Raja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, D.P.G. for the State.

Waqar Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 104

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

MOHSIN RAZA GONDAL and others---Petitioners

Versus

SARDAR MAHMOOD and others---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos.949, 1025, 1028, 1132 to 1134 of 2023, decided on 13th September, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 31.01.2023, passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in I.C.A. No.514 of 2015 and Writ Petition No.2042 of 2020).

(a) Civil service---

----Contract employees---Regularization in service---Scope---Regularization of a contractual employee constitutes a fresh appointment into the stream of regular appointments in civil services.

Province of Punjab through Secretary Livestock and Dairy Development Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore and others v. Dr. Javed Iqbal and others 2021 SCMR 767 ref.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 90, 91 & 99---Executive authority of the Federation, exercise of---Scope---Article 90 of the Constitution provides that the executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised in the name of the President by the Federal Government, which includes the Prime Minister and Federal Ministers but the said authority has to be exercised subject to the Constitution---It means that whenever the authority is exercised, it has to be within the limits prescribed by the Constitution---Neither the Prime Minister nor the members of the Federal Cabinet are permitted to perform their functions beyond the legal provisions i.e. the Constitution, statutory law, and the rules.

(c) Civil service---

----Contract employees---Regularization of posts in BS-16 and above---Cabinet Sub-Committee, powers of---Scope---Rules of Business, 1973, were duly framed to conduct the business of the Federal Government---Under these rules, although there is a concept of Cabinet Sub-Committees on different subjects, there is no provision for the intervention of a Cabinet Sub-Committee in governing the terms and conditions of service of employees---However, the Cabinet Sub-Committee can recommend reforms in the service structure, which can be approved by the Cabinet in accordance with the law and the Constitution---As, the Cabinet Sub-Committee lacks the authority to recommend the regularization of posts in BS-16 and above, therefore, any recommendation by the Cabinet Sub-Committee to regularize appointments in BS-16 and above is void ab initio and without any lawful authority.

(d) Void order---

----Any action that is void ab initio and without lawful authority cannot be protected under the doctrine of a 'past and closed transaction'.

(e) Civil service---

----Contract employees---Regularization in service---Factors to be considered by an employer/institution opting for regularization of its contract employees---Any institution opting for regularization of its employees must be either mandated by law or must carry out regularization through a well-thought-out policy of the institution concerned laying down the criteria and the process for regularization; performance evaluation of the contractual employee must be assessed to determine if the employee meets the standards required for a regular position; there must be availability of positions that match the skills and experience of the contractual employee; the budgetary considerations and financial implication of a regular employee must be weighed and considered---There must be a fair assessment of the employee's qualifications, performance and merit, so as to ensure only competent and committed employees are granted permanent employment status.

Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice Islamabad and another v. Fazal-e-Subhan and others PLD 2024 SC 515; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Forest, Peshawar and others v. Sher Aman and others 2022 SCMR 406 and Messrs State Oil Company Limited v. Bakht Siddique and others 2018 SCMR 1181 ref.

(f) Employment---

----Appointments and promotions in public sector organizations---Transparency, merit and open competition, significance of---Appointments in the public sector based on corruption, nepotism, favoritism, lack of due process, and misuse of authority have long been a significant issue in our society---These practices undermine the principles of fairness and equality, eroding public trust in governmental institutions---When positions are filled not on merit but through personal connections or corrupt practices, it not only deprives deserving candidates of opportunities but also weakens the overall efficiency and integrity of the public sector---Upholding the values of transparency, merit, and open competition in public sector employment is essential for fostering a system where the most qualified individuals serve, ensuring that public resources are utilized effectively and justly for the benefit of all---Without adherence to these principles, the public sector risks becoming a tool for the powerful rather than a service for the people, perpetuating cycles of inequality and inefficiency---Therefore, it is imperative that the recruitment and promotion processes in the public sector be conducted with the highest standards of fairness and accountability, free from any undue influence or bias.

Hafiz S.A.Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Mrs. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.Ps. Nos.949 and 1028 of 2023).

Tariq Mahmood, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No.1025 of 2023).

Abdul Rahim Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No.1032 of 2023)

Muhammad Ramzan Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. No.1033 of 2023).

Dr. G. M. Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No.1034 of 2023).

S.A. Mahmood Khan Sadozai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos.2-3 (in C.P. No.949 of 2023).

Zubair Hussain Jarral, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.Ps. Nos.1025 and 1134 of 2023).

Nemo for Respondents (in other cases).

Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom, Additional Attorney General, Hammad Nazar, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Overseas Pakistani and HRD Muhammad Abdullah, A.D. Legal FPSC for the Federation.

2025 S C M R 121

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Athar Minallah JJ

ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MODEL CUSTOMS COLLECTORATE OF APPRAISEMENT (WEST), CUSTOM HOUSE, KARACHI---Appellant

Versus

Messrs K. S. SULEMANJI ESMAILJI AND SONS (PVT.) LTD. KARACHI---Respondent

Civil Appeals Nos.799 to 824 of 2015, decided on 18th January, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 22.12.2014 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Special Customs Reference Applications Nos.8 to 33 of 2011).

(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----S. 33 & First Sched.---Classification of imported goods---Correct PCT Heading, determination of---Domain of Classification Committee---Scope---Respondent-company had imported twenty-six consignments described as "BOPP" Printed Laminated Packaging Film (Metalized)---Assessment was completed and the goods were given out of customs charge on the basis of the respondent-company's own declarations---PCT Headings attracting customs duty at the rate of 25% were also declared by the respondent-company---Belatedly, the respondent-company filed an application for refund of customs duty under section 33 of the Customs Act, 1969 on the ground that at the time of clearing the goods customs duties were paid through error because the correct H.S. Code was not declared, and that instead of 20% the customs duties were paid at the rate of 25%---On the request of the respondent-company the matter was referred to the Classification Committee constituted by the Federal Board of Revenue---Classification Committee issued a comprehensive classification ruling and determined that the imported goods fell under PCT Heading 3920.2040 which attracted customs duty at the rate of 25%---Classification Committee had sent samples to the Customs House Laboratory for analysis and after subjecting them to tests a report was accordingly submitted---Committee, in the light of the test analysis report and the physical attributes of the samples, had concluded that 'Biaxially Oriented Polypropylene film (BOPP) fell under one of the four PCT Headings i.e. 3920.2010, 3920.2020, 3920.2030 and 2920.2040---Committee further concluded that the composition of the imported goods described in the test report rendered all the aforementioned headings to merit equal consideration---Committee considered the three sub-rules of Rule 3 of the General Rules for Interpretation to the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 ("Rules for Interpretation") in order to make a determination and the reasoning was recorded in the classification ruling---Rule 3(a) was excluded because none of the headings was most specific---Rule 3(b) was not attracted because all the headings merited equal consideration---As a consequence the determination was made by applying Rule 3(c) and on that basis PCT Heading 3920.2040 was determined since it was the heading which was last in numerical order among those which equally merited consideration---Committee had correctly determined PCT Heading 3920.2040 because it occurred last in the numerical order among those headings which merited equal consideration---Determination made by Committee was in accordance with the correct appreciation of the Rules of Interpretation and it did not suffer from any infirmity---Appellate Tribunal had made its own determination and that too without considering the test report and the classification ruling of the Committee---Tribunal had also not sought any technical assistance from the Committee or the Board---High Court also did not appreciate that the Committee had interpreted the Rules of Interpretation in accordance with the Explanatory Notes and other documents---Rules of Interpretation, particularly Rule 3(c), had not been properly appreciated and thus misinterpreted---Determination made by the Classification Committee did not suffer from any legal infirmity nor was found to be in violation of the Rules of Interpretation read with the Explanatory Notes---Appeals were allowed, judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court were set-aside, and consequently, the Order in Original whereby the refund application of respondent-company was rejected stood restored.

(b) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----S. 18 & First Sched.---Classification of imported goods---Correct PCT Heading, determination of---Classification Committee, power of---Scope---Classification of goods is one of the most basic functions of the procedure in the context of import or export of goods---It is a specialised job and technical in nature---It essentially requires expertise and taking of multiple factors into consideration e.g. examining the goods, all the relevant documents, understanding the classification aids and technical literature etc.---Classification Committee constituted by the Federal Board of Revenue includes experts who possess the skills, knowledge and experience in respect of classification of goods in conformity with the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System ('Harmonised System')---Classification Committee and its classification rulings, therefore, have crucial importance---There is a presumption of regularity attached to its proceedings and findings regarding classification of goods---This presumption, however, is rebuttable if it can be demonstrably shown that the findings are arbitrary, fanciful and in violation of the General Rules for Interpretation to the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969 ("Rules for Interpretation"), the Explanatory Notes and other relevant guidelines or principles relating to classification of goods under the Harmonised System---Appellate Tribunal nor the High Court can substitute the findings of the Classification Committee unless they can be shown to be arbitrary, fanciful or in violation to the applicable rules and principles of interpretation.

Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court along with Ch. M. Javed, Chief (L), FBR and Nayyar Shafiq, Chief (Tariff) for Appellant.

Farhat Nawaz Lodhi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 129

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ

NAEEM SAJID and others---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE through Prosecutor General Punjab and another---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 46 of 2024, heard on 17th May, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 19.12.2023 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Misc. No.74603-B of 2023).

Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J.; Musarrat Hilali, J. agreeing; Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. dissenting.

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 148 & 149---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Case of cross-versions---[Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. [Majority view]: Admittedly there was an issue between the parties in respect of land where the incident had occurred---Claim of the complainant was that the petitioners and others attacked upon the father of the complainant with sticks who was injured and subsequently he was thrown in front of the tractor and the tractor ran over their father, which resulted into his death---On the other hand, the petitioners denied the claim of the complainant and narrated that the complainant was the aggressor who attacked upon them---Role of each of the accused had to be established subsequently, in the light of medical report showing cause of death---Case of the prosecution had to be proved through cogent and reliable evidence, which was yet to be produced before the Trial Court---At present stage, on a tentative assessment, prima facie, the petitioners could not be singled out for commission of the offence---Their involvement in the case was one of a further inquiry, on the basis of which, the petitioners were entitled for the grant of bail---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed; and the petitioners were granted post-arrest bail]---[Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. [Minority view]: Perusal of the record indicated that all the petitioners were expressly nominated in the FIR with specific roles attributed to them---They collectively caused injuries to the deceased and threw him in front of the tractor---Petitioners had not disputed the time, date, and place of occurrence or their presence at the time of occurrence---Medico legal certificate available on record fully supported the prosecution case---There was no contradiction between the medical report and the version put forth by the complainant---Cross-version was registered after a delay of one month and 03 days---Petitioners filed their first post-arrest bail before the Trial Court wherein they never mentioned about the alleged occurrence as mentioned in cross-version---Offence of qatl-i-amd alleged in the present case, being punishable with death or imprisonment for life under Section 302, P.P.C., fell within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1), Cr.P.C---Present case, on tentative assessment, did not seem to be one of the further inquiry---Petition was dismissed; leave was refused, and consequently petitioners were denied post-arrest bail.

Muhammad Atif v. State 2024 SCMR 1071 and Bakhti Rehman v. State 2023 SCMR 1068 ref.

Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. [Minority view]

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Bail---Rule of consistency---Scope---Rule of consistency is applicable only when one person's case is at par with the rest of the accused whose post-arrest bail has been granted.

Muhammad Atif v. State 2024 SCMR 1071 ref.

Mazhar Iqbal Sidhu, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Mirza Abid Majeed, D.P.G. Punjab and Tariq, SI/IO for the State.

Akhtar Hussain Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 134

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ

MUHAMMAD HASSANULLAH (OMG/B-18), ACTING ADDITIONAL SECRETARY, HEALTH DEPARTMENT, BALOCHISTAN---Petitioner

Versus

CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN, QUETTA and another---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 5795 of 2021 and Civil Petition No.2-Q of 2022, decided on 13th December, 2023.

(Against the judgment dated 30.10.2021 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in C.P. No.631 of 2021).

(a) Balochistan Service Tribunals Act (V of 1974)---

----S. 4---Balochistan Civil Servants Act (IX of 1974), S. 2(1)(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 199 & 212---Employees of Balochistan Secretariat Service---Matter concerning terms and conditions of service---Ouster of jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Questions and grievances relating to transfer and postings of a civil servant fell within the ambit of the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant and thus were within the exclusive domain of an administrative Tribunal established under the command of Article 212 of the Constitution---In the present case, the respondents (employees of Balochistan Secretariat Service) were asserting a right which fell within their terms and conditions of service---They were admittedly civil servants within the meaning of the said expression as defined under the Balochistan Civil Servants Act, 1974 ('Act of 1974')---There was nothing on record to show that the respondents had availed the departmental remedies provided under the law---It was mandatory for them to have agitated the grievance in the manner prescribed under the scheme of law applicable to a civil servant under the Act of 1974 and the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974 ('the Tribunals Act)---Moreover, they had explicitly stated in the memorandum of the petition that the same matter was challenged and it was pending before the Tribunal---Objection regarding maintainability of the petition and its adjudication under Article 199 of the Constitution was raised by the Government but it was not adverted to by the High Court---Respondents were attempting to achieve an object which was not justiciable before the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution---Bar under Article 212 had ousted the jurisdiction of the High Court---Declaration made by the High Court was, therefore, not sustainable---Matter was already pending before the Tribunal and thus the latter had the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it---Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, and the impugned judgment was consequently set aside.

Ayyaz Anjum v. Government of Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Department and others 1997 SCMR 169 and Peer Muhammad v. Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary and others 2007 SCMR 54 ref.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 212---Civil service---Matter concerning terms and conditions of service---Bar contained under Article 212 of the Constitution---Scope---Exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal and the bar contained under Article 212 are of such a nature that that they are attracted even if the grievance arises from an order which may involve questions of mala fide, coram non judice or having been passed without jurisdiction---Civil servant cannot bypass the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal by adding a ground of violation of fundamental right(s)---Service Tribunal will have exclusive jurisdiction in a case founded on the terms and conditions of service even if it involves the question of violation of fundamental rights---Service Tribunal will be vested with jurisdiction even where the case involves the vires of a statutory rule or notification---If a statutory rule or notification adversely affects the terms and conditions of a civil servant the same will be treated as a final order for the purposes of the jurisdiction of a Service Tribunal.

Syed Arshad Ali and others v. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. and others 2008 SCMR 314; Peer Muhammad v. Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary and others 2007 SCMR 54; Khalid Mahmood Wattoo v. Government of Punjab and others 1998 SCMR 2280; Asadullah Rashid v. Haji Muhammad Munir and others 1998 PLC (C.S.) 1371; Noor Badshahd Khattak v. Government of NWFP and others 2004 PLC (C.S.) 1084 and I.A. Sherwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others 1991 SCMR 1041 ref.

Muhammad Shoaib Shaheen, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 5795 of 2021).

Ayaz Khan Swati, Additional Advocate General, Balochistan for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 2-Q of 2022)

Nemo for Respondents

2025 S C M R 140

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Musarrat Hilali, JJ

AHMAD SIKANDER---Petitioner

Versus

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, AEOI ZONE, LAHORE---Respondent

C.R.P. No. 870 of 2023 in C.P.L.A. No. 2166-L of 2023, decided on 15th March, 2024.

(For review of this Court's order dated 08.08.2023 passed in C.P. No. 2166-L of 2023).

Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J.; Musarrat Hilali, J. agreeing; Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. dissenting. [Majority view]

(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----Ss. 111(1)(b) & 122(9)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review petition---Bank account maintained in a foreign country not disclosed in wealth statement---Proper opportunity of hearing to be provided to the tax payer---Scope---Petitioner (tax payer) was charged to tax under section 111(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance') by the Assessment Officer---Appeal filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner Inland Revenue was dismissed---Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the ITA before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue which was allowed, and against the said order, the respondent (department) filed Income Tax Reference before the High Court which was allowed---Finally the petitioner filed civil petition before the Supreme Court which was dismissed, hence the present review petition---Contentions of petitioner were that he had submitted his returns with all the necessary details and nothing was concealed; that all the necessary documents including the foreign income and assets statement along with the bank statement and foreign loan documents were e-filed which were available at e-Portal of E-FBR; that all these documents were supplied to the respondent through post as well, but the same were not considered by the fora below; that even otherwise, copies of the relevant documents were to be obtained from London, which could not be obtained in time on account of Covid-19 restrictions; that immediately upon receiving the documents they were produced before the Tribunal in order to substantiate his stance; that such documents were not new evidence, rather the same were in support of the information already available at e-Portal, but the High Court had ignored the factum of availability of these documents at e-Portal and had wrongly considered them as fresh ones; that while arguing the matter before the Supreme Court, the petitioner tried his best to highlight all these facts and to establish that the High Court had erred in law by considering the documents as new evidence, but no proper opportunity was provided to him by the Supreme Court---Validity---[Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. [Majority view]: High Court while deciding the Reference declared that the documents provided to the Tribunal were new evidence---Petitioner had raised all legal and factual grounds in his petition before the Supreme Court, but it seems that the grounds urged by the petitioner escaped the attention of the Supreme Court while deciding the civil petition---Petitioner claimed that the findings of the fora below raised serious questions of law and facts, therefore, reappraisal of the record was necessary in the best interest of justice, but the needful was not done by the Supreme Court at the time of hearing his petition---This raised sufficient reasons to accept the contentions of the petitioner---Even otherwise, no prejudice would be caused to the respondent (department), if an opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner---Review petition was allowed; and the order under review passed by the Supreme Court was re-called with the direction that Civil Petition shall be restored to its original number and be fixed for hearing]---[Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. [Minority view]: Petitioner had not raised any ground as envisaged under Rule 1 of Order XXVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 read with Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure---Petitioner had failed to establish that he had discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the order or judgment---After a careful examination of the leave refusing order in the Civil Petition, as well as that judgment of the High Court, no compelling reasons were found to entertain the present review petition---High Court had diligently addressed all issues raised thoroughly and decided the case on the basis of facts and grounds---All pleas raised in present review petition had already been addressed by the High Court and were duly considered by the Supreme Court while passing the order under review---Moreover petitioner had failed to establish any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record warranting a review---Review petition was dismissed.]

Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J.; dissenting with Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. [Minority view]

(b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980---

----O.XXVI, R.1---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review, power of---Grounds---Mistake or error apparent on the face of record---Meaning---One of the grounds to exercise the power of review is when some mistake or error apparent on the face of record is found---An error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any in-depth process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions---Thus an error which is required to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error on the face of the record---Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law---Any order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law.

Ghulam Murtaza v. Abdul Salam Shah 2010 SCMR 1883; Commissioner Inland Revenue Z-III, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Tax House, Karachi and another v. Messrs MSC Switzerland Geneva and others 2023 SCMR 1011; State of West Bengal and others v. Kamal Sengupta and another (2008) 8 SCC 612 and Parsion Devi and others v. Sumitri Devi and others (1997) 8 SCC 715 ref.

(c) Supreme Court Rules, 1980---

----O.XXVI, R.1---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XLVII, R.1---Review, power of---Scope---Grounds taken at appellate stage---Under the garb of filing a review petition, a party cannot be permitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for reopening the conclusions arrived at in a judgment---Power of review is not to be confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court to correct errors committed by a subordinate Court---Hence, if an argument has been advanced by the party in the appellate forum then the same cannot be argued at the review stage---While exercising the review jurisdiction, the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its own order---Review proceedings are distinct from appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVI,I Rule 1, C.P.C.---In exercise of review jurisdiction, the Court cannot reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion even if two views are possible in a matter.

Pakistan International Airlines Karachi v. Inayat Rasool 2004 SCMR 1737; Nook Hassan Awan v. Muhammad Ashraf 2001 SCMR 367; Kalsoom Malik and others v. Assistant Commissioner and others 1996 SCMR 710; Abdul Majeed and another v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others 1980 SCMR 504; Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB (2020) 2 SCC 677; Ghulam Murtaza v. Abdul Salam Shah 2010 SCMR 1883 and Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech Electrothermics and Hydropower Ltd. and others AIR 2005 SC 43 ref.

Sh. Muhammad Akram, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Lahore).

Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for the State.

2025 S C M R 153

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Amin-ud-Din Khan and Athar Minallah, JJ

SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, FINANCE DIVISION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others---Petitioners

Versus

MUHAMMAD ANWAR---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 848 of 2022, heard on 12th December, 2023.

(Against the judgment dated 05.1.2022 of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad passed in Appeal No. 814(R)CS of 2019).

(a) Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973---

----Rr. 7 & 7-A---Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), S. 9---Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S. 5---Ante-dated promotion---Proforma promotion---Federal Service Tribunal, jurisdiction of---Whether the Tribunal was competent and vested with jurisdiction to declare the respondent (retired civil servant) 'qualified' for promotion when others were promoted and then simultaneously direct the competent authority to consider him for proforma promotion---Held, that it is implicit from the scheme provided under the Civil Servants Act, 1973 ('Act of 1973') read with the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 ('Rules of 1973') that promotion to a higher post is confined to a civil servant who has not retired or superannuated after attaining the age of superannuation---Said scheme does not contemplate for a civil servant to be considered for promotion after retirement or having attained the age of superannuation---Civil servant who has retired after attaining the age of superannuation cannot claim to be considered for promotion to a higher post---Question of evaluating the fitness or suitability for promotion has always been within the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent authority and it is not shared by the Service Tribunal or a Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction in respect of eligibility and qualification---Tribunal is, therefore, not competent nor vested to alter, vary or in any manner modify the scheme of promotion to a higher post explicitly prescribed under the Act of 1973 and the Rules of 1973---In the present case the Tribunal had transgressed its jurisdiction by declaring the respondent (retired civil servant) to be 'qualified' for promotion from the date others were promoted---Tribunal also fell in error by pre-empting the process required to be adopted by the designated forum for determining the eligibility and entitlement of the respondent for the purposes of proforma promotion---Petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed.

(b) Civil service---

----Promotion---Not a vested right---Promotion is neither a vested right nor could it be claimed with retrospective effect---What a civil servant may claim as of right under the law is that the latter should be considered when the cases for promotion are taken up---Civil servant cannot call upon a Tribunal or Court to direct the department to fill the promotion post forthwith or on a particular date or to keep it vacant or under consideration.

Abid Hussain Shirazai v. Secretary Ministry of Industries and Production 2005 SCMR 1742 and Muhammad Yousaf v. Chairman Railway Board 1999 SCMR 1559 ref.

(c) Administration of justice---

---If the law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner it has to be done accordingly, otherwise it would not be in compliance with the legislative intent.

Zia ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed Hussain and others 2014 SCMR 1015 ref.

Rana Asadullah Khan, Additional Attorney General for Petitioners.

Respondent in person.

2025 S C M R 160

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, Shahid Waheed and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President, Karachi---Petitioner

Versus

ROZ-UD-DIN and another---Respondents

Civil Petition No.3649 of 2023, decided on 12th September, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 30.08.2023 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta passed in C.P. No.570 of 2021).

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 25---Employee of National Bank of Pakistan---Allegations of omissions and irregularities regarding ATM cash feeding, maintenance and balancing---Penalty of dismissal from service reduced to down gradation by one step in pay scale---Other employees facing similar allegations awarded lesser punishment---Discrimination---In the impugned judgment, the High Court rightly held that under similar facts and circumstances as well as the same set of allegations and charges the other employees of the Bank were awarded lesser punishment by the Disciplinary Cases Committee of the Bank, and no reason whatsoever had been assigned to single out the respondent who had been awarded the major punishment of dismissal from service which amounted to clear discrimination---Nothing had been brought on record to show that respondent was directly responsible or had committed any gross misconduct or negligence in respect of the allegations as contained in the charge sheet/show cause notice, whereas, the guilt regarding allegations and charges in the instant case had been duly accepted through confessional statement by another employee of the bank i.e. the Branch Manager against whom a criminal case was also registered, however, such aspect had been totally ignored while awarding the major punishment of dismissal from service, which, on the face of it, was otherwise not commensurate with the magnitude of the guilt and the role assigned to respondent---Neither in the charge sheet nor in the proceedings before the Disciplinary Cases Committee there was any direct charge of misconduct, fraud, embezzlement of fraud or even the connivance of respondent with the offence committed by the Branch Manager who had accepted his guilt and entire responsibility, therefore, on the allegation of not complying with office circulars to handle the ATM cash feeding and allowing the Branch Manager, who was reportedly performing the said duty as joint custodian, major penalty of dismissal from service was not only harsh but also disproportionate to the allegations/charge besides being discriminatory---Impugned judgment of the High Court by which it modified the penalty of dismissal from service awarded to the respondent to down gradation by one step in his pay scale was upheld---Petition was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Secretary to Government of the Punjab Food Department, Lahore and another v. Javed Iqbal and others 2006 SCMR 1120 ref.

(b) Civil service---

----Punishment, quantum of---Discretion of competent authority---Authority vested with discretion to award punishment to an employee has to ensure that such punishment should commensurate with the magnitude of guilt.

Malik Khushal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Quetta).

Kamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.1.

2025 S C M R 168

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Athar Minallah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

CHAIRMAN/DEAN SHEIKH ZAYED HOSPITAL, LAHORE---Petitioner

Versus

AMJAD MEHMOOD KHAN---Respondent

Civil Petition No.1353-L of 2023, decided on 12th September, 2024.

(Against the Judgment dated 20.02.2023 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Lahore in the Appeal No.8(L) of 2020).

(a) Civil service---

----Pension---Claim for pensionary benefits---Limitation---Pension constitutes a recurring cause of action---Claims constituting payment of lawful dues constitute a recurring cause of action and delay, if any, would not automatically vitiate a claim.

Abdul Jabbar v. Pakistan Railways 2018 PLC (C.S.) 375; Umar Baz Khan v. Jehanzeb PLD 2013 SC 268; M.R. Gupta v. Union of India and others (1995) 5 SCC 628 and Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh (2008) 8 SCC 648 ref.

(b) Civil Service Regulations (CSR)---

----Art. 371-A(ii)---Pensionary benefits, calculation of---Inclusion of contractual period for calculation of pensionary benefits---Contractual period (of less than 5 years),being temporary service, is recognized by Article 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations (CSR) for inclusion in the calculation of pension provided that the contractual period is followed by regularization or confirmation without any gap or interruption, in accordance with clause (ii) of Article 371-A of the CSR---Clause (ii) of Article 371-A of the CSR provides for situations where a government servant has rendered less than five years of continuous temporary or officiating service---In such instances, the period of service shall also be counted towards pension or gratuity, provided that it is immediately followed by confirmation/regularization as a permanent employee---In the present case, since temporary service (contract period) of respondent (employee) was 4 ½ years therefore clause (ii) of Article 371-A was applicable---Record reveals that the respondent's service from his contractual appointment to regularization and retirement was continuous and uninterrupted and this had not been disputed by the petitioner (employer)---Therefore, Federal Service Tribunal had rightly allowed the appeal of the respondent---Petition was dismissed and leave was refused.

Chairman, Pakistan Railway, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others v. Shah Jehan Shah PLD 2016 SC 534 and Ministry of Finance through Secretary and others v. Syed Afroz Akhtar Rizvi and others 2021 SCMR 1546 ref.

Imran Aziz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Aurangzeb Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (via video link from Lahore).

2025 S C M R 174

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ

MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and others---Appellants

Versus

MEMBER (JUDICIAL-II) BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE and others---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos.936 to 938 of 2012, decided on 16th September, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 02.07.2010 passed by Lahore High Court at Lahore in W.Ps. Nos.10329 of 2005 and 8274 of 2005).

Per Amin-ud-Din Khan, J.; Yahya Afridi, J. agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting.

(a) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)---

----Ss. 39 & 42---Mutation entries---Scope---Any entry available in the revenue record unless it is substituted through a valid entry by the decree of any court or valid attestation of mutation of correction of any rights in the land remains in the field---Simultaneously if once it is found that the entries have been unlawfully changed, it shall be deemed that the old entries would continue.

Karamat Hussain and others v. Natho Khan and others 2007 CLC 1391 ref.

(b) West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959)---

----Para. No. 22---Shamlat Deh land---Ala Maaliks and Adna Maaliks, concepts of---Interpretation of the judgments rendered in the cases of "Ladhoo v. B.O.R." (1991 MLD 99), and "Ladhoo v. B.O.R" in C.Ps. Nos.823 and 824-L of 1990---Appellants were Adna Maaliks who held possession over land in
the Shamlat Deh -- Appellants challenged mutation entries and orders of the revenue officers whereby the land in their possession was not recorded as under their ownership consequent to West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959) ["MLR-64"]---Case of appellants was based on the implementation of the High Court judgment reported as Ladhoo v. B.O.R." (1991 MLD 99), and the Supreme Court judgment "Ladhoo v. B.O.R" in C.Ps. Nos.823 and 824-L of 1990, wherein they claimed that their rights as Adna Maaliks having possession in the Shamilat Deh had been recognized and upheld in terms of MLR 64 and Notification dated 3rd March, 1960 issued by the West Pakistan Land Commission under the MLR-64 ("1960 Notification")---Respondents were Ala Maaliks, who claimed a superior right in the Shamlat Deh on the basis of their proprietary rights in the village, meaning thatthey claimed proportionate ownership in the Shamlat Deh according to their proprietorship in the village---Respondents relied on the Hasab Rasad Khewat and the Wajib-ul-Arz to justify their entitlement to proprietary rights in the Shamlat Deh---[Per Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. [Majority view]: Appellants were unable to state what their status over suit land (Shamlat Deh land) was except that they were in possession and cultivating the Shamlat land---It did not create any right in favour of appellants if they were in possession of Shamlat land---It seemed that appellants who were previously Aala Maalik or under the Aala Maalik, wanted to grab Shamlat land on the plea that they were in possession--- Without any right or valid entrance upon the Shamlat land they cannot claim any right---Concept of Aala Maalik was no more in existence after promulgation of West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation (MLR No. 64 of 1959) ["MLR-64"]---It was admitted by the appellants that they were not recorded Aala Khud Adna Maalik or Adna Maalik in the village proprietary land---Through the decision of case titled "Ladhoo v. B.O.R" reported as 1991 MLD 99 and order of dismissal of C.Ps. Nos. 823 and 824-L of 1990 by the Supreme Court no rights were created in favour of the present appellants---For determination of rights in the Shamlat Deh the benchmark as well as formula for grant of rights is on the basis of entitlement of a person in the malkiyat khata; whatever rights he was holding on the basis of said rights he is entitled to get land in the Shamlat Deh---Person who has absolutely no rights in the malkiyat khata, he cannot be granted any right in the Shamlat Deh khata---No right had been created in favour of the appellants by the MLR-64 nor they could show that any right had been created in their favour---Wrong picture of the judgment passed by the High Court reported as 1991 MLD 99 was shown to the Supreme Court---Distribution of Shamlat land upon the proprietary body of village was a rule under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 and wajib-ul-arz also supported the distribution of Shamlat land in accordance with the ownership of the whole proprietary body of the village---In accordance with para 6 of 1960 Notification distribution of Shamlat land was upon two categories only i.e. Adna Maaliks and Ala Khud Adna Maalik and none was entitled for grant of land on the basis of possession only---If anyone was in possession on the Shamlat land without having any right in the proprietorship khata, he had absolutely no right for grant of Shamlat land---The aforementioned two categories create the proprietary body of the village, therefore, they were entitled for distribution of Shamlat land in proportionate with their proprietorship---Appeals were dismissed]---[Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. [Minority view]: High Court judgment reported as Ladhoo v. B.O.R." (1991 MLD 99) ("1990 HC Judgment") and the Supreme Court judgment "Ladhoo v. B.O.R." in C.Ps. Nos.823 and 824-L of 1990 ("1991 SC Judgment") both concluded that the revenue authorities did not commit any illegality in removing the names of Ala Maaliks from column No.3 of the Jamabandi for the year 1945-46 in which they were reflected as owners---This fact alone was enough to show that the rights of Adna Maaliks consequent to MLR 64 and the 1960 Notification had to be recognized, in that, the revenue record had to translate the possessory rights of Adna Maaliks into their proprietary rights---Revenue record showed that the possession of Adna Maaliks in the Shamlat Deh had not been challenged---Secondly, the available records did not reflect that Ala Maaliks had, at any time, challenged MLR 64 or the 1960 Notification; to the contrary, they repeatedly sought exclusive possession in the Shamlat Deh as against Ala-khud-Adna and Adna Maaliks, which were denied by the Supreme Court---Hence, both the '1990 HC Judgment' and '1991 SC Judgment' recognized the rights of Adna Maaliks and clarified that even where there were no Adna Maaliks under Ala Maaliks, Ala Maaliks could not claim ownership in the Shamlat Deh on account of MLR-64---Furthermore, as per the revenue record and the Jamabandis relied upon, Adna Maaliks did have possession in the Shamlat Deh; therefore, they were entitled to proprietary rights over the land in their possession consequent to MLR 64---There were no superior rights for Ala Maaliks and any claim on the basis of Ala Maalikat stood terminated after MLR-64---Where a person was entered in the revenue record as Ala Maalik as well as Ala-khud-Adna Maalik, they could retain that land as Adna Maalik but not as Ala Maalik---Only time they could retain their title as Ala Maaliks was when there was no Adna Maalik under them---Proprietary rights of Adna Maaliks as on 03.03.1960 was based on MLR 64 and any excess land in their possession for which they claimed proprietary right had to be based on some grant, lease, inheritance or lawful manner involving proper transfer of title in their favour---In the event that there was extra land with no legal backing and subject to Clause 6(d) of the 1960 Notification, an order must be passed to that effect and the land would resume in favour of the government---Appellant's proprietorship claim on the basis of possession was backed by law and in accordance with the judgments of the Supreme Court---Appeals were allowed and impugned judgment was set aside.]

Ladhoo v. B.O.R. 1991 MLD 99 distinguished.

Khanan v. Fateh Sher 1993 SCMR 1578 ref.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 185 & 199---Litigation before the High Court and Supreme Court under Article 199 and Article 185 of the Constitution respectively---Creation of a right in favour of one of the parties---Scope---Without any existing right the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot create a new right in favour of any party before the Court.

For the Appellants:

Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record/Advocate Supreme Court (in Civil Appeal No.936 of 2012).

Syed Ali Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Syeda B.H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record (in Civil Appeal No.937 of 2012).

Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Syed Fazaz Raza, Advocate and Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record (in Civil Appeal No.938 of 2012).

For the Respondents:

Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court along with Muhammad Ikram Ch., Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Malik Noor Muhammad Awan, Advocate Supreme Court, Maulvi Anwar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record.

For Respondent/Government:

Muhammad Baleegh-uz-Zaman, Addl. A.G., Punjab along with Malik Abdul Waheed, Member Consolidation and Jamshed Gulzar, Tehsildar.

Research and assistance by:

Miss Maira Hassan, Law Clerk.

2025 SCMR 206

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

BASHIR AHMED ANJUM ---Appellant

Versus

PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Chief Minister Punjab, Lahore and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 2013 of 2022,decided on 4th November, 2024.

(On appeal from the judgment dated 24.06.2019 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 4548 of 2018).

(a) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)---

----S. 8(5)---Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S. 4---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 212(3)---Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to check and resolve serious confusion which occurred due to some proof-reading lapses while publishing section 8 of Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 in law text books by different publishers.

(b) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)---

----S. 8(5)---Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974), S. 4---Proforma promotion---Wrongly published section---Maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit"---Meaning---Appeal filed by appellant seeking proforma promotion under section 8(5) of Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 was dismissed by the Service Tribunal---Validity---Service Tribunal based its judgment on incorrect exposition of law which was result of adverting to a wrongly published gazette notification---Patent and obvious error or oversight on the part of Court in any order or decision, could be reviewed sanguine to legal maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" meaning that no man should suffer because of the fault of Court or delay in the procedure---There is de rigueur sense of duty in administration of justice that Court and Tribunal should become conscious and cognizant that as a consequence of their mistake, nobody should become victim of injustice and in the event of any injustice or harm suffered because of a mistake of Court, the same should be remedied by making necessary corrections forthwith---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed against appellant/civil servant and matter was remanded to Service Tribunal for decision afresh.

Homoeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed v. Government of the Punjab through its Secretary Health, Department and others 2022 SCMR 1546 = 2022 PLC (C.S) 1390 ref.

Appellant in person.

Sanaullah Zahid, Additional Advocate General, Punjab for Government of Punjab.

2025 SCMR 211

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

AMJAD ALI and others ---Petitioners

Versus

ANWAR SHAH and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A No. 223-P of 2015, decided on 21st November, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 08.12.2014 passed by Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench in C.R. No. 38-B of 2008).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss.8, 42 & 54---Suit for possession, declaration and injunction---Adverse possession---Electricity bills---Proof of possession---Suit filed by predecessor-in-interest of appellants was decreed in his favour but Lower Appellate Court allowed appeal and suit was dismissed---Judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court were maintained by High Court---Validity---Possession of suit property was with predecessor-in-interest of respondents/defendants who had electricity consumption meter in their name but the same did not bear any fruit for them and had no effect on merits of the case---Such entries could never be termed as equivalent to ownership---Predecessor-in-interest of appellants was owner of suit house and after his death, the appellants stepped into his shoes---Status of predecessor-in-interest of respondents was that of a tenant and thereafter, respondents had stepped into his shoes---Sale mutations were of no help to predecessor-in-interest of respondents and their possession of suit house was not less than that of a trespasser---Supreme Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by Lower Appellate Court and High Court as Trial Court had rightly granted decree in favour of appellants---Appeal was allowed.

Sabit Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Muhammad Shoaib Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 215

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, C.J. and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J

SHARIF AHMAD ---Petitioner

Versus

RASHID AHMAD and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1999-L of 2019, decided on 27th November, 2024.

(Against the order dated 12.06.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Review Application No. 12674 of 2019).

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S.115---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)---Revision petition---Suo motu jurisdiction---Dismissal for non-prosecution---Principle---Petitioner was aggrieved of dismissal of his revision petition by High Court for non-prosecution---Validity---In cases where revisional Court assumed suo motu jurisdiction, only such cases ought not to be dismissed for non-prosecution---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1 and Farman Ali v. Muhammad Yousaf Ali and another PLD 1992 SC 330 distinguished.

Muhammad Naveed Shabbir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore).

Qazi Misbahul Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (through video link from Lahore).

2025 SCMR 216

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, CJ, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ

AYAZ and others ---Petitioners

Versus

MUSTAFA SAEED and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 231 and 183-K of 2022 and Civil Petition No. 827 of 2023, heard on 7th March, 2024.

(Against the Judgment dated 23.12.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Constitutional Petition No. D-849 of 2021).

(a) Sindh Public Service Commission (Recruitment Management) Regulations, 2006---

----Reglns. 0358, 0359 & 0413---Position of Assistant Conservator Forests (BPS-17)---Conditions incorporated in the original advertisement altered without any readvertisement---High Court declared the recruitment process null and void with the directions to readvertise the posts afresh and allow all interested candidates to participate in the competitive process---Validity---It is an admitted position that the Sindh Public Service Commission ("SPSC") invited applications only for 2 posts of Assistant Conservator of Forest (BPS-17) on Urban quota, vide advertisement No.04/2020 dated 13.07.2020 and the last date of submitting applications was 20.08.2020---However, on 08.09.2020, an Addendum was issued which altered the complexion of the recruitment process for the 2 posts originally announced for urban candidates; it was modified and bifurcated, with 1 post allocated to Urban and 1 to Rural, without readvertising the 1 post dedicated to the Rural area---Not only was the original condition incorporated in the advertisement modified, but at the same time, no opportunity was afforded to the prospective candidates to apply for the 1 post dedicated to the Rural area which they could not apply for in terms of the original advertisement notifying only 2 posts for Urban areas---Another misstep was increasing the numbers of vacant posts from 2 to 7---Again, in the original advertisement, only 2 posts were announced, but departing from the original conditions, the number of posts were increased without readvertising---Furthermore, once the cutoff date for applications was fixed as 20.08.2020 for the general public, how was the deadline extended to 25.09.2020, through an Addendum dated 08.09.2020, without publishing any advertisement or re-advertisement in continuation of the original advertisement---Niceties of Regulations 0358, 0359 & 0413 of the Sindh Public Service Commission (Recruitment Management) Regulations, 2006 made it obligatory that upon the acceptance of additional vacancies or increase in the number of posts, the said posts should have been readvertised for inviting fresh applications, and the change of the closing date for the receipt of applications could not be altered unless notified, which again implies that the extension in the closing date should also be advertised for the general public who could not apply within the original timeline, but the SPSC failed to follow its own Regulations diligently---There were also allegations of a close nexus of certain candidates with high-ranking government officials, due to which preferential treatment and favoritism was allegedly proffered by the SPSC---Judgment of the High Court did not warrant any interference.

(b) Civil service---

----Appointment---Transparency in the appointment process---Significance---Wrong selection of "blue-eyed" candidates, based on nepotism, favoritism, or external pressures, leads to chaos and turmoil in the civil service structure, creating unrest and discontent among civil servants with serious repercussions---In all fairness, merit should be the sole criterion in the selection process, as it is an integral part of good governance---Lack of transparency or preferential treatment of undeserving candidates in the appointment process amounts to a brutal murder of merit and excellence---Transparent recruiting process should be marked by unambiguity, uprightness, trustworthiness, and evenhandedness---Honesty and integrity are the best means to magnetize talented individuals suited for the job, and an open-minded selection process should be based on objective criteria free from any extraneous considerations, while providing every candidate with a fair and equal opportunity to compete.

Chief Secretary Punjab v. Abdul Raoof Dasti 2006 SCMR 1876; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Bacha Alam Khan 2022 SCMR 718; Suo Motu action regarding eligibility of Chairman and Members of Sindh Public Service Commission etc. 2017 SCMR 637; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101 and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 1997(7) SCC 622 ref.

(c) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 ---

----R. 12(2)---Sindh Public Service Commission (Recruitment Management) Regulations, 2006, Regln. 0612---Position of Assistant Conservator Forests (BPS-17)---Eligibility criteria---Upper age limit, relaxation in---Notification granting age relaxation of up to 15 years in the upper age limit---Legality---Joint reading of the Notification in question which approved the 15 years relaxation in the upper age limit and Regulation 0612 of the Sindh Public Service Commission (Recruitment Management) Regulations, 2006 ('2006 Regulations'), showed that the Government of Sindh could only relax the age of eligible candidates at its discretion through an Age Relaxation Order which could be issued collectively or specifically for any candidate ---Powers to authorize age relaxation for up to 2 years was vested in the Secretary of the concerned department while the Chief Secretary was authorized to accord age relaxation for up to 5 years only which was now raised up to 15 years---Even in the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1974 ('APT Rules'), the maximum age relaxation limit was 10 years which was by itself highly unjustified and excessive, and rather than curtailing this period by setting a well thought-out benchmark and being mindful of the norms of reasonableness and proportionality, the Government of Sindh, without any justifiable rhyme or reason, extended the age relaxation up to 15 years---In the context of the recruitment in issue, the maximum age was 30 years; if one added 15 years more, then a person, if selected for the job, would join his duty under the age of 45 years and would retire upon attaining the age of 60 years---Meaning that after just 15 years' tenure of service, he would be entitled to claim huge pensionary benefits, including other retiring benefits, which was also discriminatory to those employees who gave their blood and sweat, and toiled and served the government for more than 25 to 30 years and then became entitled to the pensionary and other retirement benefits---Supreme Court struck down the Notification and the Addendum by which relaxation of up to 15 years was granted in the upper age limit---Supreme Court directed that Sindh Public Service Commission should re-advertise the posts in question afresh and allow all interested candidates to participate in the competitive process---Petitions were dismissed and leave was refused.

M. Aaqil Awan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners along with Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 231 of 2022).

Syed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 827 of 2023).

Sabtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh for Petitioners (in C.P.L.A. No. 183-K of 2022).

Sabtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh for the Government of Sindh and SPSC (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 231 of 2022 and 827 of 2023).

Dr. A. Jabbar Kazi, Additional Secretary, Forest.

Hassan Akbar, Advocate General, Sindh.

Fakhar Alam, Chief Secretary.

Ali Imran Baloch, Secretary Law.

M.Yousaf, Senior Law Officer, SPSC.

M. Ishaque, Deputy Controller, SPSC (via video link from Karachi).

Ghulam Sarwar Baloch, Advocate Supreme Court and Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 (via video link from Karachi) in C.P.L.A. No. 231 of 2022).

Syed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 13.

Respondent No. 7 (in person (via video link from Karachi in C.P.L.A. No. 183-K of 2022).

2025 SCMR 231

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

TAJ WALI KHAN ---Petitioner

Versus

HUKAM KHAN (decd) through L.Rs ---Respondent

C.A No. 176-P of 2013,decided on 6th November, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 09.09.2013 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in C.R. No. 832-P of 2002 with C.M. No. 739-P of 2012).

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)---

----Ss.31 & 32---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 18 & 29---Suit for pre-emption---Plea of fraud---Limitation---Pleadings---Proof---Suit filed by appellant/pre-emptor was decreed in his favour by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court but High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation---Validity---Mere assertion in pleadings was not beneficial at all unless established through evidence in the light of pleadings---Fraud had to be pleaded from the beginning with full particulars of fraud and then should be established through evidence---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by High Court as the suit filed by appellant/pre-emptor was barred by limitation---Appeal was dismissed.

Zia ur Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Nemo for Respondent.

2025 SCMR 235

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

TASSAWAR HUSSAIN ---Petitioner

Versus

The REGIONAL POLICE OFFICER, MULTAN and another ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1181-L of 2016, decided on 24th September, 2024.

(Appeal against the judgment dated 15.02.2016 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 899 of 2016).

Civil service---

----Departmental appeal, filing of---Limitation---Police official dismissed from service---Departmental appeal filed by police official was rejected by the competent authority for being barred by time, and the said rejection order of the departmental appeal was maintained by the Service Tribunal vide impugned judgment---Validity---When the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner (police official) on 25.11.2010 and the dismissal order was passed on 11.01.2011, the petitioner was behind the bars (in connection with a murder case) and obviously, he was not in a position to diligently pursue and avail the remedy of departmental appeal in accordance with law---Bona fides of the petitioner could not be doubted when he was incarcerated; it was not an easy or comfortable task, rather it was beyond his control, to respond to the show cause notice, which was never served upon him, or to file a departmental appeal against the dismissal order, which was also never served upon him, within the stipulated time---However, when he was released from jail, he immediately filed the departmental appeal which was rejected---Petitioner then approached the Service Tribunal for redressal of his grievance but the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation---In all conscience, neither the overall conduct of the petitioner in pursuing his legal remedies depicted any negligent or reckless conduct nor did it appear that he deliberately failed to file the departmental appeal within time, and nor was any proof presented on the record to demonstrate that the petitioner was served with the show cause notice and dismissal order while he was in jail for him to pursue and avail the remedy of departmental appeal---Departmental appeal could, no doubt, be transmitted by the petitioner through the Jail Superintendent/authority, provided that he received the dismissal order in jail, but in this case when no order was served, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty or solely responsible for the delay in filing of the departmental appeal---On the contrary, he was a victim of circumstances, therefore the (police) department cannot take the refuge of limitation---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; as a consequence, thereof, the impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal to decide the service appeal of the petitioner on merits after affording a fair opportunity of hearing to the parties.

Tariq Javaid, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Baleegh-uz-Zaman Ch., Additional Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 239

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Shahid Waheed, JJ

GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Secretary Irrigation and Power and another ---Appellants

Versus

KUNJAH TEXTILE MILLS LTD and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471 and 472 of 2011, decided on 8th October, 2024.

(On appeal against judgment dated 13.01.2011 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.C.As. Nos. 299, 301, 304, 306, 291, 316, 350 of 2005, 96, 97, 98, 191 of 2006, 303, 305, 309, 311, 322, 341, 289, 290, 293, 300, 302, 343, 344, 345, 292, 298, 449, 310, 315, 320, 342 of 2005, W.Ps. Nos. 7940 of 2007, 15425, 17491, 17492, 17493, 18777, 18778, 19300, 19301, 19548, 19549, 19640, 20677 and 21378 of 2010).

(a) Punjab Finance Act (XXXIV of 1964)---

----S. 13 [as amended by the Punjab Finance Ordinance, 2001]---Punjab Finance Ordinance (VI of 2001), S. 4---Industries using private generators of more than 500 KW capacity to generate electricity for self use---Electricity duty, levy of---Legality---Section 13 of the Punjab Finance Act, 1964 [as amended by the Punjab Finance Ordinance, 2001] is not a general levy on electricity consumption---Rather it is on such consumption for a specific (i.e., limited) purpose or class---Taxing event in terms of S. 13(1) is on energy consumed, such consumption resulting from a supply of energy by either a licensee or someone who is not a licensee to a person who is the consumer of the energy, said consumers falling in the various categories or classes set out in the first column of the Fifth Schedule---This is the first stage, or the leviability of the duty---As for the second stage, the respondents did not fall within the taxing event---Respondents certainly produce energy by means of their generators of more than 500 KW capacity, but this energy is for self use, i.e., consumed by the respondents themselves---Thus, there is no "supply" of the energy---Second element of the taxing event did not apply to them and hence they are not within the levy---Respondents are not liable to pay the electricity duty on their own self use of the power/energy generated by their generators of more than 500 KW capacity---Appeals were dismissed accordingly.

(b) Interpretation of statutes---

----Taxing statute---Multiple interpretations---Preference---It is a cardinal principle of taxing statutes that if more than one reasonable interpretation is possible of the charging, or taxing, provision, then the one more favorable to the putative taxpayer is to be adopted, i.e., the one that either takes him out of the charge altogether or (if such be the case) results in a reduced or lessened burden.

Barrister M. Mumtaz Ali, Additional Advocate General, Punjab, Muhammad Iqbal Tahir, Energy Inspector, Energy Department and Zafar Abbas, Energy Inspector, Energy Department for Appellants (in all cases).

Haq Nawaz Chattha, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 261 of 2011).

Ahmed Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 453 of 2011).

Mir Afzal Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (in C.As. Nos. 455 and 458 of 2011).

Muhammad Ramzan Ch., Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.As. Nos. 438, 440, 441, 445, 446, 448, 452, 453 and 467 of 2011).

Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link, Lahore) in C.A. No. 460 of 2011).

Mian Abdul Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link, Lahore) in C.As. Nos. 259, 260, 263, 264, 265, 444, 445, 447, 452, 459 and 461 to 469 of 2011).

Irfan ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court for NEPRA.

Ex-parte for other Respondents.

2025 SCMR 249

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

The EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR (P&GS) STATE LIFE, PRINCIPAL OFFICE KARACHI and others ---Petitioners

Versus

MUHAMMAD NISAR, AREA MANAGER, STATE LIFE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN, PESHAWAR ZONE, PESHAWAR---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 2367 of 2024,decided on 16th September, 2024.

(Appeal against the judgment dated 27.03.2024 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 3377-P of 2023).

(a) State Life Employees (Service) Regulations, 1973---

----Regln. 20---Employee of State Life Insurance Corporation---Change in date of birth sought close to retirement---Permissibility---It is obligatory for any employee to intimate his correct date of birth and to produce confirmatory documentary evidence at the time when the first entry is made in the service record which cannot be altered, except in the case of a clerical error, because the date of birth once recorded at the time of joining service is deemed to be final and thereafter no alteration in the date of birth is permissible---It is an admitted position that in the original National Identity Card (CNIC), the year of birth of the respondent (employee) was 1964, while in the CNIC prepared on 12.11.2002, again his date of birth was 22.09.1964---Even in his Passport his date of birth was 22.09.1964---However, the respondent was issued his new CNIC on 03.03.2023, wherein his date of birth was shown as 22.09.1966---Employer-Corporation had issued a circular, wherein it was categorically mentioned that certain employees are placing a representation for the correction in the date of birth after having completed a number of years of service, therefore, it was announced by means of the aforesaid circular that no change in the date of birth will be made if it is not requested within 2 years of the date of initial appointment---Respondent himself relied upon this circular---Record reflects that the respondent first applied for the correction of his date of birth in the official record vide application dated 17.03.2023 on the basis of his matriculation certificate issued in 1983, but no justification was shown in the application as to why he himself mentioned his date of birth as 22.09.1964 when he was appointed by the petitioner's company---It is also incomprehensible that even when he applied for a CNIC in 2002, why at that time the correction was not applied, and even in his passport, issued in 2010, he maintained the same date of birth---Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside and writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court was dismissed.

Manzar Zahoor v. Lyari Development Authority and another 2022 SCMR 1305 = 2022 PLC (C.S) 1128 ref.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Change in date of birth sought by an employee of a Government Corporation---Constitutional petition filed by employee before the High Court---Maintainability---Extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is envisioned predominantly for affording an express remedy where the unlawfulness and impropriety of the action of an executive or other governmental authority could be substantiated without any inquiry---Expression "adequate remedy" signifies an effectual, accessible, advantageous and expeditious remedy---In the case in hand, the remedy of filing civil suit was an appropriate and alternate remedy as remedium juris which was more convenient, beneficial, and effective---Controverted ` questions of fact, adjudication on which is possible only after obtaining all types of evidence in power and possession of parties, can be determined only by the courts having plenary jurisdiction in the matter, and on such ground the constitutional petition filed by the employee was incompetent.

Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary Civil Secretariat, Peshawar and others v. Shah Faisal Wahab and others 2023 SCMR 1642; Special Secretary-II (Law and Order), Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and others v. Fayyaz Dawar 2023 SCMR 1442 and State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. PLD 1983 SC 280 ref.

Malik Jawwad Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Noor Muhammad, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (through video link at Peshawar).

2025 SCMR 257

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Athar Minallah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

Messrs INTER QUEST INFORMATICS SERVICES ---Petitioner

Versus

The COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX and others ---Respondents

Civil Review Petitions Nos. 988 to 1001 of 2023 in Civil Appeals Nos. 94 to 106 of 2008 and 550 of 2011, decided on 28th November, 2024.

(For review of the judgment of this Court dated 08.09.2023).

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI, R. 1---Review petition before the Supreme Court---Principles upon which a judgment may be reviewed stated.

A petition for review is neither an appeal nor a revision petition to a superior court but rather a request made to the same court to reconsider its decision on the limited grounds prescribed for review. It does not entail a rehearing or re-argument of the case adjudicated in the judgment under review.

For purposes of a review petition the settled principles governing the ground of "error apparent on the face of the record" are that the error, whether of fact or law, must be self-evident and readily discernible on the face of the record. It should not require meticulous examination or detailed analysis to uncover, nor should it need to be demonstrated through extensive or intricate arguments, or established through a lengthy process of reasoning on points where reasonable divergence of opinion may exist. Established instances falling within the scope of "error apparent on the face of the record" include judgments passed on an erroneous assumption of material facts or by overlooking a material question of fact or law or an important aspect of the matter, which, if noticed and considered earlier, would have direct bearing on the conclusions reached by the Court.

Abdul Ghaffar v. Asghar Ali PLD 1998 SC 363; Pakistan v. Fecto Belarus Tractors Ltd PLD 2002 SC 208; Muhammad Boota v. Member, BOR 2010 SCMR 1049; Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421 and Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 ref.

(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001) ---

----Ss. 107 & 133(1)---Income Tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979) (since repealed), Ss. 163 & 136(1)---Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 1982, Arts. 7, 12, paras. 3(a), 3(b), 22, 23 & 24---Concept of "Royalties"---Scope---Business profits---Non-resident foreign company---Exemption from income tax---Income/royalties earned by the non-resident company in Pakistan for the lease of certain software---Whether such income was business profits and thus exempt from payment of income tax in Pakistan under Article 7 of the Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income ('the Convention'), or the same constituted "royalties" as defined in paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Convention and was liable to tax.

Petitioner (foreign incorporated company), in its tax returns, declared the receipts under the software lease agreements ('Agreements') as "business profits" and sought exemption from income tax in Pakistan under Article 7 of the Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 1982 ("the Convention"). However, the tax department treated these receipts as "royalties" under Article 12 of the Convention and subjected them to income tax at the rate of fifteen percent. The Income Tax Officer, Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal concluded that the payments received by the petitioner fell within the definition of "royalties" under paragraph 3(a) and (b) of Article 12 of the Convention and were therefore liable to income tax in Pakistan. The petitioner challenged the assessment orders, appellate orders and Tribunal judgments before the High Court through references. The High Court ruled in favour of the petitioner, holding that the amounts received by the petitioner for leasing FLIC tapes (software programs) under the Agreements did not qualify as "royalties" under the Convention and were not subject to income tax in Pakistan. The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court and the majority judgment under review allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgments and restoring the Tribunal's judgments as well as the original and appellate orders of the Income Tax Officers.

By the majority judgment under review the Court decided the matter against the petitioner mainly for the following reasons: (i) it would not really matter to the petitioner if, under Article 12 of the Convention, it had to pay income tax in Pakistan, because the petitioner could, with the tax authority of the Netherlands, claim an adjustment of the tax amount paid in Pakistan; (ii) the High Court did not note that the petitioner had an alternative remedy under Article 24 of the Convention to present its case to the competent authority of its own country, the Netherlands, which, if agreed with the respondent's stance, could take up the matter with the competent authority of Pakistan; (iii) the petitioner did not explain and prove the nature of the receipts for which it claims tax exemption before the Income Tax Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal- the fact-finding forums-and it was unwarranted for the High Court to have delved into the nature of the receipts; (iv) the High Court incorrectly assumed the applicability of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Convention' ('OECD MC'), as Article 12 of the Convention adheres to Article 12 of the 'United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries' ('UN MC') and not to Article 12 of the OECD MC; and (v) the full definition of "royalties" in paragraph 3(a) of Article 12 of the Convention included payments for "information concerning industrial, commercial, or scientific experience".

As to grounds (i) and (ii), in the majority judgment under review there is an error which is apparent on the face of the record. The possibility of adjustment of tax paid by the petitioner in Pakistan by the competent authority in the Netherlands or the availability of an alternate remedy before the competent authority in the Netherlands, was no ground for the High Court to decline to answer the questions of law referred to it in the reference application filed by the petitioner. In this regard, the Supreme Court mistakenly regarded the two different jurisdictions of the High Court to be interchangeable: one under Article 199 of the Constitution and the other exercised in the present case, the reference jurisdiction under the Income Tax Ordinance. Under Article 199, the High Court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it finds that the petitioner has an alternate adequate remedy. However, it escaped notice of the Supreme Court that a reference application is akin to an appeal and the reference jurisdiction is similar to appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, neither a reference application can be dismissed, nor can the exercise of reference jurisdiction be declined, on the ground of availability of some alternate remedy.

Messrs Squibb Pakistan v. CIT 2017 SCMR 1006 and CIR v. Rafeh Limited PLD 2020 SC 518 ref.

So far as ground (iii) is concerned, the petitioner contended that this is the result of an erroneous assumption of a material fact. There was substance in this contention, as the error in this regard is also apparent on the face of the record. The nature of the receipts was explained by the petitioner in its tax returns, and there was no dispute regarding this fact before the Income Tax Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Tribunal. It was, and remains, an admitted fact that the receipts were rentals received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs. The nature of the receipts was an admitted fact, and the questions referred were questions of law. Therefore, the observations made by the Supreme Court in the majority judgment, that it was unwarranted for the High Court to have delved into the nature of the receipts, appear to have overlooked the said orders of the Tribunal. The High Court only dealt with and answered the questions of law and did not determine the nature of the receipts, which was an admitted fact.

As for ground (iv), it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that, in the majority judgment, it escaped the notice of the Supreme Court that there is no significant difference in the definition of "royalties" provided in Article 12 of the UN MC and Article 12 of the OECD MC; therefore, the reference to Article 12 of the OECD MC, instead of Article 12 of the UN MC, by the High Court was inconsequential. This contention is supported by a plain reading of the two definitions. The only material difference between the definitions of "royalties" in the UN MC and the OECD MC is that the former includes payments received as consideration "for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment" in its definition. However, since neither the Income Tax Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals), the Tribunal, nor the respondent before the Supreme Court relied upon this clause of the definition of "royalties" as FLIC tapes containing computer software programs are admittedly not "equipment", this difference was immaterial to the decision of the case.

As to ground (v), it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that, in the majority judgment, the Supreme Court totally overlooked the question of law that was referred by the Tribunal to the High Court and decided in favour of the petitioner; that, instead, the majority judgment only cursorily observed that the full definition of "royalties" in paragraph 3(a) of Article 12 of the Convention included payments for "information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience", but did not clearly and decisively hold that the receipts received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs involved in the present case are covered by that clause of the definition of "royalties". The majority judgment cursorily observed that the full definition of "royalties" in paragraph 3(a) of Article 12 of the Convention includes payments for "information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience". However, it did not clearly or decisively hold that the receipts received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs, as involved in the present case, are covered by that clause of the definition of "royalties".

If a payment is in respect of rights to use the copyrights in a program, (e.g. by reproducing it and distributing it) then such a payment would be considered as a royalty. Other payments, however, only give a user the right to operate the program, where a consumer pays for a copy of computer program to use, this is not royalty payment. The Tribunal was not correct, and the High Court was correct, in determining that the receipts received by the petitioner for the lease of FLIC tapes containing computer software programs were not income from "royalties" but were "business profits", as claimed by the petitioner in its tax returns.

Lynne Oats and Emer Mulligaan-Principles of International Taxation, 7th edition. Bloomsbury Professional Tax. P.141 ref.

The majority judgment under review suffers from errors apparent on the face of the record. It proceeded on an erroneous assumption of a material fact and overlooked the material question of law and important aspects of the matter involved. The majority judgment under review was recalled and the appeals of the respondent were dismissed, upholding the judgments of the High Court. Review petitions were accepted accordingly with the observations that Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) provide a crucial framework for fostering international economic cooperation, facilitating cross-border investments, and avoiding the dual taxation of income that can impede global commerce; that these treaties serve as "bridges between nations," designed to encourage economic collaboration while preventing conflicts over taxing rights; that they achieve this by allocating taxing authority between the source and resident states, promoting predictability for businesses and individuals engaged in international activities; that Courts in developing countries must interpret these treaties as dynamic instruments that balance the need for economic growth with the protection of their tax base, and that treaties should not be interpreted rigidly but should reflect their "object and purpose," ensuring they serve the broader goal of equitable economic development globally.

Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions -5th edition. Wolters Kluwer ref.

Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (through video link).

Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court, Fayyaz Hussain Abro, Addl.Comm.FBR (through video link from Karachi) and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG Law, FBR for the Respondents.

2025 SCMR 269

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED and others ---Petitioners

Versus

The PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LAHORE and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 2305-L of 2016, decided on 24th September, 2024.

(Appeal against the judgment dated 27.04.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in Writ Petition No. 8153 of 2002).

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) [since repealed]---

----Ss. 25-A & 65-B---Grievance petition, filing of---Limitation---Grievance petition filed after a lapse of 22 years---Under Section 25A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 ("IRO 1969"), there is a specific timeframe for lodging the grievance in writing which cannot be stretched over an unlimited period of time---Law does not envisage that after expiry of the limitation period, if the employer gives a response to any time-barred grievance notice, it will amount to an extension in the period of limitation provided to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for redress of individual grievances---No cause of action subsists merely for the reason that one letter was replied after the lapse of the limitation period by the employer's management, which could not extend the starting point of limitation provided under the law for a workman to lodge his grievance before instituting the grievance petition in the Labour Court---No proper justification had been shown in the Order of the Labour Court and/or the impugned judgment of the High Court as to how, against the dismissal order on 25.05.1976, a grievance notice dated 26.04.1997 was found to be within time---Even for condonation of delay, nothing was mentioned by the respondent/workman before the Labour Court or the High Court---Act of sending a grievance notice and filing a grievance petition in the Labour Court or Commission has not been left open-ended but it is linked with the time constraint for initiating legal action for the redress of an individual grievance---Under the mandate of law an employee is supposed to deliver the grievance notice to his employer within the specified time, then wait only for the statutory period provided to the employer for the response, and after the lapse of this period, whether the notice was responded to or not by the employer, approach the Court immediately rather than spoiling or obliterating the period of limitation---It is a fundamental duty of the Court to examine the question of limitation vis-a-vis the statutory provisions envisioned under special or general law, requiring compliance of an act within a specific timeline---In the present case both the Labour Court and the High Court failed to advert to the crucial question of limitation provided for transmitting the grievance notice as provided in the repealed IRO 1969, and without appreciating the law and evidence led in the case, rendered the impugned judgments, which were not sustainable and were liable to be set aside, while the judgment of the Punjab Appellate Tribunal was based on the correct exposition of law---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed; as a consequence thereof, the judgment of the High Court and the Labour Court were set-aside and the judgment passed by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal was restored.

Farooq Zaman Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

M.Yafis Naveed Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for LRs of Respondent No. 3.

2025 SCMR 279

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ

PAKISTAN TEHREEK-I-INSAF, through authorized person and others ---Petitioners

Versus

ELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN, through Special Secretary, Islamabad and others ---Respondents

Civil Review Petition No. 14 of 2024 in Civil Petition No. 42 of 2024, decided on 11th October, 2024.

(a) Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act (XVIIof 2023)---

----S. 6---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review petition---Adjournment sought by counsel---Grounds---Family engagement---In the application for adjournment the nature of the pressing family engagement was not disclosed---Review petitioners were represented by Advocates of the Supreme Court ('ASCs')---Therefore, if the Senior Advocate had some pressing family engagement, then any of the other ASCs could have attended and proceeded with the present case---Moreover, section 6 of the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 now enables engagement of other counsel in a review petition, which was not permissible earlier---Supreme Court observed that in the circumstances, it was not persuaded to adjourn the case, however, in the interest of justice and only by way of indulgence it was doing so; that no further request for adjournment would be entertained, and it was expected that the case would proceed on the next date---Case was adjourned accordingly.

(b) Practice and procedure---

----Adjournment---Scope---Merely filing an adjournment application does not mean that the case will be adjourned.

Nemo for Petitioners.

Syed Ahmed Hassan Shah, Advocate Supreme Court along with/ for Respondent No. 3.

2025 SCMR 281

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Musarrat Hilali and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

ABDUL HAYEE and ABDULLAH alias GHAZALI and another ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Criminal Petitions Nos. 260-L and 275-L of 2015, decided on 21stOctober, 2024.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 28.01.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1202 of 2010, 1245 of 2010 and Capital Sentence Reference No. 33-T of 2010).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3---Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post---Reappraisal of evidence---Doubts as to the correct time of registration of FIR---As per the evidence a lot of time must have been consumed in arranging the weightlifter (crane) and removing the debris of the building and bringing out the dead bodies of 06 police persons from underneath the said debris and thereafter in preparation of the injury statements and inquest reports of the said dead bodies---It was not possible to complete all these proceedings within a period of 30 minutes as claimed by the prosecution---It was, thus evident that the FIR was not lodged at the given time mentioned in the relevant column of the FIR rather the same was registered with a considerable delay but the wrong time of registration of the FIR had been mentioned in its relevant columns to show the promptness of the FIR---Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.

(b) Criminal trial---

----Witnesses, evidence of---No enmity between witnesses and the accused ---Absence of enmity of the witnesses with the accused does not mean that they should be relied upon blindly without determining as to whether their evidence was trustworthy or the same was inherently unreliable.

Haroon v. State 1995 SCMR 1627 and Muhammad Iqbal v. State 1984 SCMR 930 ref.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3---Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post---Reappraisal of evidence---Chance witnesses---Doubtful testimony---Unnatural conduct of chance witnesses---Name of any witness who had seen the occurrence was not mentioned in the contents of the FIR---Likewise, it was not stated therein that how many accused participated in the occurrence and what were their descriptions---However, according to the prosecution case on the same day two witnesses appeared before the Police and claimed that they had witnessed the occurrence---Names of both the said eye-witnesses were not mentioned in the FIR---Conduct of the said eye-witnesses was highly unnatural because according to their statements they had witnessed the occurrence of a shocking, brutal and heinous offence of the murders of 08 innocent police employees through firing and bomb blast but they stated that instead of reporting the matter to the police they went to another city to purchase a buffalo---Both the alleged eyewitnesses were not residents of the area where the occurrence took place, as such, they were chance witnesses---Reason given by the chance witnesses for their presence at the spot at the time of occurrence had not been established plausibly, and the story of their presence at the spot was subsequently concocted to strengthen the weak prosecution case of an unseen occurrence---It was not safe to rely upon evidence of such alleged chance witnesses---Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.

Mst. Sughra Begum v. Qaiser Pervez 2015 SCMR 1142; Mst. Mir Zalai v. Ghazi Khan and others 2020 SCMR 319; G.M. Niaz v. The State 2018 SCMR 506; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 137; Muhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta and others 2017 SCMR 142 and Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192 ref.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post---Re-appraisal of evidence---Joint test identification parade---Legality---Identification parade of two accused persons was jointly held---Further no specific roles during the occurrence were attributed to any of the accused persons by the prosecution eye-witnesses at the time of their identification parades---Therefore, the identification of the petitioners (accused persons) during their identification parades carried no value in the eyes of law---Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.

Kamal Din v. The State 2018 SCMR 577; In the matter of Kanwar Ali, Special Judicial Magistrate PLD 2019 SC 488 and Azhar Mehmood v. The State 2017 SCMR 135 ref.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 342---Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post---Reappraisal of evidence---Recovery of weapons of offence from accused persons and positive forensics report---Inconsequential---Said recoveries were not put to the petitioners (accused persons) in their statements recorded under Section 342 Cr.P.C., therefore, the said pieces of prosecution evidence could not be considered against the petitioners and the same has rightly been discarded by the High Court---Even otherwise the direct evidence of alleged eye-witnesses in this case had been discarded, therefore, the convictions and sentences of the petitioners under the capital charge could not sustain merely on the basis of alleged recoveries---Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.

Fida Hussain Shah v. The State 2024 SCMR 1622; Haji Nawaz v. The State 2020 SCMR 687; Mst. Anwar Begum v. Akhtar Hussain 2017 SCMR 1710 and Muhammad Fazal v. The State 2009 SCMR 436 ref.

(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 148, 149, 412 & 440---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(a)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 3---Carrying out a bomb blast at a police check post---Reappraisal of evidence---Motive not proved---Plea of prosecution that petitioners (accused persons) were involved in other criminal cases of terrorism and they had committed the occurrence of this case in order to create terror in the society---Validity---No previous record of the petitioners regarding their involvement in any other criminal case prior to the registration of present case had been brought on the record---Moreover, the enmity of the petitioners with the local police was established during the cross-examination of a Police Inspector---A habeas petition was filed against the local police by the father of one of the petitioners (accused) before the High Court and in the said case the detenue was released---Furthermore, no record was produced by the prosecution to establish that the petitioners had any link with any terrorist/proscribed organization---It was, therefore, evident that the petitioners had no reason to commit the occurrence of this case rather the local police had a motive to falsely involve the petitioners in the instant case of an unseen occurrence---Prosecution was not able to prove its case against the petitioners (accused persons) beyond the shadow of doubt, therefore, petitions were converted into appeals and allowed, the impugned judgment was set aside and the petitioners were acquitted of all the charges while extending them the benefit of doubt.

Munir Ahmed Bhatti, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Mirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 SCMR 298

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Musarrat Hilali, JJ

Chaudhary GHULAM HUSSAIN and another ---Petitioners

Versus

Messrs SAUDI PAK COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED, LAHORE and another ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 3811 of 2019, decided on 15th January, 2024.

(Against the order dated 12.09.2019 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in E.F.A. No. 50073 of 2019).

Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)---

----Ss. 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 166---Execution of decree---Objections---Limitation---Petitioners filed objections against sale of mortgaged property which objections were dismissed---Validity---Property was auctioned on 19-07-2016 while petitioners filed objections in Executing Court on 14-05-2019---Compliant with Article 166 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, only thirty days' time was provided for making any application for setting aside a sale in execution of decree, including any such application filed by judgment debtor---Petitioners filed their objection petition to sale after more than three years, and thus, the same was time barred---Supreme Court declined to interfere in order passed by High Court as there was no illegality in it---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Rai Azhar Iqbal Kharal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.

Abdul Hameed Chohan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2.

2025 SCMR 301

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

ABID SHAHID ZUBERI and others ---Appellants

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary and others ---Respondents

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 89 of 2024 and Constitution Petition No. Nil of 2024, decided on 17th October, 2024.

Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 184(3)---Constitution petition challenging the proposed Twenty-Sixth (26th) Constitutional Amendment---Constitution petition and appeal dismissed as withdrawn---Counsel for the appellants/petitioners stated that he had been engaged on their behalf and had been instructed to withdrawl Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 89 of 2024 and the unnumbered Constitution Petition, filed on 16 September 2024 in respect of which certain objections were noted by the Registrar's office---Appellant No. 1 and the petitioner No. 1, who was earlier representing himself and was also the counsel of the other appellants/petitioners confirmed the statement made by the counsel---In such circumstances, Supreme Court declared that the said Appeal and the unnumbered Constitution Petition were dismissed as withdrawn.

Hamid Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Abid Shahid Zuberi, Advocate Supreme Court and Appellant No. 1/ Petitioner No. 1 with appellants/petitioners, namely, Ch. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Tahir Faraz Abbasi and Shafqat Mehmood Chauhan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 303

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED ---Petitioner

Versus

PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL through Chairman, Lahore and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1866-L of 2023,decided on 7th November, 2024.

(Appeal against the judgment dated 21.02.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 9869 of 2013).

(a) Interpretation of statutes---

----Substantive law and procedural law---Distinction---Substantive law defines rights, while procedural law deals primarily with the process or remedies involved---Procedural law initiates and guides the process and course of action through which the lawsuit progresses and the way in which court proceedings are undertaken---It also regulates and oversees the procedures employed---Substantive law, on the other hand, comprises statutory obligations relevant to the subject matter, declaring the applicable rights and obligations, and regulating the demeanor of an individual or government---Substantive law determines the conduct and relations of the parties inter se in respect of the matter litigated, whereas the procedural law regulates the conduct and relations of Courts and litigants in respect of the litigation---Substantive law deals with the ends which the administration of justice contemplates while the procedural law deals with the means and instruments by which the ends of administration of justice are to be attained---The question as to what facts constitute a wrong is determined by substantive law, while what facts constitute proof of a wrong is a question of procedure---Substantive law defines the rights whereas the law of procedure defines the modes and conditions of the application of one to the other---Substantive law relates to the matter outside the Courts, whereas the procedural law regulates affairs inside the Courts.

The Works of Jeremy Bentham 1843; Introduction to Jurisprudence 3rd Ed. Reprint, 2011 by Dr. Avtar Singh and Dr. Harpreet Kaur and Meeru Khan v. Mst. Naheed Aziz Siddiqui and others PLD 2023 SC 912 ref.

(b) Interpretation of statutes---

----Procedural law---Prospective and retrospective application---Outcome of legislation or changes in law that pertain solely to the procedures or legal remedies indicates that if legislation is enacted with the primary intent to alter or modify procedural aspects without prejudicing the rights of the litigants, then no doubt, it will apply to all pending and future actions---Individuals do not possess a vested right in any particular course of procedure, so for all intents and purposes, the change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively---However, laws affecting, curtailing or prejudicing vested rights shall be applied prospectively.

Corpus Juris Secundum, Francis J. Ludes and Harold J. Gilbert Volume 5B § 1841; Canon of Construction and Interpretation of Statutes; M. Mahmood Pages 315, 513, 301, The Construction of Statutes, Earl T. Crawford 1998, pages 581-583; The Interpretation of Statutes, N.S. Bindra 1984, 7th Edition, pages 645-646 and Principle of Statutory Interpretation and Statutory Words and Phrases, S.C. Sarkar 2013, page 109 ref.

(c) Industrial Relations Act (X of 2012)---

----S. 57(5)---Trans-provincial establishment---Forum of appeal---National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), jurisdiction of---Exclusion of jurisdiction of Labour Court and Labour Appellate Tribunal---Industrial Relations Act, 2012 ("IRA") is applicable only to the employees and entrepreneurs of trans-provincial establishments, while after the 18th Constitutional Amendment, the provinces have also promulgated their local labour laws, including those relating to industrial relations, and in case of any grievance, the aggrieved person may approach the Labour Courts as per the prescribed procedure---If dissatisfied with an order of a Labour Court, they may file an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, but not to the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC)---In the present case, since the petitioner was a trans-provincial establishment, the matters were previously being handled by the Labour Court before the promulgation of the IRA---However, pending adjudication of the appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, a special industrial relations law was promulgated for trans-provincial establishments whereby a procedural change was made in the choice of forum of appeal, applicable not to new cases but to those pending in Labour Courts or the Labour Appellate Tribunal for the establishments/organizations included and covered in the definition of trans-provincial establishments in the IRA---Consequently, from the effective date, the jurisdiction of Provincial Labour Courts and the Labour Appellate Tribunal for the employees of trans-provincial establishment stood excluded for all intents and purposes---Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal decided the appeal of the petitioner on 13.03.2013, when the IRA was very much in the field, having come into force on 14.3.2012---Therefore, taking into consideration Subsection (5) of Section 57 of the IRA, no Labour Court or Labour Appellant Tribunal could have taken the cognizance in respect of any matter which was well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NIRC---Industrial Relations Act has an overriding effect on all provincial labour laws---Despite these unambiguous and non-complex legal barricades, the Labour Tribunal, instead of acknowledging its lack of jurisdiction as an appellate forum in the cases of trans-provincial establishments, dismissed the appeal rather than returning the memo of appeal for presentation before the competent forum---Any order or decision passed without jurisdiction would be coram non judice and thus a nullity---If a mandatory condition for exercise of jurisdiction by a court is not fulfilled, then the entire proceeding which follows becomes illegal and suffers from want of jurisdiction---Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; consequently, the order passed by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the impugned judgment passed by the High Court, both were set aside with the directions to the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal to return the original memo/ file of Labour Appeal to the duly authorized representative of the petitioner for its immediate institution and decision by the Full Bench of the NIRC on merits, and in accordance with law, after providing ample opportunity of hearing to the parties.

(d) Words and phrases---

----"Coram non judice"---Definition.

Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, Volume 9A); Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edition, Bryan A. Garner); K J Aiyer's Judicial Dictionary: A Complete Law Lexicon (13th Edition, P.M. Bakshi) and Coram Non Judice. Legal Maxim. Law Times Journal (Amol Verma, May 29, 2019) ref.

Farooq Zaman Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Tariq Masood, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4 to 6.

2025 SCMR 318

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Musarrat Hilali and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

MAZHAR ALI ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 776 of 2024, decided on 24th October, 2024.

(On appeal against order dated 14.06.2024 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Cr.Misc (BA) No. 1270-P of 2024).

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 109---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Murderous assault---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Perusal of the contents of the FIR showed that paternal uncle of the complainant and the other family members were also present at the spot at the time of occurrence, therefore, it was not understandable as to why the FIR was lodged belatedly with a delay of 13 hours and 50 minutes---No eye-witness was mentioned in the FIR and contents of the FIR showed that the occurrence was unwitnessed---On the day after the occurrence prosecution introduced two alleged eye-witnesses, whose names were not mentioned in the FIR---It did not appeal to a prudent mind that when the said alleged eye-witnesses were statedly present at the relevant time inside the house where the occurrence took place then as to why their brother, who was complainant of the FIR, had not mentioned their names in the contents of the FIR---Furthermore petitioner (accused) along with his two brothers was nominated in the FIR, therefore, evidentiary value of the prosecution evidence qua identification of the petitioner during identification parade after his nomination in this case required further probe and inquiry entitling the petitioner to the grant of post-arrest bail---Two co-accused of the petitioner who were also identified by the alleged eye-witnesses during their identification parade had already been acquitted by the Trial Court---Same prosecution evidence had already been disbelieved against co-accused persons by the Trial Court and their case was not distinguishable from the case of the petitioner except alleged abscondence of the petitioner---Petition was converted into appeal and allowed and the petitioner was granted post-arrest bail.

Naveed Sattar v. The State 2024 SCMR 205 ref.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497 ---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Bail---Abscondence of accused---Mere abscondence of an accused by itself is no ground to refuse bail to him if otherwise he is entitled to the said relief on merits.

Hidayat Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 172; Ehsanullah v. The State 2012 SCMR 1137 and State v. Mukhtar Ahmad Awan 1991 SCMR 322 ref.

Syed Abdul Fayaz, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Altaf Khan, Additional Advocate-General. K.P.K; Muhammad Usman, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Aar Gul, SI for the State.

Hussain Ali, Advocate Supreme Court along with Complainant in person for the Complainant (via video link from Peshawar).

2025 SCMR 322

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, C.J., Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

ALL PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES BPS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (APUBTA) through its President ---Petitioner

Versus

The FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Federal Education and Professional Training, Islamabad and others ---Respondents

Constitution Petition No. 7 of 2024,decided on 24th October, 2024.

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 4, 9, 25, 25A & 184(3)---Constitution petition before the Supreme Court---Maintainability---Public Sector Universities---Posts of Vice-Chancellors, Pro Vice-Chancellors, Rectors, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Registrars, Heads of Faculties and Departments, Controller of Examination, Director Finance and other tenured positions either lying vacant and/or held on acting charge basis---Decision making bodies of the public sector universities, i.e., their board of trustees, board of governors, syndicates, senates and academic councils not meeting periodically and/or compliance not being made in holding the minimum prescribed number of meetings as stipulated in their respective laws---Matters raised in the present petition are within the ambit of clause (3) of Article 184 of the Constitution---Issues which have been raised are of public importance affecting the interest of all those attending these universities---People's taxes help run public sector universities, therefore, they expect that they be run in accordance with applicable laws and efficiently, and their taxes do not go to waste---Other pre-condition in clause (3) of Article 184 is that the petition must seek the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights---This requirement is also met---Article 25 of the Constitution mandates that citizens are entitled to equal treatment and to equal protection of the law, but if compliance is not made with the laws governing public sector universities, the citizens' Fundamental Rights are violated---Article 25A of the Constitution requires that children upto the age of 16 years must be educated, which demonstrates the importance the Constitution attaches to education---Position of a Vice-Chancellor of a university must not be left vacant, and if appointment to this position is delayed it adversely affects the functioning of the university, which attracts Article 9 of the Constitution-right to life-as life has been construed to include all of life's attendant benefits, including that of education provided by the law---Article 4 of the Constitution stipulates that citizens have an inalienable right to be treated in accordance with the law, but if public sector universities, funded by the taxpayers do not operate in accordance with laws governing them, then citizens are not being treated in accordance with the law---Constitution petition was held to be maintainable.

Aamir Raza Ashfaq v. Minhaj Ahmed Khan 2012 SCMR 6 ref.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 184(3)---Constitution petition before the Supreme Court---Public Sector Universities---Posts of Vice-Chancellors, Pro Vice-Chancellors, Rectors, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Registrars, Heads of Faculties and Departments, Controller of Examination, Director Finance and other tenured positions either lying vacant and/or held on acting charge basis---Decision making bodies of the public sector universities, i.e., their board of trustees, board of governors, syndicates, senates and academic councils not meeting periodically and/or compliance not being made in holding the minimum prescribed number of meetings as stipulated in their respective laws---Legality---From the information provided by the Higher Education Commission (HEC) and the Federal Ministry of Education very serious transgressions committed by some Federal public sector universities were brought to the Supreme Court's attention---Supreme Court issued the following directions to all Federal and Provincial public sector universities ('the universities'), the Federal Ministries of Education, Science and Technology and Defence, the Provincial Ministries of Education, the HEC and the Provincial Higher Education Departments ('HEDs'):

(i) Governing bodies of the universities, respectively referred to in their respective laws whether as board of governors, board of trustees, syndicates, senates and academic councils, must meet (at least) the minimum prescribed times;

(ii) Appointments be made to all tenured positions in the universities as prescribed in their respective laws, including those of Vice-Chancellors, Registrars, Directors-General, Deans, Treasurers/Directors of Finance, Controllers of Examinations, Chairpersons and others specified therein, and this must be done transparently and on merit, by stipulating their respective criteria and inviting appointments through their respective websites and advertisements;

(iii) Vacant tenured positions must not be held for more than six months on acting-charge-basis and such temporary charge be given to that person who is specified in the applicable law and, in the absence thereof to a person of equivalent seniority, failing which to the person next in seniority;

(iv) The Federal Ministries of Education, Science and Technology and Defence, the Provincial Ministries of Education, the HEC and the HEDs of the Provinces must collate requisite information about the universities under their respective jurisdictions, and periodically check if they are compliant with their respective laws. Such information should be made publicly accessible on their websites;

(v) The universities should not exceed the academic to non-academic staff ratio prescribed by HEC, and those universities which have exceeded the same must not hire further non-academic staff, unless absolutely necessary after specific permission is granted by their respective governing bodies;

(vi) Student unions be revived in universities but it must be ensured that they are inclusive and not divisive, ethnic or sectarian;

(vii) HEC and HEDs should annually rank the universities in their respective jurisdictions pursuant to internationally recognized criteria;

(viii) The Shariah Academy, the Dawah Academy and the Iqbal International Institute for Research and Dialogue of the International Islamic University be made fully functional in compliance with their respective statutes;

(ix) A safe and harassment free environment, free of psychotropic drugs and weapons must be ensured in the universities. Transgressors and those who destroy universities' properties must be dealt with strictly;

(x) Hostels meant for the students enrolled in the universities must not be allowed to be occupied by those who have completed their studies and by outsiders;

(xi) Community service, sustainable living, good environmental practices, inter-university competitions, sports, games and debates should be encouraged;

(xii) Research culture and research based publications should be promoted;

(xiii) The lands of the universities must be demarcated, if not already demarcated, and if their land or any part thereof is encroached upon, encroachments therefrom be removed. Universities must also secure their lands. Iron grills and steel mesh boundaries can be installed quickly and cheaply and do not require much maintenance and also do not block vision, however, if a solid brick or block wall is required it would be best not to plaster and paint it to avoid periodical and perpetual drain of resources. The universities' ownership of land must be recorded in the record of rights.

Umer Ijaz Gilani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Malik Javed Iqbal Wains, Additional Attorney-General for Pakistan Supreme Court, Mohyuddin Wani, Secretary M/o F.E&P.T., Abdul Sattar Khokhar, Senior Joint Secretary, M/o F.E&P.T. and Dr. Agha Haider, Deputy Director, (Legal), M/o F.E&P.T. for Respondents No. 1 to 2.

M. Nazir Jawwad, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Zia-ul-Qayyum, Executive Director, H.E.C for Respondent No. 3.

Khalid Ishaq, Advocate-General, Punjab, Barrister M. Mumtaz Ali, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab and Abdul Rehman Ch., Senior Law Officer, HED, Lahore for Respondent No. 4.

Shah Faisal Ilyas, Additional Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Ghulam Saeed, Special Secretary, HED, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Qazi Ayyaz, Senior Officer (Litigation) for Respondent No. 5.

Hassan Akbar, Advocate-General, Sindh, Saifullah, Additional Advocate-General Sindh, Moeen-ud-Din Siddiqui, Secretary, HEC and Ms. Naheed Haider, Deputy Director, Legal HEC, Sindh for Respondent No. 6.

Muhammad Ayaz Swati, Additional Advocate-General, Balochistan and Hafiz Muhammad Tahir, Secretary Education, Balochistan for Respondent No. 7.

On Court's Notice:

Dr. Saeed-ud-Din, Rector for Sindh Institute for Technology MS.

Professor Dr. Akhtar Ali Malik, Vice-Chancellor and Nazeer Chishti, Director (Legal) for National Fertilizer Corporation Institute.

Attaullah Hakim Kundi, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Zabita K. Shinwari, Vice Chancellor for Federal Urdu University.

Rizwan Shabbir Kayani, Advocate Supreme Court for National College of Arts.

Dr. Muhammad Mukhtar, Vice-Chancellor for National Skills University.

Muhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Niaz Ahmed Akhtar, Vice-Chancellor for Quaid-e-Azam University.

Rehan-ud-Din Golra, Advocate Supreme Court, Anis M. Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record, Professor Dr. Samina Malik, Rector and Atiq-ur-Rehman Chughtai, Director, HR for International Islamic University.

Khalid Mehmood Iraqi, Vice-Chancellor for University of Karachi.

Kamal-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court and Mir Qasim Jat, Advocate-on-Record for Shaheed Muhtarma Benazir Bhutto University.

Dr. Mujeeb Memon, Vice-Chancellor for Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto University of Law.

Abdus Salam Memon, Advocate Supreme Court and Professor Ikram-ud-Din Ujjan, Vice-Chancellor for Liaqat University of Medical and Health Sciences.

Professor Dr. Gulshan Ali, Vice-Chancellor for People University of Medical and Health Sciences.

Professor Dr. Arabella Bhutto, Vice-Chancellor for University of Sufism.

Professor Dr. Yousaf Khushk, Vice-Chancellor for Shah Abdul Latif University.

Applicant in person (in CMA. No. 10026 of 2024).

2025 SCMR 341

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-III RTO, RAWALPINDI and others ---Petitioners

Versus

Messrs SARWAQ TRADERS, RAWALPINDI and others ---Respondents

Civil Review Petition No. 275 of 2022 in Civil Petition No. 4599 of 2021, decided on 6th November, 2024.

Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J; Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. (as Referee Judge) agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting.

(a) Interpretation of statutes---

----'Directory' and 'mandatory' provisions---Ascertainment of---Legislative intent can be drawn by consideration of the entire statute, its nature, its object and the consequences whether it will cause serious inconvenience or injustice to persons as a result of construing the provision in one way or the other---If by holding a provision mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created for innocent persons of the general public without furthering the object of the enactment, the same should be construed as directory.

N.S Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes. 12th Edition. P.437 and 438 ref.

(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----S. 45B(2), first and second provisos---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review petition---Appeal to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals)---Timeframe provided under first and second provisos to section 45B(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ("Act")---Whether the first and second provisos were mandatory or directory provisions?---By way of judgment under review the Supreme Court held that the provisos were mandatory provisions and any order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 45B(2) beyond the maximum period of 180 days was an "invalid decision."---[Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J. (Majority view): First and second provisos to section 45(B)(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ("Act") are directory provisions and lapse of the statutory timeframe will not affect the proceedings before the Commissioner (Appeals) who shall conclude the appeal in accordance with law by deciding the appeal on its merits---First and second provisos to section 45B(2) of the Act are directory provisions and do not deprive the taxpayer of his right to appeal or deny the tax department the right to adjudicate the matter on merits by virtue of lapse of the maximum statutory timeframe---Inspite of the first and second provisos to section 45(B)(2) being directory provisions, the Commissioner (Appeals) must make reasonable effort to decide the appeal of the taxpayer within the maximum statutory timeframe, subject to the third proviso to section 45B(2)---In case the taxpayer unduly delays the prosecution of the appeal without sufficient cause, the Commissioner (Appeals) is well within its power to proceed ex-parte against the taxpayer---Commissioner (Appeals) must also give reasons if the appeal is not decided within the statutory timeframe under the proviso to section 45(B)(2), so that the legislative aspiration to achieve effective and efficient tax governance is also realized even though such a timeframe is only directory in nature]---[Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. (Minority view): Primary ground for filing the present review was the argument that the adjournments taken by respondent/taxpayer during the proceedings before the Commissioner (Appeals) should have been considered in terms of Section 45-B(2), third proviso of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (Act)---Record showed that the dates of adjournment were not considered while calculating the time period under Section 45B of the Act by the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, Islamabad Bench (Tribunal) or the High Court---Given that present matter was a factual matter, it was necessary for the Tribunal to consider the dates of adjournments for the purposes of calculating the delay in terms of Section 45-B of the Act---Under the circumstances, review was allowed, the judgment under review was recalled; and accordingly, the orders of the High Court and the Tribunal were set aside; and the case was remanded to the Tribunal with the directions that the appeal of the taxpayer shall be deemed to be pending and the Tribunal shall decide afresh the issue of the timeframe as prescribed in Section 45-B of the Act with reference to the adjournments sought---[Per Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, J. (as Referee Judge) (Majority view): First and second provisos to section 45(B)(2) of the Act should be treated as directory provisions---This interpretation effectively safeguards the tax-payer's constitutional rights while promoting efficient and fair tax governance---It serves the public interest by preventing procedural timelines from being used against tax-payers in a way that would compromise fairness and justice in the appellate system---Provisions must not be interpreted in a way that limits or undermines fundamental rights---Strict enforcement of statutory timelines for tax-payer appeals could jeopardize these rights and potentially deny tax-payers a fair opportunity to seek redressal---Therefore, declaring first and second provisos to section 45(B)(2) of the Act as directory is crucial to maintain due process and uphold the constitutional principles of justice.

2019 SCMR 1735 ref.

Malik Itaat Hussain Awan, Advocate Supreme Court; Ms. Asma Idrees, Additional Commissioner and Yousaf Khan, Law Officer for Petitioners.

Respondent No.1, in person.

2025 SCMR 353

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

The DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others ---Petitioners

Versus

BABAR ALI SOLANGI ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 281-K of 2022, decided on 15th October, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 17.12.2021 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad (Karachi Bench) in Appeal No. 151(K)CS of 2020).

(a) Civil service---

----Concurrent disciplinary and criminal proceedings---Permissibility---Prosecution in criminal cases and departmental inquiries on the same allegations can proceed concurrently at both venues without having any overriding or overlapping effect---It is the prerogative of the employer to conduct the disciplinary proceedings despite acquittal in the criminal proceedings.

Faraz Naveed v. District Police Officer Gujrat 2022 SCMR 1770 ref.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 10-A---Civil service---Employee of Intelligence Bureau---Removal from service---Ex-parte departmental proceedings against employee when he was incarcerated in connection with a criminal case---Constitutionality---Employee re-instated in service by the Service Tribunal after his acquittal in the criminal case on basis of a compromise---Legality---It was not disputed that not only at the time of issuing show cause notice but even at the time of the alleged inquiry, the respondent was incarcerated---Obviously, then, it was not within his control or domain to face and defend the charges of misconduct or his involvement in a criminal case as a free man---It is a most valuable and instinctive human right of every Under Trial Prisoner (UTP) and a convicted person to defend or challenge his indictment and conviction in accordance with the law---Right of proper defence is a vested right and not providing ample opportunity of defence is also against Article 10-A of the Constitution---In order to answer and defend the allegations of misconduct, the personal appearance of the delinquent ought to be ensured and he should be afforded not only a right to adduce evidence and call witnesses to support his innocence, but he should also be given a fair opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who deposed against him---In the present case during the ex-parte departmental proceedings the inquiry officer predominantly believed the police reports and challan of criminal cases and conducted the inquiry when the respondent was behind bars and his request for deferring the inquiry proceedings till the outcome of the criminal case was not accommodated and a major penalty of removal from service was recommended and imposed---Conducting ex parte proceeding, knowing that the employee (respondent) was unable to defend the charges of misconduct was nothing but a sheer violation of due process and the principles of natural justice, thus, rendering the entire exercise ineffectual and inconsequential---Petition was converted into an appeal and partly allowed, with the directions that the order of reinstatement with back benefits passed by the Service Tribunal, shall be subject to the outcome of de novo inquiry and in this regard the competent authority of the petitioner's department shall appoint an inquiry officer who should conduct an impartial regular inquiry, and during the inquiry proceedings, the respondent should be afforded ample opportunity of defence.

Khaleeq Ahmed, Deputy Attorney General and Ghulam Hussain, Inspector, I.B. for Petitioners.

Syed Shoa-un-Nabi, Advocate Supreme Court along with Respondent for Respondent.

2025 SCMR 358

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

SADAQAT ALI and another ---Petitioners

Versus

Mst. NASREEN AKHTAR ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 832-K of 2024, decided on 19th December, 2024.

(Against the order dated 05.08.2021 of the Sindh High Court, Karachi passed in Constitutional Petition No. S-1363 of 2011).

Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----S. 15---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)---Eviction of tenant---Default in payment of monthly rent---Unauthorized subletting of the property---Ex-parte order passed by Rent Controller not obtained by way of fraud or misrepresentation---Rent Controller attempted to serve notices upon the lesses and petitioners in the rent/eviction application through various modes, including by way of Bailiff, Registered Post A/D, T.C.S, pasting notice on the wall and gate of the property and finally through publication---Despite these efforts, the lessee and petitioners in the matter failed to appear---In view of the same, the Rent Controller decided that service was valid/good against the lessee and petitioners and after being afforded several chances to contest the case, the lessee and petitioners were ordered to be proceeded against ex parte, which was followed by an ex parte judgment, allowing the land lady's (respondent's) rent/eviction application---Validity---Rent Controller had attempted to issue notices to the petitioners through numerous modes, including by way of the Court Bailiff, Registered Post A/D, T.C.S, pasting notice on the wall and gate of the property and finally through publication---It was only after exhausting all the modes of service that the Rent Controller held service to be good against the petitioners---Despite notice, through all its modes and at the correct address, the petitioners had failed to enter appearance and absented themselves from proceedings in the eviction application---Order for ex parte proceedings and ex parte judgment that followed could not, therefore, be considered as a result of fraud or misrepresentation but of the willful absence of the petitioners---Furthermore, the fact that there had earlier been litigation concerning the property was not a valid ground for interference with the findings of the three Courts below---Moreover, the controversy highlighted by the petitioners that in an earlier rent/eviction application, the respondent's attorney had claimed to be owner whereas in the instant application he claimed to be the respondent's attorney would not improve their case since it would not change their status as unauthorized sub-lessees of the original lessee---No valid ground was found for interference with the orders of the three Courts below---Petition, being devoid of any merits, was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

N.R. for Respondent.

2025 SCMR 361

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

Syed ALI AHMED SHAH---Petitioner

Versus

Syed SHOUKAT HUSSAIN SHAH and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1218-K of 2023, decided on 16th December, 2024.

(Against the order dated 12.10.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Civil Revision Application No. S-60 of 2008 (Hyderabad)).

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XLVII, R. 1 & S. 114---Judicial proceedings---Presumption of correctness---Review, filing of---No grounds for review agitated---Dispute between the parties in respect of urban land---Revision application before the High Court was disposed of by consent of the counsel for the parties---Petitioner claimed that he and his counsel did not give any consent for disposal of the said revision application and to challenge such order filed a review application before the High Court, but the same was dismissed---Validity---No ground whatsoever for seeking review of an error apparent from record or in the impugned order passed by the Single Judge of Sindh High Court in the revision application had been agitated rather, there was a serious allegation that consent of the parties had been wrongly recorded by the Judge of High Court, thus disputing the judicial order and the proceedings however, without any evidence, material or formal affidavit of the petitioner or of the counsel who was present in Court along with counsel for respondent---It is settled legal position that presumption of correctness and sanctity is attached to all judicial proceedings, orders, decisions and the judgments passed by the Courts, whereas, the same can be assailed by an aggrieved party by filing appeal, revision as may be provided in accordance with law---However, in exceptional cases, any order or judgment passed by the competent Court of jurisdiction, or any proceedings can be subjected to review under Order XLVII, Rule 1 C.P.C. and Section 114 read with Section 151 C.P.C. by showing some error on the face of the record and the impugned order/decision sought to be reviewed, which otherwise could be rectified without reappraisal of the evidence or re-examination of the merits of the case---Whereas, in the instant case no error of such nature had been pointed out except an allegation to the effect that the counsel representing the petitioner did not give any consent for disposal of the revision application, however, such allegation was not duly supported by affidavit to this effect by the counsel, therefore, could not be a ground or basis for seeking review of the consent order---Single Judge of High Court had rightly dismissed the review application vide impugned order---Civil petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Khalid Javed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Neel Keshav, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1.

2025 SCMR 367

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

The GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN, through Secretary Energy Department, Quetta and another ---Petitioners

Versus

MUHAMMAD YASIR ---Respondent

Civil Petitions Nos. 187-Q and 188-Q of 2024,decided on 4th October, 2024.

(Against the order dated 27.06.2024 passed in R.A. No. 12 of 2024 and judgment dated 16.05.2024 passed in S.A. No. 41 of 2024 by the Balochistan Service Tribunal, Quetta).

(a) Balochistan Civil Servants Act (V of 1974)---

----S.4---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 10-A & 212 (3)---Restoration in service---Due process of law---Authorities assailed order passed by Service Tribunal restoring civil servant in service---Validity---Civil servant appeared in test and interview and was declared successful---Appointment order was issued to civil servant who joined service accordingly---Civil servant could not be blamed or reproached for committing any illegality or securing job through unfair means, fraud, or misrepresentation---Civil servant was at Serial Number 02 on merit list and was appointed on 08-08-2023, but his appointment order was withdrawn/cancelled on 27-09-2023 without any show cause notice or any opportunity to be heard---Such action was in sheer contravention of Article 10-A of the Constitution and lacked due process of law---Supreme Court declined to interfere in order passed by Service Tribunal---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

(b) Administration of justice---

----Principles of natural justice---Scope---Such principles require that delinquent should be afforded fair opportunity to converge, explain, and contest claims against him before he is found guilty and condemned---Principles of natural justice and fair-mindedness are grounded in philosophy of affording right of audience before any detrimental action is taken, in tandem with its ensuing constituent that the foundation of any adjudication or order of a quasi-judicial authority, statutory body, or any departmental authority regulated under some law, must be rational and impartial, and decision-maker has an adequate level of decision-making independence---Reasons of decision arrived at should be amply well-defined, just, and understandable---It is incumbent that all judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative authorities should carry out their powers with judicious and evenhanded approach to ensure justice according to the tenor of law and without any violation of the principles of natural justice.

Tariq Aziz-ud-Din, Human Rights Cases Nos. 8340, 9504-G, 13936-G, 13635-P and 14306-G to 14309-G of 2009 2011 PLC (C.S.) 1130; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101; Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat 1997 (7) SCC 622; Junaid Wazir v. Superintendent of Police 2024 SCMR 181; Federation of Pakistan v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603; Usman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745; Capital Development Authority v. Shabir Hussain 2022 SCMR 627; Raja Muhammad Shahid v. The Inspector General of Police 2023 SCMR 1135; Muhammad Yaseen v. Province of Sindh 2024 PLC(C.S.) 111; Government of Balochistan v. Ghulam Rasool 2024 SCMR 1155 and Inspector General of Police, Quetta v. Fida Muhammad 2022 SCMR 1583 rel.

(c) Review---

----Principles---Mere irregularities having no significant effect or impact on the outcome would not be sufficient to warrant review of judgment or order---If anomaly or ambiguity is of such nature so as to transform the course of action from being one in the aid of justice to a process of injustice, then review petition may be instituted for redressal to demonstrate the error, if found floating conspicuously on the surface of the record---Desire of re-hearing of the matter cannot constitute a sufficient ground for grant of review which, by its very nature, cannot be equated with the right or remedy of appeal.

Commissioner Inland Revenue Z-III, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Tax House, Karachi v. M/s. MSC Switzerland Geneva and others 2023 SCMR 1011 = 2023 PTD 964 = 2023 SCP 150 rel.

M. Ayaz Khan Swati, Additional Advocate General Balochistan for Petitioners (in both cases).

Nemo for Respondent.

2025 SCMR 374

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Ayesha A. Malik, Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

CHAIRMAN PAKISTAN ORDNANCE FACTORIES, POF BOARD, WAH CANTT. ---Petitioner

Versus

AKHTAR TANVEER and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1017 of 2022, decided on 27th November, 2024.

(Against judgment dated 28.01.2022 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 620(R)CS of 2018).

(a) Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973-

----R. 4(b)(iii)---Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), S. 4---Disciplinary proceedings---Quantum of sentence---Willful absence from service---Converting of major penalty---Jurisdiction of Service Tribunal---Authorities were aggrieved of converting of major penalty of removal from service into compulsory retirement---Validity---Civil servant was absent from duty and authorities laid out sufficient reasons to show why they did not want civil servant to continue with his service, considering that he willfully absented himself, did not obtain clearance before travelling, and started looking for jobs after travelling abroad, all of which the civil servant was unable to sufficiently rebut---Due process was observed and followed by authorities---Where absence from duty was admitted, there was no need to hold regular inquiry---Service Tribunal had no justifiable reason to reduce the punishment from major penalty of removal from service into compulsory retirement on the pretext that the punishment was harsh given that the civil servant had studied abroad and was an asset for Pakistan---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal as it exceeded its jurisdiction by arbitrary exercise of discretion which was illegal and without lawful authority and restored penalty imposed by authorities---Appeal was allowed.

Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal 2023 PLC (C.S.) 283; Deputy Postmaster General, Central Punjab, Lahore v. Habib Ahmad 2021 SCMR 584; Usman Ghani v. The Chief Post Master, GPO Karachi 2022 SCMR 745; Commissioner, Faisalabad Division, Faisalabad v. Allah Bakhsh 2020 SCMR 1418; Tahira Waheed v. Director, Federal Government Educational Institutions 2003 SCMR 1090; Imtiaz Ahmed Lali v. Returning Officer PLD 2008 SC 355; Secretary Education v. Mustamir Khan 2005 SCMR 17; Tasawar Hussain v. Deputy Commissioner District Jhelum 2021 SCMR 1367; Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Muhammad Arif Butt 2021 SCMR 1033 and Lord Woolf, Chief Justice of England and Wales from 2000 to 2005 rel.

(b) Administration of justice---

----Judicial discretion must be exercised judiciously and transparently, based on established principles and sound reasoning.

Access to Justice Report 1996 by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales rel.

Haseeb Shakoor Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Syed Qamar Hussain Sabzwari, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.

2025 SCMR 380

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

SHER AYAZ KHAN alias SHERAZ KHANA, through L.Rs. and others ---Petitioners

Versus

GUL NAJEEB KHAN ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 406 of 2022, decided on 9th December, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 24.11.2021 of the Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench, Bannu passed in C.R.No. 30-B of 2019).

(a) Words and phrases---

----Immediate--- Meaning.

Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition page 764 and Webster Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopaedic Edition page 631 rel.

(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)---

----S. 13---Right of pre-emption---Talb-i-Muwathibat---Delay in making such demand---Effect---Petitioner / vendee was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court as well as High Court whereby suit was decreed in favour of respondent / pre-emptor---Validity---Use of word immediate is significant and cannot be undermined---Delay of two hours in making demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat is not an immediate demand and such delay is fatal to a successful claim of pre-emption---Right of pre-emption is a unique and a fragile right---Unlike many other rights bestowed by law, exercise of right of pre-emption depends entirely on timely making of various demands set out in section 13 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---Making of Talb-i-Muwathibat, under section 13 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 is the foundation on which making of Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat is based---Timelines and conditions for making of Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat provided in sections 13(3) and 13(4) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 depend entirely upon making of Talb-i-Muwathibat---Date, time and place of making such demand is pivotal and foundational to the exercise of right of pre-emption, the importance of which cannot be over-looked---Person (postman) who allegedly served registered post A.D. upon deceased petitioner / vendee was not produced in witness box, when it was essential to bring him in the witness box, especially when receipt of the same was denied, so as to prove and determine the fact that he actually served registered post A.D. upon deceased petitioner / vendee---Service upon addressee was not proved by respondent / pre-emptor---Supreme Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by Lower Appellate Court and High Court and restored that of Trial Court whereby suit filed by respondent / pre-emptor was dismissed--- Appeal was allowed.

Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Ramzan 2021 SCMR 134; Mir Muhammad Khan and 2 others v. Haider and others PLD 2020 SC 233 and Muhammad Riaz v. Muhammad Akram and others 2024 SCMR 692 rel.

(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Art. 129(g)---Withholding best available evidence---Presumption---When available evidence has been withheld by a party, an adverse presumption as enunciated under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 would arise against such party that had the witness appeared in the witness box, he would not have supported the stance of that party. [p. 386] C

Anwar Ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Muhammad Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis M. Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.

2025 SCMR 387

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

TASLEEM HUSSAIN (decd) through L.R.s and others ---Petitioners

Versus

ALLAHDAD SHAH and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 1294-K of 2020 and Civil Petitions Nos. 148-K and 149-K of 2023, decided on 15th October, 2024.

(Against the order dated 10.09.2020 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Larkana in Civil Revision Appeal No. S-05 of 2009).

And

(Against the order dated 07.11.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Bench at Sukkur in Civil Revision Appeals Nos. S-229 and S-230 of 2018).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss.42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Name in official record, correction of---Principle---Petitioners/plaintiffs sought correction of parentage of their predecessor-in-interest in revenue record but Lower Appellate Court as well as High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction dismissed the suit---Validity---Party who asserts a fact to be corrected or otherwise has to prove the same through documentary or oral evidence but petitioners failed to do so---Mere assertion with regard to parentage in official record in absence of any declaration from Court of competent jurisdiction or correction of record by authorities concerned could not otherwise be given any credibility---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court as there was no error or illegality in it---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Dr. Shah Nawaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in all cases).

Sarfaraz Ahmed Akhund, Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.1 (in all cases).

Hakim Ali Sheikh, Additional Advocate General Sindh along with Ms. Rida Zahra Talpur, Assistant Commissioner Pano Aqil for the State.

2025 SCMR 395

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

FARYAL ARIF LATIF ---Petitioner

Versus

ARIF LATIF ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 3597-L of 2023 and Civil Petition No. 8-L of 2024, decided on 31st October, 2024.

(On appeal from the Orders dated 13.10.2023 and 30.11.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 67274 of 2023 and R.A. No. 78636 of 2023).

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----Preamble---Process of civil litigation---Scope---Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is a consolidatory law which is primarily procedural in nature and can be defined as a branch of law administering and directing process of civil litigation---Rules framed under Civil Procedure Code, 1908 are for advancing dispensation of justice, rather than supplementing or complementing it to defeat the ends of justice.

Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey (1883) ILR 5A11 163 rel.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. IX, Rr. 8 & 9---Restoration of suit, application for---Past conduct of party---Petitioner/defendant was aggrieved of restoration of suit filed by respondent/plaintiff which was dismissed for non-prosecution---Plea raised by petitioner / defendant was that Trial Court was to see the past conduct of respondent/plaintiff---Validity---No obligation was imposed under Order IX, Rules 8 and 9 C.P.C. on the Court to first consider past record before restoring suit to its original position---Court was only required to determine whether sufficient cause for non-appearance was made out for the day when suit was dismissed for non-prosecution---Past conduct could be ruminated to assess seriousness or non-seriousness of a party in litigation---Due to any past reckless conduct, Court could impose costs for any default with a warning---Past conduct alone could not be considered a ground for dismissing restoration application, if sufficient cause for non-appearance on the date of hearing was otherwise made out---Supreme Court declined to interfere in orders passed by High Court affirming restoration of lawsuit which was dismissed for non-prosecution, as there was no illegality or perversity---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Rai Muhammad through legal heirs v. Ejaz Ahmed PLD 2021 SC 761; Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munawar Khan 2023 SCP 368; SKB-KNK Joint Venture Contractor v. Water and Power Development Authority 2022 SCMR 1615 and Zulifqar Ali v. Lal Din 1974 SCMR 162 ref.

(c) Administration of justice---

----Procedural technicalities---Scope---Function of Court is to administer substantial justice between parties after providing ample opportunity for hearing which is a significant component and virtue of a fair trial---Procedure serves as machinery with the object of facilitating and not obstructing administration of justice---Technical objections have to be construed liberally and should not be allowed to defeat substantial justice.

Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali PLD 1963 SC 382 rel.

Asad Javed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan Daha, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.

2025 SCMR 406

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

STATE LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI ---Petitioner

Versus

NINA INDUSTRIES LIMITED, KARACHI and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1721-K of 2021, decided on 19th December, 2024.

(Against the order dated 25.10.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in J.C.M. No. 49 of 2016).

Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984) [since repealed]---

----Ss. 284 & 285---Companies Court Rules, 1997, R. 55---Scheme of Arrangement---Secured and unsecured creditors---Rights---Petitioners were minor share-holders of respondent company, who were aggrieved of sanctioning of Scheme of Arrangement by High Court---Plea raised by petitioners was that Scheme of Arrangement catered only for interest of secured creditors while ignoring interest of minority creditors and share-holders---Validity---All codal formalities were complied with---Objectors before High Court were minor share-holders and unsecured creditors, who could not point out any illegality or violation of the provisions of Companies Ordinance, 1984, in the 'Scheme of Arrangement' between respondent company and its creditors, nor could refer to any legal defect or procedural irregularity in order passed by High Court while sanctioning the 'Scheme of Arrangement'---Pursuant to the order of High Court, meeting of all stakeholders including creditors and members was held, wherein, 100% share-holders of respondent company and 95.09% in value of secured creditors pursuant to vote at the meeting, consented to and also passed a resolution approving 'Scheme of Arrangement', which fact alone was sufficient to reflect upon the will of majority creditors/share-holders while considering Scheme of Arrangement as in the best interest of respondent company and its share-holders---Secured creditors, who were majority share-holders, did not suffer from any legal infirmity or procedural defect---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court as petitioners failed to raise any substantial question of law---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Khalid Mehmood Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Ch. Atif Rafiq, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.

2025 SCMR 412

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

KHAN MIR KHAN (decd) through L.Rs. and others ---Petitioners

Versus

IBRAR LATIF KHAN and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 2597-L of 2016, decided on 17th December, 2024.

(Against the order dated 08.06.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, passed in Civil Revision No. 2709 of 2009).

Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)---

----S. 13---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 42---Pre-emption right---Shafi Jar---Proof---Sale of land from specific Khasra number---Creation of new Khewat---Record of Rights---Petitioner/pre-emptor filed suit on the plea of having suit land contiguous to his land---Suit was decreed in favour of petitioner/pre-emptor by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court but High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction dismissed the suit---Validity---When a full owner of a Khewat sells a specific Khasra number part of Khewat, through sale in favour of a vendee, such vendee becomes full owner of that specific Khasra number---In next Register Haqdaran Zamin, new Khewet is created in favour of such vendee---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by High Court, dismissing suit for pre-emption---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Malik Noor M. Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Sardar Mashkoor Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 415

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

GUL ZARIF KHAN and others ---Petitioners

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 1925 to 2006 of 2024, decided on 5th November, 2024.

(On appeal from the Judgment dated 12.02.2024 passed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Peshawar in Service Appeals Nos. 1620, 1622 to 1624, 1626 to 1628, 1001, 1022,1052, 698, 723 of 2022, 1529, 999 of 2022, 1043, 687, 1049, 1039, 970, 976, 978, 958, 1736, 1053, 1026, 971, 1000, 1032, 711, 1033, 1009, 973, 686 of 2022, 1525 of 2023, 995, 1041, 1045, 758, 968, 956, 1017 of 2022, 1514 of 2023, 957, 1003 of 2022, 1524, 1522, 1520 of 2023, 1050, 961, 977, 1047, 1036, 1048, 751, 1020 of 2022, 1516 of 2023, 689, 994 of 2022, 1518 of 2023, 974, 1515, 1013 of 2022, 1523 of 2023, 738, 1028, 757, 955, 966 of 2022, 1527 of 2023, 1008 of 2022, 1511 of 2023, 967, 1056, 986, 708, 1002, 1016, 992, 959, 1023 and 714 of 2022).

(a) Career Structure for Health Personnel Scheme Ordinance (VI of 2011)---

----S. 2(b)---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunals Act (I of 1974), S.4---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 4 & 25---Service benefits---Discrimination---Health allowance---Devolved employees---Petitioners / civil servants were aggrieved of the fact that they were not given health allowance which was being given to devolved employees in same department---Appeals filed by petitioners/civil servants were dismissed by Service Tribunal---Validity---Petitioners/civil servants were not in the category of devolved employees who became employees of the Province by virtue of 18th Amendment to the Constitution---Petitioners/civil servants were employees of the Province since the beginning, whereas benefit of allowance was only extended to devolved employees who were covered under section 2 (b) of Career Structure for Health Personnel Scheme Ordinance, 2011---No such law or rule was ever promulgated by Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for extending same benefits to originally employed persons to be treated alike---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by Service Tribunal---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Capital Administration and Development Division, Islamabad and others v. Nusrat Tahir and others 2018 PLC (C.S.) 669 ref.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 25---Discrimination---Intelligible differentia, principle of---Applicability---Persons may be classified into groups and such groups may be treated differently if there is a reasonable basis for such difference---Principle of equality does not imply or connote that every law must have universal application to all class of persons---Oscillating or wavering needs of dissimilar sets of persons, which may have little in common, can be treated differently on logical perspicacity---For such classification to meet standards of fairness, self-actualization of two vital constituents must be fulfilled---Classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which may judiciously distinguish persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and second, the differentia must have a logical and sensible nexus with the object sought to be achieved---Expression "intelligible differentia" insinuates an act of exodus capable of making sense.

Pakcom Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 44 rel.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 184(3) & 199---Judicial review---Government policy---Scope---Court under power of judicial review of governmental policy can neither act or represent itself as an appellate authority with the aim of scrutinizing rightness or aptness of a policy nor may it act as an advisor to the executives on matters of policy which they are entitled to formulate---However, judicial review can be sought when a decision-maker fails to observe statutory procedures; misdirects itself in law; exercises a power wrongly; improperly purports to exercise a power that it does not have; or the policy decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.

Federation of Pakistan v. Shuja Sharif 2023 SCMR 129 and Syed Azam Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 201 rel.

Noor Muhammad Khattak, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Muzammil Khan, Additional Advocate General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with Qayum Khan, Deputy Director and Abdur Rasheed, Deputy Secretary Finance for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 422

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shahid Waheed, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

UBAIDULLAH ---Appellant

Versus

Haji ATTA MUHAMMAD BANGULZAI and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 1394 of 2024, decided on 20th November, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 09.10.2024 of the Election Tribunal, Balochistan, Quetta passed in Election Petition No. 26 of 2024).

Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)---

----Ss. 142, 143, 144 & 145---Election dispute---Statements of witnesses---Original affidavits, failure to produce---Non-compliance of mandatory requirement---Effect---Petitioner was returned candidate in General Elections but Election Tribunal allowed election petition filed by respondent---Validity---It was mandatory requirement to file statements of witnesses on affidavits, along with election petition, otherwise the petition would be considered deficient---As per S.145(1) of Elections Act, 2017, if provisions of Ss. 142, 143 & 144 of Elections Act, 2017 were not complied with, then Election Tribunal was to summarily reject such election petition---Original affidavits were not produced rather only "marked" or "identified affidavits" were produced which could not be considered as fulfilment of mandatory requirement provided under law---In case of non-compliance of any mandatory requirement, it was the person presenting such documents, who had to face the brunt of non-compliance---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Election Tribunal---Appeal was allowed accordingly.

Col. (R) Muhammad Shabir Awan v. Raja Saghir Ahmed and 4 others PLD 2023 Lahore 458; Abdul Qahar Khan Wadan v. Zamarak Khan Achakzai and 2 others PLD 2020 BHC 47; Malik Umar Aslam v. Sumera Malik and another PLD 2007 SC 362; Lt. Col. (Rtd.) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah v. Mehr Khalid Mehmood Sargana and others 2015 SCMR 1585; Hina Manzoor v. Malik Abrar Ahmed and others PLD 2015 SC 396; Zia ur Rehman v. Syed Ahmed Hussain and others 2014 SCMR 1015; Engr. Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and others v. Khalilur Rehman and 4 others 2000 SCMR 250; Attaullah Khan v. Ali Azam Afridi and others 2021 SCMR 1979; Mst. Noor Jehan and another v. Saleem Shahadat 2022 SCMR 918; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another v. Javaid lqbal 2011 SCMR 1013; Azhar Abbas and others v. Haji Tahir Abbas and another 2021 CLC 1351; Abdul Majeed v. Abdul Rasheed PLD 2016 Lahore 383; Province of Punjab through Collector, Faisalabad and another v. Rana Hakim Ali and another 2003 MLD 67; Salt Tarajee Khimchand and others v. Yelamarti Satyam and others AIR 1971 SC 1865; Aas Muhammad v. Chahat Khan 2004 SCMR 770; Muhammad Yusuf Khan Khattak v. S.M. Ayub and 2 others PLD 1973 SC 160; State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Mst. Bibi Reema 2023 CLD 912; Water and Power Development Authority v. Ghulam Shabbir 1998 MLD 1592 Lahore; Messers Foremost Trading Company v. Messers Caledonian Insurance Company Limited PLD 1988 Karachi 131; Nawab Ali Wasaan v. Syed Ghous Ali Shah and others 2018 SCMR 87; Muhammad Saeed and 4 others v. Election Petitions Tribunal, West Pakistan, etc. PLD 1957 SC (Pak) 911; Usman Dar and others v. Khawaja Muhammad Asif and others 2017 SCMR 292; Syed Khaliq Shah v. Abdul Raheem Ziaratwal and others PLD 2017 SC 684; Syed Hafeezuddin v. Abdul Razzaq and others PLD 2016 SC 79; Muhammad Yusuf Khan Khattak v. S.M. Ayub and 2 others PLD 1973 SC 160 and Lt. Col. (Rtd.) J. Abel v. Emmanul Zafar and others 1987 MLD 1372 ref.

State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another v. Javaid Iqbal 2011 SCMR 1013; Attaullah Khan v. Ali Azam Afridi, 2021 SCMR 1979 also Muhammad Anwar and others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum and other PLD 2013 SC 255; Malik Umar Aslam v. Sumera Malik PLD 2007 SC 362; Amirzada Khan and others v. Ahmad Noor and others PLD 2003 SC 410 and Allah Rakha v. Muhammad Riaz 2009 SCMR 1045 rel.

Khawaja Haris Ahmad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Muhammad Masood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.

Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 to 24 and 26 to 44.

Falak Sher, Assistant Director Law and Muhammad Arshad, Special Secretary Law for Respondent No. 25 (ECP).

2025 SCMR 430

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

ZAKIRULLAH and others ---Petitioners

Versus

MUHAMMAD REHMAN and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 159-P of 2014, decided on 21st November, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 18.11.2013 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in C.R. No. 1374 of 2010).

Partition Act (IV of 1893)---

----S. 4---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 11 & O.VII, R.11--- Suit for partition---Res judicata, principle of---Applicability---Rejecting of plaint---Suit filed by petitioners/plaintiffs was rejected by Trial Court on the ground that earlier suit for declaration regarding same property was not decided---Validity---Right of partition is an independent right and cannot be connected with any previous suit even with regard to the same property and cannot be declared as barred by O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.---Supreme Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by three Courts below and matter was remanded to Trial Court for decision afresh on merits---Appeal was allowed.

Muhammad Shoaib Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (through video link Peshawar).

Muhammad Javaid Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (through video link Peshawar)

2025 SCMR 432

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Musarrat Hilali and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

AMNA NAZ ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

CRL.P.L.A. No. 1038 of 2024, decided on 7th November, 2024.

(On appeal against the order dated 09.09.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl.Misc. No. 47402-B of 2024).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(1), first proviso---Customs Act (IV of 1969), Ss. 2(s), 16, 139, 156(1), (8)(i)(d)(70), 157, 178 & 187---Imports and Exports (Control) Act (XXXIX of 1950), Ss. 3(1) & 3(3)---Import Policy Order, 2022, Srl. No. 55, Appendix-B, Part-I---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Notification SRO No. 666(I)/2006 dated 28-06-2006---Notification SRO No.565(I)/2005 dated 05-06-2005---SRO No.499(I)2009 dated 13-06-2009---Smuggling---Bail, grant of---Woman accused---Challan filed---Accused lady was arrested at airport for possessing foreign made cell phones---Petitioner was a woman and her case should have been examined by Courts below under first proviso to S. 497(1) Cr.P.C.---If petitioner/accused was not found entitled to bail under S. 497(1) Cr.P.C., the Courts below should have considered bail application on its own merits taking into account the petitioner's background, nature of offence and likelihood of abscondence---Prosecution had already gathered all necessary evidence and petitioner/accused was no more required for custodial interrogation---Keeping petitioner/accused in jail without Court verdict would be equivalent to convicting her without due process---Bail was allowed.

2023 SCMR 887 rel.

Shan Zeb Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom, Addl. AGP, Nadeem Mehmood, Advocate Supreme Court, Ms. Huria Fatima, Advocate and Khawaja Ziauddin, Inspector Customs for Respondents.

for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 434

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ESTABLISHMENT DIVISION, ISLAMABAD and another ---Appellants

Versus

MUHAMMAD AHMED KHAN and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 1671 of 2021, decided on 6th November, 2024.

(On appeal from the judgment dated 29.01.2021 passed by the Islamabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 1834 of 2020).

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 185 (3)---Civil service---Upgradation of posts---Leave to appeal was granted by Supreme Court to consider whether respondents were already granted upgradation by means of Office Memorandum dated 03-10-2019 and grant of upgradation and redesignation of posts was a matter of policy and unless there existed a policy, relief regarding grant of upgradation and redesignation of posts could not be allowed by High Court.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 25---Civil service---Upgradation of post---Discrimination---Upgradation of post and promotion---Distinction---Authorities were aggrieved of direction issued by High Court in favour of respondents/civil servants regarding upgradation and redesignation of posts---Validity---Upgradation of a post is not a vested right, rather it stems from a policy decision intended to benefit a particular set of employees under the scheme embedded in the policy---Upgradation cannot be mixed up with promotion---In case of upgradation, employee continues to hold same post without any change in his duties but he is accorded a higher pay scale in order to mitigate distress associated with stagnation due to lack of progression of promotional avenues---Once Government announces a policy, it is also responsible for enforcing such policy across the board to accord benefit of policy to all those who are eligible under it and may benefit because of it---Court cannot interfere in policy making domain of government but when a widespread and comprehensive policy is announced to benefit employees, it should be implemented bigheartedly and generously, without adding any ifs and buts or discrimination that can stifle main objective of the policy---Similar laws, rules and polices should apply uniformly to all in similar situations, without any discrimination or distinction between one employee and another within the sphere of legislation or policy, provided that their status is substantially equivalent and indistinguishable---Even in cases of classification or categorization, such distinctions must not be arbitrary but should be based on reasons, qualities and characteristics that establish an intelligible differentia for those who have been left out of the arena or who have been excluded with clarity regarding the objective sought to be achieved---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art.25---Civil service---Discrimination---Effect---Literal connotation of word "discrimination" essentially refers to different treatment of the same kindor class of persons or behaving less favourably towards them---During the course of employment, discrimination occurs when an employer treats an employee less favourly or disadvantageously than others without any intelligible differentia---Equal treatment with equal opportunity is a corner stone for an egalitarian society, while acts of discrimination in workplace seriously undermine a harmonious working environment and create unrest among employees discriminated who are deprived of perks and privileges.

Rashdeen Nawaz Qasuri, Additional Attorney General of Pakistan for Appellants.

Ms. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court and Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 to 18.

2025 SCMR 443

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Ayesha A. Malik, Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB through Chief Secretary, Punjab, Lahore and another ---Petitioners

Versus

ZAKA ULLAH and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1114-L of 2022, decided on 20th December, 2024.

(Against order dated 02.02.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Review Application No. 20 of 2021).

Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011---

----Rr. 19 & 25---Regularization of posts---Procedure---Vested right---Absence of approval of Finance Department---Provincial Government was aggrieved of direction issued by High Court to adopt special measures to regularize services of respondents / contract employees---Validity---Creation of new posts and change in employment status of respondents were decisions that fell squarely within the purview of R. 19 of Punjab Government Rules of Business Rules, 2011---Absence of Finance Department's approval for such decisions clarified the fact that there is no approval by Provincial Government---Posts were not approved for regularization---Employees cannot claim regularization as a matter of right---Regularization requires a statutory or legal backing and in absence of such a framework, Courts cannot impose any obligation on Government---Mere passage of time or length of service does not give rise to a vested right to regularization---There was no approval by Cabinet and no approval by Finance Department---Matter of regularization was never placed before Cabinet therefore, no recommendations could create any right in favour of respondents / contract employees---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed.

Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808; Government of Balochistan v. Attock Cement Pakistan Limited 2024 SCMR 876; Mohsin Raza Gondal v. Safdar Mahmood, C.Ps. No.949 of 2023, etc. decided on 13.9.2024 2025 SCMR 104 and Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Forest, Peshawar v. Sher Aman 2022 SCMR 406 ref.

Khalid Ishaq, Advocate General, Punjab for Petitioners.

Ch. Pervaiz Akhtar Gujjar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 and 5.

2025 SCMR 453

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

TARIQ KHAN and another ---Petitioners

Versus

ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL (NORTH) FEDERAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, ISLAMABAD and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 3463 and 3464 of 2021, decided on 7th November, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 07.04.2021 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeals Nos. 118(P)CS of 2020 and 119(P)CS of 2020).

(a) Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973---

----Rr. 5 & 6---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 133---Disciplinary proceedings---Cross examination, opportunity not provided---Effect---Civil servants were proceeded against departmentally and major penalty of compulsory retirement was imposed---Validity---Main object of affording fair opportunity of cross examination in defence is to obliterate testimony of witness or witnesses to disprove charge or allegations both in civil and criminal matters, including domestic/departmental inquires conducted under labour laws or civil servant laws---Mere statement of any witness has no legal value unless heis subjected to cross examination which cannot be envisaged as a concession---It is a vested right and a fundamental limb of dogma of fair trial---During regular inquiry, it is an unavoidable obligation of inquiry officer to provide fair opportunity of cross examining the witnesses without which it was not possible to fix responsibility for charges of misconduct---Such violation of an elementary principle of law sabotaged the fabric and substratum of entirety of disciplinary proceedings and worth and credibility of inquiry---On the basis of defective inquiry, major punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed upon civil servants---In total five persons were indicted in inquiry and on the strength of same inquiry report only two civil servants were punished with compulsory retirement, while one accused was punished with reduction to a lower time-scale and two senior officers were exonerated from inquiry proceedings---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal and matter was remanded to departmental authorities for de novo inquiry into the allegations against civil servants---Appeal was allowed.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 10A--- Civil service---De novo inquiry---Object, purpose and scope---Word "de novo" is a Latin expression which means "afresh, from the beginning or anew"---In de novo trial or de novo disciplinary proceedings, Court or competent authority is not required to refer to or rely on any conclusion or outcome of previous decisions or adjudications of Courts or authorities that had earlier seized the matter referred for de novo trial or inquiry---De novo trial or inquiry may be ordered or directed in order to meet the ends of justice and due process of law and further to ensure strict observance of conditionality envisioned for fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution.

Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Raja Shafqat Mehmood Abbasi, DAG and Anis M. Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record along with Sajjad, AD FIA for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 459

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Ayesha A. Malik, Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

MUHAMMAD YOUSAF and others ---Petitioners

Versus

MEMBER JUDICIAL-IV, BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 3297 and 1921-L of 2024, decided on 28th November, 2024.

(Against order dated 29.05.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 75147 of 2023).

Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act (V of 1912)---

----S. 10---Punjab Colony Manual (Edition-1933),Vol. 1, Para 321---Notification No.1997-2001/1174-CLI, dated 09-07-2001---Notification No.81-2006/50-C.(V), dated 17-01-2006---Notification No.917-2013/932-C.L(I), dated 26-11-2013---Allotment of state land---Chragah land (Pasture land)---Principle---Dispute was with regard to allotment of Charagah to respondent by authorities as State land---Validity--- Respondent was given land in question under Lambardari grant on the basis of Notification No.81-2006/50-C.(V), dated 17-01-2006, regarding grants of State land on lease, free of charge to Lambardar---Provisions of Notification No.81-2006/50-C.(V), dated 17-01-2006 did not mention Charagah land being included in it as State land---State land and Charagah land were wrongly construed to be one and the same---Charagah land was distinct from State land and despite different Notifications which permitted lease of Charagah land it was clear from Notification No.1997-2001/1174-CLI, dated 09-07-2001 and further from Notification No.917-2013/932-C.L(I), dated 26-11-2013 that Charagah land could only be leased out on specific conditions with the permission of Board of Revenue---Such notifications were overlooked by High Court in its order and treatment of Charagah land as State land was misconceived---Authorities did not have permission from Board of Revenue and such fact was reiterated numerous times in the orders of the revenue for grant of lease of certain available State agricultural lands situated within prohibited zone/State Charagah land for temporary cultivation---Land under possession of respondent in the form of Lambardarigrant was Charagah land---It was necessary that before allotment of such land, Board of Revenue was to consider the purpose and the terms and conditions for the grant if at all---Charagah land was always considered as a common resource for the benefit of village and, if at all, such land had to be leased out, it would be for a public purpose that too for a specified period of time with the permission of Board of Revenue---There was no Notification or provision under which Charagah land could be converted as State land or could be leased out for an indefinite term to a Lambardar for the period of his tenure---Tenure of respondent started in year 2001 and still continued and allotment was neither short term nor was it for a public purpose---Board of Revenue gave a specific advice vide letter No.538-2022/1877 C-V, dated 10.06.2022 that Charagah land could not be allotted to anyone under Lambardari grant and the reason for such advice and cautious guarding of Charagah land was that the character of the such land could not be changed---Even letter in question was ignored in the order passed by High Court, consequent to which grant in favour of respondent was upheld---Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court as revenue authorities rightly cancelled allotment of Charagah land as Lambardari grant in favour of respondent and ordered for its resumption in favour of State---Appeals were allowed.

Rai Azhar Iqbal Kharal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 3297 of 2024).

Khalid Ishaq, Advocate General, Punjab for official Respondents (in C.P. No. 3297 of 2024).

Sanaullah Zahid, Additional Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents (in C.P. No. 3297 of 2024).

Malik Noor Muhammad Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 5 (via video link, Lahore in C.P. No. 3297 of 2024).

Khalid Ishaq, Advocate General, Punjab for Petitioners (in C.P. No. 1921 -L of 2024).

Malik Noor Muhammad Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (via video link, Lahore in C.P. No. 1921 -L of 2024).

2025 SCMR 466

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shahid Waheed, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

ALI MADAD JATTAK ---Appellant

Versus

Mir MUHAMMAD USMAN PIRKANI and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 1349 of 2024, decided on 20th November, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 16.09.2024 of the Election Tribunal, Balochistan, Quetta in Election Petition No. 15 of 2024).

(a) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)---

----S. 148---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 72---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XIII, R. 4---Procedure before Election Tribunal---Exhibiting of document---Procedure---In case of substantial compliance of legal procedure, formal exhibition requirement is not absolute---Such requirement can be relaxed under certain circumstances, particularly, in election matter pending before Election Tribunal, which can adopt any course of action to regulate its proceeding instead of following technicalities of C.P.C., except such provisions specifically made applicable for limited purposes.

(b) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Art. 72---Documentary evidence---Proof---Formal exhibition of document solely does not guarantee its proof or admissibility---Absence of a formal exhibit marking doesn't necessarily mean that the document cannot be considered as evidence, provided other evidentiary requirements are met.

Sudir Engineering Company v. Nitco Roadways Ltd 1995 (34) DRJ 86 rel.

(c) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)---

----S. 155 & Form 45---Election dispute---Documentary evidence---Manipulation of record---Proof---Notification of appellant was set aside by Election Tribunal and respondent was declared as returned candidate after accepting his election petition---Validity---Documents and evidence produced by respondent fell under the category of exhibited documents, as those were tendered and produced as evidence in Election Tribunal---Document so produced were duly admitted by Election Tribunal as evidence without any objection and had become part of judicial record---Election Tribunal, after detailed scrutiny, pointed out substantial discrepancies which were result of manipulation and tampering in Form 45 by the appellant with the connivance of Returning Officer and their staff which resulted in increase of votes in favour of appellant---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by Election Tribunal as there was no illegality or procedural defect---Appeal was dismissed.

Khurshid Ali and 6 others v. Shah Nazar PLD 1992 SC 822; Azizullah through Legal heirs v. Muhammad Hanif through Legal heirs PLD 2018 Lahore 132; Muhammad Ashiq v. Additional District Judge, Vehari/Election Tribunal Khanewal camp at Vehari and others 2005 MLD 1577; Hakim Khan v. Aurangzeb and another PLD 1975 Lahore 1170; Muhammad Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhary v. Mumtaz Ahmed Tarar and others 2016 SCMR 1; R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple Appeal (civil) 10585 of 1996 and Shahin Shah v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Irrigation Department Peshawar and others 2022 SCMR 1810 rel.

M. Shahzad Shoukat, Advocate Supreme Court and Ch. Akhtar Ali, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.

Kamran Murtaza, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.

Ajmal Ghafoor Toor, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 31.

Respondent No. 17 in person.

Falak Sher, Assistant Director (Law) and M. Arshad, Spl. Secretary (Law) ECP for ECP.

2025 SCMR 485

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

DEFENCE HOUSING AUTHORITY through its Secretary DHA Complex Lahore Cantt ---Petitioner

Versus

SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB COOPERATIVES DEPARTMENT LAHORE and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.As Nos. 1378-L of 2013 and 1563-L of 2018, decided on 13th November, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 17.05.2013 and 26.04.2018 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 12256 of 2013 and Writ Petition No. 5018 of 2017).

Punjab Cooperative Societies Act (VII of 1925)---

----S.54---Cooperative society---Non-allotment of plot---Petitioner/Defence Housing Authority after merger with Cooperative Society did not issue allotment letter to respondent/allottee who was member of the Cooperative Society---Validity---After merger of the Society with petitioner/Authority, it was for petitioner/Authority to resolve all issues of owners/allottees without fail---Agreement between the Society and petitioner/Authority was dated 12-08-2006, whereas respondent/allottee had accrued rights since year 1990 on the strength of allotment---Respondent/allottee was un-necessarily dragged into litigation in presence of agreement---Such fact was visible from orders passed by Registrar and Secretary---Petitioner/Authority had set a bad example of frivolous and futile exercise despite clear-cut provision of agreement---Respondent/allottee who suffered at the hands of Society and Authority would be at liberty to initiate legal course of action---High Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Faisal Hanif, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link Lahore).

Javed lqbal Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 3 (through video link Lahore).

2025 SCMR 489

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, LAW AND

PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, LAHORE and another ---Petitioners

Versus

ALI AHMAD KHAN ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 2330-L of 2019, decided on 23rd October, 2024.

(Against the order dated 18.06.2019 passed by Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 3212 of 2016).

(a) Civil service---

----Deterrent punishment---Object, purpose and scope---Purpose of deterrent punishment is not only to balance gravity of wrong done but also to maintain discipline and decorum in an establishment---Such punishment at times serves as a preventive measure or example for others in the interest of societal reformation.

Postmaster General Balochistan v. Amanat Ali and others 2024 SCMR 1484 = 2024 PLC (C.S) 1051; Postmaster General Sindh Province, Karachi v. Syed Farhan 2022 SCMR 1154; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal 2022 SCMR 2114 and Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services, D.G. Khan v. Nadeem Raza 2023 SCMR 803 rel.

(b) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)---

----S. 4---Service appeal---Absence without leave---Appellate jurisdiction, exercise of---Pre-conditions---Respondent/civil servant remained absent from duty without leave and was proceed against departmentally---Authorities imposed major penalty of reduction to lower post---Service Tribunal allowed appeal filed by respondent/civil servant and set aside the penalty---Validity---While exercising appellate jurisdiction under the provisions of Service Tribunals Acts the first and foremost duty is to thoroughly examine all facts of the case and diligently address all factual and legal pleas raised by parties, and then decide whether proceedings for misconduct, initiated through show cause notice and statement of allegations, have duly been proved or not---In case penalty is imposed as a result of a regular inquiry, it is also necessary to examine inquiry proceedings and inquiry report, along with recommendations forwarded by inquiry officer/inquiry committee to competent authority for further action in accordance with law---In service appeals challenging minor or major penalties imposed upon civil servants, core issue is to evaluate gravity of charges and proof of guilt of delinquent during inquiry---Without adverting to inquiry proceedings and report, it would not be possible for Service Tribunal to reach a just and proper conclusion---Merely treating period of absence without pay in cases where punishments are imposed by competent authority other than dismissal/removal from service neither exonerate respondent from charge of misconduct nor act of misconduct is vanished on such count alone---In the present case such benefit was accorded by taking a lenient view to avoid breakup in the length of service only which did not amount to exoneration from period of absence---Supreme Court set aside order passed by Service Tribunal and service appeal filed by respondent / civil servant was dismissed---Appeal was allowed.

Lahore Development Authority v. Muhammad Nadeem Kachloo 2006 SCMR 434 distinguished.

Baleegh-uz-Zaman Ch., Addl.AG, Punjab for Petitioners.

Muhammad Anwar Bhanr, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (through video link Lahore).

2025 SCMR 495

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, ACJ Shahid Waheed and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

ZEESHAN PERVEZ (Late) through Legal Heirs ---Petitioner

Versus

MUHAMMAD NASIR ---Respondent

C.P.L.A. No. 812-K and C.M.A. No. 572-K of 2022, decided on 21st May, 2024.

(Against the order dated 24.05.2022 passed High Court of Sindh, Karachi in H.C.A. No. 194 of 2020).

Per Shahid Waheed, J.; Munib Akhter and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ.: agreeing.

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 12, 39, 42 & 54---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, cancellation of document, declaration and injunction---Willingness to perform agreement---Proof---Petitioner/vendor was aggrieved of judgments and decrees passed by High Court decreeing suit for specific performance of agreement to sell filed by respondent/vendee and dismissing his suit seeking cancellation of contract---Validity---Property in question was mortgaged to bank serving as collateral for loan at the time the contract was executed---Responsibility for balance payment by respondent/vendee depended on petitioner/vendor fulfilling specific obligations, which included (i) securing a clearance certificate or no objection certificate from bank; (ii) settling all outstanding dues, debts, claims, loans, mortgages, taxes and any other liabilities associated with the property; (iii) ensuring that property's mutation was duly processed in petitioner / vendor's name; and (iv) completing all necessary sale formalities, which encompassed registration of sale deed or granting a General Power of Attorney in favour of respondent/vendee or his nominee---All such conditions were expected to be fulfilled by petitioner/vendor on or before the deadline---Only after successfully meeting such prerequisites, respondent/vendee was obligated to pay outstanding amount---Respondent/vendee was consistently ready and willing to fulfill his contractual obligations, leading to equitable inference that scales of justice leaned favourably towards the respondent/vendee in such matter---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

(b) Maxim---

----Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria---Meaning---No one should benefit from their wrongdoing.

Per Irfan Saadat Khan, J; agreeing with Shahid Waheed, J.

(c) Interpretation of document---

----Context of contract---Contra proferentum, rule of---Applicability---Reasonable person, considering the context of contract, ought to be able to identify its meaning without any ambiguity and if ambiguity persists, the meaning that accords best with common sense would prevail.

MeCunn, J. (2019). The contra proferentem rule: Contract law's great survivor. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 39(3), 483-506 rel.

(d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---

----S. 55---Time as essence of contract---Scope---Whether time is essence of contract always depends upon wordings of an agreement, intention of parties and above all is a question of fact---Agreements where time is not essence of contract does not become voidable by failure to do such thing at or before specified time and only remedy available to promisee is compensation from the promisor.

Mst. Jaiwanti Bai v. Messrs Amir Corporation PLD 2021 SC 434; Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam 2015 SCMR 21; Indira Kaur v. Shri Sheo Lal Kapoor AIR 1988 SC 1074; M.P Housing Board v. Progressive Writers and Publishers AIR 2009 SC 1585; Muhammad Hussain v. Dr. Zahoor Alam 2010 SCMR 286 and Masood Ahmad Bhatti v. Khan Badshah 2024 SCMR 168 rel.

(e) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 12, 39, 42 & 54---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, cancellation of document, declaration and injunction---Willingness to perform agreement---Proof---Petitioner/vendor was aggrieved of judgments and decrees passed by High Court decreeing suit for specific performance of agreement to sell filed by respondent/vendee and dismissing his suit for cancellation of contract---Validity---When petitioner/vendor fell short of funds to pay liability, he owed to bank, he approached respondent / vendee for payment, which was done so by respondent/vendee to the bank of petitioner/vendor to enable him to obtain no objection certificate---Such conduct of respondent/vendee showed that he was ready at all relevant times to conclude the agreement and acquire the property but was hindered by the conduct of petitioner/vendor, who had repeatedly tried to establish breaches on the part of respondent/vendee and then tried to use Courts to get a rubber stamp of approval on self-serving interpretations of agreement---There was no breach on the part of respondent/vendee rather it was on the part of petitioner/vendor, therefore, recourse to a suit for specific performance was the appropriate remedy for respondent/vendee---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

United States v. Alabama 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17516; The Terms of the Contract. Beatson, J., Burrows, A., and Cartwright, J. (2020). Anson's Law of Contract. Oxford University Press; McCunn, J. (2019). The contra proferentem rule: Contract law's great survivor. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 39(3), 483-506; Modi and Co v. Union of India AIR 1969 SC 9; Buchanan v. Johnson 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384; Rao Abdul Rehman (Deceased) v. Muhammad Afzal (Deceased) 2023 SCMR 815 and Specific Remedies. Beatson, J., Burrows, A., and Cartwright, J. (2020). Anson's Law of Contract. Oxford University Press rel.

Abdul Qadir Khan, Advocate Supreme Court /Advocate-On-Record for Petitioner (via video call from Karachi).

Muhammad Wawda, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.

2025 SCMR 515

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

ABDUL AZIZ and others ---Petitioners

Versus

ALL PAKISTAN CLERKS ASSOCIATION through Zilai President Manzoor Ahmed and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 251-Q of 2024, decided on 14th January, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 26.07.2024 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, passed in C.P. No. 73 of 2023).

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. I, R. 10---Proper and necessary party, impleading of---Principle---Petitioner was aggrieved of impleading respondents as proper and necessary party to the proceedings of suit---Held, that orders passed by High Court and Trial Court were based on proper appreciation of facts of the case---Two Courts below after thrashing out the matter in detail had found that respondents were proper and necessary party---While dealing with applications under Order I, Rule 10 C.P.C., Court has to exercise its discretion in a liberal manner rather than adopting a narrow or pedantic approach, especially when a party is likely to be affected by any judgment in a proceedings and whose presence would enable the Court to effectively adjudicate the matter in accordance with law---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the order passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Syntron Limited v. Huma Ijaz and others 2014 SCMR 531; Province of the Punjab through Deputy Commissioner/District Collector, Rawalpindi and others v. Muhammad Akram and others 2023 SCMR 755; Muhammad Arif and others v. Dirstrict and Session Judge, Sialkot and others 2011 SCMR 1591 and Vidur Impex and Traders (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Tosh Apartments (Pvt) Ltd. and others [Supreme Court of India] 2013 SCMR 602 rel.

Rehmat Ullah Barech, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (through video link from Quetta).

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 517

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

KAUSAR RANA RESOURCES (PRIVATE) LIMITED and others ---Petitioners

Versus

QATAR LUBRICANTS COMPANY W.L.L. (QALCO) and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 4468 of 2024, decided on 2nd December, 2024.

(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 24.06.2024, passed in C.M. No. 3 of 2023 in C.O. No. 48681 of 2023).

(a) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---

----Ss. 126, 127 & 278---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss. 18 & 34---Pro-arbitration approach of Courts---Arbitration---Filing of award---Dispute pertaining to transfer of shares was initiated before High Court where proceedings were neither stayed under Arbitration Act, 1940 nor the matter was referred to Arbitrator---Validity---In addition to Supreme Court adopting a pro-arbitration approach, stance of referring for arbitration was also bolstered by the framework of Companies Act, 2017, which, through its Preamble, affirmatively advocated for alternative mechanisms to ensure expeditious resolution of corporate disputes---Companies were explicitly encouraged under section 278 of Companies Act, 2017 to refer any existing or future disputes, whether between companies or involving any other persons, to arbitration---Supreme Court with pro-arbitration approach and with the consensus of parties referred the matter to Arbitrator---Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court and accepted application under section 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Supreme Court stayed proceedings under sections 126 and 127 of Companies Act, 2017 concerning alleged fraudulent transfer of shares and rectification of register of members (shareholders)---Supreme Court directed that award made by Arbitrator would be filed in High Court in accordance with the proceedings under Arbitration Act, 1940, as the matter fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of Court established under the Companies Act, 2017---Appeal was allowed.

Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] AC 334; Brother Steel Mills v. Ilyas Miraj PLD 1996 SC 543; and Nilmoni Singh v. Taranath ILR 9 Cal 295 rel.

(b) Arbitration Act (X of 1940)---

----S. 2(c)---Companies Act (XIX of 2017), S. 5(4)---Term "Civil Court"---Civil Courts of special jurisdiction---Scope---Courts exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to specific matters, such as the Court established under Companies Act, 2017 cannot be read into the exception clause of section 2(c) of Arbitration Act, 1940---Term "Civil Court" mentioned in section 2(c) of Arbitration Act, 1940 does not refer exclusively to Civil Courts of general jurisdiction but also encompasses Civil Courts of special jurisdiction.

(c) Arbitration---

----Economic benefits---Scope---Significant economic benefits of arbitration are cost-effective, efficient and confidential means of resolving disputes---Arbitration alleviates burden on national Courts, enhances business productivity and provides faster resolution process, thereby minimizing disruptions to businesses---Ability to enforce international arbitration awards strengthens trade and commerce, while arbitration's stable and predictable dispute resolution mechanism promotes investor confidence, making the country an attractive destination for foreign investment---Such factors collectively foster a favourable business environment, drive economic growth and enhance country's competitiveness on the global stage.

Barrister Iftikhar-ud-Din Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court and Muhammad Haroon Mumtaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Arshad Mohsin Tayebaly, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 527

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

ABDUL KHALIQ ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 441 of 2019, decided on 20th September, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 31.05.2019, passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Appeal No. 283-P of 2019).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 121-A---Frontier Crimes Regulations (III of 1901) [since repealed], Reglns. 11 & 40---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 247---Waging war, conspiracy of---Right of appeal---Scope---Constitutional amendment---Retrospective effect---Accused assailed his conviction and sentence awarded by Trial Court whereby he was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment---Validity---Where a particular statute/law provides a self-contained mechanism and well defined forum of redressal for determination of questions of law or facts by way of an appeal or revision to another authority or tribunal as the case may be, the same has to be followed being remedy provided under law---Accused without exhausting such remedies can be allowed to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Such jurisdiction of High Court cannot be exploited as the sole solution when there are equally effective and adequate alternative remedies provided under law---Such remedies cannot be bypassed to invoke Constitutional jurisdiction---Retrospective effect cannot be given to a Constitutional amendment, without any such intention by Legislature, otherwise matters decided prior to Constitutional amendment would also need to be reviewed by Constitutional Courts and it would open flood gates to any case---In the present case, provision of Article 247 of the Constitution was in field and jurisdiction of High Court was barred in matters exclusively dealt with by FATA hierarchy---Supreme Court declined to interfere in conviction and sentence awarded to accused as the judgment passed by Trial Court had attained finality---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Mian Muhammad Yousaf and another v. Lahore Development Authority through Director-General, L.D.A. Plaza, Lahore and 5 others PLD 2001 SC 393; Syed Match Company Ltd. through Managing Director v. Authority Under Payment of Wages Act and others 2003 SCMR 1493; Mian Azam Waheed and 2 others v. The Collector of Customs through Additional Collector of Customs, Karachi 2023 SCMR 1247; Jameel Qadir and another v. Government of Baluchistan, Local Government, Rural Development and Agrovilles Department, Quetta through Secretary and others 2023 SCMR 1919 and Muhammad Safeer and others v. Muhammad Azam and others PLD 2024 SC 838 ref.

Muhammad Usman Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Altaf Khan, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.

2025 SCMR 532

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance Division and another ---Petitioners

Versus

ABDUL RASHEED MEMON ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 1124-K of 2023, decided on 20th December, 2024.

(Against judgment dated 27.07.2023 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad (Karachi Bench) in Appeal No. 134 (K) CS of 2021).

(a) Words and phrases---

----Per incuriam---Connotation---Verdict of a Court is considered per incuriam when it is rendered in ignorance of a statute or rule having force of statute.

Rupert Cross & J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law, 149 (4th ed., 1991); Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edition)]; C.C.K. Allen in Law in the Making (Page 246); Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson (1947) 2 All E.R.193; Morelle Ltd. v Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 and Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. 1944 KB 718 at 729 = (1944) 2 All E.R. 293 at 300 rel.

(b) Service Tribunals Act ( LXX of 1973)---

----S. 4---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 189---Service appeal---Stare decisis and precedent---Distinction---Authorities were aggrieved of judgment passed by Service Tribunal in violation of the principle already laid down by Supreme Court---Effect---Doctrine of stare decisis, is a Latin term that connotes "let the decision stand" or "to stand by things decided"---Law declared by Supreme Court should be certain, translucent and rational, as most decisions not only constitute a determination of rights of parties but also set down a declaration of law that serves as binding principles in future cases, thereby contributing to development of jurisprudence---Doctrine of precedents, vis-à-vis stare decisis has fundamental value in ensuring an objective certitude and firmness in legal system---Rule of adherence to judicial precedents finds it expression in the doctrine of stare decisis, which posits that when a point or principle of law has officially been decided or settled by ruling of a competent Court in a case where it was directly and necessarily involved, it should no longer be considered as open to re-examination or to a new ruling---Such policy of Courts is conveniently termed as doctrine of stare decisis---Rational behind such policy is the need to promote certainty, stability and predictability in law---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal as the same was passed against the law settled by Supreme Court---Appeal was allowed.

Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 483 rel.

Khalique Ahmed, Deputy Attorney General for Petitioners.

Respondent in person.

2025 SCMR 538

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, Ayesha A. Malik and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Revenue Division and others ---Petitioners

Versus

DEWAN MOTORS (PVT) LTD. and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.As Nos. 836-K to 887-K, 951-K, 1056-K, 1296-K of 2020, 741-K to 743-K of 2021 and 165-K of 2022, decided on 13th January, 2025.

Constitution of Pakistan---

----Arts. 185(3) & 191A [as inserted by 26th Constitutional Amendment]---Customs Act (IV of 1969), S. 221A (2)---Regular Bench of Supreme Court---Jurisdiction---Interpretation of Constitutional provision---Authorities contended that regular bench of Supreme Court could not hear the matter in question as it involved a challenge to Constitutionality of law namely section 221A (2) of Customs Act, 1989---Authorities referred to provisions of Article 191A of the Constitution, which was added to the Constitution through the 26th Constitutional Amendment---Respondents contended that Article 191A of the Constitution, was constitutionally invalid as it had infringed upon the salient features of the Constitution, including independence of judiciary and separation of powers among three organs of the State---Validity---Supreme Court found that it would be necessary to first decide upon the objection raised and reply thereto before proceeding further in the matter at hand---Supreme Court granted time to parties to prepare their arguments and assist Supreme Court on such points---Petition was adjourned.

Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan PLD 1995 SC 66; Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v. Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486 and Marbury v. Madison 5 US 137 [1803] ref.

Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link), M. Nadeem Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court, Raja M. Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Salah-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court, Haider Waheed, Advocate Supreme Court, Imran Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court, Ghulam Haider Sh, Advocate Supreme Court, Hussain Ali Amani, Advocate Supreme Court (through video-link), Afzal Awan, Advocate Supreme Court and Pervaiz Akhtar Tahir, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 540

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Athar Minallah and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

NOOR MUHAMMAD and others ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petitions Nos. 603 of 2017, 442, 443 and 444 of 2019, decided on 19th December, 2024.

(On appeal against the judgments dated 30.12.2016, 22.12.2011 passed by the Balochistan High Court, Quetta in Cr. Appeals Nos. 177 and 178 of 2012, Cr. Appeal No. 140 of 2007 and Cr. Appeals Nos. 141 and 142 of 2007).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 324, 353 & 364---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 397---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, assault on police, kidnapping for murder and terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Concurrency of sentences---Accused was convicted by Trial Court vide three judgments and was sentenced variously with maximum sentence of imprisonment for life---Such conviction and sentence was maintained by High Court---Validity---Accused at the time of his arrest, was minor who ad been behind the bars since the year 2006---Accused had almost served out his substantive sentence for life and was entitled to the benefit of section 397, Cr.P.C.---Accused did not pursue the matter on merits and had sought concurrence of sentences---Supreme Court took a lenient view and while maintaining convictions of accused directed all his sentences to run concurrently, with the benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C.---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

2018 SCMR 418 and PLD 2015 SC 15 rel.

Muhammad Shabbir Rajput, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Muhib-ur-Rehman, Advocate High Court for Petitioners through video-link from Quetta).

Ms. Robina Butt, Advocate Supreme Court, State Counsel Balochistan for the State.

2025 SCMR 544

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

UMAR GUL ---Petitioner

Versus

Dr. HAFIZA AKHTAR and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 4389 of 2023, decided on 13th January, 2025.

(Against the order dated 27.10.2023 passed by Peshawar High Court in Writ Petition No. 4357-P of 2017).

West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)---

----S.13---Ejectment of tenant--- Relationship of landlord and tenant---Proof---Utility bills---Scope---Petitioner/tenant was aggrieved of eviction order passed by Lower Appellate Court, which was maintained by High Court---Petitioner/tenant claimed to be owner of demised premises and had relied upon utility bills in his name---Validity---Utility bills in the name of any person only denote possession of property but they do not prove ownership of the same---When tenant disputes ownership of landlord, the only recourse available with him is to file a civil suit---High Court and Lower Appellate Court had correctly decided the issue of ownership---Supreme Court declined to interfere in orders passed by Lower Appellate Court and High Court, as there was no illegality or irregularity---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Tassaduq Hussain v. Muneer Fatima 2014 SCMR 1744 and Ahmad Ali alias Ali Ahmad v. Nasar-ud-Din PLD 2009 SC 453 rel.

Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record/Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 547

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Musarrat Hilali and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

GHOUS BAKSH ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 294 of 2020, decided on 11th November, 2024.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 15.02.2016 passed by the High Court of Balochistan Bench at Sibi, in Crl. A. No. 73 of 2015).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Reappraisal of evidence---Circumstantial evidence---Retracted and hostile witness---Distinction---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---Mere retraction of earlier statement by a witness does not automatically render him/her hostile---Hostility and retraction are two different concepts---Hostility, in legal terms, refers to a deliberate intent to deviate from the truth or act against interests of the party calling the witness, whereas 'retraction' refers to the act of withdrawing or taking back a statement, testimony, or accusation often due to its inaccuracy, falsity, or unreliability---Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain excluding every hypothesis other than the guilt of accused---In the present case in absence of direct or corroborative evidence, reliance on circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt---Uncertainty of complainant regarding identity of perpetrator introduced a reasonable doubt, which was sufficient to entitle accused to benefit of doubt---Retraction of a statement did not automatically equate to hostility and such crucial point was not sufficiently addressed by the lower fora---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and acquitted him of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Sarfraz and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 rel.

Ms. Ayesha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (on State expense).

Abdul Baqir, Add. PG. Balochistan for the State.

2025 SCMR 551

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin ud Din Khan and Musarrat Hilali, JJ

AKHTAR WAHEED ---Appellant

Versus

MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 26-L of 2024, decided on 2nd January, 2025.

(Against the order dated 07.03.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in C.R. No. 274 of 2017).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S.12---Specific performance of agreement to sell---Agreement---Proof---All pages not signed/thumb impressed---Suit filed by appellant/plaintiff was dismissed by High Court as first page of the agreement did not contain signatures and thumb impression---Validity---If first page of agreement was taken out of consideration, as it did not contain signatures/thumb impressions of any of the parties as well as of the witnesses, the suit for specific performance could not be decreed---Supreme Court declined to interfere in findings of High Court which were the result of thorough examination of documentary as well as oral evidence---Appeal was dismissed.

Qadir Bukhsh, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (via video link from Lahore).

Muhammad Yasin Hatif, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Lahore).

2025 SCMR 552

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J

SIKANDAR ALI alias Bhola ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 29 of 2021, decided on 13th January, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 30.11.2020 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 2016).

(a) Criminal trial---

----Exculpatory confession---Effect---Such confession cannot be used against co-accused.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302 (b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Recovery from open place---Motive introduced with unexplained delay---Effect---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for committing qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---Validity---Recovery of rope on the pointing of accused was made from an open place, under the trees accessible to public and it was not in exclusive possession of accused---Motive was introduced after six days from the occurrence and two days from registration of F.I.R., without any convincing reasons for such delay---Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond shadow of doubt---If there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in prosecution case then the same is sufficient to acquit the accused---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and acquitted him of the charge, as prosecution story was repleted with number of circumstances creating doubt---Appeal was allowed.

Ch. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia and another 1992 SCMR 1047; Sarfraz Khan v. The State 1996 SCMR 188; Asadullah and another v. The State 1999 SCMR 1034; Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another 2008 SCMR 1103; Liaquat Ali v. The State 2008 SCMR 95; Pathan v. The State 2015 SCMR 315 and Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326 ref.

Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Ms. Chand Bibi, DPG Islamabad with Imran Munir SI for Respondent.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 SCMR 558

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

MUHAMMAD EJAZ ---Petitioner

Versus

JUDGE FAMILY COURT, HAFIZABAD and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 2759-L of 2023, decided on 14th January, 2025.

(Against the order dated 21.07.2023 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 48244 of 2023).

Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----Ss. 5, 9(6) & 10---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.114---Suit for dissolution of marriage and recovery of dower---Ex-parte decree---Estoppel, principle of---Applicability---Petitioner/husband was aggrieved of ex-parte decree passed against him and the Courts below declined to set aside the same---Held, that petitioner/husband sought setting aside of ex-parte decree by filing application under section 9 (6) of Family Courts Act, 1964 but later on withdrew the same---Petitioner/husband acquiesced of the decree and waived off his right to further agitate it---Principle of estoppel was fully attracted against petitioner/husband---Lower Appellate Court after passing of decree by Trial Court reviewed its findings and concurred with the same, as thus were in accordance with pleadings, evidence and law on the subject---Supreme Court declined to interfere in orders passed by the Courts below as there was no illegality---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Fateh Khan v. Manzoor and 5 others PLD 1993 Lahore 76; Noor Muhammad and others v. Muhammad Siddique and others 1994 SCMR 1248; Hassan Akhtar and others v. Azhar Hameed and others PLD 2010 SC 657 and Afzal and others v. Abdul Ghani 2005 SCMR 946 rel.

Zulfiqar Ali Hargan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Aftab Hussain Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 562

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

JANNAT IQBAL ---Petitioner

Versus

MUHAMMAD KHURSHAD and another ---Respondents

Crl.P.L.A. No. 1-P of 2015, decided on 7th October, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 08.12.2014 passed by Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar-ul-Qaza) in Cr.A. No. 33-M of 2013).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 324 & 337-D---Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S. 13---Attempt to qatl-i-amd and jaifah---Reappraisal of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Determination of injuries---Appellant/injured complainant was aggrieved of acquittal of respondent/accused by High Court setting aside his conviction and sentence awarded by Trial Court---Validity---Respondent was single accused and had caused multiple injuries on the vital part of appellant/injured complainant, which were supported by medical evidence and also corroborated by recovery of dagger, coupled with reports of Chemical Examiner which were positive---There were sufficient evidences in shape of statement of injured witness and other supporting evidence---There was nothing on record in shape of statement of any surgeon or Radiologist which could indicate that injury extended into body cavity of injured where vital organ laid---Supreme Court set aside conviction under section 337-D, P.P.C., but maintained the ones under section 324 P.P.C. and under Section 13 of Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, passed by Trial Court---Supreme Court reduced the sentence awarded to respondent/accused to sentence already undergone---Appeal was allowed.

Iltaf Samad, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (video link Peshawar).

Abdul Fayyaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (video link Peshawar along with Petitioner in person).

2025 SCMR 564

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

HASHIM KHAN and others ---Petitioners

Versus

Mst. MUSARAT BEGUM and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 625-P of 2024, decided on 16th January, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 03.06.2024 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Writ Petition No. 1043-P of 2023).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.IX, R.13---Suit for declaration and injunction---Ex-parte decree, setting aside of---Principle of audi alteram partem---Petitioners/plaintiffs were aggrieved of setting aside of ex-parte judgment and decree passed against respondents/defendants---Validity---Mandate of law is that one should not be condemned unheard and every litigant should be provided with fair opportunity to plead and defend his/her case by adhering to principle of audi alteram partem---Technicalities should and ought to be avoided---Trial Court while dealing with the suit did not resort to mandated procedure of law for procuring service of respondents/defendants---Application seeking setting aside of ex-parte judgment and decree was rightly and correctly accepted by Trial Court and affirmed by Lower Appellate Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction and High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction---Supreme Court declined to interfere in orders passed by the fora below who had rightly and legally adjudicated upon the matter and did not commit any illegality---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Sana Jamali v. Mujeeb Qamar and another 2023 SCMR 316; Syed Muhammad Anwar Advocate v. Sheikh Abdul Haq 1985 SCMR 1228; Muhammad Sharif v. MCB Bank Limited and others 2021 SCMR 1158 and Faqir Muhammad v. Khursheed Bibi and others 2024 SCMR 107 rel.

Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Zia Ur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link, Peshawar).

2025 SCMR 570

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LTD. (SNGPL), ISLAMABAD---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs S.K. PVT. LIMITED and others---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos.3589, 3590 and 3602 of 2022, decided on 29th October, 2024.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 25.07.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court in R.F.As. Nos.35, 89 and 143 of 2018).

(a) Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act (XI of 2016)---

----S. 6---Suits before Gas Utility Courts---Billing dispute---Excessive bills---Respondents/consumers filed suit before Gas Utility Court for excessive bills issued by petitioner/Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited---Trial Court rejected the plaint on the plea that respondents/consumers had alternate remedy available to them---High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction allowed appeal and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh on merits---Validity---Equitable and expeditious remedy for filing a complaint or suit, as the case may be, for resolving disputes regarding billing or metering has been provided under section 6 of Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016, both to the Company and consumers---Statute or its provisions must be construed effectively and operatively, as per the maxim "ut res magis valeat quam pereat"---Trial Court, while non-suiting respondents/ consumers, primarily focused on Preamble of Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016---High Court rightly held that issues of overbilling, including overcharging of Gas Calorific Value (GCV), penalties, and estimated bills due to meter stoppage, fell within the scope of section 6 of Gas (Theft, Control and Recovery) Act, 2016---Lawsuit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of Gas Utility Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th ed.), by P. J. Fitzgerald, M.A., at page 132; Heydon's Case (1584) 76 ER 637; Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed.), at page 228 and Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (4th, ed.), at page 810 rel.

(b) Interpretation of statutes---

----Preamble---Object, purpose and scope---Preamble can play both constructive and contextual roles in statutory interpretation---If scope of Preamble is narrower than that of a substantive section, the statutory provision in such an enactment cannot be restricted inconsiderately merely because Preamble of statute is narrower---Straightforward and uncomplicated provision in any law cannot be controlled, restrained, or limited by a narrow Preamble---Equally, a wide-ranging Preamble cannot be deemed to have automatically enlarged scope of any law---In interpreting any statute, Court must adopt holistic approach---There are two vivid rules of interpretation: first, Preamble of any law may articulate the purpose the Legislature intended to achieve; and second, if enactment and its provisions are well defined and unequivocal, Preamble cannot be relied upon solely to expurgate or override express provisions of law without considering its pith and substance.

(c) Maxim---

----Generalia specialibus non derogant---Connotation---Latin maxim "generalia specialibus non derogant" means "things general do not derogate from things special"---This is a routine tenet of statutory interpretation, emphasizing that where there is a conflict between general and special law, the special law prevails.

(d) Maxim---

----"Ejusdem generis" and "expressio unius est exclusio alterius"---Connotation---Latin maxims "ejusdem generis" and "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" exemplify that when two rules or laws exist, one general and one specific, the specific rule takes precedence over general rule.

(e) Interpretation of statutes---

----Intent of lawmaker---Scope---At the heart of various rules of interpretation, the most important rule is to remain faithful to intent of lawmaker and adopt an interpretation which supports attainment of statute's objective---With such approach, whenever two interpretations are plausible or achievable, Court ought to prefer the interpretation that expands a remedy and represses mischief---Court should also avoid and eschew interpretations that render statute or its provisions ineffective without good reason---Court should sustain elementary objective of statute---If words are clear and free from vagueness or uncertainty, then there is no need to turn to other mediums of interpretation---If words are vague or ambiguous, then Court may rely on internal support for accurate interpretation.

Ch. Hafeez Ullah Yaqub, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 SCMR 579

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ

Mst. ANITA ANAM---Petitioner

Versus

GENERAL PUBLIC and another---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 256-Q of 2020, decided on 15th August, 2024.

(Against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta dated 28.09.2020 passed in Civil Revision No. 199 of 2020).

(a) Balochistan Civil Servants Pension Rules, 1989---

----R. 4.10 (2) [as amended]---Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925), Ss. 372 & 373---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. II, R. 2---Succession certificate---Family monthly pension---Failure to include all claims---Successive proceedings---Scope---Provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908---Applicability---Petitioner was unmarried daughter of deceased civil servant and had applied for family monthly pension---Succession Certificate was refused to her by the Courts below on the plea that she did not include claim of family monthly pensionin earlier succession application---Validity---Judge is empowered to issue more than one certificates, as provided by sections 372 (3) and 373 (3) and (4) of Succession Act, 1925---No limitation under Succession Act, 1925, has been placed upon right of parties in filing more than one application---Any decision made under Part-X upon any question of right between parties, does not bar trial of the same or related question in any subsequent proceedings under Succession Act, 1925 or in any suit or other proceedings between same parties---No person has been restricted under Succession Act, 1925 from filing application in respect of a portion of claim which he omitted while filing earlier application---Provisions of C.P.C. cannot be applied to matters falling under Succession Act, 1925 which is a special law and a specific procedure has been provided---Provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. are not attracted in the matters under Succession Act, 1925---Where Succession Act, 1925 is silent on matters relating to procedure for trial of case, procedure provided by C.P.C. may be adopted to regulate proceedings---Earlier certificate issued to petitioner was in respect of amount left by her late father in his bank account, whereas, through second application, she was claiming her share in monthly family pension---Supreme Court set aside decision of High Court which was based upon unamended Balochistan Civil Servants Pension Rules, 1989, and was an illegality---Supreme Court remanded the matter to Trial Court to determine status, entitlement and share of petitioner in family monthly pension---Appeal was allowed.

(b) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925)---

----Ss. 372 & 373---Successive application for grant of Succession certificate---Maintainability---There is no bar under Succession Act, 1925 in filing successive applications for grant of a certificate---No limitation can be imposed upon filing second application for grant of a certificate---Any person aggrieved from order granting earlier certificate, has a right to avail his remedy provided by law, subject to all just exceptions.

Manzoor Ahmed Shah, Advocate Supreme Court and Gohar Yaqoob Yousafzai, Advocate-on-Record along with petitioner for Petitioner.

Muhammad Riaz Akhtar Tareen, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.M.A. No. 185-Q of 2024).

Muhammad Ali Rakhshani, Addl. A.G. Balochistan, Muhammad Ayub Tareen, Asstt. A.G. Balochistan, Noor Hussain Baloch, Addl. Secy S&GAD, Haji Muhammad Naeem, Addl. Secy, S&GAD (PAY), Rehmat Ullah Kakar, Dy. Secretary Finance and Abdul Wajid, Representative, A.G., Balochistan for Respondent No.1.

Muhammad Mehmood Sadiq, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.2.

2025 SCMR 584

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shahid Waheed, Irfan Saadat Khan and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

Mir HAMMAL KHAN---Appellant

Versus

ELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN, through Secretary, Islamabad and others---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 1357 of 2024, decided on 20th November, 2024.

(Against the order dated 12.09.2024 of the Election Tribunal, Balochistan, Quetta passed in E.P. No. 07 of 2024).

(a) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)---

----Ss. 139, 142, 143, 144 & 145---Election dispute---Rigging and corrupt and illegal practices---Proof---Statements of witnesses---Original affidavits, failure to produce---Non-compliance of mandatory requirement---Effect---Petitioner assailed election result of respondent/ returned candidate but Election Tribunal dismissed his election petition---Validity---Polling agents of appellant were present at all polling stations, including three polling stations in question---There was no complaint either by Presiding Officers or by any other responsible officer---Election process in the constituency took place in a congenial atmosphere and continued peacefully uptill the allotted time of 5 pm---Supreme Court declined to interfere in election result as the petitioner failed to prove massive rigging, corrupt and illegal practices with credible and convincing grounds---Supreme Court maintained judgment passed by Election Tribunal, which had dealt with the issue in an elaborate and articulate manner---Appeal was dismissed.

Muhammad Saeed v. Election Petitions Tribunal, West Pakistan and others PLD 1957 SC (Pak.) 91; Khan Muhammad Yousaf Khan Khattak v. S.M. Ayub and 2 others PLD 1973 SC 160 and Usman Dar v. Khawaja Muhammad Asif 2017 SCMR 292 ref.

Ltd. Col. (Rtd.) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah v. Mehr Khalid Mehmood Sargana 2015 SCMR 1585; Engr. Iqbal Zafar Jhagra and others v. Khalil ur Rehman and 4 others 2000 SCMR 250; Attaullah Khan v. Ali Azam Afridi 2021 SCMR 1979; Muhammad Anwar and others v. Mst. Ilyas Begum and other PLD 2013 SC 255; Malik Umar Aslam v. Sumera Malik PLD 2007 SC 362 and Amirzada Khan and others v. Ahmad Noor and others PLD 2003 SC 410 rel.

(b) Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)---

----Ss. 142, 143, 144 & 145---Election dispute---Statements of witnesses---Original affidavits, failure to produce---Effect---It is mandatory requirement to file statements of witnesses on affidavits, along with election petition, otherwise the petition is considered deficient---As per section 145 (1) of Elections Act, 2017, if provisions of sections 142, 143 and 144 of Elections Act, 2017 have not been complied with, then Election Tribunal has to summarily reject such election petition.

(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Art. 72---Documentary evidence---Proof---Mandatory requirement, non-compliance of---Effect---If a document is produced as evidence but is only categorized as "marked" or "identified" such document cannot be considered valid evidence as mandatory requirement of law has not been fulfilled---In case of non-compliance of any mandatory requirement, it is the person presenting such documents, who has to face the brunt of non-compliance.

State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan and another v. Javaid Iqbal 2011 SCMR 1013 rel.

Muhammad Masood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Muhammad Arshad, Spl. Sec. Law and Falak Sher, Asst. Dir. Law for ECP.

Nemo for Respondents Nos.1-3.

Kamran Murtaza, Sr. Advocate Supreme Court, Amanullah Kanrani, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No.4.

Nemo for Respondents Nos. 5-18.

2025 SCMR 595

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

USMAN GHANI alias Ghani Mula Sangeen ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 375 of 2019, decided on 19th September, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 17.05.2019 passed by Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Writ Petition No. 6233-P of 2018).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 121-A & 122---Frontier Crimes Regulations (III of 1901) [since repealed], Reglns. 11 & 40---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 247---Waging war, conspiracy of---Right of appeal---Bar of jurisdiction under Article 247 of the Constitution---Scope---Accused was involved in anti-state activities and had been categorized as 'Black'---Authorities punished the accused under Regulation 40 of Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901 which punishment was maintained by High Court under its Constitutional jurisdiction---Validity---Following are the circumstances under which jurisdiction of Supreme Court and that of High Court are not barred under Article 247(7) of the Constitution rather the same are available to be exercised under Articles 184 and 199 of the Constitution:

(i) Where location of the corpus in dispute is situated in the territory outside the Tribal Area;

(ii) Where parties to the dispute have their residence outside the Tribal Area;

(iii) Where cause of action has arisen outside the Tribal Area;

(iv) Where the offence has taken place outside the Tribal Area;

(v) Where the arrest is made or sought to be made is outside the Tribal Area;

(vi) Where effective action or step is taken or performed outside the Tribal Area.

----Accused after his conviction exhausted all available remedies provided under Frontier Crimes Regulations, 1901 from Assistant Political Agent to the highest forum i.e. FATA Tribunal---Atthat relevant time there was no further remedy provided under the law, as such petition under Article 199 of the Constitution filed by accused before High Court was not maintainable in terms of Article 247(7) of the Constitution, and was expressly barred---High Court rightly dismissed Constitutional petition filed by accused---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Mst. Rohaifa through her sons and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and 2 others PLD 2014 SC 174; Abdul Rahim and others v. Home Secretary, Government of West Pakistan and another PLD 1974 SC 109; Manzoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1975 SC 66; Muhammad Siddiq and others v. Government of Pakistan and others 1981 SCMR 1022; Saum Bangash and others v. Qaum Turi and others 1991 SCMR 2400; Malik Taj Muhammad and another v. Bibi Jano and 25 others 1992 SCMR 1431; Shaukat Khan v. Assistant Political Agent, Landi Kotal, Khyber Agency and others PLD 2002 SC 526 and Hidayat Ullah v. Mohammad Younas and others PLD 2020 SC 362 rel.

Syed B.H.Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Altaf Khan, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Petitioner.

Barrister Umar Aslam Khan for Petitioner. (amicus curiae)

Nemo for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 601

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

MATLOOB and others ---Petitioners

Versus

TAJ DIN (deceased) through Legal Heirs and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 2095-L of 2016, decided on 15th January, 2025.

(Against the order dated 05.04.2016 passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan in C.R. No. 29-D of 2001).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Cooperative Societies Act (VII of 1925), S.27---Suit for declaration and injunction---Death of member---Transfer of interest---Nominee of member---Status---Petitioners/defendants claimed to be nominees of deceased member of cooperative society, whereas respondents/plaintiffs were among the legal heirs of deceased member---Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was dismissed by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court and High Court decreed the same in their favour---Validity---In presence of heirs of deceased member, the nominee and after his death petitioner/defendant could not succeed him, rather the share and interest of deceased established in the Society would devolve upon his legal heirs---Petitioner/defendant could not claim allotment on the basis of membership in society accorded prior to his birth---Some fraud was played by petitioner/defendant in order to deprive legal heirs of deceased member from their valuable rights accrued in their favour---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Mst. Amtul Habib and others v. Mst. Musarrat Parveen and others 1974 SCMR 185; Fazal Shah v. Muhammad Din and others 1990 SCMR 868; Manzoor Ahmad v. Mst. Salman Bibi and others 1998 SCMR 388 and Muhammad Bakhsh v. Mst. Ghulam Ghulam Fatima 2007 SCMR 1227 rel.

Muhammad Vasif Naveed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 606

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

Syed ALI HUSSAIN and others ---Petitioners

Versus

SENIOR MEMBER/MEMBER (REVENUE) BOARD OF REVENUE PUNJAB, LAHORE and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 2918-L and 3039-L of 2015, decided on 31st January, 2025.

Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983---

----R.14---Acquired land---Restoration to original land owners---Non-utilization of land---Land was acquired from respondents/landowners with the promise to set up Waste Water Treatment Plant (WWTP) but that had not materialized for over three decades---Effect---Water And Sanitary Agency's (WASA) inaction over such years had represented a serious failure in upholding its commitment to both public welfare and private rights---If there was no success reported in September 2025, the question would be open before Supreme Court as to whether land acquired three decades ago for a public purpose, which had not been fulfilled, could result in the land being restored to its original owners as per Rule 14 of Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983---Supreme Court considering the importance of WWTP and its bearing on fundamental rights of the people, expected from WASA to reconsider its financial and technological options while pursuing its negotiations with French Development Agency (AFD)---Supreme Court extended time to the authorities to conclude the matter latest by end of August 2025---Supreme Court directed ECNEC to submit its final report to the Court before the next date of hearing---Supreme Court directed the office to fix the case in last week of September 2025 to assess whether the relevant authorities had successfully concluded the matter after exploring all possible financial and technological alternatives---Petition was adjourned.

Muhammad Umer Riaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in both cases) (via video link from Lahore).

Mohsin Mumtaz, Advocate Supreme Court along with Asad Ullah Khan, Secretary Housing and Urban Development, Punjab, Ghufran Ahmad, M.D. WASA, Lahore, Zeeshan Bilal, Director (P&D) WASA, Lahore and Muhammad Usman Asif, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Lahore).

2025 S C M R 612

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

CHAIRMAN, NADRA, NADRA HEADQUARTER, ISLAMABAD and others ---Petitioners

Versus

ABDUL MAJEED and another ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 6059 of 2021, decided on 28th November, 2024.

(On appeal from the Judgment, dated 18.10.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in W.P. No. 6539 of 2014).

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 25---Employment---Regularization of service---Disabled person---Discrimination---Petitioner/National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) was aggrieved of direction passed by High Court to regularize services of respondent/employee---Validity---Petitioner/NADRA provided job opportunities to disabled persons based on their ability and capacity to work---If a disabled person, initially appointed on a contractual basis, had performed his duties for a considerable period of time to the satisfaction of his superiors/department, then proprietary demanded that he should be regularized as a permanent employee so that he could reap all employment benefits, rather than being dragged on contractual basis perpetually---Respondent/employee was only three days short of completing required one year of service, but was denied regularization, while other similarly situated employees, who were short by a greater margin than the respondent/employee were accommodated as directed by High Court without any challenge to that judgment---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court as there was no illegality or perversity---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Chairman NADRA, Islamabad, through Chairman, Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Ali Shah and others 2017 SCMR 1979; Federal Board of Revenue v. Messrs. Hub Power Company Ltd. and others PLD 2023 SC 207; NWFP Public Service Commission v. Muhammad Arif 2011 SCMR 848; Fida Hussain v. The State PLD 2002 SC 46; Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. v. Iqbal Nasir PLD 2011 SC 132; Imtiaz Ali Malik v. Mst. Surrya Begun 1979 SCMR 22; Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Samina Masood PLD 2005 SC 831; Accountant General for Pakistan (Revenue) through Auditor-General v. Zia Mohy-ud-Din PLD 2008 SC 164; Mst. Shohrat Bano v. Ismail Dada Adam Soomar 1968 SCMR 574; Punjab Employees Social Security Institution Lahore and others v. Manzoor Hussain Khan 1992 SCMR 441; Province of Punjab through Secretary Excise and Taxation, Government of Punjab v. Sargodha Textile Mills Ltd., Sargodha PLD 2005 SC 988 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Media Network PLD 2006 SC 787 ref.

(b) Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance (XL of 1981)---

----Preamble---Islamabad Capital Territory Rights of Persons with Disability Act (XXXV of 2020), Preamble---Punjab Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act (XLII of 2022), Preamble---Sindh Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities Act (XLVIII of 2018), Preamble---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Act (XVI of 2012), Preamble---Balochistan Persons with Disabilities Act (II of 2017), Preamble---Rights of disabled persons---Object, purpose and scope---Raison d'etre of such legislation is not to merely provide some benefits as an act of compassion but to rejuvenate category of such persons who suffer from some disabilities, despite their challenges, and are differently abled, and deserve to live with dignity and contribute meaningfully to society---These are individuals who require encouragement and motivation so that they may also enjoy fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution, just as other citizens do---It is imperative for all government levels to facilitate their integration into mainstream, enabling them to leverage their abilities and sense of worth---This in turn, allows them to earn a livelihood with respect and independence, rather than relying on financial assistance or help, which may hurt their ego and undermine their self-esteem and dignity---Teachings of Islam also emphasize benevolence, care, and compassion towards such individuals, urging to adopt a wide ranging and solicitous approach to empower them for active participation in society with dignity and vitality.

Hafiz S.A.Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court along with Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Muhammad Tariq, Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocates Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent No. 1.

2025 S C M R 624

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

MUHAMMAD ASIM ---Petitioner

Versus

Dr. ABDUL HAMID JAN and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 277-Q of 2024, decided on 16th January, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 24.07.2024 passed by High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Constitution Petition No. 1056 of 2023).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Striking of defence---Failure to produce evidence---Petitioner/plaintiff was aggrieved of dismissal of his suit by Trial Court on his failure to produce his evidence---Judgment and decree passed by Trial Court was maintained by Lower Appellate Court and High Court---Validity---More than sufficient opportunities were granted to petitioner/plaintiff for producing his evidence---Despite putting petitioner/plaintiff under warning he did not bother to avail the same---Such indolent person(s) could not be allowed to play with the process of Court and linger on the matter on one pretext or the other, that too, without any plausible and valid reason---Through speaking orders, petitioner/plaintiff was granted absolute last and final opportunities for production of his evidence with clear cut warnings but he did not pay any heed to orders and directions of Trial Court---Petitioner/plaintiff had an adamant attitude towards orders of Trial Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below as there was no illegality---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Rana Tanveer Khan v. Naseer-Ud-Din and others 2015 SCMR 1401; Moon Enterpriser CNG Station, Rawalpindi v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through General Manager, Rawalpindi and another 2020 SCMR 300 and Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh PLD 2024 SC 887 rel.

Abdul Wali Khan Nasar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 629

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ and Shahid Waheed, J

MUHAMMAD SAEED ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through A.G. Islamabad and another ---Respondents

Crl.P.L.A. No. 588 of 2024, decided on 3rd February, 2025.

(Against the order dated 20.05.2024 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Criminal Misc. No. 840-B of 2024).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324 & 337F (ii)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)---Attempt to Commit qatl-i-amd and ghayr jaifah badi'ah---Petition for cancellation of pre-arrest bail, dismissal of---Further inquiry, case of---Cross-version---Non-recovery of crime empty---Petitioner/complainant was aggrieved of grant of pre-arrest bail to respondent/accused by High Court---Validity---No crime empty was recovered from place of occurrence---Nothing remained to be recovered from respondent/accused as weapon allegedly used in commission of offence had already been taken into possession by police during investigation---High Court rightly observed that tentative assessment of incriminating material when considered alongside the stance of respondent/accused narrated in cross-version, prima facie indicated that case fell within the ambit of further inquiry---Such observation of High Court was in accordance with the material available on record and not contrary to it---Prosecution failed to present sufficient incriminating material to connect respondent/accused with commission of alleged offence---Supreme Court declined to interfere in bail granted by High Court as the order was neither perverse, nor against any settled principle of law---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Shahzada Qaiser Arfat v. State PLD 2021 SC 708 rel.

Riaz Hanif Rahi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Ms. Chand Bibi, DPG Islamabad, Kaleem Ullah, SHO and Mansab Dar, SI/Investigating Officer for the State.

2025 S C M R 632

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

AAMIR AKBAR ---Petitioner

Versus

ADDITIONAL SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, BAHAWALPUR and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 921-L of 2017, decided on 4th December, 2024.

(On appeal from the Judgment dated 23.11.2016 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 5720 of 2015).

(a) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)---

----S. 4---Appeal---Object, purpose and scope---Misconduct---Departmental inquiry is to Determine whether a case of misconduct is made out and whether accused is found guilty by inquiry officer/committee---As a fact finding forum, Service Tribunal is obligated to ascertain whether due process of law or right to a fair trial, as envisaged under Article 10A of the Constitution, was followed---Regular inquiry cannot be considered or labeled as regular inquiry unless fair opportunity is provided to defend the charges.

(b) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)---

----S. 4---Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, R. 5---Departmental inquiry---Object, purpose and scope---Misconduct---Proof---Principle of natural justice---Applicability---Petitioner/civil servant was dismissed from service on the charges of misconduct and his appeal was also dismissed by Service Tribunal---Validity---Principles of natural justice require that delinquent should be afforded fair opportunity to contest charges before he is found guilty---No efforts were made by inquiry officer either intentionally or unintentionally to explore guilt of petitioner/civil servant---Such inquiry report could not be construed as fair and impartial, nor was it commensurate with the procedure provided under Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 for conducting an inquiry into allegation of misconduct---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal and order passed by authorities imposing major punishment of dismissal from service was also set aside---Supreme Court remanded the matter to departmental authorities for conducting a de novo regular inquiry into the same allegation of misconduct jotted down in the charge sheet and provide fair opportunity to petitioner/civil servant to defend the charges, as inquiry proceedings and report were defective---Supreme Court directed the authorities to pass speaking order and convey the same to petitioner/civil servant---Appeal was allowed.

Muhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court and Syeda B.H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Baleegh uz Zaman, Addl. AG, Punjab and Muhammad Wasif, DSP (Legal) Bahawalnagar for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 639

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

ABDUL SAMAD ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 972-L of 2017, decided on 24th January, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 17.05.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl.A. 140 of 2015).

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 7 (ff)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S.5---Explosive material, recovery of---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Defence version---Accused was convicted for recovery of explosive material from his possession and was sentenced to imprisonment for fourteen years---Validity---Accused produced compelling evidence which had raised serious questions about mode and manner in which police alleged to have arrested and investigated him---Besides reasonable doubts that could arise in a prudent mind due to evidence presented by accused, prosecution's own account of events was fraught with doubtful circumstances that had created doubt, which automatically favoured accused without reservation---Prosecution failed to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, rather existence of such doubts decisively favoured accused and such aspect was not considered by Trial Court and High Court---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Tariq Parvez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230; Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857; Mst Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048; Abdul Jabbar v. The State 2019 SCMR 129 and Maqsood Alam v. The State 2024 SCMR 156 rel.

Arif Mehmood Rana, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Sajjad Hussain, DPG for the State.

2025 S C M R 646

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

PAKISTAN RAILWAYS through Chairman Pakistan Railways, Islamabad and another ---Petitioners

Versus

MUHAMMAD AMIN ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 512 of 2022, decided on 11th December, 2024.

(On appeal from an Order dated 29.11.2021, passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad on Misc. Petition No. 1893 of 2018 moved in Appeals Nos. 1879 to 1883 (R) CS of 2013).

Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---

----S. 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12 (2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 212 (3)---Order of Service Tribunal---Plea of fraud, misrepresentation or lack of jurisdiction---Petitioner/Pakistan Railways was aggrieved of dismissal of its application to set aside order passed by Service Tribunal directing the petitioner/Pakistan Railways to upgrade post of respondent/employee---Validity---All sweeping grounds were alien to the provision of Section 12(2), C.P.C. for setting aside any judgment and decree, wherein applicant/person is obligated to characteristically and judiciously point out act of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction, if any---Elementary constituents were missing from the application filed by petitioner/Pakistan Railways before Federal Service Tribunal, which was rightly dismissed---Service Tribunal exercises exclusive jurisdiction as a fact finding forum in respect of matters relating to terms and conditions of service of civil servants and for the matters connected there with or ancillary thereto---Exclusive appellate jurisdiction is exercised by Service Tribunal in the cases of civil servants to vet and examine departmental orders passed against civil servants---Civil servants may approach Tribunal against an adverse order within the specified limitation period for filing an appeal, where either an order is passed on his departmental appeal, or if departmental appeal is not decided within the prescribed period of time, the aggrieved civil servant may approach and file appeal before Service Tribunal within the statutory period---Matter reaches Service Tribunal against adverse orders but after it has been filtered through departmental hierarchy or chain of command---Onerous duty of service Tribunal, as an appellate forum, is to determine whether departmental action taken against civil servant, complies with the law or not---Filing application under section 12(2), C.P.C. with the prayer to dismiss an application moved for implementation of a judgment of Federal Service Tribunal was no solution after the judgment had attained finality up to Supreme Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Federal Service Tribunal as the same was based on correct exposition of law---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Umer Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link from Lahore).

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 653

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Naeem Akhter Afghan and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

MUHAMMAD ADNAN ---Petitioner

Versus

SALAH-UD-DIN ---Respondent

C.P.L.A. No. 1618 of 2024, decided on 17th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 06.03.2024 passed by Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench in R.F.A.No. 53-D of 2020 with C.M. No. 31-D of 2020).

Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881)---

----S. 4---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 17(2)(a)---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for recovery of money---Promissory note, non-attestation of---Evasive denial---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Suit filed by respondent/plaintiff was decreed by both the Courts below in his favour and against the petitioner/defendant---Validity---Promissory note, under section 4 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is required to contain four essential ingredients: (i) an unconditional undertaking to pay; (ii) the sum should be the sum of money and certain; (iii) the payment should be to or to the order of a person who is certain, or to the bearer of the instrument; and (iv) the maker should sign it---If an instrument fulfills such four conditions, it is called a promissory note---Requirement of attestation of a document provided under Article 17 (2)(a) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 does not apply to promissory note---Petitioner/defendant took a vague stance and evasively denied allegations so made by the respondent/plaintiff as to his claim against petitioner/defendant---Such denial without any substantive proof could not be considered and approved---Trial Court and High Court minutely appreciated and evaluated pleadings of parties and had assessed evidence on the principle of preponderance---Both the Court below reached to a just conclusion that petitioner/defendant failed to successfully overturn the stand taken by respondent/plaintiff against him---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by two Courts below in favor of respondent/plaintiff---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Sheikh Muhammad Shakeel v. Sheikh Hafiz Muhammad Aslam 2014 SCMR 1562 and Muhammad Ashraf v. Abdul Ghafoor and 4 others 1999 SCMR 2633 rel.

Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court and Sheikh Mehmood Ahmed, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Burhan Latif Khaisori, Advocate Supreme Court for legal heirs Respondent.

2025 S C M R 656

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN through Additional Chief Secretary Development, P&D Department, Quetta and another ---Petitioners

Versus

MUHAMMAD AKHTAR and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 100-Q of 2023, decided on 3rd December, 2024.

(On appeal from the Judgment dated 14.03.2023 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Constitution Petition No. 2080 of 2022).

(a) Civil Service---

----Recruitment---Duties of Recruitment Committee---Principle---Exercise of recruitment is an onerous and conscientious duty and if it is assigned to a person or committee, they are obligated to conduct the process fairly and squarely and according to the mandate given by recruitment agency/department to recommend suitable candidates for filling up vacant positions/posts advertised for application by interested candidates---Selection/Recruitment Committee cannot travel beyond its mandate---Neither can it subtract any post nor add any post in selection process and it is obligated to adhere to the terms of reference and conduct recruitment process strictly for the sanctioned posts allowed to be included in written test and interview by candidates---Selection Board or Recruitment Committee can only recommend candidates for issuing offer or appointment letters who are strictly selected on merit for the sanctioned posts, without deviating from terms and conditions of advertisement published for the information of general public---Predominant task of Recruitment Committee should be selection of suitable candidates, which is the substratum of a fair, transparent and efficient recruitment process---Key responsibilities of Recruitment Committee are to first determine how many positions have been advertised for inviting applications; to scrutinize all applications for shortlisting; and to examine whether all required antecedents and credentials have been attached and vetted for the purpose of initial shortlisting of applicants; whether applicant joined competitive process and qualified written test, if any such condition is required to be complied with, then to assess marks on merits; and subsequently conduct interview according to the merit list, awarding interview marks---Recruitment Committee may also consider granting additional marks for additional/value-added qualifications or experience as mentioned in the advertisement inviting applications.

(b) Balochistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1979---

----R. 3---Recruitment---Appointment letter, non-issuance of---Recruitment process, annulment of---Petitioner/authorities were aggrieved of direction issued by High Court to issue appointment letters to respondents/candidates who had been recommended for selection by Recruitment Committee---Held, that Recruitment Committee must undertake recruitment process according to conditions outlined by concerned department in consultation with Services and General Administration Department of Balochistan Government---Recruitment Committee was bound to strictly follow the criteria fixed for appointments with required number of posts---Committee was obligated to complete the process and send recommendations without deviating from or departing from benchmarks to achieve the goal---Recruitment process was declared null and void by competent authority, however it did not debar respondents/candidates from participating in competitive process initiated afresh by authorities for appointment to the same required post---All respondents/candidates could apply afresh in response to advertisement published in newspaper inviting applications for vacant situations---Supreme Court set aside the direction issued by High Court on Constitutional petitions filed by respondents/candidates---Appeal was allowed.

Uzma Manzoor and others v. Vice-Chancellor Khushal Khan Khattak University, Karak and others 2022 SCMR 694 distinguished.

M. Ayaz Swati and Tahir Khattak, Addl. Advocates General, Balochistan for Petitioners.

Taimoor Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record along with Ahmad Raza, in person for Respondents

2025 S C M R 662

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Musarrat Hilali and Naeem Akhter Afghan, JJ

MUHAMMAD NASIR BUTT and 2 others ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Jail Petitions Nos. 314 and 315 of 2017 and Crl.P.L.A. No. 576-L of 2017, decided on 9th December, 2024.

(Against a common judgment dated 15.03.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl.As. Nos. 1691 and 1692 of 2012, M.R. No. 438 of 2012 and Crl. Rev. No. 369 of 2016).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302 (b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.103---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Withholding of evidence---Presumption---Recovery proceedings---Non-association of public witnesses---Motive not proved---Accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amd; one was sentenced to death whereas the other was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained the conviction but converted death sentence into imprisonment for life---Validity---Complainant and other prosecution witnesses in their statements recorded at trial, made dishonest improvements for assigning specific roles to each accused---Such improvements created serious doubt about veracity of their testimony and it was not safe to place reliance on such statements---Eleven crime empties allegedly recovered from crime scene and one 30 bore pistol allegedly recovered on the pointing of one accused were sent together to Forensic Science Laboratory, wherefrom report was negative---No private witness of locality was associated to attest alleged recovery of crime weapon on the pointing of accused---Due to non-association of any private witness of locality to attest recovery of alleged weapon of offence, and due to lack of independent corroboration, the recovery was disbelieved---Prosecution did not produce an injured passerby and an eye-witness of the occurrence---Adverse inference was drawn under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 to the effect that had such witnesses been produced by prosecution at the trial, they would not have supported version of prosecution---Alleged motive lacked force necessary to connect accused persons with the commission of offence---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentences awarded to both the accused persons as prosecution failed to prove charge against them beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal was allowed.

2024 SCMR 1741; 2024 SCMR 1839; 2017 SCMR 898; 2024 SCMR 1310 and 2024 SCMR 1507 rel.

Qaisar Mehmood Sara, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in J.Ps. Nos. 314 and 315 of 2017).

Mushtaq Ahmad Mohal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl.P. No. 576-L of 2017) (via video link from Lahore) (and also for the Respondents in J.Ps. Nos. 314 and 315 of 2017).

Mirza Abid Majeed, Addl. PG Punjab for the State.

2025 S C M R 667

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD ASIF ---Petitioner

Versus

AMJAD IQBAL and others ---Respondents

C.P. No. 3151 of 2021, decided on 30th October, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 04.02.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 7582 of 2021).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Mutation of sale---Plea of abduction and coercion raised by plaintiff---Not proved---Respondent/plaintiff assailed sale mutation attested in favour of appellant/defendant on the plea that the same was a result of coercion while keeping him in illegal confinement---Suit was decreed by Trial Court in favour of respondent/plaintiff, whereas appeal and revision filed by appellant / defendant were dismissed by Lower Appellate Court and High Court respectively---Validity---Upon filing of suit and after that making a statement before Court on oath that he/she has not made the transaction and the instrument, the onus to prove such instrument shifts and the beneficiary must prove the transaction as well as valid registration/attestation of document---Respondent/plaintiff was a grown-up married person having a daughter, who pleaded that he was abducted by appellant/defendant who kept him in abduction for 4-5 days and got mutation in question attested and denied transaction of sale in favour of appellant/defendant---It was prime duty of respondent/plaintiff to prove the case pleaded by him but he failed to prove the same---Appellant /defendant produced Patwari as well as revenue officials in the court as witnesses, who had attested mutation in question and they fully supported the entrance and attestation of mutation---Supreme Court set aside judgments and decrees passed by three Courts below and dismissed the suit filed by respondent/plaintiff---Appeal was allowed.

Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor PLD 1991 SC 957 ref.

Muhammad Faiz Ahmad Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Junaid Iftikhar Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.

Rana Muhammad Tariq, Tehsildar/Respondent No. 4 in person.

Syed Muhammad Ashraf, Patwari/Respondent No. 5 in person.

2025 S C M R 671

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Athar Minallah and Shahid Waheed, JJ

Messrs CHAWALA FOOTWEAR, LAHORE ---Appellant

Versus

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE and others ---Respondents

C.A. No. 16 of 2022, decided on 14th January, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 26.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in ITR No. 13 of 2015).

Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----S.161---Income Tax Rules, 2022, R. 43---Withholding tax, non-deduction of---Show cause notice---Fishing inquiry, principle of---Applicability---Appellant/taxpayer was aggrieved of show cause notice issued by authorities to initiate proceedings for not deducting withholding tax---Validity---If a taxpayer fails to collect or deduct tax from payments made during a tax year, such inaction is deemed as a default under section 161 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Point that sets into motion the machinery of section 161 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to determine tax liability is the failure to either collect tax or deduct it---Show cause notice highlighted discrepancies in valuation of imports and specified categories under which tax was applicable---This indicated that there was careful consideration of any failures to deduct tax, along with an assessment of underlying bases and amounts involved, therefore, the notice was not simply a fishing expedition---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court as demand created against appellant/taxpayer was well-founded---Appeal was dismissed.

Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I, LTU v. MCB Bank Limited 2021 SCMR 1325 and Messrs. Bilz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax, Multan and another 2002 PTD 1 = PLD 2002 SC 353 ref.

Ch. Mumtaz ul Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (via video link from Branch Registry Lahore).

Ahmad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Branch Registry Lahore).

2025 S C M R 676

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Qazi Faez Isa, Chairman, Naeem Akhtar Afghan, Shahid Bilal Hassan, Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masud and Dr. Qibla Ayaz, Members

Mst. SAEEDA BEGUM ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Shariat Review Petition No. 2 of 2016 in Criminal Shariat Petition No. 24 of 2009, decided on 27th January, 2025.

(a) Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance (VIII of 1979)---

----S.3---Qazf---Proof---Denial of paternity of child constitutes offence of Qazf as it amounts to attribution of Zina to child's mother.

Bada'i al-Sana'i fi Tartib al-Shara't (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2003), vol. 5, p. 34 and Al-Hidayah fi Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtadi (Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi, n.d.), vol. 2, p. 270 rel.

(b) Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance (VIII of 1979)---

----S. 14---Li'an---Applicability---Provision of Li'anis applicable when the allegation is made at a time when marital bond between the couple is intact.

Al-Mabsut (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, n.d.), vol. 7, p. 49 rel.

(c) Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance (VIII of 1979)---

----Ss. 5 & 11---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 128---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 203F---Review of judgment---Qazf, offence of---Withdrawal of complaint---Effect---Legitimacy of child---Respondent/ex-husband was tried for committing Qazf on petitioner/ex-wife---Trial Court instead of deciding the matter of Qazf, left the same to be placed before Almighty Allah on the Day of Judgment---Federal Shariat Court partly allowed appeal filed by petitioner/ex-wife and declared that allegation of Qazf was established against respondent/ex-husband---Federal Shariat Court did not impose punishment of Hadd as Tazkiyat-al-Shuhudwas not done for the witnesses, resultantly punishment was awarded as Ta'zir---Respondent/ex-husband was acquitted by Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court---Petitioner/ex-wife sought review of the judgment passed by Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court---Held, that for enforcing Hadd of Qazf, it is necessary that complainant must not withdraw the complaint---Even silence on the part of complainant amounts to Shubhah (doubt) which becomes an obstacle in the way of enforcing Hadd punishment---Petitioner/ex-wife did not press for punishing respondent/ex-husband, therefore, Hadd could not be enforced---Respondent/ex-husband had already been released after the judgment was announced by Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court---Legitimacy of the child born to petitioner/ex-wife was conclusively established and she was entitled to all legal rights of a legitimate child under Islamic law and law of the land---Child born during subsistence of a valid marriage or within two years after its dissolution, under Article 128 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 is conclusive proof of legitimacy, provided that the woman remains unmarried after divorce---Act of respondent/ex-husband attracted rules of Qazf, not Li'an---Proceedings for Qazf could not be allowed to continue after the petitioner/ex-wife withdrew from the allegation---Judgment passed by Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court was sustained to the extent of acquittal of respondent/ex-husband---Shariat review petition was allowed accordingly.

Al-Mabsut (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, n.d.), vol. 7, p. 49 and Ghazala Tehsin Zohra v. Mehr Ghulam Dastagir Khan and another PLD 2015 SC 327 rel.

Dr. Muhammad Aslam Khaki, Advocate Supreme Court and Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Ms. Chand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor-General, Punjab for the State.

Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, ASC/AOR for Respondent No. 2.

Dr. Muhammad Mushtaq Ahmad, Ex-Director-General, Shariah Academy as Amicus Curiae.

2025 S C M R 684

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Athar Minallah and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

BASHIR AHMAD ---Petitioner

Versus

DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION (CUSTOMS), FBR, PESHAWAR and another ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 2330 of 2023, decided on 12th September, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 15.02.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Customs Reference No.36-P of 2021).

Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Ss.17, 181, 194-A & 196---Notification SRO 499 (I)/2009, dated 13-06-2009---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Transporting smuggled goods---Confiscation of vehicle---Option to pay fine---Aggrieved person---Scope---Petitioner was driver of vehicle which was confiscated by authorities for transporting smuggled goods---Owner of vehicle did not come forward, instead the petitioner sought release of vehicle against payment of fine---Validity---Vehicle was seized in year 2020 and it was outrightly confiscated---Before insertion of proviso to Section 157(2) of Customs Act, 1969 it remained effective for a short period and was omitted through Finance Act, 2022---Proviso inserted in section 157 of Customs Act, 1969 generally explained the extent of confiscation and did not in any manner affect, limit or interfere with the powers conferred on Federal Board of Revenue under Section 181 of Customs Act, 1969---In the context of giving an option to release goods in lieu of payment of fine, provisions of Sections 157 and 181 were independent of each other and the former could not be construed as having an overriding effect on the latter---Inserted and then omitted proviso was not relevant or attracted in the matter, as the vehicle was found carrying smuggled goods and was used exclusively for transportation thereof, which was covered under clause (b) of Preamble to Notification SRO 499(I)/2009, dated 13-06-2009 and the option contemplated under section 181 of Customs Act, 1969 could not have been given for its release---Aggrieved person is the one whose legal right have been invaded, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected---Expression aggrieved refers to a substantial grievance, denial of some personal pecuniary or property rights, or imposition upon a party for burden or obligation---Statutory right of appeal provided under Section 194A of Customs Act, 1969 is confined to an aggrieved person or an officer of customs---Petitioner was not owner of vehicle, nor had the latter sought benefit under section 181 of Customs Act, 1969---Petitioner was neither authorized by nor was acting as a lawful attorney on behalf of owner of vehicle---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the orders of confiscation of vehicle in question---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Collector of Customs, Peshawar v. Wali Khan and others 2017 SCMR 585; Director-General, Intelligence and Investigation-FBR v. Sher Andaz and others 2010 SCMR 1746 and Director, Directorate-General of Intelligence and Investigation and others v. Al-Faiz Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2006 SCMR 129 ref.

Naveed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Peshawar).

Shahid Qayyum, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Peshawar).

2025 S C M R 690

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

ZAFAR IQBAL and another ---Petitioners

Versus

Syed RIAZ HUSSAIN SHAH and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 3854 of 2024, decided on 25th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 14.05.2024, passed in Writ Petition No. 17731 of 2024).

(a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)---

----S. 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A---Rent proceedings---Due process and fair trial---Scope---Rent Tribunal adjudicates upon civil rights and obligations in eviction proceedings, and parties thereto are entitled to a fair trial and due process under Article 10A of the Constitution.

Khadim Mohy-Ud-Din v. Rehmat Ali Nagra PLD 1965 SC 459 and Shahid Raza v. Fauzia Shaheen 2003 MLD 1215 rel.

(b) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)---

----Ss. 15 & 17---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 17 & 79---Ejectment of tenant---Document---Proof---Provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Applicability---Rent Tribunal dismissed ejectment application for failure of landlord to prove rent deed according to the provisions of Articles 17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Lower Appellate Court allowed appeal filed by landlord and passed eviction order but High Court maintained the order of Rent Tribunal---Validity---Distinction must be drawn between invoking and applying general principles of law of evidence codified in Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 and any special provisions enacted therein---While adjudicating upon civil rights and obligations in eviction proceedings, Rent Tribunal should invoke and apply only those general principles of law of evidence codified in Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 that are necessary to give effect to fundamental rights of parties under Article 10A of the Constitution---Rent Tribunal need not apply all principles or any special provisions enacted in Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Such distinction is rooted in summary nature of rent proceedings, which are designed to resolve disputes expeditiously and without procedural formalities of regular civil trials---General principles of evidence, such as burden of proof, relevance of evidence, and right to cross-examine, must nevertheless apply to safeguard Constitutional right to a fair trial---Lower Appellate Court rightly accepted eviction petition filed by landlord---Rent Tribunal legally erred in law by dismissing the petition, and High Court similarly erred in restoring its decision---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court and upheld that of Lower Appellate Court, whereby respondent/tenant was evicted from the premises---Appeal was allowed.

Khadim Mohy-Ud-Din v. Rehmat Ali Nagra PLD 1965 SC 459 and Shahid Raza v. Fauzia Shaheen 2003 MLD 1215; Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique PLD 2007 SC 45; Ahmad Ali v. Nasar-Ud-Din PLD 2009 SC 453; Jehangir Rustom v. State Bank of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1296 and F.K. Irani and Co. v. Begum Feroze 1996 SCMR 1178 rel.

(c) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)---

----S. 15---Landlord and tenant---Proof---In absence of any evidence to the contrary, owner of a property, by virtue of his title, is presumed to be landlord---Person in possession is presumed to be tenant of that property.

Ch. Muhammad Masood Jahangir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Malik Ijaz Hussain Gorcha, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (through video link, Lahore Registry).

Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (Special Judge (Rent) and Additional District Judge) Pro forma Respondents.

2025 S C M R 699

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

ASIF MASIH and 2 others ----Petitioners

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 481 of 2019, decided on 12th February, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 20.06.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 200049-J of 2018, 104943 of 2017 and Criminal Revision No. 104946 of 2017).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 365-B, 376 & 496-B---Forcible abduction, forcible intercourse/rape and fornication---Reappraisal of evidence---Abduction---Proof---Punishment for fornication (Zina with consent) qua alleged abductee as a consenting party---Principle---Accused persons were convicted and sentenced by Trial Court for abducting daughter of complainant and committing Zina with her---Validity---Prosecution story of forcible abduction and rape of alleged abductee was the result of an afterthought of abductee and her family members after return of alleged abductee to her parents' house---No ornament or cash amount was recovered from any accused---As per medico legal report, no mark of violence was noted on the body of abductee---Neither it was a case of forcible abduction punishable under section 365-B, P.P.C. nor it was a case of forcible intercourse/rape punishable under section 376 P.P.C.---In view of the provisions of section 496-B, P.P.C., the abductee was not liable to be convicted and sentenced for offence of fornication (Zina with consent) as she was not made accused in the case by Police---No charge was framed against abductee by Trial Court and she was not provided a chance to cross-examine prosecution witnesses to defend herself---Abductee could not be convicted and sentenced in absence of fulfilment of such legal requirements---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence of accused for the charge under Section 376(i) P.P.C. but he was convicted under section 496-B, P.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo five years imprisonment---Appeal was dismissed.

Muhammad Imran v. The State Criminal Misc. Application No. 374 of 2024 in Criminal Petition No. 725 of 2023 rel.

Faiz Muhammad Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner No. 1.

Shahid Azeem, Aisha Tasneem, Advocates Supreme Court for Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3.

Sajjad Hussain Bhatti, DPG for the State.

Complainant in person.

2025 S C M R 704

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Musarrat Hilali, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD IQBAL ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through P.G. Sindh---Respondent

Criminal Petition No. 828 of 2024, decided on 17th February, 2025.

(Against judgment dated 04.06.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Mirpurkhas in Cr. Appeal No. D-45 of 2024).

Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 9 (c)---Recovery of narcotic substance---Un-broken chain of custody---Proof---Accused was convicted for recovery of 1400 grams of charas from his possession and was sentenced to imprisonment for ten years---Validity---Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond reasonable doubt---Chain of custody remained unverified, and prosecution did not conclusively establish safe transmission of recovered contraband---Contradictions in handling of case property and failure to produce key witnesses responsible for its movement further weakened the prosecution's case---Where any link in chain of evidence remains doubtful, the benefit thereof must accrue to accused---Prosecution was under a bounded duty to establish each stage of recovery, storage, and transmission of case property with unimpeachable certainty, and its failure to do so had rendered the conviction unsustainable---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence imposed on accused by two Courts below and he was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Zahir Shah v. The State 2019 SCMR 2004; Sarfraz Ahmed v. The State 2024 SCMR 1571; Muhammad Hazir v. The State 2023 SCMR 986 and Javed Iqbal v. The State 2023 SCMR 139 rel.

Muhammad Jamil, Muhammad Shabbir Rajput, Advocates Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Siraj Ali Khan, APG for the State.

2025 S C M R 708

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

MUHAMMAD NASIR ISMAIL ---Petitioner

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB through Secretary Law and Parliamentary Affairs Division, Lahore and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 3062 of 2022, decided on 25th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 30.05.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in W.P. No. 1806 of 2013).

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 10A---Civil service---Disciplinary proceedings---Due process---Affected civil servants must be granted a fair hearing, and disciplinary proceedings must adhere to legal requirements---Due process ensures that no officer is unjustly penalized without being given an opportunity to present their defense---Courts must exercise judicial restraint and avoid undue interference with executive discretion---Judicial review is necessary to prevent abuse of power---Courts must respect autonomy of Executive branch in managing its employees---Judicial intervention should be limited to cases involving clear illegality, arbitrariness, or mala fide intent---Courts must balance individual rights with the larger public interest.

(b) Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act (XII of 2006)---

----Ss. 5 & 13(5)(ii), second proviso---Disciplinary proceedings---Major penalty, imposing of---Absence without leave---Principle of proportionality---Applicability---Punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed upon civil servant who remained absent from service for 48 days, without leave---Validity---Authority of competent authority in imposing any of the three major penalties is not restricted under second proviso to section 13(5)(ii) of Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006, even where period of absence from duty is less than one year---Where competent authority elects to impose a major penalty in cases of absence from duty for less than a year, it must do so in accordance with the principle of proportionality---Civil servant remained absent from duty for a total of 48 days and imposition of major penalty of compulsory retirement failed to meet test of proportionality---Neither the punishment established rational nexus between misconduct and severity of penalty nor it considered less restrictive alternatives---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court to the extent of the penalty imposed---Supreme Court directed that reinstatement of civil servant would be subject to a fresh determination by competent authority---Supreme Court directed competent authority to revisit case of civil servant and impose a penalty commensurate with the gravity of misconduct---Appeal was allowed.

Sunni Ittehad Council v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2025 SC 67; East and West Steamship v. Pakistan PLD 1958 SC 41; Pramath Nath v. Kamir Mondal PLD 1965 SC 434; Hamdard Dawakhana v. C.I.T PLD 1980 SC 84; Kadir Bux v. Province of Sindh 1982 SCMR 582; K.E.S.C. Progressive Workers' Union v. K.E.S.C Labour Union 1991 SCMR 888; Nawaz Bibi v. Allah Ditta 1998 SCMR 2381; N S Bindra, Interpretation of Statutes Lexis Nexis, 13th Edition, 2022; De Smith's Judicial Review Sweet and Maxwell, 8th Edition, 2018; Sabir Iqbal v. Cantonment Board PLD 2019 SC 189; Muhammad Iqbal Khan Noori v. NAB PLD 2021 SC 916 and Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Nadeem Raza 2023 SCMR 803 rel.

Haseeb Shakoor Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Haroon Irshad, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 716

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, (SPECIAL ZONE FOR BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS) REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, ISLAMABAD ---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs KHUDADAD HEIGHTS, ISLAMABAD ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 862 of 2024, decided on 27th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 18.11.2023 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R. No. 60 of 2015).

Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----S.122---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)---Re-assessment---Definite information---Credit entries in bank record---Re-assessment of net worth of respondent/taxpayer was set aside by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and the order was maintained by High Court---Validity---Re-assessment proceedings were triggered on the basis of bank statement of respondent/taxpayer---All transactions in bank account did not necessarily demonstrate income of respondent/taxpayer, unless it was established that statements and/or entries therein had disclosed information of income which was 'definite'---Banking instrument could not be applied as one having 'definite information'---Neither Commissioner nor Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and High Court were of the view that all credit entries in statement of account disclosed income of respondent/taxpayer hence it did not constitute 'definite information'---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was the last fact finding forum and such question could neither be raised in reference jurisdiction of High Court nor before Supreme Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere with judgment of High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-I RTO, Rawalpindi v. Messrs Khan CNG Filling Station, Rawalpindi and others 2017 SCMR 1414 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, RTO, Bahawalpur v. Messrs Bashir Ahmed (deceased) through L.Rs 2021 SCMR 1290 ref.

Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 721

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD ABID HUSSAIN ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 146 of 2025, decided on 27th February, 2025.

(Against the order/judgment dated 22.01.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Crl. Misc. No. 10324-B of 2024).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 497 & 103---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S.9 (c)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.164---Recovery of narcotic substances---Bail, grant of---Recovery proceedings---Evidence through modern devices---Video recording not made---Accused was arrested for recovery of 1100 grams of heroin from his possession---Validity---Neither any video in shape of recording and photographs of alleged recovery was collected by police nor any private witness from locality was associated to prove alleged recovery from the possession of accused---Use of modern devices during recoveries, is not merely a procedural formality but a crucial safeguard to protect innocent persons from potential police atrocities---It provides an objective and unbiased account of recovery process, reducing risk of false implications to ensure that rights of accused are protected---In cases of stringent punishment, prosecution must present clear, cogent and reliable evidence to prove guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt---In absence of video evidence and independent witnesses, prosecution's case relied on testimony of police officers involved in raid, which was insufficient to meet required standard of proof---Ultimate incarceration of guilty person could repair the wrong caused by mistaken relief of interim bail granted to him but no satisfactory reparation can be offered to an innocent man for his unjustified incarceration at any stage of case albeit his acquittal in long run---Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Court and bail after arrest was granted to accused---Petition was allowed.

Zahid Sarfaraz Gill v. State 2024 SCMR 934 and Manzoor v. State PLD 1972 SC 81 rel.

Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court/ Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Rai Akhtar Hussain, Additional PG for the State.

2025 S C M R 724

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CORPORATE ZONE, RTO PESHAWAR ---Appellant

Versus

Messrs FLYING KRAFT PAPER MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED, CHARSADDA and another ---Respondents

(On appeal from the judgment dated 11.03.2020 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in S.T.R. No. 14 of 2008).

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL LTO, KARACHI ---Petitioner

Versus

MATIARI SUGAR MILLS, KARACHI ---Respondent

(Against the judgment dated 04.02.2021 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Special Sales Tax Appeal No. 148 of 2005].

Civil Appeal No. 316 of 2022 and Civil Petition No. 483-K of 2021, decided on 26th February, 2025.

Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----S.7---Input tax, adjustment of---Electricity and gas supply bills---Residential colony of industrial unit---Authorities were aggrieved of adjustment of input tax against supply of electricity and gas to residential colony for workers established in factory premises---Validity---Residential colony of factory for the convenience of workers was provided within factory premises for unrestrained factory work---Entire premises was registered as one manufacturing premises---Had it been objected, the entire premises would not have been registered as one manufacturing unit---Supreme Court declined to interfere in conclusion drawn by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue as well as by High Court, as it was based on admission of facts regarding residential colony existing within registered factory premises---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Sheikhoo Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Government of Pakistan and others 2001 SCMR 1376 = 2001 PTD 2097 rel.

Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court, Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General, Law, FBR and Sharif Ullah, AD, Legal for Appellant (in C.A. No. 316 of 2022).

Isaac Ali Qazi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 316 of 2022).

Irfan Mir Halepota, Advocate Supreme Court, Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record, Sharjeel Ahmed, Addl. Commissioner, FBR for Petitioner (in C.P. No. 483-K of 2021) (via video link from Karachi).

Nemo for Respondent (in C.P. No. 483-K of 2021).

2025 S C M R 728

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Athar Minallah and Shahid Waheed, JJ

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE ---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs EAGLE CABLES (Pvt.) LTD., LAHORE ---Respondent

C.P.L.A No. 2400-L of 2022, decided on 16th January, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 12.04.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in S.T.R. No. 5 of 2014).

Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----Ss.7, 8 (1)(d), 21, 47 & 73---Input tax adjustment---Invoices---Proof---Subsequent blacklisting of suppliers---Authorities denied adjustment of input tax on the ground that invoices relied upon by respondent/taxpayer were issued by the suppliers who had later been blacklisted---Validity---Authorities failed to provide any concrete evidence indicating that invoices were issued to respondent / taxpayer during any period of suspension or blacklisting---At the time purchases were made, the suppliers involved were neither blacklisted nor inactive---Payments for such purchases were processed through legitimate banking channels, adhering to procedures delineated in section 73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990---If a transaction was conducted while the suppliers were active and duly registered, invoices issued were not automatically invalidated by a subsequent black listing or suspension of the suppliers---Denial of refunds could not be justified solely based on lateral black listing of a supplier---All purchases according to Section 21(3) of Sales Tax Act, 1990 including the respondent/taxpayer, who procured goods before suppliers' registration were suspended or they were blacklisted, and who complied with the conditions outlined in section 73 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 were entitled to claim an adjustment of input tax---Demand raised by the Deputy Commissioner of Inland Revenue was unjustified, and as such it was rightly set aside by subsequent higher forums that reviewed the matter, affirming position of respondent/taxpayer---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 730

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD EHSAN SHAH ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through A.G., Islamabad and another ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 231 of 2021, decided on 26th February, 2025.

(Against the order/judgment dated 27.01.2021 passed by the Islamabad High Court in Crl. A. No. 83 of 2017).

(a) Medical jurisprudence---

----Suicide and asphyxia death---Necessary ingredients---If ligature mark is not round the neck, eyes are closed, ribs are not fractured and hands are not clenched then the case is of suicide---Such a report raises a very high probability of asphyxia death and killing by hanging, which under all probabilities is deemed to be a suicide/unnatural death and not homicide at all.

(b) Criminal trial---

----Medical evidence---Scope---Medical evidence is just a corroborative piece of evidence which does not identify the assailant---At most medical evidence is a supporting piece of evidence which may confirm ocular evidence with regard to receipt of injury, its locale, kind of weapon used for causing injury, duration between the injury and death---Medical evidence cannot tell the name of the assailant.

Zakir Hussain v. State 2008 SCMR 222 and Ata Muhammad v. State 1995 SCMR 599 rel.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302---Qatl-i-amd--- Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Thumb impression, matching of---National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) record---Wife of accused died due to suicide but complainant produced an affidavit of deceased lady wherein she recorded apprehension to her life---Accused was convicted and sentenced on basis of such affidavit---Validity---Complainant produced an affidavit claiming to have been executed by deceased---Report of hand writing expert showed that thumb impression of deceased, available on record of NADRA, did not match with the thumb impression available on stamp paper allegedly executed by deceased recording apprehension to her life---On account of producing fake affidavit criminal case was lodged against complainant, which had lost his credibility---Alleged recovery of crime weapon from the room of accused was also not helpful for prosecution as the same was not stained with blood and no report of Chemical Examiner and Serologist was available on record---There was no need of many doubts in prosecution case, rather any reasonable doubt arising out of prosecution evidence pricking judicial mind was sufficient for acquittal of accused---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Tariq Pervez v. State 1995 SCMR 1345 rel.

Fakhar Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Ms. Chand Bibi, DPG along with Sarfraz Ahmed, S.I. for the State.

2025 S C M R 733

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Ayesha A. Malik and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

MUZAMMAL KHAN ---Petitioner

Versus

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, LAHORE and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1354 of 2023, decided on 4th February, 2025.

(Against judgment dated 30.01.2023 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 4271 of 2020).

Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---

----S. 4---Dismissal from service---Absence without leave---Interference in penalty---Principle---Substantial question of law of public importance---Scope---Petitioner/civil servant remained absent from service and was proceeded against departmentally and was dismissed from service---Penalty imposed by authorities was maintained by Service Tribunal---Validity---Tribunal or Court intervenes due to severity or nature of penalty imposed by competent authority by considering it unreasonable, perverse, excessively harsh, or by exercising leniency---Such interference is based on conclusion that penalty is disproportionate to proven misconduct as determined through test of proportionality---Interference with penalty imposed by department must be approached with caution and careful consideration, reserved for cases where order is entirely perverse or so clearly disproportionate and excessive to the misconduct that allowing it to stand would be unfair, unjust, and inequitable---Petitioner/civil servant was repeatedly served and called to present his defence but chose not to, particularly in the appeal and the revision which he himself filed yet failed to appear in or tender his defence---Cases of willful absence from duty are fairly straightforward as government officers who deliberately are absent from duty without permission are aware of the fact that they would be proceeded against for their absence from duty---Legal issue may qualify as a substantial question of law of public importance if it; (i) requires interpretation of law, rules, instructions, notifications or governmental policy; (ii) remains unresolved by Supreme Court or is subject to ambiguity, conflicting interpretations, or requires a discussion of alternative perspectives; (iii) exposes a lack of clarity in law, particularly where contradictory judicial precedents exist; or (iv) reveals a serious violation of due process that affects fundamental rights or procedural fairness under the Constitution---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by Service Tribunal as petitioner/civil servant failed to raise any substantial question of law of public importance---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Tahira Waheed v. Director, Federal Government Educational Institutions 2003 SCMR 1090; Secretary to Government of the Punjab v. Zakir Ali 2022 SCMR 951; Fayyaz Hussain v. Executive District Officer (Education) 2023 PLC (C.S.) 422; Tasawar Hussain v. Deputy Commissioner 2023 PLC (C.S.) 69; Muhammad Ali S. Bukhari v. Federation of Pakistan through Establishment Secretary, Islamabad and 2 others 2008 PLC (C.S.) 428; Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services v. Nadeem Raza 2023 SCMR 803; Secretary Revenue Division v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabassum PLD 2019 SC 563; Divisional Superintendent, Postal Services Faisalabad v. Muhammad Zafarullah 2021 SCMR 400; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Nargis Jamal 2022 SCMR 2114 and Secretary Revenue Division v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabassum PLD 2019 SC 563 rel.

Mudassar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner with Petitioner.

Sanaullah Zahid, Additional Advocate General, Punjab for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 739

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

MURAD KHAN and others ---Petitioners

Versus

Mst. HUMAIRA QAYYUM and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 923-P of 2023, decided on 17th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 13.10.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No.6921-P of 2019).

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Judicial review---Scope---High Court, while exercising its powers of judicial review with respect to orders passed by Courts or Tribunals, should not substitute its own findings for those of such Courts or Tribunals.

Nawaza v. The Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 39 rel.

(b) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Writ of certiorari---Scope---Where High Court quashes a decision, it has discretion either to take judicial notice and rectify a jurisdictional error in the order or to remand the matter to the Court, Tribunal or the authority concerned with a direction to reconsider it and to reach a decision in accordance with the judgment given by High Court, while deciding a writ of certiorari.

Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141 rel.

(c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched.---Family dispute---Maintenance---Quantum---Judicial review---Substituting findings of facts---Respondent/ex-wife filed suit for recovery of maintenance and gold jewellery etc. against appellant/ex-husband---Family Court decreed the suit in favour of respondent/ex-wife to recover gold jewellery and fixed maintenance allowance at Rs.3000/- per month---Lower Appellate Court modified judgment and decree and did not find respondent/ex-wife entitled to recover gold jewellery---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction enhanced quantum of maintenance allowance to Rs. 10,000/- per month and also found her entitled to recover gold jewellery---Validity---High Court referred to testimony of 14 witnesses in holding that respondent/ex-wife was kept in her parents' house without maintenance, and that this would entitle her to a higher quantum of maintenance than that granted to her by the Courts below---High Court was well within its rights to have partially set-aside judgment and decree of Lower Appellate Court but should have remanded the matter to Lower Appellate Court for a decision in the light of observations of High Court---Supreme Court set aside finding of High Court whereby it substituted its findings with those of Lower Appellate Court---Supreme Court maintained decision of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari with respect to judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court and remanded the matter to Lower Appellate Court to decide the appeal (on the question whether respondent/ex-wife was entitled to recovery of 04 tolas of gold ornaments and a higher quantum of maintenance) in the light of observations made by High Court---Appeal was allowed.

Abdul Ahad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Zia ur Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1 (via video link, Peshawar).

2025 S C M R 744

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

IMTIAZ NAEEM ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 438 of 2018, decided on 25th February, 2025.

(On appeal against the order dated 14.06.2011 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Crl. A. No. 825 of 2010 and M. R. No. 31 of 2010).

(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 7 (a) & 7(e)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302 (b)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Jail appeal---Condonation of delay---Jail appeal was barred by 2511 days---Supreme Court condoned the delay as reasons mentioned in application seeking condonation of delay were valid and sufficient for the purpose---Application was allowed.

(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 7 (a) & 7(e)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302 (b)---Qatl-i-amd and abduction for ransom---Re-appraisal of evidence---Voice recognition, reliance on---Blind murder---Benefit of doubt---Accused persons were convicted and sentenced to death for allegedly abducting a minor child for ransom whose dead body was recovered later on---Held, that alleged murder remained unwitnessed and at some subsequent stage accused persons had been implicated on the basis of suspicion---Claim of complainant in respect of recognizing voice of one accused during ransom demand made over telephone, particularly in high stakes scenarios, was fraught with significant risks of error, bias and misinterpretation---Voice recognition, unlike fingerprints or DNA evidence, lacked standardized scientific framework for verification---Telephone calls, especially those made under duress, could suffer from poor audio quality, background noise or distortions, making it difficult to accurately identify the speaker---In absence of additional corroborative evidence (e.g., call records, witness testimony, or forensic analysis), relying solely on voice recognition was inherently unreliable---There was no evidence of recovery and discovery, legally incriminating in nature to connect necks of accused with crime in question---Retracted confession could not be made basis for conviction and that too on a capital charge entailing death penalty---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to both the accused persons and acquitted them of the charge, as prosecution failed to prove its case against accused persons beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal was allowed.

(c) Criminal trial---

----Retracted confession---Effect---Retracted confession, especially when it stands as the sole basis for conviction, raises significant legal, ethical and practical concerns---When coupled with dismissal of oral evidence furnished by complainant, relying on a retracted confession to secure a conviction becomes even more precarious.

Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Kausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General for the State.

Nemo for Complainant.

2025 S C M R 748

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

CHAIRMAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PAKISTAN LAHORE and others ---Appellants

Versus

Haji ABDUL REHMAN and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 1612 of 2018, decided on 20th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 22.11.2018, passed by the Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench, D.I.Khan in R.F.A. No. 79-D with C.M. No. 64-D of 2018).

Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)---

----Ss.4 & 23---Acquisition of land---Compensation---Enhancement---Valuation of lands in same vicinity---Respondents/landowners received their compensation without filing any objections---Later other landowners in same vicinity in another award, received enhanced compensation through Referee Court---During execution proceedings of other landowners, respondents filed application before Executing Court to pay them enhanced compensation as well---Appellant/authorities were aggrieved of admitting of application of respondents/landowners for determination during execution proceedings---Validity---Respondents/landowners could claim compensation as per enhanced rate in the light judgment of Supreme Court in case titled Saddaqat Ali Khan through L.R.s and others v. Collector Land Acquisition and others reported as PLD 2010 SC 878, if at the end they were able to establish that nature and vicinity of both the lands i.e. their lands and lands acquired from other landowners was same---Lands of respondents/landowners were acquired way back in year 1995 and they had received compensation there and then whereas lands of other landowners were acquired after lapse of couple of years---Criteria laid down by Supreme Court would not be applicable simpliciter but required some probe---Supreme Court directed Executing Court to decide the matter expeditiously---Appeal was disposed of.

Saddaqat Ali Khan through L.Rs and others v. Collector Land Acquisition and others PLD 2010 SC 878 rel.

Syed Abid Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.

Syed Mastan Ali Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 751

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

ABDUL HAQ ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Cr.P.L.A. No. 864 of 2023, decided on 4th March, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 03.06.2023 passed by Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat in Cr.Appeal No. 159-M of 2022).

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXXI of 2019)---

----S. 9(1)(d)---Recovery of narcotic substance---Re-appraisal of evidence---Chain of custody---Scope---Opium weighing 16215 grams was allegedly recovered from accused while transporting the same in a car---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for life---Validity---For justifying conviction of accused, prosecution had to establish that chain of custody was safe, secure and indispensable in order to place reliance on the report of Chemical Examiner---Prosecution failed to establish such chain of safe custody and transmission of samples of narcotic from place of seizure to police station and thereafter to Chemical Examiner---Sanctity of chain of transmission stands as the cornerstone for maintaining integrity and evidentiary credibility, particularly in narcotics cases where law imposes severe and inexorable punishments---Any rupture or inconsistency in chain of custody strikes at the root of prosecution's case rendering evidence susceptible to doubt and challenge---Prosecution bears burden of ensuring unbroken, meticulously documented chain of custody so as to preclude any possibility of tampering, substitution or contamination---If prosecution fails to establish an unbroken chain of transmission of narcotic sample and any breakage or discrepancy is observed in custody of removed substance, the benefit of such lapse must necessarily be extended to accused---When prosecution's evidence is tainted with doubt, scales of justice must tilt in favor of accused---Any failure to prove safe and continuous handling of narcotic sample from seizure to forensic analysis, not only weakens prosecution's case, but also vitiates reliability of evidence entitling accused to benefit of doubt---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Javed Iqbal v. The State 2023 SCMR 139; Qaiser Khan v. The State 2021 SCMR 363; Mst. Sakina Ramzan v. The State 2021 SCMR 451; Zubair Khan v. The State 2021 SCMR 492 and Asif Ali and another v. The State 2024 SCMR 1408 ref.

Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Zahid Yousaf Qureshi, Advocate-on-Record for Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.

2025 S C M R 756

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar and Athar Minallah, JJ

ADAMJEE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED ---Petitioner

Versus

TECHNO INTERNATIONAL and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 202-L and 203-L of 2022, decided on 15th November, 2024.

(Against judgment dated 09.12.2021 the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Civil Revisions Nos.77081 and 77089 of 2021).

Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O.XXXVII, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for recovery of money on the basis of bank cheque---Leave to appear and defend the suit, grant of---Condition of furnishing surety---Petitioner/Insurance company instituted suit for recovery against respondents/defendants---Trial Court granted conditional leave subject to deposit of surety---Validity---Respondents/defendants denied issuance of cheques and had also denied having authorized petitioner/insurance company to encash the cheques---Question regarding maintainability of two suit was also raised---Trial Court exercised its discretion in accordance with law and principles settled in such regard---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments passed by Trial Court and maintained by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Mian Rafique Saigol and another v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd. and another PLD 1996 SC 749; Fine Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi v. Haji Umar PLD 1963 SC 163; Kodak v. Alpha Film Corporation (1930) 2 K B 340 and Abdul Karim Jaffarani v. United Bank Ltd. and others 1984 SCMR 568 rel.

Farooq Amjad Meer, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 762

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD RAMZAN ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondents

Jail Petition No. 95 of 2022, decided on 20th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 22.02.2022 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Cr. A. No. 190 of 2018 and Murder Reference No. 9 of 2018).

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S.154---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 140 & 153--- First Information Report (FIR)---Scope---First Information Report by itself is not a substantive piece of evidence unless its contents are affirmed on oath in witness box by its maker and its maker is subjected to the test of cross-examination--- First Information Report in view of Articles 140 and 153 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, is a previous statement and can only be used for contradicting its maker---Unless FIR is proved through its maker, it cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence in favour of prosecution's case.

Nasar Ali's case AIR 1957 SC 366 and Ghaus Muhammad alias Ghaus and another v. The State 1979 SCMR 155 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.103---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Withholding of evidence---Recovery proceedings---Non-associating private witnesses---Accused was convicted and sentenced to death for committing murder of his wife---Validity---At the trial, prosecution did not produce owner of the house as witness, thus, adverse inference was drawn under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e- Shahadat, 1984 to the effect that had the above witness been produced by the prosecution at the trial, he would not have supported the version of the prosecution---Place of occurrence was surrounded by Abadi but investigating officer did not associate any person for the recovery of dead body---Investigating officer did not prepare recovery memo of dead body of deceased and simply made memo of iron box---No private witness of locality was associated to attest alleged iron box---Due to non-association of any private witness of locality to attest, the recovery memo lacked independent corroboration and the same was disbelieved---Judgments of Courts below were against the principles of appreciation of evidence in criminal dispensation of justice and the law settled by Supreme Court---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Mst Saima Noreen v. The State 2024 SCMR 1310; Muhammad Ismail v. The State 2017 SCMR 898 and Muhammad Ijaz v. The State 2024 SCMR 1507 rel.

(c) Criminal trial---

----Medical evidence---Scope---Medical evidence is a type of supporting evidence, which may confirm prosecution's version with regard to receipt of injury, nature of injury, kind of weapon used in occurrence but it cannot identify the assailant.

Muhammad Hassan and another v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 1427 and Iftikhar Hussain alias Kharoo v. The State 2024 SCMR 1449 rel.

Sagheer Ahmad Qadri, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Ms. Chand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 770

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ

ABDUL SHAKOOR (deceased) through legal heirs ---Petitioner

Versus

MUHAMMAD HANIF (deceased) through legal heirs and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 1808-L of 2015, decided on 25th February, 2025.

(Against order dated 19.05.2015 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 431 of 2004).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss.39, 42 & 54---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882),S. 52---Suit for cancellation of document, declaration and injunction---Lis pendens, doctrine of---Applicability---Respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit seeking cancellation of sale deed made in favour of defendant and Trial Court cancelled the same---During the pendency of trial, petitioner/subsequent purchaser, purchased disputed property from defendant---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction maintained the judgment passed in favour of respondents / plaintiffs---Validity---In the second round of litigation an issue was specifically framed as to whether defendant was a bona fide purchaser without notice of the agreement---Such issue was contested, and decided against defendant, which finding was upheld by Lower Appellate Court---Once the issue was decided it had shut the door to the claimed interest (i.e., title) of petitioner/subsequent purchaser---To accept petitioner/subsequent purchaser as an assignee of an interest on the basis of sale to him would in effect recognize the creation of assignments in what could be (effectively) an endless chain, with each link being a attenuated claim than the one before it---Finding that defendant was not a bona fide purchaser without notice, had set up an insuperable barrier which petitioner/subsequent purchaser could not surmount---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Surraya Begum and others v. Suban Begum and others 1992 SCMR 652 ref.

Malik Noor Muhammad Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 773

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shahid Waheed and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

ZARIN KHAN and others ---Appellants

Versus

CHAIRMAN, EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD, LAHORE and others ---Respondents

(Against the judgment dated 05.03.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in C.R. No. 647-A of 2009).

C.M.A. No. 3760 of 2022.

(For setting aside ex-parte order).

C. A. No. 613 of 2020 and C.M.A. No. 3760 of 2022, decided on 3rd March, 2025.

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss.42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Auction of land---Matching bid of highest bid---No concluded contact vesting interest in property---Appellants/plaintiffs were occupants of suit land who were given option to match the highest bid during auction of suit land---Suit filed by appellants/plaintiffs against respondent/Evacuee Trust Property Board was dismissed by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same against respondent/Board---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside judgment and decree passed by Lower Appellate Court---Validity---Bid at an auction was only an offer and without confirmation or approval it did not create any right in the property in favour of successful bidder---By matching bid of the highest bidder, appellants/plaintiffs merely stepped into their shoes---Status of appellants/plaintiffs upon exercising the option was no different from the highest bidder---Decision was made to re-auction suit land, and there was nothing preventing appellants/plaintiffs from participating in auction---Rejecting of highest bid and order of re-auction had afforded equal opportunity to persons whose bid had been rejected---Principles of natural justice were not deemed to have been violated---Acceptance of highest bid was subject to approval or confirmation by competent authority and unless and until such approval was granted or confirmation was made there was no concluded contract vesting the highest bidder with an interest in the property subjected to auction---Since approval contemplated by terms and conditions of auction was never issued in favour of appellants/plaintiffs, they were not entitled to a declaration to the effect that respondent/ETPB was legally bound to receive remaining amount of the highest bid and vested the appellants/plaintiffs with ownership rights in suit land---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court---Appeal was dismissed.

Javed Iqbal Abbasi and Company v. Province of Punjab 1996 SCMR 1433; Captain-PQ Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. A.W. Brothers 2004 SCMR 1956 and Afzal Maqsood Butt v. Banking Court No.2, Lahore PLD 2005 SC 470 rel.

Sardar Aman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.

M. Siddique Aman, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3.

2025 S C M R 776

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

TANVIR HUSSAIN ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Misc. Application No. 714 of 2023 in Jail Petition No. 235 of 2021, decided on 28th February, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 07.06.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. A. No. 86478-J of 2017 and M. R. No. 545 of 2017).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302 (b), 331 & 338-G---Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007, Rr. 6 & 10---Qatl-i-amd---Inability to pay diyat---Petitioner/convict after compromise with legal heirs of deceased was unable to pay Diyat amount---Effect---Four types of remedies have been provided under Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007,for convicts/inmates unable to pay amounts of Diyat, Arsh or Daman subject to terms and conditions specified therein, namely (i) provisions of soft loans, (ii) grant out of the Fund, (iii) release on parole, and (iv) facilitation for jobs---Petitioner/convict was at liberty to approach administrative committee constituted under Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007 for management of the Fund---Petitioner/convict could also approach Trial Court under section 331 P.P.C. for payment of Diyat amount in installments---Petition was dismissed.

2003 SCMR 658; 2011 SCMR 1964; PLD 2012 SC 769 and Government of Punjab v. Abid Hussain PLD 2007 SC 315 rel.

Nemo for Petitioner.

Irfan Zia, Addl. Prosecutor General for the State.

Nemo for Complainant.

2025 S C M R 780

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

TARIQ MEHMOOD ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 2023, decided on 24th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 26.07.2018 of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench passed in Cr.A. 106-A of 2011, M.R. 7-A of 2011).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Double murder---Motive shrouded in mystery---Benefit of doubt---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of two persons---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death---Validity---Prosecution failed to prove any motive in the matter---It had nowhere been stated that as to what prompted accused to kill two brothers as neither was there any enmity alleged between the parties, nor there was any report with regard to any scuffle which took place between them prior to the incident---Matter was shrouded in doubt and in such eventuality, it would be legally and factually justified not to confirm death sentence awarded by two Courts below---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and by extended benefit of doubt, acquitted the accused of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Muhammad Hassan v. State 2024 SCMR 1427 rel.

Sagheer Ahmed Qadri, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Syed Kausar Ali Shah, Addl. Auditor General for the State.

Dr. Babar Awan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Complainant along with Majid brother of the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 787

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

Al-Haaj Malik MUHAMMAD ASHRAF ---Petitioner

Versus

JAVED AKHTAR and another ---Respondents

Crl. P.L.A. No. 504 of 2021, decided on 19th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 30.03.2021 of learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi in Cr.A. No. 588 of 2019).

Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)---

----Ss.3, 4, 7 & 8---Illegal dispossession---Re-appraisal of evidence---Petition against acquittal---Co-owner---Accused was a co-owner in property in question and High Court had acquitted him of the charge---Validity--- Co-owner is deemed to be in constructive possession of every inch of joint holding unless a formal partition has been effected---Jurisprudence on co-ownership consistently affirms that one co-owner cannot allege dispossession at the hands of another without establishing exclusive possession through partition proceedings---Provision of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 is not confined to cases involving land grabbers or Qabza Mafia but extends to any person who has been illegally dispossessed from immovable property, however it is applicable only where there is clear evidence of unlawful dispossession---In cases where parties are co-owners, question of forcible dispossession does not arise unless partition proceedings have concluded and exclusive ownership is established---Acquitted accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence---Appellate Court should exercise restraint in overturning an acquittal unless the judgment is manifestly perverse, arbitrary, or suffers from a glaring misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment of acquittal passed in faovur of accused---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Shaikh Muhammad Naseem v. Mst. Farida Gul 2016 SCMR 1931; Niaz Ahmed v. Aijaz Ahmed PLD 2024 SC 1152 and Muhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Asghar and others 2003 SCMR 477 rel.

Muhammad Ilyas Siddiqi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Irfan Zia, Addl. Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 790

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance, Islamabad ---Petitioner

Versus

MUHAMMAD ATIQ-UR-REHMAN and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 687 of 2022, decided on 5th December, 2024.

(On appeal from the Judgment dated 05.01.2022 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 814(R)CS of 2019).

Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---

----S. 4---Terms and conditions of service---Pay package---Employments of two different creeds---Judgment per incuriam---Respondent/civil servant was employee of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), an autonomous body, who switched his service through Federal Public Service Commission and was appointed as Assistant Director---Respondent/civil servant was aggrieved of disallowing the benefit of pay protection by government---Service Tribunal allowed his appeal on the foothold that when contract employees, who were also non-civil servants, could get their pay-protection vide Finance Division's O.M dated 31-05-2013, then it would be discriminatory not to allow benefit of pay-protection to other non-civil servants---Validity---There was no rationale to compare or equate two different creed of employees within the one and the same employment status/pattern to invoke or bring up equality clause or treating it discriminatory rather than considering grant of pay-protection strictly in accordance with applicable rules and policy---When any decision of Court or Tribunal was found in ignorance or lack of knowledge of a relevant statutory provision or a binding decision of Court of earlier provisions or decisions, it was called a decision per incuriam, i.e., the decision was made in unfamiliarity/ignorance or obliviousness of pertinent statues or precedents as done by Service Tribunal in the present case---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal resultantly appeal filed by respondent / civil servant was dismissed---Appeal was allowed.

Muhammad Azam Chaudhry v. Federation of Pakistan Civil Appeal No. 1158 of 2009; The Ministry of Finance through Secretary Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v. Atiq-ur-Rehman and another C.P. No. 5046 of 2017; Wharton's Law Lexicon Fifteenth Edition; Satrucharla v. Vijayarama (2006) 1 SCC 212 and Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder and others v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2010 SC 483 rel.

Ch. Aamir Rehman, Additional Attorney General, Aitzaz Alam, S.O. Ministry of Finance, Faraz Ahmad, S.O. Ministry of Finance and Syed B.H.Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

M.D.Shahzad, Advocate Supreme Court for FBR.

Ms. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.

2025 S C M R 802

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

SHABEER ALI ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 2023, decided on 7th March, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 31.01.2018 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench in Crl.A. No. 132-A of 2013 with Murder Reference No. 87-A of 2013).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(i), 337-F(ii) & 452---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 10A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 237, 342 & 537---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, ghayr-jaifah damiyah, ghayr-jaifah badi'ah and house-trespass---Re-appraisal of evidence---Right to a fair trial---Defective charge---Fact not confronted to accused---Grave procedural irregularity---Effect---Sentence reduced---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for committing three murders and was sentenced to death on three counts---Validity---Omission to frame a charge for a distinct offence is a substantial illegality, rendering the trial a nullity--- Such omission is not a mere irregularity, that can be cured under section 537, Cr.P.C. rather, is a defect, that strikes at the root of proceedings, necessitating intervention to prevent miscarriage of justice---Procedural safeguard under section 342, Cr.P.C. ensures that accused is confronted with all incriminating evidence to afford him opportunity to explain circumstances against him---Omission to "frame a charge", coupled with failure to put a material accusation to accused under section 342, Cr.P.C., was a grave procedural irregularity that could not be remedied under section 537, Cr.P.C., as it resulted in a fundamental breach of the right to a fair trial---In such mitigating circumstances imposition of maximum penalty was not warranted---Absence of a proven motive, coupled with circumstances indicating absence of premeditation, necessitated reconsideration of quantum of punishment---Accused was entitled to a lesser sentence, as Courts are obligated to ensure that punishment awarded is proportionate to facts and circumstances of case---Supreme Court maintained conviction of accused but converted sentence of death into imprisonment for life---Appeal was allowed.

M. Younus Habib v. The State PLD 2006 SC 153; Arbab Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 755; Khan Zado v. The State 2015 PCr.LJ 1561; Noor Muhammad Khatti v. The State 2005 PCr.LJ 1889; Md. Mosaddar Hoque v. The State PLD 1958 SC 131; Zahid Shahzad v. The State 1981 PCr.LJ 844; Nemai Adak v. The State AIR 1965 Cal 89; Istahar Khondkar v. Emperor AIR 1936 Cal 796; Muhammad Akram alias Akrai v. The State 2019 SCMR 610 and Ghulam Rasool v. The State 2025 SCMR 74 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Sentence, quantum of---Death sentence, commuted to imprisonment for life---Principle---If offence resulted from a spontaneous altercation rather than a premeditated act, death sentence should be commuted to life imprisonment.

Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Kausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General for the State.

Complainant in person.

2025 S C M R 810

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD AZAM ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE and others---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No. 297 of 2023, decided on 3rd March, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 15.05.2018, passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench Multan in Cr.A. No.454 of 2013).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 365-B, 376 & 380---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)---Abduction, rape and theft---Re-appraisal of evidence---Material witnesses, withholding of---Presumption---Medical evidence---Delay in sending vaginal swabs to Chemical Examiner---Accused was alleged to have abducted and raped a minor girl with the help of three co-accused persons; one stood acquitted and two absconded---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for life---Validity---Mother of abductee, her brothers, and other persons who allegedly accompanied the complainant in the process of recovery of abductee were not produced by prosecution---Old lady who allegedly informed father of the victim girl was a material witness and it amounted to withholding of best available evidence---Adverse inference within the meaning of Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was drawn against prosecution that had the persons been produced in witness box they would not have supported prosecution's case---Testimony of lady doctor, in absence of any other evidence of unimpeachable character, was not sufficient to prove that sexual intercourse was committed with victim girl by accused---Vaginal swabs taken from victim girl were sent to Chemical examiner after a delay of three weeks for which no explanation, much less, plausible, had been furnished by prosecution---Accused though was examined for potency, however, his semen had not been sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for matching with the semen stained swab obtained from victim girl--- Positive Chemical Examiner Report was of no help to prosecution---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and acquitted him of the charge, as prosecution failed to prove guilt through cogent and confidence inspiring evidence---Appeal was allowed.

Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 and Muhammad Naeem Khan and another v. Muqadas Khan (decd) through L.Rs. and another PLD 2022 SC 99 rel.

(b) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---For giving benefit of doubt to accused it is not necessary that there should be so many circumstances creating doubt in prosecution's case---If only single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person is available, then such benefit is to be extended to accused not as a matter of concession but as of right.

Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Najaf Ali Shah v. the State 2021 SCMR 736 rel.

Ms. Shazia Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Irfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 819

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

AHMED OWAIS PEERZADA, CHIEF COMMISSIONER (RTD) FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION, ISLAMABAD ---Petitioner

Versus

PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT, ISLAMABAD and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 44 of 2022, decided on 14th January, 2025.

(On appeal against order dated 17.11.2021 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Misc. Petition No. 241 of 2019 in Appeal No. 3124(R)CS of 2012).

(a) Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)---

----Ss. 4 & 5---Service Tribunal, duties of---Pro forma promotion---Retirement of civil servant---Grievance of civil servant was that his case for promotion to BS-22 was placed before High Power Selection Board but due to paucity of time matter could not be decided and before next meeting he had retired from service---Directions issued by Service Tribunal were not complied with by the authorities---Validity---Federal Service Tribunal is the first judicial fact finding forum provided for civil servants, to ensure implementation of its orders/ judgments, come what may, unless it is set aside by Supreme Court---It is the function of Federal Service Tribunal to execute its orders and judgments in letter and spirit---To ensure timely and proper execution and implementation of its judgments and orders, Federal Service Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under section 5 of Service Tribunals Act, 1973, is always deemed to be a Civil Court with all powers as are vested in such Court under Civil Procedure Code,1908 for execution---In case of delay or evasion, Service Tribunal should take all necessary steps to enforce compliance with its judgments and orders to alleviate suffering of recipient of judgment or order, rather than divesting itself of jurisdiction or simply disposing of miscellaneous petition of civil servant without ensuring proper implementation---Supreme Court set aside order passed by Service Tribunal and remanded the matter to High Power Selection Board to consider case of civil servant for proforma promotion to BS-22---Appeal was allowed.

(b) Maxim---

----Interest republicaeut sit finis litium---Connotation---It is in the interest of State that there should be an end to litigation.

Ravinder Kaur v. Ashok Kumar AIR 2004 SC 904 rel.

Habib Ahmed Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Ashiq Mahmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

Rana Asadullah Khan, Additional Advocate General for Pakistan along with Sajid-ul-Hassan, S.O., Establishment on Court Notice.

2025 S C M R 830

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shakeel Ahmad and Aamer Farooq, JJ

PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through District Collector/ District Officer (Rev), Lahore and others ---Appellants

Versus

Malik ABDUL LATIF AMAR ---Respondent

Civil Appeals Nos. 119-L of 2022 and 3952 of 2022, decided on 6th March, 2025.

(Against judgments dated 20.09.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in R.F.As. Nos. 77386 and 54663 of 2021).

Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)---

----S. 23---Acquisition of land---Compensation---Object, purpose and scope---Authorities were aggrieved of enhancing of compensation in favour of respondents/landowners by Referee Court and the same was maintained by High Court---Validity---Compensation is a very wide term, indicating that land owners, for various reasons, are to be compensated and not merely paid price of land which is just an interaction of supply and demand fixed between a willing buyer and a willing seller---Mere classification or nature of land, can be taken as a relevant consideration for the purposes of determining compensation but it is not an absolute one---Factors such as location, neighbourhood, potentiality or other benefits cannot be disregarded either---Place and situation of acquired land are paramount considerations that must be accorded due and thoughtful attention in the fair assessment of compensation---Supreme Court declined to interfere in compensation assessed and determined by Referee Court as the same was just and reasonable and the Court had adverted to every aspect of the case and advanced valid and cogent reasons in support of its findings---Appeal was dismissed.

Asad Ali and others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Mst Iqbal Begum and others PLD 2010 SC 719; The Province of Sindh v. Ramzan and others PLD 2004 SC 512; Malik Aman and others v. Land Acquisition Collector and others PLD 1988 SC 32; Fazalur Rahman and others v. General Manager, SIDB and another PLD 1986 SC 158; NWFP through Collector, Abbottabad Land Acquisition and others v. Haji Ali Asghar Khan and others 1985 SCMR 767; Land Acquisition Collector Abbottabad and others v. Muhammad Iqbal and others 1992 SCMR 1245; Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. v. Province of NWFP and 3 others 1993 SCMR 1700; Murad Khan's case 1999 SCMR 1647 and Nisar Ahmad Khan and others v. Collector Land Acquisition, Swabi and others PLD 2002 SC 25 rel.

Khalid Masood Ghani, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab (in C.A. No. 119-L of 2022, as well as for the respondents in C.A.No. 3952 of 2022) along with Zakir Shah, Senior Law Officer, CNW for Appellants.

Syed Iqbal Hussain Gillani, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 119-L of 2022 as well as for the appellant in C.A. No. 3952 of 2022) (via video link from Lahore).

2025 S C M R 835

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

SAJJAD KHAN alias Shahzad Khan ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Crl. A. No. 429 of 2022, decided on 19th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 09.12.2016 passed by Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Crl. A. No. 119 of 2015).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302 (b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Confession of co-accused---Exculpatory statement---Benefit of doubt---Five persons were alleged to have been involved in the case but four were acquitted of the charge---Accused was convicted for committing qatl-i-amd and sentenced to imprisonment for life by Trial Court on the basis of exculpatory confession of one co-accused who appeared as prosecution witness---Validity---Exculpatory confession of co-accused who appeared as prosecution witness was recorded on 19-12-2011 while he was arrested on 13-12-2011---Exculpatory statement was not believed to the extent of co-accused himself, who had been acquitted by Trial Court---Such exculpatory confession which had not been taken into consideration for conviction against its maker, i.e. the co-accused, could not be used against accused---On the basis of same evidence, four co-accused persons had already been acquitted and no appeal had been filed by complainant or the State---Supreme Court extended benefit of doubt to accused, set aside conviction and sentence awarded by Trial Court and acquitted him of the charge, as there was no independent corroboration of evidence to his extent---Appeal as allowed.

Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.

Chand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor General along with Complainant for the State.

2025 S C M R 838

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

Syed MUHAMMAD ALI JAFERI ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 94 of 2025, decided on 21st February, 2025.

(On appeal against the order dated 22.01.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Crl. Misc. No. 10453-B of 2024).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S.497---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss. 20 & 21---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Sexual harassment and blackmailing---Bail, grant of---Case not falling in prohibitory clause---Complainant alleged sexual harassment and blackmailing against her husband on the basis of sharing her objectionable images on social media---Trend of such like activities is rising pointing towards deterioration of cultural values---Duty is cast upon Court to see whether from the facts and peculiar circumstances a case of bail is made out---Offences alleged in F.I.R. fell outside prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. and maximum punishment of imprisonments for them were five years and three years respectively---Accused was behind the bars for the last 2-3 months---Grant of bail in such-like cases was a rule and refusal was an exception---Supreme Court granted bail to accused as no exceptional circumstances were pointed out to refuse concession of bail---Appeal was allowed.

Mian Ahmad Mahmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Rashdeen Nawaz Kasuri, Addl. AGP and Adnan Ali, S.I. for the State.

2025 S C M R 841

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shahid Waheed, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

MUHAMMAD ISRAR ---Appellant

Versus

JEHANZEB and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 156-P of 2013, decided on 24th February, 2025.

(On appeal from the judgment dated 27.05.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Civil Revision No. 1211 of 2011).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 8, 42 & 54--- Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.100---Suit for possession, declaration and partition---Thirty years old document---Presumption of genuineness---Appellant/plaintiff claimed to be owner of suit property on the basis of gift made by her aunt in his favour---Aunt of appellant/plaintiff was owner on the basis of dower deed, which was a thirty years old document---Suit was dismissed by Trial Court but Lower Appellate Court decreed the same in favour of appellant/plaintiff---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction restored judgment and decree passed by Trial Court in favour of respondent/defendant---Validity---Dower deed which was more than thirty years old had presumption of genuineness, but such presumption was always rebuttable by the party questioning genuineness thereof---Unsuspicious character of a document, its proper custody and other circumstances are the foundation to raise presumption of its execution---If prima facie dispute to its execution and proper custody is raised then it becomes duty of Court to determine the question of its genuineness---Donor was unable to satisfy through reliable evidence that by virtue of a dower deed, title of house was conveyed to his aunt---It might have been several years old instrument but that alone could not succeed if doubt was created about genuineness of document---Corroborative evidence should have been made available before Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court---Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction to re-appraise evidence for another view---Judgment exercised by Revisional Court and conclusion drawn was the outcome of evidence available on record---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by Trial Court---Appeal was dismissed.

Allah Ditta v. Aimna Bibi 2011 SCMR 1483 rel.

Shah Faisal Nasapi, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Zia-ur-Rehman Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 844

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Naeem Akhtar Afghan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

HAMEEDULLAH ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 2021, decided on 14th January, 2025.

(Against judgment dated 01.02.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Crl. A. No. 62 of 2011 and S.C.R. No. 01-T of 2011).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 120-B, 302, 324, 435 & 436---Criminal conspiracy, qatl-i-amd, attempt to qatl-i-amd and causing damage to property---Re-appraisal of evidence---Suicide bombing---Location of prosecution witnesses--- Benefit of doubt---Accused was alleged to be a suicide bomber wearing explosive jacket and was apprehended from the place of occurrence where two suicide bombers had already detonated themselves---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death---Validity---Suicide bomber, who had detonated explosives, had also used pellets which had caused severe injuries to several innocent victims in a large radius---There was no explanation as to how complainant and six officials accompanying him, and the accused and two unidentified co-accused remained unharmed---Presence of witnesses at crime scene was not proved through unimpeachable evidence, nor the fact that accused was apprehended in the manner as was deposed by prosecution witnesses---Accused and complainant, who were 30 paces from the suicide bomber when the explosion took place, could not remain unscathed, and in such a situation of extreme distress and commotion, no one could identify or apprehend another person wearing a jacket laden with explosives---It was an incident in which impact and its harm was seen much further than thirty paces---Prosecution did not bring on record any evidence to establish that accused was a member of proscribed organization or that he was motivated by or was working for a terrorist group---Prosecution failed to discharge its obligation of proving guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentences handed down by Trial Court and upheld by High Court and acquitted the accused from all charges framed against him by extending benefit of doubt to him as of right---Appeal was allowed.

Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048; Muhammad Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 1731; Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Abdul Qadeer v. The State 2024 SCMR 1146 and Muhammad Zaman v. The State 2014 SCMR 749 rel.

Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Sajjad Hussain, Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 851

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ

MUHAMMAD AJMAL and others ---Petitioners

Versus

Mst. NOOR KHATOON and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 3455-L of 2022, decided on 3rd March, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 07.9.2022 passed by Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench in W.P. No. 6902 of 2013).

Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5, Sched.---Land in lieu of dower money---Scope---Concurrent findings of facts by three Courts below---Petitioner/defendant was aggrieved of judgments and decrees passed by all Courts below declaring respondent/plaintiff as owner of land in question given to her by her deceased husband in lieu of dower money during his life time---Validity---There was no dispute with regard to relationship between respondent/plaintiff and her deceased husband---Scriber affirmed that agreement of suit land was reduced into writing as per the directions of deceased husband of respondent / plaintiff, who at that time had also confirmed handing over possession of suit property in her favour, in presence of marginal witnesses who had endorsed signing of the agreement and had also verified the same to be genuine---High Court had rightly dealt with the question of jurisdiction, exercised by Family Court, in an elaborate and eloquent manner which suffered from no defect---Supreme Court declined to interfere with concurrent findings recorded by three Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Fozia Mazhar v. Additional District Judge, Jhang and others PLD 2024 SC 771 and Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence and another v. Messrs Rashid Builders (Pvt.) Limited 2024 SCMR 1816 rel.

Muhammad Ozair Chughtai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link, Lahore).

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 856

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MEHBOOB ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 344 of 2018, decided on 5th March, 2025.

(Against the order dated 16.11.2017 of the Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench passed in Criminal Appeal No. 73-D of 2016).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Punishment of Qisas not applicable---Grave and sudden provocation---Accused was convicted under section 302(b), P.P.C. for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to imprisonment for life---Validity---It could not be ruled out that one of the deceased had created a situation of sudden provocation due to which the case fell under section 302(c), P.P.C.---Law maker had left it to the Court to decide on a case to case basis depending upon gravity and intensity of provocation and the time taken for reaction---It was a case of spontaneous reaction and accused was rightly convicted, however, his case was to be considered within the frame of section 302(c), P.P.C.---Supreme Court converted conviction of accused awarded under section 302(b), P.P.C. into one under section 302(c),P.P.C. and his sentence of imprisonment for life on two counts was reduced to imprisonment for fourteen years---Appeal was allowed.

State v. Muhammad Hanif and 5 others 1992 SCMR 2047 and Ali Muhammad v. Ali Muhammad PLD 1996 SC 274 rel.

Ahmed Ali, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Syed Kauser Ali Shah, Additional Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.

Saleem Ullah Ranazai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4.

2025 S C M R 860

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shahid Waheed, Shahid Bilal Hassan and Aamer Farooq, JJ

Rana MUHAMMAD YAMEEN and another ---Appellants

Versus

MUHAMMAD JAMIL (decd.) through L.Rs. and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 151-P of 2013 and C.M.As. Nos. 11-P of 2014, 213-P of 2017, 530-P of 2018 and 2570 of 2024, decided on 21st February, 2025.

(Against the judgment and decree dated 21.01.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench passed in C.R. No. 52 of 2009).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Revisional jurisdiction of High Court, exercise of---Principle---Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was dismissed by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court on the ground that they could not prove their relationship with deceased allottee of suit property---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Validity---Respondents/plaintiffs could not establish and prove their relationship with allottee of suit land by leading confidence inspiring, trustworthy and independent evidence---Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was rightly dismissed by Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court and High Court had wrongly evaluated evidence on record while setting aside concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below---High Court had ample powers to undo and disturb concurrent findings of Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. but if the same were found to be based on any illegality or irregularity and wrong exercise of jurisdiction---No such occasion was available with High Court; therefore, when position was as such, concurrent findings of two Courts on facts should not have been interfered with---Supreme Court set aside judgment and decree passed by High Court and restored those of Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court---Appeal was allowed.

Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 and Mst. Khair-Ul-Nisa and 6 others v. Malik Muhammad Ishaque and 2 others PLD 1972 SC 25 rel.

Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (for appellants and applicants in C.M.A. No. 11-P of 2014) (via video-link from Peshawar).

Syed Abid Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for applicant(s) (in C.M.A. No. 213-P of 2017).

Ahmed Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for applicant(s) (in C.M. Nos. 530-P of 2018 and 2570 of 2024).

Syed Mastan Ali Shah Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 6.

Rashdeen Nawaz Kasuri, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan on Court's call.

2025 S C M R 868

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

RASHID and others ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No. 282-L of 2020 and Criminal Petition No. 461-L of 2015.

(Against the order dated 02.02.2015 of the Lahore Multan Bench passed in Crl.A. No. 39 of 2010-ATA, Crl. Revision No. 405 of 2010-ATA and CSR. No. 8 of 2010).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders, Volume III, Chapter 11, Part-C---Police Rules 1934, Volume 3, Chapter 26, R. 26.32---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Identification parade---Accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amd and were sentenced to death---Validity---Separate statements of witnesses were not recorded by Magistrate who conducted identification parade---Prosecution witness who identified accused persons by their names, had come to know about the names when Magistrate called accused persons by their names---Magistrate admitted that the witness did not identify any of the accused with their specific role at the time of occurrence---Other prosecution witnesses also did not identify nor mention specific roles of accused persons---For proper dispensation of justice while carrying out identification parades, parameters as enshrined under Article 22 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 read with Volume III of Chapter 11, Part-C of High Court (Lahore) Rules and Orders and Rule 26.32 of Chapter 26, Volume 33 of Police Rules, 1934 had to be fulfilled---Prosecution failed to discharge its initial burden to prove case against accused beyond shadow of doubt---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and acquitted accused persons of the charge---Appeal was dismissed.

Kanwar Anwaar Ali v. The State PLD 2019 SC 488; Subha Sadiq v. The State 2025 SCMR 50; Abdul Samad v. The State 2025 SCP 31; Abdul Hayee and Abdullah alias Ghazali and another v. The State 2025 SCMR 281 and Syed Fida Hussain Shah v. The State 2024 SCMR 1622 rel.

Ms. Ayesha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Sajjad Hussain Bhatti, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

Muhammad Usman, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 880

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD QASIM and others ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No. 679 of 2020, decided on 4th March, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 24.05.2016, passed by the learned Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 290-J of 2013).

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 154---First Information Report---Scope---Prosecution's story is foundation on which entire edifice of case is built and occupies a crucial status---Such story should stand to reason and must be natural, convincing and free from any inherent improbability---It is neither safe to believe such story of prosecution which does not meet such requirements nor prosecution's case based on improbable story can sustain conviction of accused.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(e)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)---Abduction for ransom---Re-appraisal of evidence---Payment of ransom---Proof---Description and denominations of currency notes---Withholding of evidence---Presumption---Accused persons were convicted and sentenced for abduction for ransom and sentenced to imprisonment for life---Validity---Complainant did not furnish detailed description of currency notes and their denominations which had raised questions regarding authenticity of payment of ransom as claimed by the complainant---Failure to provide specific details about ransom money, such as denomination and serial numbers, diminishes reliability of entire ransom allegation---Prosecution's failure to identify the place where ransom money was paid had created doubt in prosecution's case---Prosecution witnesses in whose presence ransom amount were paid to abductors were abandoned---Persons from whom complainant allegedly managed/collected ransom amount were neither cited as prosecution's witnesses nor produced in witness box---Testimony of witnesses who were present at critical moments of crime, such as payment of ransom, was inevitable for corroborating complainant's narrative---Failure to produce such witnesses had cast doubt on veracity of complainant's version and raised reasonable suspicion about nature of the incident---Non-production of such material witnesses also amounted to withholding of best available evidence, therefore, adverse inference within the meaning of Article 129 (g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 was drawn against prosecution that had those witnesses been produced they would not have supported prosecution's case---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons and they were acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Mst. Saima Noreen v. The State 2024 SCMR 1310 rel.

(b) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Scope---When case of the prosecution is found to be doubtful, then every doubt, even the slightest one, is to be resolved in favour of accused.

Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Abdul Jabbar v. The State and another 2019 SCMR 129 rel.

Basharatullah Khan and Muhammad Munir Paracha, Advocate Supreme Court for appellants.

Nemo for the Complainant.

Ms. Memoona Ihsan ul Haq, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 888

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

MUHAMMAD MASOOD alias Mithu ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Jail Petition No. 441 of 2017, decided on 10th March, 2025.

(Against judgments dated 13.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Cr.A. No. 34 of 2013 and M.R. No. 7 of 2013).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302 (b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Absconsion---Post mortem report---Scope---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to death but High Court converted death sentence into imprisonment for life---Validity---Mere absconsion cannot by itself form sole basis of conviction---Absconsion may be treated as a corroborative piece of evidence, but it cannot be read in isolation, nor can it compensate for inherent defects and shortcomings in prosecution's case---Post-mortem report merely confirms cause of death, nature of injuries, and kind of weapon used but does not, in any matter, establish identity of assailant---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused, as the prosecution had failed to establish charge against him beyond reasonable doubt---Accused was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Salman Akram Raja v. Government of Punjab 2013 SCMR 203; Ali Haider alias Pappu v. Jameel Hussain and others PLD 2021 SC 362; Basharat and another v. The State 1995 SCMR 1735; Rohtas Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 566 and Muhammad Khan v. State 1999 SCMR 1220 rel.

Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Mirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 894

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

SHER AFZAL and another ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeals Nos. 229 and 230 of 2021, decided on 25th February, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgments dated 01.02.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Murder References Nos. 36 of 2014, 105 of 2009 and Crl.A. No. 10-J of 2014 and Crl.As. Nos. 14-J, 81 and 96 of 2009).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Multiple murders---Phenomena of substitution---Accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amdof five persons and were sentenced to death---Validity---Presence of complainant and other eyewitnesses at the scene of crime on the day of incident remained undisputed---Accused persons failed to provide any plausible reason for their alleged false implication in the case while allowing actual perpetrators to escape justice---Accused persons committed a brutal and ruthless act by murdering five members of same family over a land dispute---Crime was premeditated and carried out in cold blood---Supreme Court declined to commute death sentence to life imprisonment as accused persons were not so entitled due to severity and deliberate nature of offense---Appeal was dismissed.

Muhammad Riaz v. Khurram Shehzad 2024 SCMR 51; Khadim Hussain v. The State 2010 SCMR 1090; Muhammad Afzal v. The State 2017 SCMR 1645; Munir Ahmad v. The State 2019 SCMR 79; Muhammad Makki v. The State 2021 SCMR 1672; Sardar alias Sadaruddin v. The State Criminal Jail Appeal No. S-26 of 2019; Amanullah Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 527; Muhammad Abbas v. The State 2023 SCMR 487; Nasir Ahmed v. The State 2023 SCMR 478; Muhammad Usama v. The State 2022 SCMR 2143; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2022 SCMR 2024; Makeen Ullah v. The State 2017 SCMR 1662; Mst Razia alias JIA v. The State 2009 SCMR 14; Liaquat Ali v. The State 2009 SCMR 91; Dilbar Masih v. The State 2006 SCMR 1801; Kausar Irshad v. The State 1998 SCMR 1148; Taj Muhammad v. The State 1990 SCMR 416; Khairu and another v. The State 1981 SCMR 1136; Haji v. The State 2010 SCMR 650; Nasir Ahmed v. The State 2023 SCMR 478 and Muhammad Hayat and another v. The State 2021 SCMR 92 rel.

(b) Criminal trial---

----Motive---Scope---Motive holds even greater value in cases of direct evidence, and hits the last hammer in support of the prosecution at its conclusion.

Maqbool Ahmed Case 1992 SCMR 2279 rel.

Basharatullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Rai Akhtar Hussain, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

Sheikh Ahsan-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant (in Crl. A. 229 of 2021) and Nemo (in Crl. A. 230 of 2021).

Assistance by Muhammad Subhan Malik (Judicial Law Clerk).

2025 S C M R 905

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD ASIM ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Cr.A. No. 623 of 2022 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 867 of 2019, decided on 24th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 30.05.2019 passed in Cr.A No.129-T of 2013 with Murder Reference No. 01-T of 2013, by the Islamabad High Court Islamabad).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss.302(b) & 302(c)---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S.7(a)---Qatl-i-amd and terrorism---Re-appraisal of evidence---Right of self-defence---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to death---Plea raised by accused was that he had acted in his right of self-defence---Validity---Only consideration for self-defence is that a person threatened with danger of injury should not exceed the limits fixed by law---This depends upon reasonable apprehension of danger to the person under particular circumstances of the case---Reasonableness of apprehension is a question of fact which depends upon weapon used, the manner of using it, the nature of assault or other surrounding circumstances---There were three fire shots on the person of deceased who was not holding any weapon---Accused exceeded his right of self-defence, therefore, provision of section 302(c), P.P.C., was not attracted---Supreme Court considering the mitigating circumstances, reduced the sentence of death to imprisonment for life and set aside conviction and sentence awarded under section 7(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Appeal was allowed.

Ghulam Hussain and others v. The State and others PLD 2020 SC 61; Waris Ali and 5 others v. The State 2017 SCMR 1572; Faiz v. State 1983 SCMR 76; Sultan Khan v. Sher Khan PLD 1991 SC 520 and Shabbir Ahmad's case PLD 1995 SC 343 rel.

Barrister Umer Aslam, Advocate Supreme Court along with Dawood Akhtar, brother of appellant for Appellant.

Ms. Chand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 912

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

Nawabzada MUHAMMAD FATEH KHAN ---Petitioner

Versus

MUMTAZ AHMAD and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 331-P of 2014, decided on 2nd December, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 03.03.2014, passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Civil Revision No. 544 of 2005).

(a) Registration Act (XVI of 1908)---

----S. 47---Registered sale deed--- Scope--- Sale gets completed on the day of execution of sale deed and not on the day of registration of the same.

(b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)---

----Ss. 13 & 31(d)---Suit for possession through pre-emption---Limitation---Registered sale deed---Petitioners/pre-emptors filed suit for pre-emption when mutation was attested after registration of sale deed---Trial Court decreed the suit but Lower Appellate Court and High Court concurrently dismissed the suit---Validity---Subsequent attestation of mutation did not give rise to a fresh cause of action in favour of petitioners/pre-emptors---Sale in question was completed but petitioners/pre-emptors failed to file their pre-emption suit under section 31(d) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---Suit of petitioners/plaintiffs was rightly dismissed by two Courts below as it was barred by limitation---Petitioners/pre-emptors had knowledge of sale much prior to alleged date of knowledge as shown in suit---Such blunder was a stumbling block in the way of petitioners/pre-emptors to exercise their right of pre-emption---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by High Court and Lower Appellate Court, as petitioners/pre-emptors failed to establish their first jumping demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat and such deficiency alone was sufficient to disentitle them from exercise of their right of pre-emption---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Jangi v. Jhanda and others PLD 1961 (W.P) Baghdad-ul-Jadid 34; Muhammad Amin Khan v. Mst. Parveen Ramzan and others PLD 1998 SC 1506; Muhammad Tariq and others v. Mst. Shamsa Tanveer and others PLD 2011 SC 151 and Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad through L.Rs. and others PLD 2007 SC 302 rel.

Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Peshawar).

Mian Mohibullah Kakakhel, Advocate Supreme Court and Saif Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Peshawar).

2025 S C M R 918

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

IMRAN and another ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 647 of 2022, decided on 26th February, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 24.04.2019 passed by the learned Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Appeal No. 330-P of 2018 and Murder Reference No. 13 of 2018).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Recovery---Effect---Judicial confession---Proof---Benefit of doubt---Accused persons were convicted for qatl-i-amd---Male accused was sentenced to death while the female accused was sentenced to imprisonment for life---Validity---Recovery of Chaddar on pointing out of female accused was not stained with any incriminating material, like blood, froth, etc. of deceased---No Forensic Science Laboratory report was available on record regarding the Chaddar, which was available in every house---Recovery of Chaddar was not sufficient to connect accused persons with alleged offense---Prosecution also produced evidence of torn shirt of female accused from her possession, which was allegedly torn during the occurrence but no such statement was made by sole eyewitness that during the occurrence shirt of female accused was torn who had changed the shirt after the occurrence---Such recoveries were inconsequential for the prosecution---There was no independent corroboration of judicial confession of accused persons---Evidence of sole eyewitness was not worthy of reliance---Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused persons beyond shadow of doubt---If there was a single circumstance which had created doubt in prosecution case, the same was sufficient to acquit accused persons---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons as there were number of circumstances which had created serious doubts in prosecution's story---Resultantly accused persons were acquitted of the charge by extending them the benefit of doubt---Appeal was allowed.

Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Syed Kausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 923

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Saddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

JEEHAND ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through Prosecutor General Balochistan ---Respondent

Criminal Petition No. 1187 of 2021, decided on 14th March, 2025.

(Against the order/judgment dated 20.09.2021 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, in Crl. A. No. (T)67 of 2021).

(a) Maxim---

----Communi observantia non set recedendum---Connotation---When law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, the same must be done accordingly and if prescribed procedure is not followed, it would be presumed that the same had not been done in accordance with law.

Noman Mansoor v. State PLD 2024 SC 805; Ahmed Ali v. State 2023 SCMR 781; Ameer Zeb v. State PLD 2012 SC 380 and Muhammad Hashim v. State PLD 2004 SC 856 rel.

(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 9(c)---Police Rules, 1934, R. 22.70, Register No. XIX---Recovery of narcotic substance---Re-appraisal of evidence---Safe custody and transmission of case property---Collective forensic report of all samples---Accused was arrested for recovery of 100 packets of charas, weighing 100 grams each---Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused to imprisonment for life---Validity---Safe custody and safe transmission of alleged drug from the spot of recovery till its receipt by Narcotic Testing Laboratory were not satisfactorily established---It was mandated in Police Rules, 1934 that case property must be kept in Malkhana and entry of the same must be recorded in Register No. XIX of that police station---It was duty of police and prosecution to establish that case property was kept in safe custody, and if required to be sent to any laboratory for analysis, to further establish its safe transmission and also record it in the relevant register, including road certificate etc.---Procedure in Police Rules, 1934 ensured that case property, when it was produced before Court, had remained in safe custody and was not tampered with until that time---Complete mechanism was provided in Police Rules, 1934 regarding safe custody and safe transmission of case property to concerned laboratory and then to Trial Court---Each sample was to be tested separately and individual reports must be prepared for each sample---Collective forensic report not only diminished credibility of chemical examination but also raised serious questions regarding representative nature of samples sent for analysis---In the present case. there were serious procedural violations, absence of credible forensic evidence and failure to establish safe custody and transmission---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused as prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and accused was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Ameer Zeb v. State PLD 2012 SC 380; Asif Ali v. State 2024 SCMR 1408 and Zain Shahid v. State 2024 SCMR 843 rel.

Muhammad Shabbir Rajput, Advocate Supreme Court and Asif Ali Talpur, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Ms. Rubina Butt, State Counsel for the State.

2025 S C M R 930

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ and Irfan Saadat Khan, J

MUHAMMAD FAISAL Prop., F.A.Traders, Lahore ---Petitioner

Versus

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-II, RTO-II, LAHORE ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 2100 of 2024, decided on 4th March, 2025.

(Against the order dated 27.02.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.R. No. 41034 of 2017).

Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----Ss. 114 & 133---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Reference to High Court---Limitation---Office objection---Condonation of delay---Petitioner/tax-payer was aggrieved of order passed by High Court on tax reference of authorities, which was filed beyond the time frame given by office of High Court---Validity---If objections raised by office of High Court were not removed within the time specified by the office and in the meantime limitation for filing appeal stood expired, such appeal would be rendered as time barred---Limitation is not a mere technicality, as once limitation expires a vested right is created in favour of other side by operation of law which cannot be taken away lightly---High Court had passed the order on merits of the case but failed to discuss averments of application with regard to limitation by specifying whether the same was allowed or rejected---High Court should have decided such objection of limitation as a preliminary issue---Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Court and remanded the matter for decision afresh on application for condonation of delay---Petition for leave to appeal was disposed of.

Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Abdul Jabbar Shahid and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 2019 Lahore 76; Abdul Hafeez Abbasi and others v. Managing Director, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi and others 2002 SCMR 1034 and Collectors of Customs E & S.T. and Sales Tax v. Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd 2005 SCMR 1636 rel.

Hassan Kamran Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG (Law) FBR for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 935

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

AKBAR SAEED ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 1366 of 2018, decided on 10th March, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 14.11.2018 in Crl. Appeal No. 358 of 2016, of the Lahore High Court Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Eye-witness account---Location of fire shots---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---Plea raised by accused was that ocular account of injuries was not supported by medical evidence---Validity---Person witnessing an incident of firing cannot be expected to give account of location of each fire shot on the person of deceased and direction of each fire shot with exactitude---Prosecution established presence of eye-witnesses at the spot at the time of occurrence, who had furnished straight forward and truthful account of occurrence---Single ground of conflict between ocular account and medical evidence was not sufficient to be made basis for acquittal---Supreme Court declined to interfere in conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused.

Asfandiyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009; Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487; Aman Ullah v. The State 2023 SCMR 723 and Imran Mehmood v. The State 2023 SCMR 795 ref.

Saeedullah Khan's case 1996 SCMR 1026; Abid Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 208; Ali Taj and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 900; Muhammad Iqbal v. Muhammad Akram 1996 SCMR 908; Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2010 SCMR 1025 and Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 rel.

(b) Criminal trial---

----Interested witness---Evidence---Principle---There is no universal principle that in every case interested witness should be disbelieved or disinterested witness should be believed---It all depends upon the rule of prudence and reasonableness to hold that a particular witness was present at scene of crime and that he was making a true statement.

Basharat Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

Ms. Memoona Ihsan-ul-Haq, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 939

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ

Qazi MUMTAZ HUSSAIN and others ---Appellants

Versus

GOVERNMENT OF SINDH through Secretary Revenue and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 112-K to 116-K of 2022, decided on 21st March, 2025.

(Against the order dated 07.10.2022 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Revision Applications Nos. 73 to 77 of 2004).

Land Reforms Act (II of l977)---

----S. 6---Land holdings---Void transfers---Doctrine of election---Applicability---Appellants assailed order of resumption of land under Martial Law Regulation No. 115, by Land Commission which order was maintained by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction---Validity---Appellants under the hierarchy of Land Reforms Act, 1977 invoked jurisdiction of Land Commissioner by filing their respective appeals which were taken to their logical end---By applying principle of doctrine of election, appellants could not be permitted to have another bite of the cherry by invoking original jurisdiction of Civil Court for a similar recourse---As per the doctrine of election a person aggrieved of an order/judgment may have a host of remedies to challenge the same but he has to elect one of those remedies and after choosing one he may not avail another remedy---Appellants themselves had chosen to be ousted from availing jurisdiction of Civil Court long back when they opted to invoke jurisdiction in pursuance of Land Reforms Act, 1977---Neither any mala fide could be attributed to actions taken by Land Commissioner nor could resumption of excess area in pursuance of Land Reforms Act, 1977, be termed as void or without jurisdiction---All that was done was within the frame of Land Reforms Act, 1977---Supreme Court declined to interfere with well-reasoned and comprehensive judgment encompassing all questions involved therein---High Court was well within its right to intervene while exercising jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C., as there was jurisdictional defect---Appeal was dismissed.

Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. Devan Sugar Mills Ltd. PLD 2018 SC 828 and Government of Pakistan v. Qazalbash Waqf 1993 SCMR 1697 rel.

Muhammad Yousaf Laghari, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.

Suresh Kumar, Additional Advocate General, Sindh, Ms. Lubna Pervaiz, Advocate-on-Record and Ghazanfar Ali Abbasi, Deputy Secretary BoR for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 944

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Salahuddin Panhwar, JJ

CHETAN ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 94 of 2023, decided on 6th March, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 22.03.2017 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Cr. Appeal No. D-45 of 2014 and Confirmation Case No. 9 of 2014).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Night occurrence---Source of light, absence of---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to death---Validity---Occurrence took place on the night of 11-01-2011 at 20:15 pm, however no source of light was mentioned in the FIR---In absence of any source of light, identification of accused in the darkness of night was not free from doubt---No recovery was effected insofar as source of light was concerned---In absence of any source of light having been mentioned in FIR and recovery of such source, identification of accused was not free from doubt---Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond shadow of doubt---If there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in prosecution case, then the same is sufficient to acquit accused---Case against accused was repleted with number of circumstances, which had created serious doubts in the prosecution story---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and by extending him benefit of doubt acquitted him of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Usman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2011 SCMR 1473; Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed 2017 SCMR 344; Zahir Yousaf v. The State 2017 SCMR 2002; Mst. Nazia Anwar v. The State 2018 SCMR 911 and Muhammad Azhar alias Ajja v. The State 2016 SCMR 1928 rel.

(b) Criminal Trial---

----Medical evidence---Ocular account---Conflict---Medico-ocular conflict regarding number of injuries sustained by deceased is fatal to prosecution case.

Usman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 137 and Muhammad Shafi alias Kuddoo v. The State 2019 SCMR 1045 rel.

Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Khadim Hussain, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State.

Prem (In person) along with Kanta, Sahil and Davsi for the Complainant (via video link Karachi).

2025 S C M R 952

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

Messrs PAYONEER INC., through authorized officer ---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Revenue Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 4177 of 2024, decided on 9th April, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 20.06.2024 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 2021).

Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----S. 114---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 185(3) & 199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Alternate and efficacious remedy---National Tax Number, issuance of---Tax non-resident, plea of---Petitioner/company was aggrieved of notice issued by tax authorities after issuing National Tax Number---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the notice issued by authorities---Validity---Registration alone under Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 or issuance of National Tax Number does not qualify as a coercive action against any entity---No prior notice before registration would have made any difference---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment of High Court in Constitutional petition, which was directly assailed before Supreme Court without exhausting remedy of Intra Court Appeal---Only under exceptional circumstances, to be adjudged by Supreme Court itself, such indulgence could be extended which did not exist in the present case---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal Division), LTU, Islamabad v. Messrs Geofizyka Krakow Pakistan Limited 2017 PTD 1526; Metropole Cinema's case 2014 SCMR 649 and Hub Power Company Ltd.'s case PLD 2023 SC 207 rel.

Jahanzeb Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Imtiaz Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for the Respondents.

2025 S C M R 955

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Amin-ud-Din Khan and Shahid Waheed, JJ

Mst. RAMZANU BIBI ---Appellant

Versus

IBRAHIM (deceased) through L.Rs. and others ---Respondents

C.A. No. 113-L of 2010, decided on 25th March, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 07.07.2003 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in C.R. No. 43 of 1991).

(a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 42---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120---Suit for declaration and injunction---Mutation of gift---Proof---Plea of fraud---Onus to prove---Appellant/plaintiff claimed to be owner of suit land and assailed mutation of gift on the plea of fraud, allegedly attested on her behalf in favour of respondents/defendants---Validity---Beneficiaries under mutation in question had burden to demonstrate validity of original transaction---This entailed meeting a threefold burden---Firstly, there was a pleading burden; respondents / defendants had to articulate all relevant facts and material particulars regarding purported gift in their written statement---Secondly, respondents/defendants had the burden of producing evidence, which meant presenting documents or testimony supporting their claims---Thirdly, they carried burden of persuasion, effectively convincing the Court of the legitimacy of their assertions regarding original gift transaction---Such burdens were not abstract legal formalities and formed the bedrock of fairness in civil litigation---Burden of pleading ensures proper framing of issues; the evidentiary burden establishes factual basis; and the burden of persuasion is the ultimate determinant of legal entitlement---Appellant/plaintiff was justified in delaying any legal action until the threat to her rights had become overt and undeniable---This point accrued when respondents/defendants formally denied her claim before revenue authorities---Such event culminated in an order directing appellant/plaintiff to pursue her claim in civil Court---Appellant's/plaintiff's suit was instituted within the stipulated limitation period---Supreme Court set aside concurrent findings of facts by all the Courts below as they were fundamentally flawed and the suit filed by appellant/plaintiff was decreed---Appeal was allowed.

Nirman Singh v. Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh AIR 1926 PC 100; Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani and 10 others 1992 SCMR 1832; Muhammad Akram and another v. Altaf Ahmad PLD 2003 SC 688; Muhammad Iqbal and another v. Mukhtar Ahmad through L.Rs. 2008 SCMR 855; Peer Baksh through L.Rs and others. v. Mst. Khanzadi and others 2016 SCMR 1417; Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276; Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85; Sher Baz Khan v. The State PLD 2003 SC 849; Bashir Ahmed v. Muhammad Rafiq 2002 SCMR 1291; Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Sakina Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 1021; Atta Muhammad and others v. Mst. Munir Sultan (deceased) through her L.Rs and others 2021 SCMR 73; Farhan Aslam and others v. Mst. Nuzba Shaheen and another 2021 SCMR 179; Mst. Farid-un-Nisa v. Munshi Mukhtar Ahmad and another AIR 1925 PC 204; Tara Kumari v. Chandra Mauleshwar AIR 1931 PC 303; Janat Bibi v. Sikandar Ali and others PLD 1990 SC 642; Muhammad Saeed v. Mst. Sharaf Elahi and another 2010 SCMR 1358; Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338; Muhammad Ashraf v. Bahadur Khan and others 1989 SCMR 1390; Mangal Sen v. Emperor AIR 1929 Lahore 210; Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash AIR 1972 SC 975; Jaspal Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1979 SC 1708; Land Acquisition Collector, Nowshera and others v. Sarfaraz Khan and others PLD 2001 SC 514; Raj Bibi v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Okara 2001 SCMR 1591; Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others 2007 SCMR 262; Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan AIR 1930 PC 270; Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh AIR 1931 PC 89; Izzat v. Allah Dita PLD 1981 SC 165 and Wali and others v. Akbar and others 1995 SCMR 284 rel.

(b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 42---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 122---Gift, reason of---Principle---Donor is not legally obligated to provide a rationale for his/her decision to make a gift---It is generally uncommon for a gift to be made without some form of explanation or justification, unless the donor suffers from a serious impairment in mental capacity---Superficial or frivolous gifts are often made, particularly to disadvantage female family members and undermine their inheritance rights---Courts retain the power to scrutinize motives and circumstances surrounding a gift, ensuring that rightful ownership is protected and that established lines of inheritance are respected.

Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 and Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85 rel.

(c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Arts. 59 & 84---Fingerprints---Forensic analysis---Dactyloscopy---Object, purpose and scope---Practice of utilizing fingerprints for identification, called dactyloscopy, has gained widespread acceptance and has become an indispensable tool to law due to its straightforward nature and cost-effectiveness---Dactyloscopy operates on the foundational principle that no fingerprints are alike and that an individual's fingerprint patterns remain constant throughout life---Such uniqueness makes fingerprints an invaluable asset in forensic science.

(d) Maxim---

----Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant---Meaning---Fraud and justice never dwell together.

(e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---

----S. 18---Fraudulent transactions, challenging of---Limitation---Fraud, by its very nature, unravels all aspects of any transaction, regardless of how solemnly it may have been conducted under the law---Any transaction born of deceit must be declared void, allowing the matter to be judged based on its substantive merits---This is important to prevent entrenchment of fraudulent actions, regardless of any time limitation issues.

(f) Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)---

----S. 42---Mutation---Scope---Mutation does not confer title in favour of any party but constitutes merely an official record for fiscal purposes---Illegal approval of any mutation by Revenue Officer has no bearing on the title and can be treated as a nullity.

Chunder Nath Chowdhry v. Tirthanund Thakoor and another 3 Calcutta 504; Tallapragada Sundarappa and another v. Boorugapalli Sreermalulu and another 30 Madras 402 and Sheedi v. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others PLD 1980 Lah. 477 rel.

(g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 42---Suit for declaration---Right to sue, accrual of---Principle---Declaratory suit that seeks to establish title to a particular property represents a subsisting right---Right to institute such a suit is a continuing right, remaining intact as long as the claimant (plaintiff) possesses rights to disputed property---Pivotal point at which right to sue accrues arises when opposing party denies or challenges specific rights associated with property in question or at least exerts an unequivocal threat to infringe that right---In situations characterized by successive acts of denial, a new cause of action arises each time as there is a significant challenge to the claimant's (plaintiff's) rights.

Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Fayyaz A. Sherazi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.

Sahibzada Anwar Hameed, Advocate Supreme Court for the Respondents.

2025 S C M R 967

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

SHAH HUSSAIN ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 681 of 2017, decided on 14th February, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 12.04.2016 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Appeal No. 723-P of 2015).

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 7(ff)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), S. 5---Explosive substance, recovery of---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Safe custody and transportation of case property---Explosive substance was alleged to have been recovered from accused who was riding a motor cycle which was being driven by co-accused---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment for fourteen years, whereas the co-accused was acquitted---Validity---Prosecution failed to prove that accused was owner of the motor cycle used in the occurrence, which was being driven by co-accused---Investigating officer handed over parcels of case property to Moharrar but Moharrar of Maal Khana of police station did not appear in witness box---Safe custody and transportation of parcels of explosive substance etc. was not proved during trial---Single circumstance, which creates doubt in prosecution case is sufficient to acquit accused---Case against accused was repleted with number of circumstances which had created serious doubts in prosecution story---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused by Trial Court and acquitted him of the charge by extending benefit of doubt---Appeal was allowed.

Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Syed Kosar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.

2025 S C M R 969

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ

The INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION, FBR and others ---Appellants

Versus

ABDUL KARIM and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 1088, 1231 to 1236 of 2013, 142-K of 2015, 938 of 2018 and 453 to 466 of 2022, decided on 17th April, 2025.

(On appeal from the judgment dated 27.05.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Civil Revision No. 1211 of 2011).

(a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----Ss. 2 (s), 156 (1) (89) & 211 (2)---Notification SRO 491(I)/85, dated 23-05-1985---Smuggled vehicles---Possession---Lawful excuse, plea of---Authorities were aggrieved of order passed by High Court in exercise of Reference jurisdiction pertaining to confiscation of vehicles in question which were alleged to be smuggled---Validity---Condition precedent for Section 156(1)(89) of Customs Act, 1969 to apply, is that goods in question should be smuggled, in terms of Section 2(s) of Customs Act, 1969, read with applicable notification thereunder---Vehicles in question could be considered smuggled if either (i) at the relevant time, the applicable notification in terms of Section 2(s)(ii) of Customs Act, 1969 included vehicles, or (ii) in terms of Section 2(s)(iii) of Customs Act, 1969 the vehicles were brought in by any route other than a route declared under Section 9 or 10 of Customs Act, 1969 or from any place other than the customs station---In cases of registered vehicles, if at the time the vehicle was intercepted, more than 3 years had elapsed for cases prior to Finance Act, 2007 and 5 years for cases thereafter, the defence of "lawful excuse" was indefeasible---It was reasonable to assume that if a vehicle stood registered, the government was presumed to have exercised due care and diligence with respect to its obligation to see whatever duties and taxes as payable to the government before a vehicle could be registered, stood paid---Vehicles in question were registered, which registration was duly verified, and they were presumed to have been brought lawfully; after completion of notified period in case of used vehicles also---Without any proof it could not be said that a person (last owner) was involved in registration of vehicle knowing fully well that no duties and taxes, as required under the law, were paid, and that therefore the vehicle was fraudulently registered, and the vehicle could be seized from him on his failure to produce documents of import and payment of duties and taxes thereon, and even beyond the period of three years or five years, as the case would be, as required under Section 211(2) of Customs Act, 1969---In most of the cases since first registration, the vehicles had changed many owners on the strength of registration book and no adverse inference could be drawn for the ultimate bona fide owners unless otherwise proved by the authorities, in which exercise they had failed---Verified registration book and official record was enough for bona fide presumption that a valid title existed---Vehicles in question were those which were either auctioned or were brought into Pakistan and were registered through a statutory process and the auction papers or registration papers of some other vehicles were not being used fraudulently---Where it was established that chassis/engine numbers had been tampered with after auction or registration to match the description of auctioned or registered vehicle, the lawful excuse was not available---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the orders passed by High Court as the questions had been answered cumulatively---Appeal was dismissed.

Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Panther Sports 2022 SCMR 1135 rel.

(b) Interpretation of statutes---

----Pari materia provisions---Interpretation---Principle---Where two provisions are pari materia, by applying doctrine of statutory construction, there cannot be a different interpretation for them.

(c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----S. 156 (1)(89)---Expression "lawful excuse"---Scope---Lawful excuse is an expression that is of wider import and (carries) lesser degree of burden than lawful authority---For proving a lawful excuse, which falls short of lawful authority, it is the excuse put forward by accused, rather than handling smuggled goods, that must be shown to be lawful.

PLD 1955 PC 29 rel.

Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 1088 of 2013).

M. D. Shehzad Feroze, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record and Shabbir Hussain, Superintendent Customs for Appelants (in C.As. Nos. 1231, 1233 and 1234 of 2013).

Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani, Collector (Enforcement), Karachi for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1232, 1235 and 1236 of 2013).

Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani, Collector (Enforcement), Karachi for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 142-K of 2015 and 462-463 of 2022).

Kafeel Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 938 of 2018) (via video-link from Karachi).

Akhtar Hussain, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and K. A. Wahab, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 453-461 and 464-466 of 2022) (both via video-link from Karachi).

Masood Ahmed, Director, Intelligence and Investigation, Customs, Imran Afzal, Additional Director and Shaheer Ahmed, ETO/E&T, Department for Appellant (department) (via video-link from Karachi).

M. Younas Thaheem, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 458 of 2022).

Ex-parte for all other Respondents.

Sirdar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, Advocate Supreme Court Amicus Curiae.

2025 S C M R 986

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

ABDULLAH alias Muhammad alias Masab and another ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Crl. P.L.A. No. 790 of 2017 and Jail Petition No. 527 of 2017, decided on 13th March, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgments dated 17.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 176 of 2015, as well as, Criminal Appeal No. 175 of 2015 and Capital Sentence Reference No. 07-T of 2015 respectively).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 449---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(i)(a)---Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908), Ss. 3 & 4---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)---Qatl-i-amd, loss to property and use of explosive substance---Re-appraisal of evidence---Withholding of best evidence---Benefit of doubt---Failure to produce Medico Legal Report of injured accused---Arrest before occurrence---Proof---Accused persons were alleged to have used explosive substance during their attack on a religious building, causing deaths, injuries to different persons and loss to property---Trial Court convicted the accused persons and sentenced them to death---Plea raised by accused persons was that they were already in custody in injured condition when the occurrence took place---Validity---If accused was apprehended on the day of occurrence in injured condition and medical treatment was provided to him at a hospital then why his medico legal report was not produced in evidence---Such fact supported claim of accused that they were earlier apprehended by the police and kept in illegal confinement during which they were physically tortured and they were made scapegoats in the case---Duration of injuries in the medico legal report showed that accused had injuries, which were caused 4/5 days earlier to the date of occurrence---Such fact had created further dent in the prosecution story---Medico Legal Report (MLR) of accused was the best evidence to show presence of accused at the time of occurrence which had not been produced in prosecution evidence---Adverse inference under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 could validly be drawn against prosecution that had that MLR been produced in the evidence, the same would not have supported prosecution case against accused---If there is a single circumstance which creates doubt in the prosecution case then the same is sufficient to acquit the accused---Case against accused persons was repleted with number of circumstances, which had created serious doubts in prosecution story---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons and they were acquitted of the charges---Appeal was allowed.

Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490; Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846; Riaz Ahmed v. The State 2010 SMCR 846; Abdul Oadeer v. The State 2024 SCMR 1146; Riasat Ali v. The State 2024 SCMR 1224; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.

Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka and Adil Aziz Qazi, Advocates Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Mirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 993

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

FIDA HUSSAIN alias Saboo ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 530 of 2022, decided on 29th January, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 12.10.2022 of the High Court of Sindh Circuit Court Hyderabad passed in Crl. A. No. D-118 of 2020).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 367(5)---Qatl-i-amd---Quantum of sentence---Determining factor---Expression "having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case" is of significance in the context of exercising discretion by Court in handing down one of the two prescribed punishments---If accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death and Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, then under S. 367(5), Cr.P.C. the reason why sentence of death was not passed has to be recorded in the judgment.

Dadullah and another v. The State 2015 SCMR 856; Khurram Malik and others v. The State and others PLD 2006 SC 354; Muhammad Aslam and another v. The State 2007 SCMR 1412; Ms. Najiba and another v. Ahmed Sultan and others 2001 SCMR 988; Khalid Mehmood and others v. The State 2011 SCMR 664; Asad Mahmood v. Akhlaq Ahmed and another 2010 SCMR 868 and Nadeem alias Nanha alias Billa Sher v. The State 2010 SCMR 949 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Mitigating circumstances---Motive not proved---Effect---Accused and three co-accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for committing Qatl-i-amd of wife of accused and were sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court acquitted three co-accused persons while sentence of accused was enhanced to death---Validity---Factum of motive was not proved by prosecution by bringing on record reliable and confidence inspiring evidence---All mitigating factors justified not handing down the sentence of death---Trial Court mentioned mitigating factors which had led to awarding sentence of life imprisonment---High Court had erroneously assumed that Trial Court did not record reasons---High Court enhanced sentence because, in its opinion, a harsher sentence should have been awarded---Supreme Court maintained conviction of accused as the prosecution had proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt but sentence of death was reduced to imprisonment for life as awarded by Trial Court---Appeal was partly allowed.

Dilawar Hussain v. The State 2013 SCMR 1582; Hassan and others v. The State and others PLD 2013 SC 793; Ghulam Mohyuddin alias Haji Babu and others v. The State 2014 SCMR 1034; Muhammad Asif v. Muhammad Akhtar 2016 SCMR 2035; Zafar Iqbal v. The State 2017 SCMR 1721; Hassan v. The State PLD 2013 SC 793; Abdul Haque v. The State PLD 1996 SC 1; Amjad Shah v. The State PLD 2017 SC 152 and Haji Muhammad Ilahi and others v. Muhammad Altaf alias Tedi and others 2011 SCMR 513 rel.

(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 417---Appeal against acquittal---Scope of interference with acquittal is narrow---There is a heavy burden on prosecution as there is a presumption of double innocence.

Ghulam Sajjad Gopang and Qari Abdul Rasheed, Advocates Supreme Court for Appellant.

Ghulam Shabbir Shar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant (though video link from Karachi)

Saleem Akhtar, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 1003

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ and Irfan Saadat Khan, J

Mst. HUMAIRA WAZIR ---Petitioner

Versus

MUHAMMAD FAISAL and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 344-P of 2022, decided on 7th March, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 31.01.2022 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No. 13-P of 2021).

Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5---Rules under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, Rr. 8, 10, 11, 12 & Form II, columns Nos. 13 & 16---Suit for recovery of jewelry and share in house--- Form of Nikahnama---Absence of entry---Petitioner / ex-wife was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court declining her jewelry allegedly snatched by respondent / ex-husband from her and her Shari share in ancestral house---Held, that petitioner / ex-wife admitted before Trial Court that she had given jewelry to respondent / ex-husband herself on his demand, therefore, there was no question of either snatching or taking away the same forcefully from her---Findings of Trial Court and High Court did not warrant any interference as allegation of snatching away of gold from her had remained unproved---High Court had rightly observed that columns Nos. 13 and 16 of Nikahnama entitled petitioner / ex-wife to have her Shari share in ancestral property, which respondent / ex-husband was bound to provide her, without any exception---Supreme Court maintained the judgment passed by High Court, as the same did not suffer from any misreading or non-reading of evidence or facts on record---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Ijaz Ahmed Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner along with Petitioner (video link from Peshawar).

Nemo for the Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1008

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Athar Minallah and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD MUSAWAR RAFIQ and 2 others ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE through P.G. Punjab ---Respondent

Criminal Review Petitions Nos. 14, 28 and 29 of 2023 in Criminal Petitions Nos. 76, 125 and 150 of 2019, decided on 24th March, 2025.

(To review judgment of this Court dated 19.01.2023, passed in Criminal Petitions Nos. 76, 77, 125 and 150 of 2019).

(a) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)---

----Ss. 4 & 5---Possessing explosive material---Case property---Seal not belonging to investigating officer---Effect---Seal affixed on parcels of case property and samples is usually with abbreviation of the name of investigating officer---Seal not matching with name of investigating officer supports the claim of accused regarding fake recovery proceedings.

(b) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)---

----Ss. 4 & 5---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7 & 11-F (2)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Review of judgment---Grave miscarriage of justice---Overlooking of material evidence---Contradictions in statements of witnesses regarding date and number of parcels deposited before forensic agency---Safe custody and safe transmission of the case property and sample parcels not established---Unqualified explosives inspector---Fake proceedings carried out by police---False implication---Accused persons sought review of the judgment passed by Supreme Court maintaining conviction and sentence awarded to them---Held, that there was nothing on record to show that accused persons belonged to any proscribed / terrorist organization---None of the prosecution witnesses stated that accused persons were members of any proscribed / terrorist organizations---Complainant failed to produce any proof that accused persons belonged to banned organization---Material facts / evidence were overlooked and could not be properly appreciated at the time of pronouncement of judgment under review, which resulted into grave miscarriage of justice to accused persons---Supreme Court could review its judgment for any sufficient reasons and there were many sufficient reasons to review judgment in question---Supreme Court reviewed its judgment and set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons who were acquitted of the charge while giving them benefit of doubt---Review petition was allowed.

Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.

Mudassar Khalid Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Basharat Ullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. R.Ps. Nos. 28 and 29 of 2023).

Malik Jawwad Khalid, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. R.P. No. 14 of 2023).

Irfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State (in all cases).

2025 S C M R 1015

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Musarrat Hilali and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

QAYUM NAWAZ ---Petitioner

Versus

GULAB KHAN and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 3586 of 2023, decided on 7th April, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 29.05.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench passed in Civil Revision No. 140-D of 2015 with Civil Misc. Nos. 144-D of 2015, 148-D of 2019 and 95-D of 2020).

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act (X of 1987)---

----Ss. 13(3), 15 & 19---Suit for possession through pre-emption---Talb-i-Ishhad---Notice not served under registered cover acknowledgment due---Mentioning of wrong mutation number--- Partial pre-emption---Effect---Concurrent findings of facts by all Courts below---Petitioner / pre-emptor was aggrieved of dismissal of his suit by all Courts below---Validity---Pre-emptor was required under Section 13(3) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987, to make Talb-i-Ishhad soon after making of Talb-i-Muwathibat, not later than two weeks from the date of knowledge, by sending a notice in writing attested by two truthful witnesses under registered cover acknowledgement due to vendee, confirming his intention to exercise right of pre-emption---Merely sending a notice in writing without establishing that such notice had been duly served upon vendee under registered cover acknowledgment due did not meet the requirement of law---Notice issued by petitioner / pre-emptor to respondent / vendee did not contain correct number of mutation---High Court was justified to conclude that petitioner / pre-emptor did not perform Talb-i-Ishhad against respondent / co-vendee with regard to property purchased through mutation---It had become partial pre-emption and bar on such pre-emption case in terms of Section 19 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987, was also attracted---Such omission by pre-emptor constituted waiver on the part of pre-emptor to pre-empt sale in view of Section 15 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

M. Anwar Awan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1018

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

PIOA SHAH ---Petitioner

Versus

AMIN KHAN and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 146-P of 2015, decided on 13th January, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 27.02.2015 passed by Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench in C. R. No. 90-B of 2009).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss.42 & 54---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 19, 20 & First Sched., Art. 148---Suit for declaration, injunction and redemption of mortgage---Limitation---Mortgage rights, purchase of---Effect---Petitioner / defendant purchased mortgage rights of suit property which was owned by respondents / plaintiffs---Held, that possession of petitioner / defendant over mortgaged property acted as an acknowledgement under Section 20(2) of Limitation Act, 1908 and period of fresh limitation had started running afresh---Purchase of mortgage rights from mortgagee also acted as acknowledgement under Section 19 of Limitation Act, 1908---Purchase of mortgage rights by petitioner / defendant had given a fresh start of limitation to respondent / plaintiff---Suit for redemption filed by respondents / plaintiffs was covered by both provisions of law i.e. Sections 19 and 20(2) of Limitation Act, 1908 and was well within the time and had rightly been so held by Courts below---Mortgagee was in possession and because of purchase of mortgage, fresh cause of action and fresh start of limitation had accrued to respondent / plaintiff---Petitioner / defendant purchased mortgagee rights which would confirm the fact that his right under prescription was not mature even till the cut-off date---Respondent / defendant could ask for redemption of his property from the charge of mortgage---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed against petitioner / defendant---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Nawaz Ali Khan and another v. Nawabzada and others PLD 2003 SC 425; Maqbool Ahmad v. Governm, ent of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 2063; Abdul Haq v. Ali Akbar and others 1999 SCMR 2531; Nawaz Ali Khan and another v. Nawabzada and others PLD 2003 SC 425; Durrani and 35 others v. Hamidullah Khan and 15 others 2007 SCMR 480; Muhammad Hussain and others v. Wahid Bakhs through Legal Heirs 2004 SCMR 1137 and Bilawar Khan v. Amir Sabar Rahman and others PLD 2013 Pesh. 38 ref.

Shah Faisal, Advocate Supreme Court and Haji Muhammad Zahir Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Salahuddin, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1024

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MANZAR ABBAS and another ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeals Nos. 438 and 439 of 2023, decided on 13th March, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 19.10.2016 and 18.02.2020 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, in Crl. Appeals Nos. 156 of 2012 and 347 of 2019, respectively).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S.302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Delay in FIR---Consultation---Presumption---Benefit of doubt---Accused persons were convicted for Qatl-i-amd by Trial Court and were sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentences of accused persons---Validity---Testimony of Investigating Officer was sufficient to prove that time consumed in consultation and deliberation caused delay in lodging FIR---If complainant and his wife were present at the spot and had witnessed the incident, there was no reason for them to make consultation and deliberation as to who should be the complainant of case, rather on arrival of police they could have straightaway narrated the occurrence and charged the accused---Occurrence had not taken place in the mode and manner as alleged by complainant and prosecution witnesses---Both alleged eye-witnesses were close relatives of deceased and were procured witnesses---False implication of accused person on the basis of motive of previous blood feud could not be ruled out---Motive was a double edged weapon, which could be used either way and by either side i.e. for real or false involvement---Prosecution failed to prove charge against accused persons as there were infirmities, glaring omissions and contradictions in prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt---For giving benefit of doubt it is not necessary that there should be so many circumstances rather a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind is sufficient for extending its benefit to accused not as a matter of concession but as of right---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused persons and they were acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64; Zeeshan alias Shani v. The State 2012 SCMR 428; Muhammad Fiaz Khan v. Ajmer Khan 2010 SCMR 105; Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1068; Irshad Ahmad v. The State 2011 SCMR 1190; Ulfat Hussain v. The State 2018 SCMR 313; Muhammad Yaseen v. Muhammad Afzal and another 2018 SCMR 1549; Muhammad Rafique v. The State 2014 SCMR 1698; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2012 SCMR 419; Khalid alias Khalidi and 2 others v. The State 2012 SCMR 327; Mst. Saima Noreen v. The State 2004 SCMR 1310; PLD 2011 SC 554; 2020 SCMR 1493; 2021 SCMR 387; Noor Elahi v. Zafrul Haque PLD 1976 SC 557; Allah Bakhsh v. The State PLD 1978 SC 171; Khadim Hussain v. The State 2010 SCMR 1090; Tahir Khan v. The State 2011 SCMR 646; Tariq v. The State 2017 SCMR 1672; Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652; Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 735 rel.

Muhammad Amin Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in Crl. Appeal No. 438 of 2023).

Ansar Nawaz Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (in Crl. Appeal No. 439 of 2023).

Ms. Memoona Ihsan-ul-Haq, Deputy Prosecutor-General, Punjab for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1032

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shahid Bilal Hassan and Aamer Farooq, JJ

MUHAMMAD AKRAM ---Petitioner

Versus

SHAFAQAT ALI ---Respondent

C.P.L.A. No. 1033-L of 2024, decided on 27th March, 2025.

(Against the order dated 21.05.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in C.R. No. 30366 of 2024).

(a) Administration of justice---

----Laws, rules, regulations and procedures---Object, purpose and scope---Laws and Rules are enacted and formulated as well as promulgated in order to streamline working and functioning of institution(s), Court(s) and forum(s)---If any institution(s) is functioning without formal rule(s) or regulation(s) and any parameters, making its employee(s) answerable and accountable for act(s) or fault, it would cause an anomalous situation and such institution(s) would not remain functional for a long time---Same is the situation in judicial system, if litigants are allowed to proceed with their matters without following rules and regulations, framed and promulgated to lead litigation to ultimate end at the earliest, it would not only increase burden upon Court(s) but also destroy trust of general public upon the judicial system---Litigants cannot be permitted to take the Courts for granted and proceed with the lis as per their whims and wishes as well as cause agony to their rival parties without any progress in the matter(s) brought against them (rival party).

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O. XVII, R.3---Decision of suit in absence of evidence---Pre-conditions---Evidence of a party cannot be closed under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. for non-production of evidence where the case on previous date was not adjourned at the request of such party---For the application of Order XVII, Rule 3 C.P.C. following conditions must co-exist: i) Adjournment must have been granted to the party at his request; ii) It must have been granted to it for the purposes mentioned in Order XVII, Rule 3 C.P.C.; iii) The party which has taken the time defaulted in doing the act - for which it took the time from the Court; iv) Party must be present or deemed to be present before the Court; v) There must be some material on record for decision of the case on merits and; vi) The court must decide the suit forthwith that is within a reasonable time.

(c) Punjab Pre-emption Act (IX of 1991)---

----S. 13---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XVII, R.3---Suit for possession through pre-emption---Failure to produce evidence---Dismissal of suit---Principle---Petitioner / plaintiff was aggrieved of judgment and decree passed against him on his failure to produce his evidence---Validity---More than sufficient opportunities were granted to petitioner / plaintiff for producing his evidence and despite putting him under caution he did not bother to avail the same---Such indolent person(s) could not be allowed to play with the process of Court and linger on the matter on one pretext or the other, that too, without any plausible and valid reason---Petitioner was granted with absolutely last and final opportunities for production of his evidence with clear cut warnings but the petitioner did not pay any heed to such orders and direction of Trial Court---Such act of petitioner / plaintiff showed his adamant attitude towards the orders of Trial Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the orders passed by all Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Rana Tanveer Khan v. Naseer-Ud-Din and others 2015 SCMR 1401; Moon Enterpriser CNG Station, Rawalpindi v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited through General Manager, Rawalpindi and another 2020 SCMR 300; Duniya Gul and another v. Niaz Muhammad and others PLD 2024 SC 672 and Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh PLD 2024 SC 887 rel.

Muhammad Akhtar Rana, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Syed Almas Haider Kazmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.

Assisted by: Owais Nasir, L.C.

2025 S C M R 1041

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi and Salahuddin Panhwar, JJ

AHSAN ALI DAWACH ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through Chairman NAB and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 256-K of 2024, decided on 18th March, 2025.

(Against the order dated 13.03.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Civil Petition No. D-1077 of 2023).

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 516-A---Superdari---Interim custody of vehicle---Effect---Permitting interim custody of vehicle on Superdari neither amounts to prejudice the trial nor gives a clean chit to accused, nor does it relieve or exempt owner / recipient of custody from pending legal proceedings---Duration of interim custody may continue subject to the bond and surety till the final fate of the case---Till then the person allowed interim custody is duty-bound under law to attend, participate and produce the vehicle as and when directed by Court.

(b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)---

----Ss. 12, 13 & 17---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.516-A---Freezing of vehicle---Superdari---Interim custody, grant of---Non-filing of objections---Criminal Procedure Code, 1898---Applicability---Petitioner / accused was aggrieved of refusal to grant interim custody of vehicle in question which was frozen under section 12 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 by Accountability Court---High Court declined to give interim custody of the vehicle as the accused had not filed any objection against freezing order---Validity---Accused never endeavored to challenge freezing order, rather he accepted it without demur but he applied for custody of vehicle within the sphere of freezing order (which was confined to an embargo against transfer of vehicle only)---There was no demonstrable restriction or prohibition in law that if an accused or aggrieved person had failed to lodge a claim or objection against freezing order in terms of Section 13 of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, they would be deprived and perpetually or unremittingly not be able to apply for interim custody of vehicle / property---There is no inconsistency or incongruity between section 516-A, Cr.P.C. and provision of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---There is no specific provision for releasing custody of vehicle embedded in National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and there are also no absolute restrictions against doing so---Aid and assistance may be taken by Courts from general provisions of Cr.P.C., particularly when the letter of law indubitably makes it clear that provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 apply mutatis mutandis to proceedings unless there is anything inconsistent with the provisions of National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court and allowed interim custody of vehicle in question on Superdari, in terms of Section 516-A, Cr.P.C.---Appeal was allowed.

Muhammad Iqbal Chaudhry v. Secretary, Ministry of Industries and Production, Government of Pakistan and others PLD 2004 SC 413; Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited v. Government of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 630; Amanullah Khan v. Federal Government of Pakistan PLD 1990 SC 1092; Abid Hasan v. PIAC 2005 SCMR 25 and Khalid Humayun v. The NAB through DG Quetta and others PLD 2017 SC 194 ref.

(c) Interpretation of statutes---

----General and special laws---Object, purpose and scope---Special law is meant to refer to laws regulating specific subjects and stipulating their own limitations and conditions to be applied---Special law prevails and dominates over general law---Courts while resolving the issue of whether a statute is a special or general law, the crucial consideration must be the legislative intent---In case of divergence, rule of harmonious construction may be adopted.

Shaukat Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Sattar Mehmood Awan, Deputy Prosecutor General, Syed Meeral Shah, Special Prosecutor and Irfan Ali, I.O/Deputy Director for the NAB.

2025 S C M R 1053

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 555 of 2017, decided on 12th March, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 07.06.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No.1044 of 2012 and Murder Reference No. 241 of 2012).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Eye-witnesses---Presence at place of occurrence---Proof---Ocular and medical evidence---Conflict---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to death but High Court altered the sentence to imprisonment for life---Validity---Reason mentioned by prosecution eye-witnesses for their presence at place of occurrence, which was situated in a different village could not be established---It was not safe to rely upon such evidence---Conflict between ocular account and medical evidence showed that infact prosecution eye-witnesses were not present at the spot at the relevant time---If eye-witnesses had been present at the time of occurrence they should have given correct number of injuries sustained by deceased---Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond shadow of doubt---Even a single circumstance, which creates doubt in prosecution case, is sufficient to acquit accused---Case against accused was repleted with number of circumstances, which had created serious doubts in prosecution story---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and while giving him benefit of doubt, acquitted him of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Mst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others 2015 SCMR 1142; Muhammad Irshad v. Allah Ditta and others 2017 SCMR 142; Muhammad Ali v. The State 2015 SCMR 137; Usman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Pathan v. The State 2015 SCMR 315; Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326; Liaquat Ali v. The State 2008 SCMR 95; Zahoor Ahmad v. The State 2017 SCMR 1662; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.

Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Mirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.

2025 S C M R 1058

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

The PROVINCE OF SINDH through Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and others ---Petitioners

Versus

ABID ALI JATOI and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 220-K to 442-K of 2025, decided on 20th March, 2025.

(Against the impugned judgment dated 19.11.2024 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Bench at Sukkur in C.Ps. Nos. D-176, 264, 544, 284, 1422, 1437, 1461, 1471, 1489, 1493, 1502, 1504, 1535, 1510, 455 of 2023, C.P. No. D-1699 of 2018, C.P. No. D-910 of 2020, C.P. No. D-1543 of 2021, C.P. No. D-1273, 211, C.Ps. Nos. D-1256, 1399, 1424, 1474, 1479, 1480, 1485, 1487, 1488, C.Ps. Nos. D-2889 of 2014, 1492, 1499, 1505, 1696,1515, 1519, 1521, 1529, 1532, 1545, 1536, 1538, 1539, 1547, 1554, 1555, 1561, 1562, 1571, 1572, 1573, 1617, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1611, 1625, 1626, 1627, 1628, 1633, 1641, 1643, 1644, 1646, 1649, 1664, 1665, 1689, 1707, 1708, 1713, 1719, 1720, 1724, 1725, 1729, 1731, 1749, 1750, 1751, 1772, 1773, 1774, 1786, 1789, 1791, 1792, 1796, 1800, 1803, 1804, 1809, 1810, 1811, 1819, 1835, 1836, 1837, 1845, 1846, 1875, 1904, 1905, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1913, 1914, 1929, 1934, 1936, 1940, 1944, 1947, 1973, 1997, 2004, 1629, 1838, 1645, 1697, 1821, 1878, 1889, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1978, 1982, 1991 and 2000 of 2024).

(a) Sindh Empowerment of 'Persons with Disabilities' Act (XLVIII of 2018)---

----Ss. 3, 11 & 25---Sindh Civil Servants Act (XIV of 1973), S. 5---Disabled/differently-abled, persons---Appointments---Reserved quota---Respondents were disabled/differently-abled persons who approached High Court and sought directions against Government of Sindh for their appointment according to 5% quota, reserved under section 5 of Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973---Validity---Sindh Empowerment of 'Persons with Disabilities' Act, 2018 Act is a beneficial legislation enacted for empowerment of persons with disabilities, focused on a particular subject---As such Sindh Empowerment of 'Persons with Disabilities' Act, 2018 has to be enforced and implemented in letter and spirit across the board without any bias and discrimination---There was no logical justification to cause any interference in judgment passed by High Court merely on the foothold of alleged or purported objectionable portion highlighted by authorities, which was nothing but an amplification in the broader context---High Court had directed that all such persons who had already applied for jobs against vacant situations should have their applications considered at the outset rather than shelved or deferred under the garb or guise of fresh applications submitted for the same purposes by new entrants---High Court also cautioned Deputy Commissioners that any appointment made without inclusion of petitioners, who were differently-abled persons, would not be accepted and would be subject to legal scrutiny and action---Such observations of High Court were logical and did not prejudice interest of the petitioners / authorities in any event but rather served as a guideline to ensure finality and conclusiveness in recruitment process of disabled or differently-abled persons in accordance with the law---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Chairman, NADRA and others v. Abdul Majeed and another 2025 SCP 30 ref.

(b) Legislation---

----Enforcement of law--- Object, purpose and scope---Judicial review---Scope---Mere legislation is not sufficient, nor does it serve any purpose unless it is specifically enforced and administered---Implementing and enforcing laws in right dimensions represents unfeigned strategy through which government authorities put laws into action for effective and meaningful compliance under their beneficiaries---Effectual and proficient implementation of law is not only essential for maintaining order but it also guarantees justice, evenhandedness and equality in society with impartiality---Tool of judicial review is also a significant modus operandi that authorizes Courts to dwell on legislative competence, the Constitutionality of law and executive actions, to analyze whether the law aligns with Constitutional mandates and whether its implementation is fair and just, without any arbitrariness or discrimination---This is necessary for safeguarding and upholding rights of people as a key element in strengthening rule of law.

Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General Sindh, Dr. Rana Khan, Advocate-on-Record along with Bhuro Mal, Additional Director (Law) (SGA&CD) for Petitioners.

Zaheeruddin Mujahid, Advocate Supreme Court and Ms. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 220-K of 2025, 271-K of 2025 and 307-K of 2025).

Farman Ali Tanwari, focal person for Court cases for Department of Employment of Persons with disabilities.

2025 S C M R 1066

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shahid Bilal Hassan and Aamer Farooq, JJ

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF and others ---Petitioners

Versus

MUHAMMAD KHAN and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 2270-L of 2016, decided on 3rd April, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 01.06.2016 passed by Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in C.R. No. 382 of 2010).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, Rr. 1 & 2---Suit for declaration and injunction---Withdrawal of suit---Formal defect--- Proof--- Petitioners / plaintiffs were aggrieved of order passed by High Court declining withdrawal of suit with permission to file fresh suit on the plea of some formal defect---Validity---Petitioners / plaintiffs could not refer to any 'formal defect' which could be: misdescription of partis, incorrect valuation, procedural errors or technical defects, which did not affect merits of the case and if such defects went to the root of the case, the same could not be considered as formal defects---When there was a verdict against petitioners / plaintiffs existing in field, they could not be allowed to step back, without disclosing formal defect in the plaint by using shoulders of Court---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court as there was no illegality, and the law on the subject had correctly and judiciously been appreciated and construed---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Muhammad Yar (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Muhammad Amin (deceased) through L.Rs. and others 2013 SCMR 464; Khawaja Bashir Ahmed and Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Messrs Martrade Shipping and Transport and others PLD 2021 SC 373 and Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 rel.

Mian Muhammad Tayyib Watto, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondents.

Assisted by: Owais Nasir, L.C.

2025 S C M R 1073

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Ayesha A. Malik and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, CORPORATE ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, FAISALABAD ---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs NATIONAL PUBLIC WELFARE SOCIETY, JINNAH COLONY, FAISALABAD and another ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 687-L of 2024, decided on 23rd April, 2025.

(Against order dated 31.01.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.R. No. 77169 of 2022).

Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----Ss. 2(36), 122 & 237(1)---Income Tax Rules, 2002, R. 214---Notification SRO No. 754 (I)/2016, dated 15-08-2016---Welfare society---Tax credit---Nature of amendment---Authorities issued notice for tax recovery to respondent / taxpayer on the ground that it did not have valid approval in its favour for claiming tax credits---Validity---Provision of Rule 214 of Income Tax Rules, 2002 was to apply for subsequent three years---Such amendment was to apply prospectively as the words subsequent three years did not suggest that the amendment was to apply retrospectively---Notification SRO No. 754 (I)/2016, dated 15-08-2016did not contain any provision which could suggest that the notification would apply retrospectively---Approval obtained by respondent / taxpayer in year 2007 was valid and it did not expire in year 2010, on account of notification SRO No. 754 (I)/2016, dated 15-08-2016---Retrospective application of law cannot be made unless specifically provided for, particularly in tax cases---Notification SRO No. 754 (I)/2016, was issued on 15-08-2016, the period of three years was to be counted subsequent thereto which meant that the approval granted would expired in August 2019---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the matter as the respondent / taxpayer had relevant approval necessary for claiming tax credit for the tax year 2019 and was entitled to it---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Millat Tractors Ltd. 2024 SCMR 700 rel.

Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

M. Amir Sohail Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1076

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

The CHIEF COMMISSIONER REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, BAHAWALPUR and others ---Petitioners

Versus

SHAHEEN YOUSAF ---Respondent

C.P.L.A. No. 808 of 2023, decided on 16th April, 2025.

(Against the order dated 21.12.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur in W.P. No. 5193/2017).

Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 25---Employment---Prime Minister's Assistance Package for the Families of Deceased Government Employees---Re-marriage of widow of deceased civil servant---Reinstatement in service---Respondent was appointed as a Lower Division Clerk, under Prime Minister's Assistance Package for the Families of Deceased Government Employees but later on her services were terminated on the ground of her remarriage---High Court reinstated the respondent in service---Validity---Constitution secures fundamental rights for individuals as equal citizens not as appendages of patriarchal roles or marital identities---Women are not defined by the men in their lives; they are autonomous and rights-bearing individuals---Denying a woman right to employment on the basis of her remarriage is a blatant reinforcement of patriarchal control, seeking to subordinate her legal identity to societal expectations---Financial independence is not a concession to women, it is the foundation of their Constitutional agency, dignity, and full participation in public life---Law must dismantle, not perpetuate, the structures that reduce women to secondary citizens in the eyes of society---Impugned office order was discriminatory as it singled out widows, the female spouses of deceased government employees for disqualification from compassionate employment upon remarriage, without imposing a corresponding restriction on widowers, notwithstanding the Prime Minister's Assistance Package which offered compassionate employment to both a widow and a widower---Gender-specific disqualification amounts to direct discrimination based on sex, contravening Articles 25(1) and 25(2) of the Constitution, which guarantee equality before law and prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court, whereby respondent was reinstated in service---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Zahida Parveen v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa C.P.L.A No. 566/2024 2025 SCP 107; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Syed Sadiq Shah 2021 SCMR 747; Federation of Pakistan v. Shuja Sharif 2023 SCMR 129; Hadayat Ullah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1691; Syed Azam Shah v. Federation of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 201; Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 265; Margaret Owen, 'The Human Rights of Widows in Developing Countries' in Kelly D Askin and Dorean M Koenig (eds) Women and International Human Rights Law (Brill 2023) and Kate Young, 'Widows without rights: challenging marginalization and dispossession' (2016) 14(2) Gender and Development. Paragraph 25 of the judgment provides that "it is clarified that the instant judgment shall not affect the appointments already made of the widow/widower, wife/husband or child of deceased or retired civil servants." Zarai Taraqiati Bank v. Sarfraz Khan Jadoon 2021 SCMR 1305; Pakistan Medical and Dental Council v. Muhammad Fahad Malik 2018 SCMR 1956 and General Post Office, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Jalal PLD 2024 SC 1276 rel.

General Post Office, Islamabad and others v. Muhammad Jalal PLD 2024 SC 1276 ref.

Hafiz S. A. Rehman, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondent.

Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk.

2025 S C M R 1082

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 188 of 2023, decided on 7th April, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 01.07.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court, Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. D-68 of 2015 and Confirmation Case No. D-08 of 2015).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Motive, vague in nature---Forensic Science Laboratory Report---Principle---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to death---Validity---Vague motive was alleged by prosecution, which had not been proved---Recovery of blood stained hatchet and positive report of Chemical Examiner, could not be considered without discussing merits and demerits of such pieces of prosecution evidence---When prosecution evidence had already been disbelieved, which was direct evidence, conviction and sentence of accused could not be maintained, merely on the basis of alleged recovery of hatchet and positive Forensic Science Laboratory Report---Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond shadow of doubt---If there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in prosecution case then the same is sufficient to acquit accused---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused as the case was repleted with number of circumstances, which had created serious doubts in prosecution story---Appeal was allowed.

Shaukat Hussain v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2024 SCMR 929; Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490; Liaquat Ali v. The State 2008 SCMR 95; Pathan v. The State 2015 SCMR 315; Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326; Dr. Israr-ul-Haq v. Muhammad Fayyaz 2007 SCMR 1427; Muhammad Afzal alias Abdullah and others v. The State and others 2009 SCMR 436; Abdul Mateen v. Sahib Khan and others PLD 2006 SC 538 and Nek Muhammad and another v. The State PLD 1995 SC 516 rel.

Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Khadim Hussain, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1087

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

WAQAS AHMAD ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 539 of 2017, decided on 9th April, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 10.04.2017 of the learned Lahore High Court Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 224-J of 2012 and Murder Reference No. 219 of 2012).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129, illustration (g)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Un-explained delay in registration of FIR---Presence of complainant at place of occurrence---Proof---Giving up of material witness---Presumption---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and Trial Court sentenced him to death but High Court converted the sentence into imprisonment for life---Validity---Un-explained delay in lodging FIR created doubt in prosecution's case and benefit of the same had to be extended and construed in favour of accused---Statement of complainant suffered from material contradictions which had created serious doubt about his presence at the spot at the time of occurrence as well as veracity of his statement---Complainant's statement was not corroborated by any tangible substance, therefore, his testimony could not be made basis for recording conviction for offence entailing capital punishment---Two persons who according to complainant had also witnessed occurrence were abandoned by prosecution for no good reason---Adverse inference was drawn under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 to the effect that had the two witnesses been produced by prosecution, they would not have supported prosecution's case---Such infirmities, glaring omissions and contradictions in prosecution's case led to the conclusion that prosecution had failed to prove charge against accused beyond reasonable doubt---For giving benefit of doubt it is not necessary that there should be so many circumstances, rather a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind is sufficient for extending its benefit to accused not as a matter of concession but as of right---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded by Courts below which were result of misreading and non-reading of evidence and accused was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State and others PLD 2019 SC 64; Zeeshan alias Shani v. The State 2012 SCMR 428; Muhammad Fiaz Khan v. Ajmer Khan 2010 SCMR 105; Muhammad Ilyas v. Muhammad Abid alias Billa and others 2017 SCMR 54; Khalid alias Khalidi and 2 others v. The State 2012 SCMR 327; Sufyan Nawaz and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 192; Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2012 SCMR 419; Muhammad Jahangir v. The State 2024 SCMR 1741; Irfan Ali.v. The State 2015 SCMR 840; Muhammad Riaz v. the State 2024 SCMR 1839; Mst. Saima Noreen v. The State 2004 SCMR 1310; PLD 2011 SC 554; 2020 SCMR 1493; 2021 SCMR 387; Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 736 rel.

Ms. Ruqia Samee, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Nemo for the Complainant.

Ms. Memoona Ihsan-ul-Haq, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 1093

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Musarrat Hilali and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

MUHAMMAD AZEEM and others ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 1315-L of 2022, decided on 7th April, 2025.

(Against the order dated 19.09.2022 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Revision No. 55552 of 2022).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 337-A (ii)(iv), 337-F(i)(iii), 147 & 149---Shajjah-i-mudihah, shajiah-i-munaqqilah, ghayr-jaifah damihah, ghayr-jaifah mutafahimah and rioting armed with deadly weapons---Accused in column No. 2, summoning of---Cross version---Inordinate delay---Appellants were nominated in cross version by accused persons nominated in the FIR---After thorough investigation by police, appellants were shown in column No. 2 of investigation report---Trial Court did not concur with such report and summoned appellants to face the trial---Order passed by Trial Court was maintained by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction---Validity---There was inordinate delay while introducing counter version---Medical report of injuries had been challenged before Medical Board constituted pursuant to Court's order but accused in FIR failed to appear for medical examination---Cognizance was taken under Section 190, Cr.P.C. by Trial Court, without summoning Investigating Officer or pointing out any error or illegality in the process of investigation---Both the Courts below failed to examine entire facts and material, including investigation of counter version case, and had failed to refer to any factual error or legal infirmity while discarding report furnished by Investigating Officer under Section 173, Cr.P.C.---Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed.

Munir Ahmad Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link from Lahore).

Rai Akhtar Hassan, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.

Irfan Ali and Imran Ali for Respondents (both in person).

2025 S C M R 1096

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

SURFACTANT CHEMICALS COMPANY (PVT.) LIMITED, KARACHI ---Petitioner

Versus

FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and others ---Respondents

Civil Petitions Nos. 5029 to 5032 of 2024, decided on 18th April, 2025.

(Against the orders/judgments dated 12.09.2024 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Const. P. No. D-4002 of 2019, Const. P. No. D-6074 of 2021 and Const. Ps. Nos. 774 and 2385 of 2022).

Customs Act (IV of 1969)---

----S. 19---Notification S.R.O. 565(I)/ 2006, dated 05-06-2006 and S.R.O 474(I)/2016, dated 24-06-2016---Customs duty---Exemption---Duty in excess of zero percent---Applicability---Petitioner/importer was aggrieved of imposition of import duty on chemical imported---Validity---Treatment of goods disclosed in S.R.O. 565(I)/2006, dated 05-06-2006 were subject to fulfillment of certain obligations---Amended S.R.O. 474(I0/2016, dated 24-06-2016 itself put petitioner/importer under obligations to provide its qualification in order to fectch exemption which was only available for manufacturing or formulation of agricultural pesticides by manufacturers and formulators and that could only be recognized and approved by the Ministry of National Food Security and Research---Column (2) of S.R.O. had restricted and prescribed a condition and treatment of goods of column (3) in terms of exemption of customs duty could only be if condition prescribed in Column (2) was met---Petitioner/importer was neither recognized nor approved by the Ministry of National Food Security and Research either as manufacturer or formulator of Agricultural pesticides---If petitioner/importer had chosen to protect any such alleged right which claimed to have been violated by the S.R.O., the petitioner/importer was at liberty and if any such right was exercised, it should be dealt with in accordance with the law, and permission as such was not required---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Taimur Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner (in all cases).

Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (FBR) (in C.Ps. Nos. 5029, 5031-5032 of 2024).

Nemo for Respondents (in C.P. No. 5030 of 2024).

2025 S C M R 1099

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

JABRAN and another ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE through Director General FIA and others ---Respondents

Criminal Petitions Nos. 1565 and 1574 of 2024, decided on 21st March, 2025.

(On appeal against the orders dated 05.11.2024 and 01.11.2024 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Crl. Misc. No. 1728-B of 2024 and Crl. Misc. No. 1636-B of 2024, respectively).

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497 (1)---Bail---Period of sentence for the offence---Consideration---At bail stage, maximum period of sentence prescribed for an offence is to be considered for determining whether the offence falls under the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Cr.P.C.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(2)---Anti-Money Laundering Act (VII of 2010), Ss. 3 & 4---Money laundering---Bail, grant of---Tax returns---Declared properties---Accused persons were arrested in an inquiry initiated on the basis of predicate offence regarding demanding / accepting bribery and purchasing of assets from such money---There was no evidence on record that accused actually paid consideration amount to sellers for the plot purchased by the wife of co-accused---Such fact would be appreciated by Trial Court after reading the evidence---All other properties of accused persons mentioned were not part of FIR and were declared in the appended tax returns of accused persons---Tax returns of accused persons had given rise to the presumption that the same had been legally acquired through declared sources---Whether properties were actually connected to any illegal activity would ultimately be determined by Trial Court---Prosecution case was based upon documentary evidence only which was already available with F.I.A. authorities and there was no apprehension of tampering with the same if accused persons were admitted to bail---Co-accused appended his Asset Declarations for relevant years to demonstrate availability of funds---Appended documents also indicated that sale consideration for vehicle in question was paid by co-accused himself through banking channels---Transactions in question were reflected in bank statements, which had been attached---Case of both the accused persons fell within the ambit of further inquiry under section 497(2), Cr.P.C and they were entitled to grant of post-arrest bail---Bail was allowed.

Jamal-ud-Din v. State 2012 SCMR 573; Gul Rehman v. State PLD 2021 SC 795; Hazrat Amin v. State 2020 SCMR 418; Socha Gul v. State 2015 SCMR 1077; Anti-Narcotics Force through its Regional Director/Force Commander, A.N.F. Rawalpindi v. Qasim Ali 2019 SCMR 1928; Ghulam Murtaza v. State PLD 2009 Lahore 362 and Majid Ali v. State 2022 P Cr. L J 981 rel.

Khuda Bux v. State 2010 SCMR 1160 distinguished.

Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. P. 1565 of 2024).

Umair Majeed Malik, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in Crl. P. 1574 of 2024).

Raja Shafaqat Abbasi, DAG for the State.

Arslan, Inspector (FIA) for the State.

Assisted by: Johar Imam and Habib Khan, Law Clerks.

2025 S C M R 1110

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

IMTIAZ HUSSAIN SHAH alias Tajjay Shah and another ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Crl. Appeals Nos. 201-L and 202-L of 2020 and Crl. PLA No. 596-L of 2016, decided on 14th March, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 09.03.2016, passed by the learned Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeal No. 169/J of 201l and Murder Reference No. 503 of 2011).

(a) Criminal Trial---

----Murder case---Night time occurrence---Source of light, absence of---Effect---In absence of source of light mentioned in FIR and recovery of such source, the identification of accused becomes questionable.

Usman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Principle---Night time occurrence---Medical evidence contradicting ocular account---Presence of alleged eye-witnesses at the spot doubtful---Delay in conducting postmortem examination---Accused persons were convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to death but High Court converted the sentence into imprisonment for life---Validity---Evidence of recovery and motive had rightly been discarded by High Court---Prosecution failed to prove guilt of accused persons through cogent and confidence inspiring direct and circumstantial evidence---Prosecution evidence was riddled with doubts, benefit of which was extended to accused persons not as a matter of grace or concession but as a matter of right---For giving benefit of doubt it is not necessary that there should be multiple circumstances rather a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind is sufficient for extending its benefit to accused---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused person who were acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Mst. Saima Noreen v. The State 2004 SCMR 1310; PLD 2011 SC 554; 2020 SCMR 1493; 2021 SCMR 387; Usman alias Kaloo v. The State 2017 SCMR 622; Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1068; Irshad Ahmad v. The State 2011 SCMR 1190; Ulfat Hussain v. The State 2018 SCMR 313; Muhammad Yaseen v. Muhammad Afzal and another 2018 SCMR 1549; Muhammad Rafique v. The State 2014 SCMR 1698; Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2012 SCMR 419; Khalid alias Khalidi and 2 others v. The State 2012 SCMR 327; Muhammad Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772 and Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 736 rel.

Mazhar Iqbal Sidhu, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Cr. A. No. 201-L of 2020).

Ijaz Ahmad Janjua, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Cr. A. No. 202-L of 2020) through video link from Lahore.

Muhammad Aslam Zar, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Cr. PLA. No. 596-L of 2016).

Ms. Memoona Ihsaan-ul-Haq, DPG for the State (in all cases).

2025 S C M R 1117

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

AYESHA TAYYAB ---Petitioner

Versus

STATION HOUSE OFFICER, POLICE STATION CANTT. DISTRICT SIALKOT and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1575 of 2024, decided on 22nd May, 2025.

(On appeal against the order dated 08.03.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 1684 of 2024).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 154---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 406---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Criminal breach of trust---Quashing of FIR---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Allegations against the accused-respondents were that they dishonestly misappropriated an amount of Rs. 40 lac obtained by them from petitioner as loan---Petitioner lodged FIR under S. 406 P.P.C---High Court quashed the said FIR in its writ jurisdiction---Validity---Loan did not qualify as an entrustment---Where entrustment was made a fiduciary relationship arose between the giver and recipient, and the specific property entrusted was expected to be returned in its original form to the giver---However, such elements were absent in a loan where the relationship between the lender and borrower was purely contractual and there was no expectation of return of the same exact property, but rather something of the same value was returned---Even otherwise, there was a gross contradiction in the contents of the FIR, wherein it was first claimed that the amount was given as a loan but then it was alleged that the property was given as a trust---Thus, it appeared that the term 'Amanat' had been employed merely as a tool to attract the application of S. 406 P.P.C. and to secure the registration of FIR against the respondents---Additionally, no documentary evidence was available on the record which proved or showed that the petitioner gave the amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- (rupees forty lac only) to the respondents and the same had been noted by the High Court---Necessary implication of such legal interpretation, factual inconsistencies in FIR and non-availability of any documentary proof was that the offence punishable under S. 406 P.P.C was not made out from the contents of the quashed FIR---Thus, the decision of High Court to quash the FIR was in accordance with law---Consequently, leave to appeal was declined and petition was dismissed accordingly.

DG Anti-Corruption, Establishment Lahore v. Muhammad Akram Khan and others PLD 2013 SC 401 and Muhammad Ali v. Samina Qasim Tarar 2022 SCMR 2001 ref.

Shahnaz Begum v. High Court of Sindh and Baluchistan PLD 1971 SC 677; The State v. Asif Ali Zardari and another 1994 SCMR 798); Muhammad Khalid Mukhtar v. The State PLD 1997 SC 275; Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib and others 2011 SCMR 1813; FIA, Director General FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others PLD 2023 SC 265; Ajmeel Khan v. Abdul Rahim and others PLD 2009 SC 102; The State through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore v. Chaudhry Mohammad Khan and others PLD 2025 SC 254; Zahid Jameel v. S.H.O. and 2 others 2008 YLR 2695; Shahid Imran v. The State and others 2011 SCMR 1614; Muhammad Ali v. Samina Qasim Tarar and others 2022 SCMR 2001; Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed and 3 others 2000 SCMR 122; Imtiaz Ali v. Bismillah Khan and another 1974 PCr.LJ Note 22 and DG Anti-Corruption, Establishment Lahore v. Muhammad Akram Khan and others PLD 2013 SC 401 rel.

Junaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore).

Nemo for Respondents.

Assisted by: Mian Johar Imam and Habib, Law Clerk.

2025 S C M R 1123

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUNIR AHMAD ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 2023, decided on 9th April, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 10.04.2018 passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in M.R. 5 of 2013 and Crl. Appeal No. 863 of 2012).

(a) Criminal trial---

----Interested witness, evidence of---Scope---Interested witness is one who is interested in conviction of accused for some ulterior motive.

Imran Mehmood v. The State 2023 SCMR 795 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Motive---Failure to prove---Effect---Minor discrepancies in evidence---Inconsequential---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd of his father and brother and was sentenced to death on two counts---Validity---While appreciating evidence of a witness, Court has to assess whether read as a whole, it is truthful---In doing so, Court has to keep in mind the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities to find out whether such discrepancies shake the truthfulness of the witness---Some discrepancies not touching core of the case are not enough to reject evidence as a whole---It is normal human conduct that while narrating a particular incident there may occur minor discrepancies---Parrot-like statements are always discredited by Courts---In order to ascertain as to whether discrepancy pointed out was minor or not or the same amounted to contradiction, regard is required to be made to circumstances of the case---There are always normal discrepancies---Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person---Both the Courts below while appreciating evidence on record in its true perspective arrived at the right conclusion by holding accused guilty of committing murder of his father and brother---Supreme Court converted death sentence of accused into imprisonment for life on two counts as prosecution had failed to prove motive---Appeal was dismissed.

Asfandiyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009; Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487; Aman Ullah v. The State 2023 SCMR 723; Imran Mehmood v. The State 2023 SCMR 795; Allah Bakhsh v. Ahmad Din 1971 SCMR 462; Ghulam Muhammad and another v. The State 2017 SCMR 2048; Haq Nawaz v. The State 2018 SCMR 21; Ansar Ahmad Khan Barki's case 1993 SCMR 1660; Amir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 566; Tajamal Hussain Shah v. The State and another 2022 SCMR 1567; Liaqat Ali and another v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 780; Najaf Ali Shah v. The State 2021 SCMR 736 and Khalid Mehmood and others v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 810 rel.

Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Tarique Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1130

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

MUHAMMAD AMJAD NAEEM ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through Prosecutor General Punjab and another ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 170-L of 2025, decided on 19th May, 2025.

(On appeal against the order dated 21.01.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. No. 74957-B of 2024).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 406---Criminal breach of trust, applicability of---Requirements---Section 406 P.P.C reveals that, there are two requisite elements which are necessary to establish a case of criminal breach of trust---Firstly, the accused must have been entrusted with a property as trust (amanat), or must had dominion over it as trust (amanat)---Secondly, after such entrustment or dominion is created, the accused must have breached that trust by either dishonestly misappropriating or converting the property to his own use, or dishonestly using or disposing it of in violation of any direction of law, an express or implied legal contract related to the discharge of the trust, or willfully allowing another person to do any of these acts---Both of these elements need to be present in order to constitute criminal breach of trust.

Abdul Rashid Nasir v. The State 2009 SCMR 517 and Ali Raza v. The State 2022 SCMR 1223 rel.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 406---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Criminal breach of trust---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry, case of---Petitioner/accused was aggrieved of not being granted post-arrest bail by High Court---Allegation against the petitioner was that he had misappropriated vehicles of the complainant---Term 'entrustment' was used in a broad sense under Section 405 P.P.C and therefore, it encompassed a wide variety of contexts in which a property was handed over by an owner to a recipient person as trust (amanat)---An entrustment could arise in any situation wherein property had been entrusted in the manner leading to the creation of a fiduciary relationship between the giver and recipient of the entrusted property---Mere failure to pay profits, or a breach of promise, agreement or contract in the absence of clear entrustment of property, do not attract criminal breach of trust---Contents of the FIR clearly stated that all the vehicles in question were given by the complainant to the petitioner in pursuance of successive business transactions---Complainant not only settled the price of the vehicles with the petitioner but also received partial payments in lieu of the said transactions---In such eventuality, it was quite clear that there was no entrustment of the vehicles as trust (amanat) to the petitioner by the complainant---In absence of any such entrustment, offence under Section 405 P.P.C, was not made out and resultantly, Section 406 P.P.C was not applicable in the present case---Contention of the complainant that the FIR explicitly stated the vehicles were given as a trust (amanat) was of no avail---Mere mentioning of the word 'trust' in the FIR did not per se establish criminal breach of trust, and the said offence could only be made out when the requisite elements of the offence stood fulfilled---View taken by the High Court in the impugned order that the petitioner could not be granted bail because he was nominated in three other FIRs was misplaced, because only previous conviction could furnish a ground for refusal of bail---None of the vehicles in question had been recovered from the petitioner---Complainant lodged FIR after a considerable delay of five months, without any explanation---Due to such reasons, case of petitioner also called for further inquiry, falling under subsection (2) of Section 497 Cr.P.C., thus the petitioner was also entitled for bail after-arrest on such ground---Offences did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C., and in such cases, bail must be granted as a rule and refused only in exceptional circumstances---Petition for bail was allowed in circumstances.

Zahid Jameel v. S.H.O. and 2 others 2008 YLR 2695; Shahid Imran v. The State and others 2011 SCMR 1614; Muhammad Ali v. Samina Qasim Tarar and others 2022 SCMR 2001; Rafiq Haji Usman v. Chairman, NAB and another 2015 SCMR 1575; Hashmat Ullah v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 1730; Lateef Ahmed v. The State and 3 others 2012 PCr.LJ 708; Muhammad Saifullah Cheema v. Umer Hayat and 2 others 2022 PCr.LJ 1327; Mumtaz Hussain v. The State and another 2020 PCr.LJ 1661; Khatija v. The State and another PLD 1978 Kar. 348; Ubedullah v. The State 2003 PCr.LJ 1921; Haji Javed Iqbal v. The State 2004 YLR 2288; Iqrar Ahmed and another v. The State and another 1999 YLR 1117; Mansha Khan and 2 others v. The State 1977 SCMR 449; Allah Rakha and another v. The State 1993 SCMR 1994; Muhammad Afsar v. The State 1994 SCMR 2051; Javaid Iqbal and Another v. The State 1995 SCMR 1090; Tariq Bashir v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34; Moundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934; Muhammad Rafique's case 1997 SCMR 412; Arsalan Masih v. State 2019 SCMR 1152; Babar Hussain v. State 2020 SCMR 871; Syeda Sumera Andaleeb v. The State 2021 SCMR 1227; Nazir Ahmad v. State 2022 SCMR 1467; Ali Anwar Paracha v. The State 2024 SCMR 1596; Muhammad Aurangzeb v. Karim Khan and others 2022 SCMR 849; Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed 2000 SCMR 122 and Imtiaz Ali v. Bismillah Khan and another 1974 PCr.LJ Note 22 rel.

(c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Bail---Offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C.---For such offences grant of bail is a rule and refusal is an exception.

Subhan Khan v. The State 2002 SCMR 1797; Zafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Anwar 2009 SCMR 1488; Muhammad Tanveer v. The State and another PLD 2017 SC 733; Arsalan Masih v. State 2019 SCMR 1152; Muhammad Ramzan v. State 2020 SCMR 717; Dr. Abdur Rauf v. The State 2020 SCMR 1258; Muhammad Nasir Shafique v. The State 2021 SCMR 2092; Iftikhar Ahmad v. The State PLD 2021 SC 799; Muhammad Daniyal Farrukh Ansari v. The State 2021 SCMR 557; Ahmad Khalid Butt v. State 2021 SCMR 1016; Abdul Saboor v. State 2022 SCMR 592; Nazir Ahmad v. State 2022 SCMR 1467; Hilal Khattak v. The State 2023 SCMR 1182; Muhammad Nawaz v. State 2023 SCMR 734; Munawar Bibi v. The State 2023 SCMR 1729; Muhammad Aziz v. State 2023 SCMR 1773; Zafar Nawaz v. State 2023 SCMR 1997; Noman Khaliq v. State 2023 SCMR 2122 and Ali Anwar Paracha v. The State 2024 SCMR 1596 rel.

Waqar Ahmad Hanjra, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link from Lahore).

Muhammad Jaffar, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab, Rizwan, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Shahbaz SI for the State (through video link from Lahore).

Assisted by: Mian Johar Imam and Habib, Law Clerk.

2025 S C M R 1145

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD ABRAS ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 655 of 2020, decided on 12th March, 2025.

(Against the order/judgment dated 19.12.2018 passed by the Islamabad High Court in Crl. A. No. 25 of 2011, J. A. No. 24 of 2011 and CSR No. 4-T of 2011).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to death by Trial Court but High Court converted it into imprisonment for life---Validity---Retrieval of pistol from the possession of accused bore no legal significance, as laboratory's report revealed that both the recovered pistol and secured crime empties had been submitted on the same day, thereby casting doubt on potential for fabrication---Samples were dispatched to laboratory following a considerable delay, which stripped the positive report of any evidentiary significance---Oral and medical evidence contradicted each other---Prosecution witness claimed to have sustained firearm injury on his left ankle at the time of occurrence but medical certificate provided by doctor showed that the injury was on his right lower leg---Such disparity called into question the validity of evidence used against accused---Prosecution failed to prove its case against accused beyond reasonable doubt---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and acquitted him of the charge---Appeal was allowed.

Nazir Ahmad v. Muhammad Iqbal 2011 SCMR 527 and Nasrullah v. State 2017 SCMR 724 rel.

Ansar Nawaz Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.

Ghulam Sarwar Nihang, Prosecutor General and Muhammad Imran, ASI for the State.

2025 S C M R 1214

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Ayesha A. Malik and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE ---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs EDUCATIONAL SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED, LAHORE ---Respondent

C.P.L.A. No. 109-L of 2024, decided on 24th April, 2025.

(Against judgment dated 21.11.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in S.T.R. No. 30 of 2015).

Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)---

----Ss. 2(8d), 3, 12(12a), 34A, 40 & First Schedule, Table II---Federal Excise Rules, 2005, Rr. 2(mb) & 43A---Term "franchise"---Liability to pay duty---Determination---Respondent/taxpayer entered into various franchise agreements and was providing dutiable services, as set out in Table II of First Schedule to Federal Excise Act, 2005---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue held that in the relevant year 2012, it was the franchisee(s) who had to pay duty under Federal Excise Act, 2005 and the order was maintained by High Court---Validity---On a proper reading and application of Section 3 of Federal Excise Act, 2005 and Rule 43A of Federal Excise Rules, 2005, the liability to pay excise duty lay on the franchiser (respondent tax payer)---Supreme Court set aside order passed by High Court and the relevant question was answered in affirmative, in favor of authorities---Appeal was allowed.

Ahmed Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 1221

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, ACJ and Shahid Bilal Hassan, J

AATIKA HINA MUSHTAQ ---Petitioner

Versus

SECRETARY SPECIAL EDUCATION GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, SPECIAL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT LAHORE and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 3116 of 2022, decided on 21st April, 2025.

(Against the order dated 10.01.2022 passed by the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore in Appeal No. 5689 of 2019).

(a) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 9---Right to life---Civil service---Promotion---Fair, transparent and merit-based consideration for promotion forms an essential facet of the right to livelihood, and thus, of right to life itself---Where civil servant meets prescribed qualifications and conditions for promotion, lawful and transparent consideration of their case creates a legitimate expectation that such progression has to materialize unless cogent reasons to the contrary exist---Denial or indefinite deferral of such consideration, particularly when based on arbitrary, opaque, or shifting grounds violates such expectation and reduces Constitutional guarantees to mere rhetoric.

Federal Service Public Commission v. Shiraz Manzoor 2023 SCMR 2087; Federation of Pakistan v. Misri Ladhani 2023 SCMR 915; Fazali Rehmani v. Chief Minister, N.W.F.P PLD 2008 SC 769; M.A. Rafique v. Managing Director (Power), WAPDA 1990 SCMR 927; Union of India v. Sangram Keshari Nayak (2007) 6 SCC 704; Islamabad Wildlife Management Board v. Metropolitan Corporation PLD 2021 Islamabad 6; Shehla Zia v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693; Divisional Superintendent v. Umar Daraz 2023 SCMR 761; Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730; Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director 2015 SCMR 1257; Abdul Wahab v. HBL 2013 SCMR 1383; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180; Novita Wahyu Setyawati, Dewi Sri Woelandri PG and Muhammad Richo Rianto, 'Career Development, Motivation and Promotion on Employee Performance' (2022) 1 East Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Research 1957; Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb 2022 SCMR 2020; Contempt Proceedings Against Chief Secretary, Sindh 2013 SCMR 1752; Mrs. Farkhanda Talat v. Federation of Pakistan 2007 SCMR 886 and Muhammad Nasir Ismail v. Government of Punjab 2005 SCMR 708 rel.

(b) Civil service---

----Effective role---Principles---Fundamental characteristic of an effective civil service is impartiality and meritocracy---In order to perform such role effectively, civil service must remain free from political interference---Independence, integrity and intellectual honesty of civil service are essential to sustaining rule of law and the Constitution---Allegiance of civil service lies with the Constitution and the law, not with shifting political winds.

(c) Punjab Service Tribunals Act (IX of 1974)---

----S. 4---Punjab Special Education Department (Directorate of Special Education) Service Rules, 2006 [since repealed]---Departmental promotion---Civil bureaucracy---Political influence---Withholding of promotion till amending of service rules---Legality---Civil servant was aggrieved of deferring her promotion till the amendment of Punjab Special Education Department (Directorate of Special Education) Service Rules, 2006---Validity---Arbitrary obstruction, unwarranted delay, capricious interference, unjustified hindrance, manipulation or undue delay in career progression of a civil servant erodes independence and morale of civil bureaucracy, transforming it into an instrument of political patronage, a phenomenon that is antithetical to the ethos of Constitutional democracy and democratic governance---Such interference fosters networks of favoritism and erodes impartiality and credibility of civil service---It is therefore imperative that service laws must be transparent, predictable, and uniformly applied, to ensure equal treatment---Purity of service can be obtained only if promotions are made on merit without favouritism or nepotism---Decision of Departmental Promotion Committee of withholding promotion till such time that Punjab Special Education Department (Directorate of Special Education) Service Rules, 2006 were suitably amended was not sustainable---Supreme Court directed Departmental Promotion Committee to consider the case of civil servant for promotion to the post of Lecturer Physical Education on merits and decide the same within one month from the receipt of this judgment---Appeal was allowed

Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Anwar 2025 SCMR 153; Naseem Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2024 SCMR 1341; Federal Service Public Commission v. Shiraz Manzoor 2023 SCMR 2087; Muhammad Amjad v. D.G. Quetta Development Authority 2022 SCMR 797; Abdul Hameed v. Ministry of Housing and Works PLD 2008 SC 395; Zafar Iqbal v. Director, Secondary Education 2006 SCMR 1427; Muhammad Ishaque v. Government of Punjab 2005 SCMR 980 and Tariq Aziz-ud-Din's case 2010 SCMR 1301 rel.

Mahmood Ahmad Qazi Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Khalid Masood Ghani, Additional Advocate General, Punjab along with Abu Bakar, L.O. Special Education Department Punjab for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1229

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

MUHAMMAD DAWOOD ---Petitioner

Versus

Mst. SAKEENA FAROOQUE alias Aziza and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 479-K of 2023, decided on 26th March, 2025.

(On appeal from the Order dated 31.01.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in M.A. No. 83 of 2022).

(a) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)---

----S. 123---Gift of immovable property---Pre-condition---For the purpose of making a gift of immovable property, under section 123 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of donor and attested by at least two witnesses.

(b) Islamic law---

----Gift---Pre-conditions---Constituents and components of a valid gift under Muslim Law are tender, acceptance and possession of property---It is also obligatory that donor divests and dissociates himself from dominion and ownership over property of gift and puts into words his categorical intention to convey ownership to donee distinctly and unambiguously with delivery of possession of property and ensure that donee has secured physical ascendency over property to constitute delivery of possession.

Abid Hussain v. Muhammad Yousaf PLD 2022 SC 395 = 2022 SCP 93 rel.

(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 39, 42 & 54---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), Ss. 123 & 129---Suit for cancellation of document, declaration and injunction---Oral gift---Proof---Concurrent findings of facts by Courts below---Respondent / plaintiff claimed to be owner of suit property and had assailed oral gift allegedly made in favour of petitioner / defendant by her deceased mother---Suit was decreed by Trial Court in favour of respondent / plaintiff and High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction maintained that judgment and decree---Validity---Despite the fact that oral gift under Islamic Law was not required to be compulsorily registered under Registration Act, 1908, within the exactitudes of sections 123 and 129 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the relaxation of non-registration or optional nature of such registration did not absolve petitioner / defendant (donee) from strictly proving factum of gift or the declartion of oral gift under challenge---Neither petitioner / defendant succeeded in proving indenture of declaration of oral gift nor there was any attempt made to register gift to avoid any future claim or dispute and nor was it proved to have been executed by deceased who was living abroad---Petitioner / defendant also failed to prove as to when deceased donor had come to reduce oral declaration into writing---No witnesses were produced who could satisfactorily corroborate presence of alleged donor in Pakistan---Regardless of all such incongruities and misdeeds, the Housing Society transferred the property in the name of petitioner / defendant in their record which was rightly rendered null and void---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below, as there was no illegality or perversity in their judgments and decrees---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Meeru Khan v. Mst. Naheed Aziz Siddiqui and others PLD 2023 SC 912; Additional note in Constitution Petition No. 6 of 2023 and connected cases PLJ 2024 SC 114 = 2024 SCP 4; Abid Hussain v. Muhammad Yousaf PLD 2022 SC 395 = 2022 SCP 93; Babar Anwar v. Muhammad Ashraf and another 2024 SCMR 734 = 2024 SCP 128; Allah Ditta and others v. Manak alias Muhammad Siddique and others 2017 SCMR 402; Muhammad Ejaz and 2 others v. Mst. Khalida Awan and another 2010 SCMR 342; Umar Bibi v. Bashir Ahmad 1997 SCMR 154; Maulvi Abdullah and others v. Abdul Aziz and others 1987 SCMR 1403 and Allah Diwaya v. Ghulam Fatima PLD 2008 SC 73 rel.

Shafqat Ali Shah Masoomi, Advocate Supreme Court along with Petitioner for Petitioner.

Asghar Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1.

Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.

2025 S C M R 1240

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD ASLAM ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 77 of 2023, decided on 8th April, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 27.03.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Criminal Appeal No. 180-J of 2019 and M.R. No. 05 of 2015).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Recovery of weapon---Substantive evidence, absence of---Inconsistency regarding injuries---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to death on two counts---Validity---In matters where prosecution case contains doubts and mysteries, benefit of the same has to be given to accused who is considered to be the favourite child of law---Recovery of blood stained bat, which was weapon of offence was only corroborative piece of evidence---In absence of substantive evidence, recovery of weapon of offence was not considered sufficient to hold accused guilty of offence charged---When substantive evidence failed to connect accused with commission of offence or was disbelieved, then corroborative evidence was of no help to prosecution---Corroborative evidence could not by itself prove prosecution's case---In the present case given the doubtfulness of direct substantive ocular evidence, the corroborative effect of recovery of weapon of offence was insufficient---Testimony of prosecution witnesses was doubtful, there were inconsistencies between description of injuries of deceased in crime report and post mortem report; recovery of crime weapon was also doubtful and DNA analysis was absent---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused and he was acquitted of the charge by extending benefit of doubt---Appeal was allowed.

Muhammad Hassan v. State 2024 SCMR 1427; Abdul Samad v. The State 2025 SCMR 639; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230; Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 and Naveed Asghar and others v. The State PLD 2021 SC 600 rel.

Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Sajjad H. Bhatti, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

Ms. Rabia Afzal daughter of M. Afzal, Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1248

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

C.A. No. 743 of 2014

Messrs KASSIM TEXTILE MILLS (PVT.) LIMITED ---Petitioner

Versus

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, KARACHI ---Respondent

(Against judgment dated 07.05.2013 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in I.T.R.A. No. 132 of 2011).

C.P.L.A. No. 10-L of 2017

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE ---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE LIMITED, LAHORE ---Respondent

(Against order dated 18.10.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.T.R. No. 255 of 2016).

C.M.A. No. 13838 of 2021 in C.P.L.A. No. 10-L of 2017

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE ---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE LIMITED, LAHORE ---Respondent

(Application for impleadment)

C.A. No. 1954 of 2019

DUBAI ISLAMIC BANK PAKISTAN LIMITED, KARACHI ---Petitioner

Versus

PAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue and Ex Officio Chairman, Federal Board

of Revenue, Islamabad and others ---Respondents

(Against order dated 16.08.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-5264 of 2019).

C.A. No. 404 of 2020

ENGRO POLYMER AND CHEMICALS LIMITED, KARACHI ---Petitioner

Versus

PAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue and Ex Officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others ---Respondents

(Against order dated 06.02.2020 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No.D-769 of 2020).

C.P.L.A. No. 3688-L of 2019

FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE through Member (Legal), Islamabad and others ---Petitioners

Versus

Messrs FOOD CONSULTS (PVT.) LIMITED, LAHORE and others ---Respondents

(Against order dated 09,10.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W. P. No. 136592 of 2018).

C.P.L.A. No. 3689-L of 2019

FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE through Member (Legal), Islamabad and others ---Petitioners

Versus

Messrs PANTHER TYRES LIMITED and others ---Respondents

(Against order dated 09.10.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No. 170401 of 2018).

C.P.L.A. No. 746-L of 2021

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE ---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs BIG FEED (PRIVATE) LIMITED, LAHORE ---Respondent

(Against order dated 11.02.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.T.R. No. 8992 of 2021).

C.P.L.A. No. 3503 of 2022

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, ISLAMABAD and others ---Petitioners

Versus

Messrs PAKISTAN TOBACCO COMPANY LIMITED, ISLAMABAD and others ---Respondents

(Against judgment dated 26.05.2022 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R. No. 45 of 2014).

Civil Appeal No.743 of 2014 and Civil Petition No.10-L of 2017, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 13838 of 2021 in Civil Petition No.10-L of 2017, Civil Appeals No. 1954 of 2019 and 404 of 2020, Civil Petitions Nos. 3688-L of 2019, 3689-L of 2019, 746-L of 2021 and 3503 of 2022, decided on 2nd May, 2025.

(a) Interpretation of statutes---

----Literal rule---Legislation---Powers of Court---Where words of statute are clear and unambiguous, provision should be given its plain and normal meaning, without adding or rejecting any words---Departure from literal rule, by making structural changes or substituting words in a clear statutory provision, under the guise of interpretation will pose a great risk as the changes may not be what the Legislature intended or desired---Court cannot recast or reframe legislation, as it has no power to legislate---Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there unless principles of interpretation of statute require otherwise---Legislature means what it says and says what it means---It is the obligation of Courts of law to further clear intendment of Legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same---Legislative wisdom cannot be replaced by the Judge's views.

Star Textile Mills Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 2002 SCMR 356; Province of the Punjab v. Muhammad Aslam 2004 SCMR 1649 and Allied Bank Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2023 SCMR 1166 rel.

(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----Ss. 113, 120, 122 (5A) & First Schedule Part I, Division II---Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by Federal Board of Revenue---Tax incentives---Payment of minimum tax---Carry forward tax credit---Appellant / taxpayer company was aggrieved of tax incentives and payment of minimum tax---High Court maintained the order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue declaring that expression "actual tax payable" in Section 113(2)(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 meant that tax payable under Part I, Division II in First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could be zero or otherwise, and that the excess amount of minimum tax which was paid over and above zero tax payable due to assessed losses for the years 2007 and 2008 was available for adjustment against appellant's / taxpayer's tax liability for the succeeding tax year---Validity---Verbiage of Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by Federal Board of Revenue was unambiguous and clear as that of Section 113(2)(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---First sentence of Section 113(2)(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is a clarification as to the persons who are required to pay minimum tax---Mandate of Section 113(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 that loss incurring companies and companies whose tax on income is assessed less than 0.5% of its declared turnover are to pay minimum tax---Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by Federal Board of Revenue states that profit yielding companies paying [minimum] tax [which is] more than turnover tax do not get credit for their contribution to national exchequer [in the form of minimum tax] during the years of loss or lower income---This simply is a statement as to the state of affairs prevailing before insertion of Section 113(2)(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2004---Prior to such insertion, benefit of credit in the form of carry forward for adjustment against tax liability in subsequent tax years was not available to persons paying minimum tax under Section 113(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by Federal Board of Revenue does not state that benefit of such carry forward would also be available to companies paying minimum tax but having no tax payable due to losses---Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by FBR also does not state that law had been amended to allow facility of carry forward of minimum tax on turnover for next five years to those companies paying minimum tax but having no tax payable due to losses---Even otherwise, circulars issued by FBR do not and cannot override explicit language of statute---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent judgments passed by two Courts below---Appeal was dismissed.

Messrs Pakistan Television Corporation v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2017 SCMR 1136; B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd. v. Wealth Tax Officer 1996 SCMR 1470; Molasses Trading and Export (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 1993 SCMR 1905; Zila Council Sialkot v. Abdul Ghani PLD 2004 SC 425; Messrs Hirjani & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Commissioner Sales Tax 1971 SCMR 128; Star Textile Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 2002 SCMR 356; The Chief Land Commissioner v. Ghulam Hyder Shah 1988 SCMR 715 and Star Textile Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 2002 SCMR 356 rel.

Muhammad Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court, Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record and Sh. Mehmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 743 of 2014, 1954 of 2019 and 404 of 2020).

Muhammad Yahya, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link (Lahore)) (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 10-L of 2017 and 3689-L of 2019).

Ibrar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link (Lahore)) in C.P.L.As. Nos. 3688-L of 2019 and 746-L of 2021).

Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.P.L.A. No. 3503 of 2022).

Dr. Ikram ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (via video link (Lahore)) (in C.M.A. No. 13838 of 2021).

Munawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (via video link (Karachi)) (in C.A. No. 743 of 2014).

Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 1954 of 2019).

Riaz Hussain Azam, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 404 of 2020).

Nemo for Respondents (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 10-L of 2017, 3688-L of 2019, 3689-L of 2019, 746-L of 2021 and 3503 of 2022).

Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director General (Law), FBR, Islamabad.

Ms. Kiran Masood, Additional Commissioner, FBR, Lahore (via video link (Lahore)).

2025 S C M R 1262

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

HABIB-UR-REHMAN and others ---Petitioners

Versus

ABDUL KARIM (deceased) through L.Rs and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 770-K of 2022, decided on 28th March, 2025.

(Against the orders dated 10.03.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Larkana in 2nd Civil Appeal No. S-06 of 2019).

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 11---Res judicata, doctrine of---Maxim "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa" and "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium"---Applicability---Far-sightedness or prudence ingrained in doctrine of res judicata protects against never ending litigation and ensures finality, thereby saving parties from rigors of protracted or multiplicative proceedings---Cause of action finally adjudicated on merits must not be re-litigated---Doctrine of res judicata so connotes "claim preclusion" whose indispensable elements include that the erstwhile judgment must be valid and final between the parties and the same issue must not be brought again for re-litigation---As such the rule is essential to avert repetitive litigation and to ensure justice, equanimity and dependability in judicial proceedings by curbing frivolous and vexatious litigation often initiated with mala fide intention or ulterior motives just to drag opponents in Courts for reopening matters already conclusively decided---Simultaneously, principle of res judicata also lightens the Court's docket and helps eliminate time consuming and meritless litigation---Maxim "nemo debet bis vixari pro una et eadem causa" i.e. no man should be vexed twice for the same cause and "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" i.e. it is in best interest of state to put an end to litigation---What is generally done or believed along the lines of conventional astuteness is that one judicial contest is sufficient for litigants to lodge their claims or put forward a defense rather than litigating for one and the same cause of action between the same parties for the same subject matter again and again.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 149---Court fee, deficiency of---Expression "at any stage"---Scope---Expression "at any stage" alluded to in section 149 C.P.C. accentuates that deficiency if any on account of court fee can be ordered to be made good by Appellate Court at any stage of proceedings in appeal.

(c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 100, 115 & O.VII, R.11---Suit for declaration and injunction---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Principle---Petitioners were aggrieved of judgments and decrees passed by all Courts below against them---Validity---If concurrent findings recorded by lower fora were found to be in violation of law, or based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, they could not be treated as so sacrosanct or sanctified that they could not be reversed by High Court in its revisional or Constitutional jurisdiction or in a second appeal, as a corrective measure come what may---Where glaring errors, non-reading or misreading of evidence or any legal and jurisdictional issues arise, the stumbling block of doctrine of concurrent findings cannot shield a flawed or erroneous decision---Trial Court possesses distinctive position to adjudge trustworthiness of witnesses and cumulative effect of evidence led in the lis---Appellate Court accords deference to such findings, which are not overturned unless found erroneous or defective---It is also not within the domain or function of Appellate Court and or High Court to re-weigh or re-interpret evidence but they can examine whether jurisdiction or order attains benchmark of an unflawed judgment and whether it is in consonance with the law and evidence and free from unjust and unfair errors apparent on the face of record---If the concurrent findings are found to be in violation of law or are based on flagrant and obvious defect floating on the surface of the record then it can be reversed as a corrective measure without undue regard to the fact that matter culminated in concurrent findings---Supreme Court set aside concurrent findings of facts by all Courts below and remanded the matter to Trial Court for decision afresh on merits---Appeal was allowed.

Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakoor Khan PLD 1984 SC 289; Abdul Hamid and another v. Dilawar Hussain alias Bhalli and others 2007 SCMR 945; Mian Nawaz Sharif's case PLD 1993 SC 473; Mst. Iqbal Begum's case PLD 1993 Lah. 183; Deepchand v. Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1994 SC 1901; Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Celem S.A. AIR 2017 SC 1; Sayyed Ayaz Ali v. Prakash G. Goyal 2021 (7) SCC 456; Diwan Bros. v. Central Bank of India, Bombay AIR 1976 SC 1503; Ahmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar Latifabad, Hyderabad PLD 2025 SC 302; Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (decd.) through L.Rs. 2024 SCMR 1059; Meeru Khan v. Mst. Naheed Aziz Siddiqui and others PLD 2023 SC 912; Government of K.P.K. v. Mehmood Khan 2017 SCMR 2044; Homoeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed v. Government of the Punjab through its Secretary Health Department and others 2022 SCMR 1546; Rana Muhammad Asif Tauseef v. Election Commission of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1344; Muhammad Aamir Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2019 SCMR 1021 = 2019 PLC (C.S.) 1014; Chairman, NAB v. Muhammad Usman PLD 2018 SC 28; Iffat Jabeen v. District Education Officer (M.E.E), Lahore 2011 SCMR 437 = 2010 PLC (C.S.) 451; Muhammad Shehzad Malik v. Muhammad Suhail and another 2010 SCMR 1825; Fasih-ud-Din Khan and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2010 SCMR 1778; Section Officer, Government of Punjab, Finance Department v. Ghulam Shabbir 2010 SCMR 1425 = 2010 PLC (C.S.) 641; Government of NWFP v. Akbar Shah 2010 SCMR 1408; Land Acquisition Collector and 6 others v. Muhammad Nawaz PLD 2010 SC 745; Muhammad Shahban and others v. Falak Sher and others 2007 SCMR 882; Raja Hamayun Sarfraz Khan and others v. Noor Muhammad 2007 SCMR 307; Almas Ahmad Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore 2007 PLC 64 = 2006 SCMR 783; Muhammad Gulshan Khan v. Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad PLD 2003 SC 102 = 2003 PLC (C.S.) 201;B.I.S.E v. Salam Afroze PLD 1992 SC 263; Mst. Faheeman Begum (deceased) through L.Rs. v. Islam-ud-Din (deceased) through L.Rs. 2023 SCMR 1402 = PLJ 2024 SC 75 = PLJ 2024 SC 326;Ahmed Ali Talpur v. Sub-Registrar Latifabad, Hyderabad PLD 2024 SC 302 and United Bank Limited v. Jamil Ahmed 2024 SCMR 164 = PLC 2024 SC 50 rel.

Nazar Akbar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Habib ur Rehman Jiskan, Advocate Supreme Court and Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Nemo for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.

2025 S C M R 1275

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

MAQBOOL ALI and another ---Petitioners

Versus

Mst. RAHEELA and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 1106 and C.M.A. No. 3330 of 2024, decided on 13th May, 2025.

C.P.L.A. No. 1106 of 2024

(Against judgment dated 04.12.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in W.P. No. 4688-P of 2018 with C.M. No..2331-P of 2018).

AND

C.M.A. No. 3330 of 2024

(Stay application).

Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---

----S. 5---Suit for recovery of dower---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Substituting findings of facts---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Petitioner was father of respondent's deceased husband, who sought transfer of house in lieu of her dower amount---Suit was dismissed by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court but High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction decreed the suit in favour of respondent---Validity---High Court had identified evidence that had not been read by two Courts below while dismissing suit of respondent---This might well have been enough reason for interference with concurrent findings of two Courts below but having done that, High Court could not have substituted its own findings for those of two Courts below by decreeing suit of respondent---High Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction could not arrogate to itself the powers of a Family Court and issue decrees---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court by which it had set aside concurrent judgments passed by Family Court and Lower Appellate Court---Supreme Court remanded the matter to Family Court for a decision afresh on the basis of material on record and observations made by High Court in its judgment---Appeal was allowed.

Azmat Ali v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1964 SC 260; Nawaza v. The Additional Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1970 SC 39; Shabbir Hussain v. Muhammad Afzal 1972 SCMR 47 and Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 619 rel.

Syed Azmat Ali Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Muhammad Sadiq Khan, Advocate Supreme Court with Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1280

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Irfan Saadat Khan, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, Shakeel Ahmad and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

Messrs WAK LIMITED MULTAN ROAD, LAHORE and others ---Petitioners

Versus

COLLECTOR CENTRAL EXCISE AND SALES TAX, LAHORE (NOW COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LTU, LAHORE) and others ---Respondents

C.As. Nos. 634 to 636, 1290 to 1295 of 2018, 1424 to 1430 of 2019, 1388 to 1392 of 2017, 57, 852, 1128 of 2020, C.P.L.As. Nos. 2286-L, 2298-L, 2299-L, 2065-L of 2017, C.As. Nos. 436, 1693 of 2021, C.P.L.As. Nos. 1604-L, 1411-L of 2022, C.A. No. 1486 of 2021, C.P.L.As. Nos. 1397-L, 770-L, 1285-L of 2022, C.As. Nos. 732 of 2012, 394 of 2013, 399, 712 of 2013, C.P.L.As. Nos. 5107, 592-P of 2023, 2473-L and 2474-L of 2022, C.M.As. Nos. 1917-L, 1918-L, 1919-L, 966-L and 964-L of 2015, C.R.Ps. Nos. 153, 154 of 2017 and C.M.A. No. 5471 of 2019, decided on 14th May, 2025.

(On appeal against judgment dated 24.08.201, 16.01.2017, 18.01.2017, 19.01.2017, 12.02.2015, 12.02.2015, 03.04.2019, 20.11.2014, 23.11.2015, 08.05.2017, 12.06.2017, 14.06.2017, 30.05.2017, 24.05.2017, 26.01.2021, 07.03.2022, 09.03.2022, 08.12.2020, 09.03.2022, 24.01.2022, 01.03.2022, 06.06.2012, 05.04.2012, 05.04.2012, 05.02.2012, 17.10.2023, 11.05.2023 and 22.03.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench Bahawalpur, Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in STR No. 33 of 2005, ETR No. 1 of 2005 and STRs Nos. 10 of 2006, 01/2011/BWP, 02/2011/BWP, 02/2013/BWP, 03/2013/BWP, 03/2016/BWP, STR No.169/2012, 10/2011, 165/2013, 96/2013, 82/2012, , 23/2012, 24/2012, 14/2008, 21/2009, 185/2011, 116/2007, 127/2007, 42/2011, 01/2008, 212/2015, 81/2013, 126/2013, 78/2014, 32435/2017, 22/2012, 4925/2021, 157/2012, 77/2013, 173/2011, 36459/2021, 79765/2021, Customs Reference No. 29033/2019, Sales Tax References Nos. 73/2010, 101/2010, 75/2011, 13/2011, 11/2014, 23-P/2022, ETR No. 05/2011 and STR No.88/2011.)

C.M.As.1917-L, 1918-L, 1919-L, 966-L and 964-L /2015

(Stay in C.As. Nos. 1388, 1389, 1390, 1391 and 1392 of 2017).

C.R.Ps. 153 and 154/2017

(For review of judgment dated 31.03.2017 passed by this Court in C.A. No. 399 of 2013 and C.A. No. 682 of 2008.)

C.M.A. 5471/2019

(Permission to file and argue) in C.R.P.Nil/2019 in C.A. No. 219 of 2011

(a) Interpretation of statutes---

----Word "shall"---Scope---Generally Courts have more readily concluded that in appropriate circumstances a "shall" is to be read as "may" (i.e., that the provision seemingly mandatory was in actuality directory) rather than the other way round.

(b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----S. 74---Condonation of time limit---Scope---Matter was referred to Larger Bench of Supreme Court to consider whether judgment of three member Bench of Supreme Court given in case titled Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others, reported as 2017 SCMR 1427, 2017 PTD 1756 ('Super Asia Case') was correct---Validity---Double layer of protection accorded to the taxpayer shields him from unmeritorious claims and bogus show cause notices, which may be issued by concerned officer to harass and intimidate the former and/or for ulterior motives and purposes---Conclusion that the relevant provisions are mandatory help in ensuring that it is only a genuine case, based on substance and having (objectively) a reasonable prospect of success, of alleged non- or short payment of tax that is opened against the taxpayer---It is a bogus and false claim that concerned officer would wish to keep pending, for it to be as it were a Damocles' sword hanging over the taxpayer---Time bound closure of cases would help in reducing cases being brought for non-genuine reasons and purposes---For if the show cause notice is based on firm grounds and for lawful purposes then (subject of course to whatever reply the taxpayer may give thereto) it would be in the interest of the State (as represented by the adjudicating authority) to decide the same as expeditiously as possible, which would be well within the generous time periods allowed by the statute, as held in 'Super Asia Case'---If, in the end, a case is not made out then equally a responsible officer acting lawfully and truly motivated by public interest would wish to bring proceedings to a close as quickly as possible, which would again be within the time periods set out in the relevant provisions---Multi-layered protection, by way of mandatory periods of limitation, is not just well within the legislative power; it is the intent that is expressed in the relevant provisions, as rightly held in 'Super Asia Case'---Larger Bench of Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Supreme Court in case titled Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others, reported as 2017 SCMR 1427, 2017 PTD 1756, as it had correctly stated the law on all points.

Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427; 2017 PTD 1756; Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax and others 2018 SCMR 1474; Abbasi Enterprises Unilever Distributor Haripur v. Collector of Sales Tax and Federal Excise Duty 2019 SCMR 1989; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Sarwaq Traders and others 2025 SCMR 341; A.J. Traders v. Collector of Customs and others PLD 2022 SC 817; Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal 2019 SCMR 1735; Commissioner Inland Revenue and another v. Sarwaq Traders and another 2022 SCMR 1333; 2022 PTD 1128; Federal Land Commission through Chairman v. Rais Habib Ahmed and others PLD 2011 SC 842 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Yasmeen Bano and others 2020 SCMR 1120 ref.

(c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----S. 74---Condonation of time limit---Period of extension---Scope---Like all statutory powers the one conferred by Section 74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 has to be exercised objectively---What is the period of extension appropriate in a given case or class of cases is not to be determined subjectively by Federal Board of Revenue but objectively and in accordance with settled principles of law.

(d) Discretion---

----Statutory discretion---Applicability---Statutory discretion is to be exercised by the authority or officer on which it is conferred; most fundamentally, it must be exercised reasonably.

(e) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----S. 74---Condonation of time limit---Period of extension---Exercise of discretion---Principle---Provision of Section 74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 does not confer an open-ended power in such regard---Federal Board of Revenue cannot, on the basis of its own subjective assessment, grant an extension for however long a period it thinks fit---Matter must, and if it comes before a Court, certainly has to be looked at objectively---If the period is excessive (in the sense that it is not "appropriate" within the frame of the section) it may be declared to be unlawful and quashed.

For the Private Parties

Ali Sibtain Fazli, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 634-636 of 2018).

Ch. Hafeezullah Yaqoob, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1291 of 2018).

Dl. Muhammad Khan Alizai, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. Nos. 1292-1294 of 2018).

M. Ajmal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1426 of 2019 and 1486 of 2021).

Munawar-us-Salam, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-ink, Lahore).

M. Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1128 of 2020).

Ijaz Ahmed Awan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1388-1392 of 2017).

Syed Naveed Amjad Indrabi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.R.P. No. 154 of 2017).

For Commissioner Inland / FBR

Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 634-636 of 2018 and C.A. No. 1292 of 2018, 1428 of 2019, C.P.L.As. Nos. 2298-L, 2299-L of 2017, 2065-L of 2017 and 770-L of 2022).

Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 1290, 1293, 1294, 1295 of 2018 and C.As. Nos. 1388-1392 of 2017, 712 of 2013, C.P.L.As. Nos. 1411-L of 2022, 1285-L of 2022 and 2286-L of 2017).

Abdul Razzaq Raja, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 57 of 2020 and C.M.A. No. 5471 of 2021).

Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 732 of 2012).

Mian Yousaf Umar, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1424/2019, 1429/2019, 1430/2019, 852/2020, 436/2021 and C.P.L.A. No. 1604-L/2022).

Malik Qamar Afzal, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 5107/2023).

Sarfraz Ahmed Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1425/2019 and 1128/2020).

Ahmed Pervez, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1693/2021).

Yahya, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1291/2018).

M. Saeed Tahir, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1486/2021).

Waqar A. Sh., Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1426 and 1427/2019).

Izhar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.R.Ps. Nos. 153-154/17, C.As. Nos. 394/2013 and 399/2013).

Ms. Saba Saeed, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 1397-L/2022, 2473-2474-L/2022).

Ishtiaq Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 592-P/2023) (via video-link, Peshawar).

Dr. Ishtiaq, DG (Law), FBR.

2025 S C M R 1307

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Amin-ud-Din Khan and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ

SHER ASFANDYAR KHAN and 3 others ---Appellants

Versus

NEELOFAR SHAH and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 1843 to 1846 of 2019 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1138 of 2020, decided on 8th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 16.09.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in High Court Appeals Nos. 107 of 2012, 114 of 2012 and 109 of 2012).

Per Yahya Afridi, CJ; Amin-ud-Din Khan, J. agreeing; Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting.

(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)---

----Art. 76---Secondary evidence---Scope---Failure to ensure compliance with Article 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 vitiates evidentiary basis upon which findings of Courts below were rendered, necessitating intervention by Supreme Court.

(b) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---

----Ss. 7, 9, 148, 290 & 291---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 76---Corporate affairs---Oppression and mismanagement---Proof---Summary proceedings---Secondary evidence---Non-seeking of permission---Effect---Proceedings under sections 290 and 291 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 were initiated against respondents for inquiry into mismanagement and oppression in corporate affairs---Company Judge allowed the petition and Division Bench of High Court dismissed the appeal---Objection was raised by appellant on admissibility of secondary evidence---Validity---Company Judge erred in proceeding summarily in a dispute that required a full evidentiary examination---Nature of the controversy, involving serious allegations of forgery and fabrication, necessitated framing of issues and recording of evidence; procedural safeguards that were improperly bypassed---Statutory prohibition under section 148 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 (section 121 of Companies Act, 2017) precluded recognition of a trust over shares in the company's register, reinforcing the principle that the company was not bound to take notice of any alleged trust arrangement---Claim of trust, as asserted by respondents, was legally untenable---Improper admission of secondary evidence in violation of Article 76 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 undermined validity of proceedings---Failure to establish preconditions for admissibility of secondary evidence rendered reliance on disputed documents unsustainable---Discretion of Company Judge in treating the Shareholders' Agreements as genuine was exercised in disregard of established legal principles, given the absence of a proper evidentiary inquiry---Division Bench, in upholding such finding, failed to recognize procedural and substantive irregularities in the adjudication of the case---Parties could pursue their respective claims in pending civil suits, wherein all matters in controversy, including validity of Shareholders' Agreements and legitimacy of meeting in question of Board of Directors were to be adjudicated---Supreme Court set aside judgments passed by Company Judge as well as by Division Bench of High Court---Appeal was allowed. [Majority view]

Platinum Insurance Company Limited, Karachi v. Daewoo Corporation, Sheikhupura PLD 1999 SC 1; Mian Javed Amir v. United Foam Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. 2016 SCMR 213; Enviroco Ltd. v. Farstad Supply A/S [2011] UKSC 16; Bland and Anor v. Keegan [2024] EWCA Civ 934; Perkins and others v. Mexican Santa Barbra Mining Co. (1890) 24 QBD 613 and Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik PLD 2021 SC 715 ref.

Per Ayesha A. Malik, J. dissenting (Minority view)

(c) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---

----S. 7---Original civil jurisdiction---Corporate affairs---Jurisdiction specifically vested with Company Judge under Section 7 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 cannot be ousted merely on the pretext of a factual dispute---Provision of Section 7 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 specifically provides that Company Judge has jurisdiction---Statute has authorized Company Judge to exercise jurisdiction under Companies Ordinance, 1984---Jurisdiction vested with the Court by way of statute cannot be ousted merely because the parties contend that dispute involves complicated facts, the law does not provide so.

(d) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---

----Ss. 7 & 9---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 72, 74, 75 & 76---Corporate affairs---Standard of proof---Principle---Standard of proof required in company matters is that of balance of probabilities rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt---In civil matters, this standard requires Court to assess whether, on the evidence as a whole, a fact is more likely than not to be true---It is neither necessary nor appropriate to frame formal issues or conduct a full trial to determine veracity of documents such as Shareholders Agreements---Court must evaluate totality of material, including primary and secondary evidence, where particularly in the context of secondary evidence the documents are reasonably credible, without strict insistence on original proof and reach a conclusion accordingly.

(e) Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984)---

----Ss. 7, 9, 148, 290 & 291---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 76---Corporate affairs---Oppression and mismanagement---Proof---Summary proceedings---Secondary evidence---Non-seeking of permission---Effect---Proceedings under Sections 290 and 291 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 were initiated against respondents for inquiry into mismanagement and oppression in corporate affairs---Company Judge allowed the petition and Division Bench of High Court dismissed the appeal---Objection was raised by appellant on admissibility of secondary evidence---Validity---Issues arising in the present case had brought into sharp focus the fundamental role of corporate governance in ensuring that companies act with transparency, fairness, and accountability---Protection of shareholder rights, obligation of disclosure, and adherence to ethical governance practices were not optional aspirations; they were indispensable pillars upon which trust in corporate structures was built---It was by steadfast commitment to such principles that corporations earn legitimacy, foster sustainable growth, and contribute to economic and social well-being of wider community---Corporate governance was, in its essence, a framework designed not merely to direct corporate conduct but to safeguard interests of all stakeholders through structured, principled oversight---Supreme Court accordingly reaffirmed that transparency, good faith disclosure, and protection of shareholders must remain at the heart of all corporate endeavors, for it was only through such adherence that confidence in corporate sector and by extension, in rule of law itself, could be maintained and strengthened---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Appeal was dismissed.

Brother Steel Mills Ltd. v. Ilyas Miraj PLD 1996 SC 543; Platinum Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Daewoo Corp. PLD 1999 SC 1; Javed Amir v. United Foam Industries (Pvt) Ltd. 2016 SCMR 213; Omar Masood v. Amir Hussain Naqvi 2019 CLD 931; Messrs Ammonia Supplies Corporation (Pvt) Ltd. v. Messrs Modern Plastic Containers Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1998 SC 3153; Shri Gulabrai Kalidas Naik v. Laxmidas Lallubhai Patel of Baroda (1978) 48 Comp Cas 438 (Guj) and E.V. Swaminathan v. K.M.M.A. Industries and Roadways Private Ltd. (1993) 76 Comp Cas 1 (Mad) ref.

Haider Waheed, Advocate Supreme Court and Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As.Nos. 1843 and 1846 of 2019).

Salman Akram Raja, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1844 and 1845 of 2019).

Wasim Sajjad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court, Shah Khawar, Advocate Supreme Court, Muhammad Masood Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Mehmood A. Sheikh, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Barrister Umer Aslam Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 4 to 6.

Omer Azad Malik, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 7 (SECP).

Farooq H. Naek, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (in C.M.A. No. 1138 of 2020).

2025 S C M R 1339

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

KHIZAR HAYAT ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 181 of 2022, decided on 28th April, 2025.

(Against the judgment/order dated 18.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Crl. Appeal No. 15-J of 2013 and M.R. No. 28 of 2012).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Night time occurrence---Source of light not established---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Occurrence had taken place during the night and although the prosecution had mentioned availability of torch with the prosecution witnesses at the spot yet admittedly no torch had been secured during the investigation of this case---Thus, the claim of the alleged eye-witnesses regarding identification of culprits with graphic details of the incident appeared to be a claim which could be accepted only with a lump of salt---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Delay of 14 hours in lodging the FIR---Consequential---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Occurrence took place on 30.11.2009 at about 9:00 p.m.---According to the record, the police station was situated at a distance of approximately 9-miles from the crime scene---However, the matter was brought to the notice of local police through the statement of complainant recorded on 01.12.2009 at about 1:05 p.m. after a delay of about 14 hours without any justifiable explanation, thus, a possibility regarding deliberations before lodging of the FIR could not safely be ruled out of consideration---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Co-accused acquitted in the same set of evidence---Effect---Ocular account doubtful---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Ocular account was furnished by three witnesses---Said witnesses unanimously attributed the injuries on the body of deceased to the appellant and co-accused---Similarly, all the three prosecution witnesses saddled other co-accused with the responsibility of inflicting two injuries with his hatchet on the head and shoulder of injured whereas the remaining accused persons were not ascribed overt act in the commission of the crime---It was not disputed that two co-accused of the appellant were attributed effective role of causing injuries to the deceased and injured had been acquitted of the charge---If the eye-witnesses had been disbelieved against some accused persons attributed effective roles then the same eye-witnesses could not be believed against another accused person attributed a similar role unless such eye-witnesses received independent corroboration qua the other accused person---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Non-production of Medical Officer---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Injured was being portrayed by the prosecution as a star witness on account of injuries on his body, which fact was projected by the prosecution as stamp of his presence at the time of occurrence---Injured witness had allegedly sustained injuries on his head and shoulder caused by co-accused, however, due to non-production of the concerned Medical Officer as well as acquittal of co-accused, no reliance could be placed on his evidence being shaky in nature---Even otherwise, it was not necessary that the injured witness had spoken the whole truth; he could not be relied upon unless corroborated, which was lacking in the instant case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Unnatural conduct of witnesses---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Conduct allegedly exhibited by the complainant party was offensive to normal human conduct, taking into account the number of individuals from both factions at the time of the occurrence---Despite the absence of definitive guidelines regarding human conduct and behavior, it was reasonable to assume that the prosecution witnesses would not let the perpetrators go scot-free after the murder of their loved ones in the normal course of events, given the accepted standards of human behavior---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge.

(f) Criminal trial---

----Motive---Scope---Prosecution though is not obliged to prove the motive in each and every case, however, once the motive is set up then it must be established---In case of failure to prove the motive, the prosecution must suffer its consequences and not the defence.

Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.

Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 1344

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

QURBAN ALI ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 403 of 2022, decided on 6th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 08.09.2022 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Hyderabad in Criminal Jail Appeal No. D-130 of 2014 and Confirmation Case No. 28 of 2014).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Confessional statement, recording of---Infirmities---Accused-petitioner was charged for committing murder of his wife, daughter and son by administering poison---Record revealed that though the accused had made a confessional statement on 31.12.2020 before the concerned Magistrate but subsequently retracted from it by stating that the police had arrested his father and other ladies and was maltreating them, so in order to save them from the clutches of the police he made the said confessional statement---According to accused, he was given an assurance by the police that if he made a confessional statement before the concerned Magistrate, the other persons implicated in the case of killing the three persons would be let off by the police---In the accused's statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C., recorded by the Trial Court, while answering question No.5, the accused categorically stated that the confessional statement recorded on 31.12.2020 was under duress---Accused further explained, by answering question No.10, that he was present at a village to look after his land, where he was informed that his wife and two children had passed away---Thereafter, accused went to his home where the police arrested him---Deposition of Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the accused's confessional statement, revealed that the column of length of time of the confessional statement was left blank by him and further that he had not obtained the thumb impression of the accused on the first page of the alleged confessional statement---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances, and accused was acquitted of the charge.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Medical evidence not supporting the prosecution case---Accused-petitioner was charged for committing murder of his wife, daughter and son by administering poison---Medical Officers had categorically stated that Chemical Examiner's report with regard to intoxication and poisoning of the three deceased persons returned as negative---Record transpired that there was no evidence of strangulation on the bodies of the deceased persons---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances, and accused was acquitted of the charge.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused-petitioner was charged for committing murder of his wife, daughter and son---Statement of brother of deceased casted doubt on the prosecution case as according to him accused-petitioner told him that he had killed the three persons by way of throttling and strangulation whereas according to the complainant, the deceased were killed by way of poisoning---Brother of deceased also stated that three persons aided accused-petitioner in killing the deceased persons, whereas it was a matter of record that these three persons were found to be innocent and acquitted by the Court---Record showed that neither the complainant nor the brother of deceased or any other person, either of the family/neighbor etc., were eyewitnesses of the occurrence---As per record, there was no previous enmity between the family of the accused and the deceased---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances, and accused was acquitted of the charge.

(d) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---In case of contradictions and doubts, the benefit of the same must be extended to the accused.

Abdul Jabbar and another v. The State 2019 SCMR 129 rel.

Syed Khawar Ameer Bukhari, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Ms. Rahat Ehsan, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1351

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

GHAZI KHAN PATHAN and another ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 27 of 2019, decided on 23rd April, 2025.

(Against the judgement dated 06.12.2018 passed by Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench in Criminal Appeal No. D-90 of 2012 and Criminal Appeal No. D-87 of 2012).

(a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----9(c)---Possession of narcotic substance---Reappraisal of evidence---Official witnesses, evidence of---Scope---Prosecution case was that 30 kilogram charas/hashish was recovered from the truck driven by accused "GK", while accused "MK" was seated on the front passenger seat---Trial Court convicted both the accused and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life---Appeal was preferred before the High Court but was dismissed---Validity---Official witnesses were competent witnesses unless mala fide, enmity, or ulterior motive is convincingly established on the record, which, in the present case, was conspicuously absent---In fact, it had emerged on record that all the prosecution witnesses belonged to the Excise Department, whereas the accused persons were from another province and there existed no past animosity between them that may give rise to suspicion of false implication---Petition of petitioner "GK" for leave to appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Nazir Ahmed v. The State 2023 SCMR 1299 rel.

(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----9(c)---Possession of narcotic substance---Reappraisal of evidence---Presumption of knowledge and constructive possession of contraband---Scope---Prosecution case was that 30 kilogram charas/hashish was recovered from the truck driven by accused "GK", while accused "MK" was seated in the front passenger seat---Trial Court convicted both the accused and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life---Appeal was preferred before the High Court but was dismissed---Validity---Record showed that the intercepted truck was under the control and custody of the driver, petitioner "GK", which legally amounted to his constructive possession of the narcotic recovered from the vehicle---In such circumstances, the driver was deemed responsible for the contraband found in the vehicle under his charge and it was presumed that he had knowledge of its presence---When the petitioner, "GK", was signaled to stop the vehicle, he instead accelerated, which was a clear indication of his intent to flee---Such action of speeding up in response to a police signal, strongly suggested that the petitioner "GK" had something to hide---Situation became even more telling when, upon searching the vehicle, narcotic was uncovered from secret compartments within the truck's cabin body---Petitioner "GK" not only had knowledge of the contraband but was in clear constructive possession of the contraband narcotic---In that regard, the petitioner "GK" had been rightly found guilty of committing an offence falling within the ambit of Sections 6 and 7 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, and punishable under Section 9(c) of the said Act---Petition of petitioner "GK" for leave was dismissed accordingly.

State v. Wallace 372 Md. 137, 812 A.2d 291 2002 and Kashif Ameer v. The State PLD 2010 SC 1052 rel.

(c) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----9(c)---Possession of narcotic substance---Reappraisal of evidence---Person seated in front passenger seat---Not aware of presence of narcotics in the vehicle---Prosecution case was that 30 kilogram charas/hashish was recovered from the truck driven by accused "GK", while accused "MK" was seated in the front passenger seat---Trial Court convicted both the accused and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life---Appeal was preferred before the High Court but was dismissed---Validity---As per record, petitioner "MK" was sitting on front seat at the time of interception---As such, attributing the illicit narcotics found in the vehicle to petitioner "MK" could not be justified in the absence of any evidence linking him to the possession or control of the vehicle, as prosecution failed to provide evidence that he was aware of the narcotic in the vehicle---Since petitioner "MK" lacked a possessory right in or control over the vehicle, and it could not be inferred that he had knowledge of the narcotic---Thus, petitioner "MK" was neither conscious nor aware of the narcotic present in the vehicle---Supreme Court found no reasonable grounds to uphold his conviction---Petition of petitioner, "MK", was converted into appeal and was allowed, in circumstances, and he was acquitted of the charge.

Shahzada v. State 2010 SCMR 841 rel.

Burhan Latif Khaisori, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Saleem Akhtar Buriro, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State.

Assisted by: Ms. Tayyaba Munir, Law Clerk.

2025 S C M R 1357

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Ayesha A. Malik, JJ

RAB NAWAZ ---Petitioner

Versus

SHEHZAD HASSAN and others ---Respondents

Crl. P. No. 253-L of 2025, decided on 26th March, 2025.

(Against the order of Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 18.02.2025 passed in Crl. Misc.No. 5460-B of 2025).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 427, 109 & 34---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185 (3)---Qatl-i-amd, mischief, abetment, common intention---Application for cancellation of bail, dismissal of---Petitioner/complainant was aggrieved of grant of post-arrest bail to respondent/accused by High Court---Held: Accused was charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant---Bail, though a concession granted to ensure the liberty of an accused pending trial, is not an unqualified right and can be withdrawn, if misused---Bail maybe cancelled if the accused, after securing release, engaged in conduct that undermined the administration of justice---Such grounds included attempt to influence or intimidate witnesses, tampering with evidence, committing another offence while on bail, or violating conditions imposed by the Court---Furthermore, if the accused fails to appear before the Court without just cause, or if new facts come to light that materially altered the basis on which bail was granted, the Court may justifiably revoke the concession---However, the liberty of an individual must be balanced against the need to ensure a fair trial and uphold public confidence in the justice system---Other than the above, the principles evolved for examining a bail granting order for the purpose of cancellation, the Court usually interferes on two grounds: (i) when the impugned order is perverse on the face of it, or (ii) when the impugned order has been made in clear disregard of some principles of the law of bail---Perverse order is one that has been passed against the weight of the material on the record or by ignoring such material or without giving reasons; such order is also termed as arbitrary, whimsical and capricious---Courts are not to indulge in the exercise of a deeper appreciation of material available on record at the bail stage and are only to determine tentatively, by looking at such material, whether or not there exist any "reasonable grounds" for believing that the accused person is guilty of the alleged offence---None of the said grounds for cancellation of bail were attracted in the present case---Accordingly, leave to appeal was declined and the petition was dismissed, in circumstances.

Zaro v. State 1974 SCMR 11; Sidra Abbas v. State 2020 SCMR 2089; Farid v. Ghulam Hussan 1968 SCMR 924 and Khalid Saigol v. State PLD 1962 SC 495 rel.

Aqib Javed Malik, Advocate High Court for Petitioner (With permission of the Court).

Rana Abdul Majid, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.

Respondents-in-person.

2025 S C M R 1360

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

IFTIKHAR KIYANI alias Khara ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 703 of 2020, decided on 28th April, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 22.02.2016 in Criminal Appeal No. 66-J of 2011 and Murder Reference No. 73 of 201, passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Ocular account supported by medical evidence---Appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant---Ocular account of the incident had been furnished by complainant and a witness---Testimonies of said witnesses were consistent and corroborative with each other on all material particulars of the occurrence, including the date, time, place, and the modus operandi of the offence---Both the eye-witnesses unequivocally attributed the role of causing firearm injury on the person of the deceased to the appellant---As the occurrence took place in broad daylight and the appellant was previously known to the eye-witnesses, the possibility of mistaken identity stood excluded---Presence of the eye-witnesses at the spot at the time of occurrence had been satisfactorily explained and appeared natural---Both the eye-witnesses were subjected to lengthy and searching cross-examination, yet nothing material could be elicited to undermine their credibility or shake their evidence---No doubt, complainant was the real brother of the deceased and witness was a close relative but the defence failed to advance any plausible reason or motive for their alleged false implication of the appellant while sparing the actual perpetrator(s)---Proposition of wrongful substitution, in such circumstances where close relatives had witnessed the murder of their kin, was inherently implausible and was rarely encountered in criminal jurisprudence---Medical evidence furnished by Medical Officer, who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased, fully supported the prosecution's case---According to the statement of Medical Officer, firearm injury rupturing the trachea of the deceased and causing severe bleeding resulted into the unnatural death of the deceased---Circumstances established that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Asfandiyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009 and Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Related and interested witnesses, evidence of---Reliance---Appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant---Allegedly, both the eye-witnesses were closely related to the deceased, therefore, were interested witnesses---Mere fact of a witness being related to the deceased did not, in itself, render the testimony unreliable or tainted---Interested witness is one who is motivated by some extraneous consideration or harbors an ulterior motive to falsely implicate an accused---In the instant case, the defence had not been able to bring on record any such motive that could suggest a false implication of the appellant---In the absence of any tangible material indicating enmity, malice, or ill-will, the testimony of related witnesses could not be discarded solely on the ground of relationship---Circumstances established that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Azhar Hussain and another v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1907 and Shamsher Ahmad and another v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1931 rel.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Minor contradictions in the statement of witnesses---Inconsequential---Accused-appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant---The argument that statements of the eye-witnesses were riddled with material contradictions and discrepancies did not bear merit---There were only minor inconsistencies for instance, that the complainant in his report stated that the firearm injury was sustained on the front of the neck by the deceased, whereas in his Court testimony he deposed that the shot passed through and through and this assertion stood contradicted by the medical evidence which indicated the entry wound was on the upper part of the chest near the neck and the exit wound was located at the mid-back---Other than this defence was unable to point to any substantial contradiction capable of undermining the foundational structure of the prosecution's case---Even otherwise, Court was fully convinced qua the presence of the eyewitnesses at the spot at the time of occurrence and their testimony was trustworthy and confidence inspiring, therefore, such minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitnesses with the medial evidence would not be sufficient for acquittal of the appellant---Minor discrepancies or omissions, which did not go to the root of the prosecution's case, were to be treated as inconsequential---Evidence of the prosecution was to be evaluated on the touchstone of quality rather than quantity---Moreover, it was not the identity or status of the person testifying that determined the credibility of the evidence, but the content and coherence of the testimony itself---Therefore, it was the statement that was to be judged and not the person and it must be weighed on the scales of logic, consistency, and truthfulness---Circumstances established that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Ali Taj and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 900; Muhammad Iqbal v. The State 1996 SCMR 908; Naeem Akhtar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 396; Faisal Mehmood v. the State 2010 SCMR 1025; Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 and Abid Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 208 rel.

Sardar Muhammad Ashfaq Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant.

Muhammad Faiz Ahmad Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.

2025 S C M R 1367

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

AHSIN ALI and another ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petitions Nos. 389 and 549 of 2023, decided on 8th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 05.6.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in M.R. No. 43 of 2021, Criminal Appeal No. 1413 of 2021 and Criminal Appeal No. 1410 of 2021).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 393, 449 & 109---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, house trespass, abetment---Reappraisal of evidence---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the paternal brother of the complainant by inflicting hatchet blows---Record showed that the role assigned to petitioner "R" alias "J" was merely that of a 'Jappah'---Not even a single witness had stated that petitioner "R" alias "J" inflicted any 'danda' blow on the deceased---No looted money or hens were recovered from his possession---Danda was not recovered on the pointation of the said petitioner rather the same was given to the prosecution side by the complainant himself---Moreover, it did not appeal to a prudent mind that petitioner "R" alias "J" would catch hold of the deceased when his co-accused was inflicting repeated hatchet blows on the body of the deceased because, in that case, there was every possibility to receive a fatal hatchet blow on his own body---Evidently, the role attributed to petitioner "R" alias "J" was that of 'Jappah' only, hence the other factors connecting him to the commission of the offence were obviously lacking---Hence, prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the petitioner "R" alias "J"---Thus, said petitioner was acquitted from the charges levelled against him by extending the benefit of doubt---Petition of "R" alias "J" was converted into appeal and allowed, in circumstances.

Muhammad Anwar v. The State 1981 SCMR 850; Ahmad Ali v. The State 2021 SCMR 470 and Zarin Shah and 2 others v. The State 1974 SCMR 376 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 393, 449 & 109---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, house trespass, abetment---Reappraisal of evidence---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the paternal brother of the complainant by inflicting hatchet blows---Record showed that the accusation levelled against petitioner "AA" was that he inflicted hatchet blows on the head of the deceased and that the hatchet recovered was bloodstained---Defence alleged that in the post-mortem report, which, although, attributed the cause of death to severe head injuries however, it did not specify the nature of the weapon used, as to whether it was a hatchet, a danda or any other incriminating object---Said report was not significant because the prosecution witnesses had not stated that petitioner "AA" used the right side of the hatchet---Lacerated wounds mentioned in the postmortem report of the deceased could be caused with the wrong side of the hatchet and as such there was no material contradiction between the ocular account and medical evidence of the prosecution---Petitioner "AA" was caught red handed at the spot by witnesses while carrying a bloodstained hatchet---Evidence of the prosecution eyewitnesses to his extent was confidence inspiring and trustworthy---Prosecution had proved its case to the extent of petitioner "AA" beyond the shadow of any doubt---Petition of said petitioner was converted into an appeal and was dismissed with modification in the sentence by commuting the death sentence into life imprisonment.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 393, 449 & 109---Qatl-i-amd, robbery, house trespass, abetment---Reappraisal of evidence---Motive not proved---Sentence, quantum of---Mitigating circumstances---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the paternal brother of the complainant by inflicting hatchet blows---Record showed that the accusation leveled against accused "AA" was that he inflicted hatchet blows on the head of the deceased---As per prosecution case the accused persons came to the farm house of the deceased for dacoity on the instigation of one "GN", but the same proved to be incorrect---No looted money, article or hens were recovered from the possession of accused "AA" or his co-accused---No witness had stated that he had seen the petitioners while attempting to loot any article from the poultry shed of the deceased---While awarding death sentence and convicting an accused motive had to be given prime importance since without there being an un-shattered motive proved by the prosecution, death sentence could not be awarded, rather in such cases, death sentences were usually converted into sentences for life imprisonment---In the instant matter, the aspect of proving motive to the hilt was missing---Therefore, awarding death sentence or confirming the same would not only be harsh but also uncalled for, when admittedly no material had come on the record to prove the alleged motive---Moreover, it was not determinable in this case that as to what had actually happened immediately prior to the occurrence which resulted into present unfortunate incident---Likewise, if the motive of robbery punishable under Section 393, P.P.C., was not proved then offence of trespass punishable under Section 449, P.P.C., in order to loot any article from the poultry shed of the deceased was also not proved---Thus, the conviction and sentence of accused "AA" under Sections 393 & 449, P.P.C., were set-aside and he was acquitted of the said charges---However, the sentence awarded to the accused "AA" under Section 302(b), P.P.C., was modified from death sentence to life imprisonment---With said modification in sentence, petition was converted into an appeal and was dismissed, in circumstances.

Arshad Beg v. The State 2017 SCMR 1727; Allah Wasaya and another v. The State 2017 SCMR 1797 and Muhammad Yasin and another v. The State and others 2024 SCMR 128 rel.

Hameed uz Zaman, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Irfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.

Jalil ur Rehman, Advocate Supreme Court along with Complainant for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1380

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

BASHIR-UD-DIN and others ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeals Nos. 26, 27 and 28 of 2021, decided on 8th May, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 20.12.2016 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Crl. A. No. 13 of 2011, Crl. A. No. 19 of 2021 and M.R. No. 10 of 2011).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 396 & 460---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, dacoity with murder, person jointly concerned in lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night---Reappraisal of evidence---Confession, recording of---Appellants were charged that they entered into the house of complainant, tied his and his wife's hands and one of them murdered his son---In the present case, the judicial confession of one of the appellants was available on record in the form of Section 164 Cr.P.C statement, in which the said appellant narrated the occurrence and gave an inculpatory confessional statement which involved the role of all co-accused persons, who were the present appellants in the instant case---Judicial confession is attributed with a high degree of confidence ipso facto, as it is recorded by a judicial officer in a Court in consonance with Sections 164 and 364 of the Cr.P.C. and it is commonly relied upon for maintaining conviction---Judicial confessional statement of an accused is recognized by law as circumstantial evidence against the other co-accused---In the present case, the inculpatory confession made by the appellant not only detailed his own involvement but also implicated the other appellants in the incident---Even though the confession was subsequently retracted, a conviction could still be sustained if there existed other corroborative and incriminating evidence against the appellants---Once a confessional statement was found to be true and voluntary, it could form the basis for conviction---Inculpatory judicial confession of appellant constituted a significant cornerstone of the prosecution's case---Said confession was duly corroborated by the ocular testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the identification parade, medical evidence, the recovery of the weapon and the forensic report issued by the Forensic Science Laboratory, collectively forming a consistent and credible chain of evidence supporting the prosecution's narrative---Appeal was dismissed with modification in sentence.

Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition; John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 821, at 308 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 4th rev. ed. 1970); Imran v. the State 2015 SCMR 155; Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353; Mazhar Hussain v. The State 1990 MLD 195; Haji Jatoi v. The State 2003 PCr.LJ 1492; Farooq Mengal v. The State 2007 SCMR 404; Manjeet Singh v. The State PLD 2006 SC 30; Tariq Hussain v. The State 2003 SCMR 938; Maj (R) Tariq Mehmood v. The State 2002 SCMR 1493; Mst. Rubina Bibi v. The State 2001 SCMR 1914; Emperor v. Daii Norsu and Govinda Nath ILR (1883) 6 Bom 223; Khurrum Malik and others v. The State and others PLD 2006 SC 354; Mohd. Sabir v. Rex AIR 1952 All 796; Rema Naik v. State AIR 1965 Ori 31; Balbir Singh v. The State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 and Muhammad Amin v. The State PLD 2006 SC 219 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 396 & 460---Qatl-i-amd, dacoity with murder, person jointly concerned in lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night---Reappraisal of evidence---Motive not proved---Mitigating circumstance---Quantum of sentence---Accused were charged that they entered into the home of complainant, tied his and his wife's hands and one of them murdered his son---Record showed that the prosecution's case revealed two conflicting narratives regarding the motive---One asserted that the murder occurred during a robbery/dacoity, while the other proposed the possibility of targeted killing---Consequently, the true motive remained shrouded in mystery---Both versions had surfaced in the evidence, yet neither diminished the culpability of the appellants, nor any of the versions was supported by cogent evidence---Where the motive for the offence is shrouded in mystery then the extreme penalty of death is not warranted---Additionally, given that four individuals were implicated in the crime, the investigation and identification parade did not attribute a specific role to each appellant with respect to inflicting that injury---Said factual matrix, while not exonerating the appellants, constituted a relevant mitigating circumstance in the assessment of their respective culpabilities and the quantum of sentence---Thus, death sentence of the appellants was modified to the sentence of life imprisonment--- Appeal was dismissed with said modification in sentence.

Muhammad Yaqoob v. State 1999 SCMR 1138; Ali Asghar alias Aksar v. The State 2023 SCMR 596; Nadeem Ramzan v. The State 2018 SCMR 149; Amjad Shah v. State PLD 2017 SC 152; Zafar Iqbal v. State 2014 SCMR 1227 and Shameem Khan v. The State 2024 SCMR 1802 rel.

Raja Shafat Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Ms. Chaand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

Mustafa Ramday, Advocate Supreme Court along with Zoe K. Khan, Advocate High Court, Ahmed Junaid, Advocate High Court, Akbar Khan, Advocate High Court and Barrister Salman Khan, Advocate High Court for the Complainant.

Assisted by: Muhammad Subhan Malik (Judicial Law Clerk).

2025 S C M R 1388

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

AMJAD and another ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 231 of 2023, decided on 12th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 23.06.2021 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. D-134 of 2016 and Confirmation Case No. 26 of 2016).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 377, 341, 147, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, unnatural offence, wrongful restraint, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Delay of thirty one hours and thirty minutes in lodging the FIR---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of the minor son of complainant after committing sodomy with him---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which conviction and sentence was upheld by the High Court---Validity---Record showed that there was a considerable delay of more than 31½ hours in lodging of the FIR---Moreover, it was also a matter of record, rather it was an admitted position on the part of the complainant, that the FIR was registered after due consultation with two persons and the local police---From the deposition of complainant, it was evident that the postmortem of the deceased was conducted before lodging of the FIR---Complainant had admitted that after leaving the dead body at the spot he did not go to the Police Station for lodging of the FIR rather he went to the Nekmard and his uncle to inform them about the incident---Even after picking the dead body from the spot complainant made no effort to lodge the FIR as again he went to the hospital and had the postmortem conducted, and finally after completing the burial of the deceased, he went to the Police Station for lodging the FIR, causing a delay of 31½ hours---First Information Report, was to be lodged at the very initial stage of the incidents, that the legal process might be put into motion---In the instant case however, the FIR was registered after some events, i.e. informing co-villagers, taking them to the spot, taking the deceased's body to the hospital, getting postmortem and medical checkup done and finally the burial of the deceased---Thus, it was only after all these episodes the FIR was lodged after due consultation and preliminary investigation/enquiry of the Police on the spot, which, had put a major dent on the case of the complainant as well as that of the prosecution---In this case, it stood admitted that the FIR was registered after due consultation with private persons and the police and after conducting an enquiry, due to which it lost its evidentiary value---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Asia Bibi v. The State PLD 2019 SC 64; Altaf Hussain v. The State 2019 SCMR 274; Amir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 566; Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490; Abid Hussain and another v. The State and another 2024 SCMR 1608; Shaukat Hussain v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2024 SCMR 929 and Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 377, 341, 147, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, unnatural offence, wrongful restraint, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of the minor son of complainant after committing sodomy with him---Deposition of complainant regarding the piece of cloth, with which his and his brother's hands and mouth as well as the mouth of deceased were tied also contradicted the deposition of the other witnesses---Complainant had stated that the cloth was red and white in colour whereas according to his brother, it was red in colour---Even in the postmortem report the said cloth had been mentioned as red and white---Other witness had deposed that he did not remember the colour of the said cloth---From the deposition of complainant, it was also evident that he had stated that the deceased was not tied with the kerchief whereas in the FIR he had mentioned that deceased's mouth was tied with it---Moreover, there was also a contradiction regarding the sodomy done by accused persons, as according to the deposition of complainant it was "A" who committed the said act first and then "I", whereas according to his brother, "I" committed the said offence first and then "A"---It was not mentioned in the FIR as to who committed the sodomy first either "A" or "I"---Brother of the complainant/witness had also given some contradictory statements as he stated that complainant informed the police over the telephone whereafter the police arrived at the place of incident/wardaat and inspected the dead body, whereas according to Head Constable, complainant come to the Police Station and informed him that "A" & "I" had committed murder of deceased---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 377, 341, 147, 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, unnatural offence, wrongful restraint, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Medical evidence---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of the minor son of complainant after committing sodomy with him---Medical officer had categorically mentioned that crime number was not mentioned in the police letter nor CNIC number of the identifiers of the deceased's body were mentioned in the postmortem report---In the postmortem proforma, there was no mention with regard to sodomy---No chemical report with regard to the sodomy was produced---Admittedly, in the postmortem report there was no mention of the specific weapon, with which the head of deceased was allegedly cut off---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(d) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Benefit of doubt always accrues in the accused's favour.

Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court/Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.

Salim Akhtar Buriro, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State.

Ali Hyder, In person for the Complainant (via video-link, Karachi).

2025 S C M R 1399

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Ishtiaq Ibrahim and Ali Baqar Najafi, JJ

MUHAMMAD WAJID ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 212 of 2023, decided on 15th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 29.06.2021 in Criminal Jail Appeal No. D-18 of 2014 with Murder Reference/Confirmation Case No. 6 of 2014).

(a) Criminal trial---

----Circumstantial evidence---Conviction---Scope---Conviction can be recorded even in case carrying capital punishment on the basis of circumstantial evidence if it excludes all hypothesis of innocence of accused---However, circumstantial evidence should be accepted with great caution and has to be scrutinized minutely for reaching the conclusion that no plausible conclusion can be drawn except guilt of the accused.

Munawar Hussain v. Imran Waseem 2013 SCMR 374 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 376---Qatl-i-amd, rape---Re-appraisal of evidence---Natural behavior of complainant---Accused was charged for committing rape with the minor daughter of the complainant and then murdering her---Record showed that the behavior of the complainant was natural and devoid of any mala fide---Upon daughter of complainant going missing on the evening of 17.12.2011, he promptly initiated search efforts along with his brother and on the same night reported in the Police Station that his daughter was missing---Appellant was not nominated in the said report, which reinforced the bona fides of the complainant that he was not interested in charging innocent person(s) in random---On the next day of missing of his daughter complainant nominated the appellant as accused when a witness of last seen evidence told him that he had seen the deceased in the company of the appellant on the previous evening---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its case against the appellate, however, the High Court in its well-reasoned judgment had expressly held that the medical evidence on record did not support the confessional statement of the appellant insofar as the allegation of rape upon the minor deceased was concerned---Consequently, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 376, P.P.C., were set aside---In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this aspect may justly be treated as a mitigating circumstance for the commutation of the sentence of death into imprisonment for life---Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 376---Qatl-i-amd, rape---Re-appraisal of evidence---Last seen evidence---Accused was charged for committing rape with the minor daughter of the complainant and then murdering her---Last seen evidence had been furnished by one witness---Said witness stated that he had seen the deceased in the company of the appellant on 17.12.2011 at a shop, which constituted last seen evidence---Said witness was subjected to cross-examination, yet nothing could be elicited to discredit his testimony or showing any animosity against the appellant---Statement of said witness remained un-impeached and formed an essential link in the chain of circumstantial evidence---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its case against the appellate, however, the High Court in its well-reasoned judgment had expressly held that the medical evidence on record did not support the confessional statement of the appellant insofar as the allegation of rape upon the minor deceased was concerned---Consequently, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 376, P.P.C., were set aside---In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this aspect may justly be treated as a mitigating circumstance for the commutation of the sentence of death into imprisonment for life---Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 376---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, rape---Re-appraisal of evidence---Confessional statement of appellant---Accused was charged for committing rape with the minor daughter of the complainant and then murdering her---Confessional statement of the appellant recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C., by Judicial Magistrate on 20.12.2011 was of pivotal importance---Judicial Magistrate observed all codal formalities, ensured compliance with legal safeguards, provided ample opportunity/time to the appellant to ponder over his confessional statement and confirmed voluntariness of the confession---During cross-examination of the Judicial Magistrate nothing could be unearthed to suggest that the confession was procured through coercion, inducement or threat---Although the appellant later retracted his confession but a conviction could be recorded on the basis of a retracted judicial confession if it was found to be voluntary, true and was corroborated by independent evidence---In the confessional statement the appellant had admitted commission of rape and murder of the minor deceased through asphyxia i.e. pressing her mouth with his hands and thereafter throwing her dead body in the Katchra Kundi---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its case against the appellate, however, the High Court in its well-reasoned judgment had expressly held that the medical evidence on record did not support the confessional statement of the appellant insofar as the allegation of rape upon the minor deceased was concerned---Consequently, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 376, P.P.C., were set aside---In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this aspect may justly be treated as a mitigating circumstance for the commutation of the sentence of death into imprisonment for life---Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed.

Manjeet Singh v. The State PLD 2006 SC 30 rel.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 376---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, rape---Re-appraisal of evidence---Recovery of dopatta on the pointation of appellant---Accused was charged for committing rape with the minor daughter of the complainant and then murdering her---In the instant case, dopatta of the deceased was recovered from the abandoned house of the appellant, effected on his pointation---Said recovery was witnessed by witnesses---Such discovery made pursuant to the information furnished by the accused was admissible evidence under Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and lent further credibility to the prosecution case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its case against the appellant, however, the High Court in its well-reasoned judgment had expressly held that the medical evidence on record did not support the confessional statement of the appellant insofar as the allegation of rape upon the minor deceased was concerned---Consequently, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 376, P.P.C., were set aside---In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this aspect may justly be treated as a mitigating circumstance for the commutation of the sentence of death into imprisonment for life---Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed.

(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 376---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, rape---Re-appraisal of evidence---Medical evidence---Accused was charged for committing rape with the minor daughter of the complainant and then murdering her---Medical evidence furnished by Female Medical Officer, who conducted the autopsy on the dead body of minor deceased, conclusively proved that the death of the minor was homicidal in nature---Cause of death was asphyxia due to pressure on both nostrils and compression of blood vessels, leading to cerebral insufficiency---Post-mortem findings were consistent with the manner of death described in the confessional statement of the appellant and further strengthened the prosecution's version---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved its case against the appellant, however, the High Court in its well-reasoned judgment had expressly held that the medical evidence on record did not support the confessional statement of the appellant insofar as the allegation of rape upon the minor deceased was concerned---Consequently, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 376, P.P.C., were set aside---In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this aspect may justly be treated as a mitigating circumstance for the commutation of the sentence of death into imprisonment for life---Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed.

(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 376---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, rape---Re-appraisal of evidence---Sentence, quantum of---Accused was charged for committing rape with the minor daughter of the complainant and then murdering her---High Court had rightly declined to accept the confessional statement of the appellant to the extent of the alleged commission of rape thereby acquitting him under Section 376, P.P.C., as the findings of the High Court in that regard were based on proper appreciation of medical evidence on record as well as the confessional statement of the appellant wherein he had not stated in unequivocal words anything about commission of rape with the minor deceased---Such approach of the High Court was in consonance with the settled principle that where a confessional statement was not the sole basis of the prosecution case and was corroborated by other evidence, the Court may accept the inculpatory parts that supported the established facts and reject the portions that were inconsistent or uncorroborated---In view of the corroborative circumstantial evidence including last seen testimony, recovery, medical findings and the voluntary confession, the partial exclusion of the rape charge did not detract from the overall prosecution case under Section 302(b), P.P.C.---Prosecution had succeeded in establishing an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence, each link corroborating the other and collectively pointing accurately towards the guilt of the appellant---Confessional statement, though retracted, met the legal requirements of voluntariness and truthfulness and was adequately corroborated---Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302(b), P.P.C., was well-founded and sustainable in law---So far as the sentence of death awarded to the appellant under Section 302(b) P.P.C., was concerned, the record reflected that the appellant had remained in continuous incarceration since his arrest on 20.12.2011 and had been confined in the death cell following the pronouncement of the death sentence by the Trial Court vide judgment dated 28.01.2014, a period extending over a decade, while on the other hand, there were some inconsistencies of a minor dimension in prosecution evidence which threw up doubts about prosecution version but did not qualify for acquittal---Such fact was merely a mitigating circumstance capable of affecting no more than quantum of sentence---Such inconsistencies may create dilution of prosecution version but not its complete negation---Furthermore, the High Court in its well-reasoned judgment had expressly held that the medical evidence on record did not support the confessional statement of the appellant insofar as the allegation of rape upon the minor deceased was concerned---Consequently, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 376, P.P.C., were set aside---In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, this aspect may justly be treated as a mitigating circumstance for the commutation of the sentence of death into imprisonment for life---Consequently, the appeal was partly allowed.

Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Siraj Ali Khan, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State.

2025 S C M R 1408

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Naeem Akhter Afghan, Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar

and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

Crl. A. No. 379 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 801 of 2019

FATEH KHAN ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

(On appeal from judgment dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Crl.A. No. 961 of 2018 and M.R. No. 39 of 2018).

Crl. A. No. 380 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 826 of 2019

MADAD KHAN and others ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

(On appeal from judgment dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Crl.A.No. 35 of 2016 and M.R. No. 14 of 2016).

Crl. A. No. 381 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 827 of 2019

SHAUKAT ALI and others ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

(On appeal from judgment dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Crl.A.No. 485 of 2011 and M.R. No. 90 of 2011).

Crl. A. No. 382 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 828 of 2019

KHALID MEHMOOD ---Appellant

Versus

FATEH KHAN and others ---Respondents

(On appeal from judgment dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Crl.A. No. 961 of 2018 and M.R. No. 39 of 2018).

Crl. A. No. 383 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 829 of 2019

KHALID MEHMOOD ---Appellant

Versus

MADAD KHAN and others ---Respondents

(On appeal from judgment dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Crl.A. No. 35 of 2016 and M.R. No. 14 of 2016).

Crl. A. No. 384 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 830 of 2019

KHALID MEHMOOD ---Appellant

Versus

SHAUKAT ALI and others ---Respondents

(On appeal from judgment dated 22.5.2019 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in Crl.A. No. 485 of 2011 and M.R. No. 90 of 2011).

Crl.A. No. 379 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 801 of 2019, Crl. A. No. 380 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 826 of 2019, Crl.A. No. 381 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 827 of 2019, Crl.A. No. 382 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 828 of 2019, Crl.A. No. 383 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 829 of 2019, Crl.A. No. 384 of 2021 in Crl.P.L.A. No. 830 of 2019, decided on 4th June, 2025.

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302, 324, 404, 427, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person at the time of his death, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Delay in recording the statements of witnesses by the police---Accused were charged for committing murder of four persons of the complainant party and causing injuries to the three persons---Record transpired that despite meeting with the Police Officers and Investigating Officer at the place of occurrence at noon of the day of occurrence, the statements of the witnesses under Section 161, Cr.P.C., were not promptly recorded at the place of occurrence---Statement of one witness under Section 161, Cr.P.C., was recorded in the evening of the day of occurrence at 07.30 pm and the statement of other witness under Section 161, Cr.P.C., was recorded in the evening of the day of occurrence at 08.30 pm---Neither both witnesses nor the Investigating Officer furnished any explanation for the delay in recording their Section 161, Cr.P.C., statements---In such circumstances and in view of previous enmity and blood feud between the parties, possibility of false implication of large number of accused by the complainant after consultation and deliberation with witnesses, being relatives inter-se and being relatives of all the deceased, could not be ruled out of consideration---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302, 324, 404, 427, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person at the time of his death, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Recovery of weapon of offence and crime empties---Accused were charged for committing murder of four persons of the complainant party and causing injuries to the three persons---Crime empties shown recovered from the place of occurrence on the day of occurrence were not recovered by the police soon after reaching the place of occurrence---According to the prosecution witnesses, the crime empties were recovered by the police on their second visit of the place of occurrence---In that regard, no explanation had been offered by the prosecution witnesses---Kalashnikov had been shown recovered on the pointation of the convict on 9th February 2009 and according to report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, six crime empties were fired from the same---To lend independent corroboration to the recovery of Kalashnikov on the alleged pointation of the convict, no private witness was associated by the Investigating Officer to attest the said recovery---With regard to 8 mm rifle allegedly recovered from the other convict, there was no report of the firearm expert about firing of any crime empty from the same due to which the said recovery had been held of no avail to the prosecution---Recovery of .44 bore rifle from another convict had already been disbelieved and held inconsequential by the High Court---With regard to the Kalashnikov allegedly recovered from acquitted co-accused, there was no report of the firearm expert to confirm that any crime empty was fired from the same---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302, 324, 404, 427, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person at the time of his death, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Improbable and unnatural narrations of the witnesses---Accused were charged for committing murder of four persons of the complainant party and causing injuries to the three persons---Exactitude and accurate details mentioned in the FIR and his statement at the trial by the complainant as well as narrated by witnesses about the position of each nominated accused with specific firearms at different locations of the place of occurrence and attribution of specific role of firing to each accused with reference to each deceased was highly improbable and unnatural in such like occurrence---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302, 324, 404, 427, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person at the time of his death, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Contradictions and improvements in the statements of witnesses---Accused were charged for committing murder of four persons of the complainant party and causing injuries to the three persons---According to statement of a witness, he was driving the vehicle at the time of occurrence and during the occurrence, despite heavy firing, he did not bend his head downwards to save himself---Non receiving of any firearm injury by said witness in the occurrence and his mentioning the whole episode of firing by the nominated accused on the deceased with specific firearms created serious doubt about his presence in the vehicle at the time of occurrence---Plantation of said witness as an eye-witness by the complainant with the connivance of Investigating Officer as an afterthought to strengthen the prosecution version could not be ruled out of consideration---Record further revealed that the complainant and the witnesses made dishonest improvements in their statements recorded at the trial---Statements of said witnesses recorded at the trial were also suffering from material contradictions and same were also in conflict with the medico legal evidence---Statements of the complainant and prosecution witnesses were also lacking independent corroboration in material aspects---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302, 324, 404, 427, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person at the time of his death, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Injured witness, evidence of---Reliance---Accused were charged for committing murder of four persons of the complainant party and causing injuries to the three persons---According to the complainant and his Medico-Legal Certificate, during the occurrence, he had received firearm injuries on both his feet---According to injured witness and his Medico-Legal Certificate, he had received firearm injuries on his right forearm, his right thigh and his left hip---Mere stamp of a firearm injury on the person of a prosecution witness did not per se tantamount to a stamp of credence on his testimony---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Muhammad Hayat v. The State 1996 SCMR 1411 rel.

(f) Criminal trial---

----Interested witness, evidence of---Scope---Testimony of an interested witness should be scrutinized with care and caution and independent corroboration is essential to test the validity and credibility of the testimony of an interested witness.

Muhammad Ramzan v. Khizar Hayat 2024 SCMR 1085 rel.

(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302, 324, 404, 427, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person at the time of his death, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Interested witnesses, evidence of---Accused were charged for committing murder of four persons of the complainant party and causing injuries to the three persons---Complainant and witnesses were relatives inter-se, were relatives of all the deceased; were interested witnesses, inimical towards the convicts and acquitted co-accused due to previous enmity/blood feud---Their testimonies suffered from dishonest improvements and material contradictions and lacked independent corroboration in material aspects, thus, same were not worthy of credence---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302, 324, 404, 427, 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(iii), 337-F(v), 148 & 149---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person at the time of his death, mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, ghayr-jaifah-hashimah, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Re-appraisal of evidence---Material witnesses not presented for evidence---Adverse presumption---Accused were charged for committing murder of four persons of the complainant party and causing injuries to the three persons---At the trial, the prosecution did not produce the injured driver of vehicle, the injured sitting on the front seat of another vehicle; the injured witnesses sitting on the rear seat of one of the vehicles; the injured driver of a third vehicle; and the minor and other injured sitting in the back of one of the vehicles---An adverse inference was drawn under Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, to the effect that had the said witnesses been produced by the prosecution at the trial, they would have not supported the version of the prosecution---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Saima Noreen v. The State 2024 SCMR 1310 and Muhammad Ramzan v. The State 2025 SCMR 762 rel.

(i) Criminal trial---

----Absconsion---Scope---Abscondence per se is not a proof of the guilt of an accused person but it can be taken as corroborative piece of evidence---In absence of trustworthy and confidence inspiring substantive incriminating evidence, conviction cannot be solely based upon abscondence of an accused.

Gul Khan v. The State 1999 SCMR 304; Rasool Muhammad v. Asal Muhammad 1995 SCMR 1373; Iftikhar Hussain alias Kharoo v. The State 2024 SCMR 1449; Rohtas Khan v. The State 2010 SCMR 566; Shafqat Abbas v. The State 2007 SCMR 162 and Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Asif 2007 SCMR 1812 rel.

Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa and Ajmal Raza Bhatti, Advocates Supreme Court for Appellants (in Crl.As. Nos. 379 to 381 of 2021).

Ansar Nawaz Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Crl.As. Nos. 382 to 384 of 2021).

Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa and Ajmal Raza Bhatti, Advocates Supreme Court for Respondents (in Crl.As. Nos. 382 to 384 of 2021).

Ansar Nawaz Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court for Complainant (in Crl.As. Nos. 379 to 381 of 2021).

Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.

2025 S C M R 1425

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

GHULAM QADIR ---Petitioner

Versus

GHULAM MUHAMMAD KALEEM and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1684 of 2025, decided on 23rd May, 2025.

(Against the order dated 05.03.2025, passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in Civil Revision No.125 of 2025).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 12---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 113---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, belated filing of---Limitation---Execution of the agreement to sell, denial of---Not mentioning proper description of property in the agreement to sell---Effect---Vendor being an illiterate old lady---The petitioner (vendee) allegedly entered into agreement to sell with the predecessor of respondents (their mother/vendor)in 1983---Earnest money was allegedly paid and remaining amount was agreed to be paid after the conclusion of the litigation pending in the courts---Later on, the predecessor of the respondents passed away in the year 1993---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell was filed by the petitioner (vendee) in 2017---Held: No plausible reason was put-forth by the petitioner for such a long delay in filing the suit and the same on the face of it was barred by time and there was no valid explanation for such a delay---This aspect of the case was also considered by the High Court and courts below---Similarly, it was held by all courts that the alleged agreement to sell was an ambiguous document and no proper description of property was there---Moreover, the alleged vendor was an illiterate old lady being mother of four sons and three daughters but none of them was the signatory of the alleged agreement to sell as a witness to the same and similarly all the respondents had categorically denied the factum of alleged agreement to sell with the petitioner/vendor---No misreading, non-reading or any other material irregularity and illegality in the findings of the High Court and the courts below were pointed out---Petition being meritless was dismissed and leave was refused, in circumstances.

Hameed-uz-Zaman, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1427

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

ALTAF HUSSAIN ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 507 of 2023, decided on 7th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 10.06.2019, in Criminal Appeal No. 2068 of 2016, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324, 148 & 149---Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S. 13---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, possessing illicit weapon---Reappraisal of evidence---Ocular account supported by medical evidence---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and causing firearm injuries to injured witness---Ocular account was furnished by the complainant, injured and a witness, and out of them, the former two eye-witnesses were the brothers of the deceased---Depositions of the eye-witnesses were consistent and corroborative with each other on all material particulars, including the day, date, time and place of occurrence, as well as the mode and manner in which the deceased was fatally injured and done to death by the appellant through firing from a Kalashnikov---Eye-witnesses also provided a coherent and credible account regarding the firearm injuries sustained by injured as a result of firing by the absconding co-accused---Although the occurrence took place at night time, however, all the eyewitnesses had consistently stated that the area was sufficiently illuminated by an electric bulb installed outside the house of a witness, thereby enabling them to clearly identify the appellant and his co-accused---Presence of the appellant and co-accused at the crime scene had been unequivocally confirmed by witness, outside whose house the incident took place---Eye-witnesses were subjected to rigorous cross-examination, but nothing material could be elicited to cast doubt on their credibility or contradict their version---Presence of injured having firearm injuries, stood as un-refuted physical evidence supporting the ocular account---Likewise, the presence of the complainant and eye-witness at the crime spot at the time of occurrence had been plausibly explained and remained un-impeached during cross-examination---Medical evidence adduced by Medical Officer, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, fully corroborated the ocular account of the prosecution's case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the charge of murder against the accused---As regards the injury caused to injured, the specific role of firing at injured was attributed to the absconding co-accused---Therefore, the conviction of the accused under Section 324, P.P.C., was not sustainable in law, thus was set-aside---Appeal was partly allowed.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324, 148 & 149---Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S. 13---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, possessing illicit weapon---Reappraisal of evidence---Related witnesses, evidence of---Reliance---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and causing firearm injuries to injured witness---Admittedly, the complainant and injured were real brothers of the deceased but their mere relationship with the deceased was not a sufficient ground for discarding their testimony, especially in the absence of any established animus or motive for false implication---Substitution of the actual perpetrator in place of an innocent individual particularly where close relatives are killed in the presence of family members is an improbable proposition and found consistent affirmation in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court---In the absence of any mala fide intent or ulterior motive to falsely implicate the appellant, the testimony of the eye-witnesses being confidence inspiring and having remained consistent throughout could not be discredited merely on the basis of their relationship with the deceased---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the charge of murder against the accused---As regards the injury caused to injured, the specific role of firing at injured was attributed to the absconding co-accused---Therefore, the conviction of the accused under Section 324, P.P.C., was not sustainable in law, thus was set-aside---Appeal was partly allowed.

Asfandyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009; Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487; Aman Ullah v. The State 2023 SCMR 723 and Imran Mehmood v. The State 2023 SCMR 795 rel.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 324, 148 & 149---Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S. 13---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, possessing illicit weapon---Reappraisal of evidence---Co-accused acquitted---Case of accused distinct from acquitted co-accused---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant and causing firearm injuries to injured witness---Allegedly, co-accused, who was charged with causing a firearm injury to the deceased on the left upper arm, had been acquitted by a Court of competent jurisdiction and his acquittal had attained finality, therefore, the conviction and sentence of the appellant based on the same set of evidence was contrary to the settled principles of appreciation of evidence---Appellant was specifically assigned the role of having fired with a Kalashnikov, as a result of which the deceased sustained multiple injuries on various parts of his body and fell to the ground---Conversely, co-accused was assigned role of single fire shot which hit the deceased on his left arm---However, neither any crime empty of a 30 bore pistol was recovered from the spot nor was any such pistol recovered from the possession or on the pointation of co-accused---Acquittal of co-accused was not based on discrediting the ocular account of the prosecution witnesses as was manifest from the impugned judgment of the High Court---High Court in the impugned judgment had observed that co-accused was independently tried and the Trial Court observed that in the absence of recovery of any empty of 30 bore from the spot, the injury on the left arm of the deceased could not be conclusively attributed to the co-accused and might plausibly have been caused as a result of firing attributed to the appellant---Thus, the acquittal of the co-accused did not in any way undermine the prosecution's case against the appellant, whose role was categorically established through cogent and reliable evidence---Circumstances established that the prosecution had proved the charge of murder against the accused---As regards the injury caused to injured, the specific role of firing at injured was attributed to the absconding co-accused---Therefore, the conviction of the accused under Section 324, P.P.C., was not sustainable in law, thus was set-aside---Appeal was partly allowed.

Khawar Mehmood Khatana, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Rai Akhtar Hussain, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1435

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ

Mst. MADIHA BANO ---Petitioner

Versus

SENIOR SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE COMPLAINT CELL SOUTH KARACHI

and others ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 149-K of 2024, decided on 25th March, 2025.

(Against the order dated 21.10.2024, passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Cr. Misc. Application No. 206 of 2024).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 22-A & 561-A---Powers of Justice of Peace under S.22-A, Cr.P.C.---Scope---Petition filed under S.22-A, Cr.P.C, by the petitioner for the registration of criminal case was dismissed by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace---Validity---Petitioner alleged that she was subjected to mental torture and was humiliated and blackmailed by the respondents---Two Courts below concurrently found that the petitioner was aggrieved of the fact that she was dropped out of the class and her admission was terminated due to her performance as it was poor and not up to the mark---Two Courts below found no cognizable offence and dismissed the application of the petitioner, leaving the petitioner at liberty to avail proper remedy---Petitioner had not stated anything which could make the Supreme Court form a view other than the one already formed by the Ex-Office Justice of Peace and the High Court---Petition was accordingly dismissed.

Petitioner in person.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1437

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

SAFDAR ALI ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 419 of 2022, decided on 7th April, 2025.

(Against the order/judgment dated 14.04.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. A. No. 44197-J of 2021, Crl. Rev. No. 55132 of 2021 and P.S.L.A. No. 55131 of 2021).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 365-B, 376 & 34---Forcible abduction, rape, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Unexplained delay of 3/4 days in lodging the FIR---Consequential---Accused persons were convicted and sentenced by Trial Court for abducting daughter of complainant and committing rape with her---High Court dismissed the appeal whilst upholding conviction---Validity---First Information Report of the case was lodged on 16.01.2020 after an unexplained delay of approximately 3/4 days despite the fact that the occurrence in this case took place during the night of 11.01.2020---In the same vein, the victim reportedly returned on 13.01.2020, but she was medically examined on 24.01.2020---Judicial Magistrate recorded her statement on 24.01.2020 under Section 164, Cr.P.C., and the petitioner's name was first recorded---Inexplicable delay in filing the FIR raised suspicion and undermined the credibility of the prosecution's narrative---Moreover, it was imperative that the police were provided with early information regarding the crime in order to prevent criticism of the report as a result of consultation, deliberation and manipulation---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt, as such, the instant petition was converted into an appeal and the same was allowed, in circumstances.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 365-B, 376 & 34---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Forcible abduction, rape, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Withholding material witness---Effect---Petitioners were convicted and sentenced by Trial Court for abducting daughter of complainant and committing rape with her---High Court dismissed the appeal whilst upholding conviction---Validity---Complainant stated in the FIR that "S" had witnessed the occurrence---Consequently, "S" was an important witness of the prosecution---However, the prosecution failed to present him before the Court to substantiate the allegations against the petitioner thereby withholding its best evidence---Non-production of most natural and material witnesses to the occurrence would strongly suggest prosecution's misconduct---Such fact would be regarded as a source of undue advantage for the prosecution and a suppression of material facts that would cause prejudice to the accused---Act of withholding the most natural and material witness of the occurrence would create the impression that the witness would not have supported the prosecution if he had been brought into the witness box---Consequently, the prosecution would not be able to whitewash the consequences in such an event---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt, as such, the instant petition was converted into an appeal and the same was allowed, in circumstances.

Lal Khan v. State 2006 SCMR 1846 rel.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 365-B, 376 & 34---Forcible abduction, rape, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Co-accused acquitted on the same set of evidence---Effect---Accused persons were convicted and sentenced by Trial Court for abducting daughter of complainant and committing rape with her---High Court dismissed the appeal whilst upholding conviction---Validity---In the case in hand, victim was the sole witness and no one else witnessed the occurrence in question---Entire rape incident was associated with her---Consequently, testimony of victim was the determining factor in the entire case---Courts below in acquitting the co-accused persons determined that the statement of victim was unreliable in that context---Such fact raised a substantial query about the credibility of the same statement when applied to the petitioner---Conviction of an accused person cannot be exclusively based on the testimony of a witness if that testimony has been disbelieved in relationship to another accused person---Testimony of a single witness is only admissible if it is determined to be reliable and unimpeachable---In the present case, the reliability of the statement of victim regarding the co-accused had directly been undermined by the Courts---High Court's reliance on the victim's statement, which had been disregarded in relation to the co-accused, was not only contradictory but also raised significant concern about the integrity of the prosecution's case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt, as such, the instant petition was converted into an appeal and the same was allowed, in circumstances.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 365-B, 376 & 34---Forcible abduction, rape, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Medical evidence not supporting the prosecution version---Accused persons were convicted and sentenced by Trial Court for abducting daughter of complainant and committing rape with her---High Court dismissed the appeal whilst upholding conviction---Validity---Victim was examined by Female Medical Officer, who was not present at the Court---Medico-Legal Certificates were produced by the record clerk of DHQ Hospital---This was an acknowledged aspect of the case---According to the medical certificate, there was no indication of recent or fresh vaginal intercourse or penetration---Conviction could not be upheld if the only evidence was a single statement that lacked corroboration---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt, as such, the instant petition was converted into an appeal and the same was allowed, in circumstances.

Umer Hayyat Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (through video link, Lahore).

Tariq Siddiqui, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.

Azmat Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Complainant (through video link, Lahore).

2025 S C M R 1442

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

USMAN AHMED and another ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE through Advocate General, Islamabad ---Respondent

Criminal Appeals Nos. 566 and 567 of 2020, decided on 15th April, 2025.

(Against judgment dated 16.04.2020 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Crl. A. No. 78, M.R. No. 3 and JPs Nos. 75 and 76 of 2014).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 392---Qatl-i-amd, robbery---Reappraisal of evidence---Discrepancies in evidence of witnesses---Accused were charged for committing murder of the son of complainant during robbery---Record confirmed that the FIR was registered pursuant to the statement/application submitted by the complainant---Complainant had stated during his cross-examination that in his initial application to the police, he had not disclosed that appellant, who allegedly fired upon the deceased, had a beard---Complainant was also unable to state the exact time at which the application was submitted to the police---Application was admittedly written by a relative whose name complainant once again did not disclose but was only signed by him---Similar type of statement was recorded by brother of deceased---Prominently, the witness of wajtakar had deposed that he had seen two persons running from the place of occurrence towards the forest side---Although said witness acknowledged that the faces of the two persons, he saw fleeing, were not turned towards him and that he had not seen them committing the murder of the deceased, he still however claimed to have identified them by disclosing their names to the S.H.O. as the appellants---Eye-witness had firstly described the accused as unknown persons and only later identified them during separate test identification parades---Appellant was specifically identified as the bearded assailant attributed with the role of shooting at the deceased on 01.10.2010---Circumstances established that the charges leveled against appellant had not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 392---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Qatl-i-amd, robbery---Reappraisal of evidence---Test identification parade---Infirmities---Accused were charged for committing murder of the son of complainant during robbery---Record revealed that appellant had joined the police investigation before any identification proceedings took place, admittedly appearing before the Investigating Officer---In the test identification parade that followed appellant's arrest, appellant raised the objection that he had earlier been shown to the complainant party and eyewitness and that his photos were taken---Such objections were duly recorded in the identification proceeding report, prepared by the Magistrate---Although, the Investigating Officer had categorically denied the presence of the eye-witness at any place where appellant would have been in his view prior to the identification proceedings, this claim did not withstand scrutiny since the eye-witness would have had disconcertingly easy access to appellant long before any identification proceedings took place---Trial Court had not addressed appellant's objections and the High Court had observed that the identification parade to the extent of appellant had not been believed by the (High) Court---In cases where the accused might have been seen by the identifying witness prior to the test identification parade, the identification proceedings carried no evidentiary value---Abundant possibility that appellant was seen by the eyewitness before identification proceedings took place confirmed its doubtful credibility and therefore nullified any value the test identification parade may have had, even as a corroborative piece of evidence---Prosecution's failure to independently link appellant to the crime gave rise to reasonable doubt---Circumstances established that the charges levelled against appellant had not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Kanwar Anwar Ali's case PLD 2019 SC 488; Subha Sadiq v. The State 2025 SCMR 50; Nazir Ahmed v. Muhammad Iqbal and another 2011 SCMR 527; Shafqat Mehmood and others v. The State 2011 SCMR 537 and Sabir Ali alias Fauji v. The State 2011 SCMR 563 rel.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 392---Qatl-i-amd, robbery---Reappraisal of evidence---Recovery of robbed property and weapon of offence from an open place without associating private persons---Effect---Accused were charged for committing murder of the son of complainant during robbery---Testimony of the Investigating Officer, with respect to the recovery of the robbed articles was also telling---Investigating Officer stated that the robbed articles were recovered from the house of appellant upon his pointation, which admittedly was surrounded by a number of houses---None of the neighbours were, however, associated in respect of the recovery proceedings---Record showed that the weapon of offence, a 30-bore pistol, was recovered upon the pointation of appellant from beneath some bushes near the place of occurrence---Recovery witness deposed that it was a picnic place and number of people were always available there---However, they did not make any person from the public as witness---Police's failure to associate any member of the public with the recovery of the weapon of offence despite the ready availability of such a person, constituted yet another doubt in the myriad of flaws afflicting the prosecution's case---Moreover, there was also the fact that the recovery was effected from an open place---Placing reliance on a recovery made from an open and accessible place was unsafe because it could not be said that the recovery had been effected from the exclusive possession of the accused---Circumstances established that the charges leveled against appellant had not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Amir Muhammad Khan v. The State 2023 SCMR 566; Arshad Khan v. The State 2017 SCMR 564; Muhammad Saleem v. Shabbir Ahmed 2016 SCMR 1605 and Abdul Samad v. The State 2025 SCMR 639 rel.

Muhammad Ilyas Siddiqui, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in Crl. A. No. 566 of 2020).

Nemo for Respondents (in Crl. A. No. 567 of 2020).

Ghulam Sarwar Nihung, Prosecutor General, Islamabad for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1454

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Musarrat Hilali and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

Mst. KHALIDA BIBI ---Petitioner

Versus

NAEEM KHAN and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 252-P of 2025, decided on 4th June, 2025.

(Against the order dated 14.02.2025 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P No. 2744-P of 2023).

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)---

----S. 5---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 85---Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 5 & Sched.---Suit for recovery of dower---Registered Nikah Nama---Evidentiary value---Scope---Marginal witnesses of Nikah Nama, non-production of---Effect---Claim of wife was declined on account of her failure to produce marginal witnesses of Nikah Nama---Held, that where the relationship of husband and wife is admitted and the execution of Nikah is not denied, then non-production of the marginal witnesses of the Nikah Nama before the Court is not fatal to the suit of the plaintiff / wife---In such circumstances, the execution of Nikah Nama stands proved and the plaintiff's entitlement to dower is established---Even, the copy of Nikah Nama having been produced did not require production of witnesses to prove it (Nikah Nama)---Mere verbal denial of the execution of Nikah Nama in the statement recorded before the Trial Court without supporting evidence carries no legal value---Nikah Nama is a public document, which is registered under Section 5 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and as such presumption of truth is attached to it carrying evidentiary value of Article 85 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---In the present case, neither the Appellate Court nor the High Court had recorded any findings regarding issue framed by the Trial Court with respect to entitlement of plaintiff to recovery of maintenance allowance, thus, they failed to jurisdiction vested in them---Supreme Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the High Court, and remanded the case back to it (High Court) for decision afresh, after providing the parties an opportunity of hearing---Petition for leave to appeal was converted into an appeal and was allowed accordingly.

Rasool Bibi v. Waryam 1992 SCMR 1520 and Jan Muhammad v. Salamat Bibi 2002 SCMR 1408 ref.

Nasim Ullah, Advocate-on-Record / Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Respondent No. 1 in person along with Muhammad Zia Ullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (without caveat).

2025 S C M R 1457

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

ZULQARNAIN HAIDER alias Zain ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Crl. P.L.A. No. 332 of 2025, decided on 22nd April, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 13.03.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in Crl. Misc. No. 1096-B of 2025).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-H(2), 440, 148 & 149---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rash or negligent act to endanger human life or personal safety of others, mischief committed after preparation made for causing death or hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry, case of---Cross version---Allegation against the petitioner-accused was that he along with co-accused committed murder of the deceased and caused injuries to the injured witness---Record showed that another report of the same occurrence had been registered by accused, also including the same place, time and date of occurrence, while involving the same parties inter se---However, that second report was registered on 21.05.2023, with a delay of four days---From one side deceased had lost his life and injured sustained injuries while in the second report two persons sustained injuries---When both versions were placed in juxtaposition, it became apparent that the allegations in both complaints were qua the same incident, as they shared a common nexus in terms of date, time, location, motive and parties involved---Apparent distinction laid in the sequence of reporting---Such factual overlap, prima facie, reflected that the two versions were antithetical claims arising out of one and the same occurrence thus, portraying the current scenario as cross version---Supreme Court observed that it was not in agreement with the High Court on not allowing bail to the petitioner on the basis of cross-version---In cases involving cross-versions of the same occurrence, the prime consideration before the Court is to ascertain which party is the aggressor and which party is aggressed upon---Nature, seat, and number of injuries sustained by each side may undoubtedly be relevant; however, such factors are merely indicative and do not, by themselves, carry an overriding or conclusive effect---Mere extent of injuries caused to one party could not serve as the sole basis for drawing an adverse inference against the other, especially where both versions emanated from the same transaction and each party attributed aggression to the other---In cases of counter versions arising from the same incident, one given by the complainant in the FIR, and the other given by the opposite party, bail in appropriate cases is granted as a rule on the grounds of further inquiry for the reason that the question as to which version is correct is to be decided after the recording of pro and contra evidence during the trial---Refusal of bail in such cases is an exception---Additionally, the petitioner was in custody for the last 23 months and despite the lapse of such a considerable period, there appeared to be no substantial progress in the trial pending before the Trial Court---Such prolonged incarceration, without meaningful advancement in the trial, raised a serious concern regarding the petitioner's right to a fair and expeditious trial---Petition was converted into appeal and was allowed, in circumstances, and petitioner was granted bail.

Fazal Muhammad v. Ali Ahmed 1976 SCMR 391; Shafiqan v. Hashim Ali 1972 SCMR 682; Khalid Mehmood v. Muhammad Kashif Rasool 2013 SCMR 1415 and Khizar Hayat v. The State 2024 SCMR 1605 rel.

Sardar Abdul Raziq Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Basharatullah, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 1505

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Arfidi, CJ Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui

and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

Messrs CHAUDHARY STEEL FURNACE ---Petitioner

Versus

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, SIALKOT ZONE, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, SIALKOT ---Respondent

Civil Peetition No. 312 of 2025, decided on 22nd May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 17.12.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in S.T.R. No. 39113 of 2019).

Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----S. 57---Rectification of order---Scope---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue---Powers---Registered person (appellant) filed an application for fixation of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Tribunal)---Tribunal treated said application (for fixation of appeal) as an application for rectification and passed order in favour of registered person---High Court in reference jurisdiction set-aside said favourable order---Validity---Petitioner (registered person), on its own, moved an application for fixation of the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which appeal was never in existence, as the same was already disposed of in its totality---When the application for fixation of appeal was filed , there was no lis pending and nothing could have been fixed for any leftover issue and, hence, the only way the Tribunal conceived it was by way of rectification application---Even section 57 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 had its limitation in terms of the rectification sought---A rectification of mistake, indeed, can be amended/rectified by an order passed by the Tribunal which mistake is apparent on the face of the record, however, it does not enlarge the scope of the Tribunal to render a complete and altogether different decision, independent of the earlier "view"---In the present case, although it was an application for fixation of the appeal, but essentially it sought further adjudication in the shape of rectification of an unanswered question which was not even remotely within the contours of section 57 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990---Tribunal acted as an appellate forum of its own order, which was not sustainable in law---No error in the setting-aside order passed by the High Court in reference jurisdiction had been noticed---Petition for leave to appeal filed by registered person was dismissed, in circumstances.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi v. Abdul Ghani 2007 PTD 967 ref.

Muhammad Ali Raza, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 1509

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Naeem Akhter Afghan Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

Hafiz FARHAT ABBAS ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore and another ---Respondents

Crl. P.L.A. No. 1117 of 2024, decided on 2nd May, 2025.

(Against Order dated 03.10.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. No. 49721-B of 2024).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 497(2) & 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 395, 436, 427, 290, 291, 337-L(2), 109, 120-D, 121, 121-A, 131, 146, 153, 153-A, 153-B, 505, 148, 149 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dacoity, mischief by fire and explosive substance, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, public nuisance, hurt, abetment, criminal conspiracy, attempt to wage war, attempting to seduce a soldier, rioting, giving provocation with intent to cause riot, promoting enmity between different groups, public mischief, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention, act of terrorism---Pre-arrest bail, confirmation of---Further inquiry---Admittedly the petitioner had not been nominated in FIR for the occurrence of 9th May, 2023---Petitioner had been implicated in the supplementary statement of the complainant on the basis of tweets/audio/video clips on social media---Evidentiary value, as well as admissibility of the delayed supplementary statement of the complainant, as well as the tweets/audio/video clips on social media shall be determined at the trial after recording evidence---No recovery had been effected from the petitioner---Record revealed that the petitioner had co-operated with investigation of the case---Prosecution had yet to prove the allegation of hatching criminal conspiracy by the petitioner at the trial---Apprehension of the petitioner about his arrest by the police to create humiliation and harassment despite cooperating with investigation of the case could not be held to be vague or baseless---On the basis of tentative assessment of the material so far available on record, the case against the petitioner also fell within the ambit of further inquiry---For the same allegation co-accused had already been granted pre-arrest bail by the Supreme Court---On the basis of rule of consistency as well, the petitioner was held entitled for confirmation of his ad-interim pre-arrest bail---Petition was converted into appeal and same was accepted---Ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner earlier was confirmed, in circumstances.

Petitioner in person along with Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Muhammad Shahbaz Ali Khan Khosa, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by: Mustehsan Raza Awan, Advocate for Petitioner.

Zulfiqar Abbas Naqvi, Special Prosecutor, Punjab, Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab and Dr. Javaid Asif, DSP and Zahid Saleem, Inspector for the State.

2025 S C M R 1512

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Musarrat Hilali Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar

and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD MISKEEN ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 2023, decided on 10th April, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 13.05.2019 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in J. A. No. 29 of 2011 and M. R. No. 11 of 2011).

Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 324---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Double murder---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of two persons and injured two others---Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused to death on two counts---Appeal against conviction was also dismissed---Validity---In the instant case, the date and location of the incident were acknowledged facts---In the same vein, the appellant's attendance at the crime scene at the time of the incident was uncontested---Moreover, it was also undisputed that the appellant's residence was in close proximity to the residences of the deceased and injured individuals---Present appellant was identified as the primary perpetrator and a specific role was assigned to him in the FIR that was promptly lodged in response to the incident that occurred in broad daylight---Prosecution had presented three eye-witnesses in the Trial Court, who were natural witnesses---Said witnesses were inmates of the same street where the incident occurred and one of them was physically injured---No possibility of mistaken identification was there as the appellant and the witnesses were close relatives and inmates of the same street---Ocular account provided by the said eye-witnesses was adequately supported by the medical evidence and they had made consistent statements before the Trial Court---After conducting a thorough examination of the evidence on record, both the Courts below reached the unanimous conclusion that the appellant's guilt had been fully established, thus the Supreme Court had not been able to adopt a stance that differed from the concurrent stance of the Courts below---Allegedly, the appellant had acted under the influence of his father---Principle of influence of elders was limited to offenders of impressionable ages who were living under the influence of elders---Therefore, an accused of mature age and comprehension could not be considered to have acted on instigation---Under the guise of elders, including the father, no universal authority could be granted to adult and elderly individuals to commit brutal, gruesome and wanton murder---Appellant launched an attack with a firearm and hatchet over a trivial matter, resulting in the deaths of two individuals and mercilessly injured two innocent neighbours who were attempting to transport the injured individuals to a hospital in order to save their lives---Appellant did not deserve any sympathy regarding his death sentence---Appeal being devoid of merits was dismissed, in circumstances.

Muhammad Ilyas v. Muhammad Sufian PLD 2001 SC 465 and Sakhawat v. State 2001 SCMR 244 rel.

Anis Muhammad Shahzad, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Jan Muhammad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Respondent.

Ghulam Sarwar, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 1515

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

ASAD HUSSAIN ---Petitioner

Versus

The CONTROLLER GENERAL OF ACCOUNTS FEDERAL CO-OPERATIVE BUILDING, SECTOR G-5/2, ISLAMABAD and another ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 2258 of 2023, decided on 19th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 31.03.2002 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 1250(P)CS of 2018).

(a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunals Act (I of 1974)---

----S.4---Promotion---Vacant post---Current charge---Administrative neglects---Civil servant was aggrieved of being assigned the post on current charge basis instead of being promoted n the said post being a vacant post---Validity---When the post in question fell vacant, the civil servant was the senior-most eligible officer at that time, who was entitled to be considered for promotion with effect from that date---Delay caused by authorities in convening DPC or in processing petitioner's case due to procedural irregularities such as issues with the author of his PERs could not be used to defeat his rightful claim---Competent authority was under a duty to act with a fine sense of judgment, which it had failed to do---The moment the post became vacant and civil servant met required qualifications, legitimate expectation arose in his favour that he would be considered for promotion in a fair and timely manner---Failure to fulfil such expectation, without lawful justification, amounted to arbitrariness and procedural unfairness---Such delay in promotion of civil servant stemmed not from personal shortcoming but from systemic inefficiencies and administrative neglect---Civil servant must not bear the consequences of internal procedural lapses---Supreme Court directed the authorities to promote the civil servant to post in question with effect from the date on which vacancy in his quota first became available---Supreme Court also directed the authorities that all consequential benefits, including seniority, arrears of pay and service entitlements would follow from backdated promotion---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by Service Tribunal---Appeal was allowed.

Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani 2013 SCMR 817; Brean v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971) 2 QB 175; Messrs Gadoon Textil Mills v. WAPDA 1997 SCMR 641; Province of Sindh v. Ghulam Shabbir 2023 SCMR 686; Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Fazli Ghufran 2022 SCMR 1765; Dr. Yasmeen Zafar v. Dr. Shehla Sami 2019 SCMR 993; Khalid Mehmood v. Chief Secretary, Punjab 2013 SCMR 544; WAPDA v. Haji Abdul Aziz 2012 SCMR 965; Muhammad Siddique v. Director, Special Education 1998 SCMR 88; Narender Chadha v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 638; A. Janardhana v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 769; B.S Yadav v. State of Haryana AIR 1981 SC 561; Dr. Muhammad Amjad v. Dr. Israr Ahmed 2010 SCMR 1466; WAPDA v. Muhammad Nawaz Khan 1998 SCMR 640; S. Abu Saeed v. Government of N.W.F.P. 1990 SCMR 1623; Government of N.W.F.P. v. Buner Khan 1985 SCMR 1158; Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb 2023 PLC (C.S.) 336; NADRA v. Jawad Khan 2023 SCMR 1381 and Bashir Ahmed Badini v. Hon'ble Chairman and Member of Administration Committee 2022 SCMR 448 rel.

(b) Civil service---

----Vacant post, filling of---Principle---Every sanctioned post within a government department or public institution exists to serve a defined functional need and must be filled promptly upon falling vacant---So long as the post continues to exist and has not been formally abolished or frozen pursuant to a lawful policy decision, such as due to budgetary constraints or other demonstrable administrative exigencies, it must be filled within a reasonable time---Unjustified delays in such regard not only disrupt efficient functioning of the institution but also weaken its service delivery capacity---Vacancies, when left unattended, often lead to informal arrangements and ad hoc delegations of authority that foster opacity, enable nepotism and corrode principles of merit and transparency.

Ms. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Raja Muhammad Shafqat Abbasi, DAG, Riaz Hussain Azam, Advocate-on-Record along with Javed Iqbal, Additional Secretary, Finance and Fiaz Afridi, DAG, CGA Office and Abdullah A.A.O. for Respondents.

Assisted by: Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk, Supreme Court of Pakistan.

2025 S C M R 1521

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Ayesha A. Malik and Shahid Waheed, JJ

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, ZONE-I, REGIONAL TAX OFFICE, SIALKOT and others ---Appellants/Petitioners

Versus

Messrs WHITE GOLD STEEL MILLS, S.I.E. DASKA and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeals Nos. 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2034 of 2022, Civil Appeals Nos. 308, 503 of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos. 3468-L, 3477-L, 1917-L, 1918-L, 2149-L, 2150-L, 2607-L, 2608-L, 2788-L, 2789-L, 2790-L of 2022, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals Nos. 905-L, 1463-L, 1464-L, 1465-L of 2023, 3665-L of 2022, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos. 2352-L, 2353-L, 2354-L, 3177-L, 3399-L, 3400-L of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos.106-L, 1155-L, 1268-L, 1450-L of 2024, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos. 216-L of 2025, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals Nos. 156-L of 2024, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal No. 2627-L of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals Nos. 3659-L, 3660-L, 3661-L, 3662-L of 2022, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals Nos. 3327-L, 3328-L, 3329-L, 3330-L, 431-L, 3014-L of 2023, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal No. 2340 of 2024, Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeals Nos. 4583,.4584, 4585 of 2023, Civil Petition for Leave to Appeals Nos. 5359 and 531-L of 2024, decided on 5th June, 2025.

(On appeal against judgments dated 27.04.2022, 17.05.2022, 15.06.2022, 23.02.2023, 03.04.2023, 04.04.2023, 07.03.2022, 25.05.2022, 18.10.2022, 09.05.2023, 12.10.2023, 30.10.2023, 30.11.2023, 12.12.2023, 20.05.2024, 08.05.2024, 13.05.2024, 14.01.2025, 30.11.2023, 12.06.2023, 19.10.2022, 18.09.2023, 22.11.2022, 26.06.2023, 11.03.2024, 20.09.2023 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore and Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in PTRs Nos. 334/2013, 335/2013, 336/2013, 333/2013, 337/2013, 286/2014, ITRs Nos. 55/2016, 04/2016, 34473/2022, 29379/2022, PTR No. 121/2014, ITRs Nos. 65930/2022, 65929/2022, 18361/2022, 18366/2022, 475/2015, 476/2015, PTRs Nos. 208/2011, 209/2011, 255/2014, 256/2014, 257/2014, ITRs Nos. 10198/2023, 21986/2023, 21979/2023, 21991/2023, 224/2015, 225/2015, 226/2015, 227/2015, 228/2015, 229/2015, 63076/2022, 30039/2023, 30071/2023, 30135/2023, 66961/2023, 71684/2023, 78778/2023, 81673/2023, 31022/2024, 28057/2024, 29173/2024, 1542/2025, 78977/2023, 38844/2023 PTRs Nos. 237/2012, 238/2012, 239/2012, 240/2012, ITRs Nos. 58743/2023, 58757/2023, 58760/2023, 58768/2023, 567/2010, 43943/2023, 01/2021, 44/2012, 43/2012 and 42/2012.)

(a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----S. 221(1)---Deemed assessment---Scope---Deemed assessment order is nothing other than the transmutation by legal fiction of the return created as a matter of fact by taxpayer into assessment order of Commissioner as a matter of law---Very use of deeming provision meant ipso facto that it does not fall in the category of orders that are both as a matter of fact and of law the creation of Commissioner---Any mistake in return, made as a matter of fact by taxpayer, cannot become [at any rate for purposes of section 221(1)] as a matter of law, the mistake of the Commissioner such that he can amend the deemed assessment order by rectifying it---Between taxpayer and Commissioner the mistake always lays where, and by whom, in fact it was made, i.e., the taxpayer.

(b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----S. 120(1)(a) & 120(1)(b)---Deeming provision---Effect---Two distinct deeming provisions are contained in sections 120(1)(a) and 120(1)(b) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Two provisions are directly, and intimately, linked and occur with an immediateness that is instantaneous but such immediacy is not simultaneity---Two clauses apply consecutively, the one following the other in the sequence set out in the provision---Word "and" which links the two must be understood in such sense---It does not only mean that both clauses apply to the return---It establishes also the order in which they occur---That is the very (and only) basis for the "imagining" required by section 120(1)(a) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and having so imagined, the subsection moves immediately to section 120(1)(b) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Return is deemed to be an assessment order issued to taxpayer on the date the return is filed---Again, there is as a matter of fact no such thing---Yet, by alchemy of the deeming provision, it must be imagined to be so and this second deeming is then bolstered by the words "for all purposes of this Ordinance"---Provision of section 120 (1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, requires first that it be imagined that the Commissioner did something that in fact he did not do, i.e., "made" an assessment and then, him having so acted, requires secondly that the return be imagined to be an order on the assessment so made and issued to the taxpayer on the very date it was filed.

(c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----Ss. 120(1) & 221(1)---Rectification of mistake apparent on the face of record---Deemed assessment---Amendment---Jurisdiction of Commissioner---Authorities contended that deeming assessment order issued under section 120(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was within the jurisdiction of Commissioner under section 221(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Inevitable corollary of the "state of affairs" brought about by the first deeming, i.e., the making of an assessment of taxable income and the tax due, was that the Commissioner was to be deemed to have applied his mind to the material before him, which was nothing other than the return---To conclude otherwise would be to impermissibly "cause or permit your imagination to boggle"---Such assessment (and that could be regarded as another inevitable corollary of the "state of affairs" required to be imagined) would be whatever was contained in the return, i.e., mistakes and all---Return having passed through sieve of first deeming then became, in terms of the second deeming, an assessment order deemed to have been issued by the Commissioner to the taxpayer---It followed that the two deeming provisions, when were taken together and properly applied, would result in an assessment order "passed" by the Commissioner within the meaning, and for purposes, of section 221(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Courts as determination made by High Courts on the question of jurisdiction was not correct---Supreme Court remanded the tax references to High Court which would be deemed pending in respective High Courts and questions of law raised therein would be decided in accordance with law---Appeal was disposed of.

Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner Multan and others PLD 1975 SC 397; Pak Leather Crafts Limited v. Al-Baraka Bank Pakistan Limited 2022 SCMR 1868 and Dr. Abdul Nabi v. Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Quetta 2023 SCMR 1267 rel.

FOR APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS

Ahmad Pervaiz, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link, Lahore in CAs Nos. 2026-2028/2022, CAs. 2034/2022, 308/2023, 503/2023, CPLAs Nos. 1917-L/2022, 1918-L/2022, 2788-L to 2790-L/2022, 2352-L to 2354-L, 156-L/2024 and 2627-L of 2023).

Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record.

Ibrar Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in C.As. Nos. 2029 to 2031, 2033 of 2022, CPLAs. Nos. 3468-L, 3477-L, 2149-L, 2150-L of 2022, 905-L/2023, 1463-L to 1465-L/2023, 3177-L, 3399-L, 3400-L of 2023, 106-L/2024, 1155-L/2024, 531-L/2024, 1268-L of 2024 and 216-L of 2015).

Shahbaz Butt, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link, Lahore in CPLAs Nos. 2326-L to 2331-L of 2022).

M. Yahya, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link, Lahore in CPLAs. Nos. 3665-L, 3659-L to 3662-L of 2022, 3327-L to 3330-L of 2023).

Mian Yousaf Umar, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link, Lahore in CPLA No. 1450-L of 2024).

Amir Wakeel Butt, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link, Lahore in CPLA No. 431-L of 2023).

Babar Bilal, Advocate Supreme Court (in CPLAs Nos. 4583 to 4585 of 2023).

Malik Qamar Afzal, Advocate Supreme Court (in CPLA. No. 5359 of 2024).

FOR THE RESPONDENTS

Shahbaz Butt, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link, Lahore in CAs Nos. 2031/2022, 2034/2022 and 503 of 2023).

Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Advocate Supreme Court (in CPLA No. 106-L of 2024).

Muhammad Amjad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link, Lahore in C.A. No. 308-L of 2023).

Ms. Asma Hamid, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link, Lahore in CPLAs Nos. 2326-L to 2331-L of 2022).

Wasif Majeed, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link, Lahore in CPLAs Nos. 3659-L to 3662-L of 2022).

Manzoor Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court (in CPLA No. 2340 of 2024).

FOR THE FEDERATION

Munawar Iqbal Duggal, Addl. AGP.

FOR THE DEPARTMENT

Dr. Ishtiaq, D.G. (Law) FBR, Ms. Sobia Mazhar, Additional Commissioner and Hassan, Additional Commissioner.

2025 S C M R 1542

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

AMIR SHAHZAD ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 304 of 2020, decided on 19th May, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 16.03.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench passed in Criminal Appeal No. 11-J of 2012 and Murder Reference No. 40 of 2012).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 337-F(i)---Qatl-i-amd, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah---Re-appraisal of evidence---Contradictions in the statement of witnesses---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of father of complainant and also caused injuries to complainant by inflicting spade blows---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death---On appeal the High Court converted the death penalty into imprisonment for life---Validity---Deposition of a witness suggested that the spade was recovered from the eastern room of the residential house lying underneath the heap of woods, which contradicted the averments made by the complainant in the FIR wherein it had been mentioned that the accused after inflicting spade blows on the complainant as well as on his deceased father threw away the same and then fled away---Deposition of the complainant also suggested that the accused threw the spade at the spot and then ran away---Said aspect also disproved/belied the prosecution story of recovering of the spade from the residential house of the accused---There was also another marked contradiction in his deposition as at one place complainant mentioned that the said spade, before it was stolen, was lying inside the Haveli whereas in the FIR he mentioned that the spade was lying near his Haveli---In case of doubt in recovery of weapon, the benefit of it has to be given to the accused---Deposition of another witness also depicted contradictions as at one place he mentioned that the deceased was a weak person whereas, according to the complainant, his father was neither weak nor was of an advanced age---Circumstances established that the case was shrouded with doubts and contradictions---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

Mian Sohail Ahmed and others v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 956 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 337-F(i)---Qatl-i-amd, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah---Re-appraisal of evidence---Recovery of weapon of offence, doubtful---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of father of complainant and also caused injuries to complainant by inflicting spade blows---As per record, the recovered spade remained blood stained without the blood disintegrating even after the passage of 45-days---Said aspect, however, remained unexplained on the part of prosecutor as well as the complainant---Moreover, the case of the prosecution with regard to the blood-stains on the crime weapon also created doubt---Circumstances established that the case was shrouded with doubts and contradictions---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

Muhammad Jamil v. Muhammad Akram 2009 SCMR 120; Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2016 SCMR 2138 and Ahmed Ali v. State 2023 SCMR 781 rel.

Mrs. Kausar Iqbal Bhatti, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Sh. Ahsan-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

Mirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.

2025 S C M R 1552

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD YAMIN and another ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 621 of 2017, decided on 9th April, 2025.

(Against the consolidated judgment dated 15.05.2017, passed by the learned Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1835 and 464-J of 2014).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Abduction for ransom, act of terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Accused-petitioner was charged for abduction of minor son of complainant for ransom---Record divulged that complainant, father of the minor abductee, and an eye-witness had furnished ocular account of the incident of abduction of abductee, whereas, the minor abductee had furnished the ocular account of the entire episode of his abduction from the spot till his release by the abductors after receiving ransom amount of rupees twenty two lacs from his father---According to testimony of witnesses, on 01.10.2013 the abductee along with his brother aged 11 years was returning home after offering Isha prayer and at 08.20 p.m. when they reached at the corner of a Girls High School, two abductors riding on a motorcycle arrived there and forcibly abducted the minor abductee---Incident was reported on the same day to police by the complainant---On 12.10.2013, the complainant received a phone call on his cell phone and the abductors demanded ransom of rupees fifty lacs for the release of the abductee, however, after negotiation rupees twenty two lacs were agreed to be paid to the abductors---On 13.10.2013 at about 06.00 a.m, the complainant along with witnesses paid the said ransom amount to four abductors including the petitioner on a road in lieu whereof the minor abductee was released and handed over to the complainant---As per testimony of the complainant, he obtained phone data of the mobile number of abductors w.e.f. 14.09.2013 to 12.10.2013 and handed over the same to the Investigating Officer who took the same through recovery memo---On 24.12.2013, the present petitioner was identified by the complainant and witness during identification parade conducted at District Jail by Judicial Magistrate---Minor abductee after answering rational answers to the questions of the trial Court was examined and he reiterated the same story of his abduction as set forth by his father/complainant---According to the statement of abductee, after his abduction he was confined in a room and after settling of the ransom amount by the petitioner with his father/complainant he was blindfolded and brought near a park close to his house where he was released---Said material witnesses had been cross-examined at length but nothing beneficial to defence could be extracted from their mouth---CDR data of the mobile number through which the complainant had received call for arranging ransom amount was found to be that of petitioner---Petitioner had been duly identified by the complainant and witness to be one of the abductors who abducted the minor abductee on motorcycle from the spot---Circumstances established that prosecution succeeded in proving its case against the petitioner to the extent of section 365-A, P.P.C, whereas the offence under section 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was not proved thus conviction and sentence under said section was set-aside---Appeal was partly allowed.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 365-A---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Abduction for ransom, act of terrorism---Reappraisal of evidence---Act of terrorism, applicability of---Accused-petitioner was charged for abduction of minor son of complainant for ransom---On scrutiny of the entire evidence of prosecution, court did not find any concrete evidence to bring the action of the petitioners within the meaning of terrorism as defined in section 6 of the Act of 1997---Cases of the offences specified in Entry No. 4 of the Third Schedule to the Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, were cases of those heinous offences which did not per se constitute the offence of terrorism but such cases were to be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court because of their inclusion in the Third Schedule---In such cases of heinous offences mentioned in Entry No. 4 of the said Schedule an Anti-Terrorism Court could pass a punishment for the said offence but not for committing the offence of terrorism---Offence of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under section 365-A, P.P.C., was included in Entry No. 4 of the Third Schedule and kidnapping for ransom was also one of the actions specified in section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Abduction or kidnapping for ransom was a heinous offence but the scheme of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, showed that an ordinary case of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under section 365-A, P.P.C., was merely triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court but if kidnapping for ransom was committed with the design or purpose mentioned in clauses (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of Section 6 of the AntiTerrorism Act, 1997, then such offence amounted to terrorism attracting Section 7(e) of said Act---Conviction and sentences of the petitioner under Section 7(e) of the Act of 1997 recorded by the two Courts below were set-aside, whereas, conviction and sentences under Section 365-A, P.P.C., recorded by the two Courts below were upheld---Petition was converted into appeal and was partly allowed.

Ghulam Hussain's case PLD 2020 SC 61; Farooq Ahmed v. State and another 2020 SCMR 78; Amjad Ali and others v. The State PLD 2017 SC 661 and Muhammad Bilal v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 1362 rel.

Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Nemo for the Complainant.

Ms. Memoona Ihsan-ul-Haq, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 1558

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

OBAIDULLAH and 2 others ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Jail Petitions Nos. 14 and 17 of 2020 and Criminal Petitions Nos. 1322 and 1323 of 2019, decided on 2nd May, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 21.10.2019 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Cr. Jail Appeals Nos. 52 and 54 of 2018, Criminal Revision No. 44 of 2018 and Criminal Acquittal Appeal No. 337 of 2018 and Murder Reference No. 5 of 2018).

(a) Circumstantial evidence---

----Circumstantial evidence---Scope---In case of circumstantial evidence, every circumstance should be linked with each other and it should form such a continuous chain that its one end touches the dead body and the other the neck of the accused---If any link in the chain is missing then its benefit must go to the accused.

Ch. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia and another 1992 SCMR 1047; Sarfraz Khan v. The State 1996 SCMR 188; Asadullah and another v. The State 1999 SCMR 1034 and Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another 2008 SCMR 1103 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Dealy of 11-days in lodging the FIR---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---First Information Report was lodged against co-accused (since acquitted) whereas petitioners were not nominated therein---Furthermore, deceased was missing from his house since 11.06.2018 but the FIR was lodged on 22.06.2018, i.e. with the delay of 11 days from the alleged occurrence---No motive, whatsoever, was alleged in the FIR that as to why the co-accused (since acquitted) and his unknown companions had abducted deceased and committed his murder---Both the petitioners were later on implicated in this case on the alleged disclosure of co-accused (since acquitted) before the Investigating Officer wherein it was stated by the said co-accused that the petitioners had committed the murder of deceased---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly.

(c) Criminal trial---

----Confession, retraction of---Scope---Conviction and sentence of an accused could be maintained on the basis of a retracted judicial confession provided the said evidence appeared to be trustworthy and the same was corroborated by some independent evidence---However, if the retracted judicial confession of an accused was not corroborated by any independent evidence or the same had been recorded in violation of the law on the subject then conviction and sentence of an accused could not be sustained on the basis of said confession.

Aala Muhammad v. The State 2008 SCMR 649; Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza 2008 SCMR 329; Muhammad Ismail v. The State 2017 SCMR 898 and Daniel Boyd v. The State 1992 SCMR 196 rel.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Confession, retraction of---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---As per retracted judicial confession of petitioner, he committed the murder of deceased, due to the motive that about one year prior to the occurrence he received a phone call from co-accused (since Proclaimed Offender) who wanted to marry with him and informed the said petitioner that she was already engaged with deceased, therefore, the said petitioner should first commit the murder of deceased and then they could marry with each other, whereupon, the petitioner along with other petitioner, committed the murder of deceased, while taking him out of the village on the pretext of tracing out some article---In his judicial confession, petitioner further stated that after committing the murder of deceased, they (accused) dug a grave and put the dead body of deceased in the said grave and filled the grave of the deceased with earth---Judicial confession of other petitioner was also on the same lines---Insofar as the motive disclosed in the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners was concerned, notable that no motive whatsoever was mentioned in the FIR, which was lodged after 11 days of the occurrence---Likewise, complainant, who was paternal uncle of deceased, and witness who was real brother of the deceased, had not uttered a single word in their statements before the Court that deceased was ever engaged with co-accused (since PO) or their marriage was going to be solemnized in the near future---Rather complainant and witness conceded during their cross-examinations that they had no previous enmity with the accused/petitioners---No other witness was produced to prove the alleged motive that deceased was ever engaged with the co-accused (since PO) or his marriage with the said co-accused was planned in the near future---No motive was put to the petitioners in their statements recorded under Section 342,Cr.P.C---No telephone numbers, SIM numbers, Call Data Record or transcript of the conversation of the accused with each other had been brought on the record---Keeping in view the said facts, there was no independent corroboration of retracted judicial confession of the petitioners with the motive part of the prosecution case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly.

(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 342---Examination of accused---Incriminating piece of evidence not put to the accused---Effect---If a piece of evidence is not put to an accused in his statement recorded under Section 342, Cr.P.C., in order to provide him a chance to produce his defence against the said evidence then such evidence cannot be used against the accused.

Haji Nawaz v. The State 2020 SCMR 687 and Dr. Waqar Hameed v. The State 2020 SCMR 321 rel.

(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amdand was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---Record showed that a pistol was recovered---However, said pistol was neither recovered from the possession of petitioners, rather the same was recovered from the possession of one "KR"---Said "KR" had not been cited as a witness in this case to establish that the said pistol was ever handed over to him by the petitioners rather he had himself been made an accused in a separate case registered against him under the Arms Ordinance due to the recovery of said pistol from his possession---Insofar as the positive report of the Forensic Science Laboratory was concerned, it was noteworthy that no empty was recovered from the spot on 22.06.2018 when the dead body was recovered but the same were recovered after the arrest of the petitioners on 29.06.2018 from the same place wherefrom the dead body was recovered on 22.06.2018---Not understandable that if the empties were lying at the same spot wherefrom the dead body was recovered then as to why the prosecution witnesses had not noticed the said empties and recovered the same from the spot on 22.06.2018, when the dead body was recovered---Therefore, evident that the empties were not shown to be recovered and the same were not deposited in the office of Forensic Science Laboratory till the arrest of the petitioners and alleged recovery of pistol from the possession of "KR" on 29.06.2018---Thus, it was clear that the empties and the pistol were kept together at the Police Station and were deposited together in the office of Forensic Science Laboratory, therefore, the prosecution evidence qua the recovery of pistol and positive report of Forensic Science Laboratory was not worthy of reliance---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly.

Daniel Boyd v. The State 1992 SCMR 196; Abdul Wahid v. The State 2023 SCMR 1278 and Sarfraz v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 rel.

(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the prosecution case---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---There were glaring contradictions in the prosecution case because on the one hand it was alleged by the complainant in the contents of the FIR that it was co-accused (since acquitted) who was trying to bury the dead body of deceased, near the rainy drainage, which means that the said co-accused only attempted to bury the dead body of deceased, whereas on the other hand according to the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners, the dead body of deceased was buried by them in a grave and the said grave was filled with earth---Complainant did not allege in the FIR that the present petitioners tried to bury the dead body of the deceased and the said allegation was levelled against co-accused (since acquitted) whereas according to the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners, they (petitioners) not only successfully buried the dead body of the deceased in a grave but thereafter they also filled the said grave with earth---Noteworthy that even in his statement recorded by the Trial Court, the complainant neither named the petitioners nor attributed any role to them---Complainant categorically stated that in his application for registration of FIR he named co-accused (since acquitted) and some other accused---Moreover, the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners regarding burial of the dead body of deceased in a grave and filling the said grave with earth had not been supported by the medical evidence---Medical Officer in his postmortem report or in his evidence recorded by the trial Court had not mentioned that he noticed any soil/earth on any part of the body of deceased or on his last worn clothes and, as such, the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners were also not supported by the medical evidence---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly.

(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Confession, recording of---Infirmities---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---Judicial Magistrate while appearing before the trial Court as witness had stated that he unlocked the handcuffs of the petitioners and also sent the police out of his chamber when he recorded the judicial confessions of the petitioners but no such facts were mentioned in his reports---Moreover, in his statement before the Court or in his reports, Judicial Magistrate had not mentioned that as to how much time was given to the petitioners to think over before making their judicial confessions and after how much time they were again called and he satisfied himself that the petitioners were making their judicial confessions with their free will and without any pressure or coercion---Evident that judicial confessions of the petitioners were not recorded in accordance with the law---Even otherwise, there was no independent corroboration of the said judicial confessions---Said judicial confession had also not been supported by the medical evidence, therefore, the convictions and sentences of the petitioners could not be maintained on the basis of said retracted judicial confessions---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly.

(i) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there is a single circumstance, which creats doubt in the prosecution case then the same is sufficient to acquit the accused.

Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.

Qausain Faisal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in J.Ps. Nos. 14 and 17 of 2020).

Akram Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Cr.Ps. Nos. 1322 and 1323 of 2019).

Baqir Shah, State counsel for the State.

2025 S C M R 1572

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

AMIR KHAN and another ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Jail Petition No. 149 and Cr.PLA. No. 374 of 2018, decided on 12th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 31.01.2018, in Criminal Appeal No. 534 of 2015 and Murder Reference No. 8 of 2016).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Lodgment of F.I.R with promptitude---Petitioner allegedly committed murder of the deceased by firing---From the record and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it was clear that the occurrence took place within the shop premises of the petitioner on 20.11.2012 at approximately 04:00 p.m.---Matter was reported to the police with commendable promptitude at 05:40 p.m. by the complainant to police, thereby substantially excluding the possibility of deliberation or consultation in falsely implicating the petitioner---Circumstances established that the prosecution proved its case against the accused-petitioner, however, in view of the totality of circumstances including the absence of premeditation, the sudden and spontaneous nature of the occurrence, the fact that only a single shot was fired by the petitioner/convict, the unarmed status of the deceased and the consistency between the ocular and medical evidence, court was persuaded to hold that the case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of Section 302(c), P.P.C---Conviction of the petitioner/convict recorded under Section 302(b), P.P.C. through the impugned judgment was altered to one under Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner/convict was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years---Consequently, the jail petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Ocular account supported by medical evidence---Petitioner allegedly committed murder of the deceased by firing---Ocular account of the incident was furnished by the complainant and a witness, both of whom were natural witnesses, being related to the deceased and present at the scene of occurrence---Said witnesses had categorically and consistently attributed a solitary firearm injury to the petitioner, which was inflicted upon the deceased during a physical altercation---Incident having occurred in broad daylight, left no room for mistaken identity---Testimony of the eyewitnesses was coherent and consistent not only with each other but also with the medical evidence on all material particulars, including the date, time, and location of the occurrence---Both the eye-witnesses had stated unequivocally that the deceased had purchased a SIM from the petitioner a day prior to the incident---Upon discovering that the SIM contained no balance and the petitioner's refusal to accept responsibility, an exchange of hot words ensued, followed by a physical grappling initiated by the deceased---Moreover, it was in the heat of that altercation that the petitioner drew a pistol from a drawer of his shop and fired a single shot at the deceased, which struck the deceased on the left flank---Medical evidence, as provided by Medical Officer, who conducted the post-mortem examination, fully supported/corroborated the ocular account---Circumstances established that the prosecution proved its case against the accused-petitioner, however, in view of the totality of circumstances including the absence of premeditation, the sudden and spontaneous nature of the occurrence, the fact that only a single shot was fired by the petitioner/convict, the unarmed status of the deceased, and the consistency between the ocular and medical evidence, Court was persuaded to hold that the case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Conviction of the petitioner/convict recorded under Section 302(b), P.P.C. through the impugned judgment was altered to one under Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner/convict was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years---Consequently, the jail petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Sentence, reduction in---Petitioner allegedly committed murder of the deceased by firing---On a meticulous appraisal of the evidence on record, it was evident that the occurrence took place at the spur of the moment without any premeditation or prior enmity between the deceased and the petitioner/convict---Deceased, who, was accompanied by his brothers and cousin, approached the petitioner's shop and initiated a confrontation that escalated into physical grappling---In an instinctive reaction to the perceived threat to his person, the petitioner resorted to the use of a firearm---However, as the deceased was unarmed at the time of the occurrence, therefore, the act of firing a shot even if in self-defence exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defence as contemplated under the law---In cases where the accused, while acting in self-defence or under sudden provocation, caused the death of a person, such circumstances may justify a conviction under Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Yet there was another fact that if the deceased had not visited the shop of the petitioner/convict, the occurrence would not have taken place---Case in hand was surely a case of lack of premeditation, the incident was one of a sudden fight which was the result of heat of passion developed upon a sudden quarrel and no undue advantage had been taken by the petitioner/convict nor had he acted in brutal or unusual manner---In the circumstances, Exception 4 contained in the erstwhile Section 300, P.P.C., squarely stood attracted to this case---In view of the totality of circumstances including the absence of premeditation, the sudden and spontaneous nature of the occurrence, the fact that only a single shot was fired by the petitioner/convict, the unarmed status of the deceased and the consistency between the ocular and medical evidence, Court was persuaded to hold that the case of the petitioner squarely fell within the ambit of Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Conviction of the petitioner/convict recorded under Section 302(b), P.P.C through the impugned judgment was altered to one under Section 302(c), P.P.C.---Accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner/convict was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for fourteen years---Consequently, the jail petition was converted into an appeal and was partly allowed.

The State v. Muhammad Hanif and 5 others 1992 SCMR 2047; Azmat Ullah v. The State 2014 SCMR 1178; Zeeshan alias Shani v. The State PLD 2017 SC 165; Raza and another v. The State and others 2020 SCMR 1185 and Muhammad Ajmal v. The State 2022 SCMR 88 rel.

Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record and Basharatullah Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in J.P. No. 149 of 2018).

Laiq Khan Swati, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Crl. PLA. No. 374 of 2018).

Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.

2025 S C M R 1580

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD BILAL ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 172 of 2023, decided on 5th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 03.12-2020 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl.A. No. 81407-J of 2017 and M.R. No. 364 of 2017).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Contradictions in the statement of witnesses---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of mother of the complainant by inflicting sotta blow---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which was upheld by the High Court---Validity---After gleaning the complainant's depositions as well as the FIR registered upon his complaint, it could be gathered that the appellant statedly inflicted one blow on the deceased's head---Deposition of eyewitness showed that he stated having seen the appellant delivering four or five blows to the deceased's head---Both the said witnesses, claiming to have witnessed the event from a distance of four to six feet, evidently deposed in clear contradiction to one another---Third alleged eyewitness to the occurrence who might have provided necessary clarification in that regard, was given up by the prosecution---Thus, the testimonies of said two witnesses were rendered quite doubtful---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Medical evidence not supporting the ocular account---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of mother of the complainant by inflicting sotta blow---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which was upheld by the High Court---Validity---Postmortem examination of the deceased was conducted by Woman Medical Officer, in her report she noted only two injuries on the deceased's head---Such description neither corroborated the complainant's account of only one blow being delivered by the appellant on the deceased's head nor did it support eyewitness's version of four or five blows being inflicted upon the deceased---Thus, it could not safely be said that the medical evidence supported the ocular account---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Unnatural conduct of eye-witnesses---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of mother of the complainant by inflicting sotta blow---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which was upheld by the High Court---Validity---First Information Report and ocular account deposed by the complainant and eye-witness both mentioned that the appellant entered the home and raised a lalkara (threatening declaration) that he would not leave the deceased alive---During cross-examination while the complainant remained silent when asked how much time had cumulatively elapsed in between the appellant's arrival at the place of occurrence, his commission of the offence and his eventual escape, the complainant did betrayal that the altercation between the appellant and the deceased spanned across five minutes---Obvious question then arose that why did the eye-witnesses not monitor the appellant or follow him into the deceased's room as he crossed them in the courtyard despite the clear threat he posed to the deceased having made his intentions clear, while armed with a wooden stick/Sotta---However, the eye-witnesses did not intervene once the altercation had begun---Where the eye-witnesses had ample opportunity to intervene given the drawn-out five-minute duration of the altercation and where the site map stated that the eye-witnesses saw the appellant perpetrated his assault from a distance of four to six feet---Filial duty would naturally cause the complainant to intervene, however, he and the eye-witnesses who were also close to the deceased did not even launch an abortive attempt at preventing the appellant's alleged grievous assault---Equally important was the fact that the appellant was not armed with a formidable weapon, having only a wooden stick measuring 1 foot 4 inches---Eye-witnesses' conduct was then manifestly unnatural and that failure to intervene raised serious doubts regarding both the veracity of their account as well as their presence at the scene---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Pathan v. The State 2015 SCMR 315; Zafar v. The State 2018 SCMR 326 and Liaqat Ali v. The State 2009 SCMR 95 rel.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Presence of eye-witnesses at the place and time of occurrence not proved---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of mother of the complainant by inflicting sotta blow---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which was upheld by the High Court---Validity---Eye-witnesses' failure to apprehend the appellant after he had allegedly murdered the deceased raised serious doubts about their presence at the scene---Complainant explained during cross-examination that the eye-witnesses had made an attempt to apprehend the appellant but he was able to escape---Moreover, the complainant admitted that the eye-witnesses were well-built in contrast to the weaker appellant---Here, it could reasonably be expected that eye-witnesses should have overpowered the appellant---Surprisingly, however, the appellant managed to slip away from the eye-witnesses, making his way out of the room where the deceased was murdered despite there being only one doorway and the site map describing the eye-witnesses as standing in that doorway---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Recovery of sota from an open place on the disclosure of accused---Reliance---Scope---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of mother of the complainant by inflicting sota blow---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which was upheld by the High Court---Validity---Prosecution claimed that the recovery made upon the appellant's disclosure conclusively proved his guilt---There were, however, certain deficiencies in the recovery proceedings as well as the claim that the recovered sota was actually linked to the appellant---Foremost amongst those flaws was that the sota was recovered from an open and public place, i.e. an empty plot adjacent to the deceased/complainant's home---Complainant's cross-examination also highlighted that the spot from where the sota was recovered happened to be a public thoroughfare---Established doubtfulness of that recovery undermined the prosecution case---Undeniable fact that the crime weapon, i.e. the sota, was recovered from an open place accessible to all, which made it unsafe to place reliance upon such recovery---Police neither claimed that the recovered weapon, the sota, was covered in the deceased's blood nor was the sota subjected to any chemical or serologist examination for traces of human blood---In the absence of such testing, the weapon recovered by the police did not advance the prosecution case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Mian Sohail Ahmed and others v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 956 and Muhammad Saleem v. Shabbir Ahmed and others 2016 SCMR 1605 rel.

(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Motive not proved---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of mother of the complainant by inflicting sotta blow---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death, which was upheld by the High Court---Validity---Motive alleged by the prosecution was that the appellant was addicted to narcotics and had demanded money from the deceased for the purchase of drugs and that when the deceased refused to pay, the appellant murdered her out of anger---Complainant, however, admitted during his cross-examination that the appellant was never booked in any case of narcotics---Likewise, eyewitness stated during his cross-examination that he did not know the amount that was demanded by the appellant from his mother, the deceased---No evidence was produced to show that the appellant ever remained under medical treatment for drug addiction---No cogent evidence was produced to prove the alleged motive---Thus, the motive alleged by the prosecution had not been proved in that case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(g) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Where single doubt existed in the prosecution case, the benefit of such doubt accrued as of right in the accused's favour and may form the basis for an acquittal.

Muhammad Hassan v. The State 2024 SCMR 1427; Abdul Samad v. The State 2025 SCMR 639; Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 and Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 rel.

Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Rai Akhtar Hussain, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.

Nemo for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1591

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUHAMMAD IJAZ alias Jajj ---Appellant

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 345 of 2020, decided on 7th May, 2025.

(Against the judgment/order dated 10.03.2016 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl.A. No. 231-J of 2012 and M.R. No. 280 of 2012).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Promptly lodgment of FIR---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of his wife---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death---High Court converted the death sentence into imprisonment for life---Validity---Crime report of this fateful occurrence that took place at 01:00 a.m. was registered at the instance of complainant, who happened to be the real brother of the deceased at 03:00 a.m.---Keeping in view the relationship of the appellant with the deceased and the complainant coupled with the time of incident, Court was of the view that the matter was reported to the police without any conscious and deliberate delay---Appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Related witnesses, evidence of---Reliance---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of his wife---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death---High Court converted the death sentence into imprisonment for life---Validity---Ocular account had been furnished by complainant and a witness---Complainant was real brother of the deceased, whereas witness was brother-in-law of the complainant, as such, their presence in the house of deceased and the appellant at the time of occurrence could not be doubted nor their evidence could be discredited due to their relationship with the deceased being cogent and confidence inspiring---Appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Ocular account supported by medical evidence---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of his wife---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death---High Court converted the death sentence into imprisonment for life---Validity---Ocular account found corroboration from the medical evidence as ante-mortem injuries on the person of deceased attributed to the appellant by the eye-witnesses was reflected in the post-mortem examination report which became the cause of unnatural death of deceased as opined by Female Medical Officer---Appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Absconsion of accused---Not participating in funeral of wife---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of his wife---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death---High Court converted the death sentence into imprisonment for life---Validity---Appellant absconded and was arrested on 15.08.2010, i.e. after a period about 37 days of his wife's death---It was strange and astonishing that neither the appellant reported the matter to the police authorities nor participated in the last rites of the deceased---Appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Murder of wife committed in the house of accused---Onus on accused/husband to explain circumstances leading to death---Accused was alleged to have committed murder of his wife---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to death---High Court converted the death sentence into imprisonment for life---Validity---Appellant also failed to give any plausible explanation regarding the murder of his wife in his house---In criminal cases, it is for the prosecution to establish its case against an accused, however, in the instant case deceased was a vulnerable dependent of the appellant, as such, some part of the onus had shifted to the appellant to explain the circumstances in which his wife had died an unnatural death in his house during the fateful night which part of the onus had not been discharged by the appellant---Undoubtedly, the accused was not required to take a special plea, but where the only alternative theory to his guilt was a remote possibility which, if correct, he was in a position to explain, the absence of any explanation must be considered in determining whether the possibility should be disregarded or taken into account--- Appeal against conviction was dismissed, in circumstances.

Saeed Ahmed v. State 2015 SCMR 710; Arshad Mehmood v. State 2005 SCMR 1524; Nasrullah v. State 2017 SCMR 724 and Asad Khan v. State PLD 2017 SC 681 rel.

Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

Nemo for the Respondent.

2025 S C M R 1596

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Naeem Akhter Afghan, Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar

and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

EJAZ AHMAD CHAUDHARY ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE through Prosecutor General Punjab and another ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 1175 of 2024, decided on 2nd May, 2025.

(On appeal against the order dated 03.10.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Misc. No. 48510-B of 2024).

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 395, 436, 427, 290, 291, 337-L(2), 109, 120-D, 121, 121-A, 131, 146, 153, 153-A, 153-B, 505, 148, 149 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dacoity, mischief by fire and explosive substance, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, public nuisance, hurt, abetment, criminal conspiracy, attempt to wage war, attempting to seduce a soldier, rioting, giving provocation with intent to cause riot, promoting enmity between different groups, public mischief, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention, act of terrorism---Post-arrest bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Petitioner was not nominated in FIR for the occurrence of 9th May 2023---Petitioner was implicated by the complainant in his supplementary statement on the basis of tweets/audio/video clips on social media---Admissibility, relevancy and evidentiary value of the supplementary statement of the complainant as well as the alleged tweets/audio/video clips on social media were yet to be determined at the trial which had not yet concluded despite lapse of almost two years---Thus, bail could not be withheld as mere punishment---Petitioner had been arrested for the allegation of hatching the criminal conspiracy for the occurrence of 9th May, 2023---Allegation was yet to be proved by the prosecution at trial---Prosecution had yet to explain the delay of three days in lodging FIR as well as delay of about one month by the complainant for making the supplementary statement---On the basis of tentative assessment of the material so far available on record, the case against the petitioner also fell within the ambit of further inquiry---Petitioner was also entitled for grant of bail on the rule of consistency as co-accused had already been granted bail by the Court for the same allegations in the same FIR---Petition was converted into appeal and same was accepted, in circumstances and accused was granted bail.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of Court---Scope---Observations made in a bail order are tentative in nature and should not influence merits of the case at the trial.

Shabid Masud, Advocate Supreme Court and Moiz Tariq, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Zulfiqar Abbas Naqvi, Special Prosecutor, Punjab, Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab, Dr. Javid Asif, Deputy Superintendent Police and Zahid Saleem, Inspector for the State.

2025 S C M R 1599

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

KHAIR MUHAMMAD and another ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Petition No. 132 of 2018 and Jail Petition No. 120 of 2023, decided on 30th April, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 10.01.2018 of the High Court of Balochistan, Turbat Bench in Criminal Appeals Nos. (T) 32 and 34 of 2017).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Night time occurrence---Source of light not proved---Identity of accused not proved---Accused persons were charged for committing murder of the son of complainant by firing---Trial Court convicted the accused persons for qatl-i-amd and sentenced them to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained the conviction and sentence---Validity---Occurrence took place in the night of 07.12.2015 at 11:48 p.m. and although the incident was unseen, the witnesses claimed to have seen the petitioners fleeing from the scene, one of them armed and the other empty-handed---Absence of any substantial moonlight on that fateful night necessitated a discussion into the source of light which could have made the identification of the petitioners by the witnesses possible---Complainant stated in his complaint to the police and again in his examination-in-chief that he had seen the petitioners running away from the street, in the light being emitted by a bulb---Witness accompanying the complainant stated in his examination-in-chief that he also had seen the petitioners fleeing in the same way, one armed and the other unarmed, in some light---Said witness later clarified during cross-examination that it was certainly in the light of a bulb that he had seen the petitioners fleeing and not in the light being emitted from some torch---Both witnesses had also accentuated during their respective cross-examinations that there was certainly some bulb installed at the scene of occurrence---Complainant during his cross-examination had denied that he had seen the petitioners fleeing while armed with pistol and he identified them in the light of bulb---Said express statement by the complainant had two effects; firstly, it became clear that the petitioners were not identified in the light of a bulb, which clearly contradicted the complainant's statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., as well as the FIR---First Information Report was also silent about any other source of light---Furthermore, no recovery had been made in regard to a supposed alternate source of light and the site map again did not mention any source of light or place from where such source might have been recovered---Identification of the petitioners was thus not free from doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statement of Investigating Officer---Accused persons were charged for committing murder of the son of complainant by firing---Trial Court convicted the accused persons for qatl-i-amd and sentenced them to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained the conviction and sentence---Validity---Investigating Officer stated during cross-examination that in the FIR, a bulb had been mentioned as the source of light and then corrected himself by stating that the light source was a torch---In the same breath, the Investigating Officer sought to explain the apparent contradiction by stating that there was no difference between the two---Investigating Officer then stated that there was a difference between a bulb and a torch but argued that the witnesses were illiterate and did not know the difference between the two---At the very outset, the Investigating Officer's explanation in regards the light source being mentioned as a bulb at one place and a torch at the other, was self-contradictory---Highlighting that contradiction further, eye-witness had mentioned a bulb as the light source, despite having earlier stated before the police that it was a torch---Evidenced by the fact that during cross-examination said witness denied that he mentioned a torch as the light source in his statement to the police but when the record was referred to, it was shown to be otherwise---Said facts constituted yet another doubt in regard the identification of the petitioners---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence on the pointation of accused---Inconsequential---Scope---Accused persons were charged for committing murder of the son of complainant by firing---Trial Court convicted the accused persons for qatl-i-amd and sentenced them to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained the conviction and sentence---Validity---Statedly, on 21.12.2015, the petitioner disclosed that on the night of the occurrence before dawn, he had hidden away the weapon of offence, a pistol, in a pile of garbage outside his home and that he could guide the police to its recovery---Recovery witness explained during his cross-examination that the petitioner led him, another recovery witness and Police Officers from the police station to outside petitioner's house---Here, the recovery witness's account begun to vary as he stated firstly that the place of recovery/pile of garbage was outside the petitioner's home, he however stated immediately after that the petitioner entered his home and that the garbage was inside petitioner's home---Again surprisingly, the site-map for the recovery proceeding indicated that the pistol was recovered from outside the petitioner's home---Said contradiction, thus, could not be reconciled, rendering the recovery witness account quite doubtful---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence and crime empties---Inconsequential---Accused persons were charged for committing murder of the son of complainant by firing---Trial Court convicted the accused persons for qatl-i-amd and sentenced them to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained the conviction and sentence---Validity---Record showed that a pistol was recovered from the petitioner's home---Two crime empties were statedly recovered from the scene on 08.12.2015---Weapon of offence, a pistol, was allegedly recovered on 21.12.2015---Record however showed that both the articles were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory together on the same day, i.e. 12.02.2016, pursuant to which the Forensic Science Laboratory Report recorded a positive result, that the empties had been fired from the pistol---Not only there was a proven inordinate delay in dispatching the articles but the police's failure to send the empties to the Forensic Science Laboratory before the recovery of the weapon of offence also stood established---No reliance could be placed upon the result of Forensic Science Laboratory Report where the crime empties were sent for Forensic Science Laboratory testing after the recovery of the weapon of offence---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt--- Recovery of Call Data Record (CDR) of accused and deceased---Inconsequential ---Accused persons were charged for committing murder of the son of complainant by firing---Trial Court convicted the accused persons for qatl-i-amd and sentenced them to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained the conviction and sentence---Validity---Prosecution's claim was that the petitioners lured the deceased to their home and then killed him---In that respect the Investigating Officer stated that he recovered the deceased's personal mobile phone and also recovered the petitioner's mobile phone---Record did not disclose whether the mobile phones purportedly recovered were in the use of the deceased or accused as acknowledged by the Investigating Officer during the cross-examination---Record did not mention which SIMs were taken from the recovered mobile phones and in whose name the corresponding mobile number was issued---Admittedly, it had not been proved whether the mobile phones allegedly recovered from the deceased and the petitioners were in their personal use, nor had it been proved which SIMs were recovered from the mobile phones and to whom they were issued---Again, the names of the deceased and petitioners were absent from purported Call Data Record except in the form of handwriting subsequently interpolated into the document---Importantly, the instant Call Data Record was in the form of a standard computerized document which, admittedly, could be printed and prepared with the help of any computer---Thus, it was also of foremost importance that the Call Data Record must bear the endorsement/authentication of the cellular/telecom company which had issued it---Bare document such as the Call Data Record without any signature of the concerned officer of the cellular/telecom company issuing the Call Data Record could not be considered for the purposes of trial and relied upon until and unless it would bear the company's seal or a letter of its authentication---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Azeem Khan v. Mujahid Khan 2016 SCMR 274; Khalid Perviz v. State 2021 SCMR 522; Rehmatullah and others v. The State 2024 SCMR 1782 and Asmat Ullah Khan v. The State PLD 2024 SC 1119 rel.

(f) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Reasonable doubts in the prosecution case would accrue as of right to the accused, thus they would be entitled to the benefit of the same.

Ahmed Ali and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 781 rel.

Muhammad Amjad Iqbal Qureshi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners (in both cases).

Nemo for the Complainant.

Syed Pervez Bokhari, State counsel for the State.

2025 S C M R 1613

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

MUDASSAR KHURSHEED ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Crl.P.L.A. No. 255-L of 2025, decided on 8th April, 2025.

(Against the order dated 05.03.2025, passed by the Lahore High Court Lahore in Crl.Misc. No. 10690-B of 2025).

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 452, 354, 148 & 149---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint, assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegations against the petitioner were that he along with co-accused persons, duly armed with deadly weapons and forming an unlawful assembly in prosecution of common object committed trespass into the house of complainant, assaulted his mother with intent to outrage her modesty and inflicted blow on the head of complainant with butt of a pistol---Record showed that through the impugned order the High Court had extended extra ordinary concession of pre-arrest bail to co-accused persons but had refused the same concession to the petitioner on the sole ground that the role of inflicting blow on the head of the complainant with butt of the pistol had been specifically assigned to him---First Information Report would reveal that role of the co-accused was at par to a great extent with the role of the petitioner; therefore, on the rule of consistency the petitioner was also entitled to be treated at par with his co-accused---Even otherwise, offence under Section 354, P.P.C., was bailable whereas punishments of the offences under Sections 452, 148 and 149, P.P.C., did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C.---In such like cases grant of bail was a rule and refusal thereof an exception---Legally speaking, if the relief of pre-arrest bail was refused to the petitioner, he would be entitled to post arrest bail keeping in view punishment of the offences with which he was charged---If accused person had a good case for post arrest bail then merely at the wish of the complainant, the accused could not be sent behind the bars for few days by dismissing his application for pre-arrest bail---Accordingly, petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed and he was granted pre-arrest bail.

Khalil Ahmed Soomro v. The State PLD 2017 SC 730 rel.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 498---Pre-arrest bail---Scope---Once the Court reaches at the conclusion that in case of dismissal of pre-arrest bail the accused would become entitled for his release on post-arrest bail then it would be a futile exercise to (refuse pre-arrest bail and) send the accused to prison.

Muhammad Ramzan v. Zafar Ullah and another 1986 SCMR 1380 and Khair Muhammad and another v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2021 SCMR 130 rel.

Muhammad Irfan Malik, Advocate Supreme Court along with petitioner through video link from Lahore for Petitioner.

Tariq Siddiqui, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State.

2025 S C M R 1616

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD ASGHAR ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 868 of 2017, decided on 22nd April, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 03.10.2017 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Cr. Appeal No. 375-J of 2014 and Murder Reference No. 318 of 2014).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Complainant's initial application to the police mentioned that after beating the injured than deceased, the petitioner proceeded towards the complainant's house accompanied by his fellows---Interestingly, however, none of the other prosecution witnesses mentioned that the petitioner was accompanied by other persons or that he went towards the complainant's house alongside some accomplices---In that regard, no other person had been implicated or arrested and yet the prosecution had contented itself with the assumption that the petitioner acted alone, despite the complainant's express statement to the contrary---Again, the complainant's subsequent testimony omitted any mention of other persons---Said fact in and of itself created a doubt in the prudent mind regarding the petitioner's guilt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay of 13 hours and 25-minutes in lodging the FIR---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Record reflected that in the FIR, it was alleged that on 19.07.2012 at about 1:15 p.m. the petitioner initiated his assault on the deceased and subsequently assaulted the complainant and her daughter---Admittedly, though the FIR was lodged on 20.07.2012 at 2:40 a.m. an alarming thirteen hours and twenty-five minutes after the occurrence---Complainant had sought to explain the delay by stating that she was preoccupied rushing her injured husband from hospital to hospital, however, it was also acknowledged that he was taken by ambulance to RHC shortly after the occurrence---From RHC, the deceased was referred to Civil Hospital, where he arrived at 11:45 p.m. on 19.07.2012 and was administered first aid---Foremost priority of the family members, as complainants, would be to secure treatment for their relative and attending to them during the time between the occurrence and the administration of first aid, the deceased was only shifted from one hospital to the other---After the arrival at the second hospital a further three hours elapsed before the FIR was ultimately lodged---Clearly then, there was ample opportunity to submit the report before the actual time of registration---Despite that fact, no plausible explanation for the delay had been provided by the complainant---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Inclusion of witnesses through a supplementary statement---Effect---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Record revealed that in the FIR, two witnesses were not mentioned as eyewitnesses to the alleged occurrence during which the petitioner inflicted fatal harm upon the deceased, rather they were included as witnesses through a supplementary statement submitted by the complainant later on the same day, i.e., 20.07.2012, when the crime was reported---Said subsequent inclusion of the said two witnesses merited special scrutiny since the prosecution "gave up" the other alleged eye-witnesses, as well as the complainant's injured daughter, who were actually mentioned in the FIR, preferring to rely only on the testimony of the former two---Complainant had sought to explain the belated inclusion of alleged eyewitnesses by stating that she was in a panicked and confused state of mind owing to her husband's critical condition---Said plea did not, however, persuade considering that two witnesses were not only alleged eyewitnesses credited with having intervened in an attempt to rescue the deceased but were also mentioned as the complainant's saviours when she and her daughter were being subjected to assault---Moreover, the subsequent witnesses were known to the complainant, one being her deceased husband's cousin, and other her real brother---Moreover, it was indeed alarming that the complainant failed to recall those relatives among the four individuals who intervened on her behalf when she was registering her complaint---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statement of witnesses---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---At one place eyewitness stated that he followed the petitioner and at another that he did not follow the petitioner---Testimonies of the other witnesses revealed that they came to the complainant's rescue only after hearing her hue and cry---There was thus a further contradiction that some witnesses claimed to have followed and responded to the complainant's cries whereas eyewitness stated that they followed the petitioner---Said variance in the statements raised doubt not only about the credibility of the witnesses' account but also their very presence at the scene---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Unnatural conduct of witnesses---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Record demonstrated that the petitioner was first alleged to have assaulted the deceased, whereupon the four witnesses intervened---From there, the petitioner made his way to the complainant's house where he assaulted her and her daughter, where once again the same witnesses intervened to rescue the complainant and her daughter---If the party of four witnesses was able to intervene both times and managed to restrain the petitioner from continuing his assault upon the deceased and complainant, how was it that he slipped through their fingers twice even though he was not armed with any formidable weapon---Conduct of the witnesses in that regard was perplexing, since they were admittedly greater in number and although unarmed, they managed to intervene---Such intervention naturally required the witnesses to subdue the petitioner and yet he managed to escape---Further, the close blood relation the witnesses had to the deceased and complainant naturally would not permit them to let the petitioner escape in that way---Eyewitnesses might have stated that apprehending the petitioner was difficult given the crowd and confusion at the Adda, especially since there were multiple exits but their failure to apprehend the petitioner despite a second chance to do so at the complainant's home confirmed the unnatural manner in which they acted---Thus, evident that the conduct of the witnesses was unnatural and raised serious doubt about their testimonies and presence at the scene especially in light of their belated inclusion as eyewitnesses and the abandonment of the other named eye-witnesses---Therefore, it would be unsafe to rely upon statements furnished by eye-witnesses---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Liaqat Ali v. The State 2008 SCMR 95; Pathan v. The State 2015 SCMR 315 and Zafar v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 326 rel.

(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Non-availability of medical evidence---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Although, the prosecution alleged that the petitioner, after attacking the deceased, entered the house of the complainant and assaulted both her and her daughter---No Medico-Legal Report was produced to substantiate the claim of physical assault or the alleged outraging modesty---In cases where bodily harm or indignity was alleged, the securing of medical evidence served as the most objective and reliable proof---Prosecution, however, remained content with oral assertions unsupported by any medical documentation---Such omission assumed particular significance given the seriousness of the allegation and the failure to have either the complainant or her daughter examined medically casted doubt upon whether such an incident occurred at all in the manner alleged---Absence of such evidence, where reasonably it ought to have been scoured, constituted a material lacuna, which further weakened the prosecution's version and detracted from its overall credibility---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence---Inconsequential---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Danda was said to have been recovered from the petitioner's residence upon his pointation and that recovery constituted a foundational part of the prosecution's case---Recovery, in order to carry evidentiary value, must not only be legally secured but also supported by linking it to an accused and the offence, especially where it formed a critical link in the prosecution's case---In the present matter, neither was the recovered Danda found stained with blood nor was it subjected to any chemical or serological examination, so as to connect it with the injuries sustained by the deceased---Police remained content with a mere mechanical assertion of recovery without undertaking the essential step of forensic verification---No report of the Chemical Examiner or Serologist had been brought on the record---In such a situation, the recovery, stripped of scientific support, stand materially weakened and does not advance the prosecution's case in any meaningful way---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 352 & 354---Qatl-i-amd, assault or criminal force used against someone, except when there is grave and sudden provocation, assault or criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Petitioner/accused was charged for committing murder of the husband of complainant by inflicting danda blows and then he subjected complainant and her daughter to physical assault and tore their clothes, in an attempt to outrage their modesty---Motive alleged by the prosecution was a dispute between the parties over a house---In that regard, no independent evidence was led to substantiate the existence or immediacy of such a dispute, nor was any document, litigation record, or corroborative testimony produced to establish that the petitioner bore such animosity as would propel him to commit a crime of that magnitude---Mere assertion of a vague motive, unsupported by credible material, could not be treated as conclusive proof---In that backdrop, the motive sought to be ascribed to the petitioner appeared to be speculative at best and failed to advance the prosecution's case---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(i) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Even a single circumstance creating doubt is sufficient to form the basis of an acquittal.

Muhammad Hassan v. State 2024 SCMR 1427; Tariq Parvez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. the State 2009 SCMR 230 and Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857 rel.

Sh. Ahsan-ud-Din, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Aftab Alam Yasir, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

Mirza Abid Majeed, Deputy Prosecutor General for the State.

2025 S C M R 1631

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Ishtiaq Ibrahim and Ali Baqar Najafi, JJ

MUHAMMAD AKHTAR ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and others ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 310 of 2025, decided on 17th April, 2025.

(Against the order dated 28.02.2025 in Crl. Misc. No. 613-B of 2024, passed by the Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench Bahawalpur).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----Ss. 497(2) & 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(vi), 337-L(2) & 34---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, munaqqilah, causin hurt, common intention---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the petitioner was that he along with co-accused caused fracture on the little finger of the complainant by giving blows with a wheel spanner---Legally speaking, out of the offences with which the petitioner was charged, Sections 337-F(i), 337-A(i) and 337-L(2), P.P.C., were bailable and in such like offences bail was a right, whereas, punishment of the offence under Section 337-F(vi) P.P.C. did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C., and in such like offences grant of bail was a rule and refusal thereof an exception---In such view of the matter, if petitioner was denied the extra ordinary concession of pre-arrest bail, he would nonetheless be entitled to post-arrest bail, considering the nature and extent of the punishment prescribed for the offences with which he stood charged---Once the Court concluded that the accused would become entitled to post-arrest bail upon dismissal of his pre-arrest bail application, then requiring him to undergo incarceration would be a mere procedural formality devoid of any meaningful purpose---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances, and accused was granted pre-arrest bail.

Khalil Ahmed Soomro v. The State PLD 2017 SC 730; Muhammad Ramzan v. Zafar Ullah and another 1986 SCMR 1380 and Khair Muhammad and another v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2021 SCMR 130 rel.

Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State.

2025 S C M R 1633

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

GHULAM MUSTAFA alias Raja Buledi ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeal No. 199 of 2023, decided on 12th May, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 19.10.2020 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Sibi Bench, in Criminal Jail Appeals No(s).14, 15 of 2019, Criminal Acquittal Appeal No(s).160 of 2019 and Murder Reference No.(s) 03 of 2019).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay of three hours and ten minutes in lodging the FIR---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Occurrence in the case took place on 02.01.2019 at about 06:20 pm but the FIR was lodged on the same day at 09:30 pm, with the delay of about three hours and ten minutes from the occurrence---Distance between the police station and the place of occurrence was only two (02) furlongs---Postmortem examination on the dead-body of the deceased was conducted on 02.01.2019 at about 7:20 pm i.e., earlier to the registration of FIR, which was lodged at 9:30 p.m.---Medical Officer stated in his examination-in-chief that the dead-body of deceased was brought to the Hospital for postmortem examination by the police authorities---Even eyewitness stated in his examination-in-chief that after the occurrence, as soon as, the accused persons decamped from the spot, the patrolling police employees came to the shop of the complainant/place of occurrence---All the said facts showed that the police got information regarding the incident soon after the occurrence but even then the FIR was not lodged till 9:30 pm and the same was lodged after conducting postmortem examination on the dead-body of the deceased---Under the circumstances, it was evident that the FIR was lodged after due deliberations and consultations---Actually the prosecution eye-witnesses were not present at the spot at the relevant time and they had not witnessed the occurrence, therefore, the said delay in lodging the FIR was consumed in procuring the attendance of fake eye-witnesses and concocting a fabricated story of the prosecution---Said gross delay in lodging the FIR had created doubt regarding the truthfulness of the prosecution story---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

Mehmood Ahmed and others v. The State and another 1995 SCMR 127; Shaukat Hussain v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2024 SCMR 929 and Khial Muhammad v. The State 2024 SCMR 1490 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Complainant attributed to appellant and co-convict a joint role of firing at deceased, whereas eye-witness had not attributed any role to co-convict of firing at deceased or causing injuries to him---Said glaring contractions in the statements of eye-witnesses showed that in fact they were not present at the spot, at the time of occurrence---Said material contradictions about the salient features of the case had made their evidence highly doubtful and un-reliable---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---No motive whatsoever was alleged in the contents of the FIR or in the statements of the eye-witnesses recorded before the Trial Court and it was only mentioned therein that earlier appellant extended threats of life to the complainant party and also earlier committed an occurrence in the shop of the complainant party---Not explained by the prosecution that as to why the appellant earlier extended threats of life to the complainant party---No specific date, time or place of earlier threats allegedly given by the appellant to the complainant party was mentioned therein---Likewise, no date or time of the earlier incident, which was allegedly committed by the appellant in the shop of the complainant party was stated in the contents of the FIR or in the statements of witnesses---No FIR or Rapt or any application lodged by the complainant party against the appellant regarding the alleged earlier occurrence was produced in the prosecution evidence---Thus, a vague and ambiguous motive was alleged by the prosecution which could not be proved against the appellant or his co-accused---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of pistol and crime empties---Reliance---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---Record showed that the empties and pistol were deposited together to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory on 01.02.2019---Under the circumstances, it was not safe to rely upon the prosecution evidence qua the recovery of pistol and positive report of Forensic Science Laboratory---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

Sarfraz v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 and Abdul Wahid v. The State 2023 SCMR 1278 rel.

(e) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in the prosecution case then the same will be sufficient to acquit the accused.

Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.

(f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt extended to co-convict---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---As per record, it had already been concluded that the facts and circumstances of the case showed that the prosecution eye-witnesses were not present at the spot at the relevant time and there were glaring contradictions in the statements of the prosecution eye-witnesses, hence their evidence was highly doubtful and unreliable---Prosecution had failed to prove the alleged motive---After coming to that conclusion, the conviction and sentence awarded to co-convict could not be allowed to remain in the field, merely on the basis of a technical ground that he had not filed any appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court---Though, co-convict had not filed any appeal against the impugned judgment of the High Court but it would not be just and fair for the Supreme Court to deny the benefit of doubt to co-convict, which benefit had been extended to appellant, when the case of the appellant and the co-convict was not distinguishable rather the case of the co-convict was at better footings, as compared to the case of appellant---Co-convict was not attributed any motive---No weapon was recovered from historical possession and the prosecution eye-witnesses did not assign him any role of firing at deceased or causing injuries to him---Under the circumstances, the conviction and sentence of co-convict could not be allowed to remain in the field, merely on the basis of that technicality that he had not filed any appeal before the Supreme Court against his conviction and sentence---Co-convict was acquitted, in circumstances.

Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2003 SC 2987; Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846; Rahib Ali v. The State 2018 SCMR 418; Rafaqat Ali v. Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab 2024 SCMR 34; Muhammad Aslam and 5 others v. The State 1972 SCMR 194; Ghulam Nabi Shah v. Crwon 1969 SCMR 629; Amin Ali and another v. The State 2011 SCMR 323; Shabbir Ahmed v. The State 2011 SCMR 1142 Imtiaz alias Taj v. The State and others 2018 SCMR 344 rel.

(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt extended to the absconding accused---Scope---Accused were charged for committing murder of the brother of complainant by firing---As per record, one co-accused was a proclaimed offender---According to the prosecution evidence brought on the record, on the day of occurrence, the said co-accused since P.O along with co-accused since acquitted came outside the shop of the complainant along with appellant and co-convict and they both remained present outside the said shop and raised a proverbial lalkara that the complainant party should not be spared alive---Co-accused since acquitted, who was attributed a similar role along with co-accused since P.O, had already been acquitted by the Trial Court, therefore, no useful purpose shall be served by the arrest of co-accused since P.O and putting him to trial by the Trial Court because ultimately he had to be acquitted by the Trial Court in the light of observations made by the trial Court in respect of the case of co-accused since acquitted, as well as in the light of findings recorded by the Supreme Court in the instant judgment---Further Court proceedings in the case of co-accused since P.O shall be a futile exercise and the same shall amount to sheer abuse of process of the Court and the law---Thus, co-accused since P.O was acquitted by extending benefit of doubt. [p. 1643] I

Muhammad Aslam and 5 others v. The State 1972 SCMR 194 rel.

Syeda B. H. Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Syed Pervez Bukhari, State Counsel for the State.

Hafiz Ahsan Ahmad Khokhar, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Syed Faraz Raza, Advocate High Court and Ms. Sehar Mahsud, Advocate Amici Curaie.

2025 S C M R 1644

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, Salahuddin Panhwar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

ZAKIR ALI ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 343 of 2023, decided on 24th April, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 26.06.2023 (19.07.2023) passed by the High Court of Balochistan Quetta in Cr. Appeal. No. 250 of 2023).

Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 9(c)---Possession of narcotic substance---Reappraisal of evidence---Safe custody of narcotic and transmission of samples to the laboratory doubtful---Prosecution case was that 1800-grams Methamphetamine (ice) was recovered from the possession of accused---Testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses revealed material gaps and contradictions regarding the safe custody and transmission of the recovered substance from the spot to the Police Station and then samples to the Forensic Science Laboratory---Police Official, who allegedly conveyed the mirasila and case property to the Police Station on the basis of which FIR was registered, was neither cited nor examined as a witness---Non-production of said Police Official was a serious blow to the prosecution's case as in absence of his statement, there was no other evidence to prove safe transmission of the cases property and samples from the spot to the Police Station---Seizing Officer/complainant did not mention in his statement or in his cross-examination the specific act of sending the narcotic to the Police Station or to the Forensic Science Laboratory---Moharrir, admitted that the parcels were handed over to him by the Investigating Officer without the issuance of any receipt and he did not produce Register No.19 on record---Investigating Officer failed to mention the name of the person through whom the samples were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, although the Forensic Science Laboratory Report mentioned his own name---Moharrir also admitted not recording the statements of key persons under Section 161, Cr.P.C., and failed to exhibit any documentary trail evidencing a secure chain of custody of the samples from the spot to the Forensic Science Laboratory---In narcotics cases, due to the severity of punishment involved, the prosecution must establish an unbroken secure and reliable chain of custody of the recovered contraband from the point of seizure to its receipt at the Forensic Laboratory---Any lacuna or discrepancy in that regard rendered the entire process suspect and the report of the Chemical Examiner inadmissible or at the very least unreliable---In the case at hand, the prosecution had manifestly failed to discharge that burden---Unexplained and undocumented transmission of samples, non-examination of key witnesses, failure to produce chain-of-custody registers and contradictory statements of the prosecution witnesses cumulatively casted a serious doubt on the integrity of the evidence---Consequently, the Chemical Examiner's report became unsafe to rely upon and could not be made the sole basis for conviction---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Javed Iqbal v. The State 2023 SCMR 139; Qaiser Khan v. The State 2021 SCMR 363; Mst. Sakina Ramzan v. The State 2021 SCMR 451; Zubair Khan v. The State 2021 SCMR 492; Asif Ali and another v. The State 2024 SCMR 1408 and Abdul Ghani and others v. the State and others 2019 SCMR 608 rel.

Mir Aurangzeb, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Ms. Robina Butt, Advocate Supreme Court (State counsel Balochistan) for the State.

2025 S C M R 1649

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Syed Mansoor Ali Shah and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

IFTIKHAR UD DIN (decd.) through L.Rs. ---Appellants

Versus

Messrs ASKARI BANK LIMITED and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 470 of 2022, decided on 16th April, 2025.

(Against the impugned judgment dated 16.12.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in R.F.A. No. 281-P of 2019).

Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---

----S. 17---Ejectment of tenant---Default---Payment of rent---Proof---Adjustment of loan---Tentative Rent Order---Non-compliance---Effect---Appellants/landlords were aggrieved of setting aside of ejectment order against respondents/tenants---Plea raised by respondents/tenants was that rent was being adjusted towards payment of loan by predecessor-in-interest of appellants/landlords---Validity---No documentary evidence to such effect was produced before the Courts below, which otherwise was sufficient to establish the willful default in payment of rent for period in question---Non-compliance of Tentative Rent Order itself was sufficient ground for ejectment of appellants / tenants without further inquiry into merits as it had constituted willful default---High Court passed its judgment without appreciating factual position and evidence produced by parties in support of their respective claims and had misdirected itself while setting aside order passed by Rent Controller on the issue of default in payment of rent, nor could appreciate the effect of non-compliance of Tentative Rent Order passed---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court on the ground of default in payment of rent and judgment of Rent Controller was upheld---Appeal was allowed.

M.H. Mussadaq v. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal and another 2004 SCMR 1453 and Misbahullah Khan v. Mst. Memoona Taskinuddin 1995 SCMR 287 rel.

Irfan Javed, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Iftikhar Ahmad Bashir and Khaliq uz Zaman, Advocates Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1657

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar and Ishtiaq Ibrahim, JJ

NDUKWE UDOKA PETER ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 239 of 2025, decided on 15th April, 2025.

(Against the order/judgment dated 17.02.2025 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in Crl. Misc. No. 265 of 2025).

Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(2)---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S. 9(b)---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Possession of narcotic substance---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Perusal of the contents of the FIR showed that 680-grams heroin was allegedly recovered from the possession of petitioner---Record showed that, despite the existence of spy information, no independent witness was present to witness the purported recovery and no video was produced to substantiate the allegation of the narcotic being recovered from the petitioner's possession---In addition to the petitioner's detention, his companion was also apprehended on the same charges---Petitioner's counsel in support of his contention also placed on record the CCTV footage and photographs in this matter---This case warranted judicial scrutiny for the purpose of determining bail due to its distinctive facts and circumstances---Petitioner's consistent allegations of false implication, alleged prior harassment, confiscation of CCTV evidence, absence of independent witnesses and the prompt filing of complaints before Senior Police Officials suggested that the case warranted further investigation---Moreover, the quantity recovered, although substantial, did not reach commercial levels and raid was not conducted in the presence of neutral witnesses or substantiated by any video evidence---Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed and petitioner was granted post-arrest bail.

Raja Rizwan Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner.

Ms. Chand Bibi, Deputy Prosecutor General and Ishaq, SI for the State.

2025 S C M R 1659

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi and

Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

Syed ZAKIR HUSSAIN ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Cr.P.L.As. Nos. 48-K to 51-K of 2025, decided on 5th June, 2025.

(Against the order dated 18.02.2025 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Cr. Revision Application Nos. 35 to 38 of 2025).

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 14(2)---Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court---Judicial Strictures---Expunction of remarks---Principle---Appellant was a judicial officer who was aggrieved of remarks against him, passed by Division Bench of High Court in the judgment in question---Validity---Petitioner only sought expunction of stricture, which had nothing to do with merits of the decision of High Court---High Court was required to evaluate whether the passage complained of was reprehensible; its preservation on record would cause disparagement to the credit of petitioner; and its expunction would not affect the judgment or order on merits---Before passing any stricture on demeanour and career of petitioner, Division Bench of High Court should have given him an opportunity to submit his comments/report---No such opportunity was provided to him by Divisional Bench of High Court before passing order in the Court---Even in the case of some lapses found to be surfacing on part of the judicial officer, the order or report could be sent to Chief Justice for taking action on administrative side through the Confidential Branch---Supreme Court set aside the remarks/directions made in relevant paragraph of order in question which were essentially structured on oral motion of Acting Prosecutor General; were unjustified, and made without probing into the issue and without calling for comments from the Presiding Officer or without even affording him a right of audience---Appeal was disposed of.

Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India and others (1997) 4 SCC 65; (2001) 3 SCC 54; Miss Nusrat Yasmin v. Registrar, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and others PLD 2019 SC 719; Aijaz Ahmed Tunio v. The State PLD 2021 SC 752; Hasnain Raza and another v. Lahore High Court, Lahore and others PLD 2022 SC 7; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice Islamabad v. Muhammad Hamid Mughal PLD 2024 SC 515; 2023 SCP 293 and Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder and others v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2010 SC 483 ref.

Syed Ghulam Shabbir Shah, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Irtafa-ur-Rehman, Advocate High Court for Petitioner.

Muntazir Mehdi, Acting Prosecutor General and Siraj Ali Chandio, Additional Prosecutor General for the State.

Saleem Akhtar Buriro, Additional Prosecutor General/Advocate-on-Record for the State.

Zulfiqar Ali, Public Prosecutor for the State.

Danish Qureshi, SHO, AVCC for the State.

Muhammad Ali, Inspector for the State.

Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General on Court's Call.

Zain-ul-Abideen, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Mustafa Mamdani, Iftikhar Shah, Jahanzaib Aftab and Umair Usman, Advocates for the Complainant.

Nemo for the Accused.

2025 S C M R 1670

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ

MUHAMMAD AHMED SHAIKH and others ---Appellants

Versus

SHABBIR AHMED ---Respondent

Civil Appeal No. 117-K of 2022, decided on 21st March, 2025.

(Against the order dated 03.09.2021 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Revision Application No. 239 of 2010).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----S. 8---Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S. 17---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115---Suit for possession---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Reversal---Principle---Registered sale deed---Presumption---Suit for possession of suit property filed by appellants / plaintiffs was decreed in their favour and appeal was dismissed by Lower Appellate Court---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Validity---Registered instrument as a sale deed was a title of suit property and could not be ignored despite the fact that it was challenged belatedly by respondent / plaintiff and such challenge failed not only at trial stage but also at the Lower Appellate stage---Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court decided all questions based on material and evidence placed before them with well-reasoned justification to arrive at such conclusion and within their jurisdiction---Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Court and restored that of the Courts below---Appeal allowed.

Shahenshah Hussain Syed, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants.

Shaukat Ali Shaikh, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 1673

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Shahid Waheed, Shakeel Ahmad and Aamer Farooq, JJ

EHSAN-UL-HAQ and others ---Appellants

Versus

MUHAMMAD NAWAZ and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 184 of 2013 in C.P.L.A No. 1297 of 2012, decided on 20th February, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 17.05.2012, passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi in C.R. No. 53 of 2002).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---

----Ss. 42 & 54---Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962), S. 2-A---Suit for declaration and injunction---Mutation of inheritance---Limited estate---Owner through will---Appellants / plaintiffs claimed share in suit property on the plea that respondents / defendant had become owners on the basis of will executed in favour of their predecessor-in-interest, in year 1934---Suit was decreed in favour of appellants / plaintiffs but Lower Appellate Court and High Court dismissed the suit---Validity---Creation of life interests for enjoyment of usufruct of properties upon death of a male holder were done away with and were subjected to Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962---By virtue of section 2-A of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 limited estates had been done away with retrospective application of such provision---Predecessor-in-interest of respondents / defendants became the absolute owner of property in question---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed by High Court---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.

Mullah's Principles of Mohammaden Law by Mr. Justice Hidayatullah; Dr. Tanzil-ur-Rehman, A Code of Muslim Personal Law, Volume II, page 196; Haider v. Murad PLD 2012 SC 501 and Mst. Farida Khatoon v. Dr. Masood Ahmed Butt 2009 SCMR 464 ref.

Sohail Mehmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants.

Sh. Zamir Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3).

2025 S C M R 1679

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

NOOR AGHA ---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 27-K of 2025, decided on 15th April, 2025.

(Against order dated 16.01.2025 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in Crl. Bail Application No. 2690 of 2024).

(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497 (1), 4th proviso---Bail---Expressions "shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for ten years"---Terms "hardened, dangerous or desperate criminal"---Scope---Expression in 4thproviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. i.e hardened, dangerous or desperate criminal is distinct from the restriction on the power and discretion of a Court under section 497(1), Cr.P.C. not to release an accused on bail if there appears reasonable grounds for believing that the accused may be guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or for ten years---Such distinction highlights that the exception in 4th proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. is not in the context of merits of the case i.e. forming an opinion whether reasonable grounds exist for believing that an accused may have been guilty of one of the offences specified by the Legislature---Bail may have been declined on merits in terms of forming an opinion under section 497(1), Cr.P.C. but if conditions specified under 3rdproviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. are met and the case does not attract one of the exceptions specifically mentioned in 4th proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C., then it entitles an accused to claim bail on the basis of statutory delay as a fresh and independent ground---Exception of being a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal contains four distinct expressions---'Hardened, desperate or dangerous' have been used by the Legislature disjunctively and cannot be construed as conjunctive and they precede the expression 'criminal'---There must be sufficient material placed before Court by prosecution to enable it to form an opinion that if accused is released on bail under 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. then there would be a substantial risk or it would be highly probable that he or she would cause serious harm to the society and its members because of being a hardened, dangerous or desperate criminal.

(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---

----S. 497(1)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 365---Qatl-i-amd and kidnapping---Statutory delay in conclusion of trial---Accused sought his bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of trial---Validity---Only role allegedly attributed to accused was that he had travelled in a different vehicle when victim was taken to crime scene and later murdered---High Court formed the opinion merely on the basis of alleged involvement of accused in the offence punishable with death---It could not have been concluded on the basis of material available on record that accused was a 'hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal' in the context of 4th proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C.---No material could be pointed out to suggest that accused was a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal and if released on bail he would pose a substantial risk of harm to the society or its members---Accused did not have a history of threatening witnesses or members of law enforcement agencies---After his arrest, accused remained incarcerated for a continuous period of more than two years---Expression in 4th proviso of section 497(1), Cr.P.C. was not attracted and statutory right under 3rd proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. could not be withheld or denied---Accused was entitled to be set-free by granting him the statutory right on account of delay in the conclusion of trial not attributed to him---Bail was allowed.

Moundar and others v. The State PLD 1990 SC 934; Shakeel Shah v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1; Allah Wasaya v. The State and others PLD 2022 SC 541 and Nadeem Samson v. The State and others PLD 2022 SC 112 rel.

Ali Wahid, Advocate High Court for Petitioner (with Court's permission) (via video link from Karachi).

Ms. Rahat Ehsan, Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh for the State.

Salahuddin Khan Gandapur, Advocate Supreme Court and Ghulam Rasool Mangi, Advocate-on-Record along with Abdul Khanan for the Complainant (via video link from Karachi).

2025 S C M R 1687

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

The COMMISSIONER OF INLAND REVENUE, PESHAWAR ---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs SUFI TAHIR NADEEM ---Respondent

Civil Petitions Nos. 885 to 887 of 2024, decided on 24th June, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 22.11.2023 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Tax Reference Nos. 22-P to 24-P of 2019).

Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)---

----Ss. 2(13AB), 113, 122(5) & 177---Consumer goods---Turnover---Determination---Amendment of assessment---Tax liability, demand of---Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG)---Packing material---Authorities revised the assessment of respondent / taxpayer considering packing material as consumer goods for the use of end user---Validity---Products in question were primarily used as a material for packing other products for various consumer goods and were not typically sold directly to consumers as a stand-alone product---Consumer could buy products packed in such films but would not typically purchase goods in question---Subject goods in their form as described in orders of lower fora were utilizable predominantly by end consumers---These were not directly considered as consumer items but had formed a key component for many consumer products and were meant primarily for an industrial / commercial use---Fast Moving Consumer Goods were those which were supplied in retail market as per "their" daily demand and did not qualify to form part of definition provided in section 2 (13AB) and (22A) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Insertion of phase 'durable' which excludes such product was additionally applied for tax return in question---All such products described as durable were excluded via Finance Act, 2017---Supreme Court set aside judgment passed by High Court---Appeal was allowed.

Ghulam Shoaib Jally, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director-General (Law), FBR for Petitioner (in all cases).

Muhammad Tariq, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent (in all cases) (via video-link from Peshawar).

2025 S C M R 1691

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ

SALAHUDDIN AHMED ---Petitioner

Versus

KHURRAM SULTAN ABBASI ---Respondent

Civil Petition No. 900-K of 2024, decided on 20th November, 2024.

(Against the judgment dated 27.09.2024 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in F.R.A. No. 06 of 2018).

(a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----S. 15(2)(vii)---Eviction of tenant, seeking of---Ground---Bona fide personal need of the landlord is sufficient reason to seek eviction of tenant---It is the sole choice and prerogative of the landlord to choose the premises which better suits him as he is the best judge of his personal need and he is not under any legal obligation to act upon dictation of the tenant---Personal bona fide need is accepted as a sufficient reason to seek eviction of the tenant.

Dr. Abdul Raziq v. Mubeen-ul-Haq Khan and others 1991 SCMR 1527; Muhammad Munir v. Additional District Judge and others 1991 SCMR 453; Wajahat Hasan v. Khawaja Bashir Ahmed 1993 SCMR 707; Mujahid Hussain Shah v. K.S.B. Pumps Company Ltd. and 2 others PLD 1996 SC 787; Abdul Wahid Lehri v. Arbab Mir Nawaz and 3 others 1997 SCMR 1789; Abdul Rashid v. Syed Zafar Yab Ali and 3 others 1999 SCMR 2478; Ishrat Yar Khan v. Abdul Rehman PLD 2000 SC 783; Karachi Taneery (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Muhammad Yousaf through Legal Heirs 2002 SCMR 680; Jahangir Rustam Kakalia through its legal heirs v. Messrs Hashwani Sales and Services (Pvt.) Ltd. 2002 SCMR 241; Feroz ud Din and another v. Additional District Judge, Karachi East and another 2012 SCMR 1679 and Muhammad Hayat v. Muhammad Miskeen (decd.) through L.Rs. and others 2018 SCMR 1441 rel.

(b) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----S. 15(2)(vii)---Eviction petition---Relationship between landlord and tenant, denial of---Suit for specific performance with respect to suit property filed by the tenant---Effect---Where a tenant has entered into an agreement with the vendor and has purchased the demised premises, for which he has instituted suit for specific performance and he denies the proprietary rights of the landlord on the ground of agreement to sell then he (tenant) is bound to first of all deliver the possession of the premises in question and then to contest his proprietary rights in the property and if ultimately he (tenant) succeeds in his suit for specific performance he can then enforce the same---Moreover, in absence of any evidence in rebuttal of title of landlord, there would be a strong presumption of existence of tenancy between the parties.

Barkat Masih v. Mansoor Ahmad (deceased) through LRs. PLD 2005 FSC 105 and Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others PLD 2007 SC 46 rel.

(c) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)---

----S. 15---Eviction of tenant---Tenancy, expiry of---Tenant continuing to hold possession of premises without landlord's consent---Effect and scope---After expiration of the tenancy period, a tenant, though can continue to hold over the possession of the rented premises, but his tenancy is rendered invalid, in that, it has come to an end and if there is no express consent of the landlord to extend the tenancy period the tenant shall be guilty of having infringed the condition of tenancy, rendering him liable to be evicted.

Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari and 6 others v. Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah and others PLD 2018 SC 81 rel.

Abdul Qadir Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video-link from Karachi).

Nemo for Respondent.

2025 S C M R 1694

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

Mst. RAHIM KHATOON (deceased) through LRs ---Appellant

Versus

MUHAMMAD YASIN and others ---Respondents

Civil Appeal No. 671-L of 2013, decided on 18th March, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 14.03.2013 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench passed in Civil Revision No. 4-D of 1995).

Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ---

----Ss. 39 & 42---Elderly and illiterate lady---Suit for declaration and cancellation of sale deed---Execution of sale deed denied by elderly and illiterate lady---Fraud regarding registration of sale deed, alleging of---Burden of proof---Plaintiff (elderly and illiterate lady) was not required to prove the factum of fraud; rather, the burden lay upon the beneficiaries of the sale deed to establish the genuineness of the transaction---Presumption attached with registered sale deed was rebuttable---Facts in brevity were that the predecessor-in-interest (vendor) of the petitioners filed a declaratory suit challenging the validity of a registered sale deed in favour of the respondents/defendants (beneficiaries) regarding the suit property claiming that at the time of execution of the impugned sale deed, she was an illiterate woman, approximately 80 to 90 years old, issueless, and her husband had passed away---She alleged that her close relatives (respondents/defendants) committed fraud---The trial court and appellate court decreed the suit by declaring the sale deed as null and void and ordering its cancellation, however, the High Court allowed the civil revision filed by the respondents/defendants (beneficiaries), holding that the deceased vendor and petitioners had to discharge the burden to prove the factum of fraud and forgery---Core point for determination by the Supreme Court was as to "Whether the burden of proof lay solely on the plaintiff/vendor (elderly and illiterate lady) to establish fraud, or whether the beneficiaries of the impugned transaction were required to prove the genuineness and bona fides of the transaction?"---Held: Presumption of truth was attached to the registered sale deed which was a public document but the said presumption was rebuttable---As the vendors alleged fraud regarding the registered sale deed and agreement in question, therefore, it was duty of the respondents/defendants being beneficiaries to prove the genuineness of the transaction qua the suit property in their favour through bringing on record confidence aspiring and trustworthy evidence---Respondents/defendants (beneficiaries) were legally bound to prove the genuineness of the alleged transaction by producing the concerned Registrar but the needful was not done---Similarly the respondent (beneficiaries) were bound to prove the payment of sale consideration but the bank record or any official/officer of bank was not produced by respondents to prove the factum of payment of sale consideration, therefore, the respondents being beneficiaries could not discharge the onus to prove the genuineness of the transaction in their favour---The judgment of the High Court whereby, the petitioner/plaintiff (vendor) was held responsible to prove the factum of fraud was passed against the settled law of the country on the subject---Once fraud was alleged by the original owner then the beneficiaries of the sale transaction were bound to show genuineness of the alleged transaction---Impugned judgment of the High Court was set-aside, resultantly the judgments and decrees of the trial court and the district court were restored---Appeal was allowed, in circumstances.

Misbah Khanum v. Kamran Yasin Khan and another 2022 SCMR 1629 rel.

Liaqat Ali Butt, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant (via video link, Lahore).

Shabbir Ahmad Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for the L.Rs of Respondent No. 1 (via video link, Lahore).

2025 S C M R 1698

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sardar Tariq Masood and Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel, JJ

MUHAMMAD YAQOOB (deceased) through L.Rs and others ---Petitioners

Versus

SAEEDA BIBI (deceased) through L.Rs and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 1841 of 2025, decided on 2nd June, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 28.02.2025, passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No. 65590 of 2017).

Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (V of 1962)---

----Ss. 3 & 5---Islamic law---Inheritance---Share in the legacy of deceased who left behind a widow (defendant No.1) and a daughter (plaintiff)---Property received by widow from inheritance of her deceased husband as limited owner---Limited owner status, termination of---Effect---After termination of status as limited owner the property occupied by Muslim female would be considered as a property of last male owner and same would revert back to his legal heirs and any sale made by her would be effective only to the extent of her own share---Facts in brevity were that the respondent No.1/plaintiff, daughter of the deceased filed a suit for declaration seeking her legal share in her deceased father's property---The defendant Nos. 2 to 9, (legal heirs of deceased's brother)disputed her claim alleging she was not his daughter and that deceased died issueless---However, defendant No.4 (stepbrother of respondent No.1/plaintiff) supported her claim through his written statement and oral evidence, confirming her status as deceased's daughter and he also appeared as PW-3 and his testimony remained un-shattered---The Trial Court, appellate court and High Court concurrently accepted respondent No.1's (plaintiff/daughter) claim---The petitioners, legal heirs of defendant No.10, who had purchased the property from widow of deceased (mother of plaintiff/respondent No.1) challenged the concurrent findings through civil revision, which was dismissed---Validity---Held: Defendant No. 10 (predecessor of the petitioners) purchased the share of widow of deceased/mother of plaintiff (the property inherited by her as widow of deceased)---This was the property of mother of respondent No.1/plaintiff's which was received by her from the inheritance of her deceased husband (father of respondent No.1) as limited owner and her status as limited owner was terminated under section 3 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962---After termination of her status as limited owner the property occupied by her was considered as the property of last male owner and in the present case the last male owner was her last husband (father of respondent No.1/plaintiff) and according to the Act of 1962 the property had to be reverted back to his legal heirs---The record established the fact that the plaintiff as daughter of deceased, defendant No.1 as widow and remaining brother of the deceased (as deceased had no male issue) were entitled to inherit the legacy of the deceased predecessor of respondent No.1/plaintiff and this very status of the parties as declared by three courts below had attained finality---The predecessor of the petitioner, defendant No.10, legally stepped into the shoes of defendant No.1/widow of deceased as he purchased the property from her and could ask only for the share which was received by her after promulgation of the Act of 1962 and the rest had to go to the other legal heirs of the deceased predecessor---Hence, the sale made by defendant No. 1 (mother of plaintiff / respondent No. 1 and widow of deceased predecessor) was only effective to the extent of her own share and that it was invalid, void and ineffective to the extent of rights of plaintiff (respondent No.1) and brother of the deceased---Since the actual defendants (respondent Nos. 3-9) accepted the decrees in favour of plaintiff (respondent No.1) the status of defendant No.1 (predecessor of the petitioners) was simply that of a purchaser who legally could not challenge / question the legal and sharia status of respondent No.1/plaintiff or the other respondents---The petitioners for that matter had no locus standi and cause of action to challenge the same---Present petition, petitioners' appeal before the District Court and civil revision before the High Court were not maintainable---Concurrent findings of facts recorded by three courts could not be questions in absence of any misreading or non-reading of material evidence or any other material irregularity or illegality---Present petition being meritless was dismissed and leave was refused, in circumstances.

Sheikh Sakhawat Ali, Advocate Supreme Court (via video link from Lahore) and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1702

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, JJ

M MUHAMMAD FEROZ-UD-DIN HILALI ---Petitioner

Versus

NADIR and others ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 473-K of 2023, decided on 25th March, 2025.

(Against the judgment dated 27.01.2023 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in IInd Appeal No. 132 of 2019).

(a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----S. 100 & O.XVII R. 3---Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005), S. 3---Illegal dispossession---Complaint, dismissal of---Original civil jurisdiction also invoked by filing a suit---Concurrent dismissal of suit and appeals---Petitioner seeking repeated adjournments and failing to produce evidence---Closure of evidence---Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence---Petitioner filed a complaint under the Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005, which was dismissed by the district court---Subsequently, petitioner instituted a civil suit which was also dismissed by the Trial Court---The petitioner then filed appeal before the first appellate court which was also dismissed---A second appeal under section 100, C.P.C. was filed before the High Court which was also dismissed---Two forums of different jurisdiction concluded against the petitioner i.e. complaint under provisions of Illegal Dispossession Act, 2005 which was dismissed followed by dismissal of suit on the original side along with first appeal and second appeal accordingly---In the present petition the petitioner attempted to take refuge under the purported misapplication of the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. by the courts below by stating that the trial court failed to record evidence of the petitioner---Held: The judgment of the trial court was passed after dismissal of the adjournment application---The application was dismissed after recording reasons that on the previous date (previous to the dismissal of last adjournment application) the petitioner also moved an adjournment application which was allowed as a last chance, despite availing earlier opportunities---On the fateful date neither the petitioner being plaintiff in the suit nor his counsel appeared but an adjournment application was sent stating that the petitioner was suffering from fever---On the same day after dismissal of the adjournment application the judgment was announced and the suit of the petitioner was dismissed being devoid of any evidence---The petitioner being aggrieved of decision under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. preferred an appeal but did not take ground that under the given circumstances Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. was misapplied---Scope of section 100, C.P.C. and that too against the concurrent findings of the original civil court and the first appellate court was limited---Supreme Court did not interfere in the concurrent findings of three courts below who had recorded the non-serious attitude of the petitioner in recording the evidence on a number of occasions, particularly when the petitioner had failed to point out if he had categorically taken this ground before the two appellate forums below---Petition was dismissed, in circumstances, and leave was refused.

(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---

----O.XVII, R. 3---Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to produce evidence---Scope---Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. is triggered when any party fails to produce evidence and the court in that eventuality may, notwithstanding such default, proceed to decide the suit forthwith.

(c) Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 185(3)---Raising a new ground before the Supreme Court which was neither pleaded in first appeal nor in the second appeal---Scope---A new ground is not open for indulgence before the Supreme Court under its appellate jurisdiction when such a ground was nowhere pleaded either in the first appeal or in the second appeal.

Ch. A. Rasheed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Muhammad Aziz Khan, Advocate Supreme Court and K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1706

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar, Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ

NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN through President, Karachi and others ---Petitioners/Applicants

Versus

MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ and another ---Respondents

C.P.L.As. 121 and 122 of 2024

(Against judgment dated 06.12.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Civil Revisions Nos. 916-P and 917-P of 2021).

C.M.As. 507 and 509 of 2024

(Stay)

C.P.L.As. Nos. 121 and 122 of 2024, C.M.As. Nos. 507 and 509 of 2024, decided on 9th January, 2025.

Constitution of Pakistan---

----Art. 185(3)---Employment---Bank employees---Termination from service---Master and servant relationship---Principle---Civil suit seeking reinstatement, filing of---Employees were reinstated by trial court and such decision was upheld by revisional court (High Court)---Could the trial court order for reinstatement in service or it could ordinarily entertain suit for damages merely as per the principle of master and servant?---Whether the basic principle of master and servant still fits in the present day and age or it requires re-evaluation?---The main legal issue concerned the long-standing principle that in master and servant (contractual employment) relationships, courts could not order reinstatement and instead only damages could be awarded---The petitioner bank relied on the precedent set in the case reported as 'PLD 1961 SC 531', however, the Supreme Court questioned as to whether this precedent being 65 years old remains relevant in the modern context and would continue to be fit for purpose?---For a number of reasons, this was a question which required consideration by the Supreme Court before granting leave to appeal---Given the modern age of internet and even in relation to what was called the "gig economy" (where the position of the hired/engaged person was at its most precious) the courts in many jurisdiction have held that the relationship could not be reduced to that of master and servant---Even the ancient concept as set out in traditionalist terms and certainly as appeared to be in the mind of the court in 'PLD 1961 SC 531' appeared to be outmoded---It appeared that the law might have ossified and became outmoded, being no longer congruent with the demands and requirements of modern times---Rule laid down in 'PLD 1961 SC 531' was ultimately of an equitable nature and it was of the essence of equity that it must retain flexibility and the discretion of the Court (in the judicial sense) so that the law could appropriately develop, and continue to develop, with the passage of time---The rule at hand had prima facie (barring a few developments, which do not however address the issue at the most fundamental level) now acquired a rigidity that was a negation of the discretion that was the hallmark of equity, and became little more than a self-denying ordinance that barred the healthy and organic development of the law so that it remained fit for purpose and the modern age---In the context of the modern economy, the termination of service, in particular by a large corporation, may well in practical terms make a person effectively unemployable even if the termination is later found to be unlawful by a court and compensated by an award of damages---In such circumstances, the decree, when (and if) ultimately honored, may well be cold comfort only---Supreme Court emphasized that it was now long overdue that matters be reappraised at a fundamental level and even, perhaps on the basis of recourse to first principles---Accordingly, leave to appeal was granted to, inter alia, consider the question as to "Whether the rule laid down by this Court in the case reported as PLD 1961 SC 531, and others that follow and/or lay down or affirm the same or similar principle are, and continue to be, fit for purpose or require any modification, replacement or substitution and if so, in what manner and to what extent?

Malik and Haq and another v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury PLD 1961 SC 531 rel.

Faisal Mahmood Ghani, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners/Applicants.

Amjad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1710

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

ABID and another ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeals Nos. 154 and 155 of 2023, decided on 29th April, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 17.09.2019 passed by the learned Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat in Criminal Appeal No. 271-M of 2017 and Murder References Nos. 6 and 7 of 2017).

(a) Criminal trial---

----Confession, retraction of---Conviction---Scope---Conviction and sentence can be awarded to the accused on the basis of his/her retracted judicial confession, provided that the said judicial confession is corroborated by some independent evidence.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 404 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, dishonestly misappropriating property possessed by a deceased person at the time of his death, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Medical evidence insufficient for conviction---Accused were charged for committing murder of the paternal uncle of the complainant---Appellants stated in their retracted judicial confessions that before the occurrence, sleeping pills were administered to deceased, whereupon he became sleepy and then both the appellants committed his murder---According to the medical evidence brought on the record through Medical Officer, the contents of the stomach of the deceased were obtained through a syringe and the same were sent to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory but perusal of Forensic Science Laboratory Report showed that no drug was detected in the said contents---It was alleged by prosecutor that the retracted judicial confessions of the appellants were corroborated by the recovery of Churri, at the pointing out of appellant, as well as by the recovery of blood stained dupatta and nara (belt), recovered at the pointing out of female appellant and the same was further corroborated by the Forensic Science Laboratory Report, which showed that the said articles were stained with human blood having the same blood group---However, the prosecution had not brought on the record that what was the blood group of deceased, therefore by merely mentioning that the said articles were of the same blood group by itself was not sufficient to connect the appellants with the alleged offence---No proper postmortem examination on the dead-body of the deceased was conducted in this case and the prosecution case was based on external medical examination on the dead-body of the deceased---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 404 & 34---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129(g)---Qatl-i-amd, dishonestly misappropriating property possessed by a deceased person at the time of his death, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Material witnesses not produced for evidence---Adverse presumption against the prosecution case---Accused were charged for committing murder of the paternal uncle of the complainant---Record showed that during judicial confession of female appellant two children of the said appellant from her husband/deceased, aged about 12/13 years and about 8/9 years, were living in the same house, where the occurrence took place---Even in the site plan of the place of occurrence, the presence of two children of said female appellant and her husband/deceased was shown at point No. 2 but none from them was produced in the witness box by the prosecution---Said two children of female appellant and the deceased were the most natural witnesses of the occurrence because they were sleeping in the same room, where the occurrence took place but they were not produced in the witness box, therefore, an adverse inference under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, could validly be drawn against the prosecution that had the said witnesses been produced in the evidence, they would not have supported the prosecution case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Lal Khan v. The State 2006 SCMR 1846; Riaz Ahmed v. The State 2010 SMCR 846; Abdul Qadeer v. The State 2024 SCMR 1146 and Riasat Alam v. The State 2024 SCMR 1224 rel.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 404 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, dishonestly misappropriating property possessed by a deceased person at the time of his death, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Motive not proved---Accused were charged for committing murder of the paternal uncle of the complainant---Insofar as the motive of inter-se illicit relationship between both the appellants was concerned, no prosecution witness had stated that they had ever seen the appellants in any objectionable condition or even talking to each other---Moreover, female appellant was living with deceased as his wife till the time of his death---Admittedly there was no litigation or a family suit between female appellant and her husband/deceased---Therefore, the motive as alleged by the prosecution had not been proved in this case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

(e) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there was a single circumstance, which created doubt in the prosecution case then the same would be sufficient to acquit the accused.

Rizwan Ejaz, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Cr. A. No. 154 of 2023).

M. Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in Cr. A. No. 155 of 2023).

Syed Kosar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General, KPK for the State.

Musa Khan in person for the Complainant.

2025 S C M R 1717

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan

and Shakeel Ahmad, JJ

SHER AHMED and another ---Appellant/Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another ---Respondents

Criminal Appeal No. 674 of 2020 and Criminal Petition No. 241 of 2025, decided on 13th March, 2025.

(Against judgment dated 27.09.2016 of the Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar ul Qaza) Swat passed in Crl. Appeal No. 223-M of 2013 and M.Rs. Nos. 4-M and 4-A of 2013).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Confessional statements of accused---Doubtful---Accused-appellant were charged for committing murder of the minor son of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money---In the present case, the appellants had recorded their respective judicial confessions under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.---Statement of one of the appellants was exculpatory because he had alleged that despite restraining the other appellant, the latter had killed the child---Likewise, the confessional statement recorded by the other appellant was partly exculpatory in nature since he had attributed an effective role to first accused in taking the life of the minor victim---Events narrated by both the appellants in their respective confessional statements were distinct and not corroborated---Proceedings till the registration of the case under Section 154, Cr.P.C., and the arrest of an appellant and then the recovery of the dead body, according to the prosecution's case, at his instance were not only shrouded in mystery but they were in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Cr.P.C.---Moreover, it was a mystery as to when and why the appellants were treated as suspects and the arrest of the appellant also became questionable---Said fact definitely must have had serious consequences in the context of the exercise of free will and rational thinking for the purpose of making a confession---Such circumstances raised serious doubts regarding the confessional statements recorded under Section 164,Cr.P.C. being voluntary and given out of free will---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed in its obligation to prove the case against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

Tariq Mehmood v. State 2002 SCMR 1493 and Javed Iqbal v. State 2023 SCMR 139 rel.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay in recording confessional statements of accused---Consequential---Accused-appellant were charged for committing murder of the minor son of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money---Record showed that one accused was arrested on 05.07.2012 while other on 06.07.2012---Accused had remained in the police custody for a considerable time and their confessional statements were recorded on 11.07.2012---Nothing was available on record to explain the delay in recording the judicial confessions---Delayed confessional statement lost its evidentiary value the longer an accused remained in the custody of the police---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed in its obligation to prove the case against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State PLD 2018 SC 595 and Muhammad Parvez v. The State 2007 SCMR 670 rel.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Inquiry conducted before the registration of FIR---Consequential---Accused-appellant were charged for committing murder of the minor son of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money---In this case, the initial statement filed by the complainant was only to the extent of informing the officer in charge of a police station that despite a search he could not find his son---Complainant had not expressed any apprehension regarding the commission of a cognizable offence---Thus, the information did not meet the requirements set out in Section 154, Cr.P.C.---In the circumstances, there was no need to seek an order and measures could have been taken for searching the missing child---Nonetheless, the report seemed to have been taken seriously by seeking permission for conducting an 'inquiry' under Section 153(3),Cr.P.C. and it was granted by the concerned Magistrate without appreciating the fact that no power or authority was vested to order an inquiry---Witnesses in their depositions had stated that the Magistrate had ordered an 'inquiry' and that it was marked to SI/witness---In his examination-in-chief Inquiry Officer acknowledged that during the course of inquiry, he interrogated various suspects, but they were released being not involved in the commission of the offence---Station House Officer/witness had also deposed that many persons were interrogated during the inquiry and he claimed to have taken over the inquiry only for a day i.e. on 05.07.2012 and had further stated that the appellant was arrested on the same day---Moreover, it was later in the day that, according to his testimony, the appellant had led him to the recovery of the dead body from the well---No FIR or, in other words, entry was made as required under Section 154,Cr.P.C.,before the recovery of the body---Entire proceedings before the registration of the case under Section 154,Cr.P.C.,were conducted under the garb of an inquiry not even contemplated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.---It was established from the evidence that during the period from 23.04.2012 till 05.07.2012 numerous persons were arrested and interrogated as suspects---They were released without complying with the requirements prescribed under S. 156, Cr.P.C., in the case of suspects who are arrested and released after the registration of a case---It was, therefore, obvious that the officer in charge of the police station had reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence but did not register a case nor complied with the mandatory procedure set out under section 157---By adopting this course, the officer in charge of the police station had steered clear from the external supervisory check otherwise contemplated under the scheme of the Cr.P.C.---Officer in charge of the police station or any other officer associated with the purported 'inquiry' had illegally arrested suspects and then released them---Interrogation without the registration of a case in the circumstances was also illegal---Abuse of the coercive powers in this case, therefore, could not be ruled out---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed in its obligation to prove the case against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b), 365-A & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Qatl-i-amd, kidnapping or abducting for extorting property, valuable security, etc., common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Accused-appellant were charged for committing murder of the minor son of complainant after kidnapping him for extorting money---Testimonies of the complainant and his brother were not consistent in so far as material facts were concerned---Complainant's brother had deposed that one of the appellants had remained associated with them during the search for the child---According to the testimony of said witness, appellant was suspected because of his inquiries regarding delay in the payment of ransom---Said witness had deposed that on 05.07.2012 both the appellants and the other acquitted accused had come to a grassy ground---In his examination-in-chief said witness had stated that appellant was arrested from the grassy ground but later, in his cross-examination, he had contradicted his own statement by deposing that his arrest was made while he was proceeding towards the complainant's house---Deposition of complainant's brother did not find support from the testimonies of other witnesses, particularly that of the complainant---Latter, in his deposition, did not refer to the communication between appellant and complainant's brother nor the presence of the appellants and the acquitted accused at the grassy ground---Testimony of Inspector further weakened the prosecution's story because, according to his deposition, appellant was one of the suspects during the inquiry conducted under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and that he was interrogated prior to the recovery of the body and registration of the crime report---Testimony of Inquiry Officer further raised doubts since he had contradicted the facts narrated by complainant's brother in material particulars---According to the testimony of Inquiry Officer, the appellant and the acquitted accused were arrested on 06.07.2012---There was no explanation as to why the three accused were not arrested when, according to the testimony of complainant's brother, they come together to the grassy ground to collect the ransom amount---There was no evidence to prove that ransom was demanded or that the child victim was abducted by the appellants---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed in its obligation to prove the case against the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

Arshad Husain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant/Petitioner (in both cases).

Danial Khan Chamkani, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant (in Crl. A. No. 674 of 2020).

Syed Kausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the State.

2025 S C M R 1730

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Irfan Saadat Khan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

FARMAN ALI and another ---Appellants

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Criminal Appeals Nos. 58 and 59 of 2023, decided on 26th May, 2025.

(On appeal against the judgment dated 24.02.2020 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Criminal Appeal No. 800-P of 2017).

(a) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Prosecution is bound to prove its case beyond the shadow of any slightest doubt and the benefit of even a slightest doubt is to be extended to the accused.

Ameer Zeb v. State PLD 2012 SC 380 and Muhammad Hashim v. State PLD 2004 SC 856 rel.

(b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)---

----S. 9(c)---Possession of narcotic substance---Re-appraisal of evidence---Safe custody and safe transmission of the recovered substance to the laboratory not proved---Chain of custody of contraband doubtful---Prosecution case was that 20-kilogram charas was recovered from the vehicle driven by the accused---Complainant stated that after completing the recovery proceedings, he took both the appellants, contraband, along with parcels and the vehicle to the police station and handed over the same to Moharrar---Said Moharrar stated that complainant handed over to him sample parcels total 1640 in number and 5/5 grams charas (samples) for onward transmission to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory and 82 sacks of case property for safe custody in the Mallkhana of the police station---Said witness also stated that he sent 1640 parcels weighing 5 grams each to the Forensic Science Laboratory along with application to Forensic Science Laboratory for analysis through Police Constable---However, the said Police Constable through whom 1640 samples of the contraband material were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory had not been produced in the witness box by the prosecution---No valid reason had been given before the Trial Court for non-production of the said witness in the witness box---Name of the said Police Constable had also not been mentioned in the calendar of witnesses in report under Section 173,Cr.P.C.---Report of Forensic Science Laboratory depicted that the name of the person who deposited the sample parcels in the said office had not been mentioned therein and only No. 5915 had been mentioned---Head Constable, while appearing in the witness box before the trial Court, stated that he took Murasila, the recovery memo, the card of arrest, application for Forensic Science Laboratory along with parcels to the police station and handed over the same to Police Officer/ASI---However, upon perusal of the deposition of Police Officer/ASI, said witness did not make any mention of receipt of the said parcels of charasand only mentioned receipt of the Murasila sent by complainant---However, as per the deposition of complainant, the said samples were handed over to Moharrar for onward transmission to the Forensic Science Laboratory---Such ambiguity as to who was handed over the samples parcels of the charas raised serious doubts regarding the chain of custody of the contraband material by the prosecution and the genuineness of the prosecution story, the benefit of which ambiguities and doubts was to be extended to the appellants as a matter of right---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

Abdul Haq v. The State 2025 SCMR 751; Javaid Iqbal v. The State 2023 SCMR 139; Asif Ali and another v. The State 2024 SCMR 1408; Lal Jan v. The State 2023 SCMR 1009; Said Wazir v. The State 2023 SCMR 1144; Nawaz v. State 2020 SCMR 687; State v. Imam Bakhsh 2018 SCMR 2039; Zahir Shah v. State 2019 SCMR 2004; Amjad Ali v. State 2012 SCMR 577 and Mst. Sakina Ramzan v. The State 2021 SCMR 451 rel.

(c) Criminal trial---

----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there is a single circumstance, which creates doubt in the prosecution case, the same will be sufficient to acquit the accused.

Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel.

Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellant.

Syed Kosar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and assisted by Ghulam Muhammad Adnan, Judicial Law Clerk for the State.

2025 S C M R 1737

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Munib Akhtar and Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, JJ

COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE ---Petitioner

Versus

Messrs MUSTAFA ENTERPRISES and another ---Respondents

Civil Petition No. 2336 of 2025, decided on 30th June, 2025.

(Against the order dated 26.03.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench in S.T.R. No. 8 of 2024).

Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)---

----Ss. 2(37), 6,7,8,22,23,26 & 73---Input tax, claim of---Issuance of fake/ flying invoices, allegation of---Proof---Allegation was that the registered person /company did not purchase any coal from the local suppliers but unlawfully claimed input tax on the basis of fake/ flying invoices issued by dubious suppliers, therefore, causing loss to the national exchequer--- Order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue in favour of registered person was concurred with by the High Court---Validity---Pertinently, the proceedings in the matter were initiated pursuant to issuance of Show Cause Notice wherein the respondents were not confronted with any invoices, the value of which was above Rs. 50,000/---No material or evidence whatsoever was provided to substantiate the allegation to the effect that the suppliers as mentioned in the Show Cause Notice were blacklisted during the tax period under consideration---In the present case, Show-Cause Notice and the Order-in-Original were passed on vague and frivolous allegations and certain conclusions had been made on mere presumptions only, whereas, no material or evidence had been produced to substantiate the same---Notably, while passing the Order-in-Original, the Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue exceeded his jurisdiction while travelling beyond the very premises, whereas the respondents were never confronted with the allegations made in the Show-Cause Notice or entries as reflected in the bank statement which were subsequently furnished by the respondents, showing the details of the total amount and the particulars of suppliers from whom purchases were made---While initiating the proceedings against the respondents, there was no material or evidence available on record to make out a case against the respondents of illegal or inadmissible claim of input tax adjustment, whereas the entire proceedings and the Order-in-Original passed in the present case was based on presumptions, whereas no inquiry or verification was made by the Department in respect of alleged fake/flying invoices---Thus, the Tribunal and the High Court were justified to set aside both the Order-in-Original and the Order-in-Appeal, while recording concurrent findings on facts which did not suffer from any illegality or error---Petition for leave to appeal, filed by Department, was dismissed, in circumstances.

Commissioner Inland Revenue Zone-IV, Large Taxpayer Unit, Karachi v. Messrs Al-Abid Silk Mills Limited A-39, Manghopir Road, Site Karrachi 2023 SCMR 1797 ref.

Malik Itaat Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record along with Kamran Ullah, Additional Commissioner along with Yousaf Khan, S.O. for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1742

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Athar Minallah, Naeem Akhter Afghan and Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, JJ

MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and another ---Petitioners

Versus

The STATE ---Respondent

Jail Petitions Nos. 213 and 214 of 2024, decided on 5th June, 2025.

(Against judgment dated 16.05.2024 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in Crl. Appeal No. 148 of 2022 and Crl. Appeal No. 170 of 2022, Crl. Revision No. 29 of 2022 and M. R. No. 02 of 2022).

(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 398---Qatl-i-amd, attempting to commit robbery or dacoity, when the offender is armed with a deadly weapon---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Improvements made by witnesses---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the deceased while attempting to commit robbery---In his FIR as well as supplementary statement complainant did not nominate the two accused who had entered the shop and had committed the offence---However in his supplementary statement he suspected convict "Ch", being an ex-employee of shop, as an accomplice who was sitting on the motorcycle outside the shop upon which both the accused had fled---Admittedly, Branch Manager was not an eye-witness of the occurrence as he was not present in the shop at the time of the occurrence---However, complainant and a Manager were the witnesses of the occurrence---Both the petitioners were not previously known to eyewitnesses and they both were also not aware of their names---Record transpired that eyewitnesses nominated both the petitioners in their statements at the trial with explanation that names of both the petitioners came to their knowledge during investigation---Record revealed that due to implication of convict "Ch" as a suspect by complainant in his supplementary statement, the convict "Ch" as well as the petitioners were arrested by Investigating Officer on next day of the occurrence under Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) as suspects as the FIR was against unknown accused---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 398---Qatl-i-amd, attempting to commit robbery or dacoity, when the offender is armed with a deadly weapon---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the statements of witnesses---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the deceased while attempting to commit robbery---Occurrence was of 28.12.2020 at 10:20 pm---According to the statement of Investigating Officer, on the next day of occurrence, he recovered two empties of .30 pistol from the place of occurrence i.e. shop and he also took into possession a mobile phone with a SIM from the counter of shop, which belonged to the petitioner---Call Data Record (CDR) revealed of telephonic contacts between the petitioner and the convict "Ch"---Surprisingly, witnesses had not mentioned in their statements recorded at the trial about the recovery of the mobile phone of the petitioner from the counter of the shop on 29.12.2020 by Investigating Officer---In contradiction to the statement of Investigating Officer about recovery of the said cell phone from the counter of the shop on 29.12.2020, according to the statement of eyewitness, the said phone was recovered by Investigating Officer in his presence on 28.12.2020---Foisting the recovery of cell phone by Investigating Officer from the counter of the shop on the next day of the occurrence after arrest of the convict "Ch" and the petitioners to create incriminating evidence against them could not be ruled out of consideration---According to Investigating Officer two crime empties were recovered on 29.12.2020 from the shop wherein the occurrence had taken place---Complainant and a witness had not mentioned about recovery of two crime empties by Investigating Officer from the shop on 29.12.2020---While contradicting the statement of Investigating Officer, witness stated that the said crime empties were recovered by Investigating Officer on the same day i.e. 28.12.2020---Circumstances established that the prosecution failed to prove the charge against the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 398---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Qatl-i-amd, attempting to commit robbery or dacoity, when the offender is armed with a deadly weapon---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Test identification parade---Infirmities---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the deceased while attempting to commit robbery---Complainant and eyewitness were witnesses of the identification parade of the petitioners and convict "Ch" which was conducted on 08.1.2021 in the premises of Central Jail, under the supervision of Assistant Commissioner/Sub-Divisional Magistrate---Record transpired that identification parade of the petitioners and the convict "Ch" was not conducted by Sub-Divisional Magistrate in accordance with law---During identification parade proceedings objections were raised by the petitioners and the convict that prior to the identification parade, their photographs were taken in the police station but the said objection was not dealt with/attended by Sub-Divisional Magistrate---Identification parade proceedings of petitioners and the convict had been brought on record by the prosecution, according to which, the petitioners and the convict were identified by the witnesses and they were assigned numbers as witness No. 1, witness No. 2, witness No. 3 and witness No. 4 respectively by Sub-Divisional Magistrate---In the identification parade proceedings of petitioner, three witnesses i.e. Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were mentioned thereon but there was no mention in his identification parade proceedings about witness No.2; whereas in the identification parade proceedings of other petitioner and the convict, names of all four witnesses had been mentioned with their correct serial numbers---During the identification parade proceedings, Sub-Divisional Magistrate had recorded statements of four witnesses of the identification parade in narrative form---Identification parade report revealed that the witnesses had simply identified the petitioners and the convict without any reference to their description and without assigning the role allegedly played by each of them in the occurrence---In the circumstances, the identification parade of the petitioners by the witnesses without stating the role allegedly played by them in the occurrence was not inline with Article 22 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, hence it was of no evidentiary value and could not be relied upon for conviction of the petitioners---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

Mehboob Hassan v. Akhtar Islam and others 2024 SCMR 757; Abdul Hayee v. State 2025 SCMR 281 and Abdul Qadeer v. The State 2024 SCMR 1146 rel.

(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 398---Qatl-i-amd, attempting to commit robbery or dacoity, when the offender is armed with a deadly weapon---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---CCTV footage---Faces of culprits not visible---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the deceased while attempting to commit robbery---CCTV footage of the shop with regard to the occurrence, procured during investigation and recorded in USB, duly played at the trial and relied upon by the trial Court for conviction of the petitioners, was also played in the High Court---CCTV footage was of no avail to the prosecution and it could not be made a basis for conviction of the petitioners as in the CCTV footage, the faces of the culprits were not visible and it was showing only the back of the culprit who had a scuffle with the deceased---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---

----Ss. 302(b) & 398---Qatl-i-amd, attempting to commit robbery or dacoity, when the offender is armed with a deadly weapon---Reappraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of crime weapon on the disclosure of petitioners-accused---Lack of independent corroboration---Petitioners were charged for committing murder of the deceased while attempting to commit robbery---According to the prosecution, on 17.1.2021, on the disclosure and pointation of petitioner .30 bore pistol with four live cartridges were recovered in presence of two Police Constables/recovery witnesses from a cattle shed---As per prosecution version, from the same cattle shed, a .30 bore pistol with five live cartridges were recovered on 20.1.2021 on the disclosure and pointation of other petitioner---No disclosure memos of the petitioners were prepared in that regard by the Investigating Officer---No independent witnesses of the locality/workers of the cattle shed as well as owner of the cattle shed were associated to attest the alleged recoveries nor they had been produced at the trial to lend independent corroboration to the alleged recoveries of pistols and live cartridges on the pointation of the petitioners---Such fact weakened the prosecution case and led to possibility of foisting the recovery of weapons by the Investigating Officer to lend corroboration to the prosecution version---Pistol allegedly recovered on the pointation of petitioner on 17.01.2021 was sent to the Forensic Science Agency on 22.01.2021 with two crime empties already lying therein---Record also revealed of break in chain of custody of the weapon---Positive report of Forensic Science Agency was issued on 08.02.2021---Though positive report of a firearm expert was a valid piece of corroborative evidence but its weight was heavily dependent on the reliability of the weapon recovery---If the recovery of weapon was found to be doubtful, fabricated or otherwise unreliable, the report of firearm expert, even if positive, could be disregarded by the Court as it failed to connect the weapon genuinely to the accused or the crime in a credible manner---Since recovery of crime weapon was disbelieved due to lack of independent corroboration, the positive report of the firearm expert lost its evidentiary value in connecting the petitioner to the crime---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed, accordingly.

Hameed uz Zaman, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners.

Ghulam Sarwar Nihung, Prosecutor General Islamabad along with Asif Khan, Inspector and Ashfaq, S.I. for the State.

M. Faisal and Hamad (brothers of the deceased) for the deceased.

2025 S C M R 1752

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Yahya Afridi, CJ, Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui and Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, JJ

FAHEEM ARSHAD and others ---Petitioners

Versus

MANZOOR-UL-HAQ and others ---Respondents

C.P.L.A. No. 55 of 2025, decided on 30th June, 2025.

(Against order dated 23.12.2024 of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore passed in Appeal No. 3450 of 2024).

(a) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)---

----S. 23(i)---Punjab Provincial Management Service Rules, 2004, Cl.2(a), Column-7, Sched. I---Consideration for promotion to the posts of Provincial Management Service (PMS) Officers (BS-17) amongst Tehsildars ("Promoted Tehsildars" and "Inducted Tehsildars")---Amendment in the method of recruitment while removing the condition of 5 years' service only for "Promoted Tehsildars"---Process of consideration of cases of promotion of "Promoted Tehsildars" was halted by the Punjab Service Tribunal through its injunctive order---Validity---Promotee Tehsildars' consideration of promotion as PMS Officers could not be indefinitely placed in abeyance---Vacant posts must be filled in accordance with the prescribed method of appointment at the earliest---Process of the promotion could not be halted at the instance of the Inducted Tehsildars for the simple reason that when the Inducted Tehsildars were directly appointed in the year 2022, the notification dated 21.08.2019 had already been issued---Inducted Tehsildars were aware or expected to be aware of their terms and conditions of service to be governed by the Rules of which the amendment made in Sched-I to the Rules through notification dated 21.08.2019 was an integral part---They joined service knowing fully well the adverse effect of the notification on their promotion prospects, thus, unless and until and if at all the amendments brought about in Sched-1 to the Rules through the notification were declared ultra vires by a competent court/tribunal or the said notification was withdrawn on the basis of the Governor reversing the amendment made in the method of promotion of Tehsildars as PMS Officers contained in Sched-I to the Rules, the process of promotion could not be halted---Public sector employment in Pakistan was a significant source of financial stability for many households---Prolonged vacancies not only limit their employment opportunities but also diminish public confidence in government institutions---Practice of routinely leaving posts in public institutions unfilled undermines the very rationale of sanctioned strength---If a post is not needed, it should be abolished through proper procedure; but if it has been duly approved and budgeted, it must be filled without undue delay---Keeping a post vacant hampers the functioning of public institutions and is not conducive to the maintenance of efficiency of administration---Objective of timely promotions of eligible employees in various public institutions can be achieved only by convening of meetings of DPCs---Timely filling of vacant posts is not only an administrative imperative but is essential for maintaining the integrity, efficiency and responsiveness of public institutions---Petition was converted into appeal and was allowed in terms that the process for promotion of Tehsildars as PMS Officers already initiated may continue unless amendment made in the Rules through notification was withdrawn by the Governor.

Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Hizbullah Khan 2021 SCMR 1281 and Aatika Hina Mushtaq v. Secretary, Special Education, Government of the Punjab C.P.L.A. No. 3116 of 2022 rel.

(b) Civil service---

----Words "Post" and "Vacancy"---Connotation and meaning---"Post" denotes the number of posts in the cadre, whether filled or vacant---"Vacancy" means a vacant post available for appointment, through recruitment/promotion, on the creation of new post(s) or retirement, death or resignation or removal of the incumbent working on the post---In public administration, every post in the organizational hierarchy is created after due deliberation and approval, taking into account the functional requirements of the department, the workload and the efficient delivery of services to the public---Such process ensures that each sanctioned post is essential for the functioning of public institutions---In other words, each sanctioned post reflects a deliberate recognition of a need - whether technical, supervisory, operational, or strategic within the framework of good governance. Importantly, financial allocations are also secured through budgetary processes to ensure that post is funded and resourced.

(c) Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974)---

----S. 23(i)---Punjab Provincial Management Service Rules, 2004, Cl.2(a), Column-7, Sched. I---Amendment made in the Punjab Provincial Management Service Rules, 2004, (Rules) made under section 23 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 (Act)---Scope---Section 23(i) of the Act provides that the Governor, or any person authorized in this behalf, may make such Rules as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of the said Act---Rules in question have been made by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 23 of the Act, and so has the amendment in Sched-1 to the said Rules through notification dated 21.08.2019---These Rules have the same force as the provisions of the statute under which they framed---Amendments made in Sched-I to the Rules through the said notification issued by S&GAD, Government of the Punjab, whereby the condition of five years of service as Tehsildar for the Promotee Tehsildars for their consideration for promotion as PMS Officers was done away with, were still in the field till date the notification had not been declared ultra vires the provisions of the Act or the Constitution either by any Court or Tribunal.

Ahmed Hassaan v. Government of Punjab 2005 SCMR 186 rel.

(d) Punjab Provincial Management Service Rules, 2004---

----Cl. 2(a), Column-7, Sched. I---Annulment of amendment made in Rules by the Governor through notification---Views of executive authority about such Rules through its executive order---Effect---Views that the Senior Member, Board of Revenue, may have expressed in his order dated 18.11.2024 qua the said notification or the directions that he may have issued to the Secretary, Revenue, Government of the Punjab, would not have the effect of the annulment of the said notification dated 21.08.2019---Notification was based on an amendment made in Sched.-I to the Rules by the Governor in exercise of statutory power and it was he alone who could in the exercise of the very same power undo the amendment.

Ibad ur Rehman Lodhi, Advocate Supreme Court with Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners.

Junaid Jabbar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

Khalid Masood Ghani, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab, Muhammad Tahir Riaz, Superintendent and Muhammad Ishaq, Senior Clerk, Board of Revenue, Punjab for Respondents.

2025 S C M R 1150

[Supreme Court of Canada]\

Present: Wagner C.J., Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Kasirer, Jamal and O'Bonsawin, JJ

LEADING SEAMAN C.D. EDWARDS, CAPTAIN C.M.C. CREPEAU, GUNNER K.J.J. FONTAINE AND CAPTAIN M.J. IREDALE and others ---Appellants

Versus

HIS MAJESTY THE KING ---Respondent and CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION AND BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION ---Interveners

Decided on 26th April, 2024.

(Appeals from a judgment of the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada).

Per Kasirer, J.; Wagner CJ., Côté, Rowe, Jamal and O'Bonsawin, JJ. concurring; Karakatsanis, J. dissenting.

Fundamental Rights---

----Courts martial---Military judges---Independent and impartial tribunal---Scope---Judicial independence---Scope---Persons tried before courts martial entitled to constitutional guarantee of judicial independence and impartiality---Whether military status of military judges violates such constitutional guarantee of person tried by a court martial.

The nine individuals (accused) facing charges are members of the Canadian Armed Forces who were prosecuted for service offences under the Code of Service Discipline ("CSD"), which constitutes Part III of the National Defence Act ("NDA"). These charges led to proceedings before courts martial. Under the CSD, Canadian Armed Forces personnel can be charged with service offences-serious violations that include both military-specific breaches and offences under the Criminal Code or other federal laws. Such cases are adjudicated by courts martial, military courts with the same authority, powers, and privileges as superior criminal courts. Military judges, who preside over these courts, must meet specific qualifications as outlined in s. 165.21 of the NDA: they must be barristers or advocates with at least ten years' experience; they must be military officers, having held that status for a minimum of ten years. Additionally, s. 165.24(2) requires the Chief Military Judge to hold at least the rank of colonel. According to the NDA, military judges may only be dismissed for cause by the Governor in Council, following a recommendation from the Military Judges Inquiry Committee ("MJIC"). However, as officers, military judges remain within the chain of command and are themselves subject to disciplinary action under the CSD. The nine accused contested the legal requirement that military judges be officers, arguing that this undermines their right to an independent and impartial tribunal as guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ('Charter'). In some courts martial, military judges acknowledged that their dual role as judges and officers compromised their judicial independence, thereby infringing the accused's s. 11(d) rights. However, the Court Martial Appeal Court ("CMAC") concluded that a well-informed observer, considering the situation realistically and thoughtfully, would find that military judges satisfy the constitutional standards of impartiality and independence, and thus the accused's rights under s. 11(d) were not violated.

Per Kasirer, J. (Majority view):

The fact that military judges hold officer status under the National Defence Act (NDA) does not conflict with their judicial role in terms of section 11(d) of the Charter. Members of the Canadian Armed Forces facing trial before military judges are guaranteed the same level of judicial independence and impartiality as those appearing in civilian criminal courts. However, this equivalence does not require both systems to function identically. Under its current structure, the NDA ensures that military judicial independence is upheld within the unique military context, reflecting the legislative goals of sustaining discipline, operational effectiveness, and morale in the Armed Forces, as well as public confidence in a disciplined military. As such, the stipulation that military judges be officers under sections 165.21 and 165.24(2) of the NDA does not violate s. 11(d) of the Charter.

In the case reported as R. v. Généreux ([1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, the Court determined that the military status of judges does not breach s. 11(d). Although the Court may revisit past rulings where societal or legal developments have undermined their rationale, no such erosion has been demonstrated in the present case. While the Court in Généreux acknowledged that the hierarchical placement of military judges may detract from absolute judicial independence, it also clarified that the Charter does not demand absolute independence or a sort of truly independent military judiciary that could only be assured by civilian judges. The constitutional standard endorsed in the Court's jurisprudence is not one of "absolute" independence.

Kirkpatrick, at para. 202; Lippé, at p. 142; Généreux, at p. 295; J. Walker, "Military Justice: from Oxymoron to Aspiration" (1994), 32 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at p. 31 and M. Madden, "Keeping up with the Common Law O'Sullivans? The Limits of Comparative Law in the Context of Military Justice Law Reforms" (2013), 51 Alta. L. Rev. 125, at p. 132 ref.

The Généreux decision confirms that Parliament's choice to require military judges to be officers is not inherently unconstitutional. While alternatives such as civilian-staffed military courts could also meet constitutional standards, s. 11(d) does not mandate a single model. International reform efforts in other countries and recommendations from independent reviews may inform legislative/policy choices but do not dictate/require Parliament to follow the same. It is up to Parliament to select among various constitutionally valid policy options. The Court's role is to determine whether the provisions in ss. 165.21 and 165.24(2) of the NDA comply with constitutional standards. Issue in the present case is not whether the military justice system in Canada could practically function with civilian judges but whether the impugned requirement under the NDA violates the guarantee set by s. 11(d).

Généreux, at p. 295 and Re B. C. Motor Vehicle Act, [ 1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at pp. 496-97 ref.

Généreux remains a guiding precedent on key matters: section 11(d) applies to military justice; a system staffed by military judges who understand its unique needs is not in itself problematic; and there are multiple valid ways to structure judicial independence within the military. While the military justice system differs from civilian criminal justice in certain ways, these differences do not compromise the Charter's guarantee of judicial independence. Généreux at p. 295 ref.

Although the Court in Généreux found that the then-existing NDA provisions failed to ensure adequate judicial independence, the law has since changed, requiring a new analysis. To assess independence under s. 11(d), courts apply a reasonable perception standard as king whether a well-informed and objective observer would see the tribunal as independent and impartial. This hypothetical observer is expected to understand the relevant context, think critically, and seek out necessary information.

Valente, at p. 689; Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, at para. 26; Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 282, at para. 37; Cojocaru v. British Columbia Women's Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 357, at paras. 13, 28 and 36 and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, at para. 70 ref.

The Supreme Court of Canada in Valente v. The Queen ([1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 identified three foundational requirements for judicial independence: security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence. Security of tenure means that judges must hold office, without fear of arbitrary removal from the executive, whether until age of retirement, for a fixed term, or conclusion of an adjudicative task. Financial security requires that compensation be established by law and set through an independent review process. Administrative independence ensures judges have control over matters affecting their judicial duties. Even if a court meets these three conditions, it must still be free from perceptions of partiality at both individual and institutional levels. Although courts benefit from a strong presumption of impartiality, this can be rebutted if a reasonable person believes the court might not deliver a fair outcome due to bias.

British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Provincial Court Judges' Association of British Columbia, 2020 SCC 20, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 506, at para. 31; Conférence des juges de paix magistrats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 39, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 116, at para. 33; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 ("Provincial Judges Reference; R. v. Kokopenace, 2015 SCC 28, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 398, at para. 49; Yukon Francophone School Board, at para. 25; Committee for Justice and Liberty, at p. 394 and Lippé, at pp. 144-45 ref.

The provisions of NDA, as amended, meet all three of these independence requirements for military judges. Regarding security of tenure, judges are appointed by the Governor in Council and remain in office unless they resign, retire, or are removed for cause following a recommendation by the Military Judges Inquiry Committee (MJIC). While it is true that military judges as officers are subject to disciplinary proceedings under the CSD, a reasonable person examining the NDA holistically would not see this as a practical threat to judicial independence. On financial security, military judges have a dedicated pay system, with compensation determined through an independent committee. In terms of administrative independence, judges (including the Chief Military Judge) manage key judicial functions such as assigning judges to cases and creating procedural rules, protected from command interference.

The fact that military judges are part of the executive branch and subject to prosecution under the CSD does not reasonably raise doubts about their impartiality. Their judicial role is carefully separated from their role as executive officers. Only the Chief Military Judge can assign duties, and those duties must align with their judicial responsibilities. Military judges have a distinct grievance mechanism and are shielded from performance evaluations by the executive. Like other judges, they swear an oath of impartiality and possess the same authority and immunity as superior court judges. A reasonable observer would trust that, given their experience and legal training, military judges will uphold their oath and recuse themselves if necessary.

R. v. Teskey, 2007 SCC 25, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 267, at para. 28 ref.

Additionally, the possibility that military judges could be disciplined under the CSD does not create a reasonable appearance of bias. Like all officers, military judges are accountable for conduct outside their judicial duties and must follow lawful orders. However, safeguards exist to prevent executive interference. Before a military judge can be charged, legal advice must be obtained and the Director of Military Prosecutions, who has an obligation to act independently, must approve the charges. Any attempt to interfere with judicial duties through orders or retaliatory charges would be considered unlawful. Consequently, a reasonable and informed observer would not view the possibility of disciplinary action against military judges as a threat to judicial independence or impartiality.

In conclusion, the requirements for military judges under sections 165.21 and 165.24(2) of the NDA meet the constitutional standards of independence and impartiality set out in s. 11(d) of the Charter. A reasonable and informed individual would not see the judges' status as an officer creating apprehension of bias or insufficient independence that would infringe constitutional rights under s. 11(d) of the Charter. Appeals were dismissed.

Per Karakatsanis, J. (Minority view):

The legislative provisions of the National Defence Act (NDA) should be declared invalid to the extent that they subject military judges to a disciplinary regime administered by military authorities. The Canadian Armed Forces members charged with offences are not guaranteed an impartial and independent tribunal under section 11(d) of the Charter, due to the pressures faced by military judges arising from their position within the chain of command. In particular, their susceptibility to disciplinary action initiated and prosecuted by superior officers undermines their judicial independence. This infringement of section 11(d) can not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

There is concurrence with the majority's view that requiring military judges to also hold officer status does not, in itself, violate section 11(d). If the dual role is properly circumscribed, the executive and judicial functions of military judges can coexist. There is also acceptance that military judges, as officers, may be held accountable for violations of the Code of Service Discipline (CSD). However, the capacity of the military executive to discipline judges creates a reasonable apprehension that judicial decision-making could be influenced by deference to military hierarchy and loyalty to rank, thereby impairing the accused's right to a fair trial. The institutional safeguards in place are insufficient to mitigate the risk of executive interference. There is an inadequate degree of separation or independence between judicial and executive functions.

R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 ref.

The principle of separation of powers is central to the guarantee of judicial independence, particularly the separation from the executive branch. Judges must render decisions based solely on law and conscience, free from external pressure or influence. Although judicial independence and impartiality are distinct concepts, they are often interrelated; independence forms the foundation of impartiality. The established indicators of judicial independence i.e. security of tenure, financial security, and administrative independence, do not, by themselves, guarantee adequate institutional independence if there remains a perception of potential interference.

Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781, at paras. 23-24; Beauregard v. Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, at p. 69; 2747-3174 Québec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis d'alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919, at para. 61; IWA v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 282, at pp. 332-33; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 138 and 140; MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796, at p. 826; R. v. Lippé, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114, at p. 139; British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, at para. 47 and Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, at paras. 82-92 ref.

While judicial discipline and accountability are essential components of broader social policy, they can sometimes be at odds with the principle of judicial independence. Civilian judges are held accountable for their conduct through established ethical and professional standards enforced by an independent judicial oversight body. This limited encroachment upon judicial independence is justified by the imperative of safeguarding the integrity of the justice system. Nevertheless, when it comes to disciplinary matters, maintaining a clear separation between the judiciary and the executive or legislative branches is crucial to preventing any perception of interference motivated by public sentiment or political considerations. The principle of judicial independence demands that disciplinary authority over judges reside in a body that is autonomous, impartial, and independent of political influence.

Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, at paras. 58-59; Lippé, at p. 138; Moreau-Bérubé, at para. 47 and Therrien (Re), at para. 57 ref.

In the military context, these same constitutional principles relating to judicial independence apply. Military judges must meet the same standard of independence as their civilian counterparts. While military judges are subject to the oversight of the Military Judges Inquiry Committee (MJIC), as civilian judges are to their respective bodies, they also remain subject to the chain of command. As commissioned officers, military judges may be charged under the CSD for conduct unrelated to their judicial duties, and prosecuted for infractions also covered by the Criminal Code. Importantly, the decision to proceed within the military justice system may substantially affect their rights. The unique disciplinary structure applicable to military judges, which is administered and prosecuted by the executive, has no civilian equivalent and gives rise to a distinct risk to their independence.

Généreux, at p. 293 and Létourneau, at p. 150 ref.

The military context is relevant in evaluating whether a reasonable and informed observer would perceive that disciplinary accountability to the executive compromises judicial independence. Various independent reports have recommended that military judges either be assigned a distinct judicial rank or be fully civilianized. Currently, military judges retain their pre-appointment ranks, which may give rise to a perception among accused personnel that a judge's allegiance to rank or the chain of command could override their commitment to protecting individual rights. Moreover, the possibility that a judge's conduct could be reviewed or sanctioned by the executive, whether through a summary proceeding or court martial, undermines confidence in the structural independence of military judges.

Given this reasonable apprehension of institutional partiality, the adequacy of the safeguards designed to counteract it must be critically assessed. The statutory requirement that military judges swear an oath of office, while significant for individual integrity, does little to address concerns of institutional bias. Likewise, the apparent protection of tenure through removal only for cause by the MJIC is insufficient; conviction for a disciplinary offence could result in demotion or dismissal from the Forces, effectively ending a judge's career. This vulnerability undermines the very purpose of security of tenure i.e. protection from executive interference. Furthermore, reliance on the Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) to act independently of improper influence is misplaced. The DMP remains within the military hierarchy and operates under the supervision of the Judge Advocate General, who is duty-bound to serve the interests of the Armed Forces. A reasonable and informed observer would therefore harbour concerns about institutional bias stemming from the military judge's susceptibility to disciplinary action initiated by their superiors.

Drapeau and Létourneau, at p. 34 and Généreux, at p. 302 ref.

The legislative scheme under the NDA is declared to be of no force or effect insofar as it subjects military judges to the disciplinary process administered by military authorities. Appeals were allowed accordingly.

Mark Létourneau, Patrice Desbiens and Francesca Ferguson for Appellants.

Dylan Kerr and Karl Lacharité for Respondent.

Zain Naqi and David Ionis for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.

David McEwan, Greg Allen and Chloe Trudel for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

2025 S C M R 1461

[Supreme Court of UK]\

Present: Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Sales, Lord Leggatt, Lord Burrows and Lord Stephens

R (ON THE APPLICATION OF OFFICER W80)---Appellant

Versus

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INDEPENDENT OFFICE FOR POLICE CONDUCT and others---Respondents

Decided on 5th July, 2023.

(On appeal from: [2020] EWCA Civ 1301).

Public functionaries---

----Police---Misconduct---Self-defence---Police officer shooting and killing a suspect under the mistaken belief that suspect armed---Whether officer guilty of gross misconduct for using unreasonable force---Whether reasonableness of force to be assessed by reference to criminal law test relating to self-defence or civil law test---Held, that the test to be applied in disciplinary proceedings in relation to the use of force by a police officer in self-defence is the civil law test.

In a police operation, an armed police officer ('the officer') shot the victim "J" dead. "J" was suspected of involvement in a plot to free an accused from police custody. At the time of the police operation, "J" and two other men were in a parked car, with fogged-up windows, when the vehicle was approached by the officer and other members of his team. The officer relying in part on intelligence that the occupants of the vehicle were armed and dangerous, shot "J" dead based allegedly on an honestly held but mistaken belief that "J" was reaching for a weapon contained in a shoulder bag. There was no such weapon. An investigation was conducted by the Independent Office for Police Conduct (the "IOPC")'s predecessor, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (the "IPCC"). The IPCC concluded that the officer's belief that he was in imminent danger was honestly held, but unreasonable, and that the officer therefore had a case to answer for gross misconduct on the basis of the civil law test that any mistake of fact could only be relied upon if it was a reasonable mistake to have made. It sent the report and recommendation to the Metropolitan Police Service (the "MPS"), as the appropriate authority for misconduct proceedings against the officer. The view of the MPS was that the IPCC had been incorrect as a matter of law in applying the civil law test (which looks to whether an honest but mistaken belief is reasonable) as opposed to the criminal law test of self-defence (which looks to whether the belief is honestly held). The IPCC became the IOPC in January 2018, by virtue of the Policing and Crime Act 2017. After the MPS indicated that it would not follow the (now) IOPC's recommendation to bring misconduct proceedings against the officer, the IOPC directed the MPS to do so. On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the criminal law standard should be applied i.e. "The necessity to take action in response to an attack, or imminent attack, must be judged on the assumption that the facts were as the defendant honestly believed them to be, whether or not he was mistaken and, if he made a mistake of fact, whether or not it was reasonable for him to have done so". On appeal, however, the Court of Appeal took the view that neither the civil nor criminal standard should apply. Rather, the standard set out in the in Schedule 2 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 ("the 2012 Regulations"),ought to be applied, with the relevant question being whether the use of force was "necessary, proportionate and reasonable in all the circumstances". The issue before the Supreme Court was therefore whether it is open to a reasonable disciplinary panel to make a finding of misconduct if an officer's honest, but mistaken, belief that his life was threatened was found to be unreasonable.

Ashley v. Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25; [2008] 1 AC 962, at paras 16 and 17 ref.

The route taken by the Court of Appeal gives rise to a number of difficulties. First, although the test adopted by the Court of Appeal is superficially attractive in that it reflects the wording of the 2012 Regulations and permits all relevant circumstances to be taken into account, it gives rise to a fundamental problem in principle. It requires the necessity, proportionality and reasonableness of the use of force to be assessed in all the circumstances. However, this is not possible without first identifying the circumstances against which the use of force is to be evaluated and the test does not explain how the circumstances are to be identified. It is necessary as a preliminary step to decide on what factual basis a defendant's actions are to be judged. The criminal and civil law have, therefore, developed frameworks against which the use of force is to be assessed. If the criminal and civil standards are abandoned for the purpose of police disciplinary proceedings, as the Court of Appeal in this case proposed, there is no principled basis on which to approach cases of mistaken belief. Furthermore, the open test proposed by the Court of Appeal in this case could require a tribunal in police disciplinary proceedings to make the assessment in the light of inconsistent and incompatible circumstances.

Whether the use of force in any given situation is necessary or proportionate or reasonable or not can only be assessed by reference to a defined set of circumstances. The question arises in an acute form where the officer using force has made a mistake of fact. Where an officer was mistaken as to the threat he or she faced it is impossible for the decision-maker to judge the use of force by reference to both the circumstances that existed (no threat) and the circumstances as the officer believed them to be (threat). Similarly, if the circumstances are to include the subjective mistaken understanding of the officer, the criminal and civil tests define the relevant circumstances in different ways. The criminal law test requires questions of necessity, proportionality and reasonableness to be addressed in the context of the circumstances as the officer mistakenly but honestly believed them to be, even if that belief was unreasonable. The civil law test requires such questions to be addressed in the context of the circumstances as the officer mistakenly but honestly believed them to be, provided that the belief was reasonable. Necessity, proportionality and reasonableness cannot be assessed against both sets of circumstances simultaneously because they are incompatible. The identification of what are all the relevant circumstances is necessarily a pre-condition to the assessment.

Secondly, there is force in the criticism that even if an officer uses proportionate force based on an honest but mistaken belief that he or she was in danger, use of force could still constitute misconduct because the disciplinary tribunal must still decide whether the use of force was "reasonable in all the circumstances". It is, of course, correct that the tribunal would be required to go on to consider this further question. However, the approach of the Court of Appeal elides the question whether the officer's mistake was reasonable with the question whether the use of force was reasonable in all the circumstances. The Court of Appeal's analysis cannot assist with the approach that the tribunal should take if it concludes that the use of force was reasonable and proportionate when judged against the officer's honestly held belief but that the belief was not reasonable in all the circumstances.

Accordingly, the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal was to be rejected. In disciplinary proceedings the two-limb approach must be applied in relation to the use of force in self-defence and to other occasions on which force is used by police officers, such as in effecting an arrest, restraining an individual or in preventing crime.

The question remains as to whether the test, under the first limb, is the criminal law or the civil law test. The Standard of Professional Behaviour in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/2864) ("the 2008 Regulations") and the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 ("the 2012 Regulations"), does not expressly state whether the criminal law test or the civil law test applies in police disciplinary proceedings in relation to the use of force. Supreme Court concluded that the civil law test is the correct test, for several reasons:

(i) First, the Standards of Professional Behaviour set out in the 2008 and 2012 Regulations are each framed as statements of objective fact. For instance, "officers … act with integrity". Accordingly, the standard in respect of the use of force should incorporate the degree of objectivity sought to be achieved under the Regulations, which cannot be achieved using the criminal test which includes a subjective element;

(ii) Second, the word "knowingly" which had featured in the appropriate standard for police officers in relation to the use of force contained in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/730) ("the 1999 Regulations") and the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/645) ("the 2004 Regulations") was omitted from the 2008 Regulations and subsequent regulations. When the word "knowingly" was deliberately omitted in the 2008 Regulations, this was a strong textual indicator that the test to be applied thereafter was the objective civil law test;

(iii) Third, the purpose of the disciplinary arrangements in the 2008 Regulations is not simply blame and punishment, but also achieving learning and development for the officer based on an employment model. The purpose of maintaining confidence in the police is furthered by the application of the civil law test. The civil law test would not preclude the disciplinary process from considering the reasonableness of mistakes thereby enabling the disciplinary process to protect members of the public from police officers who make unreasonable mistakes. This suggests that the civil test is more appropriate, so that the reasonableness of mistakes can be subject to a disciplinary process;

(iv) Fourth, the true interpretation of the Standard of Professional Behaviour as to the use of force in the 2008 Regulations cannot be informed by the Code of Ethics published four years later by the College of Policing in 2012. The Code of Ethics in fact expressly provides that in misconduct proceedings "the formal wording of the [2012 Regulations] will be used";

(v) Fifth, the Court of Appeal attempted to find coherence between the 2008 and 2012 Regulations, previous iterations of the Regulations, and paragraph 4.4 of the Code of Practice for the Principles and Standards of Professional Behaviour for the Policing Profession of England and Wales" ("the Code of Ethics") (which incorporates the criminal law test). The correct approach however is to interpret the 2008 and 2012 Regulations, acknowledging the fundamental shift brought about in the 2008 Regulations. Paragraph 4.4 of the Code of Ethics is wrong and misleading as it does not reflect the test in the 2008 and 2012 Regulations;

(vi) Sixth, the obligation placed upon the IOPC Director General to have regard to the "Home Office Guidance. Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance and Attendance Management Procedures. Revised July 2014" ("the 2014 Guidance") cannot mean that the Director General can disapply the 2012 Regulations or that he should be informed by para 4.4 of the Code of Ethics.

(vii) Seventh, the test to be applied in England and Wales under the 2008 or 2012 Regulations is not informed by the different provisions governing police disciplinary proceedings in Northern Ireland and Scotland; and

(viii) Eighth, the test to be applied in England and Wales under the 2008 or 2012 Regulations is not informed by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which would not demand the application of the criminal standard in any case.

. R v Morgan [1976] AC 182; Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 25; [2008] 1 AC 962, at paras 16 and 17; Smith, Hogan and Ormerod's Criminal Law, 16th Ed., (2021) para 10.7.1; R v Williams (Gladstone) (1984) 78 Cr App R 276; Beckford v The Queen [1988] AC 130; R v Keane [2010] EWCA Crim 2514; [2011] Crim LR 393 and R (Green) v Police Complaints Authority [2004] UKHL 6; [2004] 1 WLR 725 at para 78 ref.

The test to be applied in disciplinary proceedings in relation to the use of force by a police officer in self-defence is the civil law test. The IOPC applied the correct test when directing the MPS to bring disciplinary proceedings against the officer in question. Appeal was dismissed with the observations that the proliferation of legislation and guidance in relation to the use of force by police officers has resulted in unnecessary complexity and obscured the fundamental principles which must be applied; that this was an area of the law of vital importance to the public and to the police; and that it was essential that the public and the police should be informed in straightforward terms of the law which applies.

David Perry KC and Rosemary Davidson (instructed by DAC Beachcroft (London - Walbrook)) for Appellant.

Tim Owen KC, Michelle Butler and Danny Simpson (instructed by Independent Office for Police Conduct Legal Services) for Respondent (Director General of the Independent Office of Police Conduct).

Phillippa Kaufmann KC and Fiona Murphy (instructed by Bhatt Murphy Solicitors) for Respondent (Eftehia Demetrio).

Jason Beer KC and Robert Cohen (instructed by Metropolitan Police Directorate of Legal Services) for Respondent (Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis).

John Beggs KC and James Berry (instructed by Civil Nuclear Constabulary Legal Services) for Ist Intervener (NPCC).

Jonathan Moffett KC (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for 2nd Intervener (College of Policing).

Adam Straw KC and Jesse Nicholls (instructed by Hickman and Rose Solicitors) for 3rd Intervener (INQUEST and StopWatch).

2025 S C M R 1764

[Supreme Court of UK]\

Present: Lord Reed, President, Lord Hodge, Deputy President, Lord Briggs, Lord Leggatt, Lord Burrows, Lady Rose and Lord Richards

RUKHADZE and others ---Appellants

Versus

RECOVERY PARTNERS GP LTD and another ---Respondents

Decided on 19th March, 2025.

(On appeal from: [2023] EWCA Civ 305).

Per Lord Briggs, J.; Lord Reed (President), Lord Hodge (Deputy President) and Lord Richards, JJ. agreeing; Lord Leggatt, Lord Burrows and Lady Rose, JJ. concurring with the conclusion but for their own reasons.

(a) Equity---

----Fiduciary duty---Relationship between a company (principal/beneficiary) and its directors (trustees/fiduciaries)---Where defendants (fiduciaries) breaching fiduciary duties by appropriating business opportunity belonging to principal---Duty to account to principal for profits made from breach---Scope---Whether defendants liable to account for profits which would have been made regardless of breach---Whether "but for" test to be applied to account of profits---Whether common law rule on account of profits is now outdated.

The respondents in this appeal consist of a British Virgin Islands-incorporated company (which has also been assigned the claims of another similar entity) and an English limited liability partnership. The individual appellants previously worked for the respondents in senior roles, including as directors, thereby owing them fiduciary duties. The appellants breached these duties by diverting a business opportunity away from the respondents and exploiting it for their own benefit. In proceedings before the High Court, under the established "profit rule", the appellants were ordered to pay the respondents the profits they had made from this diverted opportunity. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. The appellants brought the matter before the Supreme Court through the present appeal, challenging both their obligations to account for the profits and, alternatively, the method by which those profits were calculated.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the current legal standard for ordering an account of profits should be modified by introducing a requirement that the fiduciary could not have obtained the same profit without breaching their duty. In other words, applying a "but for" test, could the same profit have been earned lawfully, without the breach? The appellants acknowledged that adopting such a test would require departing from two House of Lords decisions: Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 and Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46.

Per Lord Briggs, J.

The profit rule stems from the equitable principle that profits earned by a fiduciary are considered to belong to the principal. From the moment the profit is made, it is treated as held on trust for the principal, specifically, under a constructive trust. As a result, the fiduciary is obligated both to disclose these profits and to hand them over to the principal.

If a fiduciary earns a profit after the fiduciary relationship has ended, they may still be required to account for it if the profit can be traced back to the previous fiduciary role. While there is often disagreement about whether a profit is sufficiently connected to that past relationship, it is clear that a former fiduciary cannot escape liability by claiming they would have made the profit even without breaching their duty.

The appellants argued that the profit rule is outdated and counter-intuitive, leads to unpredictable and sometimes unduly harsh results, and is fundamentally unfair. They contended that adding a "but for" test i.e., requiring that the fiduciary could not have earned the profit lawfully, would resolve these problems. However, upon closer examination, these arguments do not amount to a compelling case for changing the legal rule.

Target Holdings Ltd v. Redferns [1996] AC 421 ref.

The central aim of the profit rule is to deter fiduciaries from succumbing to self-interest at the expense of their duty of undivided loyalty to the principal. The duty to account for profits is a core equitable obligation that arises simply by virtue of being a fiduciary. It does not necessarily depend on a separate breach of duty, nor is it a discretionary remedy granted by a court or triggered by a demand from the principal, although it may result in a remedial consequence. It is also distinct from an award of damages. Similarly, comparing this duty to equitable compensation, which does involve a "but for" test, is inappropriate, as an account of profits is not aimed at compensating loss.

Keech v. Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; 25 ER 223; Gray v. Global Energy Horizons Corpn v. Gray [2020] EWCA Civ 1668; [2021] 1 WLR 2264, para 126; Murad v. Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959, paras 74-75; Swain v. Law Society [1982] 1 WLR 17, 36 and Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver (Note) [1967] 2 AC 134 ref.

Inserting a "but for" test would mischaracterise the fiduciary's duty as merely a remedy for breach, thereby diluting its core deterrent function, namely, the automatic obligation to surrender unauthorised profits. The current law already provides a mechanism to address potential unfairness: courts can grant an equitable allowance to the fiduciary, reducing the amount payable to reflect their contribution and skill in generating the profits.

Moreover, the appellants' claim that the profit rule is unclear, incompatible with contemporary commercial practice, and outdated in light of modern regulation was not substantiated and did not warrant departing from long-standing legal doctrine.

There is no significant inconsistency between English law and the approaches taken in other common law jurisdictions. Nor was there any strong academic consensus in favour of reforming the law along the lines proposed by the appellants.

Per Lord Leggatt, J.

The term 'profit rule' is not accurate. The actual rule is that a fiduciary is prohibited from using any property, information, or opportunity that belongs to the principal for personal gain or for any unauthorised purpose If a fiduciary breaches this obligation, they are either required to compensate the principal for any resulting loss or to account for any profits obtained through the breach. This includes an implicit requirement to establish a causal connection between the breach and the loss or profit, commonly known as the 'but for' test. In the present case, that test is met: the appellants made use of a business opportunity and confidential information in breach of their fiduciary duties to the respondents. Without those breaches, they would not have obtained the profits they did. Lastly, it was incorrect to describe an account of profits as a duty rather than just a remedy.

Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18; FHR European Ventures LLP v. Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45; [2015] AC 250, para 5 and In Defence of AIB v. Redler" (2021) 27 Trusts & Trustees 725, 742 ref.

Per Lord Burrows, J.

In the present case, the account of profits operates as a remedy for the breach of fiduciary duty. The two leading authorities i.e. Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 and Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46.), which the appellants argue should be overturned, did not apply a 'but for' test to establish a connection between the wrongdoing and the profits earned. This is because the causation test in those cases did not involve assessing what profits the defendant might have lawfully made by alternative means. Any argument to overturn an established Supreme Court/ House of Lords authority should be approached with caution. The two key decisions in question cannot be regarded as clearly wrong for not applying the version of the 'but for' test that includes a 'lawful alternative counterfactual', i.e. the test advanced by the appellants. Rather, the reasoning in these two cases can be robustly supported on grounds of both legal principle and policy. As a result, those precedents should remain undisturbed.

In re Dalton [2023] UKSC 36, [2023] 3 WLR 671, at paras 45-50 ref.

Per Lady Rose, J.

The appellants' core grievance is that the formal company and partnership roles assigned to the parties did not align with their actual business relationships or with the behaviour they believed was reasonably expected of them. Instead, those formal structures were adopted primarily for tax efficiency or similar reasons. Nonetheless, the relevant legal rules have been recently codified in the Companies Act 2006, indicating that Parliament did not view evolving business practices in the UK, where the parties in the present case operated, as a reason to consider the existing rules outdated. The legal change being proposed would have wide-ranging implications. Any such reform, falls within the remit of the legislature rather than the courts.

Per Lord Leggatt, J.; concurring with the conclusion but for his own reasons

(b) Equity---

----Fiduciary duty---Relationship between a company (principal/beneficiary) and its directors (trustees/fiduciaries)---Where defendants (fiduciaries) breaching fiduciary duties by appropriating business opportunity belonging to principal---Duty to account to principal for profits made from breach---Scope---Whether defendants liable to account for profits which would have been made regardless of breach---Whether "but for" test to be applied to account of profits---Principles stated.

(i) A fiduciary owes a duty to the principal not to use any property (or any information or opportunity which, as between the parties to the fiduciary relationship, the principal has the exclusive right to exploit) for the fiduciary's own benefit, or for any purpose outside the scope of the fiduciary's authority.

(ii) This duty is distinct from the duty to avoid a conflict of interest and, unlike the latter duty, continues after the termination of the relationship which gave rise to it.

(iii) If the fiduciary breaches this duty, the fiduciary will be liable to compensate the principal for any loss suffered by the principal as a result of the breach or to account to the principal for any profit made by the fiduciary as a result of the breach (or to claim a proprietary remedy). The principal can choose between these remedies.

(iv) In determining what loss or profit, if any, resulted from the breach, a "but for" test of causation is applied: the fiduciary is liable to compensate the principal for any loss which the principal would not have suffered or to account to the principal for any profit which the fiduciary would not have made but for the breach of duty.

(v) It is not relevant to consider whether, if the fiduciary had sought to obtain the informed consent of the principal to the use made by the fiduciary of the principal's property (or information or opportunity), such consent would have been given. The breach of duty does not consist in failure to obtain the principal's consent but in the wrongful use of the property. Such use is made lawful only by actual and not by hypothetical consent of the principal.

(vi) Applying the "but for" test of causation in this case, the defendants breached fiduciary duties (and duties not to make unauthorised use of confidential information) owed to the claimants by appropriating for themselves the business opportunity of providing the recovery services. But for these breaches of duty, the defendants would not have made any of the profits which they in fact made from providing those services.

(vii) The judge was therefore right to order the defendants to account for those profits, subject to an equitable allowance for the work done to generate the profits.

(viii) It is unnecessary and unsound to postulate a duty owed by a fiduciary who makes unauthorised use of any property, information or opportunity of the principal to disclose and pay to the principal any profits made from such misuse without the need for a demand by the principal or an order of the court.

(ix) The proper analysis is simply that such misuse is a breach of fiduciary duty which renders the fiduciary liable to be ordered by a court to remedy the wrong done (by paying compensation for loss caused or paying over the profits gained to the principal or treating an asset as if it were held on trust for the principal).

Lord Wolfson KC, Graham Virgo KC (Hon) and Watson Pringle for Appellants (Instructed by Signature Litigation LLP).

Jonathan Crow KC, Tom Weisselberg KC and Tom Cleaver for Respondents (Instructed by Brown Rudnick LLP).